[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1875 Introduced in House (IH)]
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1875
To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 30, 2003
Mr. Lantos (for himself, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Berman, Mr. Bereuter, and Mr.
Ackerman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on International Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Missile Threat Reduction Act of
2003''.
TITLE I--STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION LAW
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles suitable for
launching nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads is
accelerating across the globe.
(2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, more than 25 countries possess missiles with ranges in
excess of 300 kilometers and capable of delivering a nuclear
warhead.
(3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing such missiles,
and engaging in the sale and transfer of such missiles and
their production technology to other countries, are directly
hostile to the United States, its interests, and its allies.
(B) Of particular concern in this regard is North Korea,
which regularly sells ballistic missiles and technology to
countries in regions of instability and concern to the United
States.
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated in its most
recent report on the foreign ballistic missile threat the
following:
``Emerging ballistic missile states continue to
increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the
missile systems in their inventories--posing ever
greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies
throughout the world. A decade ago, U.S. and allied
forces abroad faced threats from SRBM's [Short Range
Ballistic Missiles]--primarily the Scud and its
variants. Today, countries have deployed or are on the
verge of deploying MRBM's [Medium Range Ballistic
Missiles], placing greater numbers of targets at risk.
``Proliferation of ballistic missile-related
technologies, materials, and expertise--especially by
Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities--has
enabled emerging missile states to accelerate the
development timelines for their existing programs,
acquire turnkey systems to gain previously non-existent
capabilities--in the case of the Chinese sale of the M-
11 SRBM to Pakistan--and lay the groundwork for the
expansion of domestic infrastructures to potentially
accommodate even more capable and longer range future
systems.''.
(5) The same CIA report also noted the following: ``North
Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing
technology source for many programs. North Korean willingness
to sell complete systems and components has enabled other
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than
otherwise would have been possible--notably the sale of the No
Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to
acquire technologies to serve as the basis for domestic
development efforts--as with Iran's reverse-engineering of the
No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding
its efforts to sell missile technology.''.
(6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to abide by a
voluntary set of guidelines known as the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), whereby adherents agreed to refrain from
the transfer to nonadherents of certain categories of whole
missiles, their constituent parts, and the facilities to
manufacture them, especially ``Category I'' missiles, which at
a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload capacity of 500
kilograms or more are especially suited for delivering nuclear
weapons.
(7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to observe a
nonbinding code of conduct derived from, but less restrictive
than, the nonbinding MTCR. While this is a welcome achievement,
it does not provide a legal obligation on its adherents to
refrain from the trade in missiles or missile technology.
(8) On December 10, 2002, the White House released its
``National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction'',
wherein it is stated that strengthening international
nonproliferation controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and upon the missiles that can deliver them is the second of
three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The National
Strategy also states that ``effective interdiction is a
critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their
delivery means''.
(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States took control of
an unflagged freighter that was attempting clandestinely to
ship, from North Korea to Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that
would be generally prohibited from transfer as Category I
missiles.
(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an adherent to the
MTCR guidelines, which in any case are not legally binding, and
there is no binding international legal instrument that would
prohibit shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph
(9).
(11) At Yemen's request, the United States released the
shipment of North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen.
(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White House press
spokesman stated that existing international law regarding
halting the spread of missile proliferation could be
strengthened. The new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction also commits the United States to support
those regimes that are currently in force, and to work to
improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those
regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a regime that the United
States will seek to strengthen.
(13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying on
February 12, 2003, before the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate, stated the following: ``. . . [I]t's pretty clear
that the proliferation regimes that exist in the world worked
pretty well before, [but] they're not working very well right
now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up and says this is a
dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact
get cooperation to stop those weapons, we're going to be facing
a very serious situation in the next five years.''.
(14) The MTCR has made an invaluable contribution to
restraint in the international trade of offensive ballistic
missiles. Strengthening international controls on ballistic
missiles, however, will require a dramatic expansion of
adherents that rigorously abide by the MTCR's guidelines, and a
binding legal basis for the United Nations and countries
devoted to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary act
to prevent, further proliferation of offensive ballistic
missiles around the world.
(15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the United
States to promote the creation of new international mechanisms
that would, in all future circumstances, allow the peace-loving
and law-abiding nations of the world the authority to interdict
and prevent the transfer of such missiles.
SEC. 102. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
It shall be the policy of the United States to seek a binding
international instrument or instruments to restrict the trade in
offensive ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 kilometers or more that
have a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding
international instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a
United Nations Security Council resolution, or other instrument of
international law, and should provide for enforcement measures
including interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of illicit shipments
of offensive ballistic missiles and related technology, equipment, and
components.
SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should
immediately introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security
Council to prohibit all members of the United Nations from purchasing,
receiving, assisting or allowing the transfer of, and to authorize the
subsequent interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile,
missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or missile-
related technology from North Korea.
TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION LAW
SEC. 201. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon
the expiration, or the granting of a waiver, on or after January 1,
2003, of sanctions against a foreign person imposed under section 73(a)
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, a license shall be required, for a period of not
less than 3 years, for the export to that foreign person of all items
controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), as continued in effect under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the
Export Administration Regulations.
(b) Termination.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to a foreign
person 30 days after the President notifies the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate that he has determined that--
(1) the foreign person has--
(A) ceased all activity related to the original
imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) of the Arms
Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(A) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as the case may be; and
(B) has instituted a program of transparency
measures whereby the United States will be able to
verify for at least a period of 3 years that the
foreign person is not engaging in prohibited activities
under those provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1); and
(2) there has been an appropriate resolution of the
original violation or violations, such as financial penalties,
incarceration, destruction of prohibited items, or other
appropriate measures taken to prevent a recurrence of the
violation or violations.
SEC. 202. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS
ON FOREIGN PERSONS.
(a) Arms Export Control Act.--Section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``2 years''
each place it appears and inserting ``4 years''.
(b) Public Information.--Section 73(e)(2) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ``Such report may be classified only to the
extent necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods. If the
report is so classified, the President shall make every effort to
acquire sufficient alternative information that would allow a
subsequent unclassified version of the report to be issued.''.
(c) Export Administration Act of 1979.--Any sanction imposed on a
foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall be in effect for a
period of 4 years beginning on the date on which the sanction was
imposed.
(d) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b)
and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply to all sanctions
imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act or section
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, by reason
of acts giving rise to such sanctions that were committed by foreign
persons on or after January 1, 2003.
SEC. 203. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS
ON ALL RESPONSIBLE PERSONS.
(a) Arms Export Control Act.--Section 73(a) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person under paragraph
(2) shall also be imposed on any governmental entity that the President
determines exercises effective control over, benefits from, or directly
or indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
``(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person under
paragraph (2), the President may also impose that sanction on any other
person or entity that the President has reason to believe has or may
acquire items that may not be exported to that foreign person on
account of the sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that foreign person
access to, such items.
``(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period of time as
he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by a United States person
or within the United States, with any foreign person on whom sanctions
have been imposed under this subsection.
``(D) The President shall report on an annual basis to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the identity of
any foreign person that engages in any transaction or activity with a
foreign person on whom sanctions have been imposed under this
subsection that either--
``(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under
subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions have not been imposed;
or
``(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under
subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity had been
carried out by a United States person or by a person in the
United States.
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent feasible, but
may include a classified annex.''.
(b) Definition of Person.--Section 74(a)(8)(A) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
``(8)(A) the term `person' means--
``(i) a natural person;
``(ii) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, transnational corporation,
or transnational joint venture, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any
governmental entity;
``(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity
of any business enterprise or other organization or
entity listed in clause (ii); and
``(iv) any successor of any business enterprise or
other organization or entity listed in clause (ii) or
(iii); and''.
(c) Export Administration Act of 1979.--
(1) Sanctions imposed on government entities.--Any sanction
imposed on a foreign person under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (in this subsection referred to
as a ``dual use sanction''), shall also be imposed on any
governmental entity that the President determines exercises
effective control over, benefits from, or directly or
indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
(2) Other entities.--When a dual use sanction is imposed on
a foreign person, the President may also impose that sanction
on any other person or entity that the President has reason to
believe has or may acquire items that may not be exported to
that foreign person on account of the dual use sanction imposed
on that foreign person, with the intent to transfer to that
foreign person, or provide to that foreign person access to,
such items.
(3) Transactions by third parties.--The President may also
prohibit, for such period of time as he may determine, any
transaction or dealing, by a United States person or within the
United States, with any foreign person on whom dual use
sanctions have been imposed.
(4) Report.--The President shall submit on an annual basis
to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
contains the identity of any foreign person that engages in any
transaction or activity with a foreign person on whom dual use
sanctions have been imposed that either--
(A) would be the basis for imposing dual use
sanctions under paragraph (2) but for which such
sanctions have not been imposed; or
(B) would be the basis for imposing dual use
sanctions under paragraph (3) if the transaction or
activity had been carried out by a United States person
or by a person in the United States.
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent
feasible, but may include a classified annex.
(5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
(i) a natural person;
(ii) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, transnational
corporation, or transnational joint venture,
any other nongovernmental entity, organization,
or group, and any governmental entity;
(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent
entity of any business enterprise or other
organization or entity listed in clause (ii);
and
(iv) any successor of any business
enterprise or other organization or entity
listed in clause (ii) or (iii).
(B) In the case of countries where it may be
impossible to identify a specific governmental entity
referred to in subparagraph (A), the term ``person''
means--
(i) all activities of that government
relating to the development or production of
any missile equipment or technology; and
(ii) all activities of that government
affecting the development or production of
aircraft, electronics, and space systems or
equipment.
(B) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section
16(2) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2415(2)).
(C) Missile equipment or technology.--The term
``missile equipment or technology'' has the meaning
given that term in section 11B(c) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b)
shall apply with respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1,
2003, on foreign persons under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export
Control Act, and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with
respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign
persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as continued in effect under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
TITLE III--Incentives for Missile Threat Reduction
SEC. 301. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
(a) Types of Assistance.--The President is authorized to provide,
on such terms as the President deems appropriate, the following
assistance to countries that agree to destroy their ballistic missiles,
and their facilities for producing ballistic missiles, that have a
payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more over a distance of 300
kilometers or more:
(1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
(2) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.),
notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C.
2346(e) or 2420(a)).
(3) Drawdown of defense articles, defense services, and
military education and training under section 506 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318).
(b) Congressional Notification.--Assistance authorized under
subsection (a) may not be provided until 30 days after the date on
which the President has provided notice thereof to the appropriate
congressional committees in accordance with the procedures applicable
to reprogramming notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1(a)).
(c) Limitation.--Any assistance provided to a country under
subsection (a) may not be provided in more than 3 fiscal years.
SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
President to carry out section 301 the sum of $250,000,000.
(b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are authorized to
remain available until expended.
SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MISSILE DISARMAMENT.
The President is authorized to provide technical assistance in the
destruction of any missile or facility for producing ballistic
missiles, in any country that requests such assistance.
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