S.Amdt. 4524Senate114th Congress (2015-2017)
S.Amdt. 4524
Sponsored by
Sen. Richard Burr (R-NC)
Submitted June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
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Senate amendment submitted
June 7, 2016
Text
Submitted
SA 4524. Mr. BURR (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, and Ms. Collins) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2943, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2017 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike section 1633 and insert the following: SEC. 1633. PROCESS FOR ENDING OF ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND IS ALSO DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the ending of the arrangement (commonly referred to as a ``dual-hat arrangement'') under which the Commander of the United States Cyber Command also serves as the Director of the National Security Agency needs to be carefully considered and done through conditions-based criteria; and (2) until such arrangement is ended, it is important to ensure such arrangement does not impede the Director's service of national intelligence requirements. (b) Processes for Ending of Current Arrangement.--The Secretary of Defense may not take action to end the arrangement described in subsection (a) until-- (1) the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly determine and certify to the appropriate committees of Congress that the end of that arrangement will not pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United States Cyber Command that are unacceptable in the national security interests of the United States; or (2) the Director of National Intelligence determines and certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the continuation of that arrangement poses risks and impedes the appropriate prioritization of national intelligence requirements. (c) Conditions-based Criteria.--The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence shall develop criteria for assessing the military and intelligence necessity and benefit of the arrangement described in subsection (a). The criteria shall be based on measures of the operational dependence of the United States Cyber Command on the National Security Agency and the ability of each organization to accomplish their roles and responsibilities independent of the other. The conditions to be evaluated shall include the following: (1) The sufficiency of operational infrastructure. (2) The sufficiency of command and control systems and processes for planning, deconflicting, and executing military cyber operations, tools and weapons for achieving required effects. (3) Technical intelligence collection and operational preparation of the environment capabilities. (4) The ability to train personnel, test capabilities, and rehearse missions. (5) The ability to meet national intelligence requirements. (6) The ability to correctly and impartially conduct intelligence gain and loss assessments in scenarios with competing requirements. (d) Reports.--Not later than 90 days of the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until a certification is made in accordance with subsection (b)-- (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes which of the conditions set out under subsection (c) have not been met; and (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the Director's continuing ability to meet national intelligence requirements and appropriately conduct intelligence gain and loss assessments in scenarios with competing requirements. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) National intelligence.--The term ``national intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). ______