S.Amdt. 1148

SA 1148. Mr. RUBIO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill H.R. 1191, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to ensure that emergency services volunteers are not taken into account
as employees under the shared responsibility requirements contained in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; which was ordered to
lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON PROVIDING SANCTIONS RELIEF.

The President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
of State, and any other Executive branch officer or agency
may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with
respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from
applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement
described under section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as added by section 2 of this Act, until the President
certifies to Congress that the Government of Iran has fully
and verifiably--
(1) reduced by approximately two-thirds its installed
centrifuges, with the remaining 6,104 centrifuges being IR-
1s, Iran's first-generation centrifuge;
(2) halted any uranium enrichment over 3.67 percent and
agreed to continue to do so for at least 15 years;
(3) reduced its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300
kilograms of 3.67 percent low-enriched uranium (LEU);
(4) placed all excess centrifuges and enrichment
infrastructure in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
monitored storage to be used only as replacements for
operating centrifuges and equipment;
(5) agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose
of enriching uranium for 15 years;
(6) halted enrichment of uranium at the Fordow facility and
agreed to continue this moratorium for 15 years;
(7) converted the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics,
technology, and research center for peaceful purposes only;
(8) halted research and development associated with uranium
enrichment at Fordow and agreed to continue this moratorium
for 15 years;
(9) removed almost two-thirds of Fordow's centrifuges and
infrastructure, ensured that the remaining centrifuges are
not enriching uranium, and placed all centrifuges and related
infrastructure under IAEA monitoring;
(10) removed advanced centrifuges at Natanz, and is only
enriching uranium using IR-1 models and has agreed to
continue this arrangement for 10 years;
(11) removed the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently
installed at Natanz and placed them in IAEA-monitored storage
and agreed to keep them there for 10 years;
(12) halted use of its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8
models to produce enriched uranium and committed to continue
this for at least ten years.
(13) begun to abide by the schedule and parameters for
limited centrifuge research and development agreed to by the
P5+1 countries;
(14) provided regular access to all of Iran's nuclear
facilities, including to Iran's enrichment facility at Natanz
and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and is allowing
the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring
technologies;
(15) provided inspectors with access to the supply chain
that supports Iran's nuclear program;
(16) provided access to uranium mines and continuous
surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces
yellowcake, and has committed to continue to do so for 25
years;
(17) provided inspectors with access to allow continuous
surveillance of Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows
production and storage facilities, and has committed to
continue to do so for 20 years;
(18) placed all centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure
removed from Fordow and Natanz under continuous monitoring by
the IAEA;
(19) begun to use only the dedicated procurement channel
for Iran's nuclear program to monitor and approve, on a case
by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and
technology;
(20) implemented the Additional Protocol of the IAEA and
committed to adhere to the Additional Protocol permanently;
(21) committed to grant access to the IAEA to investigate
any suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment
facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production
facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the
country, including at military sites;
(22) implemented Modified Code 3.1 requiring early
notification of construction of new facilities;
(23) redesigned and rebuilt the heavy water research
reactor in Arak based on a design agreed to by the P5+1
countries and ensured that the reactor will not produce
weapons grade plutonium;
(24) destroyed or removed from the country the original
core of the Arak reactor;
(25) committed to ship all spent fuel from the Arak reactor
out of the country;
(26) halted any reprocessing or reprocessing research and
development on spent nuclear fuel;
(27) committed to not accumulate heavy water in excess of
the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and to sell any
remaining heavy water on the international market for 15
years; and
(28) halted building of any additional heavy water reactors
and committed to continue this moratorium for 15 years.
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