Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4568) making appropriations for the Department of Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, we have now gone about 1,000 days since the attack on this country on 9/11, and this bill is supposed to deal with our efforts to protect the homeland. I think that to evaluate how good those efforts are, we need to compare the challenges with the resources that we are applying to meet those challenges. And if we do, I think there will be no doubt that we are mistakenly trying to do this job on the cheap.

Let me give my colleagues some examples of inadequacies in this appropriations bill.

Air cargo. Air cargo is a huge threat to the safety of the flying public. If the public understood what a tiny percentage of cargo that is shipped on passenger planes is actually inspected, they would be shocked. It is a tiny percentage. We ought to do something about that. This bill prevents us from doing that.

The gentleman from Florida discussed correctly the need for more in- line explosive detection devices at airports. We wanted to try to do that in the bill; but, again, we are precluded from doing that by the budget ceiling. The chairman of the committee himself has indicated how important that is. Yet we are not going to be able to make any significant advances on that front under this bill.

If we take a look at the problem that we have with military pilots being able to communicate with commercial pilots, if you have a terrorist incident or a potential terrorist incident and a military aircraft is trying to track a civilian aircraft, it would be kind of nice if those two pilots could talk directly to each other and to the ground. But right now, we do not have the software system in place that will enable that to happen. That is a dumb omission.

We also have some problems with respect to ports.

Now, the new idea in protecting our ports is to establish inspectors at foreign ports so that they can review what goes into those cargo container boxes before they ever leave that port on their way to the United States. But we have a big problem. There are only 20 ports out of the 45 major ports that we need to cover where we have that kind of inspection activity going on; we have none going on in China, and China imports three times as much through cargo shipping as does Hong Kong, for instance.

Worse yet, the inspectors on the job in those foreign ports are assigned temporary duty for about 6 months apiece. They cannot get to know the territory; they cannot get to know the people they work with in those ports during that time. They should be long-term assignments, but we do not have the money in the bill to do that.

The northern border. The PATRIOT Act, with all of its problems, the PATRIOT Act required that we have a specific number of inspectors on the northern border. We are 2,000 short of the number that was supposedly guaranteed by the PATRIOT Act. First responders, those are the policemen, the firemen who deal with the incidents where they occur in the local community, on the ground, we have been told by the Rudman- Hart Commission that there is about $90 billion worth of need that we need to address. We have only met about 15 percent of that need.

We have fewer firefighters in this country today than we had on 9/11. Do you call that progress?

And then, we have the massive problems in the Homeland Security Agency. Of the 500 career slots in that agency, or roughly 500 career slots, 171 of them are vacant. Twenty-five percent of the slots in that agency are filled by political appointees. Is it any wonder that there is considerable chaos?

More than a year after the reorganization, that agency still does not have a phone directory. I was talking to a fellow 2 days ago who was trying to talk to the Homeland Security Agency about getting a contract, to meet a need that they were advertising; he did not even know who to call or how to find out because they do not have a phone directory.

It does not make a lot of sense.

General Zinni has made the point that when it comes to dealing with this terrorist threat that we have a lot of tactical activities going on but not very many strategic. I just think we need to face the fact this bill is not adequate.

And then, as has already been mentioned by several other Members, it has this weird feature which allows the Homeland Security Agency to give a contract that would be valued up to $10 billion to a company for the purpose of tracking who crosses our borders, they want to give that contract to a company that has already jumped our borders and decided they will locate for tax purposes in Bermuda. That means they duck their taxes, and your constituents and mine get the privilege of making up the difference.

Great deal. Great deal. That is why I would urge every Member of this House to vote against the previous question on the rule so we can offer amendments to correct these problems and to vote against the rule if we cannot bring down the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, I am inserting in the Record at this point the text of the comments I made in the report accompanying the Homeland Security Appropriation bill made in order by this rule.

Additional Views of David Obey

It has been a thousand days since al Qaeda launched its

first successful attack within U.S. borders. Since that time

many changes have taken place inside our country and in the

way we deal with other nations around the world. Most of

those changes have been justified as steps that were

necessary to insure that nothing like September 11th ever

happens again. But how much progress have we really made? How

far have we come in reducing the likelihood that it will

happen again?

One thousand days has often been viewed as a period of time

for communities and even whole nations to stop and take

stock. What have we done right? What have we done wrong? What

are our largest remaining areas of vulnerability? What are

our prospects of getting hit again?

I think our efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks can

be divided into three stages. The first step was to hit al

Qaeda and hit them hard. Take the battle to them. Destroy

their leadership; their ability to communicate; their ability

to raise and transfer funds; their ability to obtain weapons

and to move members between countries and most importantly,

their capacity to organize attacks against the United States.

The second step was to understand the factors in the Arab

and Muslim worlds that feed this kind of senseless anger and

why that anger has been directed toward the United States.

Why did so many ordinary people in the Muslim world cheer on

September 11th and what does it take to reduce or at least

redirect the anger that is now so focused on us.

Thirdly, what are we doing to upgrade our defenses here at

home? What goals have we set? Do they make sense? How well

have we performed in reaching those goals?

Attack Against Al Qaeda

With respect to the first goal, I think the United States

has for the most part performed well particularly if we look

at the early stages of our effort and if we view al Qaeda as

an organization, rather than an idea or a cause. The

organization's leadership has been significantly diminished.

While a number of its most senior leaders have survived, the

best evidence indicates that they have grave difficulty

communicating with others in the organization or playing any

kind of day-to-day leadership role. Significant numbers of

lesser figures in the organization are still at large and

they are very dangerous. But they face much greater

challenges moving about the world, receiving the training

necessary to successfully execute large scale attacks and

getting the materials and support necessary to launch such

attacks.

The initial phases of our attack against al Qaeda were

highly successful. The planning and execution of the

overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a high-water mark

in our efforts against terrorism. The initial cooperation

that we received in the wake of September 11th--from our

traditional allies in Europe and also from nations across the

globe that have at times been less than friendly to U.S.

interests was also impressive.

losing focus in afghanistan

But somehow, we lost our focus. Having destroyed the

Taliban's capability to rule Afghanistan we did not move

aggressively to insure that the government that we support in

its stead could fill the void. We did not invest anything

like the level of resources for Afghanistan that was needed

to make rapid, noticeable changes in the quality of life.

Because of that, in a large portion of the country, we did

not have the leverage to strengthen the hand of central

government, extend the rule of law, and deny terrorists safe

haven. We also did not sufficiently exert our influence to

insure that the Afghan army that we were attempting to build

was representative enough of the various ethnic and tribal

groups across the country to become a credible force for

stability and unification.

But the attack on al Qaeda began to loose steam outside of

Afghanistan as well. Talented intelligence operatives with

highly specialized knowledge of Arab culture, language and

political behavior were diverted from the listening posts and

operations centers across the Arab world where al Qaeda

activity was most likely to surface to undertake a quite

different mission. Financial resources, talented

administrators and trainers who might have helped our allies

in the Arab world improve their own military and intelligence

capabilities against indigenous terrorist organizations were

also diverted. The striking momentum that characterized the

early phases of our efforts against Al Qaeda has greatly

dissipated. The organization has lost much of its backbone,

but many of its pieces are still out there attempting to

reorganize and regenerate the segments that have been lost.

We no longer have the focus to our effort to insure that that

does not happen.

Still, you would have to say that our efforts against al

Qaeda have been a success--at least if al Qaeda is viewed

simply as an organization. The problem is that al Qaeda is as

much as idea as it is an organization and ideas are hard to

kill. Bullets can kill organizations--they sometimes only

strengthen ideas.

As General Anthony Zinni said recently in a lecture before

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while we

may be winning the war on terrorism on a tactical level, on

the strategic level we don't appear to even have a plan.

Osama bin Laden never intended al Qaeda to be the command

structure for the jihad against the United States. The term

``al Qaeda'' means simply, ``the base.'' Bin Laden wanted to

create a network to support and encourage jihad. He wanted to

attack and overthrow the Arab governments around the world

that he viewed as corrupt and out of sync with his views on

the teachings of the Koran and he wanted to attack the

foreign power that stood behind most of those governments--

the United States. Bin Laden's challenge was to create a

blueprint that could be used for such attacks and to inspire

large numbers of disgruntled members of the Arab and Muslim

world to follow that blueprint. He wanted to create a

movement that represented more than a small army of

terrorists--a movement that could bring down moderate Arab

governments and, with the overwhelming support of Arab

peoples, drive the United States from the Middle East.

American Image in Arab World

While bin Laden has suffered huge organizational setbacks

over the past thousand days, he has been enormously

successful in progress made toward his one strategic

objective. He has captured the attention of the Arab world

and much of the Muslim world. To a remarkable degree he has

even won their sympathies, and in some instances, their

commitment. If we wish to reverse that, we must begin to

think strategically as well as tactically. We must succeed in

our efforts to take the second step, to reshape the image of

the United States in the Arab and Muslim worlds. We must not

only strengthen the determination of our friends in the

region to resist terrorism but also encourage them to address

the underlying problems that feed it. Even for many of the

brightest and most industrious young people in many Arab

countries, hope is in short supply. While the energy

resources of the region have brought great wealth to a few, a

chance has largely been missed for many governments to use

those resources to build opportunity economies.

How we change our image in the Arab world and what policies

we should pursue to accomplish it is an issue that will spark

debate and some division in this country. That debate needs

to begin and it is the responsibility of leaders in both the

executive and legislative branches to begin it.

Upgrading Our Defenses At Home

Given how poorly we have done over the past thousand days

in stemming the anti-American passions in the Middle East, it

is even more important that we do a good job in the third

step required for a successful strategy: upgrading our

defenses here at home.

In evaluating our performance on that front, it is

important that we distinguish motion from movement. I am

afraid that in many respects we have had more activity than

we have had progress.

On September 11th, we had more than 130 agencies and

activities of the federal government engaged in some aspect

of homeland security. Those pieces of the bureaucracy were

spread across most of the Departments of the federal

government. There was no central capacity to oversee or

monitor how well they worked together. Many of these agencies

had only a fraction of the resources necessary to accomplish

the security tasks that experts in the field believed could

prevent future attacks.

So, after a thousand days, what has changed?

Homeland Security On The Cheap

Well, we are certainly spending more money. The government

is spending about $5 billion a year more just on airport

baggage and passenger screening. We have expanded the size of

the customs service and the immigration service. We have

bought new equipment in our ports to screen cargo coming into

the United States from international shipping and we have had

a significant

growth in law enforcement activities. But if you compare

the challenge we face with the resources we are using to

meet those challenges, it is clear we are trying to do

this on the cheap. We are like someone with a good paying

job who must get to work on time every day in order to

keep that job. But instead of building the most reliable

car he can find, he gets a fifteen year old model--one

that will get him there most of the time but will

eventually cost him his good paying job.

Failure in establishing our defenses against terrorism

places lives at risk. It also puts at risk our capacity as a

society to generate wealth. Although the greatest loss would

most certainly be measured in human life, penny pinching on

necessary security is foolhardy from a simple economic

perspective.

This legislation continues funding failures

Many in government, including the President and the

Attorney General, have warned that we are likely to be

attacked by terrorists on our homeland within the next nine

months. Given this information, you would think that we would

be doing everything humanly possible to improve the security

of our homeland. The legislation accompanying this report is

the prime vehicle to provide the resources to do that.

Unfortunately, it represents a stark failure to improve

protection of our citizens in any meaningful way against the

wide-ranging scope of the threat facing us today.

The fact is that we are not doing all we can to protect

Americans from another terrorist attack. The legislation

accompanying this report provides an increase of $2.8 billion

or 9.4 percent over the previous year. Yet excluding Project

Bioshield and user fees, the bill is only $1.1 billion or 5

percent above the previous year. Despite the Department's

huge security responsibilities, this is only slightly above

inflation.

This legislation provides a resource level equal to only

slightly more than inflation for our customs and border

protection and enforcement operations and for port security.

Worse, this legislation cuts funding for programs designed to

improve the response capabilities of our local police,

firefighters and emergency responders by $327 million or

seven percent from 2004.

OMB's homeland security spending analysis

OMB has prepared an analysis of homeland security spending

which is seriously flawed. Programs that were not counted as

homeland security a few years ago have now suddenly been

shifted into the homeland security category in order to

convey the impression of a greater increase in effort than

has actually taken place. Nonetheless, the OMB exercise is

instructive for getting a big picture sense of what we are

doing to address critical security issues. In total, OMB

argues that we have gone from spending $20 billion a year--or

about two tenths of one percent of GDP in fiscal 2000--to $46

billion a year, or less then four-tenths of one percent

today. That means that, even based on OMB accounting, our

increase in homeland security spending has been less than two

tenths of one percent. To provide some perspective on that

number, the share of GDP paid in federal taxes has dropped

from 20.8% to 16.4% during that same period--a decline of

4.4% or twenty two times the size of the increase in

spending to protect against terrorism.

Another perspective on the level of effort we have made

thus far is the oft-used analogy of Pearl Harbor. Pearl

Harbor led us to the creation of the concept of Gross

Domestic Product. The Roosevelt Administration believed that

it might require 50% of our total output to take on the

Germans and the Japanese simultaneously. They asked the

Commerce Department to develop a method of measuring national

output. They not only produced the concept that is now used

around the world to measure economic activity, but they were

also actually able to reach that goal of spending nearly half

of the nation's output on the war effort.

We do not need to put 50% of our output into this war or

even 5%. Whether you think that our war effort in Iraq is

associated with the war on terror or is a separate and

competing activity, expenditures related to that activity

account for more than 1% of GDP--more than twice as much as

we are spending on activities directly related to protecting

the homeland. Given that fact, it is blatantly ridiculous to

pretend that we cannot afford what we need to protect against

terrorist attacks.

Another major attack could erase a trillion or two trillion

dollars from the total valuation of the New York Stock

Exchange. It could substantially slow the pace of economic

growth for a year or more. Again, the most important

consequence of a terrorist attack is the loss of human life,

but penny pinching on homeland security makes no sense. Even

if we consider only the economics of the issue, the Institute

for the Analysis of Global Security found that the cost of

the 9/11 attack was nearly 2 trillion dollars, including the

loss in stock market wealth, lower corporate profits and

higher discount rates for economic volatility.

Now it should be noted that the Administration's FY 2005

budget attempts to make a case that in future years we can

reduce the size of federal deficits from the current record

levels and still afford additional tax cuts. In making that

case their projections for future year spending levels in

various categories of the budget are revealing. Homeland

Security spending is essentially locked into place at current

levels. In fact, what OMB is telling us is that unless the

American people or the Congress force a change in priorities,

what we have now for securing the nation is all that we are

going to get and could decline by as much as $900 million.

But the question we should be asking is: Are we really

doing enough? Are there things that we really ought to be

doing that the resource levels we have allocated to the

problem prevent us from doing?

aviation security gaps remain

One lesson from September 11th that virtually no one could

miss is the need to secure our airlines and our airways. We

have spent considerably more on this objective than on any

area of homeland security. But there are a surprising number

of resource issues still unaddressed with respect to

protecting our airways.

For example, we still do not have an effective system of

explosive detection. Put more directly, it is still much too

easy to get explosive materials onto passenger airlines.

The Transportation Security Administration has identified

equipment that could have provided us with that capability.

It's expensive, (it would have cost close to $3 billion to

install the equipment nationwide) but it would have

dramatically improved our capacity to detect explosive

materials. It also would have significantly reduced the

number of screeners required in airports around the country.

In fact, the savings in TSA personnel costs from the use of

this equipment was estimated to be large enough to offset the

entire cost of the equipment.

The Transportation Security Administration proposed to OMB

that the agency purchase much of the needed equipment when it

was preparing its plans to meet the 2002 explosive detection

requirement set in law. But OMB decided that the expense

could not be accommodated within the tight, arbitrary limits

for homeland security spending which the President and the

Director of OMB had decided to impose. Republicans in

Congress then adopted a budget resolution that did not

provide the Appropriations Committee with the latitude to

move forward with the purchase. As a result we do not have an

effective system of detecting explosive materials and that

failure is due entirely to artificial constraints on

resources and incompetent budgeting. TSA has recently

acknowledged that the more expensive machines would pay for

themselves within 3 to 5 years.

Following September 11th there was broad recognition of the

fact that we needed to restart the sky marshals program and

insure that there were enough marshals on domestic and

international passenger flights so that potential highjackers

would always have to think twice about the likelihood that a

sky marshal might be present on a targeted flight.

Now the exact number of marshals that the President and the

Congress agreed were necessary has remained classified. But

few people realize that we are no longer operating at that

level. No one has come forward with convincing arguments that

the level was too high or that adequate safety can be assured

at a lower level. We have simply once again allowed arbitrary

budget limits, applied to one small portion of the budget, to

drive a decision that may unnecessarily put a great many

Americans at risk. Under the President's budget submission

for Fiscal 2005, we will have 20% fewer sky marshals than the

President and the Congress agreed that we needed just two

years ago. That is in spite of the fact that there has been a

significant increase during that period in the number of

domestic and international flights and in the number of

passenger miles flown.

We have had--and continue to have--serious communications

problems between military pilots who have the ultimate

responsibility to insure that commercial aircraft are not

used to crash into buildings (and the commercial aircraft and

the FAA system that controls them). Quite simply, military

and commercial flight systems cannot easily and quickly talk

to one another and the potential that leaves for

miscalculation and mistakes it horrific.

Despite the fact that this problem could be solved for

relatively little money, the military felt the commercial

system should foot the problem and the FAA and the airlines

felt it should be addressed in the military budget. OMB

decided the cheapest solution was not to decide.

Finally, last fall, I decided for them. The $10 million

that was needed was earmarked in the Defense Appropriation

bill. I suppose that's a good ending to the story, except

that the delay in funding means that the system will not be

operative until 2006. That gives you one more thing to think

about when you board a plane. It also provides more than a

little insight into how decisions about homeland security are

being sorted out within the executive branch.

rail vulnerabilities

These examples of inaction with respect to airway security

are serious, but they do not begin to compare with the nearly

total abdication of our responsibility to assure the safety

of rail transportation. As the recent attacks in Spain have

demonstrated, our enemy is not wedded to attacks on any

single transportation mode. He will watch and wait until he

finds a vulnerability that can be exploited.

Rail is vulnerable in two ways. One is from attacks against

our freight rail system that handles a huge portion of the

materials,

products and chemicals that allow our economy to function.

The second is from attacks (like those in Spain) against the

roughly 13 million Americans who use passenger rail systems

each day.

Luckily, the Department of Transportation and other

agencies in the executive branch began a process of sharing

classified threat information with the nation's rail freight

carriers in the late 1990s. The plans developed as a result

of that process are in place and provide a foundation for

significant security upgrades. But the plans are dependent

upon the federal government meeting certain obligations it

accepted during the planning process. Under those plans

federal security forces are specifically required to monitor

tracks and facilities. Not only have we failed to do that but

we have not even designated the agency or department that

will supply the forces or establish a means of training them.

As disquieting as the lack of progress in securing our

heavy freight and passenger rail systems may be, the security

efforts on behalf of transit systems is even worse.

lack of progress in transit security

The White House has failed to mediate the dispute between

the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation over

who is actually in charge of transit security. A General

Accounting Agency report recommending a resolution of the

issue has been rejected by both departments. The impasse

continues despite the fact that it is halting any significant

progress in securing the systems and despite the fact that

transit systems have been the most frequent worldwide targets

of terrorist attacks.

Neither Department is willing to spend even a small

fraction of the security related costs most experts feel is

necessary. Department of Transportation security funding for

transit systems totals $37 million in the current year and

the Department of Homeland Security has allocated only $115

million over the past two years. This legislation contains

only $111 million for rail and transit security needs. In

contrast, the transit industry estimates that $6 billion

is needed for security training, radio communications

systems, security cameras and limiting access to sensitive

facilities.

What is the Department of Homeland Security's answer to

these unmet needs?

They testified this spring that more funds are not

necessary until they have had a better opportunity to define

the problem. Now, that is an orderly approach, which we

should applaud as long as the Department can guarantee al

Qaeda's cooperation with their schedule. My concern is that

the Department is likely to get some help they have not asked

for in developing a definition of the transit security

problem.

The Department has clearly become aware of how vulnerable

they are to criticism about their lack of serious attention

to transit issues. Only two weeks ago, in a classic move to

cover their bureaucratic backsides, they issued a directive

to transit systems ordering them to take a series of actions

that the Department's own data collection system indicates

have already been completed by the vast majority of transit

authorities across the country.

cargo container vulnerabilities

Since September 11 the vulnerability that has most troubled

many experts has been maritime cargo and the exposure of our

ports to a nuclear, chemical or biological attack from a

weapon placed in a shipping container. As the president of

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Tom Donohue, has pointed out,

such an event could cause death and destruction on a scale

far beyond the attacks launched on September 11. It could

virtually shut down our global trading system for an extended

period of time. The economic consequences would be almost

incalculable. Terms like ``economic downturn'' or

``recession'' would not begin to describe the aftermath.

The Bush Administration has spent billions looking for new

technologies with the capacity to knock a nuclear warhead out

of the sky if it were launched in the nose cone of an

intercontinental ballistic missile. It has invested heavily

in the development of other technologies that are intended to

serve that purpose but probably cannot. But they seem

unresponsive to the fact that a rogue or a terrorist

organization can simply place such a weapon in a shipping

container and explode it upon arrival in New York Harbor or

in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New Orleans or Boston. A ship

can bring into this country a far less complicated weapon

than one which could be placed on an ICBM. It can be massive

in size and its does not need to even be thermonuclear in

order to cause massive numbers of casualties, destruction and

economic chaos.

So what have we done to protect ourselves? Protecting our

ports is not unlike protecting our airports. We need to have

multiple security perimeters. The first should be overseas.

That requires a whole new approach to cargo inspection. It

requires that our inspectors leave the United States,

establish cooperative relationships with port security

officials in countries around the world that ship to the

United States. It requires that they establish a system of

certification and best practices with major exporters

around the world.

This is not a Democratic proposal. This is roughly the

proposal that George Bush's own appointed head of the Customs

Service, Bob Bonner, took to the White House in months

immediately following September 11th. It is the proposal that

the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, headed by former

Senators Rudman and Hart had endorsed. It is the proposal

that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has written editorials to

support.

But the White House waited until last year to request the

first dime for this effort. Whatever presence the United

States has had in foreign ports over the past one thousand

days has been entirely as a result of Congressional increases

to homeland security spending--increases that were opposed by

the White House, increases that the White House threatened at

various stages in the legislative process to veto, and

increases which on one occasion the White House did veto.

Last year, the White House reversed themselves and finally

requested a portion of the funds that were needed for

container security. Their position changed from, ``we can't

afford it'' to ``we needed to wait.'' That is a turnaround

and I suppose we should welcome it. But the $126 million that

the president has proposed for FY2005, and is contained in

this legislation, will not adequately fund the program. It

will not even allow us to fully staff the 45 foreign ports

where DHS had planned to inspect all manifest documents. It

will not permit our current foreign inspection programs to

become permanent. We are currently in only 17 ports. We

currently have no container security presence in China, the

biggest U.S. trading partner in terms of cargo containers.

The number of cargo containers arriving to the U.S. from

China is more than three times those arriving from Hong Kong.

More troubling than the mere question of resources is the

lack of political or bureaucratic clout behind this critical

initiative. If having inspection agents working with foreign

customs officials is to be a truly effective means of

understanding what is in foreign ships before they leave for

U.S. ports, it requires developing long term relationships

between our agents and those who control the foreign ports we

wish to monitor.

This involves a new level of training and expertise for our

customs agents. It involves establishing continuity in the

relationship we have with host governments in terms of what

we expect to get and what incentives we can provide to those

who cooperate. Nothing could be more destructive to this

effort than to rotate in and out of foreign ports agents with

only a few months of experience based on a deliberate system

of staffing through temporary assignment. But that is

precisely what we have done. In the few foreign ports where

we do have a presence, that presence is a U.S. customs

officer detailed there on a six-month temporary duty

assignment. Those agents don't even know what the problems

were between the U.S. and the host government when the

program was initiated. They are certainly not people that

officials of the host government would want to invest much

time in getting to know--they will be gone before there is

any pay off from developing a relationship.

port vulnerabilities

If the overseas effort to identify the contents of cargo

containers is the outer perimeter for protecting our ports,

the ability of the Coast Guard to interdict, board and

inspect U.S. bound shipping at sea is the next perimeter. Yet

the Coast Guard's capacity to perform that function has also

been restrained by lack of resources. The Administration

frequently states that the Coast Guard is now boarding all

vessels that are deemed to be ``high interest.'' That means

80% of all other vessels are not boarded.

Observing, tracking and controlling ships as they approach

and enter into American waters is the next perimeter in

securing our ports. Systems have been developed that are very

similar to the systems by which air traffic control directs

airplanes entering into U.S. airspace and approaching U.S.

airports. These systems, however, are available in only nine

ports, leaving 45 major ports without such a system. Again,

this is penny wise and pound foolish. It is also a bad

decision in terms of long-term cost effectiveness. More

automated systems permit more rapid detection of ships that

are not following control directives; they can be operated by

fewer people and are long-term cost savers.

And, inside our ports, there are numerous critical issues.

One is preventing unauthorized persons from having access to

ships, containers or post storage areas. A second is

protecting hazardous chemicals and materials from attack. The

Coast Guard estimated that the 185 commercial seaports in the

United States would need about $7 billion to assess

vulnerabilities and take necessary action to correct those

vulnerabilities. These port authorities do not, in most

instances, have the revenue raising authority to pay any

significant portion of these costs. This year was the first

time the Administration requested any money whatsoever for

this purpose, and it only requested $46 million. The Congress

has been able to appropriate only $587 million or less than

10% of the money needed to do the job. This legislation

includes an additional $125 million for port security, which

will keep us on the slow-moving path to addressing all of our

port vulnerabilities.

securing our land borders

Another major priority has been securing our land borders--

in particular, the 3000 mile U.S. border with Canada or 5000

miles if we include Alaska. Despite our continuing strong

economic and political ties to Canada, the situation of the

two nations with respect to potential terrorist attacks is

quite different. Canada's smaller role in world affairs and

the image of Canada in the eyes of

the international community make it a much less likely target

of attack than the U.S. At the same time, Canada's vast

geography and relatively small population have led to far

more lenient immigration policies than those in place in the

United States.

As a result there will continue to be significant

differences between the two countries on how external

security concerns are managed. That means that the question

of how to control our border and the movement of people and

cargo across that border is suddenly a matter of much greater

concern.

Recognizing that concern, the Congress included language in

the Patriot Act calling for the tripling of the number of

border agents and inspectors on the Canadian border above the

levels we maintain on September 11th. As of October 2003, we

were still more than 2000 people short of this goal. In

addition, there was a clear need for significant additional

equipment on the Canadian border to insure that those new

people would be efficiently put to work: equipment like air

stations, radiation monitors, and surveillance equipment.

To date we have fewer than 4000 agents and inspectors on

the border. In other words, about one third of the positions

promised in the Patriot Act are still unfilled. The FY 2005

budget promises no increases from current levels. And the

President' out-year budget projection provides a strong

indication that personnel strength at the border will

actually decline rather than increase over the next five

years. With respect to equipment, we have provided the first

air station (again one not requested by the Administration)

and some radiation monitors, but have made no critical

investments in things such as surveillance equipment.

preparing those who respond to terrorist attacks

The events of September 11th made clear that the brave men

and women serving in the police, fire and emergency medical

units in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, District of Columbia

and Maryland needed a significant amount of additional

equipment and training to more effectively respond to the

types of attacks that occurred on that day. It was also

apparent that first responder units across the nation did not

have most of the equipment they would need to deal with a

nuclear, chemical or biological attack.

The needs of local first responders were spelled out in

considerable detail in the Rudman-Hart reports. But the

federal government has already allowed most of the burden to

fall on local governments. Since the capacity of those local

governments to support such investments in the tough economic

times is limited, progress in equipping first responders has

been minimal.

Of the $98 billion in first responder needs identified by

the Rudman-Hart report, the Feds have provided less than

$14.5 billion, or 15%. As a result only 13% of fire

departments can effectively respond to a hazmat incident. An

estimated 57,000 firefighter's lack the personal protective

clothing needed in a chem-bio attack. An estimated \1/3\ of

firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained

breathing apparatus and nearly half of the available units

are 10 years old. Only half of all emergency responders on

shift have portable radios. And we still have massive needs

for interoperable communications equipment. On site emergency

personnel working for different agencies need to be able to

talk to each other. We will probably never know how many

victims in the World Trade Centers could have been saved if

they had known that they needed to evacuate the buildings. We

know that was a communication problem of disastrous

proportions.

This legislation cuts funding for programs designed to

improve the response capabilities of our local police,

firefighters and emergency responders by $327 million or

seven percent from 2004. These professionals are put on the

front line risking their lives every day. They are especially

put at risk when terrorists attack our homeland, as we saw

from the number who died at the World Trade Center. These

professionals need to be prepared for the various types of

attacks we may face and they are not fully prepared today.

It is disgraceful that this legislation provides less

funding in this area, not more.

These are only a few examples of where corners have been

cut in establishing the line of defense here at home.

inadequate homeland security leadership

But there is more to the story than simply talking about

resources. In many instances, we have not had the leadership

necessary to organize available resources in effective ways.

Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland

Security, the White House identified 133 separate agencies

and activities within the federal government that played a

role with respect to homeland security. The creation of a

Department was the Administration's answer as to how to

better manage and coordinate those disparate activities. The

problem, however, is that only 22 of those 133 activities

became part of the new department. A total of 111 agencies

and activities, including the FBI, the CIA, the Defense

Department and many other key components of the overall

effort remained on the outside.

But for whatever reason, the effort to have centralized

control and coordination of all of those activities within

the White House was diminished. When Tom Ridge went to DHS

his replacement within the White House was not given the same

clout to knock heads together and insure that Departments and

agencies are working together toward a common mission. Too

frequently, we have had 112 units of government headed off on

their own with no central coordination, as Attorney General

Ashcroft's press conference and the reaction within the

administration to that press conference last week so clearly

demonstrated.

And even within the new department there have been serious

problems. In its first year of operation, DHS has

disappointed even those with low expectations. Bureaucratic

snarls have been so intense that on its first anniversary the

Department still did not have a working phone directory. My

staff has been asking for one for more than six months and

has yet to receive it. It has also been reported that when

callers phone the Department's hotline number, it just rings

and rings. Members of Congress from the President's own party

have expressed grave concerns about the inability of the

Department to respond to requests for information in any kind

of a reasonable time frame.

One possible cause of the rampant chaos at the department

has been the injection of a huge number of political

appointees. Since the creation of the Department more than

one quarter of all personnel who have been hired for

departmental operations have been political appointees. These

individuals often appear more fixated on positioning

themselves politically than on the nuts and bolts security

problems, which the Department must address. We have seen a

huge number of press releases promoting the Departments

efforts but we have few concrete efforts worthy of such self-

promotion. We, for instance, still do not have regulations

regarding the licensing and registration of hazardous

material truckers nor do we the detailed guidance for

flight and cabin crew training to prepare for potential

threat conditions which was mandated by the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act more than two years ago.

Typically, political appointees remain in their appointed

positions for less than 24 months. At that point, they are

off to some other part of the administration or headed back

into the private sector. That means building true long-term

competency within any Department is heavily dependent on

recruiting a committed professional career staff. But the 114

political appointees now swarming the halls at DHS have--if

anything--impeded that process. Of the 500 career positions

needed to run the department, 171 remain vacant. One of the

most critical positions in any Department is that of Budget

Director. In only 14 months DHS has had three budget

directors.

Ironically, this legislation provides funding that is

sixty-two percent higher than this year for Departmental

Operations. Even though we were told that formation of the

Department of Homeland Security would not cost us a dime, it

now appears that the Administration has realized that this

was not true: $65 million is provided in this legislation for

the Department's headquarters and $70 million is provided for

the ``security-critical'' new personnel system. I do not

question the need for this funding. But I do think that it is

instructive that these are higher priorities for the

Administration and the Committee majority than are protecting

our border, ports, transit, and aviation system.

Instead, this $135 million could have been used to purchase

and install hundreds of additional radiation portal monitors

at our borders and ports. The Committee majority admits that

it is, and I quote this report, ``aware of a need for over

1,000 more'' radiation portal monitors than are funded by the

Committee.

Instead, this $135 million could have been used to inspect

a much greater percentage of air cargo for explosives than we

do today. While the Committee report calls for a doubling of

the screening for explosives of cargo carried on passenger

airplanes, this ``doubling'' still leaves a large percentage

of such cargo at risk.

Instead, this $135 million could have been used to secure

additional critical infrastructure, like chemical facilities,

transit systems and ports. The Committee majority agreed with

the Administration's plan to have only thirty-five percent of

protective actions that it recommends actually implemented

for ``first tier priority critical infrastructure

components''. What this means is that sixty-five percent of

the actions the Department recommends to protect the public

will not be implemented next year.

The Administration and the Committee majority seem to be

very patient when it comes to protecting our citizens on our

homeland. Unlike them, I remain unconvinced that terrorists

will wait a decade for their next attack.

congress should not abdicate its role

About a year and a half ago I spoke to a group of reporters

at the National Press Club about where the country stood at

that time in protecting itself against terrorist attacks. I

feel that the coverage of that event was fair and I think we

exposed some problems that, as a result of that coverage,

have been fixed. But I also think that the press and the

public have a presumption that this is such a complex issue

that we simply have to trust the President and his advisors

in the Executive Branch to do what is right. I think many of

my colleagues in Congress have felt the same way. While I

understand people's tendency to leave this complex calculus

to the ``experts,'' I think this town is currently awash in

new information about the decision making process within this

administration which indicates that is a bad idea!

First of all, that is not the approach to decision making

that the Constitution requires of us. It is our job to

second-guess. When so much is at stake, the Congress, the

press and the public have the clearest possible obligation to

insure that the decision making within the Executive Branch

is measured, deliberate, based on the best available

information, and consistent with the quality of judgment

befitting the seriousness of the risks to which we are

exposed. Had that happened in the wake of 9/11 or even a year

and a half ago there are many points in this statement that I

might have been able to leave out.

One problem in all of this, frankly, is that it was hard

for the press and the public to believe much of what I

reported a year and a half ago. While the facts presented in

that statement were well documented they presented a picture

of executive branch decision-making that was wholly

inconsistent with what the nation or the press corps wanted

to believe. It was hard to accept the idea that in this

moment of great national crisis we did not have systematic

methods of screening information, examining policy choices,

debating the pluses and minuses of each alternative, and

making strategic choices based on an exhaustive effort to

find the best possible alternative. But in recent months we

have learned time and time again that this was not the nature

of decision-making within this administration.

Ron Suskind, using the exhaustive notes and papers of

Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, tells of an extraordinary

decision making process in which information is collected on

the basis of decisions that preceded them. Richard Clarke

describes a process both before and after 9/11 that was quite

similar. So does Bob Woodward.

My own experience with the President himself, demonstrates

that this President has listened as infrequently to those in

the Congress who know something about homeland security as he

did to our allies or the career American military before

rushing into Iraq.

But any one who has been listening these last few months is

pretty well aware of the fact that we were not vigilant and

were not picking up on clear information of elevated threat

levels prior to 9/11. We did not respond in the summer of

2001 to that threat in the same manner that we responded 18

months earlier when similar threat information triggered a

massive response to the millennium threat. We did not have an

orderly or honest process to measure the pluses and minuses

of invading Iraq. People at the highest levels silenced,

dissent and criticism and irreversible actions were taken

based on flawed information.

We based our plans for security and reconstruction of Iraq

on intelligence from a single organization outside of this

government which both the State Department and the CIA said

was unreliable. Unfortunately, that is all spilt milk. Even

if we understand those mistakes, we can't go back and try it

again.

What I am talking about today is not spilt milk. We can

correct these policy mistakes and we can possibly correct

them in a time frame that will prevent the next attack. It

all depends on whether we are ready to get real.

Now, I am not optimistic by nature. Perhaps it is merely my

nature that leads me to believe that the cauldron that is

today boiling in Southwest Asia, North Africa and the Middle

East will likely spill over once more onto the shores of

North America. If we are not ready, I do not want to look

myself in the mirror for the rest of my life and wonder why I

didn't ask tougher questions or insist on more responsible

and responsive policies. I think the overall performance of

our government to date in the area of homeland security

merits a greater sense of skepticism and urgency on the part

of the press and the general public as well.

We lived in a more dangerous world prior to September 11th

than most Americans realized. Our efforts to making the world

safer have met with mixed results and the numbers of persons

who wish us harm and will go to great lengths to inflict harm

have grown steadily during the past thousand days. Clearly

some of our efforts have done little more than fed the flames

of discontent and hatred.

That places even greater pressure on our last lines of

defense, protecting our borders, our transportation systems

and our capacity to respond to terrorist acts in this country

if, God forbid, they are again committed. But as the facts I

have today outlined well document, those efforts remain under

funded and poorly managed. The President proposed that we

have 20% fewer sky marshals than we had a little more than a

year ago. We have hired only two-thirds the people that the

Patriot Act mandated for protecting our Northern Border. We

have invested one-tenth what is needed to protect our ports.

We have only just begun to take the steps needed to protect

our rail and transit systems. Our first responders have only

a fraction of the tools they need. And worse still, the

agencies that have been entrusted with the responsibilities

are still wallowing in bureaucratic chaos.

As we saw last week the Justice Department and the Homeland

Security Department are still in the business of surprising

each other. Simply hoping that these problems will somehow

work out is not unlike the wishful thinking that many engaged

in as they prepared to invade Iraq. Misinformation and bad

planning can lead to excruciatingly painful results. The time

to reexamine our security, our security budgets and our whole

thinking in this area is now. The Congress must act to put a

stop to this mindless, non-information based approach to

policy and national strategy. It is as likely to prove

catastrophic in the defense of our homeland as it has been in

installing democracy in Iraq.

Congress may control nothing more than the purse strings--

but that is enough. The Congress has all the power it needs

to reopen this discussion, insure that assumptions are well

founded, the information is the best available, the

management is sound and the resources are adequate. What it

will take to significantly improve the systems that protect

this nation is small in the relative scheme of things--a few

tenths of a percent of GDP may be no more than we are now

spending on Iraqi reconstruction and one-twentieth of what

we have handed out in tax breaks. Given the stakes, we

cannot afford to do less.

amendment offered in committee to provide $3 billion more

That is why I offered an amendment in Committee to provide

$3 billion to fix some of the most critical security holes.

Our homeland security agencies could do more with this

additional funding--

They could put more radiation and surveillance monitors at

our borders and ports;

They could increase surveillance on our transit systems;

They could increase surveillance by local police of

critical infrastructure facilities;

They could improve the ability of our police and

firefighters to communicate with each other and be suited

properly;

They could inspect additional containers coming into the

United States;

They could put more air marshals on flights;

They could increase our stockpile of antibiotics;

They could increase air patrols of our borders; and

They could fix some holes in our current aviation security

screening system.

This $3 billion, however, would have only been available to

do this if the President agreed. It is disappointing and

shortsighted that the Committee voted along party lines not

even to give him that choice.

The Chairman of the Committee said during markup that he

would probably support my amendment if he had additional

budget allocation. The budget allocations are severely

restricted because the Administration has decided that tax

cuts and the costs of a war should go hand-in-hand. This

squeezes spending on virtually everything else.

We need to stop being penny-wise and pound-foolish. We need

to push the Department of Homeland Security to make needed

security investment now, so that we can be protected

tomorrow. If we do not make those investments until tomorrow,

our protection may come too late.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me the customary 30 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, much is being said about how tight fiscal restraints are this year. We know that is so, but it is not an excuse for our current budget constraints. Just a few years ago, the Federal Government had a budget surplus of $3 trillion. Today, the government is facing historic deficits upward of $7 trillion. Bad fiscal policy has hamstrung the Federal Government's abilities to invest the sums necessary to protect the Nation from terrorism. The tight budget numbers are the result of tax giveaways to people who least need it, the people that the ``Oracle of Omaha,'' Warren Buffett, has said owe the most to the country and pay far too little.

It is good for the Nation that overall funding for the Department of Homeland Security has increased. However, the increase is not enough. The cost of securing the Nation is high, but throwing dollars at the threat is not the solution. We must spend homeland security funds wisely, and all homeland security activities must be coordinated within the department itself and with State and local governments.

But well into its second year, the department is still underachieving. Several years into our own war on terrorism, the department has not developed a comprehensive threat vulnerability assessment. How can we protect the people of this country when we act blindly without this basic information necessary to develop and implement a comprehensive homeland security plan?

Recent reports have shown that airports are not any safer despite the creation of Transportation Security Administration. There is no coordination of homeland security functions along the southern or along the northern border.

I represent the second busiest gateway between the United States and Canada, and the need to increase the resources along the over 4,000- mile border between the U.S. and Canada is great. For years, little attention was paid to our northern border. But if we are to maintain the $1 billion a day trade between the United States and

Canada while maintaining U.S. safety and security, we have to provide the resources to do it. We must create a northern border coordinator to ensure our dollars are invested prudently and that Federal, State and local authorities are working together.

I am extremely troubled by the $300 million cut to funding for our first-responders, the people on the ground valiantly protecting our communities with too few resources and lots of overtime. How can we justify cutting funding for police officers, firefighters and EMTs, who are the first people on the scene to respond to a terrorist attack? Money has been awarded to States and localities, but the process is so cumbersome and lengthy that local governments have difficulty actually spending the first-responder grant money.

It is also imperative that we take threat, vulnerability, and strategic importance into account when we allocate the first-responder dollars. High threat areas with high population densities certainly deserve attention and dollars. Areas of strategic importance need and deserve Federal assistance. And, as I mentioned, the border crossings at Buffalo and Niagara Falls are the second busiest portals between the United States and Canada. This entry port is tactically important to the security of the United States. Terrorists could use this entrance to gain access to the country or use the bridges as a means to slip weapons into the country. Western New York's strategic position and role are vital to national safety. Such areas need the resources to secure the northern border without disrupting the important commerce between the United States and Canada.

Mr. Speaker, another issue that greatly bothers me, and is an insult to every taxpayer in this country, are the corporate expatriates, American companies that incorporate abroad in order to skip out on their tax obligations to this country. These corporations earn millions of dollars from the Federal Government. According to the General Accounting Office, corporate expatriates cost this country an estimated $5 billion in lost tax dollars, and yet they continue to receive $2.7 billion in government contracts. That is a disgrace.

Accenture, the scion of Arthur Andersen of infamous Enron fame, recently received a $10 billion contract to build a foreign traveler tracking system known as US-VISIT. During committee consideration of the homeland security appropriations, the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro) and the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Berry) offered an amendment to ensure that companies incorporated outside the United States for tax purposes could not enter into contracts with the Department of Homeland Security. It makes sense. The DeLauro-Berry amendment would void the Accenture contract by barring any contracts with corporate expatriates before, on or after the date of enactment.

H. Res. 675 protects the first part of the DeLauro-Berry amendment, which will probably disappear in conference, but it specifically refuses to protect the second provision in the amendment that would invalidate the $10 billion contract with Accenture.

Bloomberg News reported that Accenture posted increases in American earnings from $247.3 billion in 2002 to $566.9 billion in 2003, doubled in one year, while the company reduced its tax liability to $143 million from $382 million. During that same time period, Federal procurement records show that in 2002 Accenture benefited from Federal contracts worth $450 million, of which $250 million were related to military or homeland security functions, another disgrace.

At this time, when unemployment levels have remained consistent since December 2003, it is important that we as public servants and as agents of the Federal Government do everything we can to keep jobs in this country. We should not reward companies that incorporate outside the United States in order to avoid Federal taxes.

Think of the advantage it gives them in bidding against American companies. Expatriate corporations like Accenture have a huge structural advantage over companies that stay in America, employ Americans and pay their fair share of taxes. It is our duty to support the American companies. Giving the largest contract yet awarded by the Department of Homeland Security to an expatriate company contradicts the principles and ideals that I was sent here to uphold.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Berry).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations.

(Mr. OBEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Sabo), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner).

Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman have any further speakers?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to close.

Mr. Speaker, when the previous question is called I will ask for a no vote. It seems that hardly a day goes by that we do not turn on television and hear some new report on a terrorist plot around the world. Some of the most recent reports have indicated terrorists may be planning attacks in the United States this summer. Just the other day authorities arrested a man in Ohio allegedly planning to blow up a shopping mall.

With news like this it is little wonder that the security of our Nation weighs heavily on the minds of our constituents. Unfortunately, the bill before us today does not provide an adequate level of funding to give our communities the resources that they need to keep America and its people safe. Excluding Project BioShield, the Homeland Security appropriations bill barely keeps up with inflation, and it even cuts funding for programs to help our police, firefighters and emergency personnel 7 percent.

How do we expect to keep our Nation secure when we are cutting funding for the very people tasked with keeping our constituents safe.

It does not have to be this way, Mr. Speaker. Last night at the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) brought forth a very important and responsible amendment that would have provided an additional $3 billion to the Department of Homeland Security in a contingent emergency reserve. As the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) pointed out in his testimony, this money could be used to increase the number of air marshals on planes or to address the problems in our current aviation security screening system.

It could provide for more radiation and surveillance monitors at our borders and ports and allow for increased inspection of shipping containers coming into the country. It could be used to increase surveillance in our transit systems and to improve communications between police, firefighters and other first responders.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, we will not get a chance to vote on more money for security at our borders or on our transit systems or for our first responders because the amendment by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) was defeated on a straight party line vote.

So today, Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote no on the previous question. If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to the rule that will make in order the amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey). This fund represents a tiny fraction of the money that has gone towards rebuilding Iraq. I do not think it is asking too much to make sure that our own Nation is fully protected and that emergency monies are available should they be needed.

In the 2 years since the creation of the Homeland Security Department, we have found a number of areas that need more resources. The monies contained in the contingency fund could provide a much- needed shot in the arm for these programs and services that may have vulnerabilities. Mr. Speaker, this should not be a partisan issue. The safety of our Nation and its citizens is of utmost importance to all of us in this House.

Today this Congress can put aside partisanship and act to protect America's homeland by giving the Department of Homeland Security the additional resources provided in the Obey amendment to meet our most urgent security concerns.

I am confident that all Americans and all Members of this House support that sentiment. So I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to vote no on the previous question.

Let me emphasize that a no vote will not stop the House from taking up the Homeland Security appropriations bill. It will not prevent other amendments from being offered under this rule. However, a yes vote will prevent the House from considering this badly-needed amendment to create an emergency contingency fund for homeland security and preserve that department's ability to more fully protect Americans against terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the amendment immediately prior to the vote on the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote no on the previous question and yield the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, today we bring to the House floor the fiscal year 2005 budget recommendations for the Department of Interior and related agencies. This bill includes $19.5 billion, which is $156 million below the budget request and $257 million below the enacted level.

Given our allocations, this is a balanced bipartisan bill. It provides significant operation increases for our national parks. It increases funding above the level requested for Indian schools and hospitals and clinics. It provides increased wildland fire programs and continues to make forest health a high priority. We have fully funded the healthy forests initiative.

There is an additional appropriation, in title IV of the bill, for urgent fire suppression. It includes $500 million for fiscal year 2004 and $500 million for fiscal year 2005. These funds will be made available to the extent they are needed to fight fires in those fiscal years. Given our past problems with insufficient fire fighting funds, the budget resolution includes a special allocation adjustment for this purpose.

The bill reported out of committee maintains funding for proven, mission-essential grant programs that are strongly supported by Congress and restores funding to ensure that core programs in the bill are continued.

We have partially restored critical energy research programs to protect the investment the Congress and the taxpayer have made to ensure that energy is used more efficiently and cleanly. It just does not make sense to terminate arbitrarily successful research programs before they reach a logical conclusion, and that is why we have taken this measure.

The committee transferred jurisdiction for the Weatherization Assistance Program from the Interior bill to the Labor, Health, and Human Services bill, which has the responsibility for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. LIHEAP already includes a set-aside for weatherization, and it is, logical to keep these two programs together in the same bill.

We have made difficult but sensible decisions in the energy area. Overall, energy research funding is reduced by 7 percent, after adjustments for jurisdictional change for weatherization. We hope to be able to increase this as we move forward with the bill in conference.

In order to restore funding for mission essential programs, we have reduced new construction, land acquisition and grant programs.

This is a challenging year, but this is a bill that is balanced and fair, and I urge all Members to support it.

I want to thank my friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the minority ranking member, for the hard work that he has done in producing this bill, as well as the entire committee, and both the majority and minority staff for their work on this.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, relating to the operation funds, we hope maybe in the conference we will be able to provide more money, after we work with the Senate, for the Interior bill. But we have a letter from the parks director, and this is the second letter that they have sent; and also in public testimony they pointed out that there is not going to be any reductions in visitors' services or access to the park facilities this year. Let me repeat that. Her instructions to the National Park Service field management was clear that the parks facilities are to be available at the same level as they were in the last year, with some amounts for changes for operating hours where individual work might be going on.

So we do not expect parks to be closed. We do not expect any different changes in visitation for our people who will be vacationing at national parks.

We put $1 billion into parks operation. That was a $55 million increase; and while we all want to look for more money for our entire public lands, we think this is adequate, and we have the Parks Service's guarantee that we will not be closing parks under any circumstances this year.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, year after year we try to massage our conscience for the failure in education to address a lot of the problems of the arts and humanities. We spend billions of dollars there and we never mention this in the education budget or any of the related budgets, so we think a few million dollars in the humanities or the arts will solve all the problems. It will, as one gentlewoman said, or gentleman, where the arts are disappearing from the community, it will solve that problem. The bureaucracy that is funded here and the limited programs that are funded here will not even begin to do that.

We find that there is a need to raise the cultural level in the United States, both in the arts and the humanities. There is a need for us to see that young people recognize the documents vital in our Nation's history. I take tours through the Capitol with young people. Most of the teachers and the young people have not a clue about the paintings and the things that are going on in the Capitol. But it will not be solved by increasing the amount of money for the arts and the humanities.

Our committee has a tough job. We have to increase the funding, natural funding for the forests and parks and various others, Indian health, the environment. We were cut $257 million enacted and we kept the NEA at last year's level and we increased NEH $3.5 million. There is a demand now that we increase it $13.5 million more. Based on the cuts that were in the overall bill, it was important to note that we increased both NEA and NEH. In fiscal year 2002, we increased some $15 million to the NEH and the NEA $13 million in 2003. We have grown the fund more than the rate of inflation, but it will not solve the problems of the men and women who spoke here and the dream that they are going to solve all these problems in the arts and the humanities. But it can do this. The amendment reduces administrative funds. The gentleman from Washington and I realize that we are short in that area, anyway. We know that they are going to be called on for funds and we know that that is going to be a problem. When we get to the conference, we hope we can increase that.

It is not clear that the vehicle offset that the gentlewoman from New York discussed will be sufficient. And so we risk the chance that the amendment will impair the on-grounds operation of environment protection, Indian programs, it could reduce the department's funding, including hearings and appeals and support for Indian trust reform. The committee is watchful certainly, the gentleman from Washington and I both, in areas of administrative abuse in trying to rein in excessive spending and travel in other areas and Members can count on our oversight to try to look in any other areas. But moving the money around as suggested could be very dangerous for the balance we have in this bill.

I ask Members to join me in opposition to this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman. The San Marcos National Monument in St. Augustine, Florida, is one of the outstanding examples of parks for the east coast, and his effort is commendable.

As the gentleman can appreciate, we cannot make commitments on future appropriations, but we will certainly consider the gentleman's request once the project is authorized.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California for yielding to me and greatly appreciate her continued leadership on this issue. I look to continue work with her during the conference on this very important issue.

Mr. Chairman, I assure the gentleman that the subcommittee continues to support this very important effort. Allocation constrained us from increasing funding for the program in our fiscal year 2005 recommendations, but we have included a general increase of $2 million for invasive species research, and I think that this program may qualify for some of those funds.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of title I be considered as read, printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.

Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly rise in opposition to this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I share the gentlewoman's concern for forests, as our entire committee did. We restored much of the money in the healthy forest initiative. It has $500 million for fighting fire in 2004 and $500 million for fighting fires in 2005, and we hope we can get through conference so we can get that 2004 money as quickly as possible for this year.

We also have a $58 million increase for hazardous fuel reduction. This is a large increase, and we think it will be ample, especially given the tight situation we have this year, the tight allocation.

On the other hand, we are 7 percent below in our energy programs, and we have restored a number of those above what the administration wanted at the time, and we hope we can restore more and maybe during the conference.

I would oppose this, not because I am against the gentlewoman's enthusiasm for preventing fires, but we have adequate money, I think, for this coming year to give that prevention, as well as fighting fires in this tight budget year.

Mr. Chairman, I certainly share the gentleman's concern, and we will work with the gentleman. It is outrageous, and we appreciate the gentleman bringing this to our attention; and we will work toward that.

Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I guess I am here to speak for the cultural iconoclasts of the Congress and of the Nation who are concerned about the fact that the gentleman from Connecticut who just spoke is correct in that he says this is a statement, a statement that the government has a role to play in the funding of the arts. This is the ultimate sort of decision we must make here and we will, of course, after a certain period of time as to exactly why it is the Federal Government's role to participate in this.

It is not for me to suggest that any of the things that the National Endowment for the Arts or Humanities does with the money is inappropriate. I am sure that in 2003, the New York Foundation for the Arts to support a fine-cut edit of Check Your Body At the Door, a video documentary about popular, social and club dancers in New York City; or, say, the Orange Show Foundation in Houston, Texas, to support conservation and restoration of the Beer Can House, a work by self- taught artist John Milkovisch. The Houston landmark, consisting of a house and grounds decorated with methodically trimmed cans, will be used as an artist-in-residence project space. I am sure that Lawyers for the Creative Arts, which got $10,000 to support the expansion of pro bono legal and arts mediation services, the project will provide artists and arts organizations in northern Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin with access to free legal expertise. I am sure that all of these things have some need, that there are certainly good reasons why they should be supported, but earlier on the gentleman from Iowa stood up here and said that we should respect the differences that people have about the arts. We can argue all of us, any of us, about any of these things I mentioned or any of the other things done and supported by the National Endowment for the Arts are, quote, appropriate. But it is relevant, of course, because we should stay neutral on the arts. The only way to do that, I suggest to the gentleman from Iowa and to my friends on the other side, is to, in fact, stay out of the business of funding the National Endowment for the Arts.

I will have an amendment following this to reduce the funding for it, and I will certainly hope to establish the priorities clearly in the minds of the taxpayers of this country as to where this House stands, whether we support a variety of other more relevant issues and more relevant endeavors than the arts, but it is not the debate. The debate is not over the arts in and of themselves, and it is absolutely true that they would certainly exist. The $27 billion spent in 2001 on nonprofit arts in this country certainly is the way in which arts should be funded. And to suggest that $120 million from the Federal Government in any way, shape or form improves the quality of life frankly for anybody, even one person in this country, based upon what it does to influence the arts, I think is essentially ludicrous. It has no real impact. But it does take money from people and it says we will put you in the position of making a decision and you cannot remain neutral.

All of the reasons we have heard and hear every single year about why the arts are good, in fact, wholesome and help the culture and develop all kinds of wonderful experiences in our life and develop better people, all those things are probably true. I do not argue with any of them. I do not argue with the fact that religion does exactly the same thing in the United States, provides people with the ability to go beyond themselves and to experience great things and to become innervated by the experience. That is all great. But, of course, it has got nothing to do with us.

Why should the government fund any religious activity? But we would do so. If we were to listen to the reasons why we should fund the arts, we should certainly fund, quote, religion. We should establish a board, give it $120 million, let it determine what is the proper religious experience to provide money for, because it does all of the same things for people that the arts do. But, of course, we do not do that. We do not do it because we want to remain neutral.

So I suggest that in an attempt to become more neutral on this particular issue, we should reduce the funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities and hopefully eventually stop doing it at all.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Chairman pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have had a robust debate on the issue of funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, and I do not intend to revisit that particular part of this debate. I am, however, going to suggest that we should reduce the budget for the National Endowment by $60 million and redirect the money to the budget for the U.S. Forest Service for law enforcement services.

Thankfully, the committee rejected calls by the administration to increase financing for the National Endowment for the Arts by as much as $20 million this year, but spending $120 million and change for taxpayers' funded arts still makes no sense.

Many people on both sides of the aisle have long recognized the need for additional law enforcement personnel on our public lands. The sprawling Coronado National Forest in southern Arizona, for example, which shares a border with Mexico, has fewer than a dozen law enforcement personnel, this despite the fact that it has become a hotbed for drug and immigrant smuggling and a welcome mat for would-be terrorists attempting to enter the United States from Mexico through sparsely patrolled wildlands.

Similar problems are faced by other public land agencies, including the National Park Service. A young park ranger in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument was murdered by Mexican drug smugglers in 2002. The public land agencies have less than 200 law enforcement officers combined to patrol almost 6,000 miles of public lands adjacent to the border.

These challenges are not unique to the Coronado, or to public lands on the border. National forests across the country face a shortage of law enforcement personnel as well. This hampers the ability of the agencies to combat everything from irresponsible recreation to marijuana cultivation on public lands. It also inhibits the ability of the agencies to maintain a safe and enjoyable environment for visitors.

Enhancing the ability of the Forest Service to help maintain a safe environment for visitors and to enhance homeland security on public lands would seem to be a far more important priority to fund than spending more than $100 million on federally subsidized art.

There was a discussion, as I say, during the last amendment that we are in the process here of trying to establish priorities for the budget of the United States, and certainly it seems to me to be appropriate for us to make a decision as to whether or not we would rather have a more vigorous enforcement of law in our national parks, which, by every calculation, by every agency that has looked at this issue, says we are in dire shape because of massive influences, the massive number of people coming through the area, coming through illegally and for a variety of purposes, some, of course, just coming for jobs, others coming with the transportation of illegal narcotics.

It is a very dangerous place, a place I have along the southern and northern border both visited many times. In each case I am confronted by folks down there, the Border Patrol, the Park Service, everybody who is involved with any sort of enforcement activity, law enforcement activity, who say they are in desperate need of help, that they are overwhelmed.

As I say, 200 people are committed to trying to protect a border literally thousands of miles long. It does not make sense. It only makes sense that in this bill, in a bill that is for the Interior, a bill that is supposed to reflect our priorities for Interior and management of our public lands, it only makes sense that we would reorient the budget and reprioritize it to provide more for the protection of our public lands and less for nationally subsidized art.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment to prohibit the use of recreational fees to indirectly cover any costs of biological monitoring for endangered, threatened, or candidate species under the Endangered Species Act. And as the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) said, the intention when we passed the demo fee on rec fee programs was to use that money to enhance the visitor experience in the parks. I think we all agreed on that. That was something that was very popular, and it is something that the Committee on Resources is working on right now in authorizing that program to become a permanent or a long-term program. It was never our intention at the time, nor is it now, for this money to be used in this way.

I would like to point out that, as the gentleman from California said, they used almost $1 million to do this monitoring, and not only was it for going out and doing monitoring. This nice sand buggy that they have got here was purchased at the cost of $60,000 with demo fee money. That was never our intention when this was originally passed. And I believe that the gentleman's amendment is extremely important in protecting those demo fee moneys so that the money actually goes back into the facility to be used to enhance the visitors' experience in that facility. That was our intention then; that is our intention now. As the Committee on Resources moves forward with making this a more permanent demo fee project, we will make sure that that does not happen again.

I fully support the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment says that none of the funds made available by this act may be used to adversely affect the physical integrity of Indian sacred sites on Federal lands as such terms are defined in the Executive Order No. 13007, dated May 24, 1996.

This sounds pretty straightforward and innocent enough, and who could vote against protecting a sacred site? The gentleman should be commended for his efforts to safeguard areas of cultural significance for Native Americans, and the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. Rahall), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee) and myself have worked together on a lot of Native American issues over the past several years, and I appreciate their help. The gentleman should be commended for that.

The problem with this amendment is simple: It has not been the subject of a hearing in the Committee on Resources. This is because we only saw this amendment for the first time yesterday. There also has not been a process for consultation with the tribes on this amendment, in which tribes have agreed to use an appropriations bill as a vehicle for addressing this issue.

No one wants to allow Federal land managers to adversely affect a sacred site. We all wish to protect sacred sites from desecration, vandalism and abuse. But we are then asked to take it on faith alone that this amendment will result in exactly what the author intends.

But what will this amendment do? That is the question I have. I do not think any of us know. The gentleman has taken an executive order that was intended to be implemented as policy out of the administration and attached a limitation on funding.

As the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Taylor) said in his comments, none of us really knows what that means. If there are sacred sites within a national park, which we know that there are in several cases, what does that mean on a limitation of funds on this particular bill? Is the Park Service going to be able to use that park? Is the public going to be able to use that park, if it is in any way determined that that is desecration to the sacred site or could in some way upset that particular site?

The gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. Rahall) read what it says in the executive order about defining what a sacred site is. That is an extremely broad definition that we have to work with. What does that mean to the use of those Federal lands? On BLM lands, what does it mean if we have a limitation on using funding? What does it mean to the Fish and Wildlife Service if they are called in on section 7, consultation of the Endangered Species Act, on a military base, and that is determined to be a sacred site? All of those different issues, we have no idea what the real impact of that is going to be.

I know what the gentleman's intention is on this particular amendment, and I support the gentleman wholeheartedly on what he is trying to do.

But to try to come in on an appropriations bill and attach a limitation

on funding on to an executive order, we have no idea what the outcome of that is going to be.

The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee) talked about all of the different laws that we have passed as a Congress to protect Native American sacred sites. If those laws in some way do not fulfill our mission, we should sit down in the committee and work out what amendments have to be passed on those laws in order to achieve what the gentleman is trying to achieve with this particular amendment.

I think it is a big mistake to try to do this on an appropriations bill. For one thing, I have not had a chance to talk to any of the tribes about this and what the impact is going to be and how they are going to interpret that. They have been very vocal in their opposition to dealing with Native American issues with riders on appropriations bills. And I cannot imagine at this point in time that they would reverse their stance on riders on appropriations bills, even though they may support what the underlying issue is on this particular one.

I reluctantly oppose the gentleman on this particular amendment, because I know that the gentleman's heart is in the right place with what he is trying to do. But I think it would be a huge mistake for all of us. And to my colleagues on the minority side, they have to really think about what this amendment is doing. It sounds good, it is something we all want to do, but we are talking about a limitation on funding attached to an executive order that was never intended to be used that way.

None of us have any idea how this is going to be interpreted by the administration. We have no idea how it is going to be interpreted by the courts. And that is where this is ultimately going to end up, and it would be a big mistake for us to go forward with this.

I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''

I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, there was nothing to stop BLM from saying no to begin with. The gentleman's amendment tells them they have to say no, and that is the problem. We do not know how this is going to be interpreted. We do not know how the administration is going to take this out; we do not know how the courts are going to interpret it.

Mr. Chairman, we have a number of sacred sites which are located on national parks, on BLM land, on Forest Service land. How is it going to be interpreted in the courts once a funding limitation is put in place that we cannot move forward with some things on those particular parks? It is not a negotiated settlement; it is not sitting down with the tribes and consulting and trying to work it out. What it is, the gentleman is demanding that no funds be used. That is what the gentleman's amendment does.

I just do not believe that because of the process that this is going through, we have had the opportunity to hear out exactly how this is going to be interpreted by the administration and by the courts and where we are ultimately going to end up. I support the gentleman in what he is trying to do, but we cannot do this on an appropriations bill because we do not know what is going to come out of that. I just think it is a mistake to do it in this way.

I yield to the gentleman from Washington.