To provide for uniform standards for the interrogation of persons under the detention of the Department of Defense.

Department of the Navy,

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,

Washington, DC, February 27, 2003. Memorandum for General Counsel of the Air Force Subject: Working Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations

1. In addition to comments we submitted 5 February, we concur with the recommendations submitted by the Navy (TJAG RADM Lohr), the Air Force (TJAG MGen Rives), and the Joint Staff Legal Counsel's Office. Their recommendations dealt with policy considerations, contention with the OLC opinion, and foreign interpretations of GC IV (Civilians) and customary international law, respectively.

2. The common thread among our recommendations is concern for servicemembers. OLC does not represent the services; thus, understandably, concern for servicemembers is not reflected in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is silent on the UCMJ and foreign views of international law.

3. We nonetheless recommend that the Working Group product accurately portray the services' concerns that the authorization of aggressive counter-resistance techniques by servicemembers will adversely impact the following:

a. Treatment of U.S. Servicemembers by Captors and compliance with International Law.

b. Criminal and Civil Liability of DOD Military and Civilian Personnel in Domestic, Foreign, and International Forums.

c. U.S. and International Public Support and Respect of U.S. Armed Forces.

d. Pride, Discipline, and Self-Respect within the U.S. Armed Forces.

e. Human Intelligence Exploitation and Surrender of Foreign Enemy Forces, and Cooperation and Support of Friendly Nations. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Brigadier General, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC.

[SECRET/NOFORN] DECLASSIFIED

Comments on Draft Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations

1. Change p. 54, fifth paragraph, to read as follows (new language italic):

([S/NF]U) Choice of interrogation techniques involves a risk benefit analysis in each case, bounded by the limits of DOD policy and law. When assessing whether to use exceptional interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and self-image which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at other times due to perceived law of war violations. DOD policy indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in 1979 and subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing high benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit of the law of war and humane treatment of all persons in U.S. Armed Forces custody. In addition, consideration should be given to whether implementation of such techniques is likely to result in adverse impacts for DOD personnel who are captured or detained [become POWs,] including possible perceptions by other nations that the United States is lowering standards related to the treatment of prisoners and other detainees, generally.

2. Add to p. 68, a paragraph after the seventh paragraph that reads:

(U) Comprehensive protection is lacking for DOD personnel who may be tried by other nations and/or international bodies for violations of international law, such as violations of the Geneva or Hague Conventions, the Additional Protocols, the Torture Convention, the Rome Statute of the ICC, or the Customary International Law of Human Rights. This risk has the potential to impact future operations and overseas travel of such personnel, both on and off duty.