S.Amdt. 4514Senate114th Congress (2015-2017)
S.Amdt. 4514
Sponsored by
Sen. David Vitter (R-LA)
Submitted June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
Text
Submitted
SA 4514. Mr. VITTER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2943, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2017 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following: SEC. 1227. ASSESSMENT OF INADEQUACIES IN INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads and other relevant officials of agencies with responsibilities under section 1078 or 1226, submit to Congress a joint assessment report detailing existing inadequacies in the international monitoring and verification system, including the extent to which such inadequacies relate to the findings and recommendations pertaining to verification shortcomings identified within-- (1) the September 26, 2006, Government Accountability Office report entitled, ``Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed''; (2) the May 16, 2013, Government Accountability Office report entitled, ``IAEA Has Made Progress in Implementing Critical Programs but Continues to Face Challenges''; (3) the Defense Science Board Study entitled, ``Task Force on the Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and Verification Technologies''; (4) the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (in this section referred to as the ``IAEA'') entitled, ``The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency'' and the IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2010; (5) the IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols; (6) the IAEA Model Additional Protocol; (7) the IAEA February 2015 Director General Report to the Board of Governors; and (8) other related reports on Iranian safeguard challenges. (b) Recommendations.--The joint assessment report required by subsection (a) shall include recommendations based upon the reports referenced in that subsection, including recommendations to overcome inadequacies or develop an improved monitoring framework and recommendations related to the following matters: (1) The nuclear program of Iran. (2) Development of a plan for-- (A) the long-term operation and funding of increased activities of the IAEA and relevant agencies in order to maintain the necessary level of oversight with respect to Iran's nuclear program; (B) resolving all issues of past and present concern with the IAEA, including possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program; and (C) giving IAEA inspectors access to personnel, documents, and facilities involved, at any point, with nuclear or nuclear weapons-related activities of Iran. (3) A potential national strategy and implementation plan supported by a planning and assessment team aimed at cutting across agency boundaries or limitations that affect the ability to draw conclusions, with absolute assurance, about whether Iran is developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. (4) The limitations of IAEA actors. (5) Challenges in the region that may be too large to anticipate under applicable treaties or agreements or the national technical means monitoring regimes alone. (6) Continuation of sanctions with respect to the Government of Iran and Iranian persons and Iran's proxies for-- (A) ongoing abuses of human rights; (B) actions in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; (C) procurement, sale, or transfer of technology, services, or goods that support the development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or the means of delivery of those weapons; and (D) continuing sponsorship of international terrorism. (c) Form of Report.--The joint assessment report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Presidential Certification.--Not later than 60 days after the joint assessment report is submitted under subsection (a), the President shall certify to Congress that the President has reviewed the report, including the recommendations contained therein, and has taken available actions to address existing gaps within the monitoring and verification framework, including identified potential funding needs to address necessary requirements. ______