S.Amdt. 1671

1. Adds SEC. 1232. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION at the end of title XII

   Adds a section

   In S. 1390 · Placed on Calendar Senate

   (D) providing a comprehensive assessment of how the performance of the particular measure of progress hinders or enhances the overall performance toward achieving strategic objectives of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

   Inserted: SEC. 1232. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

   Inserted: (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

   Inserted: (1) The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, recently concluded that there is significant asymmetry between the tactical nuclear weapons arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States.

   Inserted: (2) The Commission also determined that "[a]s part of its strategy to assure its allies, the United States should not abandon strategic equivalency with Russia. Overall equivalence is important to many U.S. allies in Europe. The United States should not cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. There seems no near-term prospect of such a result in the balance of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons."

   Inserted: (3) The Commission continued, "But that balance does not exist in non-strategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizeable numerical advantage. As noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals. The United States deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. Precise numbers for the U.S. deployments are classified but their total is only about five percent of the total at the height of the Cold War. Strict U.S.-Russian equivalence in NSNF numbers is unnecessary. But the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe. If and as reductions continue in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance will become more apparent and allies less assured."

   Inserted: (4) The Commission stated, "Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia, however, are fearful of Russia and its tactical nuclear forces. The imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed."

   Inserted: (5) The Commission also stated, "The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts."

   Inserted: (b) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate strongly urges the President--

   Inserted: (1) to make it a priority in all United States arms control negotiations with Russia to gain a verifiable accounting of the tactical nuclear weapons of Russia, including the types, current deployments, and security from theft of the same;

   Inserted: (2) to ensure that reductions in the tactical nuclear weapons of Russia are a top priority in any arms control negotiation with the Russian Federation; and

   Inserted: (3) to assure United States allies that they are protected from any use or threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons from Russia.

   Original wording

   At the end of title XII, add the following:

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As printed