S.Amdt. 939

SA 939. Mr. REED (for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Brown, Mr.
Whitehouse, and Mr. Durbin) submitted an amendment intended to be
proposed by him to the bill H.R. 2810, to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2018 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department
of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal
year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as
follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

SEC. ___. STRATEGY ON COUNTERING THE THREAT OF MALIGN
INFLUENCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On October 7, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security
and the Office of the Director National Intelligence issued a
joint statement warning that ``[t]he U.S. Intelligence
Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government
directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons
and institutions, including from U.S. political
organizations. The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-
mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the
Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods
and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. These thefts and
disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S.

[[Page S5164]]

election process. Such activity is not new to Moscow--the
Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across
Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion
there. We believe, based on the scope and sensitivity of
these efforts, that only Russia's senior-most officials could
have authorized these activities''.
(2) On January 6, 2017, a unanimous report from the United
States intelligence community, including the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, assessed that Russia
President Putin ``ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed
at the U.S. presidential election'' and that ``Russia's goals
were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic
process''.
(3) The Russian Federation has conducted similar influence
campaigns in European countries designed to undermine the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union
(EU), and other democratic institutions of free societies,
and violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
European countries such as Ukraine and Georgia through the
use of force.
(4) Aggressive operations by the Russian Federation and its
proxies to influence, interfere with and undermine the core
institutions and processes of democratic and free societies,
including elections and independent media, pose a threat to
the national security of the United States, to the
transatlantic relationships, and to the multilateral
institutions underpinning the global order, including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.
(b) Statement of United States Policy.--It is the policy of
the United States to employ a whole-of-government approach,
utilizing all tools of national power, to effectively counter
the threat of malign influence by the Russian Federation
while remaining true to the core values and principles of the
United States.
(c) Strategy Required.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive strategy
to counter the threat of malign influence by the Russian
Federation.
(2) Scope of strategy.--The strategy required by paragraph
(1) shall include actions as follows:
(A) To identify and defend against the threat of malign
influence by the Russian Federation, including--
(i) the use of misinformation, disinformation, and
propaganda in social and traditional media;
(ii) corrupt or illicit financing of political parties,
think tanks, media organizations, and academic institutions;
and
(iii) the use of coercive economic tools, including
sanctions, market access, and differential pricing,
especially in the energy sector.
(B) To deter, and respond when necessary, to malicious
cyber activities by the Russian Federation, including through
the use of offensive cyber capabilities consistent with the
policy specified in section 1621.
(C) To promote the core values and principles of the United
States, enhance the transatlantic relationship, strengthen
good governance and democracy among our European allies and
partners, and further integration into multilateral
institutions underpinning the global order, including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.
(3) Elements.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following elements:
(A) Threat assessment.--An assessment of the nature and
extent of the threat of malign influence by the Russian
Federation to the national security of the United States and
our allies and partners, including the following:
(i) An identification of the countries and institutions
that are most vulnerable to malign influence by the Russian
Federation.
(ii) A description of the active measures and other
techniques that the Government of the Russian Federation uses
in the conduct of influence activities.
(iii) A description of the key decision-makers,
organizational structures, proxies and agents of the
Government of the Russian Federation in its conduct of
influence activities against the United States and its allies
and partners.
(B) Security measures.--Actions to counter the use of
force, coercion, and other hybrid warfare operations of the
military, intelligence, and other security forces of the
Russian Federation, including the following:
(i) Actions to build the military presence and capabilities
of military and security forces of the United States and
European allies and partners to deter and respond to
aggression by the Russian Federation.
(ii) Actions to improve indications and warnings, and
capabilities to identify and attribute responsibility for the
use of force, coercion, or other hybrid warfare operations by
the Russian Federation.
(iii) Actions to support North Atlantic Treaty Organization
allies and non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners in
maintaining their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
(C) Information operations.--Actions to counter information
operations of the Russian Federation, including the
following:
(i) Actions to identify and attribute malign
disinformation, active measures, propaganda, and deception
and denial activities of the Russian Federation in the United
States and Europe, through traditional and social media.
(ii) The establishment of interagency mechanisms for the
coordination and implementation of the strategy with respect
to disinformation, active measures, propaganda, and deception
and denial activities of the Russian Federation.
(iii) Actions to strengthen the effectiveness of and fully
resource the Global Engagement Center to carry out its
purpose specified in section 1287(a)(2) of National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
to lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal
Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter
propaganda and disinformation efforts by the Russian
Federation, other foreign governments, and non-State actors.
(iv) Programs to strengthen investigative journalism and
media independence abroad in countries most vulnerable to
malign Russian influence.
(v) Actions to build resilience to disinformation, active
measures, propaganda, and deception and denial activities of
the Russian Federation in the United States and other
countries vulnerable to malign Russian influence.
(vi) Efforts to work with traditional and social media
providers to counter the threat of malign influence by the
Russian Federation.
(D) Cyber measures.--Actions to counter the threat of
malign influence by the Russian Federation in cyberspace,
including the following:
(i) Actions to implement the policy of the United States on
cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare specified in
section 1621.
(ii) Programs to educate citizens, information technology
experts, and private sector organizations in the United
States and abroad to enhance their resilience to malign
influence by the Russian Federation in cyberspace.
(E) Political and diplomatic measures.--Actions to counter
malign political influence by the Russian Federation in the
United States and among our European allies and partners,
including the following:
(i) Programs and activities to enhance the resilience of
United States democratic institutions and infrastructure at
the national and subnational levels.
(ii) Programs, working through the Department of State and
the United States Agency for International Development, to
promote good governance and enhance democratic institutions
abroad, particularly in countries deemed most vulnerable to
malign influence by the Russian Federation.
(iii) Actions within the United Nations, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other multi-
lateral organizations to counter malign influence by the
Russian Federation.
(iv) Actions to identify organizations or networks of
individuals affiliated with or collaborating with the
Government of the Russian Federation or proxies of the
Russian Federation in the United States or our European
allies and partners.
(F) Financial measures.--Actions to counter corrupt and
illicit financial networks of the Russian Federation in the
United States and abroad, including the following
(i) Actions to promote the transparency of corrupt and
illicit financial transactions of the Russian Federation, and
other anti-corruption measures.
(ii) Actions to maintain and enhance the focus within the
Department of the Treasury on tracing corrupt and illicit
financial flows linked to the Russian Federation that
interact with the United States financial system and exposing
beneficial ownership and opaque Russia-related business
transactions of significant importance.
(iii) Actions to build the capacity of financial
intelligence units of allies and partners.
(iv) Actions to enhance financial intelligence cooperation
between the United States and the European Union.
(G) Energy security measures.--Actions to promote the
energy security of our European allies and partners, and to
reduce their dependence on energy imports from the Russian
Federation that the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to
coerce, intimidate, and influence those countries, including
the following:
(i) Actions to develop plans, working with the governments
of our European allies and partners to enhance energy market
liberalization, effective regulation and oversight, energy
reliability, and energy efficiency.
(ii) Actions to work with the European Union to promote the
growth of liquefied natural gas trade and expansion of the
gas transport infrastructure in Europe.
(iii) Actions to promote a dialogue within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization on a coherent, strategic
approach to energy security for North Atlantic Treaty
Organization members and partner nations.
(H) Promotion of values.--Actions to promote United States
values and principles to provide a strong, credible
alternative to malign influence by the Russian Federation,
including the following:
(i) Actions to promote our alliance structure, the
importance for United States national security of
transatlantic security, and the continued integration of
countries within multilateral institutions within Europe.
(ii) Public diplomacy and outreach to the people of the
Russian Federation.

[[Page S5165]]

(d) Consistency With Prior Legislation.--The strategy
developed pursuant to subsection (c) shall be consistent with
the following:
(1) The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act (Public law 115-44).
(2) The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921
et seq.).
(3) The Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic
Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.).
(4) The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2012 (22 U.S.C. 5811 note).
(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In the
section the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives.

____________________