S.Amdt. 248

SA 248. Mr. PERDUE (for himself and Mr. Casey) submitted an amendment
intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions
with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program,
support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human
rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table;
as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. ___. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR
AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iran developed a close working relationship with North
Korea on many ballistic missile programs, dating back to an
acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the mid-
1980s.
(2) By the mid-1980s North Korea reverse-engineered Scud B
missiles originally received from Egypt, and developed the
500-kilometer range Scud C missile in 1991, and sold both the
Scud B and Scud C, as well as missile production technology,
to Iran.
(3) In 1992, then-Director of the Central Intelligence
Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress, identified Iran as a
recipient of North Korean Scud missiles.
(4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence James
Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had
sold Iran extended range Scud C missiles and agreed to sell
other forms of missile technology.
(5) Annual threat assessments from the intelligence
community during the 1990s showed that North Korea's ongoing
export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase
in capabilities to countries such as Iran.
(6) The same threat assessments noted that Iran was using
North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve
its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-
range ballistic missiles.
(7) The intelligence community assessed in the 1990s that
Iran's acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related
components could improve Iran's ability to produce an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
(8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence community
continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran's
ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant.
(10) North Korea built the nuclear reactor in Syria that
was bombed in 2007. Syria failed to report the construction
of the reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which was Syria's obligation under its safeguards
agreement with the agency.
(11) Official sources confirm that Iran and North Korea
have engaged in various forms of clandestine nuclear
cooperation.
(12) North Korea and Iran obtained designs and materials
related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement
network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan.
(13) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported, with the
assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
gas to Libya, which was intended to be used in Libya's
clandestine nuclear weapons program.
(14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth
nuclear weapons test.
(15) On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth
nuclear weapons test.
(16) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea
to witness its three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009,
and 2013.
(17) Before North Korea's 2013 test, a senior American
official was quoted as saying ``it's

[[Page S3499]]

very possible that North Koreans are testing for two
countries''.
(18) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed an
agreement for technological and scientific cooperation.
(19) In an April 2015 interview with CNN, then-Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter said that North Korea and Iran ``could
be'' cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.
(20) On March 11, 2017, Director of National Intelligence
Dan Coats provided written testimony to Congress that stated
that Pyongyang's ``export of ballistic missiles and
associated materials to several countries, including Iran and
Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a
nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to
proliferate dangerous technologies''.
(21) A 2016 Congressional Research Service report confirmed
that ``ballistic missile technology cooperation between the
two [Iran and North Korea] is significant and meaningful''.
(22) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States
Northern Command, testified to Congress on April 14, 2016,
that ``Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile
capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs,
in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions,
remains a serious concern''.
(23) There is substantial evidence that Iran and North
Korea are working together on nuclear weapons development.
(24) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277) repealed requirements for the
intelligence community to provide unclassified annual report
to Congress on the ``Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions'', the number of unclassified reports to Congress
on nuclear-weapons issues decreased considerably.
(25) Absent these reports, the President has not been
required to detail to Congress the assessment of cooperation
between North Korea and Iran on nuclear weapon or ballistic
missile development.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea
represent a serious threat to allies of the United States in
the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, members of the Armed
Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United
States;
(2) further cooperation between Iran and North Korea on
nuclear weapons or ballistic missile technology is not in the
security interests of the United States or our allies;
(3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),
which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security
Council and supported by the international community, called
upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons, including launches of such missiles, for an eight
year period beginning in 2015; and
(4) the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that
Iran would use ballistic missiles as its ``preferred method
of delivering nuclear weapons'' which could eventually
threaten the United States.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the heads of other relevant agencies,
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report that includes an assessment of the extent of
cooperation on nuclear programs, ballistic missile
development, chemical and biological weapons development, or
conventional weapons programs between the Government of Iran
and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
North Korea, including the identity of Iranian and North
Korean persons that have knowingly engaged in or directed the
provision of material support or the exchange of information
(including through the transfer of goods, services,
technology, or intellectual property) between the Government
of Iran and the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of North Korea;
(2) And a determination whether any of the activities
described in paragraph (1) violate United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2231 (2015), 2270 (2016) and 2321
(2016).
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
(4) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
______