Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here to support--well, I don't think it is going to be support. It is really more in opposition to…
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here to support--well, I don't think it is going to be support. It is really more in opposition to this so-called Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act.
Well, why? Well, because it is anticonsumer.
Well, why? Because it is antienvironment.
Well, why? Because it is antiprivacy.
Not surprisingly, a broad consortium of more than 150 organizations strenuously oppose this bill, including some of our best nonprofits: the National Resources Defense Council, for example; the Sierra Club, for another example; Public Citizen; and a lot of labor organizations and other groups.
Title I of this bill, for example, has one goal: it is to discourage the use of settlement agreements and consent decrees that compel agencies to follow the law.
When enacting new statutes, Congress routinely establishes deadlines for agency action, particularly when it involves urgent public health and safety concerns. When agencies fail to meet these deadlines, a party with standing may file a lawsuit under section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure that the agency performs this mandatory, nondiscretionary duty. By delaying the enforcement of statutory deadlines, the bill, however, jeopardizes public health and safety, which explains why the previous Obama administration issued a veto threat to similar legislation considered only last Congress.
Title I imposes nearly impossible hurdles for agencies seeking to resolve the deadline lawsuits and gives opponents of regulation multiple opportunities to stifle agency regulatory actions.
With respect to consent decrees concerning a rulemaking, an agency would be forced to go through two public comment periods--one for the consent decree, and one for the rulemaking that results from the consent decree--doubling the agency's effort. In addition, it would allow any affected party to intervene in opposition to a proposed settlement agreement or consent decree.
Contrary to the claims of those who support this measure, the Government Accountability Office has found no evidence that these deadline lawsuits are collusive. As the Justice Department, which represents most Federal agencies, acknowledged earlier this year, these agencies are left with few defenses, if any, to these lawsuits.
I am also concerned that H.R. 469 will inevitably generate more litigation that will result in millions of dollars of additional transactional costs, all of which will be borne by you know who--the American taxpayer.
For example, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, in its analysis of the bill's predecessor from the last Congress, concluded:
The measure would impose millions of dollars in additional
costs, most of which would be incurred because the litigation
involving consent decrees and settlement agreements would
probably take longer under the bill, and agencies would face
additional administrative requirements.
That is a quotation. In other words, Title I of this bill is a costly solution, again, in search of a problem.
Now, Title II of the bill isn't much better. For instance, Title II overrides the Privacy Act to require publication of sensitive personal information of victims of government abuse or unlawful conduct, which raises serious privacy concerns.
Although proponents of this measure argue it will increase government transparency, its real effect will be to force the Treasury Department to publish, on the Internet, the names of individual victims of government misconduct compensated for their claims by the Judgment Fund, including victims of race and sex discrimination, and so, in effect, revictimizing victims harmed by the Federal Government.
Finally, Title III would facilitate the ability of the House majority to intervene in pending cases where the Justice Department has already determined that it will not defend the constitutionality of a Federal law.
Not only do these provisions raise possible separation of powers concerns, it is unclear why they are even needed.
This measure has not ever been the subject of a single hearing or markup by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. As a result, there has not been any opportunity to consider these critical issues and to analyze the ramifications presented by Title III.
For all of these reasons, I must, accordingly, urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 469.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would exempt from H.R. 469 settlement agreements and consent decrees intended to prevent discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or other protected category.
Given the often systemic nature of discriminatory conduct, settlement
agreements and consent decrees provide an invaluable means to provide for general relief for non-identifiable victims and to prevent future discriminatory acts.
In particular, they are instrumental in enforcing critical civil rights protections in a wide variety of cases, including voting rights violations and predatory lending practices based on race. Other examples include the use of consent decrees by the Justice Department to address unconstitutional police pattern or practice activities.
For example, in 2003, the City of Detroit entered into a consent decree with the Justice Department concerning the inappropriate use of force and arrest practices by the city's police department. As a result of this decree, the police department implemented vastly improved practices that have substantially reduced the incidence of fatalities caused by law enforcement activities, a goal that the Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte and I very much endorse.
According to the department's civil rights division, these decrees facilitate institutional reforms, such as improving systems for supervising officers and holding them accountable for misconduct, as well as ensuring officers have the policy guidance, training, equipment, and other resources necessary for constitutional and effective policing.
Unfortunately, H.R. 469 would make the use of such remedies exceedingly difficult by subjecting them to numerous procedural and potentially meritless court challenges.
A particularly concerning provision of this bill is its broad and ill-defined authorization allowing virtually anyone to intervene with respect to a proposed settlement agreement or consent decree.
For example, imagine a proposed settlement agreement intended to restrict a city's school district from discriminating against Muslims. Under the bill, any anti-Muslim or neo-Nazi organization could petition the court to intervene for the purpose of opposing such agreement on the ground that it ``would affect'' such person.
This is just one of the many fundamental problems presented by this thoroughly flawed and, I think, harmful measure, and, so, accordingly, I ask my colleagues here to join me in opposing H.R. 469.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, although H.R. 469 has many flaws, I am particularly concerned that the bill's broad and ill-defined requirements would effectively delay and possibly deter civil enforcement agencies from providing general relief in discrimination cases, discourage courts from enforcing these settlements, and also invite costly and needless litigation.
In response to this problem, my amendment would simply exclude from the bill's burdensome requirements settlement agreements and consent decrees intended to remediate generalized harms in civil rights cases.
Mr. Chairman, this is a commonsense amendment, and I urge my colleagues here to support it.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
