To provide that the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to an understanding regarding the non-use of covers by the Russian Federation that tend to interfere with Type One inspections and accurate warhead counting, is subject to the United States and the Russian Federation reaching an agreement regarding access and monitoring, and is subject to a certification that the Russian Federation has agreed that it will not deny telemetric exchanges on new ballistic missile systems it deploys during the duration of the Treaty.

SA 4893. Mr. KYL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to Treaty Doc. 111-5, Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8,
2010, with Protocol; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of
Ratification, add the following:
(11) Covers.--Prior to entry into force of the New START
Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the
President has reached an agreement with the Government of the
Russian Federation on the non-use of covers by the Russian
Federation that tend to interfere with Type One inspections
and accurate warhead counting.
(12) Telemetry.--Prior to entry into force of the New START
Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the
United States has reached a legally-binding agreement with
the Russian Federation that each party to the Treaty is
obliged to provide the other full and unimpeded access to its
telemetry from all flight-test of strategic missiles limited
by the Treaty;
(13) Telemetric exchanges on ballistic missiles deployed by
the russian federation.--Prior to the entry into force of the
New START Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate
that the Russian Federation has agreed that it will not deny
telemetric exchanges on new ballistic missile systems it
deploys during the duration of the Treaty.
At the end of subsection (b), add the following:
(4) Type one inspections.--The United States would consider
as a violation of the deployed warhead limit in section 1(b)
of Article II of the Treaty and as a material breach of the
Treaty either of the following actions:
(A) Any Type One inspection that revealed the Russian
Federation had deployed a number of warheads on any one
missile in excess of the number they declared for that
missile.
(B) Any action by the Russian Federation that impedes the
ability of the United States to determine the number of
warheads deployed on any one missile prior to or during a
Type One inspection.
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