S.Amdt. 4171

SA 4171. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1548. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED
STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD
MODIFICATION PROGRAM.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the
projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States
nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017
dollars over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to
operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear
forces and about $400 billion to modernize them''. With
inflation, the cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not
include the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities
proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
(2) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles is possible for multiple
decades and, according to the Congressional Budget Office,
through 2036, this would cost $37,000,000,000 less in 2017
dollars than developing and deploying the ground-based
strategic deterrent program.
(3) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28,
2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American
Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in
the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile with the ground-based
strategic deterrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered
voters who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
(b) Limitation on Use of Funds.--None of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2022 may be obligated or expended for the ground-
based strategic deterrent program or the W87-1 warhead
modification program until the later of--
(1) the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to
the appropriate congressional committees a certification that
the operational life of Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles cannot be safely extended through at least
2050; and
(2) the date on which the Secretary transmits to the
appropriate congressional committees the report required by
paragraph (3) of subsection (c), as required by paragraph (4)
of that subsection.
(c) Independent Study on Extension of Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.--
(1) Independent study.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall seek to enter into a contract with the National Academy
of Sciences to conduct a study on extending the life of
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to 2050.
(2) Matters included.--The study under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
(i) extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles; and
(ii) deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent
program.
(B) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate
technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile program as part of a service life extension
program that could also be incorporated in the future ground-
based strategic deterrent program, including, at a minimum,
opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary
missile defenses.
(C) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating
sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies
to reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the
service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through
2050.
(D) An analysis and validation of the methods used to
estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and
Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch
experience of motors retired after the operational service
life of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
(E) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative
methods of estimating the operational service life of
Minuteman III motors, such as those methods based on
fundamental physical and chemical processes and
nondestructive measurements of individual motor properties.
(F) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of
configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic
missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
(G) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service
life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing
the deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery
vehicle force from 400 to 300.
(H) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class
ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will
enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile
submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine
warfare threats.
(I) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the
Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation
to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United
States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the
ground-based strategic deterrent.
(J) A best case estimate of what percentage of the
strategic forces of the United States would survive a
counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down
by intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
(K) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78
warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new ground-based
strategic deterrent missile as compared to proceeding with
the W-87 life extension.
(L) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional
launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles
with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced
deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
United States.
(M) An analysis of whether designing and fielding a new
intercontinental ballistic missile through at least 2070 is
consistent with the obligation of the United States under
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
(21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'') to ``pursue

[[Page S7639]]

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament''.
(3) Submission to department of defense.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
National Academy of Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a
report containing the findings of the study conducted under
paragraph (1).
(4) Submission to congress.--Not later than 210 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees the
report required by paragraph (3), without change.
(5) Form.--The report required by paragraph (3) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
______