To extend the deadline by which State identification documents shall comply with certain minimum standards and for other purposes.

IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to the consideration of S. 4, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 4) to make the United States more secure by
implementing unfinished recommendations of the 9/11
Commission to fight the war on terror more effectively, to
improve homeland security, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported
from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, with
an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:

S. 4

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page S2293]]

[SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

[This Act may be cited as the ``Improving America's
Security by Implementing Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007''.

[SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

[It is the sense of Congress that Congress should enact,
and the President should sign, legislation to make the United
States more secure by implementing unfinished recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission to fight the war on terror more
effectively and to improve homeland security.]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Improving America's Security
Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of Homeland Security.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.

SEC. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Table of contents.

TITLE I--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

Subtitle A--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

Sec. 111. Homeland Security Advisory System and information sharing.
Sec. 112. Information sharing.
Sec. 113. Intelligence training development for State and local
government officials.
Sec. 114. Information sharing incentives.

Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

Sec. 121. State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative.
Sec. 122. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.

Subtitle C--Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group

Sec. 131. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.

TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Homeland Security Grant Program.
Sec. 203. Technical and conforming amendments.

TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY

Sec. 301. Dedicated funding to achieve emergency communications
operability and interoperable communications.
Sec. 302. Border Interoperability Demonstration Project.

TITLE IV--ENHANCING SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

Sec. 401. Modernization of the visa waiver program.
Sec. 402. Strengthening the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center.
Sec. 403. Enhancements to the Terrorist Travel Program.
Sec. 404. Enhanced driver's license.
Sec. 405. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

TITLE V--PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES MATTERS

Sec. 501. Modification of authorities relating to Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 502. Privacy and civil liberties officers.
Sec. 503. Department Privacy Officer.
Sec. 504. Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007.

TITLE VI--ENHANCED DEFENSES AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec. 601. National Biosurveillance Integration Center.
Sec. 602. Biosurveillance efforts.
Sec. 603. Interagency coordination to enhance defenses against nuclear
and radiological weapons of mass destruction.

TITLE VII--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

Sec. 701. Definitions.
Sec. 702. Responsibilities of the private sector office of the
Department.
Sec. 703. Voluntary national preparedness standards compliance;
accreditation and certification program for the private
sector.
Sec. 704. Sense of Congress regarding promoting an international
standard for private sector preparedness.
Sec. 705. Report to Congress.
Sec. 706. Rule of construction.

TITLE VIII--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

Sec. 801. Transportation security strategic planning.
Sec. 802. Transportation security information sharing.
Sec. 803. Transportation Security Administration personnel management.

TITLE IX--INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Sec. 901. Preidentifying and evaluating multijurisdictional facilities
to strengthen incident command; private sector
preparedness.
Sec. 902. Credentialing and typing to strengthen incident command.

TITLE X--CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Sec. 1001. Critical infrastructure protection.
Sec. 1002. Risk assessment and report.
Sec. 1003. Use of existing capabilities.

TITLE XI--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 1101. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding
information.
Sec. 1102. Response of intelligence community to requests from
Congress.
Sec. 1103. Public Interest Declassification Board.

TITLE XII--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES

Sec. 1201. Promoting antiterrorism capabilities through international
cooperation.
Sec. 1202. Transparency of funds.

TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Secretary for Management.
Sec. 1302. Sense of the Senate regarding combating domestic
radicalization.
Sec. 1303. Sense of the Senate regarding oversight of homeland
security.
Sec. 1304. Report regarding border security.

TITLE I--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

Subtitle A--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

SEC. 111. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM AND INFORMATION
SHARING.

(a) Advisory System and Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 203. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

``(a) Requirement.--The Secretary shall administer the
Homeland Security Advisory System in accordance with this
section to provide warnings regarding the risk of terrorist
attacks on the homeland to Federal, State, local, and tribal
government authorities and to the people of the United
States, as appropriate. The Secretary shall exercise primary
responsibility for providing such warnings.
``(b) Required Elements.--In administering the Homeland
Security Advisory System, the Secretary shall--
``(1) establish criteria for the issuance and revocation of
such warnings;
``(2) develop a methodology, relying on the criteria
established under paragraph (1), for the issuance and
revocation of such warnings;
``(3) provide, in each such warning, specific information
and advice regarding appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures that may be taken in response to that risk,
at the maximum level of detail practicable to enable
individuals, government entities, emergency response
providers, and the private sector to act appropriately; and
``(4) whenever possible, limit the scope of each such
warning to a specific region, locality, or economic sector
believed to be at risk.

``SEC. 204. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

``(a) Information Sharing.--Consistent with section 1016 of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary shall integrate and standardize
the information of the intelligence components of the
Department, except for any internal protocols of such
intelligence components, to be administered by the Chief
Intelligence Officer.
``(b) Information Sharing and Knowledge Management
Officers.--For each intelligence component of the Department,
the Secretary shall designate an information sharing and
knowledge management officer who shall report to the Chief
Intelligence Officer regarding coordinating the different
systems used in the Department to gather and disseminate
homeland security information.
``(c) State, Local, and Private-Sector Sources of
Information.--
``(1) Establishment of business processes.--The Chief
Intelligence Officer shall--
``(A) establish Department-wide procedures for the review
and analysis of information gathered from sources in State,
local, and tribal government and the private sector;
``(B) as appropriate, integrate such information into the
information gathered by the Department and other departments
and agencies of the Federal Government; and
``(C) make available such information, as appropriate,
within the Department and to other departments and agencies
of the Federal Government.
``(2) Feedback.--The Secretary shall develop mechanisms to
provide feedback regarding the analysis and utility of
information provided by any entity of State, local, or tribal
government or the private sector that gathers information and
provides such information to the Department.
``(d) Training and Evaluation of Employees.--
``(1) Training.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall
provide to employees of the Department opportunities for
training and education to develop an understanding of--
``(A) the definition of homeland security information; and
``(B) how information available to such employees as part
of their duties--
``(i) might qualify as homeland security information; and
``(ii) might be relevant to the intelligence components of
the Department.
``(2) Evaluations.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall--

[[Page S2294]]

``(A) on an ongoing basis, evaluate how employees of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence
components of the Department are utilizing homeland security
information, sharing information within the Department, as
described in this subtitle, and participating in the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
``(B) provide a report regarding any evaluation under
subparagraph (A) to the appropriate component heads.

``SEC. 205. COORDINATION WITH INFORMATION SHARING
ENVIRONMENT.

``All activities to comply with sections 203 and 204 shall
be--
``(1) implemented in coordination with the program manager
for the information sharing environment established under
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
``(2) consistent with and support the establishment of that
environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures,
instructions, or standards established by the President or,
as appropriate, the program manager for the implementation
and management of that environment.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendments.--
(A) In general.--Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) is amended--
(i) by striking paragraph (7); and
(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (8) through (19) as
paragraphs (7) through (18), respectively.
(B) Table of contents.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 202 the following:

``Sec. 203. Homeland Security Advisory System.
``Sec. 204. Homeland Security Information Sharing.
``Sec. 205. Coordination with information sharing environment.''.

(b) Intelligence Component Defined.--
(1) In general.--Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (16) as
paragraphs (10) through (17), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following:
``(9) The term `intelligence component of the Department'
means any directorate, agency, or other element or entity of
the Department that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces, or
disseminates homeland security information.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendments.--
(A) Homeland security act of 2002.--Section 501(11) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311(11)) is amended
by striking ``section 2(10)(B)'' and inserting ``section
2(11)(B)''.
(B) Other law.--Section 712(a) of title 14, United States
Code, is amended by striking ``section 2(15) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(15))'' and inserting
``section 2(16) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101(16))''.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--Section 201(d) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, in support of the
mission responsibilities of the Department and consistent
with the functions of the National Counterterrorism Center
established under section 119 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 404o),'' after ``and to integrate
such information''; and
(2) by striking paragraph (7), as redesignated by
subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, and inserting the
following:
``(7) To review, analyze, and make recommendations for
improvements in the policies and procedures governing the
sharing of intelligence information, intelligence-related
information, and other information relating to homeland
security within the Federal Government and among the Federal
Government and State, local, and tribal government agencies
and authorities, consistent with the information sharing
environment established under section 1016 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485) and any policies, guidelines, procedures,
instructions or standards established by the President or, as
appropriate, the program manager for the implementation and
management of that environment.''.

SEC. 112. INFORMATION SHARING.

Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as
paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively;
(B) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesignated,
the following:
``(1) Homeland security information.--The term `homeland
security information' has the meaning given that term in
section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
482).'';
(C) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated--
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (D) as
clauses (i) through (iv), respectively, and adjusting the
margin accordingly;
(ii) by striking `` `terrorism information' means'' and
inserting the following: `` `terrorism information'--
``(A) means'';
(iii) in subparagraph (A)(iv), as so redesignated, by
striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iv) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) includes homeland security information and weapons of
mass destruction information.''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Weapons of mass destruction information.--The term
`weapons of mass destruction information' means information
that could reasonably be expected to assist in the
development, proliferation, or use of a weapon of mass
destruction (including chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons) that could be used by a terrorist or a
terrorist organization against the United States, including
information about the location of any stockpile of nuclear
materials that could be exploited for use in such a weapon
that could be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization
against the United States.'';
(2) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (I), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) integrates the information within the scope of the
information sharing environment, including any such
information in legacy technologies;
``(K) integrates technologies, including all legacy
technologies, through Internet-based services;
``(L) allows the full range of analytic and operational
activities without the need to centralize information within
the scope of the information sharing environment;
``(M) permits analysts to collaborate both independently
and in a group (commonly known as `collective and
noncollective collaboration'), and across multiple levels of
national security information and controlled unclassified
information;
``(N) provides a resolution process that enables changes by
authorized officials regarding rules and policies for the
access, use, and retention of information within the scope of
the information sharing environment; and
``(O) incorporates continuous, real-time, and immutable
audit capabilities, to the maximum extent practicable.'';
(3) in subsection (f)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``during the two-year period beginning on
the date of designation under this paragraph unless sooner''
and inserting ``until''; and
(ii) by striking ``The program manager shall have and
exercise governmentwide authority.'' and inserting ``Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the program manager,
in consultation with the head of any affected department or
agency, shall have and exercise governmentwide authority over
the sharing of information within the scope of the
information sharing environment by all Federal departments,
agencies, and components, irrespective of the Federal
department, agency, or component in which the program manager
may be administratively located.''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(A)--
(i) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (v); and
(ii) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) assist in the development of policies, as
appropriate, to foster the development and proper operation
of the ISE;
``(iii) issue governmentwide procedures, guidelines,
instructions, and functional standards, as appropriate, for
the management, development, and proper operation of the ISE;
``(iv) identify and resolve information sharing disputes
between Federal departments, agencies, and components; and'';
(4) in subsection (g)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``during the two-year
period beginning on the date of the initial designation of
the program manager by the President under subsection (f)(1),
unless sooner'' and inserting ``until'';
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(ii) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (I);
and
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:
``(G) assist the program manager in identifying and
resolving information sharing disputes between Federal
departments, agencies, and components;
``(H) identify appropriate personnel for assignment to the
program manager to support staffing needs identified by the
program manager; and'';
(C) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``(including any
subsidiary group of the Information Sharing Council)'' before
``shall not be subject''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) Detailees.--Upon a request by the Director of
National Intelligence, the departments and agencies
represented on the Information Sharing Council shall detail
to the program manager, on a reimbursable basis, appropriate
personnel identified under paragraph (2)(H).'';
(5) in subsection (h)(1), by striking ``and annually
thereafter'' and inserting ``and not later than June 30 of
each year thereafter''; and
(6) by striking subsection (j) and inserting the following:
``(j) Report on the Information Sharing Environment.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the President shall report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives on the feasibility of--
``(A) eliminating the use of any marking or process
(including `Originator Control') intended to, or having the
effect of, restricting the sharing of information within the
scope of the information sharing environment between and
among participants in the information sharing environment,
unless the President has--

[[Page S2295]]

``(i) specifically exempted categories of information from
such elimination; and
``(ii) reported that exemption to the committees of
Congress described in the matter preceding this subparagraph;
and
``(B) continuing to use Federal agency standards in effect
on such date of enactment for the collection, sharing, and
access to information within the scope of the information
sharing environment relating to citizens and lawful permanent
residents;
``(C) replacing the standards described in subparagraph (B)
with a standard that would allow mission-based or threat-
based permission to access or share information within the
scope of the information sharing environment for a particular
purpose that the Federal Government, through an appropriate
process, has determined to be lawfully permissible for a
particular agency, component, or employee (commonly known as
an `authorized use' standard); and
``(D) the use of anonymized data by Federal departments,
agencies, or components collecting, possessing,
disseminating, or handling information within the scope of
the information sharing environment, in any cases in which--
``(i) the use of such information is reasonably expected to
produce results materially equivalent to the use of
information that is transferred or stored in a non-anonymized
form; and
``(ii) such use is consistent with any mission of that
department, agency, or component (including any mission under
a Federal statute or directive of the President) that
involves the storage, retention, sharing, or exchange of
personally identifiable information.
``(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `anonymized
data' means data in which the individual to whom the data
pertains is not identifiable with reasonable efforts,
including information that has been encrypted or hidden
through the use of other technology.
``(k) Additional Positions.--The program manager is
authorized to hire not more than 40 full-time employees to
assist the program manager in--
``(1) identifying and resolving information sharing
disputes between Federal departments, agencies, and
components under subsection (f)(2)(A)(iv); and
``(2) other activities associated with the implementation
of the information sharing environment, including--
``(A) implementing the requirements under subsection
(b)(2); and
``(B) any additional implementation initiatives to enhance
and expedite the creation of the information sharing
environment.
``(l) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section $30,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2008 and 2009.''.

SEC. 113. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

(a) Curriculum.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief
Intelligence Officer, shall develop curriculum for the
training of State, local, and tribal government officials
relating to the handling, review, and development of
intelligence material.
(b) Training.--To the extent possible, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center and other existing Federal
entities with the capacity and expertise to train State,
local, and tribal government officials based on the
curriculum developed under subsection (a) shall be used to
carry out the training programs created under this section.
If such entities do not have the capacity, resources, or
capabilities to conduct such training, the Secretary may
approve another entity to conduct the training.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the duties described in
subsection (a), the Chief Intelligence Officer shall consult
with the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, the Attorney General, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and other appropriate parties, such as
private industry, institutions of higher education, nonprofit
institutions, and other intelligence agencies of the Federal
Government.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out
this section.

SEC. 114. INFORMATION SHARING INCENTIVES.

(a) Awards.--In making cash awards under chapter 45 of
title 5, United States Code, the President or the head of an
agency, in consultation with the program manager designated
under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), may consider the
success of an employee in sharing information within the
scope of the information sharing environment established
under that section in a manner consistent with any policies,
guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards
established by the President or, as appropriate, the program
manager of that environment for the implementation and
management of that environment.
(b) Other Incentives.--The head of each department or
agency described in section 1016(i) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C.
485(i)), in consultation with the program manager designated
under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall adopt best
practices regarding effective ways to educate and motivate
officers and employees of the Federal Government to engage in
the information sharing environment, including--
(1) promotions and other nonmonetary awards; and
(2) publicizing information sharing accomplishments by
individual employees and, where appropriate, the tangible end
benefits that resulted.

Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

SEC. 121. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER
INITIATIVE.

(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as amended by
this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 206. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER
INITIATIVE.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `Chief Intelligence Officer' means the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department;
``(2) the term `fusion center' means a collaborative effort
of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal government
agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to
detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to
criminal or terrorist activity;
``(3) the term `information sharing environment' means the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485);
``(4) the term `intelligence analyst' means an individual
who regularly advises, administers, supervises, or performs
work in the collection, analysis, evaluation, reporting,
production, or dissemination of information on political,
economic, social, cultural, physical, geographical,
scientific, or military conditions, trends, or forces in
foreign or domestic areas that directly or indirectly affect
national security;
``(5) the term `intelligence-led policing' means the
collection and analysis of information to produce an
intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement
decision making at the tactical and strategic levels; and
``(6) the term `terrorism information' has the meaning
given that term in section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
``(b) Establishment.--The Secretary, in consultation with
the program manager of the information sharing environment
established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Attorney
General, the Privacy Officer of the Department, the Officer
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, and
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established
under section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), shall establish a
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative to
establish partnerships with State, local, and regional fusion
centers.
``(c) Department Support and Coordination.--Through the
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, the
Secretary shall--
``(1) coordinate with the principal officer of each State,
local, or regional fusion center and the officer designated
as the Homeland Security Advisor of the State;
``(2) provide operational and intelligence advice and
assistance to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
``(3) support efforts to include State, local, and regional
fusion centers into efforts to establish an information
sharing environment;
``(4) conduct exercises, including live training exercises,
to regularly assess the capability of individual and regional
networks of State, local, and regional fusion centers to
integrate the efforts of such networks with the efforts of
the Department;
``(5) coordinate with other relevant Federal entities
engaged in homeland security-related activities;
``(6) provide analytic and reporting advice and assistance
to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
``(7) review homeland security information gathered by
State, local, and regional fusion centers and incorporate
relevant information with homeland security information of
the Department;
``(8) provide management assistance to State, local, and
regional fusion centers;
``(9) serve as a point of contact to ensure the
dissemination of relevant homeland security information;
``(10) facilitate close communication and coordination
between State, local, and regional fusion centers and the
Department;
``(11) provide State, local, and regional fusion centers
with expertise on Department resources and operations;
``(12) provide training to State, local, and regional
fusion centers and encourage such fusion centers to
participate in terrorist threat-related exercises conducted
by the Department; and
``(13) carry out such other duties as the Secretary
determines are appropriate.
``(d) Personnel Assignment.--
``(1) In general.--The Chief Intelligence Officer may, to
the maximum extent practicable, assign officers and
intelligence analysts from components of the Department to
State, local, and regional fusion centers.
``(2) Personnel sources.--Officers and intelligence
analysts assigned to fusion centers under this subsection may
be assigned from the following Department components, in
consultation with the respective component head:
``(A) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, or its
successor.
``(B) Office of Infrastructure Protection.
``(C) Transportation Security Administration.
``(D) United States Customs and Border Protection.
``(E) United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
``(F) United States Coast Guard.
``(G) Other intelligence components of the Department, as
determined by the Secretary.
``(3) Participation.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary may develop qualifying
criteria for a fusion center to participate in the assigning
of Department officers or intelligence analysts under this
section.
``(B) Criteria.--Any criteria developed under subparagraph
(A) may include--

[[Page S2296]]

``(i) whether the fusion center, through its mission and
governance structure, focuses on a broad counterterrorism
approach, and whether that broad approach is pervasive
through all levels of the organization;
``(ii) whether the fusion center has sufficient numbers of
adequately trained personnel to support a broad
counterterrorism mission;
``(iii) whether the fusion center has--

``(I) access to relevant law enforcement, emergency
response, private sector, open source, and national security
data; and
``(II) the ability to share and analytically exploit that
data for authorized purposes;

``(iv) whether the fusion center is adequately funded by
the State, local, or regional government to support its
counterterrorism mission; and
``(v) the relevancy of the mission of the fusion center to
the particular source component of Department officers or
intelligence analysts.
``(4) Prerequisite.--
``(A) Intelligence analysis, privacy, and civil liberties
training.--Before being assigned to a fusion center under
this section, an officer or intelligence analyst shall
undergo--
``(i) appropriate intelligence analysis or information
sharing training using an intelligence-led policing
curriculum that is consistent with--

``(I) standard training and education programs offered to
Department law enforcement and intelligence personnel; and
``(II) the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies
under part 23 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling);

``(ii) appropriate privacy and civil liberties training
that is developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy
Officer appointed under section 222 and the Officer for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, in partnership
with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
established under section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note); and
``(iii) such other training prescribed by the Chief
Intelligence Officer.
``(B) Prior work experience in area.--In determining the
eligibility of an officer or intelligence analyst to be
assigned to a fusion center under this section, the Chief
Intelligence Officer shall consider the familiarity of the
officer or intelligence analyst with the State, locality, or
region, as determined by such factors as whether the officer
or intelligence analyst--
``(i) has been previously assigned in the geographic area;
or
``(ii) has previously worked with intelligence officials or
emergency response providers from that State, locality, or
region.
``(5) Expedited security clearance processing.--The Chief
Intelligence Officer--
``(A) shall ensure that each officer or intelligence
analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section has
the appropriate clearance to contribute effectively to the
mission of the fusion center; and
``(B) may request that security clearance processing be
expedited for each such officer or intelligence analyst.
``(6) Further qualifications.--Each officer or intelligence
analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section shall
satisfy any other qualifications the Chief Intelligence
Officer may prescribe.
``(e) Responsibilities.--An officer or intelligence analyst
assigned to a fusion center under this section shall--
``(1) assist law enforcement agencies and other emergency
response providers of State, local, and tribal governments
and fusion center personnel in using Federal homeland
security information to develop a comprehensive and accurate
threat picture;
``(2) review homeland security-relevant information from
law enforcement agencies and other emergency response
providers of State, local, and tribal government;
``(3) create intelligence and other information products
derived from such information and other homeland security-
relevant information provided by the Department;
``(4) assist in the dissemination of such products, under
the coordination of the Chief Intelligence Officer, to law
enforcement agencies and other emergency response providers
of State, local, and tribal government; and
``(5) assist in the dissemination of such products to the
Chief Intelligence Officer for collection and dissemination
to other fusion centers.
``(f) Database Access.--In order to fulfill the objectives
described under subsection (e), each officer or intelligence
analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section shall
have direct access to all relevant Federal databases and
information systems, consistent with any policies,
guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards
established by the President or, as appropriate, the program
manager of the information sharing environment for the
implementation and management of that environment.
``(g) Consumer Feedback.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall create a mechanism
for any State, local, or tribal emergency response provider
who is a consumer of the intelligence or other information
products described under subsection (e) to voluntarily
provide feedback to the Department on the quality and utility
of such intelligence products.
``(2) Results.--The results of the voluntary feedback under
paragraph (1) shall be provided electronically to Congress
and appropriate personnel of the Department.
``(h) Rule of Construction.--
``(1) In general.--The authorities granted under this
section shall supplement the authorities granted under
section 201(d) and nothing in this section shall be construed
to abrogate the authorities granted under section 201(d).
``(2) Participation.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require a State, local, or regional government
or entity to accept the assignment of officers or
intelligence analysts of the Department into the fusion
center of that State, locality, or region.
``(i) Guidelines.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General of the United States, shall establish
guidelines for fusion centers operated by State and local
governments, to include standards that any such fusion center
shall--
``(1) collaboratively develop a mission statement, identify
expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine
effectiveness for that fusion center;
``(2) create a representative governance structure that
includes emergency response providers and, as appropriate,
the private sector;
``(3) create a collaborative environment for the sharing of
information within the scope of the information sharing
environment established under section 1016 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485) among Federal, State, tribal, and local emergency
response providers, the private sector, and the public,
consistent with any policies, guidelines, procedures,
instructions, or standards established by the President or,
as appropriate, the program manager of the information
sharing environment;
``(4) leverage the databases, systems, and networks
available from public and private sector entities to maximize
information sharing;
``(5) develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil
liberties policy consistent with Federal, State, and local
law;
``(6) ensure appropriate security measures are in place for
the facility, data, and personnel;
``(7) select and train personnel based on the needs,
mission, goals, and functions of that fusion center; and
``(8) offer a variety of intelligence services and products
to recipients of fusion center intelligence and information.
``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--Except for
subsection (i), there are authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012, to
carry out this section, including for hiring officers and
intelligence analysts to replace officers and intelligence
analysts who are assigned to fusion centers under this
section.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 205, as added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 206. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center
Initiative.''.

(c) Reports.--
(1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of enactment of this Act and before the State,
Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative under section
206 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by
subsection (a), (in this section referred to as the
``program'') has been implemented, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Privacy Officer of the Department, the
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the
Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board established under section 1061 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601
note), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report
that contains a concept of operations for the program, which
shall--
(A) include a clear articulation of the purposes, goals,
and specific objectives for which the program is being
developed;
(B) identify stakeholders in the program and provide an
assessment of their needs;
(C) contain a developed set of quantitative metrics to
measure, to the extent possible, program output;
(D) contain a developed set of qualitative instruments
(including surveys and expert interviews) to assess the
extent to which stakeholders believe their needs are being
met; and
(E) include a privacy and civil liberties impact
assessment.
(2) Privacy and civil liberties.--Not later than 1 year
after the date on which the program is implemented, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under
section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), in consultation
with the Privacy Officer of the Department and the Officer
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, shall
submit to Congress, the Secretary, and the Chief Intelligence
Officer of the Department a report on the privacy and civil
liberties impact of the program.

SEC. 122. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS
PROGRAM.

(a) Establishment of Program.--Subtitle A of title II of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as
amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following:

``SEC. 207. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS
PROGRAM.

``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief
Intelligence Officer, and in consultation with the Chief
Human Capital Officer, shall establish a fellowship program
in accordance with this section for the purpose of--
``(A) detailing State, local, and tribal law enforcement
officers and intelligence analysts to the Department in
accordance with subchapter VI of chapter 33 of title 5,
United States Code, to participate in the work of the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis in order to become familiar
with--
``(i) the relevant missions and capabilities of the
Department and other Federal agencies; and
``(ii) the role, programs, products, and personnel of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis; and
``(B) promoting information sharing between the Department
and State, local, and tribal law

[[Page S2297]]

enforcement officers and intelligence analysts by assigning
such officers and analysts to--
``(i) serve as a point of contact in the Department to
assist in the representation of State, local, and tribal
homeland security information needs;
``(ii) identify homeland security information of interest
to State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers,
emergency response providers, and intelligence analysts; and
``(iii) assist Department analysts in preparing and
disseminating terrorism-related products that are tailored to
State, local, and tribal emergency response providers, law
enforcement officers, and intelligence analysts and designed
to prepare for and thwart terrorist attacks.
``(2) Program name.--The program under this section shall
be known as the `Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program'.
``(b) Eligibility.--
``(1) In general.--In order to be eligible for selection as
an Information Sharing Fellow under the program under this
section, an individual shall--
``(A) have homeland security-related responsibilities;
``(B) be eligible for an appropriate national security
clearance;
``(C) possess a valid need for access to classified
information, as determined by the Chief Intelligence Officer;
``(D) be an employee of an eligible entity; and
``(E) have undergone appropriate privacy and civil
liberties training that is developed, supported, or sponsored
by the Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, in partnership with the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board established under section 1061 of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
(5 U.S.C. 601 note).
``(2) Eligible entities.--In this subsection, the term
`eligible entity' means--
``(A) a State, local, or regional fusion center;
``(B) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity that serves a major metropolitan area, suburban area,
or rural area, as determined by the Secretary;
``(C) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity with port, border, or agricultural responsibilities,
as determined by the Secretary;
``(D) a tribal law enforcement or other authority; or
``(E) such other entity as the Secretary determines is
appropriate.
``(c) Optional Participation.--No State, local, or tribal
law enforcement or other government entity shall be required
to participate in the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program.
``(d) Procedures for Nomination and Selection.--
``(1) In general.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall
establish procedures to provide for the nomination and
selection of individuals to participate in the Homeland
Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.
``(2) Limitations.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall--
``(A) select law enforcement officers and intelligence
analysts representing a broad cross-section of State, local,
and tribal agencies; and
``(B) ensure that the number of Information Sharing Fellows
selected does not impede the activities of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `Chief Intelligence Officer' means the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department; and
``(2) the term `Office of Intelligence and Analysis' means
the office of the Chief Intelligence Officer.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 206, as added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 207. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.''.

(c) Reports.--
(1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, and before the
implementation of the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program under section 207 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a), (in this section
referred to as the ``Program'') the Secretary, in
consultation with the Privacy Officer of the Department, the
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the
Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board established under section 1061 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601
note), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report
that contains a concept of operations for the Program, which
shall include a privacy and civil liberties impact
assessment.
(2) Review of privacy impact.--Not later than 1 year after
the date on which the Program is implemented, the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section
1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act
of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), in consultation with the Privacy
Officer of the Department and the Officer for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties of the Department, shall submit to
Congress, the Secretary, and the Chief Intelligence Officer
of the Department a report on the privacy and civil liberties
impact of the Program.

Subtitle C--Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group

SEC. 131. INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION
GROUP.

(a) In General.--As part of efforts to establish the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the program manager shall oversee and
coordinate the creation and ongoing operation of an
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (in this
section referred to as the ``ITACG'').
(b) Responsibilities.--The ITACG shall facilitate the
production of federally coordinated products derived from
information within the scope of the information sharing
environment established under section 1016 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485) and intended for distribution to State, local,
and tribal government officials and the private sector.
(c) Operations.--
(1) In general.--The ITACG shall be located at the
facilities of the National Counterterrorism Center of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Management.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall assign a senior level
officer to manage and direct the administration of the ITACG.
(B) Distribution.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the heads of other agencies, as
appropriate, shall determine how specific products shall be
distributed to State, local, and tribal officials and private
sector partners under this section.
(C) Standards for admission.--The Secretary, acting through
the Chief Intelligence Officer and in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and
the program manager of the information sharing environment
established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall
establish standards for the admission of law enforcement and
intelligence officials from a State, local, or tribal
government into the ITACG.
(d) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The ITACG shall include representatives
of--
(A) the Department;
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(C) the Department of Defense;
(D) the Department of Energy;
(E) law enforcement and intelligence officials from State,
local, and tribal governments, as appropriate; and
(F) other Federal entities as appropriate.
(2) Criteria.--The program manager for the information
sharing environment, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall develop qualifying criteria and establish
procedures for selecting personnel assigned to the ITACG and
for the proper handling and safeguarding of information
related to terrorism.
(e) Inapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.--The ITACG and any subsidiary groups thereof shall not
be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Grant
Enhancement Act of 2007''.

SEC. 202. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following:

``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

``SEC. 2001. DEFINITIONS.

``In this title, the following definitions shall apply:
``(1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
``(2) Combined statistical area.--The term `combined
statistical area' means a combined statistical area, as
defined by the Office of Management and Budget.
``(3) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible
tribe' means--
``(A) any Indian tribe that--
``(i) is located in the continental United States;
``(ii) operates a law enforcement or emergency response
agency with the capacity to respond to calls for law
enforcement or emergency services;
``(iii) is located--

``(I) on, or within 50 miles of, an international border or
a coastline bordering an ocean or international waters;
``(II) within 10 miles of critical infrastructure or has
critical infrastructure within its territory; or
``(III) within or contiguous to 1 of the 50 largest
metropolitan statistical areas in the United States; and

``(iv) certifies to the Secretary that a State is not
making funds distributed under this title available to the
Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes for the purpose
for which the Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes is
seeking grant funds; and
``(B) a consortium of Indian tribes, if each tribe
satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (A).
``(4) Eligible metropolitan area.--The term `eligible
metropolitan area' means the following:
``(A) In general.--A combination of 2 or more incorporated
municipalities, counties, parishes, or Indian tribes that--
``(i) is within--

``(I) any of the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas
in the United States; or
``(II) any combined statistical area, of which any
metropolitan statistical area described in subparagraph (A)
is a part; and

``(ii) includes the city with the largest population in
that metropolitan statistical area.
``(B) Other combinations.--Any other combination of
contiguous local or tribal governments that are formally
certified by the Administrator as an eligible metropolitan
area for purposes of this title with the consent of the State

[[Page S2298]]

or States in which such local or tribal governments are
located.
``(C) Inclusion of additional local governments.--An
eligible metropolitan area may include additional local or
tribal governments outside the relevant metropolitan
statistical area or combined statistical area that are likely
to be affected by, or be called upon to respond to, a
terrorist attack within the metropolitan statistical area.
``(5) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' has the
meaning given that term in section 4(e) of the Indian Self-
Determination Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)).
``(6) Metropolitan statistical area.--The term
`metropolitan statistical area' means a metropolitan
statistical area, as defined by the Office of Management and
Budget.
``(7) National special security event.--The term `National
Special Security Event' means a designated event that, by
virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious
significance, may be the target of terrorism or other
criminal activity.
``(8) Population.--The term `population' means population
according to the most recent United States census population
estimates available at the start of the relevant fiscal year.
``(9) Population density.--The term `population density'
means population divided by land area in square miles.
``(10) Target capabilities.--The term `target capabilities'
means the target capabilities for Federal, State, local, and
tribal government preparedness for which guidelines are
required to be established under section 646(a) of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C.
746(a)).
``(11) Tribal government.--The term `tribal government'
means the government of an Indian tribe.

``SEC. 2002. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

``(a) Establishment.--There is established a Homeland
Security Grant Program, which shall consist of--
``(1) the Urban Area Security Initiative established under
section 2003, or any successor thereto;
``(2) the State Homeland Security Grant Program established
under section 2004, or any successor thereto;
``(3) the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program
established under section 2005 or any successor thereto; and
``(4) the Emergency Communications and Interoperability
Grants Program established under section 1809, or any
successor thereto.
``(b) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, through the
Administrator, may award grants to State, local, and tribal
governments under the Homeland Security Grant Program for the
purposes of this title.
``(c) Programs Not Affected.--This title shall not be
construed to affect any authority to award grants under any
of the following Federal programs:
``(1) The firefighter assistance programs authorized under
section 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control
Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229 and 2229a).
``(2) Except as provided in subsection (d), all grant
programs authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.),
including the Urban Search and Rescue Grant Program.
``(3) Grants to protect critical infrastructure, including
port security grants authorized under section 70107 of title
46, United States Code.
``(4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System authorized
under section 635 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 723).
``(5) Grant programs other than those administered by the
Department.
``(d) Relationship to Other Laws.--
``(1) In general.--The Homeland Security Grant Program
shall supercede--
``(A) all grant programs authorized under section 1014 of
the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 3714); and
``(B) the Emergency Management Performance Grant authorized
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and section 662 of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6
U.S.C. 762).
``(2) Program integrity.--Each grant program described
under paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) shall
include, consistent with the Improper Payments Information
Act of 2002 (31 U.S.C. 3321 note), policies and procedures
for--
``(A) identifying activities funded under the Homeland
Security Grant Program that are susceptible to significant
improper payments; and
``(B) reporting the incidence of improper payments to the
Department.
``(3) Allocation.--Except as provided under paragraph (2)
of this subsection, the allocation of grants authorized under
this title shall be governed by the terms of this title and
not by any other provision of law.
``(e) Minimum Performance Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall--
``(A) establish minimum performance requirements for
entities that receive homeland security grants;
``(B) conduct, in coordination with State, regional, local,
and tribal governments receiving grants under the Homeland
Security Grant Program, simulations and exercises to test the
minimum performance requirements established under
subparagraph (A) for--
``(i) emergencies (as that term is defined in section 102
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)) and major disasters not less
than twice each year; and
``(ii) catastrophic incidents (as that term is defined in
section 501) not less than once each year; and
``(C) ensure that entities that the Administrator
determines are failing to demonstrate minimum performance
requirements established under subparagraph (A) shall remedy
the areas of failure, not later than the end of the second
full fiscal year after the date of such determination by--
``(i) establishing a plan for the achievement of the
minimum performance requirements under subparagraph (A),
including--

``(I) developing intermediate indicators for the 2 fiscal
years following the date of such determination; and
``(II) conducting additional simulations and exercises; and

``(ii) revising an entity's homeland security plan, if
necessary, to achieve the minimum performance requirements
under subparagraph (A).
``(2) Waiver.--At the discretion of the Administrator, the
occurrence of an actual emergency, major disaster, or
catastrophic incident in an area may be deemed as a
simulation under paragraph (1)(B).
``(3) Report to congress.--Not later than the end of the
first full fiscal year after the date of enactment of the
Improving America's Security Act of 2007, and each fiscal
year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate and to the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report describing--
``(A) the performance of grantees under paragraph (1)(A);
``(B) lessons learned through the simulations and exercises
under paragraph (1)(B); and
``(C) efforts being made to remedy failed performance under
paragraph (1)(C).

``SEC. 2003. URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE.

``(a) Establishment.--There is established an Urban Area
Security Initiative to provide grants to assist high-risk
metropolitan areas in preventing, preparing for, protecting
against, responding to, and recovering from acts of
terrorism.
``(b) Application.--
``(1) In general.--An eligible metropolitan area may apply
for grants under this section.
``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under
this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for
grants distributed under the program.
``(3) Information.--In an application for a grant under
this section, an eligible metropolitan area shall submit--
``(A) a plan describing the proposed division of
responsibilities and distribution of funding among the local
and tribal governments in the eligible metropolitan area;
``(B) the name of an individual to serve as a metropolitan
area liaison with the Department and among the various
jurisdictions in the metropolitan area; and
``(C) such information in support of the application as the
Administrator may reasonably require.
``(c) State Review and Transmission.--
``(1) In general.--To ensure consistency with State
homeland security plans, an eligible metropolitan area
applying for a grant under this section shall submit its
application to each State within which any part of the
eligible metropolitan area is located for review before
submission of such application to the Department.
``(2) Deadline.--Not later than 30 days after receiving an
application from an eligible metropolitan area under
paragraph (1), each such State shall transmit the application
to the Department.
``(3) State disagreement.--If the Governor of any such
State determines that an application of an eligible
metropolitan area is inconsistent with the State homeland
security plan of that State, or otherwise does not support
the application, the Governor shall--
``(A) notify the Administrator, in writing, of that fact;
and
``(B) provide an explanation of the reason for not
supporting the application at the time of transmission of the
application.
``(d) Prioritization.--In allocating funds among
metropolitan areas applying for grants under this section,
the Administrator shall consider--
``(1) the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences
faced by the eligible metropolitan area from a terrorist
attack, including consideration of--
``(A) the population of the eligible metropolitan area,
including appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and
commuter populations;
``(B) the population density of the eligible metropolitan
area;
``(C) the history of threats faced by the eligible
metropolitan area, including--
``(i) whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in
the eligible metropolitan area; and
``(ii) whether any part of the eligible metropolitan area,
or any critical infrastructure or key resource within the
eligible metropolitan area, has ever experienced a higher
threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than
other parts of the United States;
``(D) the degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences
to the eligible metropolitan area related to critical
infrastructure or key resources identified by the Secretary
or the State homeland security plan, including threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences from critical
infrastructure in nearby jurisdictions;
``(E) whether the eligible metropolitan area is located at
or near an international border;
``(F) whether the eligible metropolitan area has a
coastline bordering ocean or international waters;
``(G) threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced by
the eligible metropolitan area related to at-risk sites or
activities in nearby jurisdictions, including the need to
respond to terrorist attacks arising in those jurisdictions;

[[Page S2299]]

``(H) the most current threat assessments available to the
Department;
``(I) the extent to which the eligible metropolitan area
has unmet target capabilities;
``(J) the extent to which the eligible metropolitan area
includes--
``(i) all incorporated municipalities, counties, parishes,
and Indian tribes within the relevant metropolitan
statistical area or combined statistical area; and
``(ii) other local governments and tribes that are likely
to be called upon to respond to a terrorist attack within the
eligible metropolitan area; and
``(K) such other factors as are specified in writing by the
Administrator; and
``(2) the anticipated effectiveness of the proposed
spending plan for the eligible metropolitan area in
increasing the ability of that eligible metropolitan area to
prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, and
recover from terrorism, to meet its target capabilities, and
to otherwise reduce the overall risk to the metropolitan
area, the State, and the Nation.
``(e) Opportunity To Amend.--In considering applications
for grants under this section, the Administrator shall
provide applicants with a reasonable opportunity to correct
defects in the application, if any, before making final
awards.
``(f) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section
may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a
State homeland security plan and relevant local and regional
homeland security plans, through--
``(1) developing and enhancing State, local, or regional
plans, risk assessments, or mutual aid agreements;
``(2) purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining
equipment;
``(3) designing, conducting, and evaluating training and
exercises, including exercises of mass evacuation plans under
section 512 and including the payment of overtime and
backfill costs in support of such activities;
``(4) responding to an increase in the threat level under
the Homeland Security Advisory System, or to the needs
resulting from a National Special Security Event, including
payment of overtime and backfill costs;
``(5) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with
appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion
centers that comply with the guidelines established under
section 206(i);
``(6) protecting critical infrastructure and key resources
identified in the Critical Infrastructure List established
under section 1001 of the Improving America's Security Act of
2007, including the payment of appropriate personnel costs;
``(7) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007
Program Guidance of the Department for the Urban Area
Security Initiative or the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Grant Program, including activities permitted
under the full-time counterterrorism staffing pilot; and
``(8) any other activity relating to achieving target
capabilities approved by the Administrator.
``(g) Distribution of Awards to Metropolitan Areas.--
``(1) In general.--If the Administrator approves the
application of an eligible metropolitan area for a grant
under this section, the Administrator shall distribute the
grant funds to the State or States in which the eligible
metropolitan area is located.
``(2) State distribution of funds.--Each State shall
provide the eligible metropolitan area not less than 80
percent of the grant funds. Any funds retained by a State
shall be expended on items or services approved by the
Administrator that benefit the eligible metropolitan area.
``(3) Multistate regions.--If parts of an eligible
metropolitan area awarded a grant are located in 2 or more
States, the Secretary shall distribute to each such State--
``(A) a portion of the grant funds in accordance with the
proposed distribution set forth in the application; or
``(B) if no agreement on distribution has been reached, a
portion of the grant funds in proportion to each State's
share of the population of the eligible metropolitan area.

``SEC. 2004. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

``(a) Establishment.--There is established a State Homeland
Security Grant Program to assist State, local, and tribal
governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting against,
responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism.
``(b) Application.--
``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under
this section, and shall submit such information in support of
the application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under
this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for
grants distributed under the program.
``(c) Prioritization.--In allocating funds among States
applying for grants under this section, the Administrator
shall consider--
``(1) the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences
faced by a State from a terrorist attack, including
consideration of--
``(A) the size of the population of the State, including
appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and commuter
populations;
``(B) the population density of the State;
``(C) the history of threats faced by the State,
including--
``(i) whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in an
urban area that is wholly or partly in the State, or in the
State itself; and
``(ii) whether any part of the State, or any critical
infrastructure or key resource within the State, has ever
experienced a higher threat level under the Homeland Security
Advisory System than other parts of the United States;
``(D) the degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences
related to critical infrastructure or key resources
identified by the Secretary or the State homeland security
plan;
``(E) whether the State has an international border;
``(F) whether the State has a coastline bordering ocean or
international waters;
``(G) threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced by a
State related to at-risk sites or activities in adjacent
States, including the State's need to respond to terrorist
attacks arising in adjacent States;
``(H) the most current threat assessments available to the
Department;
``(I) the extent to which the State has unmet target
capabilities; and
``(J) such other factors as are specified in writing by the
Administrator;
``(2) the anticipated effectiveness of the proposed
spending plan of the State in increasing the ability of the
State to--
``(A) prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to,
and recover from terrorism;
``(B) meet the target capabilities of the State; and
``(C) otherwise reduce the overall risk to the State and
the Nation; and
``(3) the need to balance the goal of ensuring the target
capabilities of the highest risk areas are achieved quickly
and the goal of ensuring that basic levels of preparedness,
as measured by the attainment of target capabilities, are
achieved nationwide.
``(d) Minimum Allocation.--In allocating funds under
subsection (c), the Administrator shall ensure that, for each
fiscal year--
``(1) except as provided for in paragraph (2), no State
receives less than an amount equal to 0.45 percent of the
total funds appropriated for the State Homeland Security
Grant Program; and
``(2) American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each receive
not less than 0.08 percent of the amounts appropriated for
the State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``(e) Multistate Partnerships.--
``(1) In general.--Instead of, or in addition to, any
application for funds under subsection (b), 2 or more States
may submit an application under this paragraph for multistate
efforts to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to,
or recover from acts of terrorism.
``(2) Grantees.--Multistate grants may be awarded to
either--
``(A) an individual State acting on behalf of a consortium
or partnership of States with the consent of all member
States; or
``(B) a group of States applying as a consortium or
partnership.
``(3) Administration of grant.--If a group of States apply
as a consortium or partnership such States shall submit to
the Secretary at the time of application a plan describing--
``(A) the division of responsibilities for administering
the grant; and
``(B) the distribution of funding among the various States
and entities that are party to the application.
``(f) Funding for Local and Tribal Governments.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall require that,
not later than 60 days after receiving grant funding, any
State receiving a grant under this section shall make
available to local and tribal governments and emergency
response providers, consistent with the applicable State
homeland security plan--
``(A) not less than 80 percent of the grant funds;
``(B) with the consent of local and tribal governments, the
resources purchased with such grant funds having a value
equal to not less than 80 percent of the amount of the grant;
or
``(C) grant funds combined with resources purchased with
the grant funds having a value equal to not less than 80
percent of the amount of the grant.
``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may
request in writing that the Administrator extend the period
under paragraph (1) for an additional period of time. The
Administrator may approve such a request, and may extend such
period for an additional period, if the Administrator
determines that the resulting delay in providing grant
funding to the local and tribal governments and emergency
response providers is necessary to promote effective
investments to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond
to, and recover from terrorism, or to meet the target
capabilities of the State.
``(3) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for
allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal
governments in order to help those tribal communities achieve
target capabilities. Indian tribes shall be eligible for
funding directly from the States, and shall not be required
to seek funding from any local government.
``(4) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, Guam, or the Virgin Islands.
``(g) Grants to Directly Eligible Tribes.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (b), the
Secretary may award grants to directly eligible tribes under
this section.
``(2) Tribal applications.--A directly eligible tribe may
apply for a grant under this section by submitting an
application to the Administrator that includes the
information required for an application by a State under
subsection (b).
``(3) State review.--
``(A) In general.--To ensure consistency with State
homeland security plans, a directly eligible tribe applying
for a grant under this section shall submit its application
to each State within which any part of the tribe is located
for review before submission of such application to the
Department.
``(B) Deadline.--Not later than 30 days after receiving an
application from a directly eligible tribe under subparagraph
(A), each such State

[[Page S2300]]

shall transmit the application to the Department.
``(C) State disagreement.--If the Governor of any such
State determines that the application of a directly eligible
tribe is inconsistent with the State homeland security plan
of that State, or otherwise does not support the application,
the Governor shall--
``(i) notify the Administrator, in writing, of that fact;
and
``(ii) provide an explanation of the reason for not
supporting the application at the time of transmission of the
application.
``(4) Distribution of awards to directly eligible tribes.--
If the Administrator awards funds to a directly eligible
tribe under this section, the Administrator shall distribute
the grant funds directly to the directly eligible tribe. The
funds shall not be distributed to the State or States in
which the directly eligible tribe is located.
``(5) Tribal liaison.--A directly eligible tribe applying
for a grant under this section shall designate a specific
individual to serve as the tribal liaison who shall--
``(A) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and
private officials concerning terrorism preparedness;
``(B) develop a process for receiving input from Federal,
State, local, regional, and private officials to assist in
the development of the application of such tribe and to
improve the access of such tribe to grants; and
``(C) administer, in consultation with State, local,
regional, and private officials, grants awarded to such
tribe.
``(6) Tribes receiving direct grants.--A directly eligible
tribe that receives a grant directly under this section is
eligible to receive funds for other purposes under a grant
from the State or States within the boundaries of which any
part of such tribe is located, consistent with the homeland
security plan of the State.
``(7) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to affect the authority of an Indian tribe that
receives funds under this section.
``(h) Opportunity To Amend.--In considering applications
for grants under this section, the Administrator shall
provide applicants with a reasonable opportunity to correct
defects in the application, if any, before making final
awards.
``(i) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section
may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a
State homeland security plan, through--
``(1) developing and enhancing State, local, tribal, or
regional plans, risk assessments, or mutual aid agreements;
``(2) purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining
equipment;
``(3) designing, conducting, and evaluating training and
exercises, including exercises of mass evacuation plans under
section 512 and including the payment of overtime and
backfill costs in support of such activities;
``(4) responding to an increase in the threat level under
the Homeland Security Advisory System, including payment of
overtime and backfill costs;
``(5) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with
appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion
centers, that comply with the guidelines established under
section 206(i);
``(6) protecting critical infrastructure and key resources
identified in the Critical Infrastructure List established
under section 1001 of the Improving America's Security Act of
2007, including the payment of appropriate personnel costs;
``(7) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007
Program Guidance of the Department for the State Homeland
Security Grant Program or the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Grant Program, including activities permitted
under the full-time counterterrorism staffing pilot; and
``(8) any other activity relating to achieving target
capabilities approved by the Administrator.

``SEC. 2005. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.

``(a) Establishment.--There is established an Emergency
Management Performance Grants Program to make grants to
States to assist State, local, and tribal governments in
preventing, preparing for, protecting against, responding to,
recovering from, and mitigating against all hazards,
including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other
man-made disasters.
``(b) Application.--
``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under
this section, and shall submit such information in support of
an application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under
this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for
grants distributed under the program.
``(c) Allocation.--Funds available under the Emergency
Management Performance Grants Program shall be allocated as
follows:
``(1) Baseline amount.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each State shall receive an amount equal to 0.75 percent of
the total funds appropriated for grants under this section.
``(B) Territories.--American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each
shall receive an amount equal to 0.25 percent of the amounts
appropriated for grants under this section.
``(2) Per capita allocation.--The funds remaining for
grants under this section after allocation of the baseline
amounts under paragraph (1) shall be allocated to each State
in proportion to its population.
``(d) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section
may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a
State homeland security plan or a catastrophic incident annex
developed under section 613 of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
5196b) through--
``(1) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007
Program Guidance of the Department for Emergency Management
Performance Grants; and
``(2) any other activity approved by the Administrator that
will improve the capability of a State, local, or tribal
government in preventing, preparing for, protecting against,
responding to, recovering from, or mitigating against all
hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and
other man-made disasters.
``(e) Cost Sharing.--
``(1) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an
activity carried out with a grant under this section shall
not exceed 75 percent.
``(2) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant under
this section may meet the matching requirement under
paragraph (1) by making in-kind contributions of goods or
services that are directly linked with the purpose for which
the grant is made.
``(f) Local and Tribal Governments.--
``(1) In general.--In allocating grant funds received under
this section, a State shall take into account the needs of
local and tribal governments.
``(2) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for
allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal
governments in order to help those tribal communities improve
their capabilities in preventing, preparing for, protecting
against, responding to, recovering from, or mitigating
against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters. Indian tribes shall
be eligible for funding directly from the States, and shall
not be required to seek funding from any local government.

``SEC. 2006. TERRORISM PREVENTION.

``(a) Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall designate not
less than 25 percent of the combined amount appropriated for
grants under sections 2003 and 2004 to be used for law
enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
``(2) Use of funds.--Grants awarded under this subsection
may be used for--
``(A) information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks;
``(B) target hardening to reduce the vulnerability of
selected high value targets;
``(C) threat recognition to recognize the potential or
development of a threat;
``(D) intervention activities to interdict terrorists
before they can execute a threat;
``(E) overtime expenses related to a State homeland
security plan, including overtime costs associated with
providing enhanced law enforcement operations in support of
Federal agencies for increased border security and border
crossing enforcement;
``(F) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with
appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion
centers that comply with the guidelines established under
section 206(i);
``(G) any other activity permitted under the Fiscal Year
2007 Program Guidance of the Department for the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program; and
``(H) any other terrorism prevention activity authorized by
the Administrator.
``(b) Office for the Prevention of Terrorism.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the
Department an Office for the Prevention of Terrorism, which
shall be headed by a Director.
``(2) Director.--
``(A) Reporting.--The Director of the Office for the
Prevention of Terrorism shall report directly to the
Secretary.
``(B) Qualifications.--The Director of the Office for the
Prevention of Terrorism shall have an appropriate background
with experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or other
antiterrorist functions.
``(3) Assignment of personnel.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall assign to the Office
for the Prevention of Terrorism permanent staff and other
appropriate personnel detailed from other components of the
Department to carry out the responsibilities under this
section.
``(B) Liaisons.--The Secretary shall designate senior
employees from each component of the Department that has
significant antiterrorism responsibilities to act as liaisons
between that component and the Office for the Prevention of
Terrorism.
``(4) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Office for the
Prevention of Terrorism shall--
``(A) coordinate policy and operations between the
Department and State, local, and tribal government agencies
relating to preventing acts of terrorism within the United
States;
``(B) serve as a liaison between State, local, and tribal
law enforcement agencies and the Department;
``(C) in coordination with the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, develop better methods for the sharing of
intelligence with State, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies;
``(D) work with the Administrator to ensure that homeland
security grants to State, local, and tribal government
agencies, including grants under this title, the Commercial
Equipment Direct Assistance Program, and grants to support
fusion centers and other law enforcement-oriented programs
are adequately focused on terrorism prevention activities;
and
``(E) coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Department of Justice, the National Institute of
Justice, law enforcement organizations, and other appropriate
entities to support the development, promulgation, and
updating, as necessary, of national voluntary consensus
standards for training and personal protective equipment to
be used in a

[[Page S2301]]

tactical environment by law enforcement officers.
``(5) Pilot project.--
``(A) In general.--The Director of the Office for the
Prevention of Terrorism, in coordination with the
Administrator, shall establish a pilot project to determine
the efficacy and feasibility of establishing law enforcement
deployment teams.
``(B) Function.--The law enforcement deployment teams
participating in the pilot program under this paragraph shall
form the basis of a national network of standardized law
enforcement resources to assist State, local, and tribal
governments in responding to natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(6) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to affect the roles or responsibilities of the
Department of Justice.

``SEC. 2007. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF FUNDS.

``(a) Limitations on Use.--
``(1) Construction.--
``(A) In general.--Grants awarded under this title may not
be used to acquire land or to construct buildings or other
physical facilities.
``(B) Exceptions.--
``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A),
nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the use of grants
awarded under this title to achieve target capabilities
through--

``(I) the construction of facilities described in section
611 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196); or
``(II) the alteration or remodeling of existing buildings
for the purpose of making such buildings secure against
terrorist attacks or able to withstand or protect against
chemical, radiological, or biological attacks.

``(ii) Requirements for exception.--No grant awards may be
used for the purposes under clause (i) unless--

``(I) specifically approved by the Administrator;
``(II) the construction occurs under terms and conditions
consistent with the requirements under section 611(j)(8) of
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196(j)(8)); and
``(III) the amount allocated for purposes under clause (i)
does not exceed 20 percent of the grant award.

``(2) Personnel.--
``(A) In general.--For any grant awarded under section 2003
or 2004--
``(i) not more than 25 percent of the amount awarded to a
grant recipient may be used to pay overtime and backfill
costs; and
``(ii) not more than 25 percent of the amount awarded to
the grant recipient may be used to pay personnel costs not
described in clause (i).
``(B) Waiver.--At the request of the recipient of a grant
under section 2003 or section 2004, the Administrator may
grant a waiver of any limitation under subparagraph (A).
``(3) Recreation.--Grants awarded under this title may not
be used for recreational or social purposes.
``(b) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this title shall
be construed to prohibit State, local, or tribal governments
from using grant funds under sections 2003 and 2004 in a
manner that enhances preparedness for disasters unrelated to
acts of terrorism, if such use assists such governments in
achieving capabilities for terrorism preparedness established
by the Administrator.
``(c) Equipment Standards.--If an applicant for a grant
under this title proposes to upgrade or purchase, with
assistance provided under that grant, new equipment or
systems that do not meet or exceed any applicable national
voluntary consensus standards developed under section 647 of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6
U.S.C. 747), the applicant shall include in its application
an explanation of why such equipment or systems will serve
the needs of the applicant better than equipment or systems
that meet or exceed such standards.
``(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Amounts appropriated for
grants under this title shall be used to supplement and not
supplant other State, local, and tribal government public
funds obligated for the purposes provided under this title.

``SEC. 2008. ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION.

``(a) Administrator.--The Administrator shall, in
consultation with other appropriate offices within the
Department, have responsibility for administering all
homeland security grant programs administered by the
Department and for ensuring coordination among those programs
and consistency in the guidance issued to recipients across
those programs.
``(b) National Advisory Council.--To ensure input from and
coordination with State, local, and tribal governments and
emergency response providers, the Administrator shall
regularly consult and work with the National Advisory Council
established under section 508 on the administration and
assessment of grant programs administered by the Department,
including with respect to the development of program guidance
and the development and evaluation of risk-assessment
methodologies.
``(c) Regional Coordination.--The Administrator shall
ensure that--
``(1) all recipients of homeland security grants
administered by the Department, as a condition of receiving
those grants, coordinate their prevention, preparedness, and
protection efforts with neighboring State, local, and tribal
governments, as appropriate; and
``(2) all metropolitan areas and other recipients of
homeland security grants administered by the Department that
include or substantially affect parts or all of more than 1
State, coordinate across State boundaries, including, where
appropriate, through the use of regional working groups and
requirements for regional plans, as a condition of receiving
Departmentally administered homeland security grants.
``(d) Planning Committees.--
``(1) In general.--Any State or metropolitan area receiving
grants under this title shall establish a planning committee
to assist in preparation and revision of the State, regional,
or local homeland security plan and to assist in determining
effective funding priorities.
``(2) Composition.--
``(A) In general.--The planning committee shall include
representatives of significant stakeholders, including--
``(i) local and tribal government officials; and
``(ii) emergency response providers, which shall include
representatives of the fire service, law enforcement,
emergency medical response, and emergency managers.
``(B) Geographic representation.--The members of the
planning committee shall be a representative group of
individuals from the counties, cities, towns, and Indian
tribes within the State or metropolitan areas, including, as
appropriate, representatives of rural, high-population, and
high-threat jurisdictions.
``(e) Interagency Coordination.--The Secretary, through the
Administrator, in coordination with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other agencies
providing assistance to State, local, and tribal governments
for preventing, preparing for, protecting against, responding
to, and recovering from natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and other man-made disasters, and not later than 12 months
after the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007, shall--
``(1) compile a comprehensive list of Federal programs that
provide assistance to State, local, and tribal governments
for preventing, preparing for, and responding to, natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters;
``(2) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the greatest
extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and
other requirements and guidance for homeland security
assistance programs to--
``(A) eliminate redundant and duplicative requirements,
including onerous application and ongoing reporting
requirements;
``(B) ensure accountability of the programs to the intended
purposes of such programs;
``(C) coordinate allocation of grant funds to avoid
duplicative or inconsistent purchases by the recipients; and
``(D) make the programs more accessible and user friendly
to applicants; and
``(3) submit the information and proposals under paragraphs
(1) and (2) to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

``SEC. 2009. ACCOUNTABILITY.

``(a) Reports to Congress.--
``(1) Funding efficacy.--The Administrator shall submit to
Congress, as a component of the annual Federal Preparedness
Report required under section 652 of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 752), an
evaluation of the extent to which grants Administered by the
Department, including the grants established by this title--
``(A) have contributed to the progress of State, local, and
tribal governments in achieving target capabilities; and
``(B) have led to the reduction of risk nationally and in
State, local, and tribal jurisdictions.
``(2) Risk assessment.--
``(A) In general.--For each fiscal year, the Administrator
shall provide to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a detailed
and comprehensive explanation of the methodology used to
calculate risk and compute the allocation of funds under
sections 2003 and 2004 of this title, including--
``(i) all variables included in the risk assessment and the
weights assigned to each;
``(ii) an explanation of how each such variable, as
weighted, correlates to risk, and the basis for concluding
there is such a correlation; and
``(iii) any change in the methodology from the previous
fiscal year, including changes in variables considered,
weighting of those variables, and computational methods.
``(B) Classified annex.--The information required under
subparagraph (A) shall be provided in unclassified form to
the greatest extent possible, and may include a classified
annex if necessary.
``(C) Deadline.--For each fiscal year, the information
required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided on the
earlier of--
``(i) October 31; or
``(ii) 30 days before the issuance of any program guidance
for grants under sections 2003 and 2004.
``(b) Reviews and Audits.--
``(1) Department review.--The Administrator shall conduct
periodic reviews of grants made under this title to ensure
that recipients allocate funds consistent with the guidelines
established by the Department.
``(2) Government accountability office.--
``(A) Access to information.--Each recipient of a grant
under this title and the Department shall provide the
Government Accountability Office with full access to
information regarding the activities carried out under this
title.
``(B) Audits and reports.--
``(i) Audit.--Not later than 12 months after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
and periodically thereafter, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall conduct an audit of the Homeland Security
Grant Program.
``(ii) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental

[[Page S2302]]

Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives on--

``(I) the results of any audit conducted under clause (i),
including an analysis of the purposes for which the grant
funds authorized under this title are being spent; and
``(II) whether the grant recipients have allocated funding
consistent with the State homeland security plan and the
guidelines established by the Department.

``(3) Audit requirement.--Grant recipients that expend
$500,000 or more in grant funds received under this title
during any fiscal year shall submit to the Administrator an
organization-wide financial and compliance audit report in
conformance with the requirements of chapter 75 of title 31,
United States Code.
``(4) Recovery audits.--The Secretary shall conduct a
recovery audit (as that term is defined by the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget under section 3561 of
title 31, United States Code) for any grant administered by
the Department with a total value of $1,000,000 or greater.
``(c) Remedies for Noncompliance.--
``(1) In general.--If the Administrator finds, after
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that a
recipient of a grant under this title has failed to
substantially comply with any provision of this title, or
with any regulations or guidelines of the Department
regarding eligible expenditures, the Administrator shall--
``(A) terminate any payment of grant funds to be made to
the recipient under this title;
``(B) reduce the amount of payment of grant funds to the
recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grants funds
that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with
this title; or
``(C) limit the use of grant funds received under this
title to programs, projects, or activities not affected by
the failure to comply.
``(2) Duration of penalty.--The Administrator shall apply
an appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) until such time as
the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full
compliance with this title or with applicable guidelines or
regulations of the Department.
``(3) Direct funding.--If a State fails to substantially
comply with any provision of this title or with applicable
guidelines or regulations of the Department, including
failing to provide local or tribal governments with grant
funds or resources purchased with grant funds in a timely
fashion, a local or tribal government entitled to receive
such grant funds or resources may petition the Administrator,
at such time and in such manner as determined by the
Administrator, to request that grant funds or resources be
provided directly to the local or tribal government.

``SEC. 2010. AUDITING.

``(a) Audit of Grants Under This Title.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than the date described in
paragraph (2), and every 2 years thereafter, the Inspector
General of the Department shall conduct an audit of each
entity that receives a grant under the Urban Area Security
Initiative, the State Homeland Security Grant Program, or the
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program to evaluate
the use of funds under such grant program by such entity.
``(2) Timing.--The date described in this paragraph is the
later of 2 years after--
``(A) the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007; and
``(B) the date that an entity first receives a grant under
the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program, as the case may be.
``(3) Contents.--Each audit under this subsection shall
evaluate--
``(A) the use of funds under the relevant grant program by
an entity during the 2 full fiscal years before the date of
that audit;
``(B) whether funds under that grant program were used by
that entity as required by law; and
``(C)(i) for each grant under the Urban Area Security
Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the
extent to which funds under that grant were used to prepare
for, protect against, respond to, or recover from acts of
terrorism; and
``(ii) for each grant under the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program, the extent to which funds under
that grant were used to prevent, prepare for, protect
against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against all
hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and
other man-made disasters.
``(4) Public availability on website.--The Inspector
General of the Department shall make each audit under this
subsection available on the website of the Inspector General.
``(5) Reporting.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 2 years and 60 days after
the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act
of 2007, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of
the Department shall submit to Congress a consolidated report
regarding the audits conducted under this subsection.
``(B) Contents.--Each report submitted under this paragraph
shall describe--
``(i)(I) for the first such report, the audits conducted
under this subsection during the 2-year period beginning on
the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act
of 2007; and
``(II) for each subsequent such report, the audits
conducted under this subsection during the fiscal year before
the date of the submission of that report;
``(ii) whether funds under each grant audited during the
period described in clause (i) that is applicable to such
report were used as required by law; and
``(iii)(I) for grants under the Urban Area Security
Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program
audited, the extent to which, during the period described in
clause (i) that is applicable to such report, funds under
such grants were used to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, or recover from acts of terrorism; and
``(II) for grants under the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program audited, the extent to which funds
under such grants were used during the period described in
clause (i) applicable to such report to prevent, prepare for,
protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate
against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
``(b) Audit of Other Preparedness Grants.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than the date described in
paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Department shall
conduct an audit of each entity that receives a grant under
the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program to evaluate the use by that entity
of any grant for preparedness administered by the Department
that was awarded before the date of enactment of the
Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
``(2) Timing.--The date described in this paragraph is the
later of 2 years after--
``(A) the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007; and
``(B) the date that an entity first receives a grant under
the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program, as the case may be.
``(3) Contents.--Each audit under this subsection shall
evaluate--
``(A) the use of funds by an entity under any grant for
preparedness administered by the Department that was awarded
before the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007;
``(B) whether funds under each such grant program were used
by that entity as required by law; and
``(C) the extent to which such funds were used to enhance
preparedness.
``(4) Public availability on website.--The Inspector
General of the Department shall make each audit under this
subsection available on the website of the Inspector General.
``(5) Reporting.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 2 years and 60 days after
the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act
of 2007, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of
the Department shall submit to Congress a consolidated report
regarding the audits conducted under this subsection.
``(B) Contents.--Each report submitted under this paragraph
shall describe--
``(i)(I) for the first such report, the audits conducted
under this subsection during the 2-year period beginning on
the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act
of 2007; and
``(II) for each subsequent such report, the audits
conducted under this subsection during the fiscal year before
the date of the submission of that report;
``(ii) whether funds under each grant audited were used as
required by law; and
``(iii) the extent to which funds under each grant audited
were used to enhance preparedness.
``(c) Funding for Audits.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall withhold 1
percent of the total amount of each grant under the Urban
Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland Security Grant
Program, and the Emergency Management Performance Grant
Program for audits under this section.
``(2) Availability of funds.--The Administrator shall make
amounts withheld under this subsection available as follows:
``(A) Amounts withheld from grants under the Urban Area
Security Initiative shall be made available for audits under
this section of entities receiving grants under the Urban
Area Security Initiative.
``(B) Amounts withheld from grants under the State Homeland
Security Grant Program shall be made available for audits
under this section of entities receiving grants under the
State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``(C) Amounts withheld from grants under the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program shall be made available
for audits under this section of entities receiving grants
under the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program.

``SEC. 2011. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

``(a) Grants.--
``(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
for the Homeland Security Grant Program established under
section 2002 of this title for each of fiscal years 2008,
2009, and 2010, $3,105,000,000, to be allocated as follows:
``(A) For grants under the Urban Area Security Initiative
under section 2003, $1,278,639,000.
``(B) For grants under the State Homeland Security Grant
Program established under section 2004, $913,180,500.
``(C) For grants under the Emergency Management Performance
Grant Program established under section 2005, $913,180,500.
``(2) Subsequent years.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Homeland Security Grant Program
established under section 2002 of this title such sums as are
necessary for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year
thereafter.
``(b) Proportionate Allocation.--Regardless of the amount
appropriated for the Homeland Security Grant Program in any
fiscal year, the appropriated amount shall, in each fiscal
year, be allocated among the grant programs under sections
2003, 2004, and 2005 in direct proportion to the amounts
allocated under paragraph (a)(1) of this section.''.

SEC. 203. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page S2303]]

(1) by redesignating title XVIII, as added by the SAFE Port
Act (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), as title XIX;
(2) by redesignating sections 1801 through 1806, as added
by the SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), as
sections 1901 through 1906, respectively;
(3) in section 1904(a), as so redesignated, by striking
``section 1802'' and inserting ``section 1902''; and
(4) in section 1906, as so redesignated, by striking
``section 1802(a)'' each place that term appears and
inserting ``section 1902(a)''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 note)
is amended by striking the items relating to title XVIII and
sections 1801 through 1806, as added by the SAFE Port Act
(Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), and inserting the
following:

``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1903. Hiring authority.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal
agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.

``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2003. Urban Area Security Initiative.
``Sec. 2004. State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2005. Emergency Management Performance Grants Program.
``Sec. 2006. Terrorism prevention.
``Sec. 2007. Restrictions on use of funds.
``Sec. 2008. Administration and coordination.
``Sec. 2009. Accountability.
``Sec. 2010. Auditing.
``Sec. 2011. Authorization of appropriations.''.

TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY

SEC. 301. DEDICATED FUNDING TO ACHIEVE EMERGENCY
COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABLE
COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Emergency Communications Operability and Interoperable
Communications.--
(1) In general.--Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 571 et seq.) (relating to emergency
communications) is amended by adding at the end the
following:

``SEC. 1809. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS GRANTS.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
``(2) Emergency communications operability.--The term
`emergency communications operability' means the ability to
provide and maintain, throughout an emergency response
operation, a continuous flow of information among emergency
response providers, agencies, and government officers from
multiple disciplines and jurisdictions and at all levels of
government, in the event of a natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster, including where there
has been significant damage to, or destruction of, critical
infrastructure, including substantial loss of ordinary
telecommunications infrastructure and sustained loss of
electricity.
``(b) In General.--The Administrator shall make grants to
States for initiatives necessary to achieve, maintain, or
enhance Statewide, regional, national and, as appropriate,
international emergency communications operability and
interoperable communications.
``(c) Statewide Interoperable Communications Plans.--
``(1) Submission of plans.--The Administrator shall require
any State applying for a grant under this section to submit a
Statewide Interoperable Communications Plan as described
under section 7303(f) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(f)).
``(2) Coordination and consultation.--The Statewide plan
submitted under paragraph (1) shall be developed--
``(A) in coordination with local and tribal governments,
emergency response providers, and other relevant State
officers; and
``(B) in consultation with and subject to appropriate
comment by the applicable Regional Emergency Communications
Coordination Working Group as described under section 1805.
``(3) Approval.--The Administrator may not award a grant to
a State unless the Administrator, in consultation with the
Director for Emergency Communications, has approved the
applicable Statewide plan.
``(4) Revisions.--A State may revise the applicable
Statewide plan approved by the Administrator under this
subsection, subject to approval of the revision by the
Administrator.
``(d) Consistency.--The Administrator shall ensure that
each grant is used to supplement and support, in a consistent
and coordinated manner, any applicable State, regional, or
urban area homeland security plan.
``(e) Use of Grant Funds.--Grants awarded under subsection
(b) may be used for initiatives to achieve, maintain, or
enhance emergency communications operability and
interoperable communications, including--
``(1) Statewide or regional communications planning,
including governance related activities;
``(2) system design and engineering;
``(3) system procurement and installation;
``(4) exercises;
``(5) modeling and simulation exercises for operational
command and control functions;
``(6) technical assistance;
``(7) training; and
``(8) other appropriate activities determined by the
Administrator to be integral to achieve, maintain, or enhance
emergency communications operability and interoperable
communications.
``(f) Application.--
``(1) In general.--A State desiring a grant under this
section shall submit an application at such time, in such
manner, and accompanied by such information as the
Administrator may reasonably require.
``(2) Minimum contents.--At a minimum, each application
submitted under paragraph (1) shall--
``(A) identify the critical aspects of the communications
life cycle, including planning, system design and
engineering, procurement and installation, and training for
which funding is requested;
``(B) describe how--
``(i) the proposed use of funds--

``(I) would be consistent with and address the goals in any
applicable State, regional, or urban homeland security plan;
and
``(II) unless the Administrator determines otherwise, are--

``(aa) consistent with the National Emergency
Communications Plan under section 1802; and
``(bb) compatible with the national infrastructure and
national voluntary consensus standards;
``(ii) the applicant intends to spend funds under the
grant, to administer such funds, and to allocate such funds
among participating local and tribal governments and
emergency response providers;
``(iii) the State plans to allocate the grant funds on the
basis of risk and effectiveness to regions, local and tribal
governments to promote meaningful investments for achieving,
maintaining, or enhancing emergency communications
operability and interoperable communications;
``(iv) the State intends to address the emergency
communications operability and interoperable communications
needs at the city, county, regional, State, and interstate
level; and
``(v) the State plans to emphasize regional planning and
cooperation, both within the jurisdictional borders of that
State and with neighboring States;
``(C) be consistent with the Statewide Interoperable
Communications Plan required under section 7303(f) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 194(f)); and
``(D) include a capital budget and timeline showing how the
State intends to allocate and expend the grant funds.
``(g) Award of Grants.--
``(1) Considerations.--In approving applications and
awarding grants under this section, the Administrator shall
consider--
``(A) the nature of the threat to the State from a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster;
``(B) the location, risk, or vulnerability of critical
infrastructure and key national assets, including the
consequences from damage to critical infrastructure in nearby
jurisdictions as a result of natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, or other man-made disasters;
``(C) the size of the population of the State, including
appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and commuter
populations;
``(D) the population density of the State;
``(E) the extent to which grants will be utilized to
implement emergency communications operability and
interoperable communications solutions--
``(i) consistent with the National Emergency Communications
Plan under section 1802 and compatible with the national
infrastructure and national voluntary consensus standards;
and
``(ii) more efficient and cost effective than current
approaches;
``(F) the extent to which a grant would expedite the
achievement, maintenance, or enhancement of emergency
communications operability and interoperable communications
in the State with Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments;
``(G) the extent to which a State, given its financial
capability, demonstrates its commitment to achieve, maintain,
or enhance emergency communications operability and
interoperable communications by supplementing Federal funds
with non-Federal funds;
``(H) whether the State is on or near an international
border;
``(I) whether the State encompasses an economically
significant border crossing;
``(J) whether the State has a coastline bordering an ocean,
a major waterway used for interstate commerce, or
international waters;
``(K) the extent to which geographic barriers pose unusual
obstacles to achieving, maintaining, or enhancing emergency
communications operability or interoperable communications;
``(L) the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced
by the State related to at-risk sites or activities in nearby
jurisdictions, including the need to respond to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters
arising in those jurisdictions;
``(M) the need to achieve, maintain, or enhance nationwide
emergency communications operability and interoperable
communications, consistent with the National Emergency
Communications Plan under section 1802;
``(N) whether the activity for which a grant is requested
is being funded under another Federal or State emergency
communications grant program; and
``(O) such other factors as are specified by the
Administrator in writing.
``(2) Review panel.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a review
panel under section 871(a) to assist

[[Page S2304]]

in reviewing grant applications under this section.
``(B) Recommendations.--The review panel established under
subparagraph (A) shall make recommendations to the
Administrator regarding applications for grants under this
section.
``(C) Membership.--The review panel established under
subparagraph (A) shall include--
``(i) individuals with technical expertise in emergency
communications operability and interoperable communications;
``(ii) emergency response providers; and
``(iii) other relevant State and local officers.
``(3) Minimum grant amounts.--The Administrator shall
ensure that for each fiscal year--
``(A) no State receives less than an amount equal to 0.75
percent of the total funds appropriated for grants under this
section; and
``(B) American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each receive no
less than 0.25 percent of the amounts appropriated for grants
under this section.
``(4) Availability of funds.--Any grant funds awarded that
may be used to support emergency communications operability
or interoperable communications shall, as the Administrator
may determine, remain available for up to 3 years, consistent
with section 7303(e) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(e)).
``(h) State Responsibilities.--
``(1) Pass-through of funds to local and tribal
governments.--The Administrator shall determine a date by
which a State that receives a grant shall obligate or
otherwise make available to local and tribal governments and
emergency response providers--
``(A) not less than 80 percent of the funds of the amount
of the grant;
``(B) resources purchased with the grant funds having a
value equal to not less than 80 percent of the total amount
of the grant; or
``(C) grant funds combined with resources purchased with
the grant funds having a value equal to not less than 80
percent of the total amount of the grant.
``(2) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds
to local and tribal governments.--Any State that receives a
grant shall certify to the Administrator, by not later than
30 days after the date described under paragraph (1) with
respect to the grant, that the State has made available for
expenditure by local or tribal governments and emergency
response providers the required amount of grant funds under
paragraph (1).
``(3) Report on grant spending.--
``(A) In general.--Any State that receives a grant shall
submit a spending report to the Administrator at such time,
in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the
Administrator may reasonably require.
``(B) Minimum contents.--At a minimum, each report under
this paragraph shall include--
``(i) the amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of receipt
of all funds received under the grant;
``(ii) the amount and the dates of disbursements of all
such funds expended in compliance with paragraph (1) or under
mutual aid agreements or other intrastate and interstate
sharing arrangements, as applicable;
``(iii) how the funds were used by each ultimate recipient
or beneficiary;
``(iv) the extent to which emergency communications
operability and interoperable communications identified in
the applicable Statewide plan and application have been
achieved, maintained, or enhanced as the result of the
expenditure of grant funds; and
``(v) the extent to which emergency communications
operability and interoperable communications identified in
the applicable Statewide plan and application remain unmet.
``(C) Public availability on website.--The Administrator
shall make each report submitted under subparagraph (A)
publicly available on the website of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. The Administrator may redact such
information from the reports as the Administrator determines
necessary to protect national security.
``(4) Penalties for reporting delay.--If a State fails to
provide the information required by the Administrator under
paragraph (3), the Administrator may--
``(A) reduce grant payments to the State from the portion
of grant funds that are not required to be passed through
under paragraph (1);
``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to the
State, and transfer the appropriate portion of those funds
directly to local and tribal governments and emergency
response providers that were intended to receive funding
under that grant; or
``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on the use
of funds by the State under the grant, which may include--
``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay the grant-
related expenses of the State; or
``(ii) requiring the State to distribute to local and
tribal government and emergency response providers all or a
portion of grant funds that are not required to be passed
through under paragraph (1).
``(i) Prohibited Uses.--Grants awarded under this section
may not be used for recreational or social purposes.
``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
``(1) $400,000,000 for fiscal year 2008;
``(2) $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2009;
``(3) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2010;
``(4) $800,000,000 for fiscal year 2011;
``(5) $1,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2012; and
``(6) such sums as necessary for each fiscal year
thereafter.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of
contents under section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1808 the following:

``Sec. 1809. Emergency communications operability and interoperable
communications grants.''.

(b) Interoperable Communications Plans.--Section 7303 of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 194) is amended--
(1) in subsection (f)--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(6) include information on the governance structure used
to develop the plan, such as all agencies and organizations
that participated in developing the plan and the scope and
timeframe of the plan; and
``(7) describe the method by which multi-jurisdictional,
multi-disciplinary input was provided from all regions of the
jurisdiction and the process for continuing to incorporate
such input.''; and
(2) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``or video'' and
inserting ``and video''.
(c) National Emergency Communications Plan.--Section
1802(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
652(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(10) set a date, including interim benchmarks, as
appropriate, by which State, local, and tribal governments,
Federal departments and agencies, emergency response
providers, and the private sector will achieve interoperable
communications as that term is defined under section
7303(g)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(g)(1).''.

SEC. 302. BORDER INTEROPERABILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.

(a) In General.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department
an International Border Community Interoperable
Communications Demonstration Project (referred to in this
section as ``demonstration project'').
(2) Minimum number of communities.--The Secretary shall
select no fewer than 6 communities to participate in a
demonstration project.
(3) Location of communities.--No fewer than 3 of the
communities selected under paragraph (2) shall be located on
the northern border of the United States and no fewer than 3
of the communities selected under paragraph (2) shall be
located on the southern border of the United States.
(b) Program Requirements.--The demonstration projects
shall--
(1) address the interoperable communications needs of
emergency response providers and the National Guard;
(2) foster interoperable emergency communications systems--
(A) among Federal, State, local, and tribal government
agencies in the United States involved in preventing or
responding to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other
man-made disaster; and
(B) with similar agencies in Canada or Mexico;
(3) identify common international cross-border frequencies
for communications equipment, including radio or computer
messaging equipment;
(4) foster the standardization of interoperable emergency
communications equipment;
(5) identify solutions that will facilitate interoperable
communications across national borders expeditiously;
(6) ensure that emergency response providers can
communicate with each other and the public at disaster sites;
(7) provide training and equipment to enable emergency
response providers to deal with threats and contingencies in
a variety of environments; and
(8) identify and secure appropriate joint-use equipment to
ensure communications access.
(c) Distribution of Funds.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall distribute funds under
this section to each community participating in a
demonstration project through the State, or States, in which
each community is located.
(2) Other participants.--Not later than 60 days after
receiving funds under paragraph (1), a State shall make the
funds available to the local and tribal governments and
emergency response providers selected by the Secretary to
participate in a demonstration project.
(d) Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not later than December 31, 2007, and each
year thereafter in which funds are appropriated for a
demonstration project, the Secretary shall submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report on the demonstration
projects.
(2) Contents.--Each report under this subsection shall
contain the following:
(A) The name and location of all communities involved in
the demonstration project.
(B) The amount of funding provided to each State for the
demonstration project.
(C) An evaluation of the usefulness of the demonstration
project towards developing an effective interoperable
communications system at the borders.
(D) The factors that were used in determining how to
distribute the funds in a risk-based manner.
(E) The specific risks inherent to a border community that
make interoperable communications more difficult than in non-
border communities.

[[Page S2305]]

(F) The optimal ways to prioritize funding for
interoperable communication systems based upon risk.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as are necessary in each of
fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009 to carry out this section.

TITLE IV--ENHANCING SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

SEC. 401. MODERNIZATION OF THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Secure
Travel and Counterterrorism Partnership Act''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should modernize the visa waiver
program by simultaneously--
(A) enhancing program security requirements; and
(B) extending visa-free travel privileges to nationals of
foreign countries that are allies in the war on terrorism;
and
(2) the expansion described in paragraph (1) will--
(A) enhance bilateral cooperation on critical
counterterrorism and information sharing initiatives;
(B) support and expand tourism and business opportunities
to enhance long-term economic competitiveness; and
(C) strengthen bilateral relationships.
(c) Discretionary Visa Waiver Program Expansion.--Section
217(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1187(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(8) Nonimmigrant visa refusal rate flexibility.--
``(A) Certification.--On the date on which an air exit
system is in place that can verify the departure of not less
than 97 percent of foreign nationals that exit through
airports of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall certify to Congress that such air exit system
is in place.
``(B) Waiver.--After certification by the Secretary under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the
application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country if--
``(i) the country meets all security requirements of this
section;
``(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that
the totality of the country's security risk mitigation
measures provide assurance that the country's participation
in the program would not compromise the law enforcement,
security interests, or enforcement of the immigration laws of
the United States;
``(iii) there has been a sustained reduction in visa
refusal rates for aliens from the country and conditions
exist to continue such reduction; and
``(iv) the country cooperated with the Government of the
United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information
sharing before the date of its designation as a program
country, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State expect such cooperation will continue.
``(9) Discretionary security-related considerations.--
``(A) In general.--In determining whether to waive the
application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country, pursuant to
paragraph (8), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take into
consideration other factors affecting the security of the
United States, including--
``(i) airport security standards in the country;
``(ii) whether the country assists in the operation of an
effective air marshal program;
``(iii) the standards of passports and travel documents
issued by the country; and
``(iv) other security-related factors.
``(B) Overstay rates.--In determining whether to permit a
country to participate in the program, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall consider the estimated rate at which
nationals of the country violate the terms of their visas by
remaining in the United States after the expiration of such
visas.''.
(d) Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program.--
(1) In general.--Section 217 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) by striking ``Operators of aircraft'' and inserting the
following:
``(10) Electronic transmission of identification
information.--Operators of aircraft''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
``(11) Eligibility determination under the electronic
travel authorization system.--Beginning on the date on which
the electronic travel authorization system developed under
subsection (h)(3) is fully operational, each alien traveling
under the program shall, before applying for admission,
electronically provide basic biographical information to the
system. Upon review of such biographical information, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall determine whether the
alien is eligible to travel to the United States under the
program.'';
(B) in subsection (c), as amended by subsection (c) of this
section--
(i) in paragraph (2)--

(I) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as follows:

``(D) Reporting lost and stolen passports.--The government
of the country enters into an agreement with the United
States to report, or make available through Interpol, to the
United States Government information about the theft or loss
of passports within a strict time limit and in a manner
specified in the agreement.''; and

(II) by adding at the end the following:

``(E) Repatriation of aliens.--The government of a country
accepts for repatriation any citizen, former citizen, or
national against whom a final executable order of removal is
issued not later than 3 weeks after the issuance of the final
order of removal. Nothing in this subparagraph creates any
duty for the United States or any right for any alien with
respect to removal or release. Nothing in this subparagraph
gives rise to any cause of action or claim under this
paragraph or any other law against any official of the United
States or of any State to compel the release, removal, or
consideration for release or removal of any alien.
``(F) Passenger information exchange.--The government of
the country enters into an agreement with the United States
to share information regarding whether nationals of that
country traveling to the United States represent a threat to
the security or welfare of the United States or its
citizens.'';.
(ii) in paragraph (5)--

(I) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place it appears
and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
(II) in subparagraph (A)(i)--

(aa) in subclause (II), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(bb) in subclause (III), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(cc) by adding at the end the following:

``(IV) shall submit to Congress a report regarding the
implementation of the electronic travel authorization system
under subsection (h)(3) and the participation of new
countries in the program through a waiver under paragraph
(8).''; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(10) Technical assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
provide technical assistance to program countries to assist
those countries in meeting the requirements under this
section.'';
(C) in subsection (f)(5), by striking ``of blank'' and
inserting ``or loss of''; and
(D) in subsection (h), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Electronic travel authorization system.--
``(A) System.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to
develop and implement a fully automated electronic travel
authorization system (referred to in this paragraph as the
`System') to collect such basic biographical information as
the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be necessary
to determine, in advance of travel, the eligibility of an
alien to travel to the United States under the program.
``(B) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may charge
a fee for the use of the System, which shall be--
``(i) set at a level that will ensure recovery of the full
costs of providing and administering the System; and
``(ii) available to pay the costs incurred to administer
the System.
``(C) Validity.--
``(i) Period.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State shall prescribe
regulations that provide for a period, not to exceed 3 years,
during which a determination of eligibility to travel under
the program will be valid. Notwithstanding any other
provision under this section, the Secretary of Homeland
Security may revoke any such determination at any time and
for any reason.
``(ii) Limitation.--A determination that an alien is
eligible to travel to the United States under the program is
not a determination that the alien is admissible to the
United States.
``(iii) Judicial review.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review
an eligibility determination under the System.
``(D) Report.--Not later than 60 days before publishing
notice regarding the implementation of the System in the
Federal Register, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
submit a report regarding the implementation of the System
to--
``(i) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
``(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
``(iii) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
``(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
``(v) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives;
``(vi) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives;
``(vii) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives; and
``(viii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.''.
(2) Effective date.--Section 217(a)(11) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as added by paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall
take effect on the date which is 60 days after the date on
which the Secretary of Homeland Security publishes notice in
the Federal Register of the requirement under such paragraph.
(e) Exit System.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall establish an exit system that records the departure on
a flight leaving the United States of every alien
participating in the visa waiver program established under
section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1187).
(2) System requirements.--The system established under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) match biometric information of the alien against
relevant watch lists and immigration information; and
(B) compare such biometric information against manifest
information collected by air carriers on passengers departing
the United States to confirm such individuals have departed
the United States.

[[Page S2306]]

(3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress that describes--
(A) the progress made in developing and deploying the exit
system established under this subsection; and
(B) the procedures by which the Secretary will improve the
manner of calculating the rates of nonimmigrants who violate
the terms of their visas by remaining in the United States
after the expiration of such visas.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section and the amendments made by this section.

SEC. 402. STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HUMAN
SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER.

(a) In General.--Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1777) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``address'' and
inserting ``integrate and disseminate intelligence and
information related to'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsections:
``(d) Director.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
nominate an official of the Government of the United States
to serve as the Director of the Center, in accordance with
the requirements of the memorandum of understanding entitled
the `Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) Charter'.
``(e) Staffing of the Center.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
cooperation with heads of other relevant agencies and
departments, shall ensure that the Center is staffed with not
fewer than 40 full-time equivalent positions, including, as
appropriate, detailees from the following:
``(A) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
``(B) The Transportation Security Administration.
``(C) The United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
``(D) The United States Customs and Border Protection.
``(E) The United States Coast Guard.
``(F) The United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
``(G) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(H) The Department of Defense.
``(I) The Department of the Treasury.
``(J) The National Counterterrorism Center.
``(K) The National Security Agency.
``(L) The Department of Justice.
``(M) The Department of State.
``(N) Any other relevant agency or department.
``(2) Expertise of detailees.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in cooperation with the head of each agency,
department, or other entity set out under paragraph (1),
shall ensure that the detailees provided to the Center under
paragraph (1) include an adequate number of personnel with
experience in the area of--
``(A) consular affairs;
``(B) counterterrorism;
``(C) criminal law enforcement;
``(D) intelligence analysis;
``(E) prevention and detection of document fraud;
``(F) border inspection; or
``(G) immigration enforcement.
``(3) Reimbursement for detailees.--To the extent that
funds are available for such purpose, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall provide reimbursement to each agency
or department that provides a detailee to the Center, in such
amount or proportion as is appropriate for costs associated
with the provision of such detailee, including costs for
travel by, and benefits provided to, such detailee.
``(f) Administrative Support and Funding.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall provide to the Center the
administrative support and funding required for its
maintenance, including funding for personnel, leasing of
office space, supplies, equipment, technology, training, and
travel expenses necessary for the Center to carry out its
functions.''.
(b) Report.--Subsection (g) of section 7202 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8
U.S.C. 1777), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2), is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Report'' and inserting
``Initial report'';
(2) by redesignating such subsection (g) as paragraph (1);
(3) by indenting such paragraph, as so designated, four ems
from the left margin;
(4) by inserting before such paragraph, as so designated,
the following:
``(g) Report.--''; and
(5) by inserting after such paragraph, as so designated,
the following new paragraph:
``(2) Follow-up report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of
2007, the President shall transmit to Congress a report
regarding the operation of the Center and the activities
carried out by the Center, including a description of--
``(A) the roles and responsibilities of each agency or
department that is participating in the Center;
``(B) the mechanisms used to share information among each
such agency or department;
``(C) the staff provided to the Center by each such agency
or department;
``(D) the type of information and reports being
disseminated by the Center; and
``(E) any efforts by the Center to create a centralized
Federal Government database to store information related to
illicit travel of foreign nationals, including a description
of any such database and of the manner in which information
utilized in such a database would be collected, stored, and
shared.''.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out section 7202
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (8 U.S.C. 1777), as amended by this section, $20,000,000
for fiscal year 2008.

SEC. 403. ENHANCEMENTS TO THE TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

Section 7215 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 123) is amended to read as
follows:

``SEC. 7215. TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

``(a) Requirement To Establish.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center and consistent with the strategy
developed under section 7201, shall establish a program to
oversee the implementation of the Secretary's
responsibilities with respect to terrorist travel.
``(b) Head of the Program.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall designate an official of the Department of
Homeland Security to be responsible for carrying out the
program. Such official shall be--
``(1) the Assistant Secretary for Policy of the Department
of Homeland Security; or
``(2) an official appointed by the Secretary who reports
directly to the Secretary.
``(c) Duties.--The official designated under subsection (b)
shall assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in improving
the Department's ability to prevent terrorists from entering
the United States or remaining in the United States
undetected by--
``(1) developing relevant strategies and policies;
``(2) reviewing the effectiveness of existing programs and
recommending improvements, if necessary;
``(3) making recommendations on budget requests and on the
allocation of funding and personnel;
``(4) ensuring effective coordination, with respect to
policies, programs, planning, operations, and dissemination
of intelligence and information related to terrorist travel--
``(A) among appropriate subdivisions of the Department of
Homeland Security, as determined by the Secretary and
including--
``(i) the United States Customs and Border Protection;
``(ii) the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
``(iii) the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services;
``(iv) the Transportation Security Administration; and
``(v) the United States Coast Guard; and
``(B) between the Department of Homeland Security and other
appropriate Federal agencies; and
``(5) serving as the Secretary's primary point of contact
with the National Counterterrorism Center for implementing
initiatives related to terrorist travel and ensuring that the
recommendations of the Center related to terrorist travel are
carried out by the Department.
``(d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report on the implementation of
this section.''.

SEC. 404. ENHANCED DRIVER'S LICENSE.

Section 7209(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1185 note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in clause (vi), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in clause (vii), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(viii) the signing of a memorandum of agreement to
initiate a pilot program with not less than 1 State to
determine if an enhanced driver's license, which is machine-
readable and tamper proof, not valid for certification of
citizenship for any purpose other than admission into the
United States from Canada, and issued by such State to an
individual, may permit the individual to use the driver's
license to meet the documentation requirements under
subparagraph (A) for entry into the United States from Canada
at the land and sea ports of entry.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the initiation
of the pilot program described in subparagraph (B)(viii), the
Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report,
which includes--
``(i) an analysis of the impact of the pilot program on
national security;
``(ii) recommendations on how to expand the pilot program
to other States;
``(iii) any appropriate statutory changes to facilitate the
expansion of the pilot program to additional States and to
citizens of Canada;
``(iv) a plan to scan individuals participating in the
pilot program against United States terrorist watch lists;
and
``(v) a recommendation for the type of machine-readable
technology that should be used in enhanced driver's licenses,
based on individual privacy considerations and the costs and
feasibility of incorporating any new technology into existing
driver's licenses.''.

SEC. 405. WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE.

Before publishing a final rule in the Federal Register, the
Secretary shall conduct--
(1) a complete cost-benefit analysis of the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, authorized under section 7209
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 8 U.S.C. 1185 note); and

[[Page S2307]]

(2) a study of the mechanisms by which the execution fee
for a PASS Card could be reduced, considering the potential
increase in the number of applications.

TITLE V--PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES MATTERS

SEC. 501. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

(a) Modification of Authorities.--Section 1061 of the
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of
Public Law 108-458; 5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended to read as
follows:

``SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

``(a) In General.--There is established within the
Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this section as the
`Board').
``(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
``(1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government
may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of
its existing powers.
``(2) This shift of power and authority to the Government
calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to
protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of
life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for
the purposes for which the powers were given.
``(c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
``(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes
to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need
for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy
and civil liberties; and
``(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered in the development and implementation of laws,
regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism.
``(d) Functions.--
``(1) Advice and counsel on policy development and
implementation.--The Board shall--
``(A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and
policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from
terrorism, including the development and adoption of
information sharing guidelines under subsections (d) and (f)
of section 1016;
``(B) review the implementation of new and existing
legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism, including the
implementation of information sharing guidelines under
subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016;
``(C) advise the President and the departments, agencies,
and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy
and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of such legislation,
regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
``(D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance
a particular governmental power, consider whether the
department, agency, or element of the executive branch has
established--
``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need
to protect privacy and civil liberties;
``(ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the
executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy
and civil liberties; and
``(iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
``(2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
``(A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the
implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures,
of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive
branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are
protected;
``(B) the information sharing practices of the departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine
whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil
liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines
issued or developed under subsections (d) and (f) of section
1016 and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies
regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
``(C) other actions by the executive branch related to
efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine
whether such actions--
``(i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties;
and
``(ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and
policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.
``(3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties
officers.--The Board shall--
``(A) review and assess reports and other information from
privacy officers and civil liberties officers under section
1062;
``(B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such
privacy officers and civil liberties officers regarding their
activities; and
``(C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such
privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant
interagency matters.
``(4) Testimony.--The members of the Board shall appear and
testify before Congress upon request.
``(e) Reports.--
``(1) In general.--The Board shall--
``(A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and
civil liberties officers under section 1062; and
``(B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually,
reports--
``(i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress,
including the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
``(II) to the President; and
``(ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
``(2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each
year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
``(A) a description of the major activities of the Board
during the preceding period;
``(B) information on the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (d);
``(C) the minority views on any findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (d);
``(D) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection
(d)(1) that--
``(i) the Board advised against implementation; and
``(ii) notwithstanding such advice, actions were taken to
implement; and
``(E) for the preceding period, any requests submitted
under subsection (g)(1)(D) for the issuance of subpoenas that
were modified or denied by the Attorney General.
``(f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
``(1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress,
available to the public to the greatest extent that is
consistent with the protection of classified information and
applicable law; and
``(2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public
of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent
with the protection of classified information and applicable
law.
``(g) Access to Information.--
``(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this
section, the Board is authorized to--
``(A) have access from any department, agency, or element
of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee,
to all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,
papers, recommendations, or other relevant material,
including classified information consistent with applicable
law;
``(B) interview, take statements from, or take public
testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or
element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or
employee;
``(C) request information or assistance from any State,
tribal, or local government; and
``(D) at the direction of a majority of the members of the
Board, submit a written request to the Attorney General of
the United States that the Attorney General require, by
subpoena, persons (other than departments, agencies, and
elements of the executive branch) to produce any relevant
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence.
``(2) Review of subpoena request.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
receipt of a request by the Board under paragraph (1)(D), the
Attorney General shall--
``(i) issue the subpoena as requested; or
``(ii) provide the Board, in writing, with an explanation
of the grounds on which the subpoena request has been
modified or denied.
``(B) Notification.--If a subpoena request is modified or
denied under subparagraph (A)(ii), the Attorney General
shall, not later than 30 days after the date of that
modification or denial, notify the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives.
``(3) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or
failure to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to paragraph
(1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial
district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served,
or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to
produce the evidence required by such subpoena.
``(4) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or
assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably
refused or not provided, the Board shall report the
circumstances to the head of the department, agency, or
element concerned without delay. The head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall ensure that the Board is
given access to the information, assistance, material, or
personnel the Board determines to be necessary to carry out
its functions.
``(h) Membership.--
``(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time
chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
``(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be
selected solely on the basis of their professional
qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in
civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and
without regard to political affiliation, but in no event
shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same
political party.
``(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the
Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected
official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government,
other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
``(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of
6 years, except that--
``(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the
commencement of such term may serve under such appointment
only for the remainder of such term;
``(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a
member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's
successor has been appointed

[[Page S2308]]

and qualified, except that no member may serve under this
subparagraph--
``(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been
submitted to the Senate; or
``(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
``(C) the members first appointed under this subsection
after the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007 shall serve terms of two, three, four,
five, and six years, respectively, with the term of each such
member to be designated by the President.
``(5) Quorum and meetings.--After its initial meeting, the
Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority
of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum.
``(i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
``(1) Compensation.--
``(A) Chairman.--The chairman of the Board shall be
compensated at the rate of pay payable for a position at
level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of
title 5, United States Code.
``(B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be
compensated at a rate of pay payable for a position at level
IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board.
``(2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be
allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed
intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of
title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Board.
``(j) Staff.--
``(1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman of the
Board, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board,
shall appoint and fix the compensation of a full-time
executive director and such other personnel as may be
necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions,
without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States
Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and
without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter
III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification
and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay
fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that
payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule
under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
``(2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to
the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such
detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of
the detailee's regular employment without interruption.
``(3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the
temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants
in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States
Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a
person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of such title.
``(k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall
cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board
members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible under existing procedures and requirements.
``(l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The
Board--
``(1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title
5, United States Code); and
``(2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section
3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).
``(m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section
amounts as follows:
``(1) For fiscal year 2008, $5,000,000.
``(2) For fiscal year 2009, $6,650,000.
``(3) For fiscal year 2010, $8,300,000.
``(4) For fiscal year 2011, $10,000,000.
``(5) For fiscal year 2012, and each fiscal year
thereafter, such sums as may be necessary.''.
(b) Continuation of Service of Current Members of Privacy
and Civil Liberties Board.--The members of the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board as of the date of enactment
of this Act may continue to serve as members of that Board
after that date, and to carry out the functions and exercise
the powers of that Board as specified in section 1061 of the
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (as amended
by subsection (a)), until--
(1) in the case of any individual serving as a member of
the Board under an appointment by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, the expiration of a
term designated by the President under section 1061(h)(4)(C)
of such Act (as so amended);
(2) in the case of any individual serving as a member of
the Board other than under an appointment by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the
confirmation or rejection by the Senate of that member's
nomination to the Board under such section 1061 (as so
amended), except that no such individual may serve as a
member under this paragraph--
(A) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session
unless a nomination of that individual to be a member of the
Board has been submitted to the Senate; or
(B) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination is submitted; or
(3) the appointment of members of the Board under such
section 1061 (as so amended), except that no member may serve
under this paragraph--
(A) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill the position on the Board shall
have been submitted to the Senate; or
(B) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination is submitted.

SEC. 502. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

(a) In General.--Section 1062 of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-
458; 118 Stat. 3688) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 1062. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

``(a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or
element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board under section 1061 to be
appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate
not less than 1 senior officer to--
``(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or
element and other officials of such department, agency, or
element in appropriately considering privacy and civil
liberties concerns when such officials are proposing,
developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies,
procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism;
``(2) periodically investigate and review department,
agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines,
and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such
department, agency, or element is adequately considering
privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
``(3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has
adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and
redress complaints from individuals who allege such
department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or
civil liberties; and
``(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance
a particular governmental power the officer shall consider
whether such department, agency, or element has established--
``(A) that the need for the power is balanced with the need
to protect privacy and civil liberties;
``(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such
department, agency, or element of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
``(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
``(b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
``(1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or
element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which has a
statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall
perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with
respect to privacy.
``(2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency,
or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties
officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified
in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer
or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b)
shall--
``(1) report directly to the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned; and
``(2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector
General of such department, agency, or element to avoid
duplication of effort.
``(d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department,
agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and
civil liberties officer--
``(1) has the information, material, and resources
necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer;
``(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
``(3) is consulted by decision makers; and
``(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer
determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such
officer.
``(e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action
constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a
complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer
or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or
(b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or
civil liberties in the administration of the programs and
operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any
Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with
the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for
its truth or falsity.
``(f) Periodic Reports.--
``(1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties
officers of each department, agency, or element referred to
or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but
not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of
such officers--
``(A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress,
including the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
``(ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element;
and
``(iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board;
and
``(B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.

[[Page S2309]]

``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include information on the discharge of each of the
functions of the officer concerned, including--
``(A) information on the number and types of reviews
undertaken;
``(B) the type of advice provided and the response given to
such advice;
``(C) the number and nature of the complaints received by
the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged
violations; and
``(D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the
reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the
activities of such officer.
``(g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil
liberties officer shall--
``(1) make the reports of such officer, including reports
to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent
that is consistent with the protection of classified
information and applicable law; and
``(2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such
officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the
protection of classified information and applicable law.
``(h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other
authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy
officers or civil liberties officers.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458) is amended by striking the item relating
to section 1062 and inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 1062. Privacy and civil liberties officers.''.

SEC. 503. DEPARTMENT PRIVACY OFFICER.

Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
142) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a) Appointment and Responsibilities.--
'' before ``The Secretary''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Authority To Investigate.--
``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under
subsection (a) may--
``(A) have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews,
documents, papers, recommendations, and other materials
available to the Department that relate to programs and
operations with respect to the responsibilities of the senior
official under this section;
``(B) make such investigations and reports relating to the
administration of the programs and operations of the
Department that are necessary or desirable as determined by
that senior official;
``(C) subject to the approval of the Secretary, require by
subpoena the production, by any person other than a Federal
agency, of all information, documents, reports, answers,
records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary
evidence necessary to performance of the responsibilities of
the senior official under this section; and
``(D) administer to or take from any person an oath,
affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary to performance
of the responsibilities of the senior official under this
section.
``(2) Enforcement of subpoenas.--Any subpoena issued under
paragraph (1)(C) shall, in the case of contumacy or refusal
to obey, be enforceable by order of any appropriate United
States district court.
``(3) Effect of oaths.--Any oath, affirmation, or affidavit
administered or taken under paragraph (1)(D) by or before an
employee of the Privacy Office designated for that purpose by
the senior official appointed under subsection (a) shall have
the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or
before an officer having a seal of office.
``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--
``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under
subsection (a) shall--
``(A) report to, and be under the general supervision of,
the Secretary; and
``(B) coordinate activities with the Inspector General of
the Department in order to avoid duplication of effort.
``(2) Notification to congress on removal.--If the
Secretary removes the senior official appointed under
subsection (a) or transfers that senior official to another
position or location within the Department, the Secretary
shall--
``(A) promptly submit a written notification of the removal
or transfer to Houses of Congress; and
``(B) include in any such notification the reasons for the
removal or transfer.
``(d) Reports by Senior Official to Congress.--The senior
official appointed under subsection (a) shall--
``(1) submit reports directly to the Congress regarding
performance of the responsibilities of the senior official
under this section, without any prior comment or amendment by
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other officer or
employee of the Department or the Office of Management and
Budget; and
``(2) inform the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives not later
than--
``(A) 30 days after the Secretary disapproves the senior
official's request for a subpoena under subsection (b)(1)(C)
or the Secretary substantively modifies the requested
subpoena; or
``(B) 45 days after the senior official's request for a
subpoena under subsection (b)(1)(C), if that subpoena has not
either been approved or disapproved by the Secretary.''.

SEC. 504. FEDERAL AGENCY DATA MINING REPORTING ACT OF 2007.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007''.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Data mining.--The term ``data mining'' means a query,
search, or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases,
where--
(A) a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a
non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal
Government, is conducting the query, search, or other
analysis to discover or locate a predictive pattern or
anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the
part of any individual or individuals; and
(B) the query, search, or other analysis does not use
personal identifiers of a specific individual, or inputs
associated with a specific individual or group of
individuals, to retrieve information from the database or
databases.
(2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include
telephone directories, news reporting, information publicly
available to any member of the public without payment of a
fee, or databases of judicial and administrative opinions.
(c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal
Agencies.--
(1) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or
agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any
activity to use or develop data mining shall submit a report
to Congress on all such activities of the department or
agency under the jurisdiction of that official. The report
shall be made available to the public, except for a
classified annex described paragraph (2)(H).
(2) Content of report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include, for each activity to use or
develop data mining, the following information:
(A) A thorough description of the data mining activity, its
goals, and, where appropriate, the target dates for the
deployment of the data mining activity.
(B) A thorough description of the data mining technology
that is being used or will be used, including the basis for
determining whether a particular pattern or anomaly is
indicative of terrorist or criminal activity.
(C) A thorough description of the data sources that are
being or will be used.
(D) An assessment of the efficacy or likely efficacy of the
data mining activity in providing accurate information
consistent with and valuable to the stated goals and plans
for the use or development of the data mining activity.
(E) An assessment of the impact or likely impact of the
implementation of the data mining activity on the privacy and
civil liberties of individuals, including a thorough
description of the actions that are being taken or will be
taken with regard to the property, privacy, or other rights
or privileges of any individual or individuals as a result of
the implementation of the data mining activity.
(F) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations that
govern the information being or to be collected, reviewed,
gathered, analyzed, or used with the data mining activity.
(G) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures, and
guidelines that are in place or that are to be developed and
applied in the use of such technology for data mining in
order to--
(i) protect the privacy and due process rights of
individuals, such as redress procedures; and
(ii) ensure that only accurate information is collected,
reviewed, gathered, analyzed, or used.
(H) Any necessary classified information in an annex that
shall be available, as appropriate, to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
the Judiciary, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee
on Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Time for report.--Each report required under paragraph
(1) shall be--
(A) submitted not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act; and
(B) updated not less frequently than annually thereafter,
to include any activity to use or develop data mining engaged
in after the date of the prior report submitted under
paragraph (1).

TITLE VI--ENHANCED DEFENSES AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

SEC. 601. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

(a) In General.--Title III of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:

``SEC. 316. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `biological event of national significance'
means--
``(A) an act of terrorism that uses a biological agent,
toxin, or other product derived from a biological agent; or
``(B) a naturally-occurring outbreak of an infectious
disease that may result in a national epidemic;
``(2) the term `Member Agencies' means the departments and
agencies described in subsection (d)(1);
``(3) the term `NBIC' means the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center established under subsection (b);
``(4) the term `NBIS' means the National Biosurveillance
Integration System established under subsection (b); and
``(5) the term `Privacy Officer' means the Privacy Officer
appointed under section 222.
``(b) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish,
operate, and maintain a National Biosurveillance Integration
Center, headed by a Directing Officer, under an existing
office or directorate of the Department, subject to the
availability of appropriations, to oversee development and
operation of the National Biosurveillance Integration System.
``(c) Primary Mission.--The primary mission of the NBIC is
to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to--
``(1) rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a
biological event of national significance by integrating and
analyzing data from

[[Page S2310]]

human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental
monitoring systems (both national and international); and
``(2) disseminate alerts and other information regarding
such data analysis to Member Agencies and, in consultation
with relevant member agencies, to agencies of State, local,
and tribal governments, as appropriate, to enhance the
ability of such agencies to respond to a biological event of
national significance.
``(d) Requirements.--The NBIC shall design the NBIS to
detect, as early as possible, a biological event of national
significance that presents a risk to the United States or the
infrastructure or key assets of the United States,
including--
``(1) if a Federal department or agency, at the discretion
of the head of that department or agency, has entered a
memorandum of understanding regarding participation in the
NBIC, consolidating data from all relevant surveillance
systems maintained by that department or agency to detect
biological events of national significance across human,
animal, and plant species;
``(2) seeking private sources of surveillance, both foreign
and domestic, when such sources would enhance coverage of
critical surveillance gaps;
``(3) using an information technology system that uses the
best available statistical and other analytical tools to
identify and characterize biological events of national
significance in as close to real-time as is practicable;
``(4) providing the infrastructure for such integration,
including information technology systems and space, and
support for personnel from Member Agencies with sufficient
expertise to enable analysis and interpretation of data;
``(5) working with Member Agencies to create information
technology systems that use the minimum amount of patient
data necessary and consider patient confidentiality and
privacy issues at all stages of development and apprise the
Privacy Officer of such efforts; and
``(6) alerting relevant Member Agencies and, in
consultation with relevant Member Agencies, public health
agencies of State, local, and tribal governments regarding
any incident that could develop into a biological event of
national significance.
``(e) Responsibilities of the Secretary.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall--
``(A) ensure that the NBIC is fully operational not later
than September 30, 2008;
``(B) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment
of this section and on the date that the NBIC is fully
operational, submit a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives on the progress of making the NBIC
operational addressing the efforts of the NBIC to integrate
surveillance efforts of Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments.
``(f) Responsibilities of the Directing Officer of the
NBIC.--
``(1) In general.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC
shall--
``(A) establish an entity to perform all operations and
assessments related to the NBIS;
``(B) on an ongoing basis, monitor the availability and
appropriateness of contributing surveillance systems and
solicit new surveillance systems that would enhance
biological situational awareness or overall performance of
the NBIS;
``(C) on an ongoing basis, review and seek to improve the
statistical and other analytical methods utilized by the
NBIS;
``(D) receive and consider other relevant homeland security
information, as appropriate; and
``(E) provide technical assistance, as appropriate, to all
Federal, regional, State, local, and tribal government
entities and private sector entities that contribute data
relevant to the operation of the NBIS.
``(2) Assessments.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC
shall--
``(A) on an ongoing basis, evaluate available data for
evidence of a biological event of national significance; and
``(B) integrate homeland security information with NBIS
data to provide overall situational awareness and determine
whether a biological event of national significance has
occurred.
``(3) Information sharing.--
``(A) In general.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC
shall--
``(i) establish a method of real-time communication with
the National Operations Center, to be known as the Biological
Common Operating Picture;
``(ii) in the event that a biological event of national
significance is detected, notify the Secretary and
disseminate results of NBIS assessments related to that
biological event of national significance to appropriate
Federal response entities and, in consultation with relevant
member agencies, regional, State, local, and tribal
governmental response entities in a timely manner;
``(iii) provide any report on NBIS assessments to Member
Agencies and, in consultation with relevant member agencies,
any affected regional, State, local, or tribal government,
and any private sector entity considered appropriate that may
enhance the mission of such Member Agencies, governments, or
entities or the ability of the Nation to respond to
biological events of national significance; and
``(iv) share NBIS incident or situational awareness
reports, and other relevant information, consistent with the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and any policies, guidelines,
procedures, instructions, or standards established by the
President or the program manager for the implementation and
management of that environment.
``(B) Coordination.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC
shall implement the activities described in subparagraph (A)
in coordination with the program manager for the information
sharing environment of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, and other offices or agencies of the Federal
Government, as appropriate.
``(g) Responsibilities of the NBIC Member Agencies.--
``(1) In general.--Each Member Agency shall--
``(A) use its best efforts to integrate biosurveillance
information into the NBIS, with the goal of promoting
information sharing between Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments to detect biological events of national
significance;
``(B) participate in the formation and maintenance of the
Biological Common Operating Picture to facilitate timely and
accurate detection and reporting;
``(C) connect the biosurveillance data systems of that
Member Agency to the NBIC data system under mutually-agreed
protocols that maintain patient confidentiality and privacy;
``(D) participate in the formation of strategy and policy
for the operation of the NBIC and its information sharing;
and
``(E) provide personnel to the NBIC under an interagency
personnel agreement and consider the qualifications of such
personnel necessary to provide human, animal, and
environmental data analysis and interpretation support to the
NBIC.
``(h) Administrative Authorities.--
``(1) Hiring of experts.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC
shall hire individuals with the necessary expertise to
develop and operate the NBIS.
``(2) Detail of personnel.--Upon the request of the
Directing Officer of the NBIC, the head of any Federal
department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable basis, any
of the personnel of that department or agency to the
Department to assist the NBIC in carrying out this section.
``(i) Joint Biosurveillance Leadership Council.--The
Directing Officer of the NBIC shall--
``(1) establish an interagency coordination council to
facilitate interagency cooperation and to advise the
Directing Officer of the NBIC regarding recommendations to
enhance the biosurveillance capabilities of the Department;
and
``(2) invite Member Agencies to serve on such council.
``(j) Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies.--The
authority of the Directing Officer of the NBIC under this
section shall not affect any authority or responsibility of
any other department or agency of the Federal Government with
respect to biosurveillance activities under any program
administered by that department or agency.
``(k) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to
carry out this section.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 315 the following:

``Sec. 316. National Biosurveillance Integration Center.''.

SEC. 602. BIOSURVEILLANCE EFFORTS.

The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a
report to Congress describing--
(1) the state of Federal, State, local, and tribal
government biosurveillance efforts as of the date of such
report;
(2) any duplication of effort at the Federal, State, local,
or tribal government level to create biosurveillance systems;
and
(3) the integration of biosurveillance systems to allow the
maximizing of biosurveillance resources and the expertise of
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to benefit
public health.

SEC. 603. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TO ENHANCE DEFENSES
AGAINST NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is
amended by adding after section 1906, as redesignated by
section 203 of this Act, the following:

``SEC. 1907. JOINT ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION
ARCHITECTURE.

``(a) Annual Review.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence shall
jointly ensure interagency coordination on the development
and implementation of the global nuclear detection
architecture by ensuring that, not less frequently than once
each year--
``(A) each relevant agency, office, or entity--
``(i) assesses its involvement, support, and participation
in the development, revision, and implementation of the
global nuclear detection architecture;
``(ii) examines and evaluates components of the global
nuclear detection architecture (including associated
strategies and acquisition plans) that are related to the
operations of that agency, office, or entity, to determine
whether such components incorporate and address current
threat assessments, scenarios, or intelligence analyses
developed by the Director of National Intelligence or other
agencies regarding threats related to nuclear or radiological
weapons of mass destruction; and
``(B) each agency, office, or entity deploying or operating
any technology acquired by the Office--
``(i) evaluates the deployment and operation of that
technology by that agency, office, or entity;
``(ii) identifies detection performance deficiencies and
operational or technical deficiencies in that technology; and

[[Page S2311]]

``(iii) assesses the capacity of that agency, office, or
entity to implement the responsibilities of that agency,
office, or entity under the global nuclear detection
architecture.
``(2) Technology.--Not less frequently than once each year,
the Secretary shall examine and evaluate the development,
assessment, and acquisition of technology by the Office.
``(b) Annual Report.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than March 31 of each year,
the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
submit a report regarding the compliance of such officials
with this section and the results of the reviews required
under subsection (a) to--
``(A) the President;
``(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
``(C) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives.
``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form to the maximum extent
practicable, but may include a classified annex.
``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `global
nuclear detection architecture' means the global nuclear
detection architecture developed under section 1902.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101 note) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1906, as added by section 203 of this
Act, the following:

``Sec. 1907. Joint annual review of global nuclear detection
architecture.''.

TITLE VII--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

SEC. 701. DEFINITIONS.

(a) In General.--In this title, the term ``voluntary
national preparedness standards'' has the meaning given that
term in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act.
(b) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(17) The term `voluntary national preparedness standards'
means a common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster
management, emergency management, and business continuity
programs, such as the American National Standards Institute's
National Fire Protection Association Standard on Disaster/
Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/
NFPA 1600).''.

SEC. 702. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR OFFICE OF
THE DEPARTMENT.

(a) In General.--Section 102(f) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112(f)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) through (10) as
paragraphs (9) through (11), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
``(8) providing information to the private sector regarding
voluntary national preparedness standards and the business
justification for preparedness and promoting to the private
sector the adoption of voluntary national preparedness
standards;''.
(b) Private Sector Advisory Councils.--Section 102(f)(4) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112(f)(4)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``and'' at the end; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) advise the Secretary on private sector preparedness
issues, including effective methods for--
``(i) promoting voluntary national preparedness standards
to the private sector;
``(ii) assisting the private sector in adopting voluntary
national preparedness standards; and
``(iii) developing and implementing the accreditation and
certification program under section 522;''.

SEC. 703. VOLUNTARY NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STANDARDS
COMPLIANCE; ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

(a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:

``SEC. 522. VOLUNTARY NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STANDARDS
COMPLIANCE; ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

``(a) Accreditation and Certification Program.--Not later
than 120 days after the date of enactment of this section,
the Secretary, in consultation with representatives of the
organizations that coordinate or facilitate the development
of and use of voluntary consensus standards, appropriate
voluntary consensus standards development organizations, and
each private sector advisory council created under section
102(f)(4), shall--
``(1) support the development, promulgating, and updating,
as necessary, of voluntary national preparedness standards;
and
``(2) develop, implement, and promote a program to certify
the preparedness of private sector entities.
``(b) Program Elements.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Program.--The program developed and implemented under
this section shall assess whether a private sector entity
complies with voluntary national preparedness standards.
``(B) Guidelines.--In developing the program under this
section, the Secretary shall develop guidelines for the
accreditation and certification processes established under
this section.
``(2) Standards.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
American National Standards Institute and representatives of
appropriate voluntary consensus standards development
organizations and each private sector advisory council
created under section 102(f)(4)--
``(A) shall adopt appropriate voluntary national
preparedness standards that promote preparedness, which shall
be used in the accreditation and certification program under
this section; and
``(B) after the adoption of standards under subparagraph
(A), may adopt additional voluntary national preparedness
standards or modify or discontinue the use of voluntary
national preparedness standards for the accreditation and
certification program, as necessary and appropriate to
promote preparedness.
``(3) Tiering.--The certification program developed under
this section may use a multiple-tiered system to rate the
preparedness of a private sector entity.
``(4) Small business concerns.--The Secretary and any
selected entity shall establish separate classifications and
methods of certification for small business concerns (as that
term is defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15
U.S.C. 632)) for the program under this section.
``(5) Considerations.--In developing and implementing the
program under this section, the Secretary shall--
``(A) consider the needs of the insurance industry, the
credit-ratings industry, and other industries that may
consider preparedness of private sector entities, to assess
the preparedness of private sector entities; and
``(B) ensure the program accommodates those needs where
appropriate and feasible.
``(c) Accreditation and Certification Processes.--
``(1) Agreement.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall enter into
1 or more agreements with the American National Standards
Institute or other similarly qualified nongovernmental or
other private sector entities to carry out accreditations and
oversee the certification process under this section.
``(B) Contents.--Any selected entity shall manage the
accreditation process and oversee the certification process
in accordance with the program established under this section
and accredit qualified third parties to carry out the
certification program established under this section.
``(2) Procedures and requirements for accreditation and
certification.--
``(A) In general.--The selected entities shall collaborate
to develop procedures and requirements for the accreditation
and certification processes under this section, in accordance
with the program established under this section and
guidelines developed under subsection (b)(1)(B).
``(B) Contents and use.--The procedures and requirements
developed under subparagraph (A) shall--
``(i) ensure reasonable uniformity in the accreditation and
certification processes if there is more than 1 selected
entity; and
``(ii) be used by any selected entity in conducting
accreditations and overseeing the certification process under
this section.
``(C) Disagreement.--Any disagreement among selected
entities in developing procedures under subparagraph (A)
shall be resolved by the Secretary.
``(3) Designation.--A selected entity may accredit any
qualified third party to carry out the certification process
under this section.
``(4) Third parties.--To be accredited under paragraph (3),
a third party shall--
``(A) demonstrate that the third party has the ability to
certify private sector entities in accordance with the
procedures and requirements developed under paragraph (2);
``(B) agree to perform certifications in accordance with
such procedures and requirements;
``(C) agree not to have any beneficial interest in or any
direct or indirect control over--
``(i) a private sector entity for which that third party
conducts a certification under this section; or
``(ii) any organization that provides preparedness
consulting services to private sector entities;
``(D) agree not to have any other conflict of interest with
respect to any private sector entity for which that third
party conducts a certification under this section;
``(E) maintain liability insurance coverage at policy
limits in accordance with the requirements developed under
paragraph (2); and
``(F) enter into an agreement with the selected entity
accrediting that third party to protect any proprietary
information of a private sector entity obtained under this
section.
``(5) Monitoring.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary and any selected entity
shall regularly monitor and inspect the operations of any
third party conducting certifications under this section to
ensure that third party is complying with the procedures and
requirements established under paragraph (2) and all other
applicable requirements.
``(B) Revocation.--If the Secretary or any selected entity
determines that a third party is not meeting the procedures
or requirements established under paragraph (2), the
appropriate selected entity shall--
``(i) revoke the accreditation of that third party to
conduct certifications under this section; and
``(ii) review any certification conducted by that third
party, as necessary and appropriate.
``(d) Annual Review.--

[[Page S2312]]

``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with
representatives of the organizations that coordinate or
facilitate the development of and use of voluntary consensus
standards, appropriate voluntary consensus standards
development organizations, and each private sector advisory
council created under section 102(f)(4), shall annually
review the voluntary accreditation and certification program
established under this section to ensure the effectiveness of
such program and make improvements and adjustments to the
program as necessary and appropriate.
``(2) Review of standards.--Each review under paragraph (1)
shall include an assessment of the voluntary national
preparedness standards used in the program under this
section.
``(e) Voluntary Participation.--Certification under this
section shall be voluntary for any private sector entity.
``(f) Public Listing.--The Secretary shall maintain and
make public a listing of any private sector entity certified
as being in compliance with the program established under
this section, if that private sector entity consents to such
listing.
``(g) Definition.--In this section, the term `selected
entity' means any entity entering an agreement with the
Secretary under subsection (c)(1)(A).''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 521 the following:

``Sec. 522. Voluntary national preparedness standards compliance;
accreditation and certification program for the private
sector.''.

SEC. 704. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PROMOTING AN
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
PREPAREDNESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary or any
entity designated under section 522(c)(1)(A) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as added by this Act, should promote,
where appropriate, efforts to develop a consistent
international standard for private sector preparedness.

SEC. 705. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report detailing--
(1) any action taken to implement this title or an
amendment made by this title; and
(2) the status, as of the date of that report, of the
implementation of this title and the amendments made by this
title.

SEC. 706. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title may be construed to supercede any
preparedness or business continuity standards or requirements
established under any other provision of Federal law.

TITLE VIII--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

SEC. 801. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

(a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(B) transportation modal and intermodal security plans
addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation,
bridge, tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime,
pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other
public transportation infrastructure assets.''.
(b) Contents of the National Strategy for Transportation
Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, based on risk
assessments conducted by the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``risk based priorities'';
(2) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and
tribal''; and
(B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and
participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation
by private sector entities and nonprofit employee labor
organizations'';
(3) in subparagraph (E)--
(A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention,
response,''; and
(B) by inserting ``and threatened and executed acts of
terrorism outside the United States to the extent such acts
affect United States transportation systems'' before the
period at the end;
(4) in subparagraph (F), by adding at the end the
following: ``Transportation security research and development
projects initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall be based on such prioritization.''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Short- and long-term budget recommendations for
Federal transportation security programs, which reflect the
priorities of the National Strategy for Transportation
Security.
``(H) Methods for linking the individual transportation
modal security plans and the programs contained therein, and
a plan for addressing the security needs of intermodal
transportation hubs.
``(I) Transportation security modal and intermodal plans,
including operational recovery plans to expedite, to the
maximum extent practicable, the return of an adversely
affected transportation system to its normal performance
level preceding a major terrorist attack on that system or
another catastrophe. These plans shall be coordinated with
the resumption of trade protocols required under section 202
of the SAFE Port Act (6 U.S.C. 942).''.
(c) Periodic Progress Reports.--Section 114(t)(4) of such
title is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``, including the
transportation modal security plans'' before the period at
the end; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this
subparagraph shall include the following:

``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the
National Strategy for Transportation Security and the
transportation modal and intermodal security plans that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation
security, including grants for research and development,
distributed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the most
recently concluded fiscal year and a description of how such
grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for
Transportation Security.
``(III) An accounting of all--

``(aa) funds requested in the President's budget submitted
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 for the most recently
concluded fiscal year for transportation security, by mode;
and
``(bb) personnel working on transportation security issues,
including the number of contractors.
``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security
activities not delineated in the national strategy for
transportation security.--At the end of each year, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a written explanation of
any activity inconsistent with, or not clearly delineated in,
the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including
the amount of funds to be expended for the activity.''; and
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``Select''.
(d) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is
amended--
(1) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
(3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required
under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and''.
(e) Coordination and Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of
such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities
under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
consult with Federal, State, and local agencies, tribal
governments, private sector entities (including nonprofit
employee labor organizations), institutions of higher
learning, and other appropriate entities.
``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall provide an unclassified version of the
National Strategy for Transportation Security, including its
component transportation modal security plans, to Federal,
State, regional, local and tribal authorities, transportation
system owners or operators, private sector stakeholders
(including non-profit employee labor organizations),
institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate
entities.''.

SEC. 802. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

(a) In General.--Section 114 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(u) Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.--
``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the program manager of the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary of Transportation, and
public and private stakeholders, shall establish a
Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.
``(2) Purpose of plan.--The Plan shall promote sharing of
transportation security information between the Department of
Homeland Security and public and private stakeholders.
``(3) Content of plan.--The Plan shall include--
``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts within the
Department of Homeland Security will coordinate their
activities within the Department and with other Federal,
State, and local agencies, and tribal governments;
``(B) an assignment of a single point of contact for and
within the Department of Homeland Security for its sharing of
transportation security information with public and private
stakeholders;
``(C) a demonstration of input on the development of the
Plan from private and public stakeholders and the program
manager of the information sharing environment established
under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485);
``(D) a reasonable deadline by which the Plan will be
implemented; and
``(E) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the
Plan.
``(4) Coordination with the information sharing
environment.--The Plan shall be--
``(A) implemented in coordination with the program manager
for the information sharing environment established under
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
``(B) consistent with and support the establishment of that
environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures,
instructions, or standards established by the President or
the program manager for the implementation and management of
that environment.
``(5) Reports to congress.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate

[[Page S2313]]

congressional committees a report containing the Plan.
``(B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report
on updates to and the implementation of the Plan.
``(6) Survey.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct an annual
survey of the satisfaction of each of the recipients of
transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the
Plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the
annual report to be submitted under paragraph (5)(B).
``(B) Information sought.--The annual survey conducted
under subparagraph (A) shall seek information about the
quality, speed, regularity, and classification of the
transportation security information products disseminated
from the Department of Homeland Security to public and
private stakeholders.
``(7) Security clearances.--The Secretary, to the greatest
extent practicable, shall facilitate the security clearances
needed for public and private stakeholders to receive and
obtain access to classified information as appropriate.
``(8) Classification of material.--The Secretary, to the
greatest extent practicable, shall provide public and private
stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an
unclassified format.
``(9) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given
that term in subsection (t).
``(B) Plan.--The term `Plan' means the Transportation
Security Information Sharing Plan established under paragraph
(1).
``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public
and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local
agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private
entities, including nonprofit employee labor organizations.
``(D) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.
``(E) Transportation security information.--The term
`transportation security information' means information
relating to the threats to and vulnerabilities and
consequences of transportation modes, including aviation,
bridge and tunnel, mass transit, passenger and freight rail,
ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, and over-the-road bus
transportation.''.
(b) Congressional Oversight of Security Assurance for
Public and Private Stakeholders.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary shall provide a semiannual report to the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House
of Representatives that--
(A) identifies the job titles and descriptions of the
persons with whom such information is to be shared under the
transportation security information sharing plan established
under section 114(u) of title 49, United States Code, as
added by this Act, and explains the reason for sharing the
information with such persons;
(B) describes the measures the Secretary has taken, under
section 114(u)(7) of that title, or otherwise, to ensure
proper treatment and security for any classified information
to be shared with the public and private stakeholders under
the plan; and
(C) explains the reason for the denial of transportation
security information to any stakeholder who had previously
received such information.
(2) No report required if no changes in stakeholders.--The
Secretary is not required to provide a semiannual report
under paragraph (1) if no stakeholders have been added to or
removed from the group of persons with whom transportation
security information is shared under the plan since the end
of the period covered by the last preceding semiannual
report.

SEC. 803. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT.

(a) TSA Employee Defined.--In this section, the term ``TSA
employee'' means an individual who holds--
(1) any position which was transferred (or the incumbent of
which was transferred) from the Transportation Security
Administration of the Department of Transportation to the
Department by section 403 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 203); or
(2) any other position within the Department the duties and
responsibilities of which include carrying out 1 or more of
the functions that were transferred from the Transportation
Security Administration of the Department of Transportation
to the Secretary by such section.
(b) Elimination of Certain Personnel Management
Authorities.--Effective 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act--
(1) section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is repealed and any
authority of the Secretary derived from such section 111(d)
shall terminate;
(2) any personnel management system, to the extent
established or modified under such section 111(d) (including
by the Secretary through the exercise of any authority
derived from such section 111(d)) shall terminate; and
(3) the Secretary shall ensure that all TSA employees are
subject to the same personnel management system as described
in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (e).
(c) Establishment of Certain Uniformity Requirements.--
(1) System under subsection (e)(1).--The Secretary shall,
with respect to any personnel management system described in
subsection (e)(1), take any measures which may be necessary
to provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA employees
under such system.
(2) System under subsection (e)(2).--Section 9701(b) of
title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(6) provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA
employees (as that term is defined in section 803 of the
Improving America's Security Act of 2007).''.
(3) Effective date.--
(A) Provisions relating to a system under subsection
(e)(1).--Any measures necessary to carry out paragraph (1)
shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(B) Provisions relating to a system under subsection
(e)(2).--Any measures necessary to carry out the amendments
made by paragraph (2) shall take effect on the later of 90
days after the date of enactment of this Act and the
commencement date of the system involved.
(d) Report to Congress.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report on--
(A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA
employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) any changes to such system which would be made under
any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97
of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a brief description of each pay system described in
paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
(B) a comparison of the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
(C) such other matters as the Comptroller General
determines appropriate.
(e) Personnel Management System Described.--A personnel
management system described in this subsection is--
(1) any personnel management system, to the extent that it
applies with respect to any TSA employees under section
114(n) of title 49, United States Code; and
(2) any human resources management system, established
under chapter 97 of title 5, United States Code.

TITLE IX--INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

SEC. 901. PREIDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
FACILITIES TO STRENGTHEN INCIDENT COMMAND;
PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS.

Section 507(c)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 317(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (I) as subparagraph (K);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (H) the following:
``(I) coordinating with the private sector to help ensure
private sector preparedness for natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, or other man-made disasters;
``(J) assisting State, local, or tribal governments, where
appropriate, to preidentify and evaluate suitable sites where
a multijurisdictional incident command system can be quickly
established and operated from, if the need for such a system
arises; and''.

SEC. 902. CREDENTIALING AND TYPING TO STRENGTHEN INCIDENT
COMMAND.

(a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 331 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by striking section 510 and inserting the following:

``SEC. 510. CREDENTIALING AND TYPING.

``(a) Credentialing.--
``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
``(A) the term `credential' means to provide documentation
that can authenticate and verify the qualifications and
identity of managers of incidents, emergency response
providers, and other appropriate personnel, including by
ensuring that such personnel possess a minimum common level
of training, experience, physical and medical fitness, and
capability appropriate for their position;
``(B) the term `credentialing' means evaluating an
individual's qualifications for a specific position under
guidelines created under this subsection and assigning such
individual a qualification under the standards developed
under this subsection; and
``(C) the term `credentialed' means an individual has been
evaluated for a specific position under the guidelines
created under this subsection.
``(2) Requirements.--
``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall enter into a
memorandum of understanding with the administrators of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and
tribal governments, emergency response providers, and the
organizations that represent such providers, to collaborate
on establishing nationwide standards for credentialing all
personnel who are likely to respond to a natural disaster,
act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(B) Contents.--The standards developed under subparagraph
(A) shall--
``(i) include the minimum professional qualifications,
certifications, training, and education requirements for
specific emergency response functional positions that are
applicable to Federal, State, local, and tribal government;

[[Page S2314]]

``(ii) be compatible with the National Incident Management
System; and
``(iii) be consistent with standards for advance
registration for health professions volunteers under section
319I of the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-7b).
``(C) Timeframe.--The Administrator shall develop standards
under subparagraph (A) not later than 6 months after the date
of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
``(3) Credentialing of department personnel.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the Secretary and the Administrator shall ensure that all
personnel of the Department (including temporary personnel
and individuals in the Surge Capacity Force established under
section 624 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 711)) who are likely to respond to a
natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made
disaster are credentialed.
``(B) Strategic human capital plan.--Not later than 90 days
after completion of the credentialing under subparagraph (A),
the Administrator shall evaluate whether the workforce of the
Agency complies with the strategic human capital plan of the
Agency developed under section 10102 of title 5, United
States Code, and is sufficient to respond to a catastrophic
incident.
``(4) Integration with national response plan.--
``(A) Distribution of standards.--Not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall provide the
standards developed under paragraph (2) to all Federal
agencies that have responsibilities under the National
Response Plan.
``(B) Credentialing of agencies.--Not later than 6 months
after the date on which the standards are provided under
subparagraph (A), each agency described in subparagraph (A)
shall--
``(i) ensure that all employees or volunteers of that
agency who are likely to respond to a natural disaster, act
of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are credentialed;
and
``(ii) submit to the Secretary the name of each
credentialed employee or volunteer of such agency.
``(C) Leadership.--The Administrator shall provide
leadership, guidance, and technical assistance to an agency
described in subparagraph (A) to facilitate the credentialing
process of that agency.
``(5) Documentation and database system.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the Administrator shall establish and maintain a
documentation and database system of Federal emergency
response providers and all other Federal personnel
credentialed to respond to a natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(B) Accessibility.--The documentation and database system
established under subparagraph (1) shall be accessible to the
Federal coordinating officer and other appropriate officials
preparing for or responding to a natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(C) Considerations.--The Administrator shall consider
whether the credentialing system can be used to regulate
access to areas affected by a natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(6) Guidance to state and local governments.--Not later
than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Improving
America's Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall--
``(A) in collaboration with the administrators of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and
tribal governments, emergency response providers, and the
organizations that represent such providers, provide detailed
written guidance, assistance, and expertise to State, local,
and tribal governments to facilitate the credentialing of
State, local, and tribal emergency response providers
commonly or likely to be used in responding to a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; and
``(B) in coordination with the administrators of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and
tribal governments, emergency response providers (and the
organizations that represent such providers), and appropriate
national professional organizations, assist State, local, and
tribal governments with credentialing the personnel of the
State, local, or tribal government under the guidance
provided under subparagraph (A).
``(7) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report describing the
implementation of this subsection, including the number and
level of qualification of Federal personnel trained and ready
to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other
man-made disaster.
``(b) Typing of Resources.--
``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
``(A) the term `typed' means an asset or resource that has
been evaluated for a specific function under the guidelines
created under this section; and
``(B) the term `typing' means to define in detail the
minimum capabilities of an asset or resource.
``(2) Requirements.--
``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall enter into a
memorandum of understanding with the administrators of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and
tribal governments, emergency response providers, and
organizations that represent such providers, to collaborate
on establishing nationwide standards for typing of resources
commonly or likely to be used in responding to a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(B) Contents.--The standards developed under subparagraph
(A) shall--
``(i) be applicable to Federal, State, local, and tribal
government; and
``(ii) be compatible with the National Incident Management
System.
``(3) Typing of department resources and assets.--Not later
than 1 year after the date of enactment of the Improving
America's Security Act of 2007, the Secretary shall ensure
that all resources and assets of the Department that are
commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are
typed.
``(4) Integration with national response plan.--
``(A) Distribution of standards.--Not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall provide the
standards developed under paragraph (2) to all Federal
agencies that have responsibilities under the National
Response Plan.
``(B) Typing of agencies, assets, and resources.--Not later
than 6 months after the date on which the standards are
provided under subparagraph (A), each agency described in
subparagraph (A) shall--
``(i) ensure that all resources and assets (including
teams, equipment, and other assets) of that agency that are
commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are
typed; and
``(ii) submit to the Secretary a list of all types
resources and assets.
``(C) Leadership.--The Administrator shall provide
leadership, guidance, and technical assistance to an agency
described in subparagraph (A) to facilitate the typing
process of that agency.
``(5) Documentation and database system.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the Administrator shall establish and maintain a
documentation and database system of Federal resources and
assets commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(B) Accessibility.--The documentation and database system
established under subparagraph (A) shall be accessible to the
Federal coordinating officer and other appropriate officials
preparing for or responding to a natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
``(6) Guidance to state and local governments.--Not later
than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Improving
America's Security Act of 2007, the Administrator, in
collaboration with the administrators of the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and tribal
governments, emergency response providers, and the
organizations that represent such providers, shall--
``(A) provide detailed written guidance, assistance, and
expertise to State, local, and tribal governments to
facilitate the typing of the resources and assets of State,
local, and tribal governments likely to be used in responding
to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made
disaster; and
``(B) assist State, local, and tribal governments with
typing resources and assets of State, local, or tribal
governments under the guidance provided under subparagraph
(A).
``(7) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report describing the
implementation of this subsection, including the number and
type of Federal resources and assets ready to respond to a
natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made
disaster.
``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary to carry
out this section.''; and
(2) by adding after section 522, as added by section 703 of
this Act, the following:

``SEC. 523. PROVIDING SECURE ACCESS TO CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE.

``Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of
the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, and in
coordination with appropriate national professional
organizations, Federal, State, local, and tribal government
agencies, and private-sector and nongovernmental entities,
the Administrator shall create model standards or guidelines
that States may adopt in conjunction with critical
infrastructure owners and operators and their employees to
permit access to restricted areas in the event of a natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101(b)) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 522, as added by section 703 of this Act,
the following:

``Sec. 523. Providing secure access to critical infrastructure.''.

[[Page S2315]]

TITLE X--CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

SEC. 1001. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

(a) Critical Infrastructure List.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, and in coordination
with other initiatives of the Secretary relating to critical
infrastructure or key resource protection and partnerships
between the government and private sector, the Secretary
shall establish a risk-based prioritized list of critical
infrastructure and key resources that--
(1) includes assets or systems that, if successfully
destroyed or disrupted through a terrorist attack or natural
catastrophe, would cause catastrophic national or regional
impacts, including--
(A) significant loss of life;
(B) severe economic harm;
(C) mass evacuations; or
(D) loss of a city, region, or sector of the economy as a
result of contamination, destruction, or disruption of vital
public services; and
(2) reflects a cross-sector analysis of critical
infrastructure to determine priorities for prevention,
protection, recovery, and restoration.
(b) Sector Lists.--In coordination with other initiatives
of the Secretary relating to critical infrastructure or key
resource protection and partnerships between the government
and private sector, the Secretary may establish additional
critical infrastructure and key resources priority lists by
sector, including at a minimum the sectors named in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7 as in effect on January 1,
2006.
(c) Maintenance.--Each list created under this section
shall be reviewed and updated on an ongoing basis, but at
least annually.
(d) Annual Report.--
(1) Generally.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report
summarizing--
(A) the criteria used to develop each list created under
this section;
(B) the methodology used to solicit and verify submissions
for each list;
(C) the name, location, and sector classification of assets
in each list created under this section;
(D) a description of any additional lists or databases the
Department has developed to prioritize critical
infrastructure on the basis of risk; and
(E) how each list developed under this section will be used
by the Secretary in program activities, including grant
making.
(2) Classified information.--The Secretary shall submit
with each report under this subsection a classified annex
containing information required to be submitted under this
subsection that cannot be made public.

SEC. 1002. RISK ASSESSMENT AND REPORT.

(a) Risk Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary, pursuant to the
responsibilities under section 202 of the Homeland Security
Act (6 U.S.C. 122), for each fiscal year beginning with
fiscal year 2007, shall prepare a risk assessment of the
critical infrastructure and key resources of the Nation which
shall--
(A) be organized by sector, including the critical
infrastructure sectors named in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-7, as in effect on January 1, 2006;
and
(B) contain any actions or countermeasures proposed,
recommended, or directed by the Secretary to address security
concerns covered in the assessment.
(2) Reliance on other assessments.--In preparing the
assessments and reports under this section, the Department
may rely on a vulnerability assessment or risk assessment
prepared by another Federal agency that the Department
determines is prepared in coordination with other initiatives
of the Department relating to critical infrastructure or key
resource protection and partnerships between the government
and private sector, if the Department certifies in the
applicable report submitted under subsection (b) that the
Department--
(A) reviewed the methodology and analysis of the assessment
upon which the Department relied; and
(B) determined that assessment is reliable.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the last day
of fiscal year 2007 and for each year thereafter, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report
containing a summary and review of the risk assessments
prepared by the Secretary under this section for that fiscal
year, which shall be organized by sector and which shall
include recommendations of the Secretary for mitigating risks
identified by the assessments.
(2) Classified annex.--The report under this subsection may
contain a classified annex.

SEC. 1003. USE OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES.

Where appropriate, the Secretary shall use the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center to carry out
the actions required under this title.

TITLE XI--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 1101. AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE
FUNDING INFORMATION.

(a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President
shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after
fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of appropriations
requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year
for the National Intelligence Program.
(b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.--
Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year
after fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of funds
authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of
funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the
National Intelligence Program.
(c) Study on Disclosure of Additional Information.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of
disclosing to the public amounts as follows:
(A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the
budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element
of the intelligence community.
(B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be
appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated,
by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the
intelligence community.
(2) Requirements.--The study required by paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of
the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the
national security of the United States; and
(B) take into specific account concerns relating to the
disclosure of such information for each element of the
intelligence community.
(3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress
a report on the study required by paragraph (1).
(d) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``element of the intelligence community''
means an element of the intelligence community specified in
or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)); and
(2) the term ``National Intelligence Program'' has the
meaning given that term in section 3(6) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)).

SEC. 1102. RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS
FROM CONGRESS.

(a) Response of Intelligence Community to Requests From
Congress for Intelligence Documents and Information.--Title V
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS FROM CONGRESS FOR
INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

``Sec. 508.  (a) Requests of Committees.--The Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a
national intelligence center, or the head of any department,
agency, or element of the intelligence community shall, not
later than 15 days after receiving a request for any
intelligence assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion,
or other intelligence information from the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, or any other committee of Congress with
jurisdiction over the subject matter to which information
in such assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or
other information relates, make available to such
committee such assessment, report, estimate, legal
opinion, or other information, as the case may be.
``(b) Requests of Certain Members.--(1) The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national
intelligence center, or the head of any department, agency,
or element of the intelligence community shall respond, in
the time specified in subsection (a), to a request described
in that subsection from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the
Chairman or Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Upon making a request covered by paragraph (1)--
``(A) the Chairman or Vice Chairman, as the case may be, of
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall
notify the other of the Chairman or Vice Chairman of such
request; and
``(B) the Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be,
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives shall notify the other of the
Chairman or Ranking Member of such request.
``(c) Assertion of Privilege.--In response to a request
covered by subsection (a) or (b), the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national
intelligence center, or the head of any department, agency,
or element of the intelligence community shall provide the
document or information covered by such request unless the
President certifies that such document or information is not
being provided because the President is asserting a privilege
pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.
``(d) Independent Testimony of Intelligence Officials.--No
officer, department, agency, or element within the Executive
branch shall have any authority to require the head of any
department, agency, or element of the intelligence community,
or any designate of such a head--
``(1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or
``(2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or
comments to any officer or agency of the Executive branch for
approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such
recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such
testimony, legislative recommendations, or comments include a
statement indicating that the views expressed therein are
those of the head of the department, agency, or element of
the intelligence community that is

[[Page S2316]]

making the submission and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Administration.''.
(b) Disclosures of Certain Information to Congress.--Title
V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et
seq.), as amended by subsection (a), is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:

``DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS

``Sec. 509.  (a) Authority To Disclose Certain
Information.--An employee of a covered agency or an employee
of a contractor carrying out activities pursuant to a
contract with a covered agency may disclose covered
information to an authorized individual without first
reporting such information to the appropriate Inspector
General.
``(b) Authorized Individual.--(1) In this section, the term
`authorized individual' means--
``(A) a Member of the Senate or the House of
Representatives who is authorized to receive information of
the type disclosed; or
``(B) an employee of the Senate or the House of
Representatives who--
``(i) has an appropriate security clearance; and
``(ii) is authorized to receive information of the type
disclosed.
``(2) An authorized individual described in paragraph (1)
to whom covered information is disclosed under the authority
in subsection (a) shall be presumed to have a need to know
such covered information.
``(c) Covered Agency and Covered Information Defined.--In
this section:
``(1) The term `covered agency' means--
``(A) any department, agency, or element of the
intelligence community;
``(B) a national intelligence center; and
``(C) any other Executive agency, or element or unit
thereof, determined by the President under section
2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as
its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities.
``(2) The term `covered information'--
``(A) means information, including classified information,
that an employee referred to in subsection (a) reasonably
believes provides direct and specific evidence of a false or
inaccurate statement--
``(i) made to Congress; or
``(ii) contained in any intelligence assessment, report, or
estimate; and
``(B) does not include information the disclosure of which
is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
``(d) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or
otherwise affect--
``(1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence
activities that arises under this Act or any other provision
of law; or
``(2) the right of any employee of the United States to
disclose information to Congress, in accordance with
applicable law, information other than covered
information.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 507 the following new items:

``Sec. 508. Response of intelligence community to requests from
Congress for intelligence documents and information.
``Sec. 509. Disclosures to Congress.''.

SEC. 1103. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

The Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C.
435 note) is amended--
(1) in section 704(e)--
(A) by striking ``If requested'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--If requested''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Authority of board.--Upon receiving a congressional
request described in section 703(b)(5), the Board may conduct
the review and make the recommendations described in that
section, regardless of whether such a review is requested by
the President.
``(3) Reporting.--Any recommendations submitted to the
President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall be
submitted to the chairman and ranking member of the committee
of Congress that made the request relating to such
recommendations.''; and
(2) in section 710(b), by striking ``8 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``on December
31, 2012''.

TITLE XII--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES

SEC. 1201. PROMOTING ANTITERRORISM CAPABILITIES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) The development and implementation of technology is
critical to combating terrorism and other high consequence
events and implementing a comprehensive homeland security
strategy.
(2) The United States and its allies in the global war on
terrorism share a common interest in facilitating research,
development, testing, and evaluation of equipment,
capabilities, technologies, and services that will aid in
detecting, preventing, responding to, recovering from, and
mitigating against acts of terrorism.
(3) Certain United States allies in the global war on
terrorism, including Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and Singapore have extensive experience with, and
technological expertise in, homeland security.
(4) The United States and certain of its allies in the
global war on terrorism have a history of successful
collaboration in developing mutually beneficial equipment,
capabilities, technologies, and services in the areas of
defense, agriculture, and telecommunications.
(5) The United States and its allies in the global war on
terrorism will mutually benefit from the sharing of
technological expertise to combat domestic and international
terrorism.
(6) The establishment of an office to facilitate and
support cooperative endeavors between and among government
agencies, for-profit business entities, academic
institutions, and nonprofit entities of the United States and
its allies will safeguard lives and property worldwide
against acts of terrorism and other high consequence events.
(b) Promoting Antiterrorism Through International
Cooperation Act.--
(1) In general.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is
amended by inserting after section 316, as added by section
601 of this Act, the following:

``SEC. 317. PROMOTING ANTITERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION PROGRAM.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director
selected under subsection (b)(2).
``(2) International cooperative activity.--The term
`international cooperative activity' includes--
``(A) coordinated research projects, joint research
projects, or joint ventures;
``(B) joint studies or technical demonstrations;
``(C) coordinated field exercises, scientific seminars,
conferences, symposia, and workshops;
``(D) training of scientists and engineers;
``(E) visits and exchanges of scientists, engineers, or
other appropriate personnel;
``(F) exchanges or sharing of scientific and technological
information; and
``(G) joint use of laboratory facilities and equipment.
``(b) Science and Technology Homeland Security
International Cooperative Programs Office.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Under Secretary shall establish
the Science and Technology Homeland Security International
Cooperative Programs Office.
``(2) Director.--The Office shall be headed by a Director,
who--
``(A) shall be selected (in consultation with the Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, Policy Directorate) by
and shall report to the Under Secretary; and
``(B) may be an officer of the Department serving in
another position.
``(3) Responsibilities.--
``(A) Development of mechanisms.--The Director shall be
responsible for developing, in coordination with the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, and other Federal agencies, mechanisms
and legal frameworks to allow and to support international
cooperative activity in support of homeland security
research.
``(B) Priorities.--The Director shall be responsible for
developing, in coordination with the Directorate of Science
and Technology, the other components of the Department
(including the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs, Policy Directorate), the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy,
and other Federal agencies, strategic priorities for
international cooperative activity.
``(C) Activities.--The Director shall facilitate the
planning, development, and implementation of international
cooperative activity to address the strategic priorities
developed under subparagraph (B) through mechanisms the Under
Secretary considers appropriate, including grants,
cooperative agreements, or contracts to or with foreign
public or private entities, governmental organizations,
businesses, federally funded research and development
centers, and universities.
``(D) Identification of partners.--The Director shall
facilitate the matching of United States entities engaged in
homeland security research with non-United States entities
engaged in homeland security research so that they may
partner in homeland security research activities.
``(4) Coordination.--The Director shall ensure that the
activities under this subsection are coordinated with the
Office of International Affairs and the Department of State,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and
other relevant Federal agencies or interagency bodies. The
Director may enter into joint activities with other Federal
agencies.
``(c) Matching Funding.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Equitability.--The Director shall ensure that funding
and resources expended in international cooperative activity
will be equitably matched by the foreign partner government
or other entity through direct funding, funding of
complementary activities, or through the provision of staff,
facilities, material, or equipment.
``(B) Grant matching and repayment.--
``(i) In general.--The Secretary may require a recipient of
a grant under this section--

``(I) to make a matching contribution of not more than 50
percent of the total cost of the proposed project for which
the grant is awarded; and
``(II) to repay to the Secretary the amount of the grant
(or a portion thereof), interest on such amount at an
appropriate rate, and such charges for administration of the
grant as the Secretary determines appropriate.

``(ii) Maximum amount.--The Secretary may not require that
repayment under clause (i)(II) be more than 150 percent of
the amount of the grant, adjusted for inflation on the basis
of the Consumer Price Index.
``(2) Foreign partners.--Partners may include Israel, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Singapore, and other
allies in the global war on terrorism, as determined by the
Secretary of State.
``(d) Funding.--Funding for all activities under this
section shall be paid from discretionary funds appropriated
to the Department.

[[Page S2317]]

``(e) Foreign Reimbursements.--If the Science and
Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative
Programs Office participates in an international cooperative
activity with a foreign partner on a cost-sharing basis, any
reimbursements or contributions received from that foreign
partner to meet the share of that foreign partner of the
project may be credited to appropriate appropriations
accounts of the Directorate of Science and Technology.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of
contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by adding after the item
relating to section 316, as added by section 601 of this Act,
the following:

``Sec. 317. Promoting antiterrorism through international cooperation
program.''.

SEC. 1202. TRANSPARENCY OF FUNDS.

For each Federal award (as that term is defined in section
2 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act
of 2006 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note)) under this title or an
amendment made by this title, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall ensure full and timely compliance
with the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability
and Transparency Act of 2006 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note).

TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 1301. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT.

(a) Establishment and Succession.--Section 103 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Deputy
Secretary'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretaries'';
(B) by striking paragraph (6);
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as
paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively; and
(D) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
``(1) A Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(2) A Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for
Management.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(g) Vacancies.--
``(1) Vacancy in office of secretary.--
``(A) Deputy secretary.--In case of a vacancy in the office
of the Secretary, or of the absence or disability of the
Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security may
exercise all the duties of that office, and for the purpose
of section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, the Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security is the first assistant to the
Secretary.
``(B) Deputy secretary for management.--When by reason of
absence, disability, or vacancy in office, neither the
Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security is
available to exercise the duties of the office of the
Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for
Management shall act as Secretary.
``(2) Vacancy in office of deputy secretary.--In the case
of a vacancy in the office of the Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security, or of the absence or disability of the
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy Secretary
of Homeland Security for Management may exercise all the
duties of that office.
``(3) Further order of succession.--The Secretary may
designate such other officers of the Department in further
order of succession to act as Secretary.''.
(b) Responsibilities.--Section 701 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 341) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``UNDER SECRETARY''
and inserting ``DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by inserting ``The Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security for Management shall serve as the Chief Management
Officer and principal advisor to the Secretary on matters
related to the management of the Department, including
management integration and transformation in support of
homeland security operations and programs.'' before ``The
Secretary'';
(B) by striking ``Under Secretary for Management'' and
inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for
Management'';
(C) by striking paragraph (7) and inserting the following:
``(7) Strategic planning and annual performance planning
and identification and tracking of performance measures
relating to the responsibilities of the Department.''; and
(D) by striking paragraph (9), and inserting the following:
``(9) The integration and transformation process, to ensure
an efficient and orderly consolidation of functions and
personnel to the Department, including the development of a
management integration strategy for the Department.''; and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Under Secretary for
Management'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security for Management''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Under Secretary for
Management'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security for Management''.
(c) Appointment, Evaluation, and Reappointment.--Section
701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 341) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Appointment, Evaluation, and Reappointment.--The
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management--
``(1) shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, from among persons who
have--
``(A) extensive executive level leadership and management
experience in the public or private sector;
``(B) strong leadership skills;
``(C) a demonstrated ability to manage large and complex
organizations; and
``(D) a proven record in achieving positive operational
results;
``(2) shall--
``(A) serve for a term of 5 years; and
``(B) be subject to removal by the President if the
President--
``(i) finds that the performance of the Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security for Management is unsatisfactory; and
``(ii) communicates the reasons for removing the Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security for Management to Congress
before such removal;
``(3) may be reappointed in accordance with paragraph (1),
if the Secretary has made a satisfactory determination under
paragraph (5) for the 3 most recent performance years;
``(4) shall enter into an annual performance agreement with
the Secretary that shall set forth measurable individual and
organizational goals; and
``(5) shall be subject to an annual performance evaluation
by the Secretary, who shall determine as part of each such
evaluation whether the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security
for Management has made satisfactory progress toward
achieving the goals set out in the performance agreement
required under paragraph (4).''.
(d) Incumbent.--The individual who serves in the position
of Under Secretary for Management of the Department of
Homeland Security on the date of enactment of this Act--
(1) may perform all the duties of the Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security for Management at the pleasure of the
President, until a Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for
Management is appointed in accordance with subsection (c) of
section 701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
341), as added by this Act; and
(2) may be appointed Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security
for Management, if such appointment is otherwise in
accordance with sections 103 and 701 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113 and 341), as amended by this Act.
(e) References.--References in any other Federal law,
Executive order, rule, regulation, or delegation of
authority, or any document of or relating to the Under
Secretary for Management of the Department of Homeland
Security shall be deemed to refer to the Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security for Management.
(f) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Other reference.--Section 702(a) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 342(a)) is amended by striking
``Under Secretary for Management'' and inserting ``Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security for Management''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(b))
is amended by striking the item relating to section 701 and
inserting the following:

``Sec. 701. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.''.

(3) Executive schedule.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating
to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security the following:
``Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.''.

SEC. 1302. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING COMBATING DOMESTIC
RADICALIZATION.

(a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) The United States is engaged in a struggle against a
transnational terrorist movement of radical extremists
seeking to exploit the religion of Islam through violent
means to achieve ideological ends.
(2) The radical jihadist movement transcends borders and
has been identified as a potential threat within the United
States.
(3) Radicalization has been identified as a precursor to
terrorism.
(4) Countering the threat of violent extremists
domestically, as well as internationally, is a critical
element of the plan of the United States for success in the
war on terror.
(5) United States law enforcement agencies have identified
radicalization as an emerging threat and have in recent years
identified cases of ``homegrown'' extremists operating inside
the United States with the intent to provide support for, or
directly commit, a terrorist attack.
(6) The alienation of Muslim populations in the Western
world has been identified as a factor in the spread of
radicalization.
(7) Radicalization cannot be prevented solely through law
enforcement and intelligence measures.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
the Secretary, in consultation with other relevant Federal
agencies, should make a priority of countering domestic
radicalization and extremism by--
(1) using intelligence analysts and other experts to better
understand the process of radicalization from sympathizer to
activist to terrorist;
(2) recruiting employees with diverse worldviews, skills,
languages, and cultural backgrounds and expertise;
(3) consulting with experts to ensure that the lexicon used
within public statements is precise and appropriate and does
not aid extremists by offending the American Muslim
community;
(4) developing and implementing, in concert with the
Attorney General and State and local corrections officials, a
program to address prisoner radicalization and post-sentence
reintegration;
(5) pursuing broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim
community to foster mutual respect, understanding, and trust;
and
(6) working directly with State, local, and community
leaders to--

[[Page S2318]]

(A) educate these leaders on the threat of radicalization
and the necessity of taking preventative action at the local
level; and
(B) facilitate the sharing of best practices from other
countries and communities to encourage outreach to the
American Muslim community and develop partnerships between
all faiths, including Islam.

SEC. 1303. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING OVERSIGHT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY.

(a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) The Senate recognizes the importance and need to
implement the recommendations offered by the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (in
this section referred to as the ``Commission'').
(2) Congress considered and passed the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3643) to implement the recommendations of the
Commission.
(3) Representatives of the Department testified at 165
Congressional hearings in calendar year 2004, and 166
Congressional hearings in calendar year 2005.
(4) The Department had 268 representatives testify before
15 committees and 35 subcommittees of the House of
Representatives and 9 committees and 12 subcommittees of the
Senate at 206 congressional hearings in calendar year 2006.
(5) The Senate has been unwilling to reform itself in
accordance with the recommendation of the Commission to
provide better and more streamlined oversight of the
Department.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
the Senate should implement the recommendation of the
Commission to ``create a single, principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security.''.

SEC. 1304. REPORT REGARDING BORDER SECURITY.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress regarding ongoing initiatives of the Department to
improve security along the northern border of the United
States.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) address the vulnerabilities along the northern border
of the United States; and
(2) provide recommendations to address such
vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to
protect the northern border of the United States.
(c) Government Accountability Office.--Not later than 270
days after the date of the submission of the report under
subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States
shall submit a report to Congress that--
(1) reviews and comments on the report under subsection
(a); and
(2) provides recommendations regarding any additional
actions necessary to protect the northern border of the
United States.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with the authority of the Homeland
Security and the Governmental Affairs Committee--that is, the consent
of a majority of the Members--I now withdraw the committee-reported
substitute amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
withdrawn.
The majority leader is recognized.

Amendment No. 275

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I send a substitute amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid], for himself, Mr.
Lieberman, Ms. Collins, Mr. Inouye, and Mr. Dodd, proposes an
amendment numbered 275.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. REID. Mr. President, the substitute I have just offered
encompasses the provisions of S. 4, also legislation on surface
transportation security, aviation security, and rail security from the
Commerce Committee, as well as transit security legislation from the
Banking Committee.
As I said yesterday, I deeply appreciate, as does the distinguished
Republican leader, the work done by the two committee managers. Senator
Lieberman and Senator Collins have worked together for a number of
years, and they work well together. This is an extremely important
piece of legislation, and so we ask Members if there is something about
the bill that has just been laid down that they don't like, they should
come and try to change it and not wait around because they will be
disappointed. We have to move through this bill.
We have been told there are a number of amendments people have to
offer, and we want them to do that. I asked the Democratic manager,
Chairman Lieberman, if people offer amendments, to have a reasonable
debate. We are not going to mess around here for a long time. With
appropriate debate, Senator Lieberman is going to move to table if it
is something we don't like, and I think it is important that Members
know that.
I have been told there are a lot of amendments on both sides. It is
our goal to finish this legislation as soon as we can next week. That
is going to be difficult. We could have some late nights, and as I
indicated this morning, we might have to work into Friday sometime.
Monday night, I hope we can stack votes so that we have a number of
votes. As I have indicated, we will not have votes starting before
5:30, but I hope we can have a number of votes at 5:30 so we can
dispose of them that night.
This is what we do. We are legislating now, and I look forward to a
good piece of legislation when we finish.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, let me echo the remarks of the majority
leader. We have a number of amendments on this side, and we are
prepared to offer them in the next few hours. I believe the first
amendment is going to come from the Democratic side. Senator Collins is
either here or on her way, and she is certainly going to manage the
bill on our side, but then we will follow the Democratic amendment with
an amendment on our side.
I also want to remind everyone that at 2 p.m. this afternoon the
Transportation Security Administration will hold an all-Members
briefing related to the provisions of S. 4, the bill we are now
discussing, which will be pending today. A notice was sent to all
offices, and Senators should be made aware that this briefing will be
held in S407 of the Capitol.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would also say this: We are going to
alternate back and forth. If there is not a Democrat here, a Republican
will offer two amendments in a row, and vice versa. In other words, we
need expedition. There are a number of amendments, and we are not going
to wait while somebody is coming from their office to offer an
amendment. If somebody is here ahead of someone, then they will
proceed.
Our first amendment, if she is here on time, will be from Senator
Feinstein; otherwise, Senator Collins, I understand, has an amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, while the two leaders are here, I want
to thank Senator Reid for designating this urgent legislation which
would implement the previously unimplemented or inadequately
implemented recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I also thank
Senator McConnell, the Republican leader, for his cooperation and
consent to moving this forward quickly on the Senate floor.
This bipartisan cooperation, obviously, is justified by the subject
matter, homeland security, and in that regard I want to thank, again,
Senator Collins. We switched titles in this session of Congress, but as
I said to her when that happened, nothing else will change but our
titles. She has been a wonderful partner and coworker on this measure
once again, and it is in that spirit that we invite amendments, as
Senator Reid said, from our colleagues who may think that, as good as
the bill is, it could be better, and we urge them to come forward
quickly.
In our committee, only one amendment was divided on a party-line
vote. The rest were totally nonpartisan, and I hope that is generally
the way things will go on the Senate floor as we consider the
amendments brought forth.
Yesterday, to expedite matters, Senator Collins and I both made our
opening statements, so we do not have those opening statements now.
Therefore, we look forward to the Senator from California coming to the
floor as soon as she can to offer an amendment, which I note will
concern visa waiver sections of the measure. Senator Collins has
another amendment which we will go to if Senator Feinstein does not
come soon.
I thank the Chair and, for the moment, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S2319]]

Amendment No. 271 to Amendment No. 275

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from
California, Mrs. Feinstein, I call up amendment No. 271.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], for Mrs.
Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 271 to amendment
No. 275.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To prohibit a foreign country with a visa refusal rate of
more than 10 percent or that exceeds the maximum visa overstay rate
from participating in the visa waiver program)

Strike subsection (c) of section 401 and insert the
following:
(c) Discretionary Visa Waiver Program Expansion.--Section
217(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1187(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(8) Nonimmigrant visa refusal rate flexibility.--
``(A) Certification.--On the date on which an air exit
system is in place that can verify the departure of not less
than 97 percent of foreign nationals that exit through
airports of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall certify to Congress that such air exit system
is in place.
``(B) Waiver.--After certification by the Secretary under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the
application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country--
``(i) if the country meets all security requirements of
this section;
``(ii) if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines
that the totality of the country's security risk mitigation
measures provide assurance that the country's participation
in the program would not compromise the law enforcement,
security interests, or enforcement of the immigration laws of
the United States;
``(iii) if there has been a sustained reduction in the rate
of refusals for nonimmigrant visitor visas for nationals of
the country and conditions exist to continue such reduction;
``(iv) the country cooperated with the Government of the
United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information
sharing before the date of its designation as a program
country, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State expect such cooperation will continue; and
``(v)(I) if the rate of refusals for nonimmigrant visitor
visas for nationals of the country during the previous full
fiscal year was not more than 10 percent; or
``(II) if the visa overstay rate for the country for the
previous full fiscal year does not exceed the maximum visa
overstay rate, once it is established under subparagraph (C).
``(C) Maximum visa overstay rate.--
``(i) Requirement to establish.--After certification by the
Secretary under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of State jointly shall use
information from the air exit system referred to in
subparagraph (A) to establish a maximum visa overstay rate
for countries participating in the program pursuant to a
waiver under subparagraph (B).
``(ii) Visa overstay rate defined.--In this paragraph the
term `visa overstay rate' means, with respect to a country,
the ratio of--

``(I) the total number of nationals of that country who
were admitted to the United States on the basis of a
nonimmigrant visitor visa for which the period of stay
authorized by such visa ended during a fiscal year and who
remained in the United States unlawfully beyond the such
period of stay; to
``(II) the total number of nationals of that country who
were admitted to the United States on the basis of a
nonimmigrant visitor visa for which the period of stay
authorized by such visa ended during such fiscal year.

``(iii) Report and publication.--Secretary of Homeland
Security shall submit to Congress and publish in the Federal
Register a notice of the maximum visa overstay rate proposed
to be established under clause (i). Not less than 60 days
after the date such notice is submitted and published, the
Secretary shall issue a final maximum visa overstay rate.
``(9) Discretionary security-related considerations.--In
determining whether to waive the application of paragraph
(2)(A) for a country, pursuant to paragraph (8), the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, shall take into consideration other
factors affecting the security of the United States,
including--
``(A) airport security standards in the country;
``(B) whether the country assists in the operation of an
effective air marshal program;
``(C) the standards of passports and travel documents
issued by the country; and
``(D) other security-related factors.''.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my concern about
the efforts to expand the Visa Waiver Program in the 9/11 commission
report bill and to offer an amendment that will cap the unlimited
expansion of this program.
I believe the bill as offered on the floor will make us less safe,
not more safe with respect to this huge program called Visa Waiver.
The bill would allow the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of State to expand the Visa Waiver Program without limits.
My amendment would limit this discretion based on a 10 percent visa
refusal rate or on the actual visa overstay rate.
The Visa Waiver Program provides an extraordinary exception to our
immigration laws. It allows the citizens of 27 nations to visit this
country by merely showing up on the day of departure with a passport
from their home country. In 2004, the State Department reported that
15.6 million people came to this country as part of this program. I am
told that in 2005, unofficially, the number was at least 15.5 million
and in 2006, the number was at least 15.6 million.
We have no way of knowing how many left because we do not have an
exit system.
The bill on the floor today changes the Visa Waiver Program in a
number of key ways.
First, it adds some good security measures, such as the expedited
reporting of lost and stolen travel documents; and the exchange of
information on terrorist watchlist. It also authorizes the Department
of Homeland Security to develop an electronic travel authorization
program so that all persons entering the U.S. will have to apply for
clearance to enter the U.S. in advance of their trip. And it requires
the Department of Homeland Security to develop a system to track all
the foreign visitors who leave the U.S. via our airports--but not our
seaports or land ports. This has been an unmet goal, however, year
after year.
I welcome and support the enhanced security measures included in the
bill. They are long overdue.
Second--and here is the problem--the bill allows the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of State to fundamentally change
the way countries are admitted into the visa waiver program, and thus,
who can come into the U.S. without getting a visa.
Under current law, a country is eligible for this program so long as
the vast majority--at least 97 percent--of its nationals can get a visa
when they apply for one. The percentage of people who are rejected when
they apply for a visa is called the ``visa refusal rate'' and that
percentage must be under 3 percent for a country to participate in the
program.
The rationale is that if the overwhelming majority of visitors
satisfy requirements for a U.S. visa when they apply, we should not
waste our resources and the time of U.S. consular officers to evaluate
every single visa application. The 3 percent rate means that 97 percent
of these applicants will return to their home country for one reason or
another. They have family and earn a satisfactory living.
But even with a 3 percent rejection rate, the Visa Waiver Program is
a security problem.
Convicted terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui from France and ``shoe-
bomber'' Richard Reid from Great Britain both boarded flights to the
United States with passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries.
On August 10 of this past year, British police charged 17 suspects
with a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on board
several airliners traveling from the United Kingdom to the United
States. The key suspects were reported to be British-born Muslims,
eligible to travel to the U.S. with just a passport in hand.
For that reason, I believe that the current Visa Waiver Program is
the soft underbelly of our national security.
But this bill undermines even the scant protection afforded by our
current laws in that it allows the administration to admit new
countries into the program with complete disregard for how many people
were previously rejected when they applied for a U.S. visa. My
amendment would provide a meaningful limit to that discretion.
This bill does not affect just a handful of countries. It would
affect any

[[Page S2320]]

and every country whose nationals travel to the United States.
As a matter of fact, the ``roadmap'' countries--or countries that the
administration is currently talking to about inclusion in the Visa
Waiver Program--total 19. So the Departments of State and Homeland
Security are actively talking with 19 countries for acceptance into
this Program.
A significant number of these 19 countries have visa rejection rates
that are well above 3 percent. They are marked with an asterisk, and
total 13 of the 19. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record a chart showing by country the rejection rates.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Country Name                        2006 Refusal Rate (Percent)
Argentina*..........................................................6.7
Brazil*............................................................13.2
Bulgaria*..........................................................17.5
Cyprus..............................................................2.2
Czech Republic*.....................................................9.4
Estonia*............................................................7.1
Greece..............................................................2.2
Hungary*...........................................................12.7
Israel..............................................................4.2
Korea, South........................................................3.6
Latvia*............................................................21.6
Lithuania*.........................................................27.7
Malta...............................................................2.8
Poland*............................................................26.2
Romania*...........................................................34.1
Slovakia*..........................................................16.0
Taiwan..............................................................3.1
Turkey*............................................................15.4
Uruguay*...........................................................12.6
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today, 544 million people are eligible
to travel into the U.S. without a visa as part of the Visa Waiver
Program. If we add these ``roadmap'' countries to the program, we will
add 162 million more people who can travel into the United States
without a visa--a 30 percent increase.
And if these 19 additional ``roadmap'' countries can come into the
program, what is to preclude any other country from coming into the
program? How do we say ``no'' to India, also a good ally, when its
refusal rate--19.5 percent--is lower than 4 of the roadmap--countries?
The rejection rate for China--24.5 percent--is lower than those coming
from Romania. Indonesia, at 35.1 percent just exceeds Romania. So this
bill will likely set up some real conflicts and create additional
problems.
The administration has argued that the expansion of the visa waiver
countries should be limited to our allies. But what does it mean to be
an ally? According to this administration, when we invaded Iraq we
counted Colombia with a 33.3 percent visa rejection rate, and
Nicaragua, with a 48 percent rejection rate among our allies because
they had provided some assistance in war.
Do we, in Congress, really want to give the administration unfettered
flexibility to allow nationals from any country to travel to the U.S.
without a visa, simply because their governments have cooperated with
ours?
Does that mean that those nationals should be allowed to come to the
United States with no advance screening?
We can only assume that we will also significantly increase the
number of people who will not leave the United States after their visa
expires. In this manner, this bill, if enacted into law, will likely
add many thousands, if not millions, to the undocumented or illegal
population.
Remember, today, 30 to 40 percent of the illegal population are, in
fact, visa overstays--people who come with temporary or visitor visas
and do not return to their countries.
I believe we should not expand this program without a good hard look
at how it will compromise our national security, law enforcement, and
immigration goals and without ensuring that safety measures are in
place to make the program strong.
First, whenever the United States adds new countries to the program,
it increases the demand for, and the availability of, fraudulent travel
documents.
The value of lost, stolen or fraudulent Visa Waiver Program documents
is enormous. A person carrying a visa waiver country passport has
virtually unlimited access into and out of the United States.
No doubt, the expansion of the program will increase the use of
fraudulent border documents which are sold on the black market in the
tens of thousands: passports, international driver's licenses, and
other forms of identification from new visa waiver countries will flood
the market.
According to the July 2006 GAO report on improving the security of
the Visa Waiver Program, visa waiver travel documents have been used by
criminals and terrorists seeking to disguise their true identity.
In 2004, more than 15 million people from 27 countries traveled in
and out of the United States with no visa.
And from January through June 2005--a 6-month period--the Department
of Homeland Security reported that it confiscated 298 fraudulent or
altered passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries that
travelers were attempting to use to enter the United States. And these
are just the ones who got caught.
In fact, Interpol reports that they have records of more than 12
million stolen and lost travel documents in their database, but that
there are 30 to 40 million travel documents have been stolen worldwide.
We can extrapolate that tens of thousands of those documents are from
visa waiver countries.
As the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates, individuals with
fraudulent documents pose a far greater threat to our national security
than those traveling with no documents at all.
For that reason, Senator Sessions and I have introduced a bill this
Congress to crack down on people who traffic in lost and stolen travel
documents.
The second problem is that some countries have very weak policies on
who can become a citizen--and therefore legally obtain travel
documents. Not every country has the same strict controls on who can
become a citizen as the U.S. does.
For example, Romania, one of the ``road map'' countries, extends
citizenship to many citizens of Ukraine or Moldova as a matter of
course without prior residency requirements. Ukraine and Moldova are
not slated to participate in the visa waiver program, and in fact, have
visa rejection rates of 38.7 percent and 34.2 percent, respectively.
Adding Romania is like adding Ukraine and Moldova. How would their
inclusion impact national security?
Finally, this bill does not go far enough to protect U.S. borders.
The bill requires the development of an air exit system, but it does
nothing to track who comes and goes by way of our land and sea ports.
It also requires the Department of Homeland Security to track how
many people overstay their visas, but it does not require them to use
this information to determine who can participate in the program.
For example, even if we learn that one out of four Lithuanian
visitors never returns to Lithuania when their visa expires, Lithuania
could still participate in the Visa Waiver Program.
Again, experts estimate that between 30 percent and 40 percent of
those undocumented people living in the U.S. today are here because
they ignored the time limits on their visa and just never went back
home.
At a time when this country is torn about how to handle the 12
million undocumented people currently living here, we must consider who
plays by the rules when we talk about who participates in the program.
If a high number of travelers from countries overstay their visas,
then those countries should not be allowed the benefit of permitting
their nationals to enter the U.S. without a background check and a
consular interview.
The amendment I am proposing today offers a way to limit the
expansion of the Visa Waiver Program in light of our immigration and
national security concerns.
The amendment I am offering would increase the visa rejection rate
under the current law from 3 percent to 10 percent for countries that
agree to these enhanced security measures.
The result is that countries such as South Korea, 3.6 percent,
Taiwan, 3.1 percent, Estonia, 7.1 percent, and the Czech Republic, 9.4
percent could be eligible to participate in the program provided they
pass the security requirements this bill imposes.
Then, once the U.S. has statistics on which foreign nationals
regularly overstay their visa, the government should use those
statistics to decide who can participate in the program.
My amendment would require the Departments of Homeland Security and
State, in consultation and with the approval of Congress, to set a
meaningful

[[Page S2321]]

overstay rate once they have that data. Then countries with a proven
track record--those with nationals who go home when they are supposed
to go home--could be eligible for the program.
The answer is not to entirely remove the visa rejection rate, 3
percent, as this bill does with no suitable replacement, but to enact a
fair system across the board that recognizes that the screening of
those who wish to come to our country is important, both for the
security of the country, as well as to ensure that visitors do what
their ``visa waiver'' provides--and that is to return to their country
of origin at the end of the 90-day period.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, there are discussions going on between
the Senator from California and others to answer a question or two
about the amendment, so for the moment we are going to leave it
pending, and I yield for my colleague from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have only had a brief time to look at
the amendment offered by the Senator from California, but it would, in
my judgment, enhance certain provisions in the underlying bill on the
visa waiver program. There are discussions going on with key Senators
on our side of the aisle, such as Senator Kyl of Arizona, who has also
a great interest in this area.
We are not prepared on this side to proceed with a full discussion of
the amendment at this time or to dispose of it at this time, but I
would inform my colleagues that I am optimistic that the discussions
will produce a fruitful result. At this time, we cannot proceed to
disposing of the amendment, however.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Parliamentary inquiry: Am I correct
that the Feinstein amendment, No. 271, is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have been informed the questions one Member was
raising about the amendment of Senator Feinstein have been resolved. I
now urge we adopt the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? The Senator from
Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to clarify for our colleagues, the
objection or the clarification I mentioned earlier has been resolved on
this side of the aisle. I know of no objection to adopting the
amendment of Senator Feinstein. I believe it strengthens the provisions
in the underlying bill and I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 271) was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 277

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for herself, Mr.
Alexander, Mr. Carper, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Cantwell, and Ms.
Mikulski, proposes an amendment numbered 277.

Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To extend the deadline by which State identification
documents shall comply with certain minimum standards and for other
purposes)

On page 145, strike line 21 and insert the following:

SEC. 404. IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS.

(a) Minimum Document Requirements.--Section 202(a)(1) of
the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note) is amended by
striking ``3 years after the date of the enactment of this
division'' and inserting ``2 years after the promulgation of
final regulations to implement this section''.
(b) Authority to Extend Compliance Deadlines.--Section
205(b) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--The Secretary''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Lack of validation systems.--If the Secretary
determines that the Federal or State electronic systems
required to verify the validity and completeness of documents
under section 202(c)(3) are not available to any State on the
date described in section 202(a)(1), the requirements under
section 202(c)(1) shall not apply to any State until adequate
electronic validation systems are available to all States.''.
(c) Negotiated Rulemaking.--
(1) Negotiated rulemaking committee.--Not later than 30
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall reconvene the committee originally
established pursuant to section 7212(b)(4) of the 9/11
Commission Implementation Act of 2004 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note),
with the addition of any new interested parties, including
experts in privacy protection, experts in civil liberties and
protection of constitutional rights, and experts in
immigration law, to--
(A) review the regulations proposed by the Secretary to
implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C.
30301 note);
(B) review the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005;
(C) submit recommendations to the Secretary regarding
appropriate modifications to such regulations; and
(D) submit recommendations to the Secretary and Congress
regarding appropriate modifications to the REAL ID Act of
2005.
(2) Criteria.--In conducting the review under paragraph
(1)(A), the committee shall consider, in addition to other
factors at the discretion of the committee, modifications to
the regulations to--
(A) minimize conflicts between State laws regarding
driver's license eligibility;
(B) include procedures and requirements to protect the
Federal and State constitutional rights, civil liberties, and
privacy rights of individuals who apply for and hold driver's
licenses and personal identification cards;
(C) protect the security of all personal information
maintained in electronic form;
(D) provide individuals with procedural and substantive due
process, including rules and right of appeal, to challenge
errors in data records contained within the databases created
to implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005;
(E) ensure that private entities are not permitted to scan
the information contained on the face of a license, or in the
machine readable component of the license, and resell, share,
or trade such information with third parties;
(F) provide a fair system of funding to limit the costs of
meeting the requirements of section 202 of the REAL ID Act of
2005;
(G) facilitate the management of vital identity-proving
records; and
(H) improve the effectiveness and security of Federal
documents used to validate identification.
(3) Rulemaking.--To the extent that the final regulations
to implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 do not
reflect the modifications recommended by the committee
pursuant to paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary shall include,
with such regulations in the Federal Register, the reasons
for rejecting such modifications.
(4) Reports.--Not later than 120 days after reconvening
under paragraph (1), the committee shall submit a report to
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives that includes--
(A) the list of recommended modifications to the
regulations that were submitted to the Secretary under
paragraph (1)(C); and
(B) a list of recommended amendments to the Real ID Act of
2005 that would address any concerns that could not be
resolved by regulation.
(d) Enhanced Driver's License.--

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce an amendment to
address the growing concern among States regarding the implementation
of the REAL ID Act of 2005. This law requires States to meet minimum
security standards before citizens can use their driver's licenses for
Federal purposes, such as boarding an airplane. I am very pleased to
have several cosponsors of this amendment, including Senator Alexander,
Senator Carper, Senator Cantwell, Senator Snowe, and Senator Mikulski.
All of them have expressed concerns about the impact on their States. I
particularly wish to single out Senator Alexander,

[[Page S2322]]

who has long been a leading voice in raising concerns about the costs
imposed upon States by the REAL ID Act.
As the deadline for compliance for the REAL ID Act rapidly
approaches, States are beginning to send a very clear message that they
are deeply concerned they simply will not be able to meet these
standards. The amendment I introduce today recognizes those concerns by
allowing more time to devise a way to make driver's licenses more
secure without unduly burdening State governments and without
threatening privacy and civil liberties.
To begin with, perhaps some background information would be useful.
The 9/11 Commission's investigation found that all but one of the 9/11
terrorists had acquired some form of U.S. identification--in most cases
a State driver's licenses. The Commission recommended that the Federal
Government should set standards for the issuance of driver's licenses
to make them more secure, to ensure the person was, in fact, entitled
to a driver's license, and to make certain the driver's license has
certain security features to ensure the individual is who he or she
claims to be.
To implement that recommendation, which was indeed in response to a
very real concern identified by the 9/11 Commission, I worked with a
bipartisan group of Senators, most notably my colleague, Senator
Lieberman, to craft a provision in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act
that would accomplish the goal of the Commission. It called for the
creation of a committee of experts from the Federal Government, from
State governments, from privacy groups, from technology information
organizations, to come together in a negotiated rulemaking process and
to develop a means of providing secure identification, while protecting
privacy and civil liberty rights, and also respecting the role of the
States, which have always had the primary responsibility in this area.
The language we came up with also provided for some grants that would
help the States bear this cost--not the whole cost but to help them
out.
This committee was indeed appointed--indeed, at my recommendation,
Maine's secretary of state was one of the members--and they began
diligently working on this task. Unfortunately, before the committee
could complete its work, the House of Representatives attached the REAL
ID Act of 2005 to an emergency war supplemental, a bill that was truly
urgent. There was not a lot of consideration in the Senate nor debate
over this provision. It was inserted into the emergency war
appropriations bill.

The effect of that was to repeal the negotiated rulemaking provisions
that we had worked so hard to craft and to put into the Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004. The further effect, therefore, was to halt the very
productive and worthwhile progress this committee was making in
devising standards to improve security without imposing unnecessary
burdens and costs on State governments.
Unlike our Intelligence Reform Act, the REAL ID Act of 2005 did not
include States and other interested parties, whether privacy advocates
or technological experts, in the rulemaking process. Instead, the REAL
ID Act simply instructed the Department of Homeland Security to write
its own regulations. It has been almost 2 years since the REAL ID Act
was passed, and the Department has yet to issue the detailed guidance
the States need to comply with the law. We expect these regulations are
just about to be published, that they are about to be issued under the
formal notice and comment period later this week.
The problem is, the States are facing this looming May of 2008
deadline for being in full compliance with the REAL ID Act. That is an
enormously constricted period for the States to comply, when the
regulations have not yet been issued.
As States begin work this year on their 2008 budgets, they still have
no idea what the final regulations will require of them, but they do
know that the costs are likely to be substantial based on a study
released in 2006 by the National Governors Association. The NGA
estimated that the costs to States to implement the REAL ID Act could
total more than $11 billion over the next 5 years. This is a
substantial amount. Perhaps the cost will be less than that, but the
point is, we don't know because the regulations with the detailed
guidance have still not been issued, even as we speak.
The State of Maine reports that the costs of implementation of the
REAL ID Act could total $158 million. The Secretary of State tells me
that is more than six times the normal operating budget of the Maine
Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
The result has been an increasing rebellion by States over this
unfunded, very difficult mandate. Some States, including my home State
of Maine, have passed resolutions that have sent the message to
Washington that they cannot and will not implement the REAL ID Act by
the May 2008 deadline. So what do we do?
Here is what my amendment proposes. I have had extensive
consultations with the National Governors Association, the National
Council of State Legislatures, and other experts on this issue.
My amendment has two primary objectives. The first is to give the
Federal Government and States the time and flexibility they need to
come up with an effective but practical system to provide secure
driver's licenses.
Second, my amendment would ensure the involvement of experts from the
States, from the technology industry, and privacy and civil liberties
advocates, by bringing them back to the table and giving them a chance
to review these regulations and make them work.
There are three major provisions in the amendment we are offering.
First, the amendment provides that States would not have to be in full
compliance with the REAL ID Act until 2 years after the final
regulations are promulgated. That is reasonable. This is a difficult
task, and it is important that we get it right. It is important for our
security, but it is also important for the States that have been
burdened with the task. That means no matter how long it takes for the
Department of Homeland Security to finish these regulations, States
will have a full 2 years to implement them. Most likely, the impact of
that is to delay from May of next year to May of 2010 the compliance
date. That is the likely timeframe about which we are talking.
Second, the amendment would give the Secretary of Homeland Security
more flexibility to waive certain requirements of REAL ID, if an aspect
of the program proves to be technically difficult to implement. I have
talked with some technology experts. Some of them say it can be done.
Some of them say this is an enormous task because we are talking about
having interlocking databases so that States can check with other
States on whether an individual is licensed there. That is a very
complex project because, not surprisingly, each State has its own
system. So there are questions about the technology and the feasibility
of all of the requirements of the REAL ID Act. We want to give the
Secretary some flexibility in that area.
It is possible that some of the technological links necessary for
REAL ID may not be fully in place at the time that compliance is
required. On the other hand, if the technology is there and the systems
are up and running, it will be easier for the States to proceed. That
is another advantage of the extension in time. The technology is only
going to get better and become more effective.
This also gives us more time to address privacy concerns because
there are a lot of questions, if you have people throughout the country
working in motor vehicle bureaus who are now going to have access to
databases and are going to need training in evaluating the underlying
documents, whether they are birth certificates or visas, in determining
their validity. So this is a complicated task.

Third, the amendment reconstitutes the committee that we created in
2004, and that was making such good progress in its deliberations
before these provisions were repealed by the REAL ID Act. This
committee would be required to look at the regulations published by the
Department of Homeland Security and to make suggestions for
modifications to meet the concerns of States, privacy advocates, and
other interested parties. Within 120 days of convening, the committee
would report its recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security
and to Congress. So we are not throwing out

[[Page S2323]]

the work that has already been done by the Department of Homeland
Security. It doesn't make sense to go back to square one, to go back to
scratch, as the 2004 bill had proposed. Instead, we create this
committee, bringing all the stakeholders to the table. They would take
a rigorous look at the regulations that are issued, and they would make
recommendations to the Department and to us so that we could exercise
our oversight.
The Department of Homeland Security would then either have to make
the recommendations recommended by this committee or explain why it
chose not to. So we would have much more transparency and
accountability in the process.
In addition, the committee could recommend to Congress, if they
believed that statutory changes are needed to mitigate concerns that
could not be addressed by modifications to the regulations. That is an
important safeguard as well.
The amendment we are offering would give us time, the information
that Congress and the Department of Homeland Security need to better
implement the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission in order to make our driver's licenses secure so that
they cannot again be used to facilitate a plot to attack our country.
There is a real problem. The 9/11 Commission was correct in
identifying the ease with which the hijackers were able to secure
driver's licenses. But let's come up with not only an effective
solution to the problem identified but also a practical one. We don't
have to choose one versus the other. We can come up with a cost-
effective, efficient, effective way to achieve this goal. This bill
does so in a way that does not rewind the clock 3 years but instead
keeps us moving to a more secure America.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to address REAL ID and to put us back on the right track to
protect our country, to protect our privacy, to protect our liberty,
and to do so in a practical way.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Klobuchar). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the Collins
amendment.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, it is actually a Collins-Alexander
amendment, along with several of our colleagues. I am very pleased to
note the Senator from Tennessee, who has been such a leader and such an
early voice raising concerns about the implications of the REAL ID Act
for State governments, is here on the floor. As a former Governor, he
has a better appreciation than many of us of the burden this act
imposes on the States. So I am very pleased the Senator is here and I
yield to him such time as he may need.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee, the coauthor of
the amendment, is recognized.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maine and I
salute the Senator from Maine. She is paying close attention not just
to the security of our country but the fact that we need strong States
and cities in our country at the same time. She, obviously, is in tune
with the people in Maine because they, like people in Tennessee and
other States, have taken a look at the so-called REAL ID law and
wondered what we are doing up here.
She has made a very thoughtful and sensible suggestion, which is that
we delay for 2 years the implementation of the so-called REAL ID law,
and let's make sure we know what we are doing.
Senator Collins, because she is ranking member of the committee that
deals with homeland security and a former chairman, and because she
served in State government, is more sensitive to this issue than
perhaps some of our colleagues. But she understands it is very easy for
those of us in Washington to stand up here and come up with a big idea
and think it might be a good idea, and then turn it into a law and hold
a press conference and take credit for it, and then send the bill to
the Governor and the legislature and say: You pay for it.
Senator Collins is more polite about this than I might be. Nothing
used to make me madder when I was Governor than for legislators and
Congressmen to do just that: to pass a big bill, take credit for it,
and send the bill to the State. Then that same Congressman would
usually be back in Tennessee making a Lincoln Day speech or a Jefferson
Day speech or a Jackson Day speech about local control and saying how
we need strong States and strong cities, but they dumped a big unfunded
mandate on top of us.
So let me see if I can be in support of Senator Collins, who has made
a very reasonable, sensible amendment: First, to think about what we
are doing with REAL ID and to make sure if we want to continue down
this path, we do it in a way that respects the privacy of Americans. We
are, after all, for the first time in our history actually creating a
national identification card with all the ramifications of that. That
is what the REAL ID law did. Second, to make sure that we don't create
an unfunded mandate. The Republican Congress in 1994 was ushered in
claiming no more unfunded mandates. The Congressmen stood on the steps
over there in the House and said: If we break our promise, throw us
out. Well, they threw us out this past election, so why would we
persist with unfunded mandates?
This is an $11 billion unfunded mandate on State governments over the
next 5 years. What does that mean? Higher property taxes, higher
tuition costs, less funding for higher education so we can stay
competitive with China and India, less money for lower classroom sizes,
and less money for rewarding outstanding teachers. That is what
unfunded mandates will mean, so we shouldn't do that.
Then the third thing that is unfortunate about this REAL ID law that
passed is we didn't have the opportunity to say anything about it over
here in the Senate. Now, we are not always the wisest people in
Washington, DC, but we have half the say. The REAL ID Act came up in
the House of Representatives. It was stuffed into the supplemental
appropriations bill for Katrina and the troops in Iraq. So of course we
had to vote for the bill. We had no chance to amend it, no debate, no
hearings, and no consideration of other alternatives. Yet we impose on
every State in this country a total of $11 billion worth of unfunded
mandates, and we create for the first time in the history of a liberty-
loving nation a national identification card. I would say we wouldn't
be doing our job if we didn't stop and think about what we have done.
Fortunately, we have time to stop and think about it, because while the
law has been passed, it is not implemented yet.
Here is what Senator Collins has done, and I give her great credit
for this. For her to introduce this amendment is especially useful
because of her position as former chairman of the affected committee
and now its ranking member. She has quickly attracted several
cosponsors, Republicans and Democrats. She would extend the deadline
for compliance with REAL ID to 2 years after final regulations are
issued by the Department of Homeland Security.
Now, from the point of view of a Governor, that makes sense. If I
were sitting back in Nashville, I would say: Well, now, Madam
Congressman or Mr. Congressman, you are not going to expect me to take
3 or 4 million Tennesseans and run them through the State driver's
license offices and find out if they are terrorists or if they are
illegally here, or send them back home to grandma's attic and dig up
their birth certificates, are you? I mean how many Tennesseans have
their birth certificates handy? How many want to go back to the
driver's license office and stand in line? That is a lot of people, 3
or 4 million people, and that is only Tennessee. There are over 196
million people with driver's licenses in the United States.
There is another section or two in Senator Collins' amendment. She
gives a little more discretion to the Secretary of DHS to waive State
deadlines. That is a reasonable approach. She reestablishes the
negotiated rulemaking committee that was created as part of the
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. That means in plain

[[Page S2324]]

English that States that have the job of implementing this law will
have a chance to come to the Federal Government and say: Well, in
Minnesota, we have longer lines during this part of the year because it
snows and shorter lines during that part of the year because there is
ice. And in other times of the year people are fishing on their lakes,
and so we have some local conditions here. This gives more time to take
into consideration the local conditions.
Also, it requires figuring out what a fair system of reimbursement
is. Here are the figures I have seen: Apparently we have appropriated
$40 million for this. The Senator from Maine is nodding her head. Yet,
the Governors tell us it is going to cost $11 billion. We have
appropriated $40 million. They say it is going to cost $11 billion. We
have a 60-vote point of order against unfunded Federal mandates. We
couldn't even raise that when this went through like a freight train in
the middle of a Katrina and troops-in-Iraq bill. There would have to be
60 votes in order to impose on the States this kind of financial
burden.
So that is basically it. This amendment says let's stop and think
about this since this is the first national identification card we have
ever had in this country. And since it is a massive unfunded mandate
that would have the effect, if the Governors are right, of raising
State taxes, raising tuition, cutting the amount of money available for
colleges and competitiveness, cutting money for reducing classroom
size, and cutting money for State health care plans.
Then the third thing is we had no discussion--I don't believe there
was a single hearing anywhere in the Senate--about this bill. I am
delighted to have a chance to be a cosponsor of this legislation that
Senator Collins has introduced.

I will say one other thing about this idea of a national
identification card. I have lived long enough to have changed my mind a
few times on important issues. When I was Governor of Tennessee, I
vetoed twice the photo identification card I now carry in my billfold
because I thought it was an infringement on civil liberties and I
didn't think it was anybody's business to have my picture on the
identification card. Well, the retailers wanted it for check cashing,
and law enforcement people wanted it so they could catch more
criminals. So the legislature overrode me. Plus, when I tried to get
into the White House one time as Governor, they wouldn't let me in
because I didn't have a photo identification card and I said: Well, I
vetoed it, and they didn't think that was a good reason. The Governor
of Georgia had to vouch for me, and after that indignity, Tennessee
finally got a photo identification card.
We have a right in America to be skeptical of national identification
cards. We love liberty more than anything in this country, and that
could infringe on our liberty. We have seen what happened in South
Africa when people carried around passports and they were classified
based on race, and their lives, their activities, everything about them
was regulated that way. We can think back on Nazi Germany and other
totalitarian countries where so much information was on a single card
that it gave the Government a good chance to keep up with every single
person.
I have changed my mind after 9/11. I believe we need a national
identification card of some kind, and we, in fact, have one now. It is
a de facto identification card. We call it the driver's license, but it
is completely ineffective. It gets stolen. It gets copied. We show it
when we go through the line at an airport. For a long time, mine said
on the front that it expired in the year 2000, but if you turn it over,
it said 2005. Well, at the airport they never turned it over so it is
not a very effective identification card, and that is the impetus for
the REAL ID. I understand that.
The first thought was let's take all of these 196 million driver's
licenses and turn them into identification cards, but that might not be
the best thought. There are other options. For example, we might need a
work card in the United States. A lot of the impetus for this came from
immigration problems. Since many of the immigration problems are the
result of people wanting to come here and work, maybe one way to think
about identity theft is to say: Let's have a Social Security card that
is biometric and let people apply for that; let people who get new
cards get that, and let's have a work card. Or maybe we need a travel
card for people who want to travel on airplanes, and they would have a
travel card. Maybe we need to expand the number of passports. Twenty-
five percent of us have passports. I am not sure what the right answer
is. My instinct is that probably a work card would be a good card to
have. Maybe we ought to have two or three cards that meet certain
Federal requirements, any of which could be used for other
identification purposes. That way we would technically avoid having the
national identification card, but for convenience, people could have a
work card, a travel card, and a passport. All of those are just ideas.
But I wouldn't suggest that the Senate wait until midnight and take
Senator Alexander's ideas, ram them through, and send them to the House
and tell them to pass them with the next Iraq supplemental bill just
because we thought of it.
I think it would be better to let Senator Lieberman and Senator
Collins and others consider all of these options very carefully. I
think it might be best when we get to the immigration bill and we talk
about having an employer identification system, because that is going
to be an essential part of the comprehensive immigration bill. Well, if
that is the case, then we are probably going to need some kind of work
card. If that is the case, we might end up with a secure Social
Security card. If that is the case, we might not need REAL ID at all.
So that is an even better reason to adopt the Collins amendment,
because between now and the expiration of 2 years, we should pass a
comprehensive immigration bill here in Congress. In fact, if we don't,
we should all be severely criticized, because it is our job to do it.
So I urge my colleagues respectfully to look at the Collins amendment
and see it as a reasonable approach. It says: Let's delay 2 years.
Let's hold some hearings. Let's ask the States to be more involved in
what the cost is. Let's think about any privacy issues that might
result from a de facto national identification card, and let's even
make sure, if we are going to have an identification card, that the
idea of using driver's licenses is the best way to do it.
As my last comment, I would underscore the fact that there are a
number of States already considering taking the action Maine has
already taken, the Senator's State, in passing a resolution rejecting
the REAL ID card. Those are Hawaii, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington State. If the REAL ID card were to go
into effect in those States in May, next spring, and they didn't have
the REAL ID card, according to the law they can't fly on a commercial
airplane. Well, that is going to create a situation I don't think any
Member of this Senate wants to see.
So I am here to salute the Senator from Maine for being diligent in
protecting our liberty and in protecting the rights of State and local
governments, and making sure that if we are going to have some kind of
more secure card, whether it is a driver's license or a work card, a
travel card, or even a passport, that we do it right after we have
suitable hearings.
I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Collins amendment, and I thank
the Senator for yielding time to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee for
his excellent statement. He outlined the issue very well.
I emphasize two points the Senator made. First is the cost. The
National Governors Association has estimated that compliance with the
requirements of the REAL ID card will impose $11 billion of costs on
State governments over the next 5 years. Yet we have appropriated only
$40 million to be used toward that cost, and of that amount the
Department of Homeland Security has only allocated $6 million, so only
a tiny fraction of the expected cost.
The second point I emphasize is the Department of Homeland Security
has yet to issue the regulations detailing how States are to comply
with the law.

[[Page S2325]]

So to expect the States to comply by May of next year with regulations
that have yet to be issued is simply unfair and will add another layer
of costs because of the short time for compliance. This 2 years will
allow a more careful review. It will allow more input by the States
when DHS does issue the regulations, and it will allow us to devise a
cost-effective way of achieving a goal all of us have, and that is to
make driver's licenses more secure.
I am very grateful for the insights of the Senator from Tennessee,
for his support, and for his very early leadership on this issue.
Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, the provisions included in the Commerce
Committee title, title 13 of the substitute amendment, reflect the
Commerce Committee's relentless efforts to tackle emerging issues and
building upon existing security transportation legislation. The
provisions included in the Commerce title improve and enhance our
security efforts across all modes: rail, truck, motor carrier,
pipeline, and aviation.
Senator Stevens and I, and our colleagues on the Commerce Committee
are no strangers to the issue of transportation security. In fact, the
Commerce Committee responded and the Congress enacted immediately in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attack landmark aviation and maritime
security laws.
Last year, the Congress took its first step in 4 years, to
significantly improve the Nation's transportation security system by
enacting the Commerce Committee's SAFE Port Act, which strengthened the
security of our Nation's ports and maritime vessels.
While significant in terms of the protections provided to our ports
and maritime system, the Congress failed during conference to seize the
opportunity to enact comprehensive transportation security legislation
that would have addressed many of the gaps in other modes of the
transportation system.
Today we begin to correct that shortcoming with the proposed
legislation before us.
The Commerce title to the substitute amendment before the Senate
addresses transportation security for our rail, motor carrier, and
pipeline industries. The economic importance of these three industries
can not be overstated.
While 95 percent of the Nation's cargo comes through our ports, our
rail system and our motor carriers move these goods from our coasts and
borders, through the interior of this country, to their final
destinations. Together, these systems are the backbone that sustains
our economy.
In terms of rail security, the Nation's 560-plus freight railroads
own more than 140,000 miles of track over which nearly 30 million
carloads are transported annually. This network transports 42 percent
of all domestic intercity freight, the majority of coal used in
electricity generation, more than 12 million trailers and containers,
and two million carloads of chemicals. Meanwhile, U.S. trucking hauled
9.1 billion tons of freight and employed 5.6 million people in trucking
related fields in 2003.
Equally important is the contribution that these modes make in moving
passengers throughout our Nation. Approximately 24 million passengers
ride Amtrak annually, and there are nearly 3.4 billion passenger and
commuter rail trips in this country each year. Similarly, over-the-road
buses transport approximately 600 million passengers annually and are
the only viable means of public transportation for many people
throughout the country.
The recent attacks on the passenger trains and transit systems in
Madrid, London, and Mumbai all demonstrate that railroads and surface
transportation systems are vulnerable targets for terrorists, and are a
constant reminder of what can happen in our communities.
We must address the risks facing our essential surface and rail
transportation systems here at home in a comprehensive and coordinated
way before we become the next victim of a successful attack.
Toward this goal, Senator Stevens and I, along with Senators
Lautenberg, Rockefeller, Kerry, Boxer, Snowe, Pryor, Carper, Dorgan,
Hutchison, Klobuchar, Cantwell, and others, introduced the Surface
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007, or STARS Act. This bill
has 22 cosponsors to date.
The STARS Act incorporates updated versions of provisions within the
Rail Security Act of 2004, which the Senate passed by unanimous consent
in the 108th Congress, and the Senate version of the SAFE Port Act
which we passed in the 109th Congress.
The Commerce Committee unanimously reported this bill along with S.
509, the Aviation Security Improvement Act, and S. 385, the
Interoperable Emergency Communication Act, on February 13, 2007, and
these provisions are included in the substitute amendment before us
today as title 13.
The surface and rail provisions in title 13 require the Department of
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration to
expand existing security initiatives and develop grant programs to
assist private-sector surface transportation security efforts. The
title authorizes $1.1 billion over fiscal years 2008 through 2011.
The rail title of the substitute amendment requires railroad risk
assessments and plans for improving rail security. It also authorizes
grants to Amtrak, freight railroads and others to upgrade passenger and
freight rail security, undertake research and development, and improve
tunnel security.
Additionally, the title encourages the deployment of rail car
tracking equipment for high-hazard material shipments, requires
railroads to create a railroad worker security-training program, and
provides whistleblower protection for rail workers who report security
concerns.
The surface transportation security provisions in title 13 of the
substitute amendment promotes tracking technology for truck shipments
of high-hazard materials and requires new guidance and assessments
pertaining to hazardous materials truck routing.
The title also establishes programs for reviewing and enforcing
hazardous materials and pipeline security plans and requires the TSA to
develop pipeline incident recovery plans.
Additionally, the title authorizes the existing grant program for
improving intercity bus and bus terminal security.
Finally, the title clarifies, at the TSA's request, the Secretary of
Homeland Security's legal authority for initiating an administrative
enforcement proceeding for violations of security regulations relating
to nonaviation modes of transportation.
Regarding aviation security, title 13 addresses all the
recommendations in the 9/11 Commission's report, including cargo and
baggage screening, explosive detection at airport checkpoints,
passenger prescreening, airport access controls, and general aviation
security. The title requires the TSA to provide for the screening of
all cargo being carried on commercial passenger aircraft within 3
years. The system must allow for a level of screening ``comparable'' to
that of checked baggage screening and ensure the security of all cargo
that is shipped on passenger aircraft.
The aviation provisions in title 13 advance the deployment of
electronic Explosive Detection Systems, EDS, at airports across the
nation by extending the Aviation Security Capital Fund that is used to
integrate such machines into the baggage conveyor process.
The title also bolsters the existing grant program through changes in
funding allocation requirements requiring a prioritized schedule for
such projects that will increase flexibility for funding options.
Our legislation recognizes the threat presented by passengers
transporting explosives through security checkpoints and promotes key
changes to address this risk.
Title 13 requires the TSA to produce a strategic plan to deploy
explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints and fully
implement that plan within 1 year of its submission. They must also
provide specialized training to the screener workforce in the areas of
behavior observation, and explosives detection. To address ongoing
problems in developing an advanced passenger

[[Page S2326]]

prescreening system, the aviation provisions in title 13 would ensure a
system is in place to coordinate passenger redress for those
individuals misidentified against the ``no-fly'' or ``selectee''
watchlists. The TSA must also submit a strategic plan to Congress for
the testing and implementation of its advanced passenger prescreening
system.
To increase General Aviation, GA, security, the title will require a
threat assessment program that is standardized and focused on GA
facilities. It will further require foreign based GA aircraft entering
U.S. airspace to have their passengers checked against appropriate
watchlists to determine if there are any potential threats on board.
Title 13 of the substitute amendment includes a number of additional
provisions that will take significant steps toward strengthening
aviation security generally.
Title 13 will also authorize research and development spending for
aviation security technology, remove the arbitrary cap of 45,000 full-
time equivalent--FTE--employees currently imposed on the TSA's screener
workforce, and mandate security rules for foreign aircraft repair
stations.
In addition, this title will require the TSA to develop a system by
which the Administrator will provide blast-resistant cargo containers
to commercial passenger air carriers for use on a random or risk-
assessed basis, implement a sterile area access system that will grant
flight deck and cabin crews expedited access to secure areas through
screening checkpoints, and require a doubling of the DHS's existing dog
team capacity used for explosive detection across the Nation's
transportation network.
In addition to transportation security, title 13 also includes the
text of S. 385, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Act, which I
introduced earlier this year with Senators Stevens, Kerry, Smith, and
Snowe. Under the foresight and leadership of Senator Stevens, during
the Deficit Reduction Act, the Commerce Committee created a new $1
billion fund administered by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration--NTIA--to support state and local first
responders in their efforts to talk to one another during emergencies.
The interoperable provisions in title 13 provide congressional
direction on the implementation of that fund.
Since its creation, NTIA has served as the principal
telecommunications policy advisor to the Secretary of Commerce and the
President, and manages the Federal Government's use of the radio
spectrum.
In this capacity, NTIA has historically played an important role in
assisting public safety personnel in improving communications
interoperability and recognizing that effective solutions involve
attention to issues of spectrum and government coordination as well as
funding.
Today, our first responders continue to struggle in their efforts to
improve the interoperability of their systems. The statutory guidance
provided to NTIA in this legislation will help them in these efforts.
First, the provision would make clear that proposals to improve
interoperable communications are not solely limited to systems or
equipment that utilize new public safety spectrum that will be vacated
following the digital television transition.
In a letter to the majority leader earlier this year, Mayor Bloomberg
of New York City noted the significant efforts of his city to improve
communications interoperability for first responders utilizing systems
in other public safety spectrum bands, and urged Congress to eliminate
the apparent eligibility restriction in current law. As a result, our
provisions make clear that if the project will improve public safety
interoperability, it is eligible for funding.
In addition, the provisions provide the NTIA Administrator to direct
up to $100 million of these funds for the creation of State and Federal
strategic technology reserves of communications equipment that can be
readily deployed in the event that terrestrial networks fail in times
of disaster.
Recently, an independent panel created by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications networks
noted the impact that limited pre-positioning of communications
equipment had in slowing the recovery process. As a result, these
provisions will help to ensure that our focus on interoperability also
considers the importance of communications redundancy and resiliency.
Second, the provisions ensure that funding allocations among the
several States result in a fair distribution by requiring a base amount
of funding--.75 percent--to be distributed to all States.
On top of these minimum allocations, the provision would further
require that prioritization of these funds be based upon an ``all-
hazards'' approach that recognizes the critical need for effective
emergency communications in response to natural disasters, such as
tsunami, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes, in addition to
terrorist attacks.
Finally, NTIA's administration of the grant fund will not only help
to integrate the disparate elements that must be a part of effective
interoperability solutions, but will also ensure greater program
transparency and oversight. Given the myriad of different grant
programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security, it is
critical that these funds--specifically allocated by Congress to speed
up our efforts to improve communications interoperability for first
responders--not get lost in the shuffle of other disaster and
nondisaster grants.
As a result, the provisions not only devote NTIA's attention to the
success of this program, but also require the inspector general of the
Department of Commerce to annually review the administration of this
program.
The terrorists that seek to do us harm are cunning, dynamic, and most
of all, patient. While they have not successfully struck our homeland
since September 11, 2001, it does not mean they are not preparing to do
so.
They work 24 hours a day, studying every move we make, looking for
some weakness to exploit. It is imperative that we stay ahead of them.
We must recruit, train, and deploy a skilled and dedicated security
force. We must research and implement the most effective and cutting
edge technologies to enhance the capabilities of that security force.
And we must provide communications equipment to our first responders
that is interoperable and accessible in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster.
Simply put, our entire economy relies on a well-functioning, secure
transportation system, and we must ensure that the system, and the
passengers and cargo that use it, are well protected.
The steps we take in the coming months will impact our safety,
security, and one of our most essential freedoms--movement--for years
to come. We must commit ourselves to ensuring that our transportation
security remains a priority and is as strong and effective as possible.
The provisions before the Senate this week that were reported out of
the Commerce Committee make that commitment.
We have worked over the past several years with our colleagues and
with the TSA and DHS and with the FCC and NTIA to address concerns,
improve on initial efforts, and plan for the future. Now, it is time to
act and to pass these provisions, so we can continue to move forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank Senator Inouye for his
extraordinary leadership in these matters. The committees have
differing jurisdictions, all aimed at supporting homeland security. The
Commerce Committee sections we are proud to have put together with the
parts that came out of the Homeland Security Committee, as well as
parts that came out of the Banking Committee.
It is always an honor and pleasure to work with Senator Inouye. I
thank him for the contributions he and Senator Stevens and their
committee have made to the overall movement in the Senate to improve
our homeland security. I thank the Senator very much.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I thank the chairman for his kind words.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S2327]]

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from South
Carolina, who has come to the floor to offer an amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Amendment No. 279 to Amendment No. 275

Mr. DeMint. Madam President, I ask to set aside the pending
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I thank the managers of this bill for
the time and effort they have put into it. It is almost 400 pages long,
and it contains numerous provisions. I look forward to working with the
Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, and the Senator from Maine,
Ms. Collins, in the coming days to make this bill better. I call up
amendment No. 279.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. DeMint] proposes an
amendment numbered 279 to amendment No. 275.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant
from the receipt of a transportation security card)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

(a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the
individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and
inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the
individual poses a security risk''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read as
follows:
``(1) Disqualifications.--
``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as
provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently
disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been
convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a
civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following
felonies:
``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section
2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or conspiracy
to commit such crime.
``(v) A crime involving a transportation security incident.
``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material
under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution,
manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an
explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive
or explosive device includes--

``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and
844(j) of title 18);
``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c)
through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of
title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986).

``(viii) Murder.
``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false
information knowing the same to be false, concerning the
deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or
other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a
State or other government facility, a public transportation
system, or an infrastructure facility.
``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable
State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or
admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed
in this subparagraph.
``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in
clauses (i) through (iv).
``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes
described in clauses (v) through (x).
``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as
provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified
from being issued a biometric transportation security card
under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or
found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year
period ending on the date on which the individual applies for
such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
year period ending on the date on which the individual
applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture,
purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a
firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other
weapon includes--

``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title 18
and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986);
and
``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions
Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal
Regulations.

``(ii) Extortion.
``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including
identity fraud and money laundering if the money laundering
is related to a crime described in this subparagraph or
subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare fraud and passing
bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or
misrepresentation.
``(iv) Bribery.
``(v) Smuggling.
``(vi) Immigration violations.
``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to
distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
``(viii) Arson.
``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
``(xii) Robbery.
``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes
listed in this subparagraph.
``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section 1036
of title 18, or a comparable State law.
``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a comparable
State law, other than any of the violations listed in
subparagraph (A)(x).
``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant who
is wanted, or under indictment, in any civilian or military
jurisdiction for a felony listed in this paragraph, is
disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) until the want or warrant
is released or the indictment is dismissed.
``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses
an arrest for a disqualifying crime listed in this section
without indicating a disposition, the Transportation Security
Administration shall notify the applicant of such disclosure
and provide the applicant with instructions on how the
applicant can clear the disposition, in accordance with
clause (ii).
``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition
under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written
proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not
later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause
(i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the
disqualifying criminal offense.
``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the
Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof
in accordance with the Transportation Security
Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses
and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall
notify--

``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from
being issued a biometric transportation security card under
subsection (b);
``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in the
case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is disqualified,
if the applicant is a mariner.

``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as
provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual
may not be denied a transportation security card under
subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that
individual--
``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year period
of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a
felony--

``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the
individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United
States; or
``(II) for causing a severe transportation security
incident;

``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the
preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in
clause (i);
``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or
removed from the United States under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the
United States.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as
paragraphs (3) through (7); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a
work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to
terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, the amendment I have offered, No. 279,
is very simple. It codifies the recent regulations issued by the
Department of Homeland Security which bans certain criminals from
gaining security access to our seaports. My amendment is needed to
protect these regulations from outside groups that may challenge them
in court, as well as from future administrations that may repeal or
weaken them.
My amendment is also bipartisan and should not be controversial. It
was unanimously adopted by this body last

[[Page S2328]]

year as part of the SAFE Port Act which passed 98 to 0. Unfortunately,
it was gutted by the conference committee behind closed doors, and that
is why I am offering it again today.
As my colleagues know, the Maritime Transportation Security Act
requires the Transportation Security Agency, TSA, to develop a
biometric security card for port workers at our seaports that can be
used to limit access to sensitive areas within a seaport. The security
card is called a transportation worker identification card or, as we
sometimes call it, a TWIC.

The law requires that the Secretary issue this card to any individual
requesting it unless the Secretary determines that the individual poses
a terrorism security risk or if the individual has been convicted of
treason, terrorism, sedition, or espionage. To clarify who poses a
security risk, the Department of Homeland Security recently issued
regulations that bar certain serious felons from receiving these TWICs.
Specifically, the regulations permanently bar from our ports criminals
convicted of espionage, sedition, treason, terrorism, crimes involving
transportation security, improper transport of hazardous material,
unlawful use of an explosive device, bomb threats, murder, violation of
the RICO Act, where one of the above crimes is a predicate act, and
conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.
The Department of Homeland Security regulations also bar recent
felons--defined as those convicted within the last 7 years or
incarcerated in the last 5 years--from gaining access to our ports if
they have been convicted of any of the following felonies: assault with
intent to murder, kidnapping or hostage-taking, rape or aggravated
sexual abuse, unlawful use of a firearm, extortion, fraud, bribery,
smuggling, immigration violations, racketeering, robbery, drug dealing,
arson, or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.
These regulations were developed after an extensive process that
included consultation with the Department of Justice and Transportation
to identify individuals who have a propensity to engage in unlawful
activity, specifically activity that places our ports at risk. These
regulations governing who can gain access to our seaports are nearly
identical to the regulations that govern those who can gain access to
our airports as well as those who can transport hazardous material in
our country.
These prohibitions are crucial because individuals who engage in this
type of unlawful activity have a greater likelihood to engage in these
acts or in acts that put American ports and American lives at risk. Our
law enforcement officials understand this risk. They understand the
threat our ports face when traditional criminals, particularly
organized criminals, work with terrorists. For example, the FBI
recently apprehended a member of the Russian mafia attempting to sell
missiles to an FBI agent who he believed was acting as a middleman for
terrorists.
Joseph Billie, Jr., the FBI's top counterterrorism official, recently
commented that the FBI is continuing to look at a nexus between
organized crime and terrorists, and they are looking at this very
aggressively. The threat not only comes from criminals working directly
with terrorists, it also comes from criminals who may look the other
way when a suspect container comes from a port. Joseph King, a former
Customs Service agent and now a professor at the John J. College of
Criminal Justice, outlined the concern very clearly: ``It is an
invitation to smuggling of all kinds,'' he said. ``Instead of bringing
in 50 kilograms of heroin, what would stop them from bringing in 5
kilograms of plutonium?'' The nightmare scenario here is where a
criminal at one of our ports who may think he is just helping a friend
smuggle in drugs inadvertently helps smuggle in a weapon of mass
destruction. That is a risk we cannot take.
I offered this amendment last year to address this threat and to
ensure that serious felons are kept out of our ports. My amendment
codified in statute the then-proposed TWIC regulations. As I said
earlier, my amendment was unanimously adopted and was included in the
Senate-passed version of the SAFE Port Act that passed 98 to 0.
Unfortunately, my amendment was also completely gutted behind closed
doors in the conference committee. The provision went from addressing a
list of 20 serious felons to a list of just 4. These 4 felonies are so
rare that the conference committee made the provision almost
meaningless.
I am extremely disappointed by the stealth opposition to this
measure. I cannot understand who would oppose banning serious felons
from gaining secure access at our American ports. While no Senator has
been willing to publicly oppose this measure, the longshoremen's labor
union was more than happy to take credit for gutting the provision.
Late last year, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union claimed
credit for killing the provision in the SAFE Port conference committee.
They stated in their newsletter:

We have heard rumors that Senator DeMint is particularly
angry with the union's successful lobbying effort to strip
his anti-labor provision. He may attempt to amend another
piece of legislation, so the union will stay on guard to
protect its members' interests.

Apparently, this union has stayed on guard because it was able to get
five Senators to object to this vital homeland security measure when I
tried to pass it the second time late last year.
I wish I could say that the unions would stop at fighting this
legislation on the Senate floor, but they are also gearing up to mount
a legal battle against Department of Homeland Security regulations. In
response to a Wall Street Journal editorial on the subject, the union
stated that the TWIC security regulations were `` . . . double jeopardy
and unconstitutional.'' This is a clear indication that they have a
legal challenge in mind. It seems clear that once longshoremen start
applying for TWIC cards and some members are rejected because they are
convicted felons, the labor unions are going to take the Department of
Homeland Security to court and try to bog the regulations down in
lengthy legal battles. The consequence will be that as we continue to
fight this global war on terror, America's ports will be staffed by
serious felons who cannot be trusted.
Some of my colleagues may be tempted to come to the defense of the
longshoremen. They will say that the individuals in question have paid
their debt to society and barring them is gutting our port workforce.
They may also claim that the crimes listed in the Department of
Homeland Security regulations are somehow not related to homeland
security. These objections are just plain wrong.
I don't disagree that convicted felons should be given a second
chance. I hope they get back on their feet and become productive
members of their communities. What I disagree with is that we should
give serious felons a pass, literally and figuratively, to access the
most secure areas of America's port infrastructure. When they are fresh
out of prison, we should not trust them with the most vulnerable areas
of our ports. The stakes here are simply too high.
As for the concern that barring these individuals will empty the
ranks of the port workforce, the facts don't agree. When the Department
of Homeland Security issued nearly 350,000 ID cards for hazmat
truckdrivers and subjected them to the same background check that is
required by my amendment, only 3,100 were rejected. That is less than 1
percent. The fact is, we are talking about an isolated group of serious
felons here, and the workforce in the United States is dynamic enough
to supply the few thousand longshoremen who may be needed to replace
those we let go.

Finally, some may say these felonies do not represent serious crimes.
To that, I would ask any of my colleagues to tell me which individual
he or she wants working at our ports where security is so important:
Murderers? Extortionists? Drug dealers? Bomb makers? I just want to
hear the rationale for trusting these criminals with our national
security.
The bottom line is this: My amendment applies nearly the same
protections to seaports that are already applied at our airports. It
will make us safer by keeping individuals who have shown a willingness
to break the law outside our ports. This is extremely important. We can
spend all the money in our Treasury trying to screen cargo, but if we
don't screen the people who

[[Page S2329]]

work at our ports, we cannot expect to be safe.
I do wish to thank several people for supporting this important
policy. First, I thank the Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, who was
very helpful to me during the debate on the SAFE Port Act last year. I
also thank the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, for his
support. I should also say that the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye,
was also helpful in getting this provision into the bill.
This is a bipartisan proposal, and it should not be controversial.
Americans expect us to check and verify the nature of the people who
work at our seaports, and we have a responsibility to ensure that
happens even if it upsets a labor union that feels compelled to protect
the jobs of a small group of serious felons. My amendment codifies in
statute these important security regulations, and I hope all of my
colleagues will support it.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important measure, and
I will be happy to work with the bill managers to arrange a time to
come back to the floor if further debate is needed.
I thank the Chair for this time, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank our friend from South Carolina
for the amendment he has offered. We worked together when last this
subject came before the Senate to bring about a result that I believe
was a good one and in the public interest, which was that the Secretary
of Homeland Security issued regulations to create an identity card. The
card has a marvelous acronym, which doesn't sound as serious as it is.
The acronym is TWIC, transportation worker identification card. This is
one of the necessities of the post-9/11 age, that we need to move
toward some filter for people working in areas that now have become
higher vulnerability areas and are more likely targets for terrorism.
Unfortunately, that includes our ports and, obviously, includes our
airports as well, which have a separate ID program on which they are
working.
I know there is some hope within the Department of Homeland Security
that we are moving toward a more common program for a similar
background check and card for postal workers at a host of different
transportation-related locations to protect them and us from potential
terrorist attacks.
Senator DeMint, I gather from his statement--and I appreciate his
intentions here--intends by this amendment to codify in law the
regulations the Department of Homeland Security has established for
these identification cards for workers at our ports. I want to take a
look at it. I know Senator Collins does as well. We want to work with
Senator DeMint.
Clearly, the intention here is one we all share, which is to do
everything we can, within reason and respectful of common sense and
constitutional rights, to secure our critical transportation
facilities, including our ports. I rise now to simply thank the Senator
for offering his amendment, to tell him we will consider it with some
thoughtfulness and look forward to working with him as we move toward a
vote on this amendment.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The DeMint amendment is the pending business.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I ask unanimous consent that amendment be set aside
and I be allowed to speak on the Collins amendment, No. 277, please.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 277

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
amendment offered by my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins, relative
to the issue of REAL ID. I was back in my State last week, as most of
us were, and I had the opportunity to speak to our legislature and
visit with members of both the State house and the State senate in
Atlanta, and I cannot tell you the angst and apprehension that I saw
among members of my legislature over this issue of REAL ID.
When I got back I did not understand why there would be that much
concern about the issue. I was not sure how this thing came about. When
I checked with my staff I found out, as Senator Alexander said this
morning in his comments, that this was a measure that was stuck into
the Katrina appropriations bill that did not go through committee, we
did not have debate on it on the floor of this body, and I don't think
anybody here understood the real consequences of it.
When the 19 hijackers came to this country and carried out the
horrific attack on September 11, they were in possession of 63 driver's
licenses issued by various States around the country. That should never
have happened, and we need to make sure it does not happen again. But
the fact is, I don't think anybody understood the consequences of this
REAL ID Act as it pertains to that particular issue of driver's
licenses.
In 1994, when I was elected to the House of Representatives, we
talked a lot about unfunded mandates. The Presiding Officer was a
Member of that body. He remembers well we had a lot of conversations
about unfunded mandates coming out of Washington to our State and local
officials and organizations that were required to fund those mandates
that we passed. There is no bigger unfunded mandate that we have passed
lately that is more atrocious than this particular mandate.
I applaud Senator Collins for looking at this issue, for deciding
that it is a real, practical problem. It is an issue that needs to be
dealt with. Her amendment makes a lot of sense. It does not repeal the
law. What it does is to say that the law is not going to be implemented
until 2 years following the issuance of the regulations. Here we are,
with this law supposed to be implemented by our State legislatures this
year, and we don't even have the regulations coming out of the
Department of Homeland Security yet. They don't know how to carry out
the provisions of this law.
I support the Collins amendment, No. 277. I think it makes an awful
lot of sense. It allows us to go back in and take a more thorough look
at this particular issue and decide how we can accomplish the results
that the REAL ID Act wants to accomplish but at the same time not
burden our States with a mandate that none of us intended to impose
upon them.
I do support this amendment. I hope when the time comes it will
receive not only passage but significant numbers to support the passage
of this amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Georgia for his
support and his excellent comments. This is a carefully drafted
amendment. It doesn't rewind the clock in terms of throwing out the
work that the Department has done, but it recognizes that it is simply
unreasonable to expect States to comply by May of next year with
complex and costly regulations that the Department has yet to issue.
The Department has yet to issue the detailed guidance that the States
need.
It also recognizes that the quality of the final regulations will be
improved by the formation of a committee with State officials, privacy
advocates, technological experts, and Federal officials sitting down,
looking at the regulations, and providing input to the Department on
their proposed regulations and also providing that input to us.
The third provision of the amendment would increase the waiver
authority that the Secretary can have if it proves that there are
technological barriers to complying with certain provisions of the law.
I think this is a reasonable approach to a real problem.
Finally, let me say to my colleagues, the estimates for the cost of
compliance with this law are as high as $11 billion over the next 5
years. This is a huge unfunded mandate on the States. My hope is
through our approach we can come up with more practical, cost-effective
means of achieving a goal that all of us share and that is improving
the security of driver's licenses that are used for Federal
identification purposes, such as boarding an airplane. There is a real
need to have a secure driver's license, but let's do it in a practical,
collaborative way, and let's make sure there is adequate time to
comply.

[[Page S2330]]

I thank the Senator from Georgia for his support and for his
excellent comments.
I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss,
be added as a cosponsor of the Collins amendment, No. 277.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for 20 minutes. I don't think I will use all that
time. If I need more time, I will ask for it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Taxes

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, as everybody who follows Congress on a
regular basis knows, when you get close to the month of March, we are
in budget season. The President sent his budget to the Hill, which he
does regularly, the first week of February, about a month ago. So now
it is up to the Congress. In the next few days the Senate Budget
Committee will be marking up our budget resolution.
For the public at large, don't confuse a budget resolution, which is
a discipline for Congress on budgeting, with appropriations bills that
actually give the President the authority to spend money. They come
along a little bit later in the year.
At a minimum, the budget resolution will lay out the fiscal
priorities of the next 5 years. As everyone knows, the American people
spoke last November and sent a Democratic majority to both Houses of
Congress. For the first time in 12 years, Democrats will take the
initiative on the Senate budget. As ranking Republican on the Finance
Committee, which deals with taxes, trade, Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, and also as the senior Republican on the Budget
Committee, which is the committee that sends the budget to the Senate,
I am eager to see the direction the new Democratic majority wants to
take on fiscal policy for this year, but the budget also has long-term
implications of 5 years.
There are a lot of questions I am waiting to get answered. What will
be their plan on pay-go, which means pay as you go? With spending at
higher-than-average levels of our economy, what kind of spending
discipline will the Democratic majority show? On the revenue side of
the ledger, will Democrats look to prevent a tax increase on virtually
every American taxpayer a few years down the road, when the present tax
policy sunsets, or will the Democratic majority, without a vote, set in
motion, then, the largest Federal tax increase of all time? This is a
fact. It will happen. When we have a sunsetting of tax law, it is
possible to have a tax increase without Congress voting it. In this
particular instance, this would put in place the biggest Federal tax
increase ever.
Over the next few days, I want to talk about the tax issues--I want
to do it topic by topic--that are going to come up during debate on the
process of the budget. There are probably many ways to do it, but this
is how I split the general subject into topics: One, the importance of
preventing a tax hike on virtually all American taxpaying families and
individuals. That is what I want to visit about today. Next is the
negative economic consequences of sunsetting the bipartisan tax relief
plan that will be the biggest tax increase in the history of the
country without a vote of the people, if we don't do something about
it. Then another time, I am going to review Democratic tax increase
offset proposals with a specific focus on the limits and problems
associated with those tax increases.
Next I will focus on one particular ill-defined but often mentioned
offset; that is, reducing the tax gap. Everybody is for reducing the
tax gap, and I am working with Senator Baucus to do that. He is
chairman of our committee. But there has to be realism brought into
that debate, and I hope to provide that realism. Then fifth and last,
tax reform and simplification, its necessity and bipartisan
opportunities to do so.
These discussions are meant to be about the revenue side of the
budget. But before we get into the revenue side of the budget, I want
to issue a challenge to my friends on the other side of the aisle. It
is a challenge I have made over the last few years. It is in the
context of intellectually honest budgeting. It is also in the context
of the bipartisan record of the Finance Committee on tax policy over
the last few years. That tax policy has been led by this Senator, when
I was chairman, and by Senator Baucus working with me during that
period of time, or Senator Baucus, now leading the committee and,
hopefully, my always working with him as he worked with me.
That bipartisan record of the Senate Finance Committee shows about
$200 billion of revenue raisers from antitax shelter measures and
corporate loophole closures, basically doing something about abuse of
the Tax Code, unintended by Congress, by people who can hire very
sophisticated lawyers to find ways around paying taxes. We have closed
$200 billion of those, and it has been bipartisan. So when I hear from
self-styled deficit hawks, or from the media, who are sympathetic to
those points of view that we need higher taxes to reduce the deficit, I
believe the Finance Committee has anted up in terms of producing
revenue raisers without raising general levels of taxation on the
American people.
Here is my challenge, and I will ask my friends to listen up. Anyone
on the other side who considers themselves a deficit hawk needs to
prove it, then, on the spending side. Compared to our committee already
raising revenue by $200 billion by closing tax loopholes and tax abuse,
show me, then, a spending restraint proposal for deficit reduction. I
issued that challenge several years ago and have issued it repeatedly.
No one from the other side has stepped up. We can look and look and
look and we won't find such a proposal. All of those liberal think
tanks that oppose tooth and nail any kind of tax relief are usually
advocates of spending increases, all of this under the guise of fiscal
responsibility. We won't find any proposals to restrain spending from
these liberal think tanks.

If we look at the media sources that are sympathetic to the views of
the Democratic leadership or the liberal think tanks, we will find
hard-line opposition to tax relief and a lot of tax increase proposals
but, likewise, no proposal reining in spending. They will claim the
mantle of fiscal responsibility but won't show anything on the spending
side other than spending increases. For these folks, when it comes to
deficit reduction, there is only one side of the Federal ledger. That
is raising taxes.
We have a Federal Government that is projected to spend $2.7 trillion
for this fiscal year alone and is projected to spend $33.7 trillion
over the next 10 years. Yet leadership on the other side of the aisle,
the liberal think tanks that back them up, and the media that helps
them get their message out so easily and is sympathetic to their views,
can't find a dollar of savings on the spending side. To these folks,
with all due respect, I want to call them out. They won in November.
The Congress is in their hands. Let's see some credibility on the
spending side of the ledger. Show the taxpayers the money. Show me a
proposal to restrain spending and put it to deficit reduction. That is
a preliminary point.
Now I will move to talk about preventing tax hikes. The same group's
position on current law tax relief is radically different than its
position on spending restraint. Back in 2001 and 2003, Congress
approved, and the President signed, legislation that provided across-
the-board tax relief to nearly every American taxpayer. The Democratic
leadership, liberal think tanks, and sympathetic east coast media
criticized tax relief on a couple of grounds. One charge was that the
tax relief was a tax cut for the rich. The other charge was that the
bipartisan tax relief was fiscally irresponsible.
Nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation distribution tables actually
put a lie to that first charge. The record levels of revenue show that
the growing economy, the expanding U.S. economy, and economic stimulus
from tax relief better the Nation's fiscal situation, bringing in more
tax dollars,

[[Page S2331]]

not depriving the Federal Treasury of dollars.
This debate on preventing tax increases is often couched only in
macroeconomic terms. We will hear what it ``costs'' to extend
bipartisan tax relief. We will hear very big numbers. For instance, the
Joint Committee on Taxation projects that the revenue loss from making
the bipartisan tax relief permanent is $1.9 trillion over the next 10
years. That is the way the Democratic leadership, liberal think tanks,
and sympathetic east coast media will define proposals to prevent a tax
hike. We won't see them talk about the number of families who benefit
from the extension of the $1,000 child tax credit. You won't see them
talk about the number of married couples who benefit or the average
family benefit from marriage penalty relief.
Today I am going to take a few minutes and shed some light on the
side of the debate about extending bipartisan tax relief. Lord only
knows, there is not much light shed on these important facts, because
everybody is talking about tax relief for the rich. I will acknowledge
the critics' point on the macro cost of extending tax relief. But keep
in mind, a liberal's tax relief cost is a conservative's tax hike, when
we are talking about extending current law. They are the two sides of
the same taxpayer's coin. I will agree to that number, but call it a
$1.9 trillion tax increase.
So I am going to follow the Democratic leadership plan and dismantle
the bipartisan tax relief package bit by bit. I am also going to
challenge the Democratic leadership to show us the money by indicating
whether they want to scrap each piece as I move through the package.
Which pieces would they scuttle? I will work through the bipartisan tax
legislation piece by piece.

Let's start, then, with the basis for the 2001 bipartisan tax relief
measure. That is the new 10-percent bracket. The revenue loss for this
part of the package is $299 billion over 10 years, according to the
Joint Committee on Taxation. The 10-percent bracket is a huge piece of
tax relief for low-income people. The 10-percent bracket does that. No
wonder 100 million families and individual taxpayers benefit from the
10-percent bracket. I do not think anybody wants to dismantle that
piece. But I want to hear that from the Democratic leadership because
that is a compromise of their position of whether the 2001 tax
increases ought to sunset.
Where do we go next, then? The marginal tax rate cuts, which include
the 10-percent bracket, lose $852 billion over 10 years, according to
the Joint Committee on Taxation. That proposal reduces the taxes of
approximately 100 million families and individuals across America. It
appears some folks think 35 percent is too low of a top rate. Well,
guess what. Repealing the marginal rate cuts hits small business--the
biggest source of new jobs in this great country of ours--and it hits
small business the hardest.
The Treasury Department estimates 33 million small business owners
who are taxed on their business income at individual rates benefit from
the marginal rate cuts. Repealing these cuts would cause 33 million
small business owners to pay a 13-percent penalty. Do the Democratic
leaders want to raise taxes on these small business taxpayers,
restricting the ability of small business to create jobs?
Treasury also projects that small business gets over 80 percent of
the benefits of the cuts in the top two rates. Do we want to raise the
tax rates on these people--small businesses for the most part--by 13
percent? Does that make any sense? So to the Democratic leadership,
what do you say?
How about the death tax relief package? The Joint Committee on
Taxation scores that package at $499 billion over 10 years. Most of the
revenue loss is attributable to increasing the exemption amount and
dropping the rate to 45 percent on already taxed property. Is it
unreasonable to provide relief from the death tax or should we raise
the death tax on small businesses and family farms? That is what will
happen if the bipartisan tax relief package is not extended. So to the
Democratic leadership, what is your take on that provision?
Do the opponents want to repeal the proposal to double the child tax
credit, which the 2001 bill does? Mr. President, 31.6 million families
benefit from the child tax credit, according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation. Or how about the refundable piece that helps 16 million kids
and their families? That proposal loses $135 billion over 10 years. I
do not think we would have a lot of takers on that one. They are going
to want to extend that. Democratic leadership, do you agree?
How about the lower rates on capital gains and dividends? Thirty-
three million Americans--a good number of them low-income seniors--
benefit from the lower tax rates on capital gains and dividends,
according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. Does the Democratic
leadership think we should raise taxes on these 33 million Americans
benefiting from these lower tax rates? That would be families and
individuals.
On a side note, in another speech, I will be talking about the
worrisome Goldman Sachs economic report on the adverse economic effects
of failing to extend lower rates on capital gains--this line right
here, as shown on the chart--when it expires.
There are consequences to what Congress does. When you have a booming
economy, there could be very detrimental consequences to the country
when you take away the incentives that have had this economy exploding
like not any time since the early 1990s.
Let's take a look at the marriage penalty piece. It is the first
marriage penalty relief we delivered in over 30 years. The Joint
Committee on Taxation scores this proposal at $52 billion over 10
years, and Treasury estimates that in 2004, nearly 33 million married
couples benefited from this tax relief. Again, I do not think many
folks would want to raise taxes on people because they decided to be
married. I hope the Democratic leadership would agree with that
statement.
Another proposal is expensing for small businesses; in other words,
writing everything off in 1 year instead of stretching it out over 10
years. This is a commonsense, bipartisan proposal and directed
specifically to small business--the engine that creates new jobs.
According to IRS Statistics of Income, 6.7 million small businesses
across the country benefited from this expensing provision in 2004. If
we do not make it permanent, small businesses face a tax increase of
$19 billion over 10 years and probably sputtering the engine that
creates so many jobs in America. Does the Democratic leadership think
small business expensing is an unwise tax policy?
Continuing on through the bipartisan tax relief package, let's take a
look at education tax relief. This package, which will help Americans
deal with college education costs, scores at $12 billion over 10 years
by the Joint Committee on Taxation. IRS Statistics of Income show
nearly 16 million families and students benefited from this tax relief
in 2004.
In this era of rising higher education costs, should we gut tax
benefits for families to send their kids off to college? Does the
Democratic leadership think that is the way to go, which would be the
way we would go if Congress does nothing and you let this tax law
sunset?
Finally, families where both parents work have to deal with childcare
expenses. The tax relief package includes enhanced incentives for
childcare expenses. Mr. President, 5.9 million families across America
benefit, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. Does the
Democratic leadership think we ought to take away these childcare
benefits? That is what would happen if the tax cuts of 2001 were
sunset. It would happen without a vote of the Congress either.
Now, I have taken you through about $1.9 trillion of tax relief. It
sounds like a lot in abstraction, but it provides relief to every
American who pays income tax. I would ask any of those who want to
adjust or restructure--and those are words that are used around here
about this tax relief package passed in 2001--do you want to adjust it
or restructure it? Where would you cut in this package?
Would you hit the 10-percent bracket, driving up the taxes of low-
income people? Would you hit small business tax relief and sputter the
growth machine, the job machine of America; or the now refundable child
tax credit, and hurt low-income people; or the death tax relief; or the
marriage penalty relief;

[[Page S2332]]

dividends and capital gains relief; education tax relief; or childcare
tax relief? I hope not. Because in a recovering economy, with above-
average levels of individual income tax, as a percentage of GDP, even
with the tax relief package in place, which areas would you adjust,
which areas would you restructure?
Why, then, undo bipartisan--with emphasis upon ``bipartisan''--tax
cuts that make the Tax Code actually more progressive? Now get that,
not regressive; it is more progressive now than before the tax bill of
2001.
As folks on both sides of the aisle say, budgets are about
priorities. As the Democratic leadership draws up its budget, we will
hear a lot of talk about a big number for extending tax relief. It is a
big number. It is the biggest tax increase ever. It is going to affect
nearly every American taxpayer.
If leadership now in the majority of this body, because of the
results of the last election, decides to propose the biggest tax
increase in history in the name of deficit reduction, I will be looking
for that one, single dollar of spending restraint I never see. Now,
maybe we will see it, but I will bet we would not. Only time will tell,
and it will be within the next 2 or 3 weeks.
Mr. President, I yield the floor. I do not think I see any colleagues
who wish to speak, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to
speak as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Space Station Safety Report

Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, there was a space station task
force safety report released yesterday which points out a number of
hazards as we are now in the process of completing the space station.
Remember that we have this multibillion-dollar structure about 300
miles above the Earth, with a crew of three, and eventually it will
have more of a complement, of five or six, which will have the ongoing,
full-time responsibility of scientific experiments. Right now it is
about two football fields long. During the completion, which will occur
over the next 3 years, it will have all the additional appendages,
including the international laboratory we need to conduct all of the
experiments that we want. Yet the task force that released its report
yesterday says there are certain inherent hazards that we have always
known about, such as meteorites striking and/or space debris.
The U.S. Air Force catalogs all of the space debris. Therefore, we
have the ability, if something really got in the way, to actually
maneuver the space station out of the way of that debris--if we know
where that debris is. The same is true with weather and reconnaissance
satellites. I don't need to say anything about weather satellites here.
Everybody knows because it is obvious what technology we have today to
see the approaching storms, and if you live on the coast and it is
during the summer, it is all the more important, because of an inbound
hurricane, that everybody is prepared.
Well, what is preparing us? It is not only that airplane that is
flying into the hurricane, it is those satellites that are constantly
tracking the position of that hurricane. Those are threatened by this
space debris, which brings me to share with my colleagues: Isn't it
interesting that there has almost been a strange silence throughout the
world for the last 6 weeks after the Chinese tested their antisatellite
missile, which created a debris field that is 100 times more than any
debris that has been created, and because of its altitude, some 500
miles, it is going to be years before all of that debris is pulled back
to Earth by the gravitational pull of the Earth?
It is that debris field of thousands of particles, as a result of the
Chinese rocket destroying a Chinese satellite by hitting it and
exploding all of the kinetic energy in parts into the vacuum of space,
that now we have a new threat not only to our space station but also to
all of our weather satellites and our reconnaissance satellites. So my
colleagues can imagine the headache now for the U.S. Air Force of
trying to track all of that Chinese debris, much more so I think just
from that one explosion, more debris than all the other debris that is
up there. It is going to take several years before it ever comes down
because of the altitude where the kinetic energy occurred when the
vehicle slammed into the target, which was an old Chinese weather
satellite.
So as we are looking at the future of NASA and the completion of the
space station and the saving of the Hubble space telescope, which has
opened vast vistas of new knowledge to us about the heavens and about
the origin of the universe, thanks to the Chinese, as we do this we now
have to worry about something that could be lethal to our astronauts
and cosmonauts who are onboard the space station.
Some of the things they are talking about in this report released
yesterday include some kind of special curtains they put over the
windows that would give extra protection to the glass of the space
station windows. Others are talking about protective blankets they
might put over very sensitive areas of the space station that could be
hit by debris. This debris could be coming at a velocity of 10,000
miles per hour because, if it is in a different orbit and suddenly it
crosses the orbit of the space station and hits it--remember, going
around the Earth in orbital velocity is 17,500 miles an hour. If that
debris hits at right angles, you are going to have a velocity of 17,500
miles an hour. With the space station going at a different orbit, you
start to see the kind of kinetic energy that could rain from such a
collision. So it complicates it, and it complicates it not only for the
American space program but for every space program on planet Earth, and
that is the problem.
That is what the Chinese have done for us. Yet there has been a
suspicious silence of anybody speaking out in the world community about
what the Chinese have done in space. There was an intellectual
discussion about China having shown they have the capability of
targeting an antisatellite to hit a satellite, which is a significant
feat. But in the process, they ignored the threats now to all of the
human and nonmanned assets that are up there, not just for our country
but for every country in the world that depends on a satellite or a
spacecraft of some kind.
That is what we are facing. That is what we have to figure a plan
for. I hope the Chinese who have had singular success--and this Senator
has invited their Chinese astronaut to come here and visit, and he did.
This Senator has congratulated them on their space accomplishments. But
this time China has done something in accomplishing something
technologically that has endangered the other nations of the world with
the manned and the unmanned programs.
That is what is facing us. This is only the first the Chinese have
heard from this Senator about how they have endangered the interests of
planet Earth.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two parts of the
bill that is before us, the Improving America's Security Act, which is
really the attempt by our committee and the Senate to finish the job
the 9/11 Commission gave us to protect the security of the American
people from terrorist attack and also to adopt for the first time a
national all-hazards defense strategy that would set up a system that
would not only be aimed at preventing and, if, God forbid, necessary,
responding to a terrorist attack but

[[Page S2333]]

also being ready and preparing every level of government to be ready to
respond to a natural disaster.
The amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina is pending.
I wanted, in the interim, hoping others will come to the floor to offer
other amendments or speak on that pending amendment, to speak about
these two parts of the bill.
The first is about what is one of the most significant changes the
bill would make; that is, to establish for the first time a dedicated
grant program to assist States and localities in creating interoperable
communications systems to be used to protect the American people in
time of emergency. The ability of first responders to communicate with
one another is fundamental at a time of disaster. Yet time and time
again over the years, disasters have occurred, and police,
firefighters, and emergency medical workers are unable to exchange
critical information with one another, even indications of their
location. Sometimes, as we saw in Katrina, certainly, not only is this
a problem of their not being able to communicate with one another, it
is a problem of their not being able to communicate at all. There is a
painful and tragic cost to this failure to communicate or to
interoperate with others in law enforcement, and that is that lives are
lost.
This is a problem which was intensely made clear to all of us on
September 11, 2001 and again during Katrina, but it is not new. In
1982, the record shows, communications difficulties frustrated the
recovery efforts in response to the crash of the Air Florida plane
right here in Washington, DC. In 1995, again the record shows
communications difficulties complicated the response to the terrorist
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK.
In 1999, communications difficulties again slowed the response to the
shootings at Columbine High School near Littleton, CO.
Then came 9/11. The story of the communication breakdown among New
York City's first responders is well known. It is well known because it
cost the lives of some of the bravest Americans, some on duty and some
off duty, who rushed to the aid of their fellow citizens and fellow
first responders. But there were other communications breakdowns on
September 11, 2001, as well--less well known but also breakdowns that
hampered the response at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, PA.
After an in-depth look at the three incidents I have described--the
Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the plane that went down in
Pennsylvania on 9/11--the 9/11 Commission wrote:

The occurrence of this problem at three very different
sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate
communications among public safety organizations at the
local, State, and Federal level remains an important problem.

That was the 9/11 Report which came out in 2004. We are now at the
end of February 2007, and that problem remains as real and intense as
ever.
The Commission recommended expediting and increasing the assignment
of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. In 2005, as part of the
Deficit Reduction Act, Congress set February 2009 as the deadline for
broadcasters to transition to digital signals, which will free up much-
needed spectrum for first responders. A lot of us, including myself,
believed that delay to February 2009 was too long. The occupant of the
chair remembers that well; we stood together on that. But so be it,
that is what it is.
Since that time, Hurricane Katrina devastated the gulf coast,
particularly the great city of New Orleans, and reminded us again how
much more needs to be done to improve communications operability, to
sustain the very operation of an emergency communications system, and
interoperability, the ability of different first responders to
communicate with one another.
The communications infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi at the
time of Hurricane Katrina was decimated. Once again, difficulties in
communicating among officials and first responders significantly
impeded rescue and relief efforts. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour
drove the point home when he said the chief of the National Guard in
Mississippi ``might as well have been a Civil War general for the first
2 or 3 days'' because in order to get information, he had to use
runners. His runners had helicopters instead of horses, but the point
was clear. The lack of operable or interoperable communications
equipment put first responders in that disaster back about a century
and a half.
The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which is
proud to claim the Presiding Officer as a member, investigated the
preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina, a 9-month
investigation that produced a 700-page report and almost 90
recommendations. We enacted some of those recommendations last fall as
part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. That
legislation, which I am proud has largely become law, included ways to
improve planning and coordination, establish a much needed national
emergency communications plan, and strengthen technical guidance and
assistance to local first responders. The newly created Office of
Emergency Communications, which was created therein, will be
responsible for carrying out many of those responsibilities. Like many
of the homeland security challenges we face, achieving nationwide
operability and interoperability of communications will require
significant resources, a lot of money. One estimate from our Government
several years ago put the figure at $15 billion. Testimony before the
Senate Commerce Committee this past month estimated that the cost may
be as high as $50 billion to create a genuinely interoperable,
disaster-resistant communications system for our country. We don't know
the exact price tag, but we do know the costs will be significant. We
do know they are beyond the ability of State and local government
themselves to provide. That is why title III of the legislation before
the Senate, the Improving America's Security Act, establishes a
dedicated interoperability grant program for first responders which
will put us on the path to nationwide operability and interoperability,
capable of surviving and helping America survive a potential terrorist
attack or a natural disaster.
This is an important investment, a kind of leverage for the Federal
Government to create in partnership with the States and local
governments. Of course, part of the reason there is not only financial
need but programmatic policy justification for this. The kinds of
attacks, the kinds of natural disasters we are talking about, as we saw
most painfully in Katrina, have national consequences. The Federal
Government needs to be there to make some additional investments on
which the State and local governments will build.
The legislation, S. 4, before the Senate today authorizes $3.5
billion over 5 years, beginning in the coming fiscal year. That is on
top of the $1 billion interoperability grant program to be administered
by the Department of Commerce during this fiscal year, the result of
previous legislation. This is the beginning of moving toward a genuine
national system, if we can adopt this and fund it, a call to the States
and localities to match that money, each in their own way, so we can
build this survivable network of communications.
Individual States will be able to apply for grants under this new
program, which will be administered by FEMA, with assistance from the
Office of Emergency Communications. The committee was very anxious, as
the Presiding Officer knows, to not only create a fund of money and
throw it out there for every local official who had some idea about how
to create interoperable communications--all applications will have to
be consistent with each State's communications plan and the national
emergency communication plan which is being developed and expanded by
the new Office of Emergency Communications. In other words, to get
money, you have to prove you are going to fit into a statewide and
national plan for interoperability of communications.
Incidentally, the national element of this is pretty obvious. In
Katrina, you had a lot of first responders streaming into the gulf
coast, and New Orleans particularly, when local first responders were
overwhelmed. They were all bringing their own communications systems
with them. A similar response occurred--a really moving patriotic
response--after 9/11 to New York City, with first responders from all
over the country coming in.

[[Page S2334]]

What do we want at that point? A Tower of Babel, where people cannot
communicate with one another, or the ability, easily, as part of a
national communications plan, to do so? Obviously, the latter is what
we want.
States, incidentally, which would be the recipients of this money,
would be required to pass at least 80 percent of the grant funding to
local and tribal governments. The money could then be used for a range
of activities: planning, system design, engineering, training,
exercises, procurement, and installation.
We also include a minimum amount of funding for each State because
interoperability is an all-hazards concern. In other words, we are
having a well-intentioned, good-faith debate about homeland security
grants and to what extent--as some would say--should they all be
distributed based on risk or be distributed with a minimum amount going
to each State?
In this case of interoperability of communications, it seems to me
the argument is compelling there ought to be some element that gives a
minimum to each State because what we are trying to establish is a
national emergency communications system that will be ready to respond
not just to a potential terrorist attack, but to natural disasters
which, obviously, can occur anywhere in the country. In other words,
the ability for first responders and other emergency responders to
communicate with one another, either by voice or through data sharing,
is necessary regardless of the nature of the emergency.
In short, we owe it to the memory of the firefighters and police
officers who gave their lives on 9/11, some of whom lost their lives
because of the absence of interoperable communications, and to the
commitment of first responders who struggled under such adverse
circumstances to do their jobs in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
and to first responders and emergency managers today all across our
country who are ready to respond in the time of our need to pass this
legislation, to provide the funding necessary for this critical effort,
and to move the Nation's first responders toward real 21st century
operable and interoperable communications in the face of disaster.
I have one more topic I want to discuss at this time. The one I have
just talked about--a dedicated fund for interoperable communications--I
think is one of the most significant parts of the bill. It is the
beginning of a transformational partnership between the Federal, State,
local, and tribal governments that I am convinced will have a
measurable, significant effect on the security of the American people.
This next topic I want to talk about has to do with a provision in
the committee bill which extends employee rights and protections to
airport screeners who work for the Transportation Security
Administration. Frankly, I do not consider this to be a major part of
the bill. To me, it is correcting an inequity that exists in current
law. I honestly do not know why anybody would oppose it. I will listen
to the arguments, but I want to contrast it with the section I just
described, because if the last 24 hours are any indication, this
section may receive more attention than any other section of the bill.
The White House has indicated it will veto the bill if this section is
in it. I respectfully do not understand that.
Colleagues, I know, are preparing to come to the floor to try to
strike this section from the bill. I think this section is an act of
elemental fairness, granting quite limited employee rights to airport
screeners who are now denied--I am using this term beyond its judicial
meaning--equal protection that is enjoyed by most every other Federal
employee, including most every other Federal employee involved in
security.
So I hope, one, we do not spend a disproportionate amount of time on
this section; and, two, we do not allow it to get in the way of us
fulfilling our urgent responsibility to finish the job of enacting the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which S. 4, the legislation
before us, would do.
I wish to spend a few moments talking about this section of the bill.
The fact is, since the Transportation Security Administration was
created in 2001, TSA screeners have been denied the same employment
rights and protections as almost all of their fellow workers in TSA. In
fact, they have been denied the same rights and protections that are
enjoyed by most of their fellow employees at the Department of Homeland
Security, such as the Border Patrol and Customs and Immigration
officers.
TSA screeners--often also known as TSOs, transportation security
officers--are familiar to most Americans because we see them at every
airport across our country. Thanks, in part, I believe to their hard
work and diligence, we have been spared a repeat of September 11, and
air travel generally is safer than it was before that day.
They deserve to be treated equally in their employment rights. It is
long past time to provide the same protections to TSA screeners as are
enjoyed by their colleagues.
I wish to take just a moment to review the history of how this
inequality came to exist. Shortly after the September 11 attacks,
Congress federalized the work of passenger and baggage screeners at
U.S. airports. TSA was created within the Department of Transportation.
It was subject generally to the same personnel rules as the Federal
Aviation Administration. Responding to the sense of emergency at the
time, however--remember, this was right after 9/11--Congress gave the
head of TSA broad authority to set personnel rules at his own
discretion for airport screeners.
In 2002, when Congress established the Department of Homeland
Security to coordinate and strengthen our defenses against manmade and
natural disasters, TSA was removed from the Department of
Transportation and put into the Department of Homeland Security.
At that time, Congress engaged in extensive debate with quite serious
partisan and political overtones about how to apply civil service law
to employees at the new Department. This was an amalgam of 22 different
agencies, almost 180,000 employees, most of whom were coming already
with their own employee rights--their own rights--most particularly, to
join a union.

Ultimately, and contrary to my own position, Congress authorized the
Department of Homeland Security Secretary to waive certain provisions
of civil service law which Congress and the President believed were
necessary for national security purposes.
Meanwhile, since 2001, TSA has declared itself exempt from laws
enforcing the most basic employee protections, including the
Whistleblower Protection Act, the Rehabilitation Act protecting Federal
employees with disabilities, the Federal Sector Labor-Management
Relations statute, appeal of adverse personnel actions to the Merit
Systems Protection Board, and veterans preference laws.
In each case, the Transportation Security Agency has devised its own
version of these fundamental employee protections substantially below
the standard that Congress and the President decided were appropriate
generally for DHS employees.
So now you have this anomaly because of this unusual statutory
history where TSA screeners have a much lower level of employee
protection than most of the other employees at the Department of
Homeland Security.
It is now 5 years after the agency was established, and TSA screeners
still lack those basic rights that are available to their colleagues at
DHS and throughout the Federal Government. That is exactly the inequity
this small provision in this bill, S. 4, aims to overcome.
For example, TSA screeners have no individual right to appeal to the
Merit Systems Protection Board when they believe they have been subject
to unlawful retaliation for protected whistleblowing activity. OK, this
is exactly what we want employees of the Federal Government to do. They
are our representatives. We are paying them. If they see something
wrong going on, we want them to blow the whistle, and we do not want
them to be punished as a result.
But under the current state of the law, TSA screeners do not have any
right to an outside appeal when they believe they have been subject to
unlawful retaliation because they blew the whistle on something or
someone else they saw doing something they thought was wrong.
Second, TSA is not bound and the screeners are not protected by the
Rehabilitation Act. So TSA is not bound

[[Page S2335]]

to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled screener still able to
perform his duties. This is the basic mindset we have overcome in
recent decades, that somebody who may be disabled in one way is--if I
can make up a word--abled in many other ways and perhaps, therefore,
able to carry out the responsibilities of a screener at one of the
security checkpoints we have all gone through. We have all gone through
them, so we know there are a number of those functions that could be
performed by somebody who may have a disability. But there is no right
to appeal if an employee, a screener, thinks they have been
discriminated against based on that.
TSOs--that is, screeners--are allowed to join a union, but they
cannot collectively bargain as other security forces at DHS and
throughout the Federal Government can do. Nor can TSOs claim an unfair
labor practice with the independent Federal Labor Relations Authority.
I want to stress something. Screeners at TSA can join a union. They
cannot strike. There is nothing in this small provision in S. 4 that
will give them the right to strike. There is nothing in this provision
that will give them the right to strike. I fear people hearing about
this provision may think we want to extend some employee rights to TSA
screeners and may think, oh, my God, at a time of crisis these people
will just walk off their jobs and strike. It is illegal. They cannot do
it. It is the same limitation that is on Federal employees who have
collective bargaining rights generally. It is just that these screeners
have much less, many fewer rights than others do. They cannot claim an
unfair labor practice with the independent Federal Labor Relations
Authority.
Finally, unlike the rest of the Federal Government, TSA limits the
veterans preference in hiring and other personnel decisions to veterans
who retired from the Armed Services, and denies the preference to those
who were honorably discharged. Of course, it is the vast majority of
men and women who have served our country in uniform who are honorably
discharged as opposed to serving until the time of their retirement.
But they do not get any veterans preference in hiring and other
personnel decisions at the TSA. Is that a big deal? It is if you are a
veteran. One of the things this provision in this bill would say is
that, the full veterans preference should apply for TSA screeners.

So that is the amendment we adopted, the literal effect of which is
to instruct the Secretary of Homeland Security to include TSA
screeners, either under the departmentwide human resources management
system or under the specialized system that now applies to TSA
employees other than the screeners, in the most specific way, which
leaves no ground--no gaps for misunderstanding. Although there are
people, I fear, who are misunderstanding or misstating it, this
amendment simply and directly says that TSA screeners have to be
included under the departmentwide DHS human resources management
system, or under the specialized system that applies to TSA employees
other than the screeners.
I know critics of this provision are arguing right now that TSA needs
flexibility to manage the screener workforce in a way that provides
security when, where, and how it is needed, such as when the threat
level is raised, or when a new threat becomes evident, or when
unexpected problems arise at a particular location so the Administrator
of TSA would want to move screeners from one airport to another. This
argument is not based on fact. The concerns are misplaced. The
committee bill, in this small section, retains flexibility for the TSA
Administrator to promptly redeploy employees, change their assignments,
or otherwise respond to problems as they arise. The bill recognizes
this is a department which has to have the flexibility, the management
flexibility, to respond to emergencies. In granting these TSA screeners
the same employee rights most everybody else within the Department,
including people involved in border patrol, for instance, and other
security functions, we retain nonetheless the flexibility of the
administrator to redeploy his forces at a time of crisis.
There is another reason to do this, I believe, apart from equity, and
that goes to the effectiveness of the TSA screeners and the Department
of Homeland Security employees generally. Personnel management at TSA,
the record will show, has been troubled since its inception. The record
will show the agency has experienced unusually high rates of
attrition--people leaving, unusually high rates of workplace injury,
high rates of absenteeism, and other indications of low employee
morale. Anybody in the private sector will tell you if you have high
attrition, high workplace injury, absenteeism, and low morale, you have
a problem, and the problem is going to mean the service you are
intending to provide is not going to be what you want it to be.
I would say those problems interfere with establishing and
maintaining the core of experienced and professional screeners we need,
that the American people need to ensure aviation security. From
conversations I have had with screeners, simply taking a step to put
them on an equal plane with everybody else in TSA or DHS in terms of
their employee rights will go a long way toward creating the kind of
morale, devotion to work, and avoidance of workplace injury that will
better serve our Nation. I know the Administrator of TSA, Kip Holley,
has recently made some efforts to improve personnel management, but I
believe they haven't gone far enough, and this amendment will take them
a large step forward.
I want to say finally that when the Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee marked up the bill, there was apparently a
Transportation Security Agency screener by the name of A.J. Castilla
who was there in the public section of the room. Later he wrote a note
of thanks in which he said:

We TSOs aren't asking for special treatment, merely to be
made whole and equal again in the eyes of the law.

A.J. Castilla is committed to his job, is as committed as any other
employee of the Department of Homeland Security or the Transportation
Security Administration, and it is time to give him and every other TSA
screener parity with those other Federal employees so that they may
better do the critical work we ask and need them to do.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak at some length about these two
provisions. Both are, I think, important. One is a dedicated grant
program for interoperable communications that, as I said, I think will
have a critical effect and I hope we will discuss the positive effect.
The second, I am afraid, will be discussed more than it deserves. That
provision is fair. It is simple equity. It treats working people with
the fairness they deserve, and in fact will improve our security, not
hamper it, as its critics say. I urge my colleagues to look at both
carefully, and particularly when an amendment is offered, as I fear it
will be, to strike the section that would correct the inequity now
suffered by transportation screeners, when it comes to the floor, that
my colleagues will come, will listen, and ultimately will vote to
reject that amendment.
I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 269

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside
the pending amendment and call up amendment No. 269.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, for the moment I am going to object on
behalf of Senator Collins who is co-managing the bill with me because
no one has looked at the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The Senator from California has the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. President. The amendment I
am seeking to bring up is a bill that has been reported out of the
Judiciary Committee, and essentially what it would do is ensure the
confirmation of all U.S. attorneys by the Senate.
What happened was that in 2006, an amendment went into the PATRIOT

[[Page S2336]]

Act that allowed the administration to appoint an interim U.S. attorney
indefinitely without confirmation. In the early part of this year, I
believe it was on January 6, I learned that six U.S. attorneys had been
called and summarily told they were to resign effective a specific date
in January. I was told by the person who gave me the information that
there was something suspicious about that. I didn't know, so I began to
look into it.
Well, I received a new story today about one of those U.S. attorneys,
and if I might, I will read it to this body. It is an article by Marisa
Taylor of the McClatchy Newspapers:

The U.S. Attorney from New Mexico who was recently fired by
the Bush administration said Wednesday that he believes he
was forced out because he refused to rush an indictment in an
ongoing probe of local Democrats a month before November's
congressional elections.
David Iglesias said two Members of Congress separately
called in mid October to inquire about the timing of an
ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an
indictment to be issued on the eve of the elections in order
to benefit the Republicans. He refused to name the Members of
Congress because he said he feared retaliation.
Two months later, on December 7, Iglesias became one of six
U.S. Attorneys ordered to step down for what administration
officials have termed ``performance-related issues.'' Two
other U.S. Attorneys also have been asked to resign.
Iglesias, who received a positive performance review before
he was fired, said he suspected he was forced out because of
his refusal to be pressured to hand down an indictment on the
ongoing probe:
I believe that because I didn't play ball, so to speak, I
was asked to resign, said Iglesias, who officially stepped
down on Wednesday.
Iglesias acknowledged that he had no proof that the
pressure from the congressional members prompted his forced
resignation, but he said the contact in and of itself
violated one of the most important tenets of a U.S.
Attorney's Office: Don't mix politics with prosecutions. The
article goes on.

Now this is only one element of this story. The matter has been the
subject of a hearing in the Judiciary Committee. Legislation is ready
to come before the floor. I have introduced it as an amendment. We
approved it in the Judiciary Committee with a bipartisan vote. I think
the time has come to do two things. One would be for the Judiciary
Committee--and I hope it will, and I believe the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and The Courts, Senator
Schumer, is interested in doing this--to issue subpoenas to have these
U.S. attorneys come before the Committee to answer questions about how
their demanded resignations took place.
Generally, a U.S. attorney is appointed for a term of four years, but
serves at the pleasure of the President. If he wants to fire them he
can. However, U.S. attorneys have very complicated and very difficult
cases and I believe they must have some level of independence. The FBI,
as we have heard in our oversight hearings, has raised the level of
public corruption in their investigations.
So if the FBI investigates a case and comes up with the evidence, a
U.S. attorney is obviously bound to prosecute that case. How this
affects David Iglesias, I don't know. But the fact that these people
all had very good performance reviews causes me a great concern. I wish
to read from those performance reviews.
The performance review for John McKay of the Western District of
Washington says:

``McKay is an effective, well-regarded and capable leader
of the [U.S. attorney's office] and the District's law
enforcement community,'' according to the team of 27 Justice
Department officials.

David Iglesias, about whom I read the news story, of the District of
New Mexico, got this performance review:

The [U.S. Attorney] had a highly effective firearms
violence initiative and active and effective program to
address drug trafficking.

Daniel Bogden, District of Nevada:

United States Attorney Bogden was highly regarded by the
federal judiciary, the law enforcement and civil client
agencies, and the staff of the United States Attorney's
Office. He was a capable leader of the [office].

Bud Cummins, who many of us know, in the Eastern District of
Arkansas:

The U.S. Attorney had an active, well managed anti-
terrorism program . . . The Project Safe Neighborhoods
initiatives were being effectively implemented and
successfully managed.

Carol Lam, Southern District of California, including San Diego, whom
I am very familiar with:

Carol Lam was an effective manager and respected leader in
the District . . . Appropriate management procedures and
practices were in place to ensure a quality written work
product.

These are some of the snippets from the reviews. But clearly, the
performance of these U.S. attorneys was not a reason to fire them.
I truly believe what the Department of Justice intended to do was
what they did in the Eastern District of Arkansas--bring in bright,
young Republican political operatives to assume these roles to give
them a leg up and fire or require the resignation of these U.S.
attorneys.
When I began to inquire into it, I asked whether interviews for
replacements were taking place within these offices, particularly in
San Diego. At that time, no one in the office was being interviewed as
a replacement. Since these hearings have begun, individuals within the
office have been interviewed. In fact, one has been appointed to fill
in for former U.S. Attorney Carol Lam.
I truly believe there was an effort to use this section of the
PATRIOT Act reauthorization to bring political operatives into these
offices, and I think it is a matter of urgency for us to pass the
legislation that was marked up by the Judiciary Committee. Absent that,
there is no recourse, other than to issue subpoenas, to have these
former U.S. attorneys come before the committee and be able to ask them
some hard questions.
I think when a U.S. attorney who has served, and served well, is
summarily dismissed for no real reason, it is a problem. We all know
the U.S. attorney in San Diego brought the prosecution of a Member of
the House of Representatives who is serving consequential time for
major felonies and had subpoenas outstanding for other Members of the
House and was summarily told in December that she should resign--in
this case--by the end of January. That is not right.
So the only way I know to right the wrong is to restore the law to
where it was before the PATRIOT Act reauthorization. That law is this
amendment and the amendment is very simple. It simply says that the
Attorney General may appoint an interim U.S. attorney to a vacancy for
120 days. After 120 days, if a nominee has not been confirmed by the
Senate, the district court in the district where the vacancy exists can
make an appointment. This provides the incentive for the administration
to move a nominee. I should say there are 13 vacancies, of which only 3
nominees have presently been sent to the Senate. If you combine those
13 vacancies with the seven new vacancies, then over 20 percent of the
U.S. attorney positions could be filled without Senate confirmation if
we assume the intent was not to send a nominee to the Senate. Of
course, the administration will decry this and say that is not the
case. Nonetheless, there were 13 vacancies and now seven new vacancies
with only 3 nominees before the Judiciary Committee for review and for
approval by the full Senate.
If the law is left as it is, any Attorney General or President could
essentially appoint every single U.S. attorney as an interim U.S.
attorney, not subject to confirmation. If you consider the work of the
U.S. attorneys--the public corruption, the major narcotics cases, the
immigration cases, the complicated Federal law they carry out--I think
every Member of this body would believe that confirmation by the Senate
for every U.S. attorney should be assured. This amendment will carry
that forward.
I was shocked to read about David Iglesias. I don't know whether it
is accurate. I know it appeared in the news. Based on that, he has said
he believes he was forced out for a political reason. There is only one
way to find out, and that is for the Judiciary Committee to issue
subpoenas, have these U.S. attorneys come before us, and ask a number
of hard questions.
I am hopeful this body will see fit to pass this amendment. It is
simple, short, direct, and it solves the problem.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, knowing the Senator from California as I
do, I am certain a lot of the issues she has raised are serious ones,
deserving of

[[Page S2337]]

scrutiny. They are, however, under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
Committee and not the Homeland Security Committee. As such, I don't
feel that I, at this time, have the expertise or the knowledge to
evaluate the amendment that has been filed by the Senator from
California. That is why I am objecting to the amendment. It is not
because of its merits but because it is not relevant to this debate. I
have not had a chance to look at it, and it is not in the jurisdiction
of the Homeland Security Committee.
I will say to my colleagues that the Senator from Connecticut and I
have been working very hard in a bipartisan way to try to keep the
focus of this bill on issues to improve our homeland security. We were
very pleased that, despite the overwhelming importance of the debate on
Iraq, there had been an agreement by our leaders to try to keep that
debate for the next issue to come before the Senate, rather than having
it tied in with this bill. Similarly, the families of the victims of 9/
11 have made a plea to all of us to focus on this bill and to keep
extraneous issues off this bill and rather focus on issues the 9/11
Commission raised. That is what we are attempting to do. I have no
doubt this is an important issue, an issue that is worthy of debate, an
issue that is worthy of scrutiny by the Judiciary Committee, based on
the explanation of the Senator from California, for whom I have a great
deal of respect. But it is an issue that is completely outside the
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Committee.
For that reason, my hope is the Senator from California will look at
this as an opportunity to educate us on the issue but will not proceed
with this amendment because it is not at all relevant to the bill
before us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise to follow up on the comments of my
friend from California, who has legislation I am proud to cosponsor on
the general issue of the fired U.S. attorneys.
Mr. President, it is said that ``where there is smoke there is
fire.'' As we look at the case of the U.S. attorneys, that is more and
more likely to be true.
Today, according to the McClatchy Newspapers, one of the fired U.S.
attorneys from New Mexico said that ``two Members of Congress
separately called in mid-October to inquire about the timing of an
ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an indictment
to be issued on the eve of the elections in order to benefit the
Republicans.''
That is a quote in an article by Marisa Taylor of the McClatchy
Newspapers. Frankly, it comes as no surprise to me. That is because
David Iglesias, the U.S. attorney, told my staff the same thing the day
before. He asked, in fact, that he be brought to Washington--was
willing, rather, to be brought to Washington, under the power of
subpoena, to tell his story. We have inquired of the fired U.S.
attorneys. The overwhelming majority of them want to tell more but feel
honor-bound not to do it, except if they were brought under the power
of subpoena to Washington.
So I join certainly in the request of my colleague from California
and others. I have already spoken to Senator Leahy, and we are
examining how that can be accomplished. Senator Leahy is very mindful
of the fact that the Judiciary Committee doesn't issue subpoenas willy-
nilly. But given the fact that some of the U.S. attorneys expressed a
desire to testify, and others said they would be willing to testify,
and now with these new revelations, the fear many of us had that these
U.S. attorneys were summarily fired not for no reason and not for a
good reason but for a bad reason is coming closer to reality.
Mr. President, we must get to the bottom of this issue. The U.S.
attorney is the lead enforcer of the law in his or her jurisdiction.
Fortunately, for decades, the U.S. attorneys, almost without exception,
have been insulated from the political process, even though they are
chosen in part by the political process. So when six were fired in one
evening, and when it later became clear in hearings I held that at
least one, by the admission of the Deputy Attorney General, was fired
for no reason, and a call from the White House to suggest a replacement
who was someone with very little legal experience but someone who had
worked for both Karl Rove and the RNC, I believe it was, you can
imagine the concern that not only the Senator from California and I had
but the concern throughout the country in law enforcement--
nonpolitical, simply a desire to protect the integrity of the U.S.
attorneys. So we must do two things now.
These new revelations are extremely troubling. They would show
politics at its worst--the long hand of the Justice Department reaching
out to fire U.S. attorneys who would not do what was politically asked.
At least that is a very real suspicion. So we must get to the bottom of
this. The only way to do that is to call before us the fired U.S.
attorneys and hear their side of the story.
I remind my colleagues that we did have a briefing--the Senator from
California was there, the Senator from Rhode Island was there--and then
were shown the evaluation reports, the EARS reports, and almost to a
person the fired U.S. attorneys received very good evaluations from
their peers and from everybody else. If you read those evaluations, you
would say: Oh, they will keep that person in office for as long as he
or she wants to stay. But instead, they were fired.
In private conversations my staff has had with them, they have grave
suspicions as to why--some of them more than grave suspicions. Today,
Mr. Iglesias said publicly what he told my staff privately, that he has
a very troubling view that he may well have been fired because he
refused to bend his U.S. attorney's office to politics of the worst
sort.
So there are two imperatives here. One, as I said, is to get to the
bottom of this and get to the bottom of it quickly. The second is to
pass legislation that restores the appointment of U.S. attorneys away
or at least removes it somewhat from the political realm because when
the Senate must confirm or when an independent judge must temporarily
appoint, there is a check, there is a balance that was removed,
unbeknownst to almost all of us, in the PATRIOT Act. The minute that
passed, people were surprised and wondered: Why did it happen? The
explanation from the administration didn't quite ring true. Then, on
the evening of December 7, when six U.S. attorneys were called at once
and fired and not given any reason, suspicions went further. The
investigations my subcommittee has had, with the help of our chairman,
the Senator from Vermont, and the Senator from California, who has
taken a keen interest in this issue and is lead sponsor of the
legislation, have gotten worse every day.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the expression goes: Where
there is smoke, there is fire. Every day, not only is there more smoke
in this investigation of the firing of the U.S. attorneys, but there
seems to be, unfortunately, a real fire. We will not rest until we get
to the bottom of this matter, to see what happened, to see if possibly
any rules, regulations, or even laws were broken. By bringing it to
light, it will importune this body, the other body, and the White House
to pass legislation so that it cannot happen again.
Mr. President, in sum, this is serious stuff. When U.S. attorneys are
fired for political reasons, fired to stand in the way of justice
rather than promote justice, it puts a dagger into the heart of the
faith Americans have in their Government and in their system of
justice. That faith, fortunately, is long and deep, but if we don't get
to the bottom of this, if we don't change the law to make sure it
doesn't happen again, we will be weakening permanently our system of
justice and the faith the public has in it.
We will move forward in whatever way we can. Hopefully, we will find
it is possible to subpoena these attorneys and subpoena them quickly
and then take the necessary action in these cases and prevent future
cases from occurring, which justice and the faith the people have in
the American system demand.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, the remarks the Senator from
California and the Senator from New York

[[Page S2338]]

have made today are very well taken, and I rise to express my shared
concern with them and my support for their initiative to get to the
bottom of what took place. In May of 1994 I had the honor to be sworn
in as Rhode Island's U.S. attorney. It was one of the great honors of
my life, equivalent to the great honor of being sworn in with you, Mr.
President, into this extraordinary body. I knew when I took that oath
that I would be forced to make very hard decisions and that my
independence and my integrity would be my strongest allies as I
discharged the extraordinarily difficult and powerful responsibilities
of a U.S. attorney.
Last December, seven U.S. attorneys were fired by the Department of
Justice, all on the very same day. That is unprecedented. Never, to my
knowledge, in the history of the Department have so many heads of U.S.
attorneys rolled all on the same day. These men and women had been
confirmed in this great Chamber. By all indications, they were well
qualified and performing well in their jobs. Several of them were
involved in ongoing public corruption investigations. Yet in this
unprecedented step, this administration showed them all the door. It
suggests to us all the question: why might such an extraordinary act
have taken place; why were they told their services were no longer
required?
The Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, told us this:

What we do is make an evaluation about the performance of
individuals, and I have a responsibility to the people in
your district that we have the best possible people in these
positions.

Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty testified that ``turnover in the
position of U.S. attorney is not uncommon.''

So the two suggestions that were made were that this was performance
related, that a performance evaluation had been done of these
individuals and they had not measured up, and that it was just
turnover. It is hard to accommodate both of those stories, but when one
looks into each of them, it makes even less sense.
The committee, through Senator Schumer and Senator Feinstein, asked
to see the Evaluation and Review Staff reports, what is called an EARS
evaluation. When I was a U.S. attorney in Rhode Island, I lived through
an EARS evaluation. All the local agencies were interviewed by career
U.S. attorney services staff, detailed to Rhode Island just for the
purpose of doing these evaluations. They happen in every office every 3
years. They are a significant part of the oversight and management
practice of the Department of Justice, and they are extremely thorough.
We asked to see the reports. When it was clear that we were going to
ask to see these performance evaluations, the Department began to back
down. Mr. McNulty told the committee:

We are ready to stipulate that the removal of the U.S.
attorneys may or may not be something supported by an EARS
report because it may be something performance related that
isn't the subject of what the evaluators saw or when they saw
it or how it came up, and so forth.

There isn't much that an EARS evaluation doesn't look at, and
contrary views began to emerge from the Department very shortly.
In an article published February 4, the Washington Post reported
that:

[O]ne administration official, who spoke on the condition
of anonymity in discussing personnel issues, said the spate
of firings was the result of ``pressure from people who make
personnel decisions outside of Justice who wanted to make
some things happen in those places.''

Let's look at some of those places. In Arkansas, H.E. Bud Cummins III
was a 5-year veteran U.S. attorney serving in Arkansas's Eastern
District. Last June, he was asked to resign. The man chosen to replace
the well-respected Mr. Cummins was Tim Griffin. Mr. Griffin is 37 years
old. He served as Special Assistant to Assistant Attorney General
Michael Chertoff in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice,
where he was sent as a detailee to the Arkansas U.S. Attorney's Office.
What Mr. Griffin lacked in prosecutorial experience, he more than
made up for in political experience. Mr. Griffin is a former aide to
Presidential adviser Karl Rove. He is also a former Republican National
Committee research director. As those of us who have been through this
sort of thing know, ``research director'' is not about looking up old
statutes; it is about prying into personal lives of other candidates in
order to try to dig up dirt on them.
A more partisan choice could not have been made to replace Mr.
Cummins. Remember, Mr. McNulty said:

The Department is committed to having the best person
possible for discharging the responsibilities of that office
at all times in every district.

It is just hard to believe that Mr. Tim Griffin was the best person
possible, at least not as we ordinarily define those terms. At the end
of our Judiciary hearing, Mr. McNulty admitted that Mr. Cummins, the
Government's chief prosecutor in Little Rock, Arkansas, was fired to
give Mr. Griffin the opportunity to have the appointment.
In San Diego, U.S. attorney Carol Lam successfully prosecuted Duke
Cunningham, who pled guilty and resigned in 2005. She subpoenaed the
House Armed Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence Committees in
connection with a probe into Defense Department contracts. Her office
indicted Kyle ``Dusty'' Foggo, the CIA's former Executive Director, and
Brent Wilkes, a defense contractor and top Republican fundraiser.
In her district, former Reagan U.S. attorney Peter Nunez--another
Republican political appointee familiar with the world of U.S.
attorneys because he served there himself; he served from 1982 to
1988--said this:

It's just like nothing I have ever seen before in 35-plus
years. To be asked to resign and to be publicly humiliated by
leaking this to the press is beyond any bounds of decency and
behavior. It shocks me. It is really outrageous.

San Diego's top-ranking FBI official, Dan Dzwilewski, also commented
on Lam's firing. Bear in mind, this is the Director of the FBI office
that is operating as lead agency in these public corruption
investigations. His quote:

I guarantee politics is involved . . . It will be a huge
loss from my perspective.

Other U.S. attorneys, such as David Iglesias of New Mexico and John
McKay of Seattle, said they had no idea why they were being asked to
step down.
That changed recently. Today was posted a story from which I will
quote:

The U.S. attorney from New Mexico who was recently fired by
the Bush administration said Wednesday that he believes he
was forced out because he refused to rush an indictment in an
ongoing probe of local Democrats a month before November's
Congressional elections.
David Iglesias said two members of Congress separately
called in mid October to inquire about the timing of an
ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an
indictment to be issued on the eve of the elections in order
to benefit the Republicans. He refused to name the members of
Congress because he said he feared retaliation. . . .
"U.S. Attorney Daniel Bogden, who also stepped down
Wednesday after being asked to leave in December'' had it
recently reported in the Wall Street Journal that the FBI was
investigating in his district allegations ``whether Nevada
Governor Jim Gibbons performed any official acts on behalf of
a contract in exchange for gifts or payments. Gibbons, a
Republican, has denied any wrongdoing.''
Bogden said he hoped that the ongoing case did not have
anything to do with his ouster.

This is his quote:

You would like to think that the reason you're put in the
position as U.S. attorney is because you are willing to step
up to the plate and take on big cases, Bogden said.
It's not a good thing if you begin to wonder whether you'll
lose your job if you pursue them.

Last month, a Las Vegas newspaper reported:

a GOP source said . . . the decision to remove U.S.
attorneys, primarily in the West, was part of a plan to
``give somebody else that experience'' to build up the back
bench of Republicans by giving them high-profile jobs.

These are extremely troubling facts. The New York Times has recently
editorialized on this subject and hypothesized three reasons for why
these well-qualified attorneys were fired. As the New York Times said,
``all political and all disturbing.'' The first reason: helping
friends; the second, candidate recruitment; the third, Presidential
politics.
The newspaper concluded that the politicization of Government over
the last 6 years has had tragic consequences in New Orleans, in Iraq,
and elsewhere, but allowing politics to infect U.S. Attorney's Offices
takes it to

[[Page S2339]]

a whole new level. Congress should continue to pursue the case of the
fired U.S. attorneys vigorously, both to find out what really happened
and to make sure that it does not happen again.
I would like to highlight two further concerns that come from my
experience as a U.S. attorney. One concern is how this alters the
balance between U.S. Attorney's Offices and what we used to call main
Justice, and the second concern is the chilling effect on prosecutions
of public corruption.
There is constant tension between the U.S. attorneys in the field and
main Justice. The U.S. attorneys know their districts, they have
practiced before those judges, they know their office's capabilities
very well, and they have their own local priorities. Of course, the
Department of Justice also has its own priorities, its national
priorities set by the President, and the tension between those two is
healthy and is constant. In getting its message out to the U.S.
attorneys, the Department has a wide array of ways to send its signals
and make its wishes known, but to take six or seven well-performing
U.S. attorneys and sack them all at once ends that dialogue. It brings
the blunt instrument of, not even persuasion any longer, but brute
force, to bear.
Now, there can very well be policy differences between the Department
of Justice and local offices, but this would be a first for the
Department of Justice, to say: You haven't emphasized this enough so we
are going to have your head. It will squash the healthy tension between
U.S. attorneys and between the Department, and at least in my
experience, the greater wisdom of the Department of Justice versus that
of all the U.S. attorneys in the field was not such that it justifies
this level of force in emphasis and enforcement and in the demand for
conformity with its policy positions.
I submit there is long-term damage to the capabilities of the
Department of Justice as this tension is disrupted. We live in a
country of checks and balances, and tensions like these are very often
the best things for the public we serve when they are allowed to be
maintained in a healthy fashion.
The second point I would make is the chilling effect on prosecutions
of public corruption. This applies particularly with respect to Ms. Lam
in California. In many respects, she had become the leading edge of the
Federal Government's sword point on public corruption investigation
because of the investigations that I mentioned earlier in my remarks.
Her office was leading the biggest public corruption cases in the
Nation, with more to come it appears. U.S. Attorney Lam was personally
at the helm of these investigations, and she was well qualified for
that role. Her unceremonious expulsion from office will send a
shockwave through the offices of her fellow U.S. attorneys, and that
shockwave will carry a very unfortunate message because these cases are
not easy ones.
Public corruption cases are resource intensive for the office
involved. They are extraordinarily challenging. Witnesses are scarce
and difficult, significant agent expertise is required, internal
procedures governing the investigation itself are complex and onerous,
and launching one's office at established political figures is a
decision with potentially serious consequences not only for the U.S.
attorney but for the career people in that office. Someone who has come
through all of that and moved out onto the leading edge of public
corruption investigation for this country, I believe, merits the active
support of the Department of Justice not just for the good work done
but as a message and a signal to U.S. attorneys around the country that
when they step out into that public corruption arena, we will back them
up.
The signal to the contrary is a dangerous one. When a U.S. attorney
gets fired, and one who was deep into a public corruption investigation
and is leading it so well that their termination draws a public rebuke
from the FBI chief, antennae will go up across the country.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record at the conclusion of my remarks a letter that the Attorney
General has received from the National Association of Former United
States Attorneys.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Clinton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, the sentence in that letter which
strikes me as the most significant is:

We are concerned that the role of the United States
Attorneys may have been undermined by what may have been
political considerations which run counter to the proper
administration of justice and the traditions of the
Department of Justice.

This is not a good day. This is not the sort of thing that we need to
be discussing. This is not the sort of thing that we should be
discussing. As Senator Schumer earlier said, there is a lot of smoke in
the air right now, and it looks as if there is actually some fire. It
is truly incumbent on this body, the body which confirmed these
individuals to their offices and which has oversight responsibility
with the Department of Justice, to look into what is happening and to
reestablish the procedures to prevent this from happening again.
I yield the floor, and I thank the Chair.

Exhibit 1

The National Association of Former United States
Attorneys,
February 14, 2007.
Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales,
Attorney General of the United States, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Re: Media Reports of Termination of United States Attorneys
Dear Attorney General Gonzales, We are the President and
Executive Director of the National Association of Former
United States Attorneys (``NAFUSA''). NAFUSA was founded in
March 1979 to promote, defend and further the integrity and
the preservation of the litigating authority and independence
of the Office of the United States Attorney. Our membership
includes United States Attorneys from every administration
back to President Kennedy and includes former United States
Attorneys from every state in the union. It is with this
mission and with our cumulative experience as United States
Attorneys that we write.
We are very troubled with recent press accounts concerning
the termination of a sizable number of United States
Attorneys. Historically, United States Attorneys have had a
certain degree of independence because of the unique and
integral role the United States Attorneys play in federal law
enforcement Among other things, the United States Attorney
establishes and maintains working and trusting relationships
with key federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
In many respects, while the United States Attorney is a
representative of the Department of Justice in each district,
the United States Attorney also brings to bear his or her
experience and knowledge of the law enforcement needs of the
district in establishing priorities and allocating resources.
Most importantly, United States Attorneys have maintained a
strong. tradition of insuring that the laws of the United
States are faithfully executed, without favor to anyone and
without regard to any political consideration. It is for
these reasons that the usual practice has been for United
States Attorneys to be permitted to serve for the duration of
the administration that appointed them.
We are concerned that the role of the United States
Attorneys may have been undermined by what may have been
political considerations which run counter to the proper
administration of justice and the tradition of the Department
of Justice. While we certainly recognize that the United
States Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President, we
would vigorously oppose any effort by any Attorney General to
remove a United States Attorney as a result of political
displeasure or for political reward. Any such effort would
undermine the confidence of the federal judiciary, federal
and local law enforcement agencies, the public, and the
thousands of Assistant United States Attorneys working in
those offices.
We do not mean to suggest that we know the reasons for each
of the terminations or, for that matter, all of the relevant
facts. Indeed, we encourage the Department of Justice and
Congress to make as full and as complete a disclosure of the
facts surrounding these firings as is permissible. Still, the
reported facts are troubling, perhaps unique in the annals of
the Department of Justice, and certainly raise questions as
to whether political considerations prompted the decision to
terminate so many United States Attorneys. It may well be
that legislative attention or a written policy of the
Department of Justice is necessary to deal with this and
similar situations in the future to afford continuity and
protection to United States Attorneys. We will be happy to
assist the Department or Congress in any such effort.
Sincerely yours,
Atlee W. Wampler III,
President.
B. Mahlon Brown,
Executive Director.

Amendment No. 279, as Modified

Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I ask for regular order in regards to my
amendment No. 279. I have a modification of that amendment that I would
like to send to the desk.

[[Page S2340]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's amendment is pending. He has the
right to modify it. The amendment is so modified.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant
from the receipt of a transportation security card)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

(a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the
individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and
inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the
individual poses a security risk''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read
as follows:
``(1) Disqualifications.--
``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except
as provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently
disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been
convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a
civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following
felonies:
``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in
section 2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or
conspiracy to commit such crime.
``(v) A crime involving a transportation security
incident.
``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material
under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution,
manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an
explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive
or explosive device includes--

``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and
844(j) of title 18);
``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c)
through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of
title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986).

``(viii) Murder.
``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false
information knowing the same to be false, concerning the
deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or
other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a
State or other government facility, a public transportation
system, or an infrastructure facility.
``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable
State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or
admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed
in this subparagraph.
``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in
clauses (i) through (iv).
``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes
described in clauses (v) through (x).
``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as
provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified
from being issued a biometric transportation security card
under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or
found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year
period ending on the date on which the individual applies for
such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
year period ending on the date on which the individual
applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture,
purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a
firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other
weapon includes--

``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title
18 and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986);
and
``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions
Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal
Regulations.

``(ii) Extortion.
``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation,
including identity fraud and money laundering if the money
laundering is related to a crime described in this
subparagraph or subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare
fraud and passing bad checks do not constitute dishonesty,
fraud, or misrepresentation.
``(iv) Bribery.
``(v) Smuggling.
``(vi) Immigration violations.
``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to
distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
``(viii) Arson.
``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
``(xii) Robbery.
``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the
crimes listed in this subparagraph.
``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section
1036 of title 18, or a comparable State law.
``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a
comparable State law, other than any of the violations listed
in subparagraph (A)(x).
``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant
who is wanted, or under indictment, in any civilian or
military jurisdiction for a felony listed in this paragraph,
is disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) until the want or warrant
is released or the indictment is dismissed.
``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses
an arrest for a disqualifying crime listed in this section
without indicating a disposition, the Transportation Security
Administration shall notify the applicant of such disclosure
and provide the applicant with instructions on how the
applicant can clear the disposition, in accordance with
clause (ii).
``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition
under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written
proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not
later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause
(i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the
disqualifying criminal offense.
``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the
Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof
in accordance with the Transportation Security
Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses
and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall
notify--

``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from
being issued a biometric transportation security card under
subsection (b);
``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in
the case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is
disqualified, if the applicant is a mariner.

``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as
provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual
may not be denied a transportation security card under
subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that
individual--
``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year
period of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity
of a felony--

``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the
individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United
States; or
``(II) for causing a severe transportation security
incident;

``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the
preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in
clause (i);
``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or
removed from the United States under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the
United States.''.
``(F) Modification of listed offenses.--The Secretary
may, by rulemaking, add the offenses described in paragraph
(1)(A) or (B).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as
paragraphs (3) through (7); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a
work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to
terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, if I can make a couple of comments about
the modification, many will recall that this amendment is focused on
our ports and the security of our ports. I think all of us are well
aware that as a nation we see that our ports of entry, whether they be
in Seattle, New York, or Charleston, SC, could be our most vulnerable
points when it comes to smuggling in a weapon of mass destruction. We
have committed many resources and lots of technology to try to detect
radiation and other types of weapons that might be smuggled into our
country that could hurt Americans and destroy American cities, and we
are making some progress. But there is a lot more to be done.
All the spending, all the technology, all the equipment in the world
will make no difference at all if we don't have the right people
working in the secure areas of our ports. We need to make sure those
people are the most trusted we have, just as we do in our airports. Our
responsibility, whether it is homeland security as an administration or
we as the Congress, is to make sure these people are screened and that
we have the best and the most trusted individuals working in our secure
areas. This is very important.
My amendment focuses on just that subject. It prohibits convicted
felons

[[Page S2341]]

from working in the secure areas of our ports. This is common sense to
most Americans, and I think it is common sense to most in this Senate
because when this exact same amendment was offered last year, when we
were dealing with port security specifically, everyone voted for this
amendment in the Senate. Unfortunately, that amendment was stripped out
when we had a conference with the House.
Many of my colleagues have encouraged me to reintroduce this
amendment, Republicans and Democrats alike, and that is exactly what I
have done. I understand the Senator from Hawaii is considering
introducing a modification that would allow the Secretary to eliminate
some of these felonies that we have listed in our amendment. Please
keep in mind that the listed felonies are the exact same ones that
homeland security has listed in the regulation that they have put in
force at their agency. So this amendment puts in law what homeland
security has already put into regulation.
The importance of putting it in law is that we already suspect this
legislation will be contested; that there will be delays, there will be
challenges, and we need to make sure that our ports are secure. The
modification of my amendment would allow the Secretary to add felonies
in the future which may become important but that are not now listed.
We think it would be a huge mistake if we put in law something that
allowed future administrations to eliminate felonies that are
specifically laid out in regulation and in this amendment I am
offering.
If anyone in the Senate would like to eliminate some of the felonies
that we have listed, I would encourage them to come to the Senate floor
and let's discuss those that they would like to eliminate. Maybe they
would like to have some of these folks working in the secure areas of
our ports, folks who have committed espionage, sedition, treason,
terrorism, crimes involving transportation security, improper transport
of hazardous material, unlawful use of an explosive device, bomb
threats, or murder. These are specifically listed. If there are some of
these that we think should be eliminated, let's discuss them.
Homeland Security has evaluated this and has listed these, just like
we have for our airports, to keep our ports secure.
I am offering this modification that would allow our Secretary to add
felonies but prohibit the elimination of these felonies which we think
are so important to our security.
I thank the Chair for the opportunity to offer this modification, and
I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from South
Carolina for his modification. We talked about this briefly. I think he
is heading in the right direction. We are taking a look at the
amendment as it is offered, and we look forward to working together. I
think the purposes are very important.
I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to add Ms.
Murkowski, a Senator from Alaska, as a cosponsor to the Collins
amendment No. 277.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 277

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, speaking of the Collins amendment on
REAL ID, cosponsored by Senators Alexander, Mikulski, Carper, Cantwell,
Snowe, Chambliss, and Murkowski, I bring to my colleagues' attention
the several groups representing Governors, State legislatures, and
others who are now speaking in favor of passage of this amendment. In
addition, as the Presiding Officer so ably represents the State of New
York, there was a Newsday editorial today also endorsing the amendment
with its 2-year delay.
The National Governors Association has also issued a statement that
says:

Senator Collins' bipartisan amendment recognizes the need
to give state officials and other interested parties the
right to review regulations and suggest modifications.

It goes on to say:

This proposal would provide states a more workable time
frame to comply with federal standards, ensure necessary
systems are operational and enhance the input states and
other stakeholders have in the implementation process.

We have also heard from the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, a union that is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, which
has written a letter as well. It says:

It is clear that the states do not have the capacity to
comply with the REAL ID Act by the 2008 deadline and that a
number of serious concerns related to privacy must be
addressed. The Collins amendment provides the opportunity to
address these matters.

Similarly, another group with whom we have worked closely is the
National Conference of State Legislatures. In fact, it was a high-
ranking official of the NCSL who sat next to me on a plane going to
Maine some time ago and suggested that what States needed most was a
delay in the compliance time. I worked very closely with the NCSL in
drafting our amendment. I am very grateful for their advice.
I ask unanimous consent that the letters and editorials I have
mentioned be printed in the Record so we may share them with our
colleagues.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the National Governors Association, Feb. 28, 2007]

NGA Praises Congressional Movement To Correct REAL ID

Washington.--On behalf of the nation's governors, the
National Governors Association (NGA) issued the following
statement regarding the introduction of an amendment to delay
implementation of Real ID.
``Governors praise Senator Susan Collins, ranking member of
the Senate Homeland Security Committee, for introducing an
amendment to address the issues raised by the Real ID Act of
2005. This proposal would provide states a more workable time
frame to comply with federal standards, ensure necessary
systems are operational and enhance the input states and
other stakeholders have in the implementation process.
``Improving the security and integrity of their drivers'
license systems is vital; however, the substantial costs and
looming implementation deadline make Real ID unworkable and
unreasonable. NGA has called on the Department of Homeland
Security and Congress to fix the law by providing additional
time, resources and flexibility for states to enhance their
systems.
``Senator Collins' bipartisan amendment recognizes the need
to give state officials and other interested parties the
right to review regulations and suggest modifications. This
allows governors and state legislators to help create
reasonable standards and ensure the act is implemented in a
cost-effective and feasible manner with maximum safety and
minimum inconvenience for all Americans.''
____

American Federation of State, County and Municipal
employees, AFL-CIO,
Washington, DC, February 27, 2007.
Dear Senator: On behalf of the 1.4 million members of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), I am writing with respect to the Senate debate over
S. 4, legislation to implement 9/11 Commission
recommendations.
We understand that an amendment may be offered, possibly by
Senator DeMint, to strike or weaken a provision in the bill
that gives Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
screeners collective bargaining and other civil service
protections. We strongly urge you to oppose this amendment.
In addition, we urge you to support an amendment to be
offered by Senator Collins that would delay implementation of
requirements under the REAL ID Act and to reopen negotiated
rulemaking of the Act.
With respect to the DeMint amendment, it is important to
highlight that civil service protections, backed up by
collective bargaining, ensure that federal employment is
efficient, fair, open to all, free from political
interference and staffed by honest, competent and dedicated
employees. Civil service protections and collective
bargaining rights ensure that federal employees are able to
fulfill their assignments with professional integrity and a
commitment to the public interest. The decision to take away
civil service protections and collective bargaining rights
has resulted in a demoralized workforce, with injury and
illness rates that are six times higher than the federal
average and an attrition rate that is more than ten times
higher than the federal employee average. Clearly, the
removal of civil service protections and collective
bargaining rights has jeopardized the public, not made it
safer.
With respect to the Collins amendment, we have previously
expressed our concern over the costs to the states to
implement the requirements under the REAL ID Act. It is clear
that states do not have the capacity to

[[Page S2342]]

comply with the Act by the 2008 deadline and that a number of
serious concerns related to privacy must be addressed. The
Collins amendment provides the opportunity to address these
matters.
Sincerely,
Charles M. Loveless,
Director of Legislation.
____

[From NCSL News, Feb. 20, 2007]

State Lawmakers Encouraged by REAL ID Activity in U.S. Senate

Senator Collins' measure to provide extra time, state input into the
regulatory process

Washington, DC.--The National Conference of State
Legislatures praises Maine Senator Susan Collins for
introducing legislation (S. 563) to address state concerns
over the Real ID Act, a measure which creates national
standards for state-issued drivers licenses and
identification cards.
S. 563 addresses some of the recommendations for change
called for by NCSL, governors and motor vehicle
administrators in a September 2006 report--The REAL ID:
National Impact Analysis. Legislators throughout the country
support REAL ID's goal of making drivers licenses more
secure, but are frustrated by the rigidity of the law's
approach, the high costs it imposes on states and the
inordinately long time it has taken the Department of
Homeland Security to issue the regulations needed to
implement REAL ID.
NCSL is encouraged that Senator Collins, ranking member of
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, and other members of Congress are taking steps to
correct the problems associated with the law. S. 563 provides
a longer time frame to comply with the federal standards and
to ensure that necessary systems are operational. Senator
Collins' legislation also establishes a committee of state
officials and other interested parties to. review the draft
DHS regulations and to submit recommendations for regulatory
and legislative changes.
NCSL's official policy statement calls for repeal of Real
10 if, by December 31 of this year, Congress fails to adopt
the necessary changes as outlined in the September 2006
report and if they fail to provide full funding for the law.
Senator Collins' legislation, therefore, is especially timely
and NCSL looks forward to working with her and her colleagues
to fix and fund the law.
NCSL is the bipartisan organization that serves the
legislators and staff of the states, commonwealths and
territories. It provides research, technical assistance and
opportunities for policymakers to exchange ideas on the most
pressing state issues and is an effective and respected
advocate for the interests of the states in the American
federal system.
____

[From Kennebec Journal Morning Sentinel]

Addressing the Real Problems of REAL ID

The REAL ID Act was passed by Congress in 2005. Part of a
suite of measures to beef up homeland security, the act
requires that by mid-2008, Americans must have a federally
approved ID card--most likely an enhanced driver's license--
to travel on airplanes, collect government payments or use
government services and open a bank account. The national ID
cards would have to be machine-readable.
As the deadline approaches for compliance with the act,
opposition to the mandate has grown. Late last month, the
Maine Legislature became the first in the nation to pass a
measure against the requirement, unequivocally refusing to
implement the act and urging Congress to repeal it. Too
expensive, too fast, too much of an invasion of privacy and
too burdensome to administer, said a bipartisan coalition of
Maine lawmakers. Estimate of the cost of compliance in Maine
alone is $185 million.
The Legislature's rejection made news around the nation.
What Maine started threatened to become a tidal wave of state
opposition. In an effort to stem the momentum and salvage
what she considers good about the requirement, U.S. Sen.
Susan Collins Friday announced she's introducing legislation
to delay implementation of the act and provide states with a
more reasonable time frame for complying with its new
standards for drivers' licenses. ``The costs of complying
with REAL ID are enormous and overly burdensome to states,
including Maine,'' said Collins.
We agree. Collins' legislation puts the brakes on a mandate
that raises significant concerns, as well as the broader
question of whether the REAL ID would ultimately be
effective.
Her bill would give the Department of Homeland Security the
ability to delay or waive REAL ID requirements if states
don't have the technical capability to comply with it, or the
money.
It furthermore calls to the discussion table the right
group of people to hammer out an alternative: federal and
state officials, privacy advocates and others with a stake in
the matter. We're encouraged that this senator, who has made
her name as an advocate of effective and real security
measures, has focused on finding a solution to the real
problems posed by REAL ID.
____

[From the Bangor Daily News]

Needed ID Delay

By introducing a bill to slow the pace of new federal
identification rules, Sen. Susan Collins today is expected to
offer a way out of a growing confrontation between Washington
and the states. The bill would extend the deadline for REAL
ID by two years and recognize the cost burden currently
imposed on states. Additionally, it reopens the question of
how much information the federal government should
centralize.
This pause is needed. Last week, for instance, Georgia
looked at REAL ID's expected price tag of between $30 million
and $60 million and declined to fund it. That follows Maine's
resolution to reject the program and likely precedes work in
about a dozen states that have legislation against REAL ID
before their legislatures. The Collins bill would reconvene
the panel that made recommendations on this issue and review
problems raised by the states, the standards for protecting
constitutional rights and civil liberties and the security of
the electronic information, among other issues.
Under the current regulations, all Americans would have a
federally approved ID card by the end of next year. Usually
seen as a machine-readable driver's license, the card would
be needed not only for driving but all the standard uses--to
board airplanes, do business with the federal government,
open a bank account. One estimate put the cost to states for
transitioning to these new IDs at $11 billion.
Besides cost, opponents of the standardized identification
program fear that REAL ID will result in a national database,
which the federal government may not be equipped to protect.
In particular, one provision would require states to verify
all documents required for the issuance of a driver's license
or identification card. That would require each state to have
agreements with all other states or, more likely, have a
single national agreement.
Given the government's track record on securing private
information, states are reasonably worried. Not long ago, the
House Government Reform Committee looked at 19 agencies going
back to 2003 and found 788 separate cases of confidential
data being either lost or stolen. Most of the lost data, the
report concluded, was due to ``unauthorized use of data by
employees.''
The extended deadline proposed by the Collins legislation
would give officials an opportunity to improve security at
both federal and state levels. And it should find ways for
Washington to help pay for this expensive program.
____

[From the Portland Press Herald]

Real ID program Is a Real Mess; How Can States Standardize Driver's
Licenses by 2008 When Standards Haven't Been Set?

Maine's ``revolt'' against a federal mandate to create an
expensive, high-tech driver's license that meets new
standards set by the federal government is catching on.
Since state legislators overwhelmingly approved a
resolution objecting to the Real ID Act of 2005 in late
January, lawmakers in Vermont, Georgia, Wyoming, Montana, New
Mexico and Washington state have followed suit.
The Real ID Act was an effort to enhance and standardize
the information on state driver's licenses so they could
double as a national identification card.
Such a sensitive federal-state issue ought to have been the
subject of negotiations including the states. But the House
of Representatives forged ahead with the Real ID Act, which
simply ordered the Department of Homeland Security to write
its own requirements. The measure passed the Senate attached
to a supplemental spending bill.
A very real set of concerns revolve around the security of
the machine-readable personal information that will be
included in the high-tech card, as well as the security of
the linked national database that will house this
information. One recent study found more than 700 instances
of confidential data being stolen from the federal government
since 2003.
Also problematic is the notion that state transportation
workers will be essentially conscripted to the front line of
this federal program.
Across the country, states will begin working on their 2008
budgets this year. A 2006 study by the National Governors
Association tabbed the cost of compliance at $11 billion over
five years. Secretary of State Matt Dunlap estimates Maine's
share will be $185 million.
Yet despite Real ID's looming May 2008 deadline for
compliance, states still haven't seen the law's requirements.
On Monday, Sen. Susan Collins introduced a bill that would
delay the compliance date for two years to 2010 so the
federal government can get its act straightened out.
Her bill would convene a panel of federal and state
stakeholders to examine issues raised by the states around
cost, privacy and feasibility.
Rep. Tom Allen intends to offer a bill that would repeal
the law entirely.
If Congress feels homeland security requires that all
Americans carry an internal passport, then it ought to
administer the program.
It ought to pay for it as well.
____

[From Newsday (NY), Feb. 28, 2007]

Go Slow on New Driver's Licenses

u.s. should take time to get it right

It's a sad sign of the times, but a national identification
card, a new gold standard for

[[Page S2343]]

proof of identity, may be needed in the battle against
terrorism. The 9/11 Commission urged tighter security for
driver's licenses and Congress has asked the Department of
Homeland Security to develop rules for standardizing licenses
and other state issued identification into what would be,
essentially, a national ID card.
But establishing a system that will make it appreciably
harder for terrorists to operate without exacerbating the
problem of identity theft or compromising what's left of
privacy in the digital age won't be quick or easy. The
current May 2008 implementation date is unrealistic. And
there's the question state officials are already asking: Who
will pay?
Washington hasn't gotten off to a very promising start in
dealing with these concerns. In 2004, Congress established a
committee of state and federal officials and others to craft
regulations for making licenses more uniform and secure. It
preempted that process in 2005 when it tacked the Real ID Act
to a spending bill, giving the rule-making job to the
Department of Homeland Security. It's been almost two years
and no rules have been announced, although officials say they
may come as soon as this week.
But creating a secure, standardized national ID card
involves more than deciding on such things as digital
photographs and bar codes. Clerks everywhere would need ready
access to nationwide databases to verify vital records such
as birth certificates, immigration status and driver's
license records in all 50 states. Integrating that data,
securing it, controlling access and correcting errors will be
no small task.
Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) wants to give states more time
to comply. That's advisable and probably inevitable.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 285 to Amendment No. 275

Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment that
incorporates Senator DeMint's amendment No. 279 regarding the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, known as TWIC.
I am pleased to advise my colleagues of this amendment. It is
cosponsored by Senator Stevens, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Murray.
The amendment offered by Senator DeMint codifies in statute the list
of permanent and interim disqualifying offenses for individuals
applying for a TWIC that the Department of Homeland Security has
already codified in final regulations this January.
While I understand Senator DeMint's desire to ensure we do not allow
individuals who could pose a terrorism security risk to have access to
our ports, Senator DeMint's language restricts the authority of the
Secretary to identify, adopt, and modify criminal offenses that may
pose a terrorist security threat.
We are all aware of the fact the war on terrorism continues to evolve
with emerging threats. We need to ensure the Department has the
flexibility to adjust their procedures accordingly. I, along with my
fellow cosponsors, believe such a responsibility is best left to the
intelligence, terrorist, and law enforcement experts at the Department
of Homeland Security rather than Members of Congress. Therefore, this
amendment preserves the authority of the Secretary to modify the
offenses accordingly.
I ask my colleagues to support our amendment and help ensure we
improve the security of our port facilities in a fair and effective
manner.
Madam President, I call up my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for himself, Mr.
Stevens, Mr. Lieberman, and Mrs. Murray, proposes an
amendment numbered 285 to amendment No. 275.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant
from the receipt of a transportation security card)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

(a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the
individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and
inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the
individual poses a security risk''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read as
follows:
``(1) Disqualifications.--
``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as
provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently
disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been
convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a
civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following
felonies:
``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section
2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or conspiracy
to commit such crime.
``(v) A crime involving a transportation security incident.
``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material
under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution,
manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an
explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive
or explosive device includes--

``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and
844(j) of title 18);
``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c)
through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of
title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986).

``(viii) Murder.
``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false
information knowing the same to be false, concerning the
deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or
other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a
State or other government facility, a public transportation
system, or an infrastructure facility.
``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable
State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or
admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed
in this subparagraph.
``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in
clauses (i) through (iv).
``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes
described in clauses (v) through (x).
``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as
provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified
from being issued a biometric transportation security card
under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or
found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year
period ending on the date on which the individual applies for
such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
year period ending on the date on which the individual
applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture,
purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping,
transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a
firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other
weapon includes--

``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title 18
and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986);
and
``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions
Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal
Regulations.

``(ii) Extortion.
``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including
identity fraud and money laundering if the money laundering
is related to a crime described in this subparagraph or
subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare fraud and passing
bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or
misrepresentation.
``(iv) Bribery.
``(v) Smuggling.
``(vi) Immigration violations.
``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to
distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
``(viii) Arson.
``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
``(xii) Robbery.
``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes
listed in this subparagraph.
``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section 1036
of title 18, or a comparable State law.
``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a comparable
State law, other than any of the violations listed in
subparagraph (A)(x).
``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant who
is wanted, or under indictment, in any civilian or military
jurisdiction for a felony listed in this paragraph, is
disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation
security card under subsection (b) until the want or warrant
is released or the indictment is dismissed.
``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses
an arrest for a disqualifying

[[Page S2344]]

crime listed in this section without indicating a
disposition, the Transportation Security Administration shall
notify the applicant of such disclosure and provide the
applicant with instructions on how the applicant can clear
the disposition, in accordance with clause (ii).
``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition
under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written
proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not
later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause
(i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the
disqualifying criminal offense.
``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the
Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof
in accordance with the Transportation Security
Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses
and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall
notify--

``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from
being issued a biometric transportation security card under
subsection (b);
``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in the
case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is disqualified,
if the applicant is a mariner.

``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as
provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual
may not be denied a transportation security card under
subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that
individual--
``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year period
of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a
felony--

``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the
individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United
States; or
``(II) for causing a severe transportation security
incident;

``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the
preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in
clause (i);
``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or
removed from the United States under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the
United States.
(F) Modification of listed offenses.--The Secretary may, by
rulemaking, add or modify the offenses described in paragraph
(1)(A) or (B).``.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as
paragraphs (3) through (7); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a
work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to
terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the
roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. OBAMA). Without objection, it is so
ordered.

U.S. Economic Sovereignty

Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, we are in the middle of an ongoing
discussion and debate over our homeland security, and certainly, as all
of us know, this remains a matter of grave concern. Homeland security
means many things, and it certainly does mean that we fully and
appropriately fund our police and our fire. It means we guard our ports
and our infrastructure such as our tunnels and bridges, all of which
are going to be the subject of the authorization legislation brought
forward by the chairman and ranking member. But it also means we have
to remain strong at home and we have to have the economic resources to
spend on protecting ourselves.
Yesterday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted 416 points--the
largest single drop since the markets reopened after the September 11
attacks. While our markets were reeling, alarm bells were ringing once
again over the irresponsible fiscal and economic policies of this
administration that continue to surrender the economic sovereignty of
our country to foreign banks, investors, and governments piece by
piece.
Yesterday's stock market disruption came on the heels of pessimistic
economic news on the homefront and ominous comments about recession by
former Fed Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. So while it can and will be
debated whether yesterday's market fluctuation was a blip or a larger
indicator of our economy's vulnerabilities, it is clear that what
happened underscores the exposure of our economy to a combination of
economic developments in countries such as China and economic policies
here at home. A scare in the Chinese stock market, based on rumors
within that country, sent economic reverberations around the world.
In terms of our fiscal stability, we are in uncharted waters.
Markets, to a certain degree, will always be volatile and, to a great
extent, we are fortunate that our domestic markets are deep enough to
absorb certain shocks. But there is no precedent in U.S. history for an
economy as large as ours to be as heavily in debt to its trading
partners as the United States is to countries such as China, Japan, and
others.
When it comes to the fiscal recklessness and economic fatalism of the
current administration, the writing may not be on the wall, but
yesterday the writing was on the ``Big Board.'' In the face of this
challenge, the economic policies of the last 6 years have contributed
to an erosion of U.S. economic sovereignty and have made us more
dependent on the economic decisions of other nations. As I have
proposed, and continue to support, we need to take steps to restore
fiscal responsibility and sound economic policies based on the facts,
not ideology.
I will continue to support legislative steps to require that the Bush
administration address mounting fiscal and trade imbalances. Today I
sent letters to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke urging them to address many of our underlying
economic vulnerabilities resulting from our debt and deficits.

Our Nation has been running record deficits and digging a massive
fiscal hole of nearly $8.8 trillion as foreign countries have been
buying our debt and in essence becoming our bankers. According to the
most recent Treasury statistics, foreign nations now hold more than
$2.2 trillion, or 44 percent, of all publicly held U.S. debt. Japan and
China alone hold nearly $1 trillion. To put it plainly: 16 percent of
our entire economy is being loaned to us by the Central Banks of other
nations. I know other Members of this Chamber, such as Senator Conrad,
the chairman of our Budget Committee, share my concern over the
implications of this massive foreign debt.
While the foundations of our fiscal house are eroded by our fiscal
policies, our failure to pursue smart economic policies has added
strain on our economy. Every single year since President Bush took
office we have had a record trade deficit. Last year the deficit was
$764 billion. One of the ramifications of that trade deficit to foreign
interests is the control by foreign interests of more and more of our
assets.
How can we negotiate fair, pro-American trade agreements and ensure
foreign countries uphold these agreements when we sit across the
negotiating table not only from our competitor but from our banker as
well? While ceding our economic sovereignty, we also sow the seeds of
economic vulnerability. Precipitous decisions by any country holding
our debt could create much graver economic problems than what we saw
yesterday.
I believe in smart, pro-American trade, and globalization does hold
incredible promise to continue to improve our standard of living and to
create economic growth. But for too long, the choices have been painted
far too starkly and with a broad political brush. In fact, we can
protect our economic interests while promoting trade. We can secure our
economic sovereignty while promoting policies that secure our global
economic position. Trade does not have to be a zero sum game.
The choice is not between fatalism and protectionism. The choice is
between policies that work and policies that are not working. We have
to curb these deficits and ensure foreign governments do not own too
much of our Government debt. We need a firewall that keeps our economic
future more in our own hands.
In years past I have worked with other Members of Congress who share
my concerns. For example, during the last session of Congress I
supported legislation by Senator Dorgan and then-Congressman Cardin
that rings an alarm bell when U.S. foreign-owned debt reaches 25
percent of GDP or the trade deficit reaches 5 percent of GDP. It would
require the administration to

[[Page S2345]]

develop a plan of action to address these conditions and report their
findings to Congress. At the very least this proposal would compel our
Government to deal with these economic issues while they are problems
but before they become crises. I believe proposals such as these need
to be considered in order to put our economic house in order, as we can
too easily be held hostage to the economic policies that are being made
not in Washington and not in the markets of New York but in Beijing,
Shanghai, Tokyo, and elsewhere.
Yesterday it was the selloff of foreign stocks that had
reverberations in U.S. markets. But if China or Japan made a decision
to decrease their massive holdings of U.S. dollars, there could be a
currency crisis and the United States would have to raise interest
rates and invite conditions for a recession. Precipitous decisions by
any country holding our debt could create far graver economic
consequences than what we witnessed yesterday.
While it is clear we should take reasonable steps now to ensure that
the economic problems of today do not become the crises of tomorrow, we
are awaiting some action by the administration that gives us a clear
signal that we can begin to restore responsibility. This is a long-term
problem, but it is one that I think we must respond to. We ignore it at
our peril. As we saw yesterday, the United States is interconnected
with globalized markets. They are not going to leave anyone out. We
will all be impacted by decisions that we have nothing to do with
making, even if they are rumors or quickly reversed.
It is my hope what happened yesterday, which gave us headlines across
the world, will open our eyes to what we need to do to take action to
put ourselves in a much more competitive position and to begin to move
away from the loss of economic sovereignty we have seen over the last
years.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Inouye amendment to S. 4 is pending.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Bunning are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5:20
today, the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Inouye amendment
No. 285, to be followed by a vote in relation to the DeMint amendment
No. 279, as modified; with the time until then for debate to run
concurrently on both amendments, with the time equally divided and
controlled between Senators Inouye and DeMint or their designees; that
no amendments be in order to either amendment prior to the vote and
that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided between the votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Hawaii is
recognized.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I concur with the statement just issued,
and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 285

Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the second-degree
amendment that has been offered by my colleague from Hawaii, Senator
Inouye.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired under the previous
agreement.
Mr. DeMINT. I ask unanimous consent----
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to clarify the unanimous consent request,
I believe there were 2 minutes between the votes, am I correct, for
debate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from South
Carolina may proceed.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator through the
Chair, how much time does the Senator from South Carolina need?
Mr. DeMINT. Three or 4 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senator be given 4 minutes to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DeMINT. I thank the Senator. I appreciate the Senator fitting me
in. Again, I am speaking on the second degree to my amendment that is
related to port security.
As we talked about here several times on the floor, and actually
passed last year, it is important that the people who are working at
our ports are people we can trust to use the equipment and technology
they are given to keep the people of America safe.
The amendment I have offered is consistent with--in fact, it is
identical to--the regulations that the Secretary and the homeland
defense agency have put together so that we will not have convicted
felons working in our ports around this country, so that we know the
people who are operating our most secure areas are people who have not
proven to be susceptible to crimes.
Senator Inouye is offering a second degree to my amendment that would
allow the Secretary to change some of these crimes or felony
convictions or to modify the rules. The Secretary of Homeland Security
has not asked for this. In fact, he is supporting the amendment we
have. I cannot imagine any future Secretary or future administration
wanting to eliminate some of these felonies. The whole point of having
this amendment and putting it into law is so that our agencies are not
subject to lawsuits and constant harassment to change the criteria for
working in the secure areas of our ports.
So I appeal to my fellow colleagues, a vote for this second-degree
amendment is a vote to gut my amendment. It is a vote to allow in the
future any administration or this administration to eliminate certain
felonies that would keep convicted criminals from working in our ports.
I encourage my colleagues not to vote for this second degree. Vote for
my amendment, which everybody in this body has voted for unanimously in
the past.
Again, I thank the Senator from Connecticut and Senator Collins for
the opportunity to speak.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the amendment I introduced is not a
second-degree amendment. However, it incorporates Senator DeMint's
amendment.
It doesn't in any way minimize the matter of security. It just says
the Secretary shall have flexibility with changing times. As we all
concur, times do change.
Thirdly, in the other areas where security threats are common, such
as airports, the Department of Transportation has not asked for
anything like this, with no flexibility.
Fourth, if rules are to be made to differ from the present rules as
set forth in the DeMint amendment and the Inouye amendment, it will
have to go through the rulemaking process. I can assure my colleagues
that we will not let felons be in charge of our security.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, may I have an additional 60 seconds?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DeMINT. I thank the Senator from Hawaii. I need to make an
important point. The whole point of my amendment is to put a regulation
in law so it cannot be changed and contested. The amendment offered by
Senator Inouye basically guts the amendment and eliminates the reason
for the amendment. It moves from being a law to something that is
subject to the whims of any future administration or Secretary.
Our job here is certainly to be fair to workers, but our first
priority is to protect the American people. Please, let's not allow
convicted felons to work in our ports. Our job is to protect our ports.
The second degree completely guts the whole idea of an amendment that
makes this law.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
285.

[[Page S2346]]

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden),
the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson), and the Senator from Rhode
Island (Mr. Reed) are necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 37, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 54 Leg.]

YEAS--58

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Clinton
Cochran
Conrad
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Hagel
Harkin
Hutchison
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
McCaskill
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reid
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Smith
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Tester
Voinovich
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden

NAYS--37

Alexander
Allard
Bennett
Bond
Bunning
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Coleman
Collins
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Inhofe
Isakson
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Sununu
Thomas
Thune
Vitter

NOT VOTING--5

Biden
Brownback
Johnson
McCain
Reed
The amendment (No. 285) was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 279, as Modified

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, there will now be 2
minutes of debate equally divided on the DeMint amendment No. 279.
Who yields time?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the time on
our side and go right to the vote.
Mr. BYRD. Let's hear something about the amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. The proponent of the amendment is the Senator from
South Carolina, and he has 1 minute to describe it, if he so chooses.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator from West Virginia is
seeking an explanation of the amendment, I believe I can provide that.
The amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina would give
authority to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
add certain advances to the list of disqualifying crimes that would
prevent someone from working at our seaports.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield back the remaining time on this
side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
279, as modified.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to
be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden) and
the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson) are necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 2, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 55 Leg.]

YEAS--94

Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brown
Bunning
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Tester
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden

NAYS--2

Smith
Specter

NOT VOTING--4

Biden
Brownback
Johnson
McCain
The amendment (No. 279), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. REID. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the
table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. Madam President, because of these two votes coming together
as they did, there was some confusion. That is why this vote took
longer. Everyone should understand, we will not make a habit of this.
We have been very strict in enforcing the 20-minute rule, and we will
continue to do so.
For the benefit of all Senators, we had a productive day today but,
in my opinion, not as productive as it should have been. For Senators
who have amendments, tomorrow is Thursday. We are not having votes
until 5:30 on Monday night. We are going to have some amendments
offered or I am going to get the idea there are not any amendments to
offer, and we will have to either move to third reading or move to
cloture or something. If Members have amendments, we said this would be
an open process. This is a very important piece of legislation. I hope
they are not waiting until the last minute because the last minute may
arrive more quickly than they think. It is important legislation. In
our cloakroom, we sent out a hotline today to find out what amendments
my caucus has. I hope the Republicans will follow up on that so we may
have a list of amendments so we know whom to call.
We have had a lot of dead time today. If this bill is open to
amendment and people have concerns with it, they should offer those
amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Amendment No. 281 to Amendment No. 275

Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I call up amendment No. 281 and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the
pending amendment?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for himself and
Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 281 to amendment
No. 275.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment
be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To provide financial aid to local law enforcement officials
along the Nation's borders, and for other purposes)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

TITLE__.--BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT RELIEF ACT

SEC. __01. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Border Law Enforcement
Relief Act of 2007''.

SEC. __02. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) It is the obligation of the Federal Government of the
United States to adequately secure the Nation's borders and
prevent the flow of undocumented persons and illegal drugs
into the United States.

[[Page S2347]]

(2) Despite the fact that the United States Border Patrol
apprehends over 1,000,000 people each year trying to
illegally enter the United States, according to the
Congressional Research Service, the net growth in the number
of unauthorized aliens has increased by approximately 500,000
each year. The Southwest border accounts for approximately 94
percent of all migrant apprehensions each year. Currently,
there are an estimated 11,000,000 unauthorized aliens in the
United States.
(3) The border region is also a major corridor for the
shipment of drugs. According to the El Paso Intelligence
Center, 65 percent of the narcotics that are sold in the
markets of the United States enter the country through the
Southwest Border.
(4) Border communities continue to incur significant costs
due to the lack of adequate border security. A 2001 study by
the United States-Mexico Border Counties Coalition found that
law enforcement and criminal justice expenses associated with
illegal immigration exceed $89,000,000 annually for the
Southwest border counties.
(5) In August 2005, the States of New Mexico and Arizona
declared states of emergency in order to provide local law
enforcement immediate assistance in addressing criminal
activity along the Southwest border.
(6) While the Federal Government provides States and
localities assistance in covering costs related to the
detention of certain criminal aliens and the prosecution of
Federal drug cases, local law enforcement along the border
are provided no assistance in covering such expenses and must
use their limited resources to combat drug trafficking, human
smuggling, kidnappings, the destruction of private property,
and other border-related crimes.
(7) The United States shares 5,525 miles of border with
Canada and 1,989 miles with Mexico. Many of the local law
enforcement agencies located along the border are small,
rural departments charged with patrolling large areas of
land. Counties along the Southwest United States-Mexico
border are some of the poorest in the country and lack the
financial resources to cover the additional costs associated
with illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and other border-
related crimes.
(8) Federal assistance is required to help local law
enforcement operating along the border address the unique
challenges that arise as a result of their proximity to an
international border and the lack of overall border security
in the region

SEC. __03. BORDER RELIEF GRANT PROGRAM.

(a) Grants Authorized.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to award
grants, subject to the availability of appropriations, to an
eligible law enforcement agency to provide assistance to such
agency to address--
(A) criminal activity that occurs in the jurisdiction of
such agency by virtue of such agency's proximity to the
United States border; and
(B) the impact of any lack of security along the United
States border.
(2) Duration.--Grants may be awarded under this subsection
during fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
(3) Competitive basis.--The Secretary shall award grants
under this subsection on a competitive basis, except that the
Secretary shall give priority to applications from any
eligible law enforcement agency serving a community--
(A) with a population of less than 50,000; and
(B) located no more than 100 miles from a United States
border with--
(i) Canada; or
(ii) Mexico.
(b) Use of Funds.--Grants awarded pursuant to subsection
(a) may only be used to provide additional resources for an
eligible law enforcement agency to address criminal activity
occurring along any such border, including--
(1) to obtain equipment;
(2) to hire additional personnel;
(3) to upgrade and maintain law enforcement technology;
(4) to cover operational costs, including overtime and
transportation costs; and
(5) such other resources as are available to assist that
agency.
(c) Application.--
(1) In general.--Each eligible law enforcement agency
seeking a grant under this section shall submit an
application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner,
and accompanied by such information as the Secretary may
reasonably require.
(2) Contents.--Each application submitted pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) describe the activities for which assistance under this
section is sought; and
(B) provide such additional assurances as the Secretary
determines to be essential to ensure compliance with the
requirements of this section.
(d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
(1) Eligible law enforcement agency.--The term ``eligible
law enforcement agency'' means a tribal, State, or local law
enforcement agency--
(A) located in a county no more than 100 miles from a
United States border with--
(i) Canada; or
(ii) Mexico; or
(B) located in a county more than 100 miles from any such
border, but where such county has been certified by the
Secretary as a High Impact Area.
(2) High impact area.--The term ``High Impact Area'' means
any county designated by the Secretary as such, taking into
consideration--
(A) whether local law enforcement agencies in that county
have the resources to protect the lives, property, safety, or
welfare of the residents of that county;
(B) the relationship between any lack of security along the
United States border and the rise, if any, of criminal
activity in that county; and
(C) any other unique challenges that local law enforcement
face due to a lack of security along the United States
border.
(3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated
$50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011 to
carry out the provisions of this section.
(2) Division of authorized funds.--Of the amounts
authorized under paragraph (1)--
(A) \2/3\ shall be set aside for eligible law enforcement
agencies located in the 6 States with the largest number of
undocumented alien apprehensions; and
(B) \1/3\ shall be set aside for areas designated as a High
Impact Area under subsection (d).
(f) Supplement Not Supplant.--Amounts appropriated for
grants under this section shall be used to supplement and not
supplant other State and local public funds obligated for the
purposes provided under this title.

SEC. __04. ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW.

Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize State
or local law enforcement agencies or their officers to
exercise Federal immigration law enforcement authority.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, this is an amendment I am offering on
behalf of myself and Senator Domenici, my colleague. It is to provide
funds to local law enforcement agencies along our very substantial
borders with Canada and Mexico to assist them with criminal activity,
problems of enforcement of the laws, and dealing with criminal activity
in those border communities. This is an amendment that sets up a $50
million-a-year grant program. It is an amendment we have passed twice
in the Senate, but it has not become law as yet.
It calls upon the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
competitive grant program to assist local law enforcement located along
the border or other local law enforcement agencies that are determined
by the Homeland Security Department to be heavily impacted, high-impact
areas elsewhere in the country.
The border with Canada is 5,525 miles long. Our border with Mexico is
nearly 2,000 miles long. We have had serious problems on the New
Mexico-Mexico border, as has the State of Arizona. In fact, last year
the States of Arizona and New Mexico declared states of emergency in
order to provide local law enforcement with immediate assistance in
dealing with criminal activity along the border. The Federal Government
needs to step up and do its part in helping these local law enforcement
agencies. This amendment helps to do that.
I hope when the time comes for a vote on the amendment, my colleagues
will agree to support it, and we can pass it with a unanimous vote.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, the Improving America's Security Act
is not only about unfinished business, it is not only about doing what
others have failed to do, it is about living up to the responsibilities
we have as a Congress and a government to protect our Nation and its
people and to do everything possible to prevent what was once
unthinkable from happening again.
As a Senator from New Jersey, I take that responsibility as a solemn
promise to the 700 New Jerseyans who lost their lives on September 11
and their families who survived them.
More than 5 years ago, it became painfully clear that we, as a Nation
that believed it was the most secure in the world, were unprotected. In
the glimpse of a few minutes and over the course of a few short
horrific hours, our Nation and the security we thought we had was
changed forever. We entered into the stark reality of a post-September
11 world.
On that day, glaring gaps in our security were exploited, lax systems
were taken advantage of, and a trusting nation paid the price.
Thousands of innocent lives, everyday Americans whom this Nation has
grieved every day

[[Page S2348]]

since, were lost. We can never go back to rectify past mistakes that
could have prevented that day, but we can work to better secure our
Nation moving forward.

We have a roadmap of how to get there. The 9/11 Commission laid out a
plan, provided guidance, and delivered 41 specific and wide-ranging
recommendations. Yet more than 2 years after the Commission issued
those recommendations, many of them remain just that--recommendations
that have not been acted on or fully implemented.
This legislation already comes before this body far later than it
should. But the fact that it is on the floor of this Chamber just 2
short months into a new Congress speaks boldly of our new leadership
and how important finishing the 9/11 Commission's work is to our
leadership. I commend both Majority Leader Reid and Chairman Lieberman
for making this a top priority for this Congress, as well as Chairman
Inouye and Chairman Dodd for their roles in crafting this legislation.
Many of us have been pushing for a long time to see all 41
recommendations fully implemented and to make significant improvements
to our Nation's security that have been under the radar screen for far
too long.
As a former Member of the House of Representatives, I fought to see
that all 41 recommendations were fully implemented in the 2004
intelligence reform legislation. I was proud to serve as the lead
Democratic negotiator in the House on the conference committee that
created the final intelligence bill. While that legislation made
essential and urgently needed reforms to our Nation's intelligence,
unfortunately, it fell far short on implementing all of the
recommendations.
I have also since introduced legislation that ensures that all of
these recommendations will be fully implemented and to hold the
executive branch accountable for implementing each recommendation. It
is my hope that with the bill we are working on now before the Senate,
and with the vigorous oversight under the leadership of Chairman
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, we will be able to see all these
recommendations enacted and implemented.
It was just over a year ago the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, led by
former members of the 9/11 Commission, published its disturbing report
card, giving far more Fs than As on the implementation of those 41
recommendations.
There is no excuse left for Congress, the White House, or our Federal
agencies for not finishing what is so direly needed: improving the
security of our Nation. Yes, we have made some great steps forward.
Yes, we have made some significant improvements that have likely saved
lives and stopped terrorists in their tracks. But no one--no one--
should use the lack of another catastrophic attack on our soil as proof
that we have succeeded in fully meeting our goals.
The fact is, so long as we do not heed the advice of the 9/11
Commissioners who spent months examining how we could improve our
Nation's security, so long as we do not make dramatic improvements to
our security--at our Nation's ports, on our trains and buses, around
our chemical plants, and in how we allocate homeland security funding--
we continue to leave our Nation at risk.
I cannot imagine talking about the security of our Nation without the
41 recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The Commission's findings
and recommendations are integral to understanding our deepest flaws,
the complexity of our intelligence and security networks, the obstacles
that lie ahead and, most of all, what needs to be done.
Yet if some in our Government had had their way, there would have
been no Commission, there would have been no digging into the secrecy
and ineffectiveness of our Nation's security, no poring over thousands
upon thousands of documents, no reviewing of every action Federal
agencies took or did not take to prevent and respond to the attacks of
September 11, no asking of some of the toughest questions our Nation
has had to bear.
So once we pass this final legislation, have it signed into law and
implemented, we will come to the day--I hope sooner rather than later--
when our Nation's security funding is based more on risk, when our
ports are fully secure because of 100 percent scanning, when we are
making the necessary investments in mass transit security, and when our
first responders have a strong emergency communications system that
works in interoperable ways, so that those who are sworn to protect us
can speak to each other effectively.
These are only a few of the dimensions in this fight. Unfortunately,
this is a fight that would not have taken place without the commitment
and strength of the families of the victims of September 11.
When the loved ones of those who were lost on September 11 have to
become full-time advocates, spending every possible hour lobbying
Congress, when they have to be the constant reminder for our Government
to do its job, we know we have failed them. Many of them are here and
have been here today watching this body, waiting to finally see this
legislation become law, hoping that all their suffering, their work,
and their tireless advocacy will not be in vain.
Let us not only fulfill their wishes but the wishes of all Americans
to have a nation as secure as possible for their families and
neighbors. Let's work to pass this legislation and make sure it is
fully enacted. Let's finally accomplish what should have been finished
several years ago.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). Without objection, it is so
ordered.

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