S.Amdt. 4490Senate117th Congress (2021-2023)2nd degree
S.Amdt. 4490
Sponsored by
Sen. James E. Risch (R-ID)
Submitted November 4, 2021
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Senate amendment submitted
November 4, 2021
Text
Submitted
SA 4490. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following: SEC. 1253. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND. (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized to be appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence. (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of-- (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.-- (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a). (2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for-- (A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this division; (B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based on a determination that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate; (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and [[Page S7988]] (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that align with subsection (d) of this section. (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to-- (A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and (B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Chinese Communist Party. (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist and consult with the senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1). (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that-- (1) undermine a free and open international order; (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency; (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or (4) undermine the economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption. (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section, countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include efforts to-- (1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party; (2) support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initiatives; (3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party; (4) encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure; (5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the People's Republic of China; (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models. ______