In Support Of Employee Free Choice
Madam Speaker, I would like to submit for the record a speech, titled ``What Would Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace'' given by Professor William B. Gould IV, Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus at Stanford Law School;…
Madam Speaker, I would like to submit for the record a speech, titled ``What Would Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace'' given by Professor William B. Gould IV, Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus at Stanford Law School; Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board in the Clinton Administration (1994-1998); member of the National Academy of Arbitrators since 1970; Independent Monitor for Freedom of Association Complaints, First Group America, 2008, to the 58th Annual Conference of the Association of Labor Relations Agencies on July 20, 2009 in Oakland, California.
What Would Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace?
It is a pleasure to be with you here today. By my rough
count, this is my third speech to this organization during
the past couple of decades. I have enjoyed the chance to
speak to and with you in the past and look forward to today's
program. I am particularly pleased to renew my contact with
Maria-Kate Dowling, Associate General Counsel of the National
Mediation Board.
Kate was my Deputy Chief Counsel at the NLRB in 1997-98,
one of the youngest women (perhaps the youngest) to ever hold
that senior of a position. She is illustrative of the very
best and brightest who should--and I believe now will--
receive great recognition in Washington today.
I want to commend the Association of Labor Relations
Agencies for holding this session here today on the practical
implications of the Employee Free Choice Act. This
significant legislative proposal warrants dispassionate
examination in an arena which has been too frequently divided
and polarized. My sense is that the bill even with proper
amendments--and I am quite confident that if it is enacted it
will be amended--will have a considerable impact on the
workplace. EFCA and labor law reform contain some of the
assumptions that I have held for more than four decades,
i.e., that the Act is plagued with lethargic enforcement,
creaky and convoluted administrative procedures and
ineffective remedies, that it is not working well and that,
as a result, some employees who wish to join unions are
unable to do so. No one can say with certainty what the
precise union membership impact of law reform will be, given
the fact that so many other factors are responsible for the
precipitous decline of trade unions. But it is safe to say
that it is unlikely that any statutory reform in the
foreseeable future can by itself accomplish the desirable
objective of restoring the middle class--though its
proponents so often claim it will!
The fundamental need for reform relates to the rule of law.
The National Labor Relations Act, once considered a bedrock
of labor rights of freedom of association, has not been
performing as advertised. There is nothing terribly new about
this story. The overriding theme is that justice is being
denied through its delay! The loopholes, disproportionately
exploited by employers, have dilated into a ``black hole'' in
Washington headquarters where complaints can sit for more
than five years while workers await reinstatement and back
pay.
How can we properly address this? I think that the Employee
Free Choice Act is right on the mark in establishing a treble
damage award for back pay. For too long, an award of back pay
minus interim earnings has been regarded by everyone involved
on all sides as a ``license fee'' for employer misconduct
because back pay is cheaper than a union contract.
EFCA also provides for fines up to $20,000 for each
employer violation as well as new contempt sanctions. And
again, I think that the new law has it right in expanding and
making more effective the Board's injunctive authority for
employer unfair labor practices--in much the same manner that
the statute has established them for union unfair labor
practices since the Taft-Hartley amendments. Judge (and I
hope soon-to-be Justice) Sonia Sotomayor's opinion in
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations
Committee, Inc. upholding my Board's view that an injunction
was appropriate in the baseball players' 1994-95 strike has
made this provision's importance about as well known as
anything.
On other key issues I think that there is much more room
for debate. While card checks are evidence of employee
support in some circumstances, I think that they are, as the
Supreme Court has characterized them, second best. And in
Canada, where the consensus in the 1960s favored card check,
a majority of provinces have now settled on secret ballot box
elections. Moreover, there will be fewer disputes over the
way in which employees mark secret ballots than there will be
over cards; fewer disputes means less litigation and less
delay.
But the unions are right to say that the election system
(and indeed many other provisions of the statute) is broken.
Accordingly, my view is that the principal breakdown in the
election scheme--which has led to the card check proposal--is
delay through which employees are subjected to a one-sided,
anti-union campaign by employers for at least two months, and
in a minority of instances a much more considerable period of
time. The answer here is to both expedite elections--to
require that they be held within a couple of weeks of the
union's petition, as is done in the provinces of Ontario and
British Columbia--and to reverse Supreme Court precedent
excluding non-employee union organizers from company premises
so that they can carry their side of the message to employees
more effectively in the run-up to the ballot itself.
Another reform can provide for postal ballots which give
employees a greater opportunity to cast their vote privately
in a neutral facility of their choosing outside of the
employer's control. In truth, the statute already provides
for this, as I noted in my concurring opinion in San Diego
Gas & Electric--but I think that Congress can be helpful by
explicitly providing that postal ballots can be available
within the Board's discretion along the lines that I set
forth in San Diego Gas. The plurality in that case, which
limited such ballots only to cases where employees are
scattered and unavailable, did not rely upon any provision of
the statute as it is written today and the Board, as well as
Congress, can reverse that poorly-reasoned opinion at any
time that it wants.
The third important feature of EFCA provides for interest
arbitration in first contract negotiations. Clearly, as
Professors Ferguson and Kochan have established, there is a
problem here--only 56% of newly-certified bargaining units
reach a contract, and only 37% do so within the first
certification year--that cannot be easily remedied by
refusal-to-bargain litigation. The surface bargaining cases
have not been an effective avenue through which to establish
or restore collective bargaining relationships that should
have been less dysfunctional in the first instance.
However, EFCA-sponsored interest arbitration, in contrast
to the ``grievance'' or ``rights'' variety, is relatively
untested in the private sector in the United States. In
Canada, which has first contract arbitration in most
provinces, the process is rare and used sparingly (except in
Manitoba where it is automatic after a specific time period).
The conundrum is that the potential for a mechanism like this
must be available to rescue bargaining which is at a stall,
and yet its mere availability can undermine the collective
bargaining process itself which is furthered by the Act.
The proper approach here, it seems to me, is to provide
that the mediator--perhaps in consultation with the NLRB
itself--should certify after extensive mediatory efforts that
collective bargaining is either at an impasse or
dysfunctional. As it presently stands, EFCA simply allows for
arbitration to be invoked after three months of collective
bargaining and subsequent mediation. Not only is this period
of time too abbreviated, but by spelling out a specific
period of time after which arbitration is automatic, it
encourages the parties to maneuver in anticipation of
arbitration in a way which can erode the voluntary collective
bargaining process. Moreover, this approach fails to take
into account the fact that both sides are frequently learning
for the first time as they put together their very first
collective bargaining agreement.
Arbitration must be used sparingly, although it should
remain available in the final analysis so as to shore up a
relationship which might otherwise disappear. This must be
what the law encourages not only because of the
considerations above but also because experience with
interest arbitration in the public sector--where it is
available in many jurisdictions for police and fire--is
itself extensive and time-consuming. Amongst the interest
arbitrations that I have done was one between the Detroit
Board of Education and the Federation of Teachers twenty
years ago where hearings continued day and night for a week,
detailed briefs were filed thereafter, and the arbitration
board was required to meet and decide on the basis of
voluminous submissions at the end of it all. Though we cannot
tolerate delays such as the fifteen months which apparently
exist in the public sector in Michigan, framers of the law
must realize that it will take considerable time and expense.
This is another reason why arbitration should be the rare
exception and not the rule at the end of collective
bargaining.
Yet there is one other consideration. My view is that
final-offer baseball arbitration, where the arbitrator is
obliged to select one package offer or the other, is the best
approach because it creates uncertainty which promotes
voluntary negotiation. But because there is much uncertainty
for the arbitrator as well as for the parties, I am of the
view that his award should appear initially in the form of
recommendations and that the parties should have 10-14 days
to negotiate with the arbitrator acting as a mediator. If the
parties cannot resolve their differences in that time, the
recommendations within the parameters of the initial award
would be final and binding. In this way the real potential
for arbitral error is diminished, and the integrity of the
process maintained.
There are a few other matters that I think you should
consider which should be a vital part of labor law reform,
and yet are not covered in EFCA. First, Congress should
encourage rulemaking in lieu of adjudication so as to avoid
repetitive and wasteful litigation which enhance cost and
delay. My Board attempted to do this in the 1990s and was
stopped by appropriations riders fashioned by the Republican
Congress. A different political environment exists this time
around and Congress and the Board should take full advantage
of the opportunity to resolve disputes expeditiously and
sensibly.
Second, the amount of litigation before the Board can be
reduced if Congress unfreezes the Board's jurisdictional
guidelines and thus decreases the volume of cases that come
before it by taking into account fifty years of inflation.
The freeze has resulted in NLRB assertion of jurisdiction
over very small employers. Again, the Republican Congress in
the 1990s insisted that I withdraw Board jurisdiction when I
was Chairman but, as I pointed out to them, only Congress can
change these statutory provisions which were enacted a half-
century ago and which have left Board jurisdiction in terms
of dollar values the same as it was then--even though the
dollar is worth one-seventh of what it was at that time.
But at this time, Congress can initiate action on this
which will both deregulate labor-management relations for
small employers in some jurisdictions and, since state law
should be followed, also allow the states to enact more
expansive laws protecting union organizing. This promotes the
kind of laboratory conditions of which Justice Brandeis spoke
a century ago and relieves small business from the federal
regulation under which it currently lives. Here Congress can
and should take the lead as the 1959 amendments require.
Third, labor law reform must take into account that it is
not simply employers who are promoting delay before the NLRB
and the courts at this juncture--in many instances it has
been the Board itself as cases have languished in the black
hole in Washington headquarters for half a decade or more
while workers awaited reinstatement and back pay. As
Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie of Colby College has noted,
much of this is attributable to the ``transcendent loss of
purpose in the appointment process'' at the NLRB where
appointees ``come from congressional staffs or think tanks or
interest groups--not from across the country but from across
the street: interchangeable public elites, engaged in an
insider's game.'' The packaging and ``batching'' of
appointees was unknown prior to 1994 and has become so
embedded in the appointment process that even President Obama
has batched a Republican Senate Labor Committee policy
director with his two Democratic nominees.
This approach should be abandoned. It fosters delay through
the reticence of decision-makers who procrastinate, concerned
about congressional reaction. If reappointments were barred,
this tendency would be diminished. At the same time, Congress
should extend the term of office to eight years, reduce the
number of Board members from five to three so as to eliminate
the potential for individual Board member obstruction (with
the reduction of cases obtained through withdrawal of
jurisdiction this can work more easily), and explicitly
provide that when a Board member's term expires he or she can
serve no longer. In this way we will attract the best people
who will serve for the very best reasons.
Finally, one of the most interesting developments in recent
years relates to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
devised by the parties, particularly as a result of their
frustration about the National Labor Relations Board and its
ability to function promptly. One classic example of this
approach is set forth in the procedures devised by First
Group America to deal with complaints involving freedom of
association issues arising out of union organizational
campaigns or relating to discrimination on account of union
activity. The First Group machinery provides that an
Independent Monitor (I have functioned in that capacity for
the past 18 months) is to make public recommendations
regarding such complaints within 30-60 days of the time that
they are filed. Most recommendations have been accepted and
the program has been praised by both sides. The process is
able to move with dispatch because there is simply a
provision for investigation rather than a full-fledged
hearing. Congress ought to explicitly encourage parties to
devise such procedures, and their existence may provide
guidance with regard to how lengthy proceedings before the
Board and the courts--which are frequently excessively time-
consuming or wasteful--can be abbreviated.
Conclusion
The job of labor law reform is an important one and the
Employee Free Choice Act has done more than any other
mechanism in recent years to get this issue front and center.
The chance to engage in this process does not come often and
thus it is important that the country gets it right this time
around.
EFCA is right on the mark when it comes to sanctions,
damages, penalties, and contempt proceedings. It has gone off
course in connection with card check--but fortunately through
expedited and postal elections as well as union access to
private property that matter can be addressed with some
measure of success. On arbitration, EFCA got us part of the
way there, but much more needs to be done and revised.
The reform initiative provides a great opportunity to have
a new look at some of the problems that have plagued the
Board and the Act for far too long, i.e., the appointments
process and its relationship to delay, the failure or
inability to borrow from voluntary machinery, and the need to
get small employers beyond the reach of the Act either for
the purpose of deregulation or for, in those jurisdictions
that want it that way, more expansive protection than is
provided by the National Labor Relations Act even as revised
in 2009--if it is to be.
This is the beginning of a great debate. It is a debate
which necessarily involves labor and management, Democrats
and Republicans, and the result must be not only sensible in
content but the product of some measure of consensus and
compromise.