S.Amdt. 1848

SA 1848. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be
proposed by him to the bill S. 4049, to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2021 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department
of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal
year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as
follows:

At the appropriate place in title XVI, add the following:

Subtitle __--Limitations on Explosive Nuclear Testing

SEC. __01. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to continue to observe the national moratorium on
explosive nuclear testing;
(2) maintaining the national moratorium on nuclear testing
advances United States nonproliferation and arms control
objectives and bolsters efforts to constrain the nuclear
arsenals of adversaries;
(3) the United States should pursue the entry into force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a means of
enabling use of the treaty's on-site inspection measures and
resolving compliance concerns related to the nuclear testing
moratoria commitments of other countries; and
(4) the United States should continue to improve and invest
in the Stockpile Stewardship Program to ensure the safety,
security, and reliability of the United States stockpile in
the absence of nuclear testing.

SEC. __02. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) National security laboratory.--The term ``national
security laboratory'' has the

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meaning given that term in section 4002 of the Atomic Energy
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501).
(3) Stockpile stewardship program.--The term ``Stockpile
Stewardship Program'' means the program established under
section 4201 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C.
2521).

SEC. __03. LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR
TEST.

(a) Limitation on Use of Funds.--None of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by
this Act for fiscal year 2021, or authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available by any other Act for
fiscal year 2021 or any fiscal year thereafter, for the
Department of Energy may be obligated or expended to conduct
an underground or other explosive nuclear test that produces
a yield unless all of the conditions described in subsection
(b) are met.
(b) Conditions.--The conditions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Report on proposed nuclear test by national nuclear
security administration.--Not less than 12 months before the
date on which a nuclear test described in subsection (a) is
proposed to be conducted, the Administrator for Nuclear
Security, with the concurrence of the directors of the
national security laboratories and in consultation with the
Commander of the United States Strategic Command, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
on the proposed test that includes the following:
(A) The date on which the President proposes to conduct the
test.
(B) The location of the test site.
(C) An estimate of the costs of conducting the test and any
subsequent activities related to the test.
(D) A description of how resumption of nuclear testing
would impact the schedule and cost of the nuclear weapons
stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan of
the National Nuclear Security Administration under section
4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523).
(E) An assessment of the desired technical and nuclear
weapons design data that conducting the test would generate.
(F) A discussion of why the science-based tools and methods
and any other capabilities under the Stockpile Stewardship
Program are insufficient for generating the data described in
subparagraph (E).
(G) An assessment of the anticipated yield of the nuclear
test.
(H) An assessment of the status of the infrastructure and
diagnostics instrumentation required for conducting the test.
(I) An assessment of the status of the workforce skills and
capabilities that are required for conducting the test.
(2) Environmental impact statement by national nuclear
security administration.--Not less than 12 months before the
date on which a nuclear test described in subsection (a) is
proposed to be conducted, the Administrator for Nuclear
Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an environmental impact statement under section
102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4332) with respect to conducting the test.
(3) Certification of public health impacts by department of
health and human services.--Not less than 12 months before
the date on which a nuclear test described in subsection (a)
is proposed to be conducted, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a certification that conducting the test will have
no short-term and long-term public health impacts.
(4) Analysis by defense nuclear facilities safety board.--
(A) Independent analysis.--
(i) In general.--Not less than 12 months before the date on
which a nuclear test described in subsection (a) is proposed
to be conducted, the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an independent analysis, conducted
by the Board in accordance with the mission of the Board
under section 312 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2286a), of the safety and public health impacts of conducting
the test at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site or another
location, including with respect to the health and safety of
the employees and contractors.
(ii) Recommendations.--The independent analysis required by
clause (i) shall include recommendations on specific measures
that should be adopted to ensure that public health and
safety are adequately protected.
(iii) Authority of defense nuclear facilities safety
board.--For purposes of this subparagraph, the Nevada Nuclear
Security Site, or any other location selected to conduct a
nuclear test, shall be treated as a Department of Energy
defense nuclear facility (as defined in section 318 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286g)) under the
regulatory authority of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.
(B) Public hearing.--
(i) In general.--Not later than 120 days after Congress
receives all of the documents required by paragraphs (1)
through (4), the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and
the National Nuclear Security Administration shall convene
joint public hearings for localities in proximity of the test
site with respect to such certifications and reports.
(ii) Authority.--The meetings required by clause (i) shall
be conducted, in the case of the Board, under the authority
provided by section 313 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2286b).
(5) National intelligence estimate.--
(A) In general.--Not less than 12 months before the date on
which a nuclear test described in subsection (a) is proposed
to be conducted, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a National
Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear testing capabilities and
intentions of other countries with nuclear weapons,
consisting of--
(i) an unclassified executive summary and judgments; and
(ii) a more detailed, classified report.
(B) Elements.--The National Intelligence Estimate required
by subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) A description of the respective nuclear testing
capacities of other countries with nuclear weapons, including
test readiness.
(ii) An assessment of whether the resumption of nuclear
testing by the United States would prompt any of such
countries to conduct nuclear tests.
(iii) An assessment of the technical and nuclear weapons
design enhancements that such countries would gain by
conducting nuclear tests.
(iv) An assessment of whether the resumption of nuclear
testing by the United States would prompt any country seeking
to develop a nuclear weapon to conduct an explosive nuclear
test.
(v) An assessment of how the resumption of nuclear testing
by the United States would affect efforts to constrain the
nuclear arsenals of adversaries of the United States.
(vi) A description of the nuclear detonation detection
benefits provided by the International Monitoring System and
International Data Center of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization.
(vii) An assessment of what specific capabilities the
United States Government would have to develop and deploy to
ensure that no loss of collection capability would occur in
the event the United States lost access to data of the
International Monitoring System.
(6) Report on foreign policy implications by department of
state.--Not less than 12 months before the date on which a
nuclear test described in subsection (a) is proposed to be
conducted, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the likely
foreign policy implications and potential impacts to United
States diplomatic relations of conducting the test that
includes the following:
(A) A determination with respect to whether the test is
consistent with the international legal obligations of the
United States.
(B) An assessment of the likely reactions of other
countries with nuclear weapons, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and NATO member countries, and allies of
the United States.
(C) A description of the expected impacts relating to--
(i) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST
483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty''); and
(ii) key nonproliferation and arms control objectives of
the United States.
(D) A description of the anticipated impact on the
international political and financial support for the
Preparatory Commission and the International Monitoring
System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization.
(7) Certification that test is in national security
interests of united states.--Not less than 12 months before
the date on which a nuclear test described in subsection (a)
is proposed to be conducted, the President, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy
(with the concurrence of the Administrator for Nuclear
Security), shall each submit to Congress a certification that
conducting the test is in the national security interest of
the United States.
(8) Certification related to safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.--Not less than
12 months before the date on which a nuclear test described
in subsection (a) is proposed to be conducted, the directors
of the national security laboratories and the Commander of
the United States Strategic Command shall each submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a certification that the
test is required to certify the safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United
States.
(9) Briefings on certifications.--Not later than 90 days
after submitting a document required under any of paragraphs
(1) through (8), the official responsible for submitting that
document shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees on the document.
(10) Enactment of joint resolution of approval.--Not later
than 120 days after Congress receives all of the documents
required under paragraphs (1) through (8), there is enacted
into law a joint resolution that approves the conduct by the
United States of a nuclear test described under subsection
(a).
(c) Form of Reports and Certifications.--Each report and
certification required by this section shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit activities under the Stockpile Stewardship

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Program or any activities authorized under section 4203 of
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) that are
consistent with the zero-yield standard.

SEC. __04. REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION AND
APPROPRIATION.

(a) In General.--Any funds needed to conduct or make
preparations for a nuclear test that produces a yield must be
specifically authorized by an Act of Congress and
appropriated for that purpose.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit activities under the Stockpile Stewardship
Program or any activities authorized under section 4203 of
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) that are
consistent with the zero-yield standard.

SEC. __05. REPORT ON ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY NUCLEAR TEST.

(a) In General.--If a nuclear test that produces a yield is
conducted by a foreign country after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the concurrence of the Secretary of Energy and the
Secretary of the Air Force, shall, as soon as practicable
after the date of the test, submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the test that includes
the following:
(1) A description of the date, geographic location, and
yield of the test.
(2) A description of the data collected from the
International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization related to the test.
(3) An assessment of the technical and nuclear weapons
design data generated by the test.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.

SEC. __06. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO DISABLE,
DECOMMISSION, OR DISMANTLE INTERNATIONAL
MONITORING SYSTEM STATIONS.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available by this Act for fiscal year 2021, or
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by
any other Act for fiscal year 2021 or any fiscal year
thereafter, for the Department of Defense may be obligated or
expended to disable, decommission, dismantle, or undertake
any activity that would in any way impede the transmission of
monitoring data from facilities of the International
Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization located on United States territory.
______