S.Amdt. 4639Senate117th Congress (2021-2023)2nd degree

S.Amdt. 4639

Submitted November 15, 2021

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Senate amendment submitted

November 15, 2021

Text

Submitted

SA 4639. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H--Ukraine Security Partnership Act of 2021

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security
Partnership Act of 2021''.

SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has experienced several
long periods of occupation.
(2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally ruled by
the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural
collectivization caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-
made famine that resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000
Ukrainians by starvation.
(3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine accompanying
World War II--
(A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian civilians and
3,000,000 soldiers were killed; and
(B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were massacred.
(4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow in 1991,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
(5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian
Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged
to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the
existing borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's
surrender of its nuclear arsenal.
(6) From November 2004 through January 2005, thousands of
Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully protest
electoral fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling elite
in the 2004 Presidential election, successfully triggering a
re-vote, in what became known as the Orange Revolution.
(7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, or
Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor
Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians
peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer
relationship with the European Union and his continued
systemic corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were
killed by violent government suppression.
(8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western
orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government
of the Russian Federation, in violation of international law
and in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest
Memorandum--
(A) sent undisclosed military personnel into Ukraine's
Autonomous Republic of Crimea in February 2014 and has
illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula for the past seven
years;
(B) sent covert, unmarked military personnel into the
Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in April 2014,
instigating and supporting a still-ongoing conflict that has
cost nearly 14,000 lives; and
(C) provided the Buk missile system used by those Russia-
led forces to shoot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over
eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing all 298 passengers and
crew on board.
(9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities have
kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars,
opposition figures, activists, and other minority
populations, and have persecuted religious minorities by
pressing false charges of terrorism and deregistering
religious centers.
(10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the fighting
that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern Ukraine,
France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
led forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk Protocol.
(11) In February 2015, after the failure of the initial
Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the Minsk
II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in
eastern Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Germany.
(12) Despite these agreements, the Government of the
Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian sovereignty
through--
(A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian natural
gas, including cutting off access in 2014, which deprived
Ukraine of its energy supply and transit fees;
(B) espionage and clandestine assassinations on Ukrainian
territory;

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(C) continuous cyber warfare against the Government of
Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as the NotPetya hack
in 2017; and
(D) seizure of Ukrainian property and citizens, including
the November 2018 seizure in the Kerch Strait of three
Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 Ukrainian officers on board
those vessels.
(13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 2020
on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation that
``Crimea is Ukraine''.
(14) On February 26, 2021 President Joseph R. Biden
confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States does
not and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation of
the peninsula.
(15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian soldiers
have died fighting for their country against the Russian
Federation and Russia-led forces, while no less than 3,361
civilians have perished as a result of that fighting.
(16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and neighborhood,
in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse of the
Soviet Union to become a developing democracy, steadily
working to overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression,
oligarchic control, and corruption.
(17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform,
Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73
percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the
People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian
parliament.
(18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were
``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally
respected''.
(19) In March and April 2021, the Russian Federation
amassed over 75,000 troops on its border with the Eastern
Ukraine and in the occupied territory of Crimea.
(20) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has made
difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address
corruption and more closely align with the West, such as
slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing
immunity from prosecution for Members of Parliament,
reforming its gas, pension, and procurement systems, and
working to adapt its military to the standards of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
(21) Despite progress in reforming many areas of Ukrainian
governance, serious issues still remain, particularly in the
areas of corruption and rule of law.
(22) The United States Government has consistently
supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight
against Russia-led forces by assisting its governance reform
efforts, maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against
the Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and
providing the Ukrainian military with training and equipment,
including lethal defensive weaponry.
(23) In addition to the United States, the European Union,
European countries, and Canada have provided substantial
diplomatic, monetary, and military support for Ukraine's
democratic transition and its fight against Russia-led forces
in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and maintained
robust sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation for
its illegal occupation of Crimea and its active
destabilization of Ukraine.
(24) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly supported
the United States and European allies by deploying troops to
Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), allowing
United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian soil,
and trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and services
with the United States.
(25) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine in its
Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of
Ukraine's contributions to NATO missions and efforts to
reform its military in line with NATO standards.
(26) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion of
Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its
support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation,
including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
(Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established
under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(Public Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the
United States Congress continues to demonstrate strong
support for assisting Ukraine in defending itself and
deterring Russia.

SEC. 1293. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign
influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust
United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States
national security and demonstrates the commitment of the
United States to upholding a free and open international
order;
(2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Government
and people of Ukraine have made significant strides towards
improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures,
and economic reforms;
(3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly connected to
its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong democratic
institutions that are able to defend against internal and
external corrupt actors;
(4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian citizens to
determine their own fate after centuries of oppression,
through democratic representation and governance reforms, is
evidence of that country's dedication to a free, independent,
and democratic future;
(5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable security
partner of the United States, not simply a recipient of
assistance;
(6) it is in the national security interests of the United
States to continue and deepen its security partnership with
Ukraine, including through the provision of both lethal and
non-lethal assistance;
(7) the United States should continue to place policy-based
conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and military
assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in
incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;
(8) the United States should use its voice and vote at NATO
to encourage the adoption of a policy by the Alliance that
all of its member states will refuse to recognize the illegal
attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation;
(9) the United States should support at the highest level
and take an active part in the Ukrainian ``Crimean Platform''
initiative to ensure that the international community's
attention remains focused on--
(A) the unacceptable violation of Ukraine's territorial
integrity in Crimea; and
(B) working towards the reversal of such violation;
(10) the United States should continue to bolster the
capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the
goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';
(11) the military-focused technical, training, maintenance,
and logistical assistance provided by the United States to
Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware provided to
the country;
(12) all security assistance provided to Ukraine should
continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements under
section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of title
10, United States Code, including assistance provided to
units in the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units
falling under the authority of the Ministry of Defense;
(13) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States
Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed in order to
administer the security assistance being provided to the
country;
(14) the United States should continue to support Ukraine's
NATO aspirations, including through work towards a Membership
Action Plan;
(15) the enduring partnership between the United States and
Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a sovereign,
democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, monetary,
and military assistance, remains strong and must continue to
be reaffirmed; and
(16) the United States should continue to strongly support
Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community of
democracies.

SEC. 1294. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to refuse to recognize the attempted annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that was taken in
contravention of international law;
(2) to utilize existing sanctions and other authorities to
deter malign actions by the Russian Federation in or intended
to harm Ukraine, including the mandates and authorities
codified by--
(A) the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.); and
(B) the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019
(title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note);
(3) to work with our European allies to coordinate
strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine;
(4) to work with our allies and partners to conduct more
frequent multinational freedom of navigation operations in
the Black Sea in order to demonstrate support for Ukraine's
internationally-recognized maritime boundaries, to safeguard
the unimpeded traffic of lawful commerce, and to push back
against excessive Russian Federation claims of sovereignty;
(5) to work with our allies and partners to demonstrate
support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including its
internationally-recognized land borders; and
(6) to support democratic, economic, and anti-corruption
reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration into Euro-
Atlantic institutions.

SEC. 1295. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR
UKRAINE.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
with a strategy on how the United States will work to
diplomatically support Ukraine during fiscal years 2022
through 2026.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:
(1) A description of how relevant departments and agencies
of the United States Government will work together to
collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to
deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions,
cyber attacks,

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the coercive use of energy resources, the disruption of
lawful commerce and traffic to Ukrainian ports, use of
passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian
political and economic systems.
(2) A description of the United States' current efforts and
strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives when
they align with United States interests.
(3) A strategy on how the United States will use its voice
and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe,
NATO, and other relevant international bodies to support
Ukraine and its reform efforts.
(4) A strategy on how the United States will assist Ukraine
in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy, and maritime
relationships with key Black Sea countries, including
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.
(5) A strategy on how the United States will engage with
Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the Normandy
Format and Minsk Agreements.
(6) An assessment of Ukraine's recent progress on anti-
corruption reforms and a strategy on how the United States
will work with allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure
meaningful progress on democratic, economic, and anti-
corruption reforms.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.

SEC. 1296. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON UKRAINE.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to
establish a United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.
(b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working Group
on Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the
European Union, its institutions, and relevant European
governments, as appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate
and coordinate economic and policy reform assistance and
support for Ukraine.
(c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this
section shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal
year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 1297. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.

(a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and
with the consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine,
who should report to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and Eurasia.
(b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the
rank and status of ambassador.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine
should--
(1) serve as the United States liaison to the Normandy
Format, tasked with leading the peace process between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation;
(2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue with
countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are
faced with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of
the Sea;
(3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission in
Ukraine;
(4) coordinate with the United States-Europe Working Group
on Ukraine established pursuant to section 1296;
(5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine; and
(6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations and
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives regular updates and briefings on the
status of peace negotiations.
(d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position
authorized under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 1298. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of State for each of
fiscal years 2022 through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance to Ukraine to assist the
country in meeting its defense needs.
(b) Availability of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a),
not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the
Secretary of State makes the certification described in
paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed
explanation justifying the certification with respect to each
of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of
such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex.
(2) Certification.--The certification described in this
paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the
Government of Ukraine has taken actions to--
(A) make defense institutional reforms, in accordance with
NATO standards;
(B) further strengthen civilian control of the military;
(C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
(D) increase transparency and accountability in defense
procurement;
(E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise oversight of
the Ministry of Defense and military forces;
(F) promote respect for the observation of human rights as
enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) within the security
forces of Ukraine; and
(G) support the work of Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies,
including the High Anti-Corruption Court, National Anti-
Corruption Bureau, and the Special Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor's Office.
(c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before
providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a),
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a notification containing the
following:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery of such
assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
assistance provided under this section should--
(1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the Ukrainian
Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of the
Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and
maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black
Sea; and
(2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any
equipment provided.
(e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary
of State is authorized to provide lethal assistance under
this section, including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars,
crew-served weapons and ammunition, grenade launchers and
ammunition, anti-tank weapons systems, anti-ship weapons
systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and small arms and
ammunition.

SEC. 1299. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER
PROGRAM.

During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of
excess defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same
priority as that given other countries and regions under
section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

SEC. 1299A. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM ALLIES.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a classified
strategy on how the United States will encourage third
countries to donate excess defense equipment to Ukraine.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:
(1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations that have
excess defense material that may be compatible with the needs
and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
(2) A description of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by
the United States Government to encourage allied nations to
donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on an
expedited basis.

SEC. 1299B. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for International
Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance for
Ukraine. The assistance shall be made available for the
following purposes:
(1) Training of future leaders.
(2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
(3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed
Forces and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the
future.
(4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for
joint operations.
(5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian
control of the military, and human rights.
(b) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before
providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a),
the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a
notification containing the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery of such
assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.

SEC. 1299C. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United
States IMET program, encourage eligible officers and civilian
leaders to participate in the training, and promote
successful graduates to positions of prominence in the
Ukrainian Armed Forces.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy
for the implementation of the IMET program in Ukraine
authorized under section 1299B.

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(c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:
(1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United
States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel
program graduates to positions of prominence in support of
the Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO
standards.
(2) An assessment of the education and training
requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear
recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of
education or training.
(3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the
Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of
alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and
other flexible solutions to reach such students.
(4) An identification of opportunities to influence the
next generation of leaders through attendance at United
States staff and war colleges, junior leader development
programs, and technical schools.
(d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.

SEC. 1299D. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should
provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of
defense articles, defense services, and design and
construction services pursuant to the authority of section 23
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support
the further development of Ukraine's military forces; and
(2) such loans should be considered an additive security
assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military
Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative programming.

SEC. 1299E. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITORS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should work with the Government of Ukraine
to ensure strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's
aerospace and defense sector are not subject to foreign
ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic
competitors to the United States, such as the People's
Republic of China (PRC). These efforts will require support
from across the Executive Branch and should leverage all
available tools and authorities.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and in
consultation with the heads of other relevant Departments and
agencies as the President may determine, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to support
Ukraine in protecting its aerospace and defense industry from
predatory investments.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) An assessment of the efforts by strategic competitors,
such as the PRC, to acquire strategic assets and companies in
Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector and the national
security implications for Ukraine, the United States, and
other NATO allies and partners.
(B) An assessment of the vulnerabilities that strategic
competitors of the United States exploit to acquire strategic
assets in the Ukrainian aerospace and defense sector,
Ukraine's progress in addressing them, and United States
initiatives to support these efforts such as assistance in
strengthening Ukraine's investment screening and national
security vetting laws.
(C) An assessment of Ukraine's efforts to make reforms
necessary to incentivize Western investment in Ukraine's
aerospace and defense sector and United States support for
these efforts.
(D) A strategy to--
(i) promote, as appropriate, United States direct
investment in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector;
(ii) better leverage tools like debt financing, equity
investments, and political risk insurance to incentivize
greater participation by United States firms;
(iii) provide an alternative to PRC investments; and
(iv) engage like-minded allies and partners on these
efforts.
(3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in classified form.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.

SEC. 1299F. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of State $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal
years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes described in
subsection (b) with respect to Ukraine.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (a) may only be used--
(1) to strengthen Ukraine's cyber security, cyber
resilience and intellectual property enforcement;
(2) to provide support and training in Ukraine for--
(A) sectoral reforms related to banking and public finance
management reform;
(B) the privatization of state-owned enterprises;
(C) regulatory independence;
(D) subsidy reform;
(E) land reform;
(F) corporate governance; and
(G) foreign investment screening;
(3) to combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and
otherwise strengthen independent legal institutions,
including by--
(A) expanding regional anti-corruption training and
exchanges among Ukrainian Ministry officials, law enforcement
officers, judges, and prosecutors to build peer support,
share best practices, maintain reform momentum, and protect
reforms from capture;
(B) supporting regional training of United States Embassy
personal responsible for supporting anti-corruption and the
rule of law to improve their effectiveness in supporting the
consolidation and expansion of reform;
(4) to respond to the humanitarian crises caused or
aggravated by the invasion and occupation of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation, including by supporting internally
displaced persons and communities in conflict-affected areas;
(5) to improve participatory legislative processes in
Ukraine, including through--
(A) engagement with members of the Verkhovna Rada;
(B) training on government oversight, legal education,
political transparency and competition, and compliance with
international obligations; and
(C) supporting the development of professional legislative
staff to advise and assist member of the Verkhovna Rada and
committees in the execution of their duties and build legal
and policy expertise within the Verkhovna Rada; and
(6) to further build the capacity of civil society,
independent media, human rights, and other nongovernmental
organizations in Ukraine, with an emphasis on--
(A) building capacity outside of Kyiv; and
(B) regional civil society training and exchange programs.

SEC. 1299G. DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NORD STREAM 2 AG AND
ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION VESSELS MEET CRITERIA
FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS UNDER PROTECTING
EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY ACT OF 2019.

(a) In General.--Not later than 15 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress a report that includes the following:
(1) The determination of the President with respect to
whether Nord Stream 2 AG meets the criteria for the
imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act of 2019.
(2) The determination of the President with respect to
whether the following vessels and entities meet the criteria
for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act of 2019:
(A) Akademik Cherskiy.
(B) Umka.
(C) Errie.
(D) Yuri Topchev.
(E) Mentor.
(F) DP Gezina.
(G) Krebs GEO.
(H) Vladislav Strizhov.
(I) Glomar Wave.
(J) Finval.
(K) Katun.
(L) Venie.
(M) Murman.
(N) Baltiyskiy Issledovatel.
(O) Artemis Offshore.
(P) Havila Subsea.
(Q) Russian Maritime Register of Shipping.
(R) LLC Insurance Company Constanta.
(S) TUV Austria Holding AG.
(3) A detailed explanation for each determination made
under paragraph (1) or (2), including with respect to any
determination that the criteria for the imposition of
sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
of 2019 were not met with respect to a vessel or entity.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019'' means the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public
Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note), as amended by section 1242
of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).

SEC. 1299H. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
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