S.Amdt. 4475

SA 4475. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2943, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2017 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle H of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1277. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN
VIOLATIONS OF THE OPEN SKIES TREATY.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the President's letter of submittal for
the Open Skies Treaty provided to Congress by the Secretary
of State on August 12, 1992, it is the purpose of the Open
Skies Treaty to promote openness and transparency of military
forces and activities and to enhance mutual understanding and
confidence by giving States Party a direct role in gathering
information about military forces and activities of concern
to them.
(2) According to the Department of State's 2016 Compliance
Report, the Russian Federation ``continues not to meet its
obligations [under the Open Skies Treaty] to allow effective
observation of its entire territory, raising serious
compliance concerns''.
(3) According to the 2016 Compliance Report, Russian
conduct giving rise to compliance concerns has continued
since the Open Skies Treaty entered into force in 2002 and
worsened in 2010, 2014, and 2015.
(4) According to the 2016 Compliance Report, ongoing
efforts by the United States and other States Party to the
Open Skies Treaty to address these concerns through dialogue
with the Russian Federation ``have not resolved any of the
compliance concerns''.
(5) The Russian Federation has engaged in other activities
in coordination with, but outside the scope of, the Open
Skies Treaty overflights, which are a cause of concern and
should be addressed.
(6) It is a generally accepted principle of customary
international law that in the event of a material breach of a
multilateral treaty by one of its parties, a party specially
affected by that breach may invoke it as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in
the relations between itself and the defaulting state.
(b) Statement of United States Policy.--It is the policy of
the United States that--
(1) restrictions upon the ability of Open Skies Treaty
aircraft to overfly all portions of the territory of a State
Party impede openness and transparency of military forces and
activities and undermine mutual understanding and confidence,
especially when coupled with an ongoing refusal to address
compliance concerns raised by other States Party subject to
such restrictions;
(2) it is essential to the accomplishment of the object and
purpose of the Open Skies Treaty that Open Skies Treaty
aircraft be able to overfly all portions of the territory of
a State Party in a timely and reciprocal manner;
(3) restrictions upon the ability of Open Skies Treaty
aircraft to overfly all portions of the territory of the
Russian Federation constitute a material breach of the Open
Skies Treaty;
(4) in light of the Russian Federation's material breach of
the Open Skies Treaty, the United States is legally entitled
to suspend the operation of the Open Skies Treaty in whole or
in part for so long as the Russian Federation continues to be
in material breach of the Open Skies Treaty;
(5) for so long as the Russian Federation remains in
noncompliance with the Open Skies Treaty, the United States
should--
(A) suspend certification or operation of new sensors for
Russian overflights of the United States pursuant to the Open
Skies Treaty;
(B) place restrictions upon Russian overflights of the
United States in response to Russian restrictions placed upon
United States overflights of the Russian Federation; and
(C) use appropriate additional measures to encourage the
Russian Federation's return to compliance with the Open Skies
Treaty; and
(6) during a period of Open Skies Treaty suspension or
curtailment, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, shall coordinate with parties to Open Skies Treaty
that are not the Russian Federation and Belarus, and fulfill
imagery requirements of those parties in a manner relative to
that provided by Open Skies Treaty collection.
(c) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
together with the Annual Arms Control and Verification
Compliance Report defined in subsection (e), the Secretary of
State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that contains
the following elements:
(1) A description of all outstanding concerns regarding
compliance by the Russian Federation with its obligations
under the Open Skies Treaty.
(2) A description of all consistency, counterintelligence,
and other intelligence related issues that have arisen over
the previous year, including Russian Federation sensor or
equipment anomalies, intelligence actives carried out in
coordination with Open Skies Treaty overflights, and other
intelligence concerns as determined by the Director of
National Intelligence.
(3) A description of all compliance dialogue, diplomatic
engagement, or other interactions between the United States
and the Russian Federation with regard to concerns about
actual or potential Russian noncompliance with the Open Skies
Treaty, as well as any such dialogue, engagement, or
interactions between other Open Skies Treaty parties and the
Russian Federation with regard to concerns about Russian
actual or potential Russian noncompliance.
(4) A United States strategy for bringing the Russian
Federation into full compliance with its obligations under
the Open Skies Treaty, including--
(A) an assessment of the tools available to the United
States for purposes of enforcing compliance with the Open
Skies Treaty, including--
(i) bilateral or multilateral compliance dialogue;
(ii) the imposition of restrictions upon Russian
overflights pursuant to the Open Skies Treaty, either by the
United States or other States Party; and
(iii) the use of pressures or points of political,
economic, or military leverage separate from the Open Skies
Treaty.
(B) a description of how United States compliance dialogue
with the Russian Federation about the Open Skies Treaty
incorporates and integrates the tools described in
subparagraph (A); and
(C) an assessment of whether the Russian Federation is
expected to return to full compliance with the Open Skies
Treaty, and if so, when and under what conditions this is
most likely to occur.
(5) An assessment of the benefits the Russian Federation
receives from the conduct of Open Skies Treaty overflights
over European countries and the United States, including--
(A) The value of such information collection relative to
other sources of information available to the Russian
Federation; and
(B) A description of the types of United States and
European targets over which Russian overflights pursuant to
the Open Skies Treaty have flown, how this target set has
evolved over the course of the Russian Federation's Open
Skies overflights, and how this target set relates to current
Russian military doctrine and planning.
(6) An assessment of the intelligence value of Open Skies
information to States Party to the Open Skies Treaty, other
than the

[[Page S3559]]

United States or the Russian Federation, relative to other
sources of information available to such States Party,
including commercially-available satellite imagery.
(7) The impact of Russian noncompliance with the Open Skies
Treaty and other international agreements or commitments
relating to arms control, international security, or crisis
prevention or stability, including the INF Treaty, the
Incidents at Sea Agreement, and the Budapest Memorandum, the
Biological Weapons Convention, and the CFE Treaty, upon
defense and security planning in and among States Party to
the Open Skies Treaty, including members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (c)
shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Annual arms control and verification compliance
report.--The term ``Annual Arms Control and Verification
Compliance Report'' means the annual Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report required under
section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22
U.S.C. 2593a).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological
Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
done at London, Moscow, and Washington April 10, 1972, and
entered into force March 26, 1975.
(4) Budapest memorandum.--The term ``Budapest Memorandum''
means the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection
with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December
5, 1994.
(5) CFE treaty.--The term ``CFE Treaty'' means the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe done at Vienna
November 19, 1990, and entered into force November 9, 1992.
(6) 2016 compliance report.--The term ``2016 Compliance
Report'' means the Report on Adherence to and Compliance With
Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments published by the United States Department of
State on April 11, 2016.
(7) Incidents at sea agreement.--The term ``Incidents at
Sea Agreement'' means the Agreement Between the Government of
The United States and the Government of The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas, done at Moscow on May 25, 1972, and
entered into force on May 25, 1972.
(8) INF treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, done at Washington
December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
(9) Open skies treaty.--The term ``Open Skies Treaty''
means the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24,
1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002.
______