S.Amdt. 4366

SA 4366. Mr. RUBIO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H--Countering Chinese Influence

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese
Government and Communist Party's Political Influence
Operations Act''.

SEC. 1292. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate;
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(J) the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of
Representatives;
(K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives;
(M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(N) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political
influence operations'' means the coordinated and often
concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation,
economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or
academic censorship, which are often intended--
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, values,
institutions, or individuals; and
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes
in the United States that support the interests of the
Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party.

SEC. 1293. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and
culture and the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Chinese Communist Party in official statements, media
messaging, and policy;
(2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally
accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications
campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic
institutions or freedoms;
(3) to protect United States citizens and legal residents
from malign or coercive political influence operations;
(4) to enhance cooperation and coordination with the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan,
Singapore, and the members of the European Union, whose
governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from
the political influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party,
and with other allies throughout the world;
(5) to create strategies to ensure that countries in
Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere
are aware of the People's Republic of China's ``sharp power''
tactics, including the Chinese Communist Party's party-to-
party training program, which is designed to instill
admiration and emulation of Beijing's governance model and
weaken democracy in these regions, and provide needed
capacity to counter them effectively;
(6) to implement more advanced transparency requirements
concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media
agencies, universities, think tanks, and government
officials;
(7) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
(A) the goals and methods of the political influence
operations of the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
(B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese
intelligence agencies or related actors;
(8) to require greater transparency for Confucius
Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and
nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party, or by individuals or public or private
organizations with a demonstrable affiliation with the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party that are operating in the United States to
register through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938
(22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mechanism;
(9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency
among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding
linked to the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(10) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently
screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
(11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the
goals of--
(A) screening investments from the Government of the
People's Republic of China or sources backed by such
government to protect against the takeover of United States
companies by Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities;
and
(B) protecting institutions or business sectors critically
important to United States national security and the
viability of democratic institutions.

SEC. 1294. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ``SHARP POWER'' POLITICAL
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PROTECT UNITED
STATES CITIZENS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in coordination with all relevant
Federal agencies, shall develop a long-term strategy--
(1) to carry out the policy set forth in section 1293(c);
(2) to effectively counter the ``sharp power'' political
influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party globally
and in the United States;
(3) to ensure that United States citizens, particularly
Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese, Uyghur,
Mongolian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Tibetan diaspora who are
often the victims and primary targets of malign political
influence operations, are protected;
(4) to ensure that--
(A) the United States Government strategy to protect the
communities described in paragraph (3) is clearly
communicated by relevant Federal officials; and
(B) secure outlets are created for reporting on
intimidation and surveillance;
(5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are legally
studying, living, or working temporarily in the United States
know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
Party is an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they
reside in the United States;
(6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation
and surveillance; and
(7) to identify new tools or authorities necessary to
implement this strategy.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State or an appropriate high-ranking official shall--
(1) submit an unclassified report, which may include a
classified annex, containing the strategy required under
subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees;
or
(2) describe the strategy required under subsection (a)
through unclassified testimony before the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1295. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY.

(a) In General.--Because it is important for United States
policymakers and the American people to be informed about the
influence operations described in section 1293, not later
than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, and
in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit an unclassified
report,

[[Page S7889]]

which may include a classified annex, to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party affecting
the United States and select allies and partners, including
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan,
and Japan, including efforts--
(1) to exert influence over United States governmental or
nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or government
officials among United States allies and partners;
(2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal
permanent residents or their families and associates living
in China or elsewhere;
(3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms
of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly,
religion, or academic thought;
(4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in
the United States and abroad; or
(5) to develop or obtain property, facilities,
infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in
facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1)
through (4).
(b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include recommendations for the President and Congress
relating to--
(1) the need for additional resources or authorities to
counter political influence operations in the United States
directed by the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Chinese Communist Party, including operations carried
out in concert with allies;
(2) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to
political influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
should be established within the Department of State or
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
and
(3) whether regular public reports on the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party are needed
to inform Congress and the American people of the scale and
scope of such operations.
______