S.Amdt. 560

SA 560. Mr. RUBIO (for himself and Mr. Cornyn) submitted an amendment
intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1790, to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H--Western Hemisphere Security Initiative

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``2020 Western Hemisphere
Security Initiative Act''.

SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The stability and security of the Western Hemisphere
directly impacts the security of the United States. The
nations of the hemisphere are connected in every domain. Our
partnerships are vital to security and prosperity in this
hemisphere, and to our ability to meet complex global
challenges. The security and prosperity of future generations
depend on our trust and cooperation.
(2) The Western Hemisphere is home to more than
1,000,000,000 people and largely unified by respect for
democracy and human rights that is shared by nearly all
nations in the hemisphere.
(3) The United States is in competition with China and
other aspiring global powers in the Western Hemisphere. China
has accelerated expansion of its One Belt One Road Initiative
at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in
Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports regional
information outlets that spread its false narrative of world
events and United States intentions. Iran has exported its
state support for terrorism to the hemisphere. China and
Russia also support autocratic regimes in Venezuela, Cuba,
and Nicaragua, who are counter to democracy and United States
interests.
(4) The Western Hemisphere continues to experience high
levels of corruption, violence, trafficking in drugs and
other illicit commodities, and illegal migration resulting
from weak institutions and instability. Seventeen of the top
20 most violent countries in the world are in Central
America, the Caribbean, and South America.
(5) The United States National Security Strategy, which was
released in December 2017, states the following:
(A) ``Stable, friendly, and prosperous states in the
Western Hemisphere enhance our security and benefit our
economy. Democratic states connected by shared values and
economic interests will reduce the violence, drug trafficking
and illegal immigration that threaten our common security,
and will limit opportunities for adversaries to operate from
areas of close proximity to us.''
(B) ``The United States also has important and deepening
relationships with key countries in the region. Together we
will build a stable and peaceful hemisphere that increases
economic opportunities for all, improves governance, reduces
the power of criminal organizations, and limits the malign
influence of non-hemispheric forces.''
(C) ``U.S. agencies and foreign partners will target
transnational criminal organization leaders and their support
infrastructure. We will assist countries, particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, to break the power of these organizations
and networks.''
(6) The ``Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America'' which was released in January
2018, states, ``The U.S. derives immense benefit from a
stable, peaceful hemisphere that reduces security threats to
the homeland. Supporting the U.S. interagency lead, the
Department will deepen its relations with regional countries
that contribute military capabilities to shared regional and
global security challenges.''
(7) The United States homeland is physically and
geographically connected with Latin America and the Caribbean
across all domains--sea, air, land, space, and cyber. Any
challenges in the region affect the United States and can
quickly become threats to our national security.
(8) The drugs that pour into the United States, killing
thousands of Americans every year, largely enter from Latin
America and the Caribbean. Drug overdoses killed more than
70,000 United States citizens in 2017, and treating drug
abuse cost United States taxpayers over $30,000,000,000 in
2015. In order to stop this epidemic, the United States
Government must address domestic consumption and assist our
partner nations in the region in reducing local cultivation
and manufacturing of narcotics while controlling their own
borders. And while interdictions of drug shipments are at an
all-time high, it's still

[[Page S3577]]

only a small percentage of the known flow. Additional United
States and partner assets, operational funding, coordination,
and capacity building, along with intelligence and data
exploitation, can all contribute to reducing this flow.
(9) In addition, we must assist in strengthening our
partners' institutions in order to reduce corruption and
extend governance. By reducing the flow of drugs through
Central America--the primary transit zone--we will also
mitigate the drivers for extreme violence and corruption left
in the wake of the illegal drug trade. The vicious side
effects of illicit trade also cost American taxpayers
billions of dollars every year.
(10) Directly tied to the instability and insecurity
associated with the flow of drugs through Central America is
the movement of thousands of Central American migrants toward
the United States. Migrant flows between countries have also
increased, straining partner nations' capacity and straining
security and stability.
(11) Natural disasters and other humanitarian crises also
increase instability and exacerbate the causes of migration.
(12) As the United States Government has focused--
necessarily--on other parts of the world, the governments of
countries like the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China have increased their economic and political
focus in this hemisphere, deepening their own relationships
in an effort to supplant United States security presence and
assistance, including through the following activities:
(A) The Government of the People's Republic of China
pledged at least $150,000,000,000 in loans to countries in
the hemisphere with long-term consequences. Infrastructure
investments in the Panama Canal region could jeopardize
United States, allied, and partner access and transit through
the region. Chinese information technology investments in the
region place intellectual property, data, and government
security at risk, potentially curtailing our ability to share
information with our key security partners.
(B) The Government of the Russian Federation established a
Counter Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) Training Center
in Nicaragua, providing the Government with a regional
platform to recruit intelligence sources and conduct
collection activities. The Government of the Russian
Federation also conducted disinformation campaigns,
publishing hundreds of articles in 2018 that deliberately
distorted United States defense engagements. The Government
of the Russian Federation has deployed strategic bombers,
warships, intelligence collection ships, and underwater
research vessels that are capable of mapping and interfering
with undersea cables.
(13) The United States has a fundamental interest in
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Western Hemisphere.
(14) Intelligent and focused investments in the United
States Armed Forces and security assistance yield meaningful
results with partners able to secure their own countries and
stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States to address
threats to our mutual security interests.
(15) Given the lack of direct military threats in the
Western Hemisphere, the United States Government has taken
the relative stability and democratic progress of the region
for granted. Recent developments demonstrate that this is
dangerous:
(A) There are now four countries in the region whose ruling
parties do not share United States values and who actively
seek to undermine democratic stability. The Governments of
Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua enable Russian and
Chinese military deployments to the region, allowing those
two actors access to infrastructure and the potential ability
to impede United States, allied, and partner nation efforts
in the event of contingencies.
(B) Support from the Governments of the Russian Federation
and the People's Republic of China for autocratic Governments
in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia enables anti-
democratic sentiment and threatens United States security
interests in the region.
(16) The United States has many strong, established
partnerships to assist us in advancing shared objectives in
this hemisphere. The United States Government must renew
focus on our own hemisphere to stop these challenges and
threats as far away as possible before they reach our borders
and shores, and strengthen the security partnerships critical
to ensuring our hemisphere remains a beacon of peace and
stability.

SEC. 1293. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security, stability, and prosperity of the Western
Hemisphere region are vital to the national interests of the
United States;
(2) the United States should continue to engage in the
Western Hemisphere by strengthening alliances and
partnerships, working with regional institutions, addressing
the shared challenges of illicit trafficking of humans,
drugs, and other contraband, transnational criminal
organizations, and supporting the rule of law and democracy
in the region;
(3) the United States should maintain a military presence
and capability in the Western Hemisphere region that can
project power, build partner capacity, provide humanitarian
assistance and large scale disaster relief, deter acts of
aggression, and respond, if necessary, to regional threats or
to threats to the national security of the United States from
China, Russia, Iran, transnational criminal organizations,
violent extremists, or autocratic regimes;
(4) continuing efforts by the Department of Defense to
commit additional assets and increase investments to the
Western Hemisphere are necessary to maintain a robust United
States commitment to the region;
(5) the Secretary of Defense should--
(A) assess the current United States force posture in the
Western Hemisphere to ensure that the United States maintains
an appropriate and consistent presence in the region,
including by--
(i) prioritizing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets;
(ii) increasing aerial and maritime domain awareness by
exploring commercially available options in addition to
traditional means;
(iii) increasing deployment of surface and air assets and
making available operating funds to cultivate multi-national
participation in security activities, including multinational
military exercises and training; and
(iv) providing a continuous United States Navy presence
with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as
drug interdiction-capable platforms;
(B) exploit innovative solutions, including data analytics
and use of emerging technologies such as machine learning, to
illuminate and target corruption and illicit networks;
(C) compete in the information domain, including by--
(i) exploiting publicly available information; and
(ii) sharing signals and insights into state and non-state
destabilizing activities;
(D) develop strategic options to expand the competitive
space in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(E) streamline security cooperation processes;
(F) enhance regional force readiness through joint training
and exercises; and
(G) continue to build interoperability to address threats
in space and cyberspace;
(6) the Secretary of State should--
(A) increase the designation of International Military and
Education Training (IMET) funding for use by countries in the
Western Hemisphere because education and training activities
are force multipliers, providing partners with mutual
understanding, shared values, interoperability of forces, and
deepen relationships lasting generations; and
(B) increase Foreign Military Financing within the United
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility
to adequately match requirements; and
(7) Congress should provide additional funds for use by
USSOUTHCOM in contracting solutions to mitigate gaps in
capabilities.

SEC. 1294. WESTERN HEMISPHERE SECURITY INITIATIVE.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$1,000,000,000 for the Department of Defense for fiscal year
2020 to carry out the Western Hemisphere Security Initiative.
(2) Amounts in addition.--These funds may be used under
this authority notwithstanding any other funding authorities
for humanitarian assistance, security assistance, or combined
exercise expenses.
(3) Limitation.--Funds appropriated pursuant to the
authority under this subsection may not be obligated to
provide assistance to any foreign country that is otherwise
prohibited from receiving such type of assistance under any
other provision of law.
(b) Authorized Purposes.--The Secretary of Defense may use
amounts made available pursuant to subsection (a) for the
following purposes:
(1) Activities to increase continuous United States
presence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
(2) Activities to build the defense and security capacity
of allies and partner nations in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
(3) Activities to illuminate threats, including malign
influence of state actors, transnational organized crime with
a nexus to drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapons
proliferation, at scale.
(4) Efforts to disrupt and degrade transregional and
transnational illicit trade with an emphasis on drugs.
(5) Activities to provide transparency and support strong
and accountable institutions.
(6) Bilateral and multinational military exercises and
training with allies and partner nations in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
(7) Foreign military financing (FMF) and international
military education and training (IMET) programs.
(8) The provision of assistance to national military or
other security forces of such countries that have among their
functional responsibilities national or regional security
missions.
(9) The provision of training to ministry, agency, and
headquarters level organizations for such forces.
(10) Payment of other expenses that the Commander of the
United States Southern Command considers necessary for Latin
American cooperation.
(11) Humanitarian Assistance to support partner by
promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive
institutions through activities such as providing logistical
support, such as the transportation of humanitarian supplies
or personnel, making available, preparing, and

[[Page S3578]]

transporting nonlethal excess property (EP) to foreign
countries, transferring on-hand Department of Defense stocks
to respond to unforeseen emergencies, conducting Department
of Defense humanitarian demining assistance activities, and
in some circumstances, conducting medical support and base
operating services to the extent required by the operation.
(c) Types of Assistance and Training.--
(1) Authorized elements of assistance.--Assistance provided
under subsection (b)(8) may include the provision of
equipment, supplies, training, transportation and the
establishment, including small-scale military construction,
and operations of bases of operation or training facilities
for the purpose of facilitating counterdrug activities or
activities to counter transnational organized crime.
(2) Required elements of assistance and training.--
Assistance and training provided under subsection (b) shall
include elements that promote the following principles:
(A) Observance of and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
(B) Respect for legitimate civilian authority within the
country to which the assistance is provided.
(d) Priorities for Assistance and Training.--In developing
programs for assistance or training to be provided under
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall accord a
priority to assistance, training, or both that will enhance
the security capabilities of the recipient foreign country,
or a regional organization of which the recipient country is
a member, to respond to emerging threats to regional
security.
(e) Incremental Expenses of Personnel of Certain Other
Countries for Training.--If the Secretary of Defense
determines that the payment of incremental expenses in
connection with training described in subsection (b) will
facilitate the participation in such training of organization
personnel of friendly foreign countries within South and
Central America and the Caribbean, the Secretary may use
amounts available under subsection (f) for assistance and
training under subsection (b) for the payment of such
incremental expenses.
(f) Use of Security Cooperation Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of funds authorized to be appropriated for
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for security
cooperation activities, $250,000,000 is authorized for the
sole purpose of security cooperation activities under the
United States Southern Command to build the capacity of
partner nations in the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Use of funds.--Funds made available under paragraph (1)
may be used in accordance with subsection (b) notwithstanding
any other funding authorities for security assistance,
counter-drug activities, counter-transnational organized
crime activities, humanitarian assistance, or combined
exercise expenses. The funds may not be obligated to provide
assistance to any foreign country that is otherwise
prohibited from receiving such type of assistance under any
other provision of law.
(g) Applicability of Restrictions on Direct Participation
by Military Personnel.--Any support to counter-drug or
counter-transnational organized crime activities under
subsection (b) shall be subject to the provisions of section
275 of title 10, United States Code.
(h) IMET Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$18,000,000 for the Department of Defense for fiscal year
2020 for International Military Education and Training
activities under the Western Hemisphere Security Initiative.
(i) Humanitarian Assistance.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $20,000,000 for the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 2020 for the United States Southern Command to
execute Theater Security Cooperation activities such as
humanitarian assistance, and the payment of incremental and
personnel costs of training and exercising with foreign
military and security forces.
(j) Transfer Requirements Related to Certain Funds.--
(1) Use of funds only pursuant to transfer.--In the case of
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Western
Hemisphere Security Initiative Fund, the funds may be used
for the purposes specified in subsection (b) only pursuant to
a transfer of the funds to either or both of the following
accounts of the Department of Defense:
(A) Military personnel accounts.
(B) Operation and maintenance accounts.
(2) Effect on authorization amounts.--During fiscal years
2020 and 2021, the transfer of an amount made available for
the Western Hemisphere Security Initiative to an account
under the authority provided by this section shall be deemed
to increase the amount authorized for such account by an
amount equal to the amount transferred.
(3) Construction with other transfer authority.--The
transfer authority provided by paragraph (1) and subsection
(b) is in addition to any other transfer authority available
to the Department of Defense.
(k) Notification Requirements.--Not later than 15 days
before that date on which a transfer of funds under this
section takes effect, the Secretary of Defense shall notify
the congressional defense committees in writing of the
planned transfer. Each notice of a transfer of funds shall
include the following:
(1) A detailed description of the project or activity to be
supported by the transfer of funds, including any request of
the Commander of the United States Southern Command for
support, urgent operational need, or emergent operational
need.
(2) The amount planned to be transferred and expended on
such project or activity.
(3) A timeline for expenditure of the transferred funds.
(l) Duration of Transfer Authority.--The transfer authority
provided by this section expires on September 30, 2020.
(m) Unfunded Requirements Authority.--Funds appropriated
for the Western Hemisphere Security Initiative that are not
transferred pursuant to subsection (i)(1) shall be utilized
to meet the requirements listed in the Unfunded Requirements
listed by the United States Southern Command for the fiscal
year 2020 budget.
(n) Coast Guard Support.--
(1) Reimbursement.--The Department of Defense is authorized
to reimburse up to $500,000,000 to the Coast Guard for Coast
Guard national security functions in support of the United
States Southern Command. These national security functions
include--
(A) maintaining and exercising readiness to operate with
the Department of Defense, including military training for
operational units and joint exercises with the Department of
Defense;
(B) performing the missions of maritime interception
operations in support of sanctions against another nation or
group of nations;
(C) performing the missions of maritime interception
operations in support of drug interdiction;
(D) environmental defense operations where the Coast Guard
responds to environmental disasters overseas that could
disrupt military actions; and
(E) security and defense in support of the United States
Southern Command.
(2) Use of funds.--The Coast Guard is authorized to utilize
such funding in order to procure additional vessels in order
to meet requirements of the United States Southern Command.
(o) Sense of Congress on Enhanced USSOUTHCOM Presence.--It
is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should
pursue whatever means necessary to increase the presence of
the Department of Defense within the United States Southern
Command's area of responsibility, including additional Navy
deployments of Small Surface Combatants and hospital ships,
P-8 Poseidon's, maintain Special Forces and Army presence,
and source year-round presence of a Special Purpose Marine
Air-Ground Task Force.
(p) Navy Strategy.--The Secretary of the Navy shall submit
to Congress a strategy on permanently assigning Navy vessels
to the 4th Fleet, including the potential use of ships
scheduled to be decommissioned.
(q) State Partnership Program.--It is the sense of Congress
that the National Guard Bureau should continue its State
Partnership Program in support of the United States Southern
Command and United States embassy security cooperation
objectives, along with the Department of Defense policy goals
within the United States Southern Command's area of
responsibility.
______