H.R. 24House108th Congress (2003-2005)In Committee

Bullet Tracing Act To Reduce Gun Violence

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Referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.

Crime and Federal Government Surveillance Subcommittee

March 6, 2003

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HouseIntro Referral

Introduced in House

January 7, 2003

HouseIntro Referral

Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.

Judiciary Committee

January 7, 2003

HouseCommittee

Referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.

Crime and Federal Government Surveillance Subcommittee

March 6, 2003

Floor Debate

1 member

What members said about H.R. 24 on the floor

1 Democrat

Rep. Sherrod BrownD-OH-13 · Mar 11, 2003

Mr. Speaker, the administration continues to assert rightly that Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator, but the administration fails to explain how a preemptive war is in the best interest of the…

Mr. Speaker, the administration continues to assert rightly that Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator, but the administration fails to explain how a preemptive war is in the best interest of the American people.

On February 25 I introduced House Joint Resolution 24 with the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel.) The resolution requires the President to submit a new report to Congress that answers eight specific questions. It includes a sense of Congress clause that requests the President present the report before a public joint session of Congress.

It is our duty in Congress on behalf of the American people to ensure that if the President authorizes military force against Iraq, that he first give Congress a full accounting of the potential cost and the potential consequences.

The two reports submitted to Congress by the administration under requirements of the October resolution have failed to communicate the President's plans for Iraq. The administration in reports included no indication of the potential financial costs of the war and its aftermath, no indication of how weapons of mass destruction will be secured, and no discussion of blow-backs, the CIA term for terrorist actions against the United States.

The second report clearly acknowledges the magnitude of the task of reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq, calling it a massive undertaking. Unfortunately, the report fails to explain how this challenge will be overcome, what level of financial, what level of political, what level of military commitment that the administration is willing to make in Iraq after the war.

Before the U.S. initiates a preemptive strike, something we have never done before, without the consensus of the U.N. Security Council and in the absence of a clear, imminent threat to the United States of America, the administration must clearly explain to the American people the short- and long-term implications of attacking Iraq. H.R. 24 asks, and the administration should answer to the American public and to Congress:

Have we exhausted every diplomatic means of disarming Iraq?

Will America be safer from terrorism if we attack Iraq?

How will we deal with the humanitarian crisis that inevitably will follow this war?

How will the war with Iraq affect our already weak economy?

What will reconstruction of Iraq and providing humanitarian assistance to that country cost? And how long will it take, how long will American troops and civilians be stationed there and at what cost?

How will attacking Iraq prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, when Korea and Libya and other countries, and Iran, for instance, are much further along with nuclear development, we know, than Iraq is?

What will preemptive war do to the stability of the Middle East?

Are we ready to commit to a decade of military troops policing Iraq and the billions of dollars needed to rebuild and stabilize that country and make that country, in the words of the President, into a democracy?

These important questions need to be answered to the American public before President Bush decides preemptively, without U.N. support, to attack another country.

The Washington Post reported today: ``The greatest source of concern among senior army leaders is the uncertainty and complexity of the mission in postwar Iraq, which could require U.S. forces,'' and get this, ``to protect Iraq's borders, referee clashes between ethnic and religious groups, ensure civilian security, provide humanitarian relief, secure possible chemical and biological weapon sites, and govern hundreds of towns and villages.'' Simply put, we could be in the middle of a civil war.

How has the administration responded to these concerns? With silence. There are no legitimate plans for reconstruction that anyone has seen. There are no cost estimates for the conflict or the post-conflict occupation. There are no casualty estimates. These are concerns we must address.

Retired Army Major General William Nash commanded the first peacekeeping operation in the Balkans in 1995. After the Gulf War in 1991, he occupied the area around the Iraqi town of Safwan on the Kuwaiti border almost 2 years ago. He told The Post that during this time his troops dealt with recurring murders, attempted murders, ``ample opportunity,'' in his words, ``for civil disorder,'' and refugee flows they could never fully fathom. He went on to say that 200,000 U.S. and allied forces will be necessary to stabilize Iraq. Two hundred thousand.

Note that he uses the term ``allied forces'' in that total. If we continue on the course we are on, there will be few allied forces. Maybe Great Britain, maybe a few Turks, if we pay them enough, maybe a few Spaniards, maybe a few Italians, but overwhelming almost all of those 200,000 will be Americans and we will be footing the bill alone.

The civilian leadership at the Pentagon and the Department of Defense continually refuse to acknowledge the enormity of the challenge in post-conflict Iraq. They respond to inquires with delay tactics and uncertain estimates.

I am certain of one thing, Mr. Speaker. Any action against Iraq will be difficult, costly, and dangerous if we do not go to the U.N. Security Council.

Bill Text

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Introduced in HouseIssued January 7, 2003

        [Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 24 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 24

To require ballistics testing of firearms manufactured in or imported
into the United States, and to provide for the compilation, use, and
availability of ballistics information for the purpose of curbing the
use of firearms in crime.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 7, 2003

Mr. Becerra introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To require ballistics testing of firearms manufactured in or imported
into the United States, and to provide for the compilation, use, and
availability of ballistics information for the purpose of curbing the
use of firearms in crime.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Bullet Tracing Act To Reduce Gun
Violence''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF FIREARM BY LICENSED FIREARMS
MANUFACTURER OR LICENSED FIREARMS IMPORTER BEFORE TEST
FIRING AND TRANSMISSION OF BALLISTICS RECORDS.

(a) In General.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 931. Test firing and transmission of ballistics records
``(a) A licensed manufacturer or licensed importer shall not
transfer a firearm to any person before--
``(1) test firing the firearm;
``(2) preparing ballistics records of the fired bullet and
cartridge casings from the test fire; and
``(3) transmitting the records to the Attorney General.
``(b)(1)(A) With respect to each violation of subsection (a) by a
licensee, the Attorney General may, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, suspend for not more than 5 years or revoke the license of the
licensee, impose on the licensee a civil fine of not more than $20,000,
or both.
``(B) An action of the Attorney General under this paragraph may be
reviewed only as provided in section 923(f).
``(2) The suspension or revocation of a license or the imposition
of a civil fine under paragraph (1) shall not preclude any
administrative remedy that is available to the Attorney General under
other law.
``(3) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.''.
(b) Definition of Ballistics.--Section 921(a) of such title is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(35) The term `ballistics' means a comparative analysis of fired
bullets or cartridge casings to identify the firearm from which the
bullets or cartridge casings were discharged, through the
identification of the unique characteristics that each firearm imprints
on bullets and cartridge casings.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for such chapter is
amended by adding at the end the following:

``931. Test firing and automated storage of ballistics records.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take
effect 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. COMPILATION, USE, AND AVAILABILITY OF BALLISTICS INFORMATION.

(a) Compilation of Information.--The Attorney General shall
compile, in electronic form, the ballistics records transmitted
pursuant to section 931(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, and
shall make the compilation available for use in Federal, State, and
local criminal investigations, arrests, indictments, and prosecutions.
(b) Federal Assistance to Firearm Manufacturers and Importers.--The
Attorney General shall assist qualified firearms manufacturers and
qualified firearms importers in--
(1) obtaining use of new and upgraded computerized
ballistics equipment and bullet recovery equipment owned by the
Federal Government, to be placed at the sites of licensed
manufacturers and licensed importers;
(2) training personnel necessary to develop, maintain,
research, and evaluate a database containing ballistics
information on firearms possessed by the manufacturers or
importers, and to record and transmit to the Attorney General
such information; and
(3) taking any other steps necessary to implement effective
ballistics testing.
(c) Qualified Firearms Manufacturers and Qualified Firearms
Importers.--A manufacturer or importer of firearms shall be considered
qualified for assistance under subsection (b) only if the Attorney
General determines that the manufacturer or importer meets such uniform
requirements as the Attorney General establishes relating to the
creation, preservation, and transmission of ballistics records
described in section 931(a) of title 18, United States Code.
(d) Annual Reports on Effects of This Act.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this section and annually
thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report
regarding the effects of this Act, including the number of Federal,
State, and local criminal investigations, arrests, indictments, and
prosecutions of all cases in which access to ballistics records
provided under section 931 of title 18, United States Code, served as a
valuable investigative tool.
(e) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``licensed
manufacturer'', ``licensed importer'', ``firearm'', and ``ballistics''
shall have the meanings given in section 921(a) of title 18, United
States Code.
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