Air Cargo Security Improvement Act
Legislative Activity
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Referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
May 9, 2003
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Introduced in Senate
January 15, 2003
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR S850-851)
January 15, 2003
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
January 15, 2003
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with amendments favorably.
March 13, 2003
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Reported by Senator McCain under authority of the order of the Senate of 4/11/2003 with amendments. With written report No. 108-38.
April 24, 2003
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 76.
April 24, 2003
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S5929-5939; text of measure as reported in Senate: CR S5929-5931)
May 8, 2003
Committee amendments withdrawn by Unanimous Consent.
May 8, 2003
Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent. (text as passed Senate: CR S5936-5939)
May 8, 2003
Received in the House.
May 9, 2003 • 9:39 AM
Message on Senate action sent to the House.
May 9, 2003
Referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
May 9, 2003
Floor Debate
22 membersWhat members said about S. 165 on the floor
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Floor Debate
22 membersWhat members said about S. 165 on the floor
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, the Nation's eyes have been turned to war overseas. The country's focus has been on the daily…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, the Nation's eyes have been turned to war overseas. The country's focus has been on the daily battles in Iraq. On the news almost daily there have been reports of American soldiers still dying. While the President arguably says that the mission in Iraq has been accomplished, the mission to protect our citizens here at home is far from complete.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, there was a great outcry for strengthening homeland security. Congress responded, infusing $40 billion into the war on terrorism--including efforts to better protect our citizens here at home. But since those early weeks after that clear September morning, the momentum has slowed. The pace has slackened. Homeland security initiatives are falling behind.
Just last month, former Senator Warren Rudman chaired a task force at the Council on Foreign Relations that examined investments in police, fire, and emergency medical teams. This blue ribbon panel included Nobel laureates, U.S. military leaders, former high-level government officials, and other senior experts, and was advised by former White House terrorism and cyber-security chief Richard Clarke. The results of their examination should shake this Congress from its homeland security slumber and especially it should shake the White House from its slumber and from its focus elsewhere.
The task force found that, nearly two years after 9/11, the United States is drastically underfunding local emergency responders and remains dangerously unprepared to handle a catastrophic attack on American soil, particularly one involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-impact conventional weapons. The panel concluded that, if the Nation does not take immediate steps to better identify and address the urgent needs of emergency responders, the next terrorist incident could be even more devastating than 9/11.
Imagine that, more devastating than September 11, 2001.
The underlying legislation before the Senate is the Fiscal Year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. It provides more than $28 billion for a variety of programs, from better border security to natural disaster response efforts. But while this is a step forward, the legislation does not accomplish enough. It does not provide the investments in protections that the Nation so desperately needs.
This fact is not the fault of Subcommittee Chairman Thad Cochran or Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens. The hand that they were dealt was poor from the start. But that does not mean that this Senate needs to settle for less than is needed.
The amendment that I have offered would add critical dollars to some of our Nation's most vulnerable entities. It is a responsible $1.75 billion approach to begin to close the enormous gaps in America's homeland security. The amendment to which I address my remarks at this time is about fulfilling our promises to the American people. After 9/ 11, Congress passed the Patriot Act. It passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act. It passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. It passed the Enhanced Border Security Act. And the President signed these with great fanfare. But when it comes to securing our homeland, the administration follows the same pattern. The President seems to be satisfied with rhetoric, which doesn't cost anything, rather than working with Congress to provide real dollars.
The amendment I offer today is intended to fulfill the promises made for securing our homeland. It would add a total of $1.75 billion for critical homeland security programs. The amendment adds: $602 million for Maritime and Land Security, including port security and transit security; $729.5 million for first responder funding for our police, fire and emergency medical personnel, including funding for high threat urban areas; $238.5 million for security improvements at U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico; it includes 100 million for air cargo security; and it includes $80 million for protections at chemical facilities.
With public warnings ringing in our ears from Secretary Ridge that another terrorist attack is inevitable, some may argue that our homeland security needs seem endless, and therefore the Congress must set limits. I agree that they are endless and that Congress must set limits. That is why this amendment focuses on the specific expanded homeland security missions that Congress has authorized since 9/11, but that the administration has yet to adequately fund. Unfortunately, the budget resolution endorsed by this White House has forced us to exclude from the bill some funding that both the Congress and the President have recognized as being real needs. This amendment focuses on those critical shortfalls. It puts the beam on those critical shortfalls. It puts the microscope right down to their level.
One of the mysteries about the President's budget is the budget for the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA. TSA was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 and was supposed to focus on securing all modes of transportation. Yet the President's budget includes only $86 million or 2 percent of the TSA budget for maritime and land security. Yes, I said 2 percent--just 2 percent of the TSA budget for maritime and land security. The rest of the President's budget request is for aviation security and for--you guessed it--administration. What about securing our ports? What about securing our trains? What about securing our railroad tunnels, and our subways? What about buses or securing the trucks that carry hazardous materials?
In fact, the President's budget requests 2.5 times more for administering the TSA bureaucracy than he does for securing the Nation's ports, trains, trucks, and buses.
This amendment would add $602 million for maritime and land transportation funding. To his credit, Chairman Cochran provided $295 million for these programs. My amendment further enhances the good work Senator Cochran has begun.
On November 25, 2002, the same day that the President signed the Homeland Security Act, he also signed the Maritime Transportation Security Act--MTSA, putting in place significant new standards for improving the security of our 361 ports around the Nation. On July 1, the Coast Guard published regulations putting the MTSA into action.
During the Senate Appropriations Committee's homeland security hearings last year, one witness, Stephen Flynn, noted that the Nation's seaports:
. . . are the only part of an international boundary that the
federal government invests no money in terms of security. . .
. Most ports, the best you get is a chain link fence with
maybe some barbed wire.
Let me repeat that. The Appropriations Committee of the Senate conducted hearings last week, anent homeland security. And we heard testimony from mayors, Governors, and from seven Department heads--I am talking about Departments in the President's Cabinet--and from FEMA as well. And one of these witnesses was Stephen Flynn. Here is what he said about the Nation's seaports. He said:
[They] are the only part of an international boundary that
the federal government invests no money in terms of security.
. . . Most ports, [he said] the best you get is a chain link
fence with maybe some barbed wire.
Comforting? Is that comforting?
Consider that U.S. ports receive 16,000 cargo containers per day and more than 6 million containers per year. Consider the fact that U.S. ports are home to oil refineries and chemical plants that process noxious, volatile chemicals. Consider the additional fact that there are 68 nuclear powerplants located along U.S. waterways and that the average shipping container measures 8 feet by 40 feet and can hold 60,000 pounds. Consider, further, that a ship or tanker transporting cargo can hold more explosives and dangerous materials than could ever be smuggled in an airplane or a truck crossing a land border.
Yet despite the clear danger, the best port protection the American people
have is a chain link fence? It is unfathomable--unfathomable--why we have not insisted this amendment be signed into law months ago.
This amendment would make sure that more than a chain link fence is protecting the Nation's ports. Not too much to ask, is it?
The Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost the ports $5.4 billion during the next decade to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act standards, including $1.1 billion this year; and yet the President did not request one thin dime--can you believe it, not one dime--for port security. The amendment that I will offer, which is at the desk, would increase port security grant funding from the $150 million contained in the bill by $460 million, thus providing a total of $610 million for this program.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard testified before the House authorizing committee on June 3, 2003, about the implementation of the MTSA legislation. Here is what he said:
The regulatory impact on the maritime industry will be
significant, and the time line for implementing the new
robust maritime security requirements is exceptionally short.
However, the administration, while aggressively supporting Federal security funding for the aviation industry, has failed in four straight spending requests to include a single penny--not one red cent--for port security grants even though 95 percent of all non- North American U.S. trade enters our 361 ports around the Nation. This is serious.
During our Homeland Security Subcommittee hearings this spring, I asked Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson why there was no money requested in the President's budget for port security grants and Mr. Hutchinson testified that he believed it was the responsibility of the port industry--the responsibility of the port industry. Yet the port industry's first priority is moving goods through ports as quickly as possible because that increases profits. There must be incentives if we are to realistically expect the ports to improve security.
This year, the Transportation Security Administration received over $1 billion of applications from the ports for the limited funding that was approved by Congress last year. There clearly is a demand from the ports, for help to harden physical security to reduce the Nation's well documented seaport vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that are well documented.
The amendment also addresses other important homeland security needs authorized by the Maritime Transportation Security Act--and yet again not funded.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act requires that vessel and port facility owners prepare and submit security plans to the Department of Homeland Security for the purpose of deterring a transportation security incident. The Coast Guard serves as the lead agency to develop a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan and review all security plans prepared by vessel or facility owners or operators.
To meet requirements set in the MTSA, vessel and facility owners must submit security plans to the Coast Guard for review and approval by the end of calendar year 2003. But, once again, the administration provided no funding to the Coast Guard for this effort or for tracking compliance with the plans in its fiscal year 2004 budget request.
In recent testimony, Coast Guard Commandant ADM Thomas H. Collins acknowledged that the Coast Guard still needs an additional $70 million and 150 full-time employees by this fall to review and approve more than 10,000 security plans by vessel and facility owners. My amendment provides the money.
My amendment also provides $57 million for public transit grants. According to a Mineta Transportation Institute study, one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide have been on transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. According to the study, nine surface transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through the year 2000.
The approximately 6,000 transit agencies in the United States provide more than 9 billion trips each year representing 43 billion passenger miles, and yet the administration has provided minimal funding for transit security.
The General Accounting Office, the GAO, recently reported that:
Insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in
making transit systems as safe and secure as possible.
Mr. President, at just 8 of the 10 transit agencies surveyed, the General Accounting Office identified the need for security improvements estimated at $700 million. The General Accounting Office also found that:
TSA has yet to exert full responsibility for the security
of any transportation mode other than aviation.
The chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 is a sobering reminder of how a terrorist attack on one transit system can affect human lives, the economy, and confidence in our transit systems. How many times do we have to witness attacks on transit systems in other countries before we secure our transit systems?
This amendment would provide $57 million in direct grants to the Transportation Security Administration to help with that shortfall.
The amendment also would add $15 million to the $10 million already provided in the bill for intercity bus grants. A study conducted by the Mineta Transportation Institute, ``Protecting Public Surface Transportation against Terrorism and Serious Crime,'' found that during the period 1997 through 2000, 54 percent of the worldwide attacks on surface transportation systems were against buses or bus terminals.
Almost 800 million people ride over-the-road buses annually, more than the airlines and Amtrak combined. Intercity buses serve approximately 5,000 communities daily, compared to roughly 500 each for the airlines and Amtrak. Intercity buses serve those who truly need public transportation--rural residents who have no other public transportation alternatives and urban residents who must rely on affordable public transportation.
Given the important role that intercity buses play in the Nation's transportation system and their susceptibility to terrorist attacks, they must be protected.
One of the most glaring funding deficiencies identified in the recent Rudman report is the poor support for first responders. The Rudman report estimated that America will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical emergency responder needs in the next 5 years, if current funding levels are maintained. But the legislation before the Senate does not even maintain that current funding level.
While the underlying bill provides first responder funding at a level that is $303 million above the President's request, it is $434 million below the level that the Congress approved for the current fiscal year.
In the nearly 2 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, States and cities have worked to better protect the Nation. They have undertaken critical assessments of vulnerabilities. They have provided specialized training to police officers, firemen, and emergency medical teams. They have attempted to close as many gaps as possible to prevent another terrorist attack. But unfortunately, for many communities, they have had to act without the support of the Federal Government.
A March 2003 analysis by the U.S. Conference of Mayors reports that cities are spending an additional $70 million per week on personnel costs alone, to keep up with security requirements. Mayors and governors have contacted almost every Member of this Congress, if not all, practically begging for additional funds to help defray the huge expenses for homeland security. Their requests come at a time when cities, counties, and states are in the worst financial shape in decades. Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn stated earlier this year that ``We've dug deep into our own pockets. Now we really need the help of the Federal Government.'' This is taken from the Los Angeles Times of February 23. They have come hat in hand for help, and we ought not turn our backs on them.
My amendment adds $500 million to the budget of the Office of Domestic Preparedness for first responders. Specifically, it provides $250 million for
State grants, and $250 million for high threat urban areas, bringing the total for high-threat urban areas to $1 billion. This amendment provides funds to meet the immediate and growing needs that State and local first responders have for funds for equipment, training, homeland security exercises, and planning.
The needs are great.
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Fire Protection Association, only 13 percent of fire departments have the equipment and training to handle an incident involving chemical or biological agents.
Forty percent of fire department personnel involved in hazardous material response lack formal training in those duties.
Only 10 percent of fire departments in the United States have the personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse.
Funds would be used to purchase: Personal protective equipment for first responders--chemical resistant gloves, boots, and undergarments; interoperable communications equipment, portable radios, satellite phones, batteries; detection equipment--equipment, to monitor, detect, sample, identify and quantify chemical, biological, radiological/ nuclear and explosive agents; medical supplies and pharmaceuticals; and, training costs and paying overtime costs associated with attendance at training for emergency responders, emergency managers, and public officials.
My amendment also provides $79.5 million for grants for interoperable communications equipment. This bill currently includes no funds specifically for interoperable communications equipment. This amendment proposes to add $79.5 million, the same amount that was provided in fiscal year 2003.
The initial $79.5 million was a small step in starting the process of integrating and coordinating communications equipment between and among first responders firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel--a deficiency uncovered during the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
Only one-fourth of all fire departments can communicate with all of their rescue partners. The Council on Foreign Relations' June, 2003 study on homeland security needs estimated that the need for interoperable communications equipment funding was $6.8 billion over the next 5 years.
The amendment also provides an additional $150 million for fire grants. The Senate bill includes $750 million for assistance to firefighter grants, roughly the same amount as last year. This amendment would add $150 million for fire grants, which would bring the total to $900 million, the level authorized. Our fire departments need this money.
On average, fire departments across the country have only enough radios to equip half the firefighters on a shift, and breathing apparatuses for only one third.
In the 3 years this program has been in existence, it has become one of the best run programs in the Federal Government. This Senate should fund this program at the authorized level. Our frontline defenders deserve no less.
In October of 2001, the President signed the Patriot Act which called for tripling the number of border patrol agents and Customs and immigration inspectors on the northern border. In May of 2002, the President signed the Enhanced Border Security Act, which authorized significant new investments in border patrol agents and facilities. The goals with regard to Customs inspectors and border facilities cannot be met with the limited funding that was made available for this bill.
The amendment I have offered adds $100 million for improvements to our border ports-of-entry. There are 197 ports-of-entry on our Nation's land borders. Of those, 128 out of 197 are stretched across our 5,525 mile long border with Canada.
The remaining sites are along our highly-trafficked border with Mexico.
Most facilities along the U.S.-Canada border were constructed either as part of the Civilian Conservation Corps program during the Great Depression or in the period between 1950 and 1965. These older facilities are having an increasingly difficult time meeting the energy and power requirements of today's technology.
Along the U.S.-Mexico border, traffic both in people and goods has more than doubled since the last major border infrastructure effort was launched during the Reagan administration.
Trade with Canada has doubled in the last decade, while trade with Mexico has tripled during the same time frame. However, the facilities through which trade must flow have not been expanded or enhanced to keep pace with this traffic.
A Congressionally mandated study called the ``Ports of Entry Infrastructure Assessment Study,'' completed over a year prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, identified a growing backlog of infrastructure needs at our Nation's border crossings. It specifically identified 822 infrastructure requirements with an estimated gross cost of $784 million. That report was completed 3 years ago last month--but Congress has yet to seriously begin to address this growing problem.
Consistent with the Enhanced Border Security Act and legislation introduced in this body by a bipartisan group of Senators, this amendment provides $100 million for the new Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to begin addressing this backlog. The funds provided in this amendment could be used to replace the trailer--yes, the trailer--that serves as a border port-of-entry in Easton, ME, or to complete construction of the San Diego fence along the border with Mexico which was authorized by Congress in 1997.
My amendment would also add $138.5 million to hire additional border protection staff to meet the levels authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act.
While funding in the Committee bill will allow the Bureau for Customs and Border Protection, CBP, to succeed in meeting the Congressionally mandated staffing goal for the Border Patrol by the end of this fiscal year, the remaining components of this newly created bureau fall far short of meeting the authorized target.
The PATRIOT Act authorizes a total of 4,845 legacy Customs, Immigration and Agriculture inspection personnel along the northern border by the end of fiscal year 2004. According to the CBP, it will fall far short of that goal. It estimates that it will only have 3,387 inspection personnel at the many port-of-entry and other facilities that stretch across the 5,525 mile northern border with Canada. This is 1,458 personnel short of the authorized and required level.
My amendment would provide the $138.5 million estimated to complete the hiring initiative called for in the PATRIOT Act. The funds would be used to hire an additional 1,458 inspectors to: enhance our ability to conduct inspections of people and goods entering our country to ensure that the people entering the country are authorized to do so; to ensure that the products in the containers are indeed what they are claimed to be and that no dangerous foods, meats, or other products are brought into the country.
Another key area of focus is air cargo security. Most Americans would be stunned to learn that, under the President's budget proposal, each airline passenger will be screened before boarding a plane. Each passenger's baggage will be screened before being loaded on a plane. But commercial cargo on that same plane is left unchecked.
The amendment would add $100 million to the Transportation Security Administration's budget. The additional funds proposed in this amendment would accomplish some key immediate objectives while at the same time laying the ground work for a more comprehensive, multi-year plan. Of this amount, $70 million would be provided to immediately strengthen and expand a number of ongoing TSA activities while the remaining $30 million would be used to increase research, development and testing of screening technologies and other systems.
The $70 million would be used for the following purposes:
To immediately deploy personnel to the Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center to develop rules for targeting suspicious packages on passenger aircraft and, as resources are provided, all-cargo aircraft; to provide $20 million for approximately 125 inspectors to be devoted to cargo screening. These personnel would be trained to inspect cargo operations, but in keeping with TSA's Aviation Operations strategy to cross-train its personnel, they would be trained for additional duties in future fiscal years; to provide $15 million to advance
by one-year the TSA plan to expand canine screening teams for limited cargo screening. These activities would be co-located at airports currently using TSA canine for screening of U.S. mail, and would work as a complement to EDS screening at smaller locations; to provide $25 million to fully deploy the ``known shipper'' and profiling programs for cargo being carried on passenger aircraft; to provide $5 million to update the risk and vulnerability assessments for cargo operations; to provide $5 million to launch immediately a pilot program to use explosive detection system, EDS, machines at select locations to screen cargo.
The additional $30 million would be added to the currently budgeted $30 million in TSA's research and development account for air cargo activities, doubling the total amount available for research and development within the air cargo pilot program.
Finally, my amendment provides $80 million to begin addressing the issue of physical security at chemical facilities.
Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution has called the lack of security at U.S. chemical plants a ``ticking time-bomb.'' The General Accounting Office has reported that chemical plants remain vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, the GAO noted that 123 chemical facilities across the country, if attacked, could inflict serious damage and expose millions of people to toxic chemicals and gases.
There are 3,000 chemical facilities in 49 States that, if attacked, could affect more than 10,000 people each.
The General Accounting Office found that the Federal Government has not comprehensively assessed the chemical industry's vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, nor has the Federal Government adequately addressed our nuclear vulnerabilities.
The Homeland Security Department is responsible for carrying out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States. The President's National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets identifies chemical plants as part of the Nation's critical infrastructure. We are talking about chemical plants.
Unfortunately, this administration has paid lipservice to the issue by saying that the Homeland Security Department will take the lead in managing vulnerability assessments of U.S. chemical facilities, but--b- u-t--no funding is identified in this budget to do just that.
When I asked Secretary Ridge who was responsible to secure these facilities, he testified that he thought that securing chemical facilities was the responsibility of the chemical industry. Frankly, I do not believe our communities would be satisfied to wait for the administration to wake up to this danger.
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that it will cost $80 million to conduct vulnerability assessments for chemical plants. This amendment I have offered would provide those resources.
Protecting this Nation's communities is not easy. Protecting this Nations communities is not cheap. And protecting this Nation's communities cannot wait. After 9/11, Congress passed the Patriot Act, the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act and the President signed all of these with great fanfare. But the President has done little to fulfill the promise of those laws. Now the Senate has before it the funding legislation that will either fulfill the promise of those acts or continue to leave the Nation vulnerable.
We will hear the same old mantra in opposition to this amendment that money cannot possibly solve the problems facing homeland security. I agree that money cannot solve all of our problems but if we fail to invest sufficient funds, if we fail in the effort to protect our people as best we can, we will never even begin to address them. The gaps in our protections and preparations will continue to grow. We all know these caps exist. And, to be sure, if we know where those gaps are, so do the terrorists know where those gaps are. The American people believe that we here in Washington are taking care of the problem. We must make every effort to close those gaps.
In just a few weeks, America will pause to remember the second anniversary of the moments when the airplanes struck the World Trade Centers, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania field. We again will remember the mothers and fathers, the brothers and sisters, the firefighters, the police officers, the ambulance drivers. We will remember all of those who lost their lives in those tragic moments. And we should remember those who saved our lives when they sent that plane into the Pennsylvania fields. But as we remember the lives of all these, we owe them more than high-sounding rhetoric. We owe them our best judgment. We owe them rational, responsible action. We owe them a legacy that may truly save lives and prevent another terrorist attack from happening.
I urge all Members to be mindful of their solemn duty to ``provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity'' as we debate this important legislation.
I have gone to considerable lengths to speak concerning my amendment. I urge Senators to support the amendment.
I ask unanimous consent that certain Senators have their names added as cosponsors: Senators Lieberman, Cantwell, and Stabenow.
And I welcome the cosponsorship of other Senators--all Senators for that matter. I yield the floor.
Mr. President, Senator Cochran has said there is no end to the list of homeland security needs. He is absolutely correct on that. We could list these security needs from now until Kingdom come. Additional needs can be found. So he is correct. But that does not mean the amendment I have offered is excessive. It does not mean the amendment is excessive. It is targeted to specific activities that Congress has approved.
As I said in the beginning, I named several pieces of legislation that have been approved and signed into law by the President, some of them with great fanfare. So Congress has approved these acts, and the President has signed them into law.
The chairman is correct in stating the progress we have made in hiring Border Patrol agents and inspectors. But that leaves us nearly 1,500 inspectors short of the goal established in the PATRIOT Act. The President signed that law.
Are we serious or are we not serious about meeting the goals set forth in these acts? My amendment would provide the resources to meet the goals that have been set forth in the acts by Congress, the acts that have been signed by the President.
It has also been noted that the bill already includes $150 million for port security grants. But the Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost $1.1 billion in just the first year for the ports to implement the security plan that the Coast Guard issued on July 1, pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
Who signed that act? The President signed it. Who issued the regulations? The Coast Guard. Are they serious or not about port security? Is the President serious? The amendment would result in less than $1 billion of total funding. This is less than the Coast Guard's $1.1 billion estimate.
Our distinguished chairman has said he tried to include a base level of funding for grants to equip and train our police, fire, and medical personnel. And I compliment the chairman. He has done a masterful job in writing the provisions in the bill we have before us, a masterful job in distributing the limited amounts that have been provided to the chairman and to the committee for distribution. He has sought to exercise good judgment. He has done so--with the limitations.
The problem is, we do not have enough funds to appropriately allocate to meet the needs of the country. But I do not believe that establishing a base level of funding is enough. When a nonpartisan organization such as the Council on Foreign Relations estimates a $98 billion shortfall over the next 5 years, I simply cannot understand why the committee funding level is enough. It is $434 million below the level available in fiscal year 2003.
With regard to funding chemical facilities security, the chairman notes there is significant funding in the bill for securing critical infrastructure. Yet, nearly 2 years after 9/11, we have no details-- none--from the administration describing how these funds would be used. Secretary Ridge testified to the subcommittee that he believes that securing chemical facilities is the responsibility of the chemical industry.
I do not believe we should continue to wait for the administration to get its act together. We should not allow the budget resolution to artificially limit our ability to address known vulnerabilities in this country. Our citizens do not know about budget resolutions. Our citizens do not know about 302(b) allocations. But they do know they feel vulnerable to terrorist attacks that Secretary Ridge has said are inevitable.
Mr. President, the full committee conducted careful and extensive hearings last year. We had seven Department heads here before the committee. The committee membership was there. The committee hearings were well attended. Senator Stevens and I carefully selected witnesses to appear before those hearings. There were Governors who appeared. There were mayors who appeared. There were members of county commissions who appeared. First responders appeared. Firemen, policemen, health personnel appeared at those hearings. And we have gone over those hearings carefully. The staff has gone over those hearings and painstakingly gleaned from the rich testimony that was submitted by these public officials and public servants. Based on those and subsequent hearings, we decided that these are needs that ought to be addressed. And so I have tried to address these needs in the amendment.
As I say, the amendment adds $1.75 billion. That would fund 42 hours of the Defense Department expenditures. The Defense Department will be spending $1 billion a day on the military--$1 billion a day. They are spending a billion dollars a week in Iraq. Why can't we spend $1.75 billion on the protection of our own people, and our industries here, the protection of our own infrastructure; $1.75 billion to defend the American people, to defend our infrastructure, to defend our ports, to meet the needs of our ports, $1.75 billion? We spend a $1 billion every 24 hours on our defense budget. Yet when it comes to defending this country, defending its infrastructure, then we say it is too much.
I hope Senators will support the motion to waive the point of order. As I close my remarks at this point, I thank the distinguished chairman for his characteristic courtesy and also for his proficiency, his professional handling of this bill and the hearings. He attended the hearings, started them on time, and asked incisive questions. He is always fair to those on the minority side. I have nothing but praise for him. And I thank the cosponsors of the amendment. I must state again, however, that I feel the need for adding appropriations as I am attempting to do here.
A stitch in time saves nine. There is no question in my mind but that we are underfunding the homeland security needs. The Senator has done the best he could with the limited amount of moneys, but there is no good reason why we can't add moneys to this bill. We have to overcome the point of order, of course. There is a 60-vote point of order. That is difficult. But Senators may come to rejoice in having voted for this amendment. Who knows?
I see the distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. President, I want to thank the very distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, on the ringing defense of the provisions that are set forth in the amendment that I and several other Senators are cosponsoring. I do not think any Senator could come to this floor with better credentials than those of the Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton. She represents the State and the city that was the hardest hit by the terrorist attacks on 9/11. There is only one other State and one other jurisdiction that suffered, but she has made an extraordinary plea coming from the experiences that she has suffered as a result of 9/11.
I was chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the Senate, and she came to my office not once, not twice, not three times but many times in support of the appropriations that the Senate was considering and that the Senate finally enacted. She had a great impact on me as we sat and talked and as I listened to her recount the problems of her city, the problems of New York City and of New York State that resulted from those attacks.
So I thank her for her support of the amendment and say that no one in the Senate could have made a finer statement in support, and no one in the Senate would better understand the needs the American people have as we try to prepare against any future terrorist attacks. I thank her and her staff for the excellent effort they have put into this matter.
I yield the floor.
Will the Senator yield?
Let me express my appreciation to the Senator for his support of the amendment; more than that, for his steadfast support of the appropriations as we have dealt with this problem time and again on the floor.
The Senator, as is Senator Clinton, is a member of the Armed Services Committee, and his support for this amendment tells a lot. Here is the support of two Senators on the Armed Services Committee. They have been on there quite a while. They have seniority.
The Senator from Rhode Island is an outstanding member of the committee. I deeply appreciate his support of this amendment. I appreciate his patriotism and his eloquence and support of preparing this country against such attacks as it was subjected to on September 11, 2001.
Mr. President, I realize this is not debatable. I shall shortly move to waive the point of order, which will be debatable, not that I intend to take long in debating it. But if the Chair will indulge me momentarily, I want to thank Senator Dodd for his very forceful and cogent and persuasive statement in support of the amendment. He is extremely eloquent. He intends to follow up this statement after a little while with an amendment of his own. But I thank him profusely, without being profuse, for an excellent, excellent statement. I believe his perspicacity will be rewarded in time. I believe it will be. I know the American people are better off for having him in the Senate and for the support he has given to this amendment. I hope the Senate will prevail in support of the statement of the Senator from Connecticut.
Now, Mr. President, pursuant to section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, I move to waive the applicable sections of that act for purposes of the pending amendment.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, will the Senator withhold?
Mr. President, while Senator Nelson is coming to the floor, let me just remind my colleagues that I offered an amendment last January to add $5 billion to the omnibus appropriations bill for 2003 for homeland security programs such as port security, nuclear security, airport security, and first responders. The White House labeled the amendment as extraneous spending and the amendment was defeated.
So what happened? Ten weeks later, the White House requested a $4.4 billion supplemental. And a month later, Congress approved $5.1 billion of supplemental homeland security funding. So the White House was a day late and several hundred million dollars short. All the White House accomplished was the delay of critical homeland security investments for 3 months.
That was a repeat of the same old tune we heard from the White House at the time Senator Stevens and I wrote a letter to the White House and to Secretary Ridge urging that there be more money for homeland security. Secretary Ridge responded with a letter to Senator Stevens and to me saying that the White House believed that our amendment was extraneous for the moment and that the White House would be submitting its own request in due time.
So it seems that whenever we have attempted to offer legislation to protect our own country, to protect the people of the country, to protect the infrastructure of the country, to protect the industries of the country from attack, the administration always says it does not need these moneys and that in due time it will submit its own request. And so that seems to be the record today.
Today we are debating an amendment to add just $1.75 billion for homeland security. And the majority, speaking for the administration, says the amendment is too large. Mr. President, history has a way of repeating itself. The Senate should approve this amendment today. The Senate should not wait for the White House to recognize real homeland security vulnerabilities. Delay does not make the Nation more secure.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Florida, Mr. Nelson, and I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, for their excellent statements. I thank them for supporting the amendment. I hope the
Senate will vote to waive the point of order.
I agree this is important and timely funding for one of the many needs facing our Nation as we deal with terrorist threats.
Yes, I understand this project is in development in Nevada. I encourage the Department to consider using a portion of the $13 million appropriated for hazardous materials tracking to help initiate the development of this project.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3706 on behalf of Senator Shelby, Senator Roberts, Senator Bond, Senator…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3706 on behalf of Senator Shelby, Senator Roberts, Senator Bond, Senator Wyden, Senator Bayh, Senator Feinstein, and myself.
I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, this is one of two amendments which I intend to offer to strengthen the position of the national intelligence director. At the outset, I join many others in complimenting the chairwoman, Senator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, for their leadership and their outstanding work in presenting the bill which is now on the floor.
This measure is a long time in coming for decision by the Congress. In my view, had there been a strong national intelligence director in existence prior to September 11, 2001, the attack on 9/11 might well have been prevented. There were many indicators present. Had they all been put together, I think there is a good chance we could have avoided the calamity of that day.
There is a famous FBI report from Phoenix about this suspicious character who wanted to learn how to fly an airplane but who was not interested in takeoffs or landings. That information never got to the appropriate authority in headquarters at the FBI. There were two al- Qaida suspects in Kuala Lumpur known to the Central Intelligence Agency, information not communicated to the INS, to Immigration, so that those two al-Qaida agents came into the United States and were among the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11.
There was an extensive investigation conducted by the Minneapolis office of the FBI, the famous 13-page, single-spaced memorandum by special agent Coleen Rowley about Zacarias Moussaoui. Had those leads been followed, had there been an application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act using the right standard--the FBI used the wrong standard--that would have produced a great deal of information which could have, in combination with other information, been pieced together to have warned us of the impending attack.
There is the information from NSA, where there was the tip that something was going to happen on 9/11 which was either not translated or not communicated to the Intelligence Committee.
There had been the information about Murad, an al-Qaida operative back in 1996, and his plans to fly an airplane into the CIA.
Those are only some of the threats. In combination and along with others, had we had all the information together, had we known what could have been pieced together, I think the likelihood is present that 9/11 could have been prevented.
During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committee reported a bill, S. 1718, which sought to lodge effective power in the Director of Central Intelligence. That position theoretically was in charge of all the intelligence community but, because of lack of authority, lack of budget control, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was never able to carry out the role of being the unifier, the real leader of the intelligence community.
In section 707 of that bill, it provided for:
Enhancement of authority of Director of Central
Intelligence to manage, budget, personnel, and activities of
the intelligence community.
On a cross referral, by the time it got to the Armed Services Committee, the substance was taken out. There was a big turf battle and the effort to lodge authority in the Director of CIA to do effective direction and management of the Central Intelligence Agency went to naught.
Thirty days after 9/11, Senator Lieberman and I introduced legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. That was on October 11 of 2001. When special agent Coleen Rowley testified before the Judiciary Committee in June of 2002, there was finally impetus to get support from the administration to move ahead with a Department of Homeland Security, and when the matter was debated on the floor of the Senate, the effort was made to vest authority in the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct other intelligence agencies. It seemed to us that when we were creating a new department, Homeland Security, this was an opportune time to pick up the strands of what had been attempted by S. 1718 back in 1996, and by many others.
It wasn't my idea alone. The Scowcroft Commission had come up with similar recommendations. Others had called for real power and real authority in a national director. It seemed to us that that was the time, with the new Department of Homeland Security, to give this effective power to the newly created Secretary of Homeland Security.
Our efforts, again, were unsuccessful because of the turf battles, because of the interests of the CIA and the Department of Intelligence, DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense and the FBI, and the
other agencies to protect their own turf.
In October of 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill and went home leaving the Senate with the alternative of either taking the bill or letting the matter go over until the next year. I was prepared at that time to offer the amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to direct some real power. After talking to Secretary Ridge, talking with the Vice President, and talking with the President, rather than have no bill at all, it was decided to proceed and let the matter stand without having that kind of authority for the Secretary of Homeland Security.
There the matter languished until the families of the victims of September 11 became a powerful advocacy group, which led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 Commission report was filed in July of this year. There was very substantial momentum finally to create a national intelligence director with some real authority to really manage the entire community.
Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I have produced a bill as had been recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then the Governmental Affairs Committee proceeded to have hearings, came back after the recess in late July, had hearings in August, marked up the bill, and passed it out of committee last week. So it is now on the floor in a context where there is considerable public pressure created by the 9/11 Commission report and what the families of the victims have done. And the momentum is present.
There has been very substantial opposition to moving at this time. There are those who say this legislation is precipitous, that it ought not to be passed on the eve of an election, that we have more of an eye on 11/2, the election date, than we have on 9/11.
I reject those contentions. This issue has been under study for decades, and personally on my behalf since I spent 8 years on the Intelligence Committee and chaired the committee during the 104th Congress.
The 9/11 Commission unanimously and emphatically has called for the creation of a national intelligence director. It is my view that is a proposition whose time has come.
When I offered the amendment in committee, which was rejected although we received five votes in the committee, there was very intense lobbying coming, as I understand it--you can never present competent evidence which would stand up in court but a lot of lobbying from the protectors of their turf.
My amendment to create the strength of the national intelligence director was deferred until this day. It is my hope and expectation that from this bill we will have a national intelligence director if it is the one proposed by amendment or if it is the one which is in the bill which has been reported by the committee.
It is my conclusion after very substantial study and after very substantial thought and after very substantial consideration that we need a very strong national intelligence director. We need an independent national intelligence director who will stand up to the executive branch, who will stand up to the Congress, who will tell the Congress exactly what is needed by way of resources, and who will have the stature and strength to get that job done.
There is an enormous controversy about the resolution to authorize the use of force which Congress passed and the President acted on--a lot of concern about the adequacy of the intelligence which led to that judgment, the 77 votes in this body joined by a majority of Democrats as well as Republicans. But there is no doubt that however one views the resolution for use of force, it would have been highly desirable to have better intelligence.
The amendment which is embodied in amendment No. 3706 would give substantial additional authority to the national intelligence director than is contained in the committee bill. It would put the CIA under the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director would have the authority to manage and oversee the intelligence community, including the CIA, the NSA, the National Security Agency, the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NGA, the National Geospacial Agency, and national collection from the Defense Intelligence Agency leaving tactical intelligence within the Department of Defense as it is now.
Valid considerations have been raised that tactical intelligence ought to be left in the Department of Defense so the Department of Defense can carry out its functions. My amendment would leave that important facet with the Department of Defense.
The national intelligence director under the committee bill has budget authority over the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a great deal of thought, this amendment No. 3706 does not include the FBI under the supervision, direction, and control of the national intelligence director as the other agencies enumerated would have the national intelligence director with the authority to supervise, direct, and control which, in my judgment, would give the national intelligence director the authority to manage and oversee the national intelligence community in an effective way.
The essence of my bill was circulated to the Governmental Affairs Committee with a letter dated August 3 of this year. I put the bill into the Congressional Record on September 7. I introduced the bill on September 15 under the caption of S. 2081. The amendment embodied in No. 3706 is somewhat different, as I have described it.
We are dealing here with agencies where there are inbred cultures of concealment. It is very difficult to get information, even as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
My experience has shown it was very difficult for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to know fully and adequately what has happened within his own agency. One of the matters which I referred to during the committee hearings was information which was disseminated by the CIA Chief of Reports and Requirements in the Soviet East European Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was a man who was in the CIA from 1950 until 1991. He had information which was tainted by the Soviet Union--information where the individual conceded that he knew the intelligence came from Soviet-controlled sources and that he disseminated that information at the highest levels of government without disclosing that fact to the individuals whom he transmitted the information that it came from controlled or tainted sources.
That information was transmitted, including transmission on January 13 of 1993. So it went to President George Herbert Walker Bush and it went to President-elect Bill Clinton.
When I took his testimony and expressed shock at what he had done, the individual confidently responded that he had acted entirely properly because disclosure of the controlled source that the information was tainted would have made it even harder, as he put it, to sell the intelligence to policymakers; that there was no reason to believe the Soviets used deception was inaccurate, and no customer would use it unless he had concealed the fact it was tainted.
This was an extraordinary approach, as I saw it, but I think revealing as to what happens within the Central Intelligence Agency, within the Bureau, where the individuals have their empires, where they know better than anybody else, and transmit information to the President of the United States and the President-elect, knowing it to be tainted and not telling the President or President-elect that it was tainted because they then would not use it, and saying that the information was given because the CIA agent, the CIA individual, knew that it was correct. That is just the height of audacity but I think indicative of the kinds of problems we face with the cultures of concealment that we have in the intelligence agencies.
Another matter which I refer to, in the course of the committee hearings, is relevant for presentation; that is, the difficulty of having adequate oversight over the intelligence agencies and the duties that the intelligence agencies have to make disclosures to the oversight committee.
In the spring of 2002, when I chaired a subcommittee of oversight on the Department of Justice and had a wide-ranging subpoena, a document was presented which I ask unanimous consent
be printed in the Record, Mr. President.
The essence of the document disclosed that there had been an effort by ranking officials in the Department of Justice to try to influence the FBI not to pursue an investigation on campaign finance irregularities in December of 1996 because at that time Attorney General Reno was under consideration for reappointment. The relevant part of this document from Director Freeh to Mr. Esposito, who was his deputy handling this matter:
I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment
to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS
[Public Integrity Section] regarding this case because the
``Attorney General's job might hang in the balance'' (or
words to that effect). I stated that those comments would be
enough for me to take him and the Criminal Division off the
case completely.
This matter was not brought to the attention of the Judiciary Committee as a matter of oversight. In my judgment, this is the kind of a matter which the Director, on his own, without request, without knowledge by the oversight committee, without subpoena, as it was disclosed some 4 years later, should have turned over as a matter of oversight.
Another amendment which I intend to offer would give the national intelligence director a 10-year term on the analogy to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That would enable the director of national intelligence to have a substantial degree of independence since his term would outlast the term of the President--4 years or, with reelection, a total of 8 years.
We have seen in today's press reports of very substantial problems in the FBI, where there are inadequate translators and a great deal of information from al-Qaida has gone untranslated. I have talked to FBI Director Mueller, who tells me the information is dated, but there is still a significant problem in having sufficient translators to handle that important matter so we have our intelligence in hand.
The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and independent, with enough stature, with a tenure of a 10-year term, to come to the Congress and be able to see to it that adequate funds are provided for the intelligence community.
The media reports are full of information that show very substantial problems on what would happen in Iraq after a military victory with the insurgents. The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and independent and bring those matters to the attention of the Congress as well as to the executive branch.
It is my hope that in this legislation we will do a complete job and structure the responsibilities of the national intelligence director to give him the authority on budget and the authority on supervision, direction, and control to effectively manage and oversee the entire intelligence community.
That is an abbreviated statement of a great many considerations. At this time, I yield the floor.
Mr. President, by way of a very brief reply at this time, others will say the committee bill goes too far, and the committee bill stands between others who would reject any reorganization of the national intelligence community. The amendment I have offered doesn't go to that point.
The question is, what is the best way to reorganize the national intelligence community? When reference is made to the comments by Mr. Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, he made an analysis of S. 2811, which is a bill similar to the amendment now pending, but it is not the same. I think it is an overstatement to say that the 9/11 Commission rejects the amendment I have offered because it hasn't been considered by the Commission.
Former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee during my tenure as chairman, called me, unsolicited, and said that he favored the elements which I had offered and thought it was preferable to have the national intelligence director with greater authority, which I was proposing.
I believe it is a fair statement to say that the 9/11 Commission would be pleased to see us move to establish a national intelligence director, whether it was along the lines of the committee report or whether it was along the lines of my amendment. I say, too, that it is important to establish a national intelligence director with as many powers as we can reasonably give the national intelligence director. I think that is what the 9/11 Commission is looking for. I don't think it can be accurately said that the 9/11 Commission rejects the substance of my amendment. Certainly, former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a member of the 9/11 Commission, was not, as far as I can say from an unsolicited call. He said he liked the substance of what I was offering.
I think other Senators are going to be interested in participating in the debate. It was unknown, generally, what sequence would occur as to the offering of the amendment. But I think others will want to come and be heard.
I yield the floor.
Parliamentary inquiry: I believe we have 2 more minutes until 4:30.
I seek recognition to make a comment about the pending amendment.
Mr. President, we can get more into the details on rebuttal as to what Senator Collins has said. I do not think it is accurate that we are taking away key authority from the Department of Defense, but I want to print in the Record a letter signed by 14 Senators objecting to the committee bill saying that it ``does not give the NID additional authorities will be required to provide the unity of leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the Intelligence Community performing national missions.'' It is signed by Senators Roberts, Shelby, DeWine, Hatch, Lott, Snowe, Voinovich, Bayh, Graham, Wyden, Bond, Hagel, Chambliss, and myself. There is the current chairman, Senator Roberts, and three prior chairmen, Senator Shelby, Senator Graham, and myself.
I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record together with a memorandum from me to the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee dated December 5, 1995.
A December 9, 1996 memorandum has already been printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I have listened with a keen interest, as I always do, when the Senator from Virginia speaks. The concerns which I have seen in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and as chair-- and I served with the Senator from Virginia on the Intelligence Committee--is the dominance of the Department of Defense on the budget and the lack of coordination with the other intelligence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence branch of the
Mr. President, I yield the floor. I had the floor, but I do yield it.
Then in that event I will stay standing.
Mr. President, through the Chair, I would inquire of the Senator from Virginia, what does he see which would stop those various officers from complying with those requirements and still allow the national intelligence director to have overall management? That is my question to the Senator from Virginia.
I hadn't meant to promote Senator Warner.
If you are confused on the substance of the question, maybe the court reporter could repeat it.
There is nothing in the amendment which takes the so- called residual authority from the Secretary of Defense. The amendment gives to the national intelligence director management and supervision, but it does not undercut the directions of the statutes to which you have referred.
Mr. President, the concept of unintended consequences is not an unusual argument. It can be attenuated in many directions. My submission to this body is that the amendment is plain on its face, that it seeks to create a national intelligence director who has the authority to manage the intelligence community. When the Senator from Virginia cites responsibilities in existing law, there is nothing in my amendment which undercuts that law, nothing at all. Ambiguity, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and in this situation, on the face of the amendment, there is no ambiguity.
Mr. President, I regret the Senator from Virginia is at a loss, but that doesn't affect the plain language of the amendment and the fact that it doesn't disturb the responsibilities under the section cited by the Senator from Virginia.
I think the amendment speaks for itself, I say to Senator Warner.
Mr. President, we are on the Homeland Security appropriations bill. We have two amendments pending for consideration. It is my understanding a briefing is being held right now and Senators are…
Mr. President, we are on the Homeland Security appropriations bill. We have two amendments pending for consideration. It is my understanding a briefing is being held right now and Senators are expected to be in the Chamber soon to either debate these amendments or make other comments about the bill.
We encourage those who do have amendments to let us know about them. We have some indication that there are amendments that will be offered before we complete action on this bill, but we intend to push ahead and work as late tonight as the leader permits and complete action on this bill tomorrow, if possible. That is our intention. We hope to have the cooperation of all Senators.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, first, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for his cooperation in the development of this bill that is now before the Senate. His assistance and participation in the hearings, the review of the President's budget request, our meetings with administration officials to fully understand the priorities as they saw them, and, in many ways, his experience and judgment in helping guide the development of this bill were very essential to the success we had in getting it to this point. His support in getting it through the committee and subcommittee was essential and very important.
This amendment, as the distinguished Senator has pointed out, will add money for many different areas of spending in the legislation that we have presented. Of course, it is because there are many needs there. There are many ways we can allocate and spend resources to try to upgrade our capability of protecting our Nation's homeland. So there is no end to the list of ways we could spend additional funds.
What we have tried to do, though, is be guided by the limitations that have been imposed on the committee by the budget resolution. We have a limited amount of money to spend in this bill. In fact, the amount we have been allocated to spend is $1 billion more than the President's budget request that was submitted to Congress earlier. So this bill provides $29.326 billion. We have tried to allocate it among all the competing needs that we have come to understand through our review of the budget request and the information we have been able to obtain as to what our needs are and what the highest priorities are, and that is what this bill reflects: the judgment of the Appropriations Committee of the priorities that exist and how we can best use the amount of money that is allocated to this committee for this next fiscal year, keeping in mind that we have already appropriated funds in the year we are in now, fiscal year 2003.
We have also added a substantial amount of money for homeland security in the supplemental appropriations bill that was just recently passed by the Senate and signed by the President. Therefore, since this amendment proposes to add another $1.75 billion to the bill that is before us with no offsetting suggestion of where the money would come from, I will be constrained to make a point of order against the amendment because it provides spending in excess of the subcommittee's allocation in violation of the Budget Act. Before doing that, let me make a few observations about the Senator's comments on some specific provisions in the bill.
Facilities along the land borders, which the Senator discussed, are maintained under the General Services Administration, and funds for upgrading, maintaining, and replacing facilities are funded through the General Services Administration and the appropriations bill that has that as part of its jurisdiction.
This committee does not have GSA jurisdiction. What we do have is the responsibility of trying to accommodate the deployment of facilities to implement the U.S. visitor and immigrant status indicator technology. This is a new program. It is to be deployed upon land ports of entry, and funds are included in the committee bill for that purpose.
In addition, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has undertaken to hire additional inspectors to be deployed on these borders, to enforce the new rules and to better protect us from people who come across the border who may be a threat to the security of our homeland.
Our indications from the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection are that over 4,000 inspectors have been added to the workforce since September 11, 2001. That has increased coverage at these ports of entry by 25 percent. Over 2,600 inspectors are on the northern border, compared to about 1,600 prior to September 11. There are 613 Border Patrol agents who are assigned to the northern border compared to 368 before September 11. Commissioner Bonner says he plans to have 1,000 agents on the northern border by October of this year. So when the new agents who are funded in this bill are counted, are included, there will be over 11,600 Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2004. That is funding already in this bill.
We added additional staffing in the wartime supplement. We put in the supplemental $75 million for additional northern border and maritime ports of entry personnel. This was in addition to the money that was previously appropriated for this fiscal year for new personnel. We also included $25 million to transfer Border Patrol agents to the northern border. It is an important new undertaking, and we are cooperating with the administration in trying to meet those needs.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection can only hire so many people in any one year. This bill includes the maximum number of new border agents who can be absorbed in one year.
We also think it is important to preserve the Department's flexibility to assess its staffing needs nationwide. We should not come in and say they have to hire 1,000 more than they planned to hire this year. We have to leave to the good judgment of the administrators how they can absorb and find the qualified people to hire, how they can train them in their new duties and deploy them to the places where they can be used. I think it would be a mistake at this point for the Senate to try to superimpose our judgment about a detail of that kind.
We have the same goal. We are on the same team with this administration. We have to listen to the statements and suggestions they make to us about the funds they can use and what they need to do their job within the limits that we have. We have to allocate the funds according to the priorities as we see them.
Up to this point in time, it is the judgment of the committee at least that the funding we have made available for border security agencies, for personnel to carry out the missions of the USA PATRIOT Act, which the Senator mentioned, and other authorizing legislation is funded in the bill to the extent that it is possible to be funded in the bill.
In the case of the Transportation Security Administration, the additional funding suggested in the amendment is $100 million for screening of air cargo. First, the authorizing committee assessed the needs for new authorities and how the responsibilities for screening air cargo would be changed to meet the new threats. Congress responded by passing the Air Cargo Security Improvement Act, S. 165. It authorizes the development and deployment of something called a known shipper database, strengthening security enforcement and compliance measures for indirect air carriers and implementing mandatory security programs for all cargo carriers.
The Transportation Security Administration has undertaken a comprehensive, strategic plan for air cargo security. It is based on threat assessment and risk management.
As I understand it, there are three elements to the approach of the Transportation Security Administration. They strengthen the current known shipper program to verify shipper legitimacy. They have developed a cargo prescreening and profiling system that targets shipments based on a set of guidelines to indicate which shipments may be suspicious. They have a targeted inspection system to identify suspicious cargo utilizing explosive detection systems, explosive trace detection, canine detection, and other approved methods for inspecting air cargo.
This comprehensive approach is consistent with the Department's approach in securing containers that cross our borders by all modes of transportation, and the funding that was requested in the President's bill has been respected. The bill we have before the Senate provides $60 million. Ironically, it is $30 million more than the President requested for this function.
The Transportation Security Administration, according to my understanding, can use this money. But this amendment that has been offered by the Senator from West Virginia would add an additional $100 million in addition to what is already in the bill. I am not sure the administration can use that and use it effectively.
The amendment has additional money for grants for public transit agencies, for enhancing security against chemical and biological threats. We already have $71 million for the Science and Technology Directorate to develop and deploy chemical, biological, and nuclear sensor networks throughout the country, including public transit facilities. That would duplicate and be over and above what is already being spent to try to make sure that we deploy the right kind of defenses to this kind of threat.
Again, I think it is important for us to work with the administration and say: Okay, we have so much money that has been allocated to us to spend for homeland security. How can we best spend that money right now? How much do they need this year? What can they use? What are the highest priorities? Where do we need to spend the money first?
The amendment the Senator has offered also increases port security grants by $460 million, as he pointed out. We already have $150 million in the bill for port security grants, and this is in addition to $365 million provided in 2002 and 2003.
Of the $365 million already provided by the Congress, only $260 million has been obligated by the administration. So think about this: We have a proposal to add $460 million to an account where the money is still there and has not been obligated that has previously been appropriated. How much can be spent is something that has to be taken into account as well, not how much we can appropriate. That is not going to be a measure of the success of this bill or whether or not it has been thoughtfully expended to protect our security. We have to make sure it can be used and that it can be used thoughtfully, consistent with a plan that has been developed by the administration.
The Transportation Security Administration can only obligate about $150 million a year because assessments of ports have to be conducted, they have to be given some kind of priority, and then an application process by the ports for the funds has to be analyzed, assessed, and careful decisions need to be made. It cannot be just a rush to apply for a grant: Hey, they have a new fund in Washington. If you are a port director, if you get your application in now and put pressure on the administration, you may get some funds.
Will it be consistent with the overall national plan? Will it be targeted where the threats are the most imminent and most troublesome, where the money really needs to be spent? Are
other agencies going to be able to take up the slack in helping to deal with threats that are known to exist in our ports?
There is a capacity only to spend so much money at one time. That is the point. The rush to spend money can put the agency in disarray, can give a false sense of security to the people in the country, saying, look, we spent $460 million in addition to what had already been appropriated. But that may not actually help improve our security.
There is no doubt there will be a need for these funds later. There will be a need to increase security at our ports over and above what we are doing in this fiscal year or next fiscal year--and not just in ports but in all modes of transportation. But we need to take a measured, thoughtful approach, and weigh the funding provided for the security of our Nation's homeland security needs. That is what we tried to do, take a balanced approach and make an assessment based on limitations we have and the realities we face.
There is a proposal in this amendment to add $70 million to the Coast Guard operating expenses account to increase the total funding of the Coast Guard. The bill already provides $4.719 billion for Coast Guard operating expenses. This is $12 million more than the President has asked for operating expenses, excluding environmental compliance and restoration, and reserve training, which are funded separately.
Included in the bill for acquisition, construction, and improvements is the amount of $1.035 billion which is $238 million above the President's budget request.
Funding to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was not requested in the President's budget because that Act had not been passed until after the President's budget was prepared. No request was made for funding to implement MTSA in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental either. We know funding for the implementation of the MTSA is a priority for the Coast Guard. If we had additional funds available, we would agree to increased funding in fiscal year 2004. But the bill has been very generous to the Coast Guard. We believe funding for the implementation of MTSA should be included in next year's budget request by the President.
The Office for Domestic Preparedness is targeted in this amendment with a funding increase. Mr. President, $729.5 million is provided in this amendment to increase funding for grants to State and local governments.
One of the first calls I made when I realized it was going to be my obligation to chair this subcommittee was to Warren Rudman, our former colleague from New Hampshire, who has been, with Gary Hart, part of a study to assess our homeland security needs. They had published reports and made some presentations in New York, Council on Foreign Relations, and other places.
One of the things I remember former Senator Rudman suggesting to me is, it is impossible to know precisely what is needed and how much it will cost. That is something I have kept in mind.
The fact is, this is not an exact science. We have to use our judgment, make choices, understand that we cannot do everything at once. What we are trying to do is maintain a base level of preparedness through this program.
The Department is going to be better able to assess true needs once the States have had a chance to submit their updated homeland security strategies. We cannot just assume right now the States can identify all of the areas where they need to spend the money, which local governments continue to have needs, and which ones ought to be funded first.
In my judgment, we run the risk of being irresponsible if we increase funding over and above an amount that can logically and systematically be provided through the grant program to State and local governments.
We will have provided through the funds recommended in this bill almost $9 billion through the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the firefighters assistance grants since September 11. A lot of money has been spent already. In addition to those expenditures and the funding in this bill, the Senator suggests we ought to spend another $729.5 million.
We are suggesting the funds appropriated in this bill, in this account, for this fiscal year, are a responsible level of funding for first responders, given the other needs and other demands that come under the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security.
The amendment also suggests we earmark $80 million for information analysis and infrastructure assessment, a directorate, to conduct assessments for chemical facilities. I am impressed with the concerns reflected in this suggestion. We do not have funding made available to individual industries involved in the chemical business to make these assessments. I am not enough of an expert in that business to know the assessments that have already been made and the security arrangements that many of these businesses and industries already have. One thing we need to keep in mind is that self-interest has motivated business and industries, and anyone who owns a business or a home should do what they can to protect themselves, to be sure their workers are protected, to be sure their families are protected. We all feel that obligation. It is not like everyone has been assuming they had no responsibilities for self-protection.
Businesses and industries have done a great deal, invested huge sums of money, to protect their own assets.
The suggestion is we need to give them more money to do some more analysis, to do some more assessments.
There may be a need for additional critical infrastructure assessment; however, this bill already provides $293.9 million for key asset identification, field assessments of critical infrastructures, and key asset protection implementation to help guide and support the development of protective measures to improve the security of industrial facilities and assets.
Of the amount provided for critical infrastructures, $199.1 million is made available for critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessments of the highest priority infrastructures and assets. But we need the benefit of the advice of the administration, those who are in charge of the programs, to tell us what those are. This amendment that is offered by my friend from West Virginia says it is the chemical industry. That is the only earmark in this part of the bill--$80 million for chemical facilities. There may be other facilities that are more vulnerable or that would cause more damage and displacement of American businesses than the chemical facilities would if they were under a threat of terrorist attack.
The priorities that have to be made and assigned have to be based on a combination of factors: threat, vulnerability, and risk analysis. And we have to leave that up to the administration. I don't feel competent to make that kind of decision. I don't know of any Senator, if this amendment were to be voted on this afternoon, who could just walk in here and decide should that be an earmark or should it not. But it is folded into this big amendment and we are asked to decide whether to target $80 million for just these kinds of facilities. Who is to know whether that is a good decision or not, if they have not been through the hearings, they have not had the opportunity to assess the other options?
So I think it is an unfair choice that we present to other Senators, to have them make that decision right now. Why can't the administration make that decision? I think they are better suited to make that decision than we are right now. We have to work with them and not make prejudgments.
The prioritization is going to be based on a lot of factors. There are 14 critical infrastructure areas--including the chemical sector--5 key asset categories that further break down into about 99 distinct segments, all of which must be considered based on changing threat assessments. So this is not necessarily an effective way to improve our Nation's security, just to earmark money for one particular kind of industry requiring a specific amount of funds to be spent. Why not $180 million? Why not just $40 million? Where does $80 million come from? I don't know. Who knows?
So without the corresponding analysis that helps advise the Senate, it is a mistake for us to be asked to make this kind of choice.
We are telling the terrorist organizations, aren't we, that we are going to spend the money in this sector? We are going to target this sector and emphasize it and make it a high priority, but
not the others? Is that a good way to make decisions in this area or should we let the administration and the infrastructure protection experts decide where the threats really are? What does the intelligence show as to where the threats are? These need to be taken into account.
This amendment, adding $1.75 billion to the bill, violates the Budget Act because it does not offset the spending, it exceeds the subcommittee's allocation that is given to us, and at the appropriate time I will be constrained to make a point of order against the amendment.
Mr. President, I make a point of order under section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act that the Byrd amendment provides spending in excess of the subcommittee's 302(b) allocation.
Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee and of the full committee, the Senator from West Virginia, for his constancy in…
Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee and of the full committee, the Senator from West Virginia, for his constancy in sounding the alarm. He is the Paul Revere of the homeland security debate. Because every time we come to the floor to debate and consider provisions that we believe will make our country safer, the Senator from West Virginia is there sounding the alarm.
This time I hope our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will respond to that alarm which he has once again sounded, because his amendment reflects a full and complete understanding of what we know, what the experts tell us is absolutely essential to meeting the homeland security needs of our Nation.
As has already been referred to in many different settings, the amendment the Senator presents to us contains the best thinking of people who
have considered our vulnerabilities and have honestly assessed what it will cost so we can look into the eyes of our constituents and say: We have done the best we knew to do.
Recently the independent Homeland Security Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, a task force chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman, issued its third report regarding the state of our homeland defense. While the report noted that we had made progress and that positive action in a number of areas had occurred since September 11, there was still much to be done and we remained woefully unprepared.
The report, ``First Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared,'' says it all in its title. It reminds us as to how much work we truly have in front of us if we intend to address these needs honestly and to equip our frontline homeland defenders with the resources they desperately need.
Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared
The United States has not reached a sufficient national
level of emergency preparedness and remains dangerously
unprepared to handle a catastrophic attack on American soil,
particularly one involving chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear agents, or coordinated high-impact
conventional means.
How much more specific and dramatic a conclusion from independent experts do we need to have before we act to pass overwhelmingly the amendment that has been presented to us?
The report also emphasizes the pivotal and primary role our first responders play in our national homeland defense:
America's local emergency responders--
We are talking about our police officers, our firefighters, our EMTs, and others who are on the front line, who need to be given the resources that will equip them to prevent horrific attacks, as well as to respond--
will always be the first to confront a terrorist incident and
will play the central role in imagining its immediate
consequences. . . . the United States--
Namely, the U.S. Government, not the New York State government, or the New York City government, or the Buffalo government, or the West Virginia government, but the United States Government--
has both a responsibility and a critical need too provide
them [our first responders] with equipment, training, and
other necessary resources to do their jobs safely and
effectively.
Again, I don't know how much more specific we need to be. The efforts of these first responders in the minutes and hours following an attack will be critical to saving lives, reestablishing order, and preventing mass panic.
The report speaks about the heroic police and fire professionals who entered the World Trade Center on September 11. They acknowledge what all of us saw: that our emergency responders will be there; they will answer the call; they will perform their duties. What will we do for them?
In providing just a few examples of the needs of these brave police officers and firefighters and EMTs that are unmet, I have picked a few very representative, dramatic examples from the report:
Two-thirds of our fire departments do not meet the
consensus fire service standard for minimum safe staffing
levels.
On average, fire departments across the country have only
enough radios to equip half the firefighters on a shift, and
breathing apparatuses for only one-third. Only 10 percent of
fire departments in the United States have the personnel and
equipment to respond to a building collapse.
Most States' public health labs still lack basic equipment
and expertise to respond adequately to a chemical or
biological attack. Seventy-five percent of State laboratories
report being overwhelmed by too many testing requests.
Most cities do not have the necessary equipment to
determine what kind of hazardous materials emergency
responders may be facing.
Police departments in cities across the country do not have
the protective gear to safely secure a site following an
attack using weapons of mass destruction.
I read these statistics, but I also know firsthand from speaking to police officers and firefighters, police chiefs and fire commissioners, and others throughout New York who tell me exactly what we were reading here from this report.
Now, I have to say it is troubling to me that, while we know we have not done enough to equip and fund and provide the resources needed by our first responders, we are seeing, because of budget constraints, cities and counties cutting back on their personnel. According to the International City-County Management Association, the average number of full-time, paid police employees for jurisdictions between 250,000 and 500,000 residents, today, is 16 percent below the figure for 2001. Why is anyone surprised by that? We have seen countless stories about the budget cutbacks that States and counties and cities are experiencing.
Police departments and fire departments are not immune. In the city of New York, after the heroic, incredible performance of these brave firefighters, they watched helplessly as fire stations were closed. So this is something that we know is happening. So not only are we failing to fully fund our first responders, we are seeing the numbers cut back.
When you think about what this report tells us and what the estimate is as to what is necessary for us to protect ourselves, clearly, we are asking that we honestly assess where we are and the funding that is needed. The report says we need approximately $100 billion over the next 5 years--approximately $20 billion a year for 5 years. We spend $5 billion a month in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are asking for 4 months of the expenditures of those two military actions and postconflict activities to make sure we are safe here at home.
These preliminary figures are based on the assessments that are coming directly from first responders and from communities. They were developed in partnership with the Concord Coalition and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. It may be conservative, but it is the best assessment we could find.
First, it assumes, however, that State and local governments will continue to spend somewhere between $26 billion and $76 billion of their own funds for homeland security over the next 5 years.
Second, in looking at specific needs, particularly the need for a communications system that actually works and includes everybody, the task force erred on the side of conservative figures they obtained from communications policy experts.
Third, many law enforcement associations could not even assess their own needs. They don't have time to stop and do a survey or try to hire a consultant. So they did the best they could in assessing what they thought their needs were. Clearly, as the task force has pointed out, we should have a thorough national needs assessment. Under Senator Byrd's leadership, he did hold very thorough hearings out of which we got some specific information, and we need to continue a comprehensive needs assessment so that we do know what our needs are so that we can better plan how to meet them.
We certainly would not do for our men and women in uniform what we do for our men and women in uniform at home. I have the honor of serving on the Armed Services Committee. It is a painstaking process to determine what our troops need and how to best plan that they can be protected. I am very proud of that process.
I think it is time we did the same for our front-line defenders, our soldiers in the war against terrorism here at home--primarily our police officers, our firefighters, and our EMTs.
Among the many things we need to be doing, the task force concludes-- and I agree--is to create those interoperable communications systems so that first responders can communicate seamlessly across borders, between police and firefighters, and certainly across borders of jurisdictions. We need to extend nationally the Emergency 911 system. I am very proud to be working with my colleague from Montana, Senator Burns, on groundbreaking legislation to extend the E-911 system. I think it will certainly move us forward as long as we fund it.
We need to enhance our urban search and rescue capabilities. We need to enhance our public health preparedness, particularly by strengthening and expanding the quality and number of laboratories that can track diseases, that can quickly diagnose some kind of biological, chemical, or radiological event.
This report reflects what I hear from all over New York and, of course, from all over the country, whether you are in Los Angeles, where every time the terror alert goes to orange, it costs that city $1.5 million a week and another $1 million a week to protect the Los Angeles International Airport; or whether you are in Denver, a city that has incurred many millions of dollars for emergency preparedness and has purchased mobile emergency equipment but still doesn't have an adequate communications system; or whether you are in Douglas County, NE, which needs resources to buy protective suits for first responders, this is a national problem. Certainly in New York, I know firsthand how inadequately funded many of our brave men and women are.
I know that under the leadership of the chairman of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, whom I commend, the committee has worked very hard to come up with a good bill and, given the budgetary constraints under which the committee has operated, they have done an incredible job.
The problem is that the budget resolution we adopted last spring did not adequately reflect the real costs of homeland security. That is why the Senator from West Virginia has an amendment which more honestly assesses those needs. It provides an additional $1.7 billion: $729.5 million for first responders; $602 million for maritime and land security; $238 million for border security; $100 million for air cargo security; and $80 million for chemical facility security.
It is hard to argue with the EPA's own figures that we have 123 chemical facilities located throughout the Nation that have toxic worst-case scenarios where more than 1 million people would be in the so-called vulnerable zone and could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas.
Remember the terrible accident in Bhopal, India? Remember that? We have 123 chemical facilities that could produce this kind of extraordinary horror.
We have 600 facilities that could threaten between 100,000 and 1 million people, and 2,300 more that would threaten between 10,000 and 100,000 people in these so-called vulnerable zones.
When I read statistics such as that, it has to make one feel vulnerable, and it certainly makes me, as a Senator with responsibility for my constituents, sick at heart. I do not think any of us want to see these scenarios ever come true and, thank goodness, we have been spared that since September 11.
But that is not the way a great country plans to defend itself. If that were the case, we could have shut down our entire military. After the War of 1812, we could have just said forget it. After the Civil War, we could have said forget it. We could say we do not think we will ever have anything bad in the world happen again, so let's just send everybody home. Let's just let the tanks rust. Let's just give up preparing for the worst-case scenario which will more than likely make it possible for us to avoid such an occurrence.
That is what we are doing when it comes to homeland security. The Congressional Budget Office estimated it will take $80 million to conduct vulnerability assessments associated with our chemical plants. This amendment provides the money for that purpose.
Regarding the first responder funding in the Byrd amendment, there is additional money for State and local grants, $250 million, and I especially appreciate an additional $250 million for high-threat urban area grants; $150 million for FIRE Act grants so we can fund the program fully at the authorized level; and, finally, $79.5 million for the interoperable communications equipment I have talked about in this Chamber so many times since September 11.
We learned tragically that our police and fire departments could not talk with each other. We learned that people coming to our rescue to assist us could not communicate with the New York City police and fire departments.
Later in the debate, I will talk about State and local grants and how important they are and how strongly I believe the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Ridge should disburse those funds using a threat base rather than a per capita formula. Right now I want to underscore how important it is to get more money into this high-threat urban area category.
In January, I gave a speech at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. In that speech, I made some recommendations and released a survey about what I had found as I surveyed cities and counties throughout my State: Seventy percent of New York cities and counties had not received any Federal homeland security funding since September 11. Since January, some money has come forward; more has been appropriated.
But I was in Buffalo, NY, on Sunday speaking with the mayor. They have not received a penny of the money we have appropriated. It is either tied up in Washington or it is tied up in the State capital.
Either explanation is, to me, unacceptable. We need to do more, and in that speech I called for a domestic defense fund.
In March, I proposed that we provide direct funding and we include $1 billion for high-threat urban areas. Later that month, I offered an amendment to the budget resolution that would have provided funding for the domestic defense fund, including the $1 billion for high-threat urban areas for fiscal year 2003. Unfortunately, the amendment was narrowly defeated but at least we began a dialog and a debate about high-threat areas with critical infrastructure, with dense populations.
We are making some progress and, in fact, the supplemental we considered for funding the action in Iraq in April did include $700 million for high-threat urban areas. I thank my colleagues for that funding. I think we all recognize how critical that funding is.
The Department of Homeland Security has begun to allocate high-threat funding based on factors such as credible threat, vulnerability, population, mutual aid agreements, and identified needs of public agencies. And many communities, not just New York and Washington but Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cincinnati, Kansas City, New Orleans, Memphis, Cleveland, Charleston, among others, across our country have received this high-threat funding. This will help us shore up our defenses against our most vulnerable targets.
Regarding New York, I would give anything if terrorists did not have such an interest in New York but we have to accept that reality. New York is such a symbol of our Nation. It is such an incredibly diverse, dynamic place, the most fascinating and exciting city in the world, and it is going to draw that kind of attention. Therefore, we need the support we have been getting and that the Byrd amendment will provide in additional funding that, believe me, we can put to good use.
In recent articles that have appeared in national newspapers, such as USA Today, I read about communities that got homeland security funding and did not know what to do with it. I said: If you really do not know what to do with the money, send it to New York; we have more needs than we can possibly meet.
If we are serious about defending our Nation, then we have to be serious about putting money behind that commitment. What the Byrd amendment does is to say very straightforwardly: We have not done enough. We may have done all we could within the constraints of the budget resolution, and for that I commend the chairman and the ranking member, but the budget resolution was inadequate.
We do not have a budget resolution for our military and occupational expenses in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are not even in the budget. There is not one penny. We passed a $398 billion defense budget last week and there is not one penny for Iraq and Afghanistan.
We did not worry about the budget resolution when it came to supporting our troops. We did what we thought we had to do. Well, we should do the same when it comes to protecting us at home. How on Earth can we do less?
So, yes, we have made some progress since we were attacked. How could we not? How negligent would we have been if we had not done what at least we have started to try to achieve in providing more support? But we have not done nearly enough.
History will judge us harshly if we are found wanting when it comes to defending ourselves on our own soil.
So I hope for the sake of our country, for the sake of our citizens, we will listen to former Senator Warren Rudman
and the task force, we will listen to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, and we will do our duty, we will vote for the Byrd amendment, and we will send a clear signal to friend and foe alike that we intend to prevent, in every way possible, any further terrorism on our shores. But if anyone dares to take us on, we intend to be ready.
Yes.
I certainly would agree with the Senator from Nevada. I believe that is a factor that Secretary Ridge should consider in a threat-based formula where we have large crowds of people who come for attractions such as those that the Senator has in Las Vegas or we have in New York City and certainly other places around our country. That should be taken into account because our police officers, our firefighters are constantly on duty because there is a constant stream of people coming from all over the world to enjoy the attractions.
I certainly do agree with that.
I thank the Senator from Nevada.
Certainly.
I thank the Senator from West Virginia and I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment which I cosponsored with Senator McCain. This is the first of several he and I will be introducing, along with other Members, which would implement…
Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment which I cosponsored with Senator McCain. This is the first of several he and I will be introducing, along with other Members, which would implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission not included in the underlying bill that Senator Collins and I have introduced which focuses on intelligence reform.
Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment of Senator Hutchison. I thank her for proposing it. She was ahead of her time because she has been on this case, along with members of the Commerce Committee, at least since March of last year, when the bill came out of the Commerce Committee; in fact, the Senate passed this bill unanimously in May of 2003.
Unfortunately, there has been no action that meets up with this bill in the House. So Senator Hutchison is quite right to introduce this as an amendment to our underlying reform of the intelligence community. This is directly relevant to the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that ``major vulnerability still exists in cargo and general aviation security. These, together within adequate screening and access controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.'' That comes from the 9/11 Commission.
The Commission concluded that we are safer than we were on September 11, 2001, but we are not yet safe. This underlying bill is aimed at reforming our intelligence community so we will be safe, so we can see the threats coming at us, hear them, and stop them before the terrorists are able to strike, but also that we may adopt other provisions of the 9/11 Commission report.
Senator McCain and I introduced an amendment that was the first to pass a short while ago. I hope this amendment will pass as well, because it tightens existing weaknesses, loopholes in the screening of cargo transported in passenger aircraft, opening up a vulnerability that we all fear terrorists may exploit to strike at us.
I thank the Senator from Texas for not only being foresighted last year in seeing this weakness in our defenses to terrorism but for coming forth and introducing this amendment. It will strengthen the bill Senator Collins and I and other members of the Governmental Affairs Committee have brought out and, therefore, I urge its adoption.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, if I might say a word before that and then I will be happy to yield the floor to Senator Nelson. Maybe I should yield to the chairman who will probably say the same thing I will be saying.
I am very grateful to the Senate majority leader and to the Senate Democratic leader for this agreement and for the pace they are setting for consideration of this bill on a bipartisan basis. These are not ordinary times. This is not ordinary legislation. It goes to the heart of our security. We want to have thoughtful debate.
The chairman of the committee, Senator Collins, and I found in the committee that when we let some time for debate occur, people came to very thoughtful conclusions, totally without regard to party. The votes on all the amendments went all around the lot. I think people ultimately felt good about the process.
By setting these deadlines now for amendments to be noticed and then filed, we are going to expedite exactly that kind of thoughtful consideration so we can get this done with the same feeling of, well, confidence that we are doing the right thing. We are not only doing something we need to do quickly, but we are doing it the right way. So I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle for their help on that matter and the help they have given to Senator Collins and me.
Mr. President, with great respect for Senator Specter, friend and colleague, I rise to oppose this amendment.
I want to say that Senator Specter has been a very constructive member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, not just on this matter but on so many others that come before the committee. He has contributed substantially to the strength of the bill that is before the Senate that Senator Collins and I have offered. He and I talked quite seriously about this earlier in the year, and ultimately my conclusion was that it would construct a bridge too far.
We have a crisis, which the 9/11 Commission documents, which is that we have an intelligence community, as we discussed yesterday and showed on the graphs, without a leader, without anyone in charge. It is so frustrating to the point of being infuriating to read the lengthy narrative at the beginning of the 9/11 Report to see documented the failure to connect the dots. The cases that Senator Specter mentioned-- one agency knowing something, not telling it to another agency, which might well have either kept out some of the terrorists who struck us on September 11--should have--or would have opened our eyes to the plot that was being hatched that FBI agents came face to face with, this is a system, the American intelligence community, without a leader.
The most urgent recommendation, according to Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, that the Commission makes to us is to create a strong national intelligence director and then, right alongside that, a strong counterterrorism center--connect the dots. We have done this. Senator Collins documented the various powers we have given to the national intelligence director.
First, this has been a recommendation of commission after commission. Going back to the late 1940s, when the National Security Act was adopted and the Central Intelligence Agency was created, post Second World War, there was the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence who was supposed to be not just the head of the CIA but the overseer of our entire intelligence community. The position was taken but hamstrung. It was not given the power. The DCI was the same person as the head of the CIA. That contributed to the community being without a leader.
In this bill we separate these two positions. We create the overarching national intelligence director, separate from the head of the CIA, and we give that national intelligence director real budget authority, personnel authority and tasking, assignment coordinating authority, which we are convinced will make us a lot safer and stronger against the threat of terrorism here at home and against Americans and others throughout the world.
The Specter amendment goes further than that and would provide that not only would the national intelligence director in the underlying bill direct, oversee, and execute the budgets of these agencies, but he or she would also supervise, direct, and control their day-to-day operations. That approach would create a department in everything but name and put the national intelligence director in charge of multiple agencies on a day-to-day basis.
One of the witnesses before our committee was Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. We asked Dr. Zelikow: Did the Commission consider creating a department of intelligence, giving the national intelligence director the powers that the Specter amendment would give?
Dr. Zelikow said: Yes, the Commission considered creating such a department but decided against it on several bases.
And they are the bases of my opposition to the Specter amendment. First, the current job that the Director of Central Intelligence had-- which was CIA Director, director of presumably the overall intelligence community and principle intelligence adviser to the President--was in itself more than one person could do. To give powers to the national intelligence director for day-to-day operations of the agencies under his or her control would again give more authority, more responsibility than the Commission decided was appropriate and manageable.
The Commission also opted for what they considered to be a more modern management approach. They didn't want to create another big Federal bureaucracy; they wanted to create, really patterned after some very large and very successful private corporations in this country, a central management system, strong as our national intelligence director would be, with budget, personnel, tasking authority, but not top heavy, agile, and not in response or in charge of the day-to-day decisions of all of the agencies under that position. That is what we have in the approach we are taking in this bill.
Senator Collins said some people will say--and you will hear of amendments on this floor, as the debate goes on, from Members and those outside the Chamber who feel the bill Senator Collins and I have put before the Senate gives the national intelligence director too much power. They will try to strip away that power or fuzz it up so that it is not clear and the status quo can remain. There will be plenty of opportunity to argue against that when those amendments are filed.
But here we are in the middle of a war on terrorism, struck as we were on September 11, under a continuing threat of attack, alerts all over, particularly in Washington and New York--real concern--and to do what looks like protecting the status quo of the particular authority of existing agencies doesn't make sense. There will be those who feel our bill goes too far.
I don't mean to put words into Senator Specter's mouth because he is very eloquent, but this amendment suggests we have not gone far enough. The Commission deliberately decided not to take the National Security Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Organization out of the Department of Defense. The Commission was concerned, Dr. Zelikow said, about the balance between national and departmental guidance, and they didn't want to tilt the balance too far away from defense. The Commission's executive director portrayed the Commission's idea of a lean, creative command center this way:
Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old
ways of executive management in our national security
bureaucracy,
counterterrorism requires an innovative response.
I believe the underlying bill does exactly that: real authority, decisionmaking authority, but lean and, may I add, mean, because the people who are threatening us are very mean.
The other thing the kind of structure we have created does is make it harder for the problems that many in the Senate and Committee on Intelligence cited in its report on prewar intelligence are worried about, which is group-think. There is an increased danger that persons at the top of the daily operations of the organizations--there is a danger that you will begin to have not the competition of ideas we want to see in our intelligence community and that we feel strongly will be encouraged by the national intelligence director we are creating by the language in the bill, the focus on independence and objectivity of intelligence and by the national counterterrorism center, which is ultimately the place where everybody who knows anything about a particular problem--in this case terrorism--and maybe the director will create other centers on weapons of mass destruction for particularly problematic countries like Iran or North Korea. Everybody in the Government who knows anything about that will sit down together to share what they have collected in the way of intelligence, share their analysis of it, and then plan jointly on how to stop it, how to deal with the threat represented by those situations.
So I believe Senator Specter's intentions are very good, and I admire him for them. But I think at this moment they are a bridge too far, both in the substance of where he would take us and also, frankly, in terms of the probability of any such measure passing Congress. There is an urgency to our deliberations, as we have said over and over again. I think if we reach too far, we may end up with nothing and nothing maintains the status quo, which failed us on September 11 and will fail us again unless we act.
I oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
I ask unanimous consent to speak for not more than 1 minute.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Hutchison's amendment. It really strengthens the basic bill that we brought before the Chamber. It would reorganize our intelligence community to better deal with the threat of terrorism. We want this core proposal to be a vehicle for responding to the other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to close as many of the points of vulnerability that we have in America to terrorists as we possibly can.
The Commission said major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security. This amendment would go a long way toward ending those vulnerabilities. I thank the Senator from Texas, and I urge adoption of the amendment.
Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner, who chairs the Armed Services Committee, which the chairman of our committee and this ranking member are privileged to serve on, for his statement, his reference to sections of statute that could be compromised and indeed overridden if this amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania were adopted.
I thought that the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator Collins was very illuminating. I hope our colleagues had a chance to listen to it because it did, I believe, ultimately explain why this is a bridge too far, a motto from the Second World War, where the troops were sent to take one bridge too far--I have the feeling that Senator Warner is going to know the background of this ``bridge too far'' reference--too far to hold the bridge and, as a result, the overall effort collapsed.
I am afraid this stretches too far and it weighs down the reforms we are trying to make. I believe the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator Collins is a great argument for the balance we have struck. We leave the line authority over these national intelligence agencies with the Defense Department. Without going into details--because it is classified--thousands of men and women in uniform serve in these agencies. So we want to leave that line authority with the Secretary of Defense but create a reporting authority to the national intelligence director because the NID will oversee the entire intelligence community.
This has been a wonderful learning experience for Senator Collins and me. We met with the head of the NSA, General Hayden, and the head of the NGA, General Clapper, and it was fascinating to hear the extent to which they are not only providing day-to-day technical military intelligence to help their personnel in the field at Central
Command today, and other commands, but the way in which they are also providing, because of their extraordinary capabilities, daily assistance and intelligence security to law enforcement agencies. That is the balance we tried to strike.
I thank the Senator for his question, my chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It is an important question, one that Senator Collins and I weighed as we went through this process of accepting the assignment from the bipartisan leadership to consider and recommend to the Senate on the 9/11 Commission Report. We both take not only our responsibility to protect America's security under the Constitution seriously, we take our membership on the Armed Services Committee seriously. We have a purpose here. We want to put somebody in charge. The 9/11 Commission Report says the intelligence community doesn't have a leader. They are not coordinating their effort. As we do that, we said we want to make sure we don't compromise the quality and availability of intelligence to our warfighters. In fact, we believe our proposal not only doesn't compromise the quality of intelligence, but will ultimately improve it because there will be better coordination.
Even from within some of these agencies, national assets under the Defense Department, high officials said to us that they don't benefit, they don't think the military benefits, the warfighters benefit from the current ambiguity. Make those lines clear, and all the customers, if I can use that term, of intelligence will benefit, including the military.
Senator Warner knows that in specific regard to the so-called TIARA, or tactical intelligence budget of the military, that remains totally within the Defense Department, and so do most of the joint military intelligence programs. So the answer is a resounding yes. We understand the uncertainty, the anxiety because of our bill. The 9/11 Commission recommendations represent change. It does take the budget authority and put it under the national intelligence director for national intelligence programs, including these three within the Defense Department. So we understand the anxiety. But we think we put together a balanced system that will not only first provide the No. 1 customer of intelligence, the President of the United States, with the best intelligence, with the coordinated unity of effort that he requires, but do the same for the warfighters. That is our firm belief.
Mr. President, the sentence is subject to more than one interpretation. So I am not sure what the meaning of it is, but I can assure the Senator about what the intention of the underlying bill is and that is the way in which I look forward to continuing this discussion and debating any amendments the Senator might have.
I found a quote that may be reassuring to the Senator. It is from General Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, when he testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on August 18 of this year about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. He said an empowered national intelligence director, with direct authority over the national agencies, including his own, should not be viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibility as combat support agencies, which I found reassuring. That is certainly our intention and I hope the Senator from Virginia will find that reassuring as well. That, combined with the possibility that the administration might oppose one of the Senator's amendments, I hope will lead the Senator to reconsider.
Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, my understanding is, as the Senator said, this is not a complete bill. It was legislative language for parts of what ultimately have been covered in our bill.
I have no objection.
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Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that…
Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that reserved time for Senator Stevens and instead have Senator Hutchison recognized to offer an amendment.
Mr. President, before the Senator from Mississippi has to leave the floor, I want to thank him for his advice and his support as we bring this very important legislation before the Senate for consideration. I very much value the advice and support of the Senator, and I appreciate all he is doing to help move this legislation forward. He has been a very early voice in identifying the flaws in our current intelligence system and has been stalwart in his support for significant reform. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
I also commend the Senator from Texas for her continued effort to examine the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to pursue legislative solutions, particularly in the area of improving the security of cargo and general aviation security in general. Senator Hutchison has been a longtime leader in this area. Her amendment encompasses a significant portion of S. 165 that the Senate passed by unanimous consent in May. I commend her for her foresight in recognizing areas of concern that have been singled out by the 9/11 Commission.
In the Commission's report, for example, the Commission noted that:
Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general
aviation security.
The Commission went on to say that:
The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to
improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect
explosives.
The Commission says:
More attention and resources should be directed to reducing
or mitigating the threat posed by explosives in vessels'
cargo holds.
These are all areas of weakness identified by the Commission that the Senator from Texas would address in her amendment. It will assist in implementing several of the Commission's recommendations and as a whole will help to make our Nation's air passengers, air carriers, and air cargo more secure. I would note that the Department of Homeland Security has no objections to the Senator's amendment. When the roll call does occur, I will be urging our colleagues to support her efforts.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I, too, thank our leaders for their cooperation in moving this bill forward. The process they have outlined is a fair one. It will help us know how many amendments there are, and we will work with the sponsors of those amendments to ensure adequate debate.
If the Senator from Florida could tell me how much time he anticipates needing.
Mr. President, we would be happy, in light of the devastation to his State, to give the Senator from Florida 10 minutes, if that would be helpful.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following cosponsors be added to Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman amendment No. 3705: Senators Voinovich, Leahy, Akaka, Rockefeller, Nelson of Nebraska, and Hagel.
Mr. President, Senator Voinovich, along with Senator Levin, was very instrumental in helping to draft the compromise represented in this amendment. I talked earlier about the efforts of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Connecticut, but I also wanted to acknowledge that Senator Voinovich and Senator Levin worked very hard to help us strike the right balance in allocating funding so that large States with high-threat areas would receive additional funding. Yet we wanted to make sure that we recognize that every State, regardless of size or population, has certain vulnerabilities.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins- Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too much authority in the NID.
Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department of Defense.
Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense.
What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. I think that would be a mistake.
I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/ 11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense.
In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO-- within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is working well for the military today.
For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said:
We should not break the link between these intelligence
organizations and the organizations that they are supporting,
especially within the military context and the direct kind of
support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the
warfighter.
I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on
combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than to the Secretary of Defense?
There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA, NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just an example of some of the unintended consequences.
Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the 9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense.
I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense.
I urge opposition to the amendment.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his excellent comments. He states the case very well.
There are two final points that I would like to make on Senator Specter's amendment, and that is, when we asked Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, to comment on this, he gave us a history of why the Commission specifically rejected this approach, and we talked about many of the reasons.
But one other that he mentioned is that one damaging consequence of stripping NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the Department of Defense is that then the Pentagon might well feel obligated to recreate the capabilities within the Department at great expense and creating many more opportunities for bureaucratic conflict. That was a point made by the executive director in expressing his opposition to Senator Specter's amendment and in giving us an insight into why the Commission specifically rejected the route taken in this amendment.
I also note that Senator Specter's amendment, while it is intended to create clear lines of authority between the NID and the combat support agencies, in reality could well create much ambiguity and confusion. While the amendment gives the NID supervision, direction, and control over these combat support agencies, it keeps them housed in DOD buildings, on DOD land, and the amendment does not take away from the Secretary of Defense the direction and control he currently has over these agencies.
For example, the law that created the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which is now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, establishes that Agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Yet under the Specter amendment, the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO would fall under the line authority of both Agencies. I think that would create tremendous confusion and ambiguity.
Mr. President, I see the time for the vote has arrived.
Mr. President, I urge support for Senator Hutchison's amendment.
If the Senator will yield on that point, I think this points out the confusion and ambiguity I pointed out earlier due to the way the Specter amendment is drafted. I agree that it creates confusion and also that the implications of substituting the national intelligence director for the Secretary of Defense throughout the laws creating these agencies creates a lot of unintended problems. That is one reason I believe this amendment should be defeated.
Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements.
We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we recognized that they are national as well.
What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment.
I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought up another important point. Do we really believe that the national intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11 Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal adviser to the President.
Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day- to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the intelligence community.
So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that approach was wise.
I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered by Senator Specter.
Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still wish to be heard.
The Senator's point is well taken.
It has not.
Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.
Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11 Commission.
What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA than he does to the Secretary of Defense.
If we look at the administration's legislative language they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets. I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in the Department of Defense.
Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.
What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion in putting tactical intelligence--
Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am not the author--
That is correct, other than there may be some programs that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes, but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that would be DIA.
Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would be helpful.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the Specter amendment for 10 minutes. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the Specter amendment for 10 minutes.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11 Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel ever so strongly about that.
These three agencies are designated in law as combat support agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and in the future.
The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One, no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations.
These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters.
The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law-- I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their operational missions.
I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues' attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense:
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director
of Central Intelligence, shall--
(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the
intelligence community within the Department of Defense are
adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the
Department of Defense. . . .
Further on down it reads:
(4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community
within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely
with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military
forces. . . .
I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is to be effective.
I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title 10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from section 193:
(a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often
than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on
the combat support agencies. Each such report shall
include--
(A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and
readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in
the event of a war or threat to national security; and
(B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers
appropriate.
That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to be adopted.
So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law. Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel.
In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter.
Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore, the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility.
So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote against this amendment.
Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--
I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.
I would hope you do so.
I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation.
My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to some extent, title 50.
I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer. You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.
I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.
I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me. Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the Secretary of Defense?
I would draw that argument to the attention of the distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50.
``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is the clear English language.
I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to the Senate.
Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the Secretary of Defense?
I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of the bill in having this amendment defeated.
Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20, 2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in other statutes. I will read it:
We are writing to you, however, to express our serious
concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your
summary and after review--
It is addressed to the chairman.
--by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff,
does not give the NID additional authorities that will be
required to provide the unity of leadership and
accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In
particular--
This is the operative sentence.
--we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day
operational control of all elements of the intelligence
community performing national missions.
It goes on. So it is very clear.
I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,'' but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO, as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways.
So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not correct?
Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators. Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to study what they have said.
I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title 10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do not wish to have.
Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers, also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings, particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were in the system at that time.
As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.
Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.
Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it.
I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that operative paragraph 2:
The Administration supports, in particular, the
establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful
budget authorities and other authorities to manage the
Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the
newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The
Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken
the full budget authority or any other authorities that the
President has requested for the NID. The Administration will
work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and
streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make
adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have
flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting
intelligence activities.
It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.''
Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?
Without diminishing in any way that very encouraging sentence, if you go on to read the totality of this communication, there are expressly in here some reservations, but I will not get into that at this point in time.
I want to go back to these words, ``full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.'' We just had a debate on the Specter amendment, which I believe, with no disrespect to my good friend and colleague, is an extreme viewpoint on this, and I am hopeful the Senate will not adopt it, but we do come back to this pivotal question, and tomorrow I hope to bring forth some amendments. Now that I see the expressed language and the Senator assured me her bill tracks this, I have to have some clarification--at least I shall seek clarification--of what is the remaining role of the Secretary of Defense with regard to those portions; namely, these three combat agencies, together with DIA, what is the residual area of collaboration, jointness, in the preparation of the budget--preparation is part 1--and then the execution of the budget after it goes through the authorization and appropriations process and begins to come back to the several departments and agencies.
So let's talk about what the Senator believes this language--which is consistent, as she says, with the language in the bill--I presume the Senator's language would not be modified or changed by this--what is left to the Secretary of Defense in regard to the budget authority?
Mr. President, I really think that is an important representation the Senator has made, but I do not read in this language of the communication from the White House the distinction that she draws between tactical and national. Can I refer the Senator again to this language?
I draw the attention of the distinguished managers to the words ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority. . . .'' It is the word ``full.''
To me ``full'' is the whole basket. It could be interpreted that way.
Mr. President, I acknowledge that, the JMIP and the TIARA in the language sent up. But it seems to me the writer of this could have been somewhat more explicit in the communication because this is an important communication to guide Senators desiring to establish their voting pattern in connection with the Senator's bill.
I think I pressed the point far enough and I think the Senator from Maine has been very courteous in her responses. I just want to bring to the attention of colleagues, when this says ``full,'' it is your understanding it did not include the JMIP, the TIARA, and those programs; is that correct?
I am privileged to be in this colloquy with my friends. I would like to have the assurance of the ranking member of the committee that he concurs in the statements just made by our distinguished Chair.
The question is the language sent up by the administration did have a breakout of the budget authority as relates to certain parts of the overall programs performed by these combat agencies.
I ask our distinguished manager of the bill whether this language in the communication today which said the administration opposed any amendments, because I proposed to have an amendment tomorrow--it may be opposed by the administration, but I want to make sure that the phrase ``full budget authorities'' is not amending what they sent up by way of language.
Well, time will tell. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record a copy of the administration--I think the Senator referred to it as a bill although it was never introduced--language they sent up which made a clear reference and distinction to what budget authority was given to the NID and what residual remains in the Secretary of Defense. Am I correct on that?
Yes.
Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation to authorize the distribution of judgment funds to eligible tribal members of the Gila River Indian Community in Arizona. Identical legislation…
Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation to authorize the distribution of judgment funds to eligible tribal members of the Gila River Indian Community in Arizona. Identical legislation unanimously passed the Senate last year, but was not able to be considered by the House of Representatives prior to the adjournment of the 107th Congress.
The Gila River Indian Community Judgment Fund Distribution Act resolves two half-century old claims by the Gila River tribe against the United States for failure to meet Federal obligations to protect the community's use of water from the Gila River and Salt River in Arizona. The original complaint was filed before the Indian Claims Commission on August 8, 1951. In 1982, the United States Court of Claims confirmed liability of the United States to the community, and recently the settlement of these two claims was determined to be 7 million.
So much time has passed that the Indian Claims Commission formerly in charge of fund distributions no longer exists. However, a debt does not disappear. The judgment award has since been transferred from the Indian Claims Commission to a trust account on behalf of the community, managed by the Office of Trust Management at the Department of the Interior.
This judgment award was certified by the Treasury Department on October 6, 1999 for the final portion of the litigation to the two remaining dockets of the Gila River Indian Community. Since that time, the community has been working with the BIA in an attempt to finalize a use and distribution plan to submit to Congress for approval. As outlined in its plan, the community has decided to distribute the judgment award equally to eligible tribal members.
The purpose of this legislation is to comply with Federal regulations which requires congressional approval for distribution of judgment funds to tribal members. The terms of the legislation reflect an agreement by all parties for a distribution plan for final approval by the Congress. As part of this legislation, the BIA is also seeking to resolve remaining expert assistance loans by the Gila River Indian Community, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida, as originally authorized by the Indian Claims Commission.
Members of the Gila River Indian Community have waited half a century for final resolution of all their legal claims regarding this matter. After considerable delay, it is only fair to resolve this matter and provide compensation as soon as possible. I hope that my colleagues will act quickly to move this legislation through the process.
Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation to continue Federal support for the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution. This legislation is identical to legislation which passed the Senate unanimously in September of last year.
The Congress enacted legislation to establish the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution in 1998, with the purpose of offering an alternative to litigation for parties in dispute over environmental conflicts. As we know, many environmental conflicts often result in lengthy and costly court proceedings and may take years to resolve. In cases involving Federal Government agencies, the costs for court proceeding are usually paid for by taxpayers. While litigation is still a recourse to resolve disputes, the Congress recognized the need for alternatives, such as mediation and facilitated collaboration, to address the rising number of environmental conflicts that have clogged Federal courts, executive agencies, and the Congress.
The Institute was placed at the Morris K. Udall Foundation in recognition of former Representative Morris K. Udall from Arizona and his exceptional environmental record, as well as his unusual ability to build a consensus amoung fractious and even hostile interests. The Institute was established as an experiment with the idea that hidden within fractured environmental debates lay the seeds for many agreements, an approach applied by Mo Udall with unsurpassed ability.
The success of the Institute is far greater than we could have imagined. The Institute began operations in 1999 and has already provided assistance to parties in more than 100 environmental conflicts across 30 states.
Agencies from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, the U.S. Navy, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and others have all called upon the Institute for assistance. Even the Federal courts are referring cases to the Institute for mediation, including such high profile cases as the management of endangered salmon throughout the Columbia River Basin in the Northwest.
The Institution also assisted in facilitating interagency temawork for the Everglades Task Force which oversees the South Everglades Restoration Project. The U.S. Forest Service requested assistance to bring ranchers and environmental advocates in the southwest to work on grazing and environmental compliance issues. Even members of Congress have sought the Institute's assistance to review implementation of the Nation's fundamental environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act, to assess how it can be improved using collaborative processes.
The Institute accomplishes its work by maintaining a national roster of 180 environmental mediators and facilitators located in 39 states. We believe that mediators should be involved in the geographic area of the dispute whenever possible and that system is working.
The demand on the Institute's assistance had been much greater than anticipated. At the time the Institute was created, we did not anticipate the magnitude of the role it would serve to the Federal Government. The Institute has served as a mediator between agencies and as an advisor to agency dispute resolution efforts involving overlapping or competing jurisdictions and mandates, developing long- term solutions, training personnel in consensus-building efforts, and designing international systems for preventing or resolving disputes.
Unfortunately, experience has also taught us that most Federal agencies are limited from participating because of inadequate funds to pay for mediation services. This legislation will authorize a participation fund to be used to support meaningful participation of parties to Federal environmental disputes. The participation fund will provide matching funds to stakeholders who cannot otherwise afford mediation fees or costs of providing technical assistance.
In addition to creating this new participation fund, this legislation simply extends the authorization for the Institute for an additional five years with a modest increase in its operation budget. The proposed increase is in response to the overwhelming demand on the Institute's services, an investment that will ultimately benefit taxpayers by preventing costly litigation.
I hope that we can consider this legislation expeditiously to ensure continuing support for the valuable services of the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution to our Nation.
Mr. President, I am reintroducing legislation today to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a special resource study of sites associated with the life of Cesar Estrada Chavez. Chavez is one of the most revered public servants in our history for his leadership in helping organize migrant farm workers, and for providing inspiration to those most oppressed in our society. He is an exemplary American hero. It is important that we honor his struggle and do what we can to preserve certain sites located in Arizona, California and other States that are significant to his life.
Cesar Chavez, a fellow Arizonan born in Yuma, was the son of migrant farm workers. He no doubt loved qualities of life associated with his family's Hispanic heritage, but he will be remembered for the sincerity of his American patriotism. He fought to help Americans transcend distinctions of experience, and share equally in the rights and responsibilities of freedom. He made America a bigger and better nation.
While Chavez and his family migrated across the southwest looking for farm work, he evolved into a defender to worker's rights. He founded the National Farm Workers Association in 1962, which latter became the United Farm Workers of America. Essentially, he gave a voice to those that had no voice. In his words: ``We cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our community. . .our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations and needs of others, for their sakes and for our own.''
I introduced this legislation last October and received an overwhelming positive response, not only from my constituents in Arizona, but from Americans all across the nation. Similar legislation was introduced by Congresswoman Hilda Solis, D-CA, in September 2001. The bill specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to determine whether any of the sites meet the criteria for being listed on the National Register of Historic Landmarks. The study would be conducted within three years. The goal of this legislation is to establish a foundation for a future bill that will designate land for these sites to become historic landmarks.
Cesar Chavez was a humble man of deep conviction who understood what it meant to serve and sacrifice for others. He was a true American hero who
embodied the values of justice and freedom this nation holds dear. Honoring the places of his life will enable his legacy to inspire and serve as an example for our future leaders.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a letter of support from the Cesar E. Chavez Foundation be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, today I am proposing bipartisan legislation to provide the basis for reform of the administration and management of the assets and funds held by the United States in trust for federally recognized Indian tribes and individual Indians. I am pleased that my two colleagues from South Dakota, Senators Daschle and Johnson, are once again joining me in this effort.
Last year, we introduced a similar bill to serve as a legislative vehicle in the event a consensus agreement could be reached during an extensive dialogue between a designated tribal task force and the U.S. Department of Interior on administrative and legislative reforms to federal management of trust funds and assets. Unfortunately, the dialogue resulted in a stalemate. While we received many favorable comments to move forward with this legislation, and conducted a full committee hearing to consider it, a sufficient consensus did not exist to approve the legislation prior to the adjournment of the 107th session.
We are reintroducing this legislation again because we believe it is important to continue to offer a legislative remedy to the management problems plaguing the Interior Department and instill a meaningful role for Indian tribes in the process. Indian trust funds management continues to be mired in controversy and systemic mismanagement. Native American beneficiaries
continue to be denied a full reconciliation of money rightfully belonging to them.
The history of Indian trust funds management is long, exhaustive and fraught with controversy. It is a problem inherited by successive Administrations yet only limited progress has been made. The major structural changes called for in the 1994 American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act have not been accomplished. Two Special Trustees have resigned in frustration and high-level government officials have twice been held in civil contempt by the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. for breach of fiduciary duties.
No one is more frustrated about the lack of resolution to these long- standing problems than the Native American beneficiaries. However, recent reorganization plans submitted to the Court by the Interior Department earlier this month have only raised more controversy and concern among Indian tribes and beneficiaries as to the extent the Department will fully account for lost and mismanaged trust accounts. Significant questions have also been raised as to the impact of these proposed plans on long-standing Federal policies of self-determination and the function of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
I cannot speak as to the merits of the Department's recent plans. The fact is, many in the Congress were not notified of the Department's intended actions nor has there been an opportunity to evaluate these plans through the respective legislative committees of jurisdiction. I have sought a commitment from the incoming Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, to hold hearings as soon as possible on recent Department proposals that will restructure trust funds management as well as to consider legislative proposals such as the one we're proposing today.
The purpose of this legislation we are introducing is simple. It focuses on two primary changes to the 1994 American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act, the underlying law governing Indian trust funds management. First, it creates a single line-of-authority in the Interior Department by establishing a Deputy Secretary for Trust Management and Reform; and second, the bill strengthens provisions for Indian tribes and beneficiaries to directly manage or co-manage with the Interior secretary trust funds and assets, based on successful self-determination policies.
A fundamental objective of this legislation is to raise the profile of Indian trust funds management within the Interior Department and provide a statutory basis for Indian tribes to assume a greater management role in future management of their trust funds and trust assets. The structure of this legislation is similar to the bill introduced last year, but it is modified to reflect comments received from Indian tribes.
The legislation affirms the fiduciary standards to be applied to the management of Indian trust funds and assets. The Office of Special Trustee is abolished and replaced with the Office of Trust Reform under the direction of a new Deputy Secretary. The existing Advisory Committee to the Special Trustee is replaced with a Task Force composed of representatives of the tribes and the Department who will work with the new Deputy Secretary to develop appropriate standards and further necessary changes.
Senator Daschle, Senator Johnson and I introduce this legislation as a demonstration of our continuing commitment to seek a real and meaningful trust reform solution that provides an active role for tribal participation and consultation. We hope this legislation will prompt the necessary dialogue to ensure reform to Indian trust funds and trust assets management in a way that increases accountability of the Interior Department and respects the fact that the tribes must be involved as active participants without the threat of termination of the trust responsibility.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, today I join Senators Boxer, Chafee, and others to introduce The Toxic Clean Up and Polluter Pays Renewal Act for. For more than 20 years, the polluter pays principle has been a…
Mr. President, today I join Senators Boxer, Chafee, and others to introduce The Toxic Clean Up and Polluter Pays Renewal Act for. For more than 20 years, the polluter pays principle has been a cornerstone of environmental policy. The Superfund toxic waste cleanup program, based on that principle, has made it possible to clean up hundreds of toxic waste dumps across the country, and has led to better management of industrial pollution and waste.
The polluter pays principle is now under attack. Last year, the Bush administration announced that it would not seek reauthorization of the taxes levied on oil and chemical companies that go into the Superfund trust fund, which is used to pay for cleanup of toxic waste sites.
The Superfund program established three ways to pay for the cost of cleanups: 1) the company or individual responsible for creating the site pays for its cleanup; 2) the Environmental Protection Agency performs the cleanups and recoups the costs from the responsible party or parties; and 3) for those ``orphan'' sites where no responsible party can be found, or the party is insolvent or no longer in business, the cleanup is paid for out of the trust fund.
The Superfund trust fund was created primarily with revenue from a corporate environmental income tax and excise taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals. The trust fund received about $1.5 billion per year before the legislative authority to collect the taxes expired at the end of 1995. The trust fund is expected to run out of money in 2004, having dwindled from a high of $3.8 billion in 1996 to $28 million this year.
There are 1,234 sites on the EPA national priority list of toxic waste sites that need to be cleaned up. One in four Americans live within 4 miles of a Superfund site. These sites contain hazardous pollutants like arsenic, cyanide, and agent orange. Last year, EPA Administrator Christine Whitman told Congress that 75 sites on the national priority list would be cleaned up in 2001 and 65 sites would be cleaned up in 2002. The Bush administration then revised its plan, requiring that only 47 site cleanups be completed in 2001 and 42 in 2002. For 2003, the Bush administration has proposed to further decrease cleanups. On October 25, 2002, the EPA Inspector General found that the Bush administration has cut funding at 55 Superfund sites in 25 states for which regional officials had requested cleanup. For Fiscal Year 2002, EPA regional officials requested $510 million to clean up waste sites. In response, EPA headquarters obligated only $280 million, resulting in a shortfall of $229 million, or 45 percent.
The program is insufficiently funded to allow sites that are already scheduled to be cleaned up to move forward. This results in increased risks to human health and the environment and increased cleanup costs in the long term. Reinstating the Superfund fee would restore a source of funding to the program at a time when the backlog of sites requires more resources if the program is to be successful. The Bush administration is the first administration since Superfund was enacted in 1980 to oppose reinstating this tax on polluters--a policy that either halts cleanup efforts or shifts the cost to rank-and-file taxpayers. Either result is unacceptable.
The administration's plan to cut the Superfund program would seriously compromise the health of our communities and amount to an enormous windfall for the oil and chemical industries. Funding is the key to cleaning up these sites and protecting communities from harm. The ``polluter pays'' principle has worked well over the last two decades, and the financial burden should not be shifted from polluters to average taxpayers. The administration should change course and find ways to restore the ``polluter pays'' principle to the program and aggressively fund cleanups at contaminated sites.
Mr. President, today I am joining with Senators John McCain and Tim Johnson in reintroducing legislation that will focus attention on the need to address and correct the longstanding problem of mismanagement of the assets and funds held by the United States in trust for federally-recognized Indian tribes and individual American Indians.
This is a problem that has festered for far too long outside the spotlight of public recognition. And it is a problem that is undermining urgently needed efforts to improve the quality of life in Indian Country.
Indian Country has faced many challenges over the years. Few, however, have been more important, or more vexing, than that of restoring integrity to trust fund management.
For over a hundred years, the Department of Interior has managed a trust fund funded with the proceeds of leasing of oil, gas, land and mineral rights for the benefit of Indian people. Today, the trust fund may owe as much as $10 billion to as many as 500,000 Indians.
To provide some perspective, the 16 tribes of the Great Plains in South Dakota, North Dakota and Nebraska comprise 10 million acres of trust lands representing over one-third of the tribal trust assets. Many enrolled members of the nine South Dakota tribes have individual trust accounts.
How these trust funds have been and will be managed is being litigated in Cobell v. Norton, and the resolution of this lawsuit will have far-reaching implications throughout Indian Country. It is foolhardly not to evaluate potential solutions in the context of this lawsuit.
There is clear consensus in Indian Country that the current administration of the trust fund is a failure. The daunting question has always been how to reform it.
In November 2001, the Secretary of the Interior unveiled her controversial plan to reorganize the Bureau of Indian Affairs, BIA, and segregate the oversight and accounting of trust-related assets in a new Bureau of Indian Trust Asset Management, BITAM. In testimony before the U.S. District Court, the Secretary acknowledged that, ``We undoubtedly do have some missing data, and we are all going to have to find a way to deal with the fact that some information no longer exists.''
The Secretary's controversial reorganization proposal, a hasty effort to avoid being held in contempt of court, was presented with minimal consultation with the tribes or individual Indian account holders, not to mention Congress.
In South Dakota, tribal leaders communicated to Tim Johnson and me their concern that the Secretary's solution appeared to be a fait accompli, conceived without meaningful participation of the stakeholders most directly affected by it. They felt strongly that this proposal should not be implemented without further consultation with the tribes. Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary on Indian Affairs, despite their reorganization plan, were both subsequently found in contempt of court.
In the early months of 2002, in the face of Administration assurances that its reorganization plan was not set in stone, the Interior Department requested that $200 million from the BIA and $100 million from the Office of the Special Trustee, be reprogrammed to ``a single organization that will report to the Secretary through an Assistant Secretary, Indian Trust.'' This contradiction set off red flags in Congress, and a clear and direct message was sent to Secretary Norton by Senators Inouye, Campbell, Byrd, Johnson and others that no action should be taken to implement her proposed reorganization plan administratively. Notwithstanding this clear signal, just this last December, while most members of Congress were out of town and with very little fanfare, the Secretary submitted yet another smaller request to reprogram BIA funds for trust fund reform activities.
Given these developments, Senators McCain, Johnson and I feel that Congress should be more assertive in forcing discussion of what role Congress might play in ensuring that tribes and individual Indian account holders have a voice on shaping trust reform policy. It is our hope that this bill will promote more constructive dialogue among the Congress, the Interior Department and Indian Country on this problem and lead to a true consensus solution.
With that goal in mind, the bill was received by representatives of the Great Plains tribes last Congress at a recent meeting in Rapid City. And earlier today, the Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association urged me to re-introduce this legislation in the new Congress.
Mike Jandreau, Chairman of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe and member of the Secretary's Trust Reform Task Force, has been an effective advocate and champion of trust reform, not only for his tribe, but also for all Indian people. He and Flandreau-Santee Sioux Tribal Chairman and Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association President Tom Ranfranz led a very impressive and productive working sessions with tribal leaders from South Dakota, North Dakota and Nebraska. Mike and Tom have also worked with tribal leaders from Montana and Wyoming to raise awareness of the stakes of this issue and build support for the bill that regrettably died at the end of the 107th Congress due to Administration opposition.
I commend the willingness of these participating Great Plains and Rocky Mountain regional tribal leaders to be part of a public process that will hopefully will not stop until Indian Country feels comfortable with a final product they create. The McCain-Johnson- Daschle bill is intended to contribute to this result.
At this point, I would like to remind my colleagues some initial observations on this proposal that were raised in the last Congress by participating South Dakota treaty tribes and tribes of the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain regions that are still relevant in the 108th Congress. These comments demonstrate how thoughtfully Indian leaders are approaching the trust problem, and I fully expect that their suggestions will be considered and incorporated as the bill moves through the committee process.
The following issues are of great importance to the Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association:
1. Providing the Deputy Secretary with sufficient authority to ensure that reform of the administration of trust assets is permanent. They do not believe the bill at present gives the Deputy Secretary the full and unified authority needed;
2. Including cultural resources as a trust asset for management purposes;
3. Incorporating the Office of Surface Mining and Bureau of Reclamation and other related agencies within the Department of the Interior and the Federal government under the purview of the Deputy Secretary;
4. Assuring that the legislation not infringe on tribal sovereignty by interfering with tribal involvement in the management of individual trust assets or tribal assets, or both;
5. Maintaining the Bureau of Indian Affairs' role as an advocate for tribe;
6. Maintaining current levels of Bureau of Indian Affairs employment;
7. Applying Indian employment preference to all positions created by the legislation;
8. Providing in law that Bureau of Indian Affairs funds not be used to fund the Deputy Secretary appointed by the legislation;
9. Stressing the importance of appropriating adequate funding to allow reform to succeed;
10. Reflecting in the legislative history that much of the funding needed for real trust reform be allocated at the local agency and regional levels of the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and
11. Placing more tribal representatives, including tribal resource managers, from various Bureau of Indian Affairs regions on the advisory board to the Office of Trust Reform.
The issues of trust reform and reorganization within the Bureau of Indian Affairs are nothing new to us here on Capitol Hill, or in Indian Country. Collectively, we have endured many efforts, some will intentioned and some
clearly not, to fix, reform, adjust, improve, streamline, downsize, and even terminate the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its trust activities.
These efforts have been pursued under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Unfortunately, they have rarely included meaningful involvement from tribal leadership, or recognized the Federal Government's treaty obligation to tribes.
I would be remiss if I did not commend this Administration for taking the time to travel to Indian Country to discuss this problem. Their interest in promoting dialogue with tribal leaders was welcome and appreciated. At the same time, however, talk must be supported by action if the trust management problem is to be successfully resolved.
The recent unveiling last month of the Department of the Interior's attempt to implement a trust reorganization plan without full tribal or congressional consultation in response to the Cobell v. Norton case was appalling and an egregious act by the federal government to Indian stakeholders. One tribal task force member described Interior's latest deceptive actions as ``a sham.'' That sentiment is widespread in Indian Country and exacerbates an underlying frustration and disappointment that is both understandable and disconcerting.
I share this frustration and disappointment. And I am concerned that the progress made jointly last year could be wasted away by a rising tide of disillusionment and mounting sense of betrayal.
The message I have heard from tribal leaders is clear. What is needed to achieve true reform are clear trust standards, one clear line of authority for trust management and the resources necessary to achieve meaningful reform, respect for self-determination, and meaningful consultation.
Meaningful consultation and acceptance of tribal status is the critical starting point if we hope to find a workable solution to the very real problem of trust management. The bill Senators McCain, Johnson and I are introducing today reflects this conviction.
There is no more important challenge facing the tribes and their representatives in Congress than that of restoring accountability and efficiency to trust management. And nowhere do the principles of self- determination and tribal sovereignty come more into play than in the management and distribution of trust funds and assets.
I am disappointed that this problem was not solved to the satisfaction of tribal leaders in the last Congress. Yet, that fight is not over, and my commitment to my South Dakota tribal constituents and Indian Country on this important issue has not diminished.
Last week, the Senate Democratic leadership introduced its priority bills for the 108th Congress. I am proud that trust reform is included as part of our civil rights legislation.
An effective long-term solution to the trust problem must be based on government-to-government dialogue. The McCain/Johnson/Daschle bill will not only provide the catalyst for meaningful tribal involvement in the search for solutions, it can also form the basis for true trust reform. I look forward to participating with tribal leaders, Administration officials and my congressional colleagues in pursuit of this essential objective.
Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Hutchison in introducing the Air Cargo Security Act, a bill that passed the Senate by Unanimous Consent in the 107th Congress. Today Senator Hutchison and…
Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Hutchison in introducing the Air Cargo Security Act, a bill that passed the Senate by Unanimous Consent in the 107th Congress.
Today Senator Hutchison and I released a report from the General Accounting Office that demonstrates why the Congress and the Transportation Security Administration must, together, move quickly to shore up our vulnerabilities to protect against another terrorist attack.
I strongly believe that we must increase our defenses across the board to anticipate the next attack, not just correct the vulnerabilities that were already exploited by terrorists on September 11th.
After September 11th, Congress moved quickly to federalize the airport security screening workforce to prevent more hijackings, but we have not done enough to increase our air cargo security.
The General Accounting Office report shows that Congress must require the TSA to develop a strategic plan to screen and inspect air cargo to protect our Nation's air transportation system. According to this report, our air cargo system remains vulnerable to a terrorist attack because: first, there aren't enough safeguards in place to ensure that someone shipping air cargo under the ``known shipper'' program has taken the proper steps to protect against use by terrorists; second, cargo tampering is possible at various points where cargo transfers from company to company; third, air cargo handlers are not required to have criminal background checks, and they do not always have their identification verified; fourth and most importantly, most cargo shipped by air is never screened.
To address these problems, the GAO recommends that the Transportation Security Administration develop a comprehensive plan for improving air cargo security.
The legislation we are reintroducing today, directs the TSA to: 1. Develop a strategic plan to ensure the security of all air cargo; 2. Establish an industry-wide pilot program database of known shippers; 3. set up a training program for handlers to learn how to safe-guard cargo from tampering; and 4. Inspect air cargo shipping facilities on a regular basis.
The Aviation Security Act Congress passed after September 11 required the Transportation Security Administration to screen and inspect air cargo ``as soon as practicable.'' This report shows we cannot wait any longer. The time is now for the Senate to again take up this legislation, again pass this legislation, and for the TSA to prevent terrorists from tampering with the cargo loaded into the underbelly of our airplanes.
The General Accounting Office recommends that the Under Secretary for Transportation develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that includes priority actions identified on the basis of risk, costs, deadlines for completing those actions, and performance targets.
The TSA has a great deal of options at its disposal. The TSA could: screen air cargo for explosives; secure cargo with high-tech seals; control access to holding areas containing cargo; use cargo tracking systems; install more cameras in cargo areas at airports; use blast resistant containers; have more bomb-sniffing dogs; put cargo in decompression chambers before loading it onto an aircraft; require the identity of people making air cargo deliveries to be checked; establish an industrywide computer profiling system; require criminal background checks for employees at freight forwarders and consolidators; and require third party inspections.
We do not expect the TSA to X-ray and scan all cargo for explosives because shippers and carriers would be able to process only 4 percent of cargo received daily, which would severely disrupt the air cargo industry. However, the Federal Government can deploy a combination of the techniques I have listed to implement a comprehensive security plan for air cargo.
Since one half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is typically filled with cargo and 22 percent of all cargo transported by plane is loaded on passenger flights, I believe air cargo security is just as important as passenger security. In fact, you cannot keep passengers safe without stronger air cargo security.
Each time there is a major jet crash or bombing, we reexamine our aviation security. I hope it will not take another accident or attack for us to finally pass this legislation into law.
I would like to thank Senator Hutchison for her leadership on the issue of transportation security and I urge my colleagues to support our legislation.
Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleague Senator Boxer, to introduce the ``San Francisco Old Mint Commemorative Coin Act'' to authorize the United States Mint to issue a commemorative coin that will honor the San Francisco Old Mint and help restore this historic building in downtown San Francisco.
The San Francisco Old Mint Building is an important historical landmark for San Francisco, the State of California, and the United States. Beginning its operations in 1854, the San Francisco Mint was established to take advantage of the plentiful gold and silver mined in the West during the California Gold Rush. At one point, more than half of the money minted in the United States came from the San Francisco Mint, and it once held a third of the Nation's gold supply. Today the ``S'' Mint Mark is found on many rare coins as well as on many new proof coin sets.
The Old Mint Building, located in the heart of the city, has been standing for more than 125 years as the oldest stone building in San Francisco. It is the Old Mint opened in 1874, it was the largest Federal building in the West. Architect Alfred B. Mullet designed this building which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. A.B. Mullet is the same architect who designed both the U.S. Treasury building and the Old Executive Office Building here in Washington D.C.
A product of America's ``Gilded Age,'' the Old Mint is architecturally reflective of a distinguished line of Greek revival- style buildings that were soon to be eclipsed by other designs at the turn of the century.
Aided by its magnificent stone structure, the Old Mint Building was able to survive the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. In fact, the Mint was the only financial instruction that remained operable after the earthquake and the building was used as the treasury for the city's disaster relief funds.
The San Francisco Old Mint Building minted coins until 1937 when the building became too small and its operations moved to a larger space elsewhere in San Francisco. In the years since then, the building has deteriorated. In 1994, the Bureau of the Mint closed the Old Mint because it could not afford the then-estimated $20 million seismic retrofit to bring the building up to code. Since then the building, transferred to the General Services Administration, has remained closed.
Now, the San Francisco Museum and Historical Society has proposed an exciting project to restore and rejuvenate the Old Mint Building in downtown San Francisco. A fine history museum supported by shops, restaurants, community office space, a coin shop, and a visitors center will combine to make the building a striking and viable destination.
I am introducing this legislation to honor the history of the San Francisco Old Mint and the role it played in rebuilding the great ``City by the Bay'' after the 1906 Earthquake and Fire. This legislation will authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to mint and issue 100,000 $5 gold coins and 500,000 $1 silver coins, which will be emblematic of the San Francisco Old Mint Building and its importance to California and the United States.
The commemorative coin will also help provide funds for the building's restoration. The proceeds generated from the sale of these commemorative coins will be paid to the San Francisco Museum and Historical Society for the building's rehabilitation.
The San Francisco Old Mint is venerated by coin collectors as the ``Granite Lady'' and I believe it is worthy of a commemorative coin. I am very pleased to note that the Citizens Commemorative Coin Advisory Committee, CCCAC, has agreed and that its members have unanimously endorsed this legislation for a 2006 coin, a year that will mark the 100-year anniversary of the building's survival of the 1906 earthquake and fire.
2006 is also the year the U.S. Mint will issue the California quarter and I expect both coins will be attractive to coin collectors. The CCCAC's recommendation will be included in its 2002 annual report that will be delivered to Congress before the end of this month.
Collectors, Californians, and millions of Americans hold the San Francisco Old Mint in the highest regard as a national treasure. Because no other such icon of the numismatic community has been honored by the issuance of a commemorative coin, I believe the San Francisco Old Mint merits commemoration at this time.
I believe honoring and restoring the San Francisco Old Mint Building is an important historic preservation project. I hope my colleagues will join me to support the San Francisco Old Mint Commemorative Coin Act to honor the unique and proud history of the ``Granite Lady.''
Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3711, which is at the desk. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that…
Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3711, which is at the desk.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Snowe be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.
Mr. President, I rise today to offer the Air Cargo Security Act as an amendment to the Intelligence Reform Act. This is a measure that we need to pass to answer some of the criticisms in the 9/ 11 Commission Report regarding cargo security.
I am going to talk further about this bill, but I would like to offer Senator McCain some of the time to also talk because he was one of the cosponsors. It went through the Commerce Committee with his chairmanship. We all agree this is a bill that is needed to add to the security that is in the bill in accordance with the 9/11 Commission Report.
I yield to Senator McCain for his remarks, and then I will finish my presentation.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain, for adding his support to this bill. We would not have gotten it through the Commerce Committee without his support. I think it adds immeasurably to the bill that is before us today.
Congressional action following 9/11 quickly created the Transportation Security Administration to address the appalling security gaps exposed by terrorists. We took drastic but appropriate steps to considerably increase security of our airports and planes, and 3 years later we are light-years ahead of where we were on that horrific day.
I am pleased that the 9/11 Commission raises issues that are similar to those I have discussed since we enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Commission report states:
Concerns also remain regarding the screening and transport
of checked bags and cargo. More attention and resources
should be directed to reducing or mitigating the threat posed
by explosives in vessels' cargo holds.
I have worked since 2001 to enact stringent air cargo security standards and, along with Senator Feinstein, introduced the Air Cargo Security Act to create a comprehensive system to secure shippers, freight forwarders, and carriers. The Senate has twice passed this bill unanimously, but it remains stalled in the House of Representatives.
The bottom line is this: Are we safer than on September 11? Absolutely. But have we done enough? Not yet. So I think we can do more. I think this is an opportunity for us to address this issue.
The Air Cargo Security Act will make a difference in our Nation's air security. One thing we have not provided since 9/11 is security in the belly of the aircraft equal to protections for passenger areas and airports. Cargo is shipped on passenger aircraft, in some cases, without being screened. That is why we need this amendment.
The Air Cargo Security Act would establish a reliable known-shipper program, mandate inspections of cargo facilities, and direct the Transportation Security Agency to work with foreign countries to institute regular inspections at facilities that bring cargo into the United States.
The legislation would develop a training program for air cargo handlers and give TSA the power to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder whose practices are unsound. These provisions will go a long way toward further securing aircraft in our country. All of us want America to have the safest aviation system in the world. Closing the cargo loophole is an important step.
There is no doubt in my mind that the traveling public is considerably safer. We have made changes to ensure our screeners undergo background checks, training, and testing. Checked bags are scrutinized, flight crew training is constantly being improved, and we are traveling in a more secure system. But we must address the cargo issue.
Mr. President, 22 percent of all air cargo in the United States is carried on passenger flights, only a tiny fraction of which is inspected.
Beyond transport on passenger planes, there are other issues in the cargo arena. Identification cards used by workers are generally not secured with fingerprints or other biometric identifiers. Background checks for cargo employees are still inadequate.
Perhaps the weakest link in the cargo security chain is the freight forwarder. These are the middlemen who collect cargo from the shippers and deliver it to the air carrier. Regulations governing these companies are lax, and the TSA is finding security violations when it conducts inspections. Under current law, however, TSA lacks the authority to revoke the shipping privileges of freight forwarders that repeatedly violate security procedures. This air cargo security amendment would give TSA that power.
Air cargo security is not a new problem. In 1988, Pan Am 103 went down over Lockerbie, Scotland, because of explosives planted inside a radio in the cargo hold of a passenger airplane. The 1996 Valujet crash in the Everglades was caused by high-pressure tanks that never should have been put on a passenger aircraft in the first place.
My amendment will strengthen air cargo security on all commercial flights. It establishes a more reliable known shipper program by requiring inspections of facilities, creating an accessible shipper database, and providing for tamper-proof identification cards for airport personnel. It gives TSA the tools required to hold shippers accountable for the contents they ship by allowing the administration to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder engaged in unsound or illegal practices. This is the most important part of the bill. The TSA has told me time and again they need to have this capability in order to revoke licenses when they find an unsafe situation.
I have had the support of my colleagues, such as Senator McCain. Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, has worked with me on this bill. We have passed this bill twice in the Senate. It is a bill we have looked at, we have vetted. We have had hearings.
I see my colleague Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, is on the floor of the Senate. He knows this bill. He worked with me to perfect it. If we can put this amendment on this very important piece of legislation, it will add immeasurably to our aviation security. We will have the most secure aviation system in the world with this amendment on this particular legislation.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, the Senator from Mississippi. In fact, one of the unanimous consents we had when we took this intelligence reform bill to the floor was that all the amendments would have to be relevant to the 9/11 Commission. The amendment before us is relevant. I think because the Senate has acted on this, it will be a valuable contribution to the bill.
I appreciate the help and counsel of the Senator from Mississippi. I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Governmental Affairs Committee for bringing this bill to the Senate floor. We will pass this bill, and it will be a good bill. We are all going to work together to make that happen, which the distinguished chairman and ranking member have already proven.
I ask for the yeas and nays at the appropriate time for whenever it can be scheduled along the lines that the chairman and ranking member would schedule.
Mr. President, do I have 1 minute remaining before the vote begins?
Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will support this air cargo security amendment. This is an amendment that the Senate has voted on twice and passed. It will add significantly to the security of our aviation community. The airports and the top of the airplane are very safe. We have done a super job of creating those safe areas, but what we have not done is matched that with cargo security, what is in the belly of the airplane. We want a seamless aviation system, and with this amendment I think we will have the safest aviation system in the world.
I am very proud to have the support of so many of my colleagues, and I hope we send a strong message that this amendment should be added to the final bill. I appreciate the support of the chairman, the ranking member, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, and the Aviation Subcommittee as well.
Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of the Members. I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for giving me an opportunity to spend a few minutes before making a motion on the…
Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of the Members. I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for giving me an opportunity to spend a few minutes before making a motion on the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, to give me a chance to express my views on this amendment and to begin by thanking my seatmate and colleague of these many years for offering this amendment. Once again, his eloquence and his leadership and his vision are giving this body an opportunity to do something right for the American people.
We have all felt the sense of anxiety in this country since the startling events of September 11, 2001. There have certainly been no limits to the number of speeches given to the importance of making our Nation more secure, taking steps to see to it that our airports, our harbors, our borders, receive the kind of support and backing needed to keep this Nation as secure as we possibly can be, with the full understanding that as a nation, an open society, a nation where freedom and liberties are extended to all, this is not an easy path to walk--to be an open, free nation and simultaneously to be more secure. How we balance those interests requires a great deal of thought, a great deal of work.
The Senator is offering a reflection of what has been suggested by the Council on Foreign Relations in the report analyzing where we are today, 2 years after the events of September 11.
To quote the authors of that report, we are ``still dangerously unprepared, underfunded for a catastrophic terrorist attack.''
I think we ought to take their words to heart and we ought to do what we can to see to it that first responders--our fire departments, our police departments--are going to receive the kind of backing and support they ought to be getting from the Federal Government.
What the distinguished Senator from West Virginia is offering is a modest proposal. The money is not significant, I know that. But when you consider the gap that exists--the Council on Foreign Relations suggests that we are underfunding first responders by more than $98 billion. That is a huge amount of money. But if you go even further, reading the report, the number actually is twice that amount when you consider what needs to be done at other levels of government as well, to maximize our protection.
Unfortunately, we are coming way short of that number. So while we talk about this issue and identify the various problems that exist, this 62-page report, released on Monday, points out that we have a lot more work to do.
Senator Byrd has offered us an opportunity to close some of that gap. That is all, it is just some of this gap that will be closed by his amendment. I am disturbed that we are not going to be doing more. I fully support what the Senator from West Virginia is offering, but I think the American public would expect more. I suspect most did not have an opportunity to read this report or even hear news reports about it. But
as certainly as I am standing here today, there are going to be events that will come. I wish I didn't have to say that, but I think all of us know that to be the case. From what we are witnessing in Iraq today, what we have seen in Liberia, what we have seen in various targets around the globe, none of us should operate under the illusion that we are going to be immune from any future attacks because of what we have done since 9/11.
There are those gathered in places around the globe, as I share these words this afternoon, who are planning to attack this country, whether abroad or at home. They are planning it. Be certain of it. They are going to look for the opportunities to do us great harm and great damage. Any conclusion other than that would be foolhardy. They are doing it, and the question is, What are we doing to see to it that we are maximizing the protection of the people we have been charged to represent?
The painful conclusion is that we are not doing enough yet. Obviously, we cannot do this all at once, but we have a report telling us that after 2 years we are still woefully short of meeting those obligations. We have an opportunity. We have to make choices here. They are not comfortable choices, but we need to make these choices.
The time will come when a judgment will be made, and the question will be asked of us: What did you do, when you knew better? You were being told over and over again that you hadn't done enough yet. What did you do on that day in July, prior to your August break, when you were given an opportunity by the Byrd amendment to invest more resources to make these first responders better prepared? Where were you? How did you cast your vote?
Because the memories of 9/11, even after just 2 years, seem to be fading, it would be a catastrophic and tragic mistake, in my view, not to heed the counsel and advice of my colleague from West Virginia and step up and do what is right here and provide backing. I hope for unanimous support for this amendment. I cannot think of a more important or meaningful message we can send that we are prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to maximize the protections of our people within constitutional limitations.
My fear is the less we do along the lines suggested by the Senator from West Virginia, the more likely we are to take steps to limit the freedoms of average Americans. That seems to be the direction we are heading, to restrain or prevent individuals from doing certain things or examining or investigating individual people, rather than to strengthen the first responders and provide more harbor protection, to see to it our harbors and ports are going to be better protected.
Senator Byrd is offering us an opportunity, in a modest way, to answer that question that history will ask of us at some point. When you knew you were likely to be attacked again, when you knew you were likely to be victimized by terrorists, on that day in July when you were asked to make a choice to do more, to step to the plate, how did you cast your ballot? How did you represent your constituents when confronted with that choice? Senator Byrd is providing that opportunity to us this afternoon, and I hope our colleagues will join me in supporting this amendment to take a modest step, and that is all this is, to answer the deep concerns that have been expressed by our former colleague, Warren Rudman, and other individuals who prepared this report for the Council on Foreign Relations.
This report is a serious document. These are serious conclusions reached by serious individuals who have done their homework. This is not a political document. It is a document that lays out, chapter and verse, where the shortcomings are and what needs to be done by this National Government to try to close these gaps. Senator Byrd is offering us that chance to do it.
I thank him profoundly for this suggestion that he has made to us. I am going to have several amendments myself later on in this debate to deal with fire departments across the country to increase, if we can, the resources to see to it they can have the tools necessary to respond to the challenges they will see. This amendment is more comprehensive, the amendment being offered by Senator Byrd. We will have other suggestions to make as well. But this is the first opportunity for us to say that our memories have not faded.
While others may focus on other events as they captivate the attention of the media, we remember what happened on 9/11. While there is no certainty we can stop it from happening again, we want to take the steps necessary to see to it that we make it that much harder for those who would do us harm to achieve their goals.
For those reasons, I strongly endorse this amendment and urge my colleagues to do likewise by casting a vote in favor of the Byrd amendment.
Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Byrd amendment. The Senator from West Virginia has clearly identified that there are inadequate resources being devoted to homeland security, and the…
Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Byrd amendment. The Senator from West Virginia has clearly identified that there are inadequate resources being devoted to homeland security, and the paramount concern and responsibility of this body is to protect the homeland. We have to do that. It cannot simply be protected by rhetoric. There have to be real resources applied to the task.
In the wake of 9/11, this Congress laid out very clearly and very deliberately, after much consideration and consultation, major legislation such as the Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and the USA PATRIOT Act. All of these legislative pronouncements laid out a framework to secure our homeland and, as Senator Byrd points out, we are not living up to the requirements that were clearly identified by that legislation in terms of appropriations.
Specifically addressed by Senator Byrd's amendment is a shortfall in seaports, Coast Guard, and land transit security of $602 million; police, fire, and emergency medical teams of $729.5 million; security at United States borders with Canada and Mexico of $238.5 million; air cargo security, $100 million; and chemical facility security, $80 million.
Now, all of these protections are imperative because what we have discovered from those who wish us ill--terrorist cells--is first they are sophisticated; second, they are ruthless; and third, they tend to strike at areas which are the least protected, not the most protected.
We have made significant improvements in our air transportation system in terms of passenger travel, screening passengers, and I do not think most security consultants would say that would be the primary route of a new attack against us. We still have miles to go with respect to seaport security, maritime security, security at the borders, air cargo security. Again, given the nature of our opponents, our adversaries, it is likely they would look to these places, rather than areas we have reinforced or fortified, to launch another attack.
The Transportation Security Agency, as we all know, is responsible for all modes of transportation security. Yet the TSA, as I have suggested, has focused almost exclusively on our air transportation system with passenger travel throughout the United States and throughout the world. With a $4.8 billion budget, TSA has committed only $86 million for maritime and land security activities in this budget proposed by the administration. In contrast, $4.3 billion was requested for aviation security. In fact, the budget requests for administrative costs at TSA, their headquarters and the mission support centers, consist of amounts to $218 million, 2.5 times greater than the total request for maritime and land security activities.
As a result, the budget proposed by the President, the budget Senator Byrd seeks to amend, does not fully recognize the potential threats to our
ports, to our interstate buses, trucks that carry hazardous material, trains, our transit system, chemical factories--and the list, unfortunately, is longer.
Let me for a moment concentrate on one area of particular concern; that is, public transit. In the last Congress, I had the opportunity, responsibility, and privilege of being the chairman of the subcommittee in the Banking Committee that dealt with transit issues. We had several hearings with respect to numerous transit issues but particularly with respect to transit security. We found, and the GAO verified, there is a huge demand for resources to protect our transit systems, our subway systems, our bus systems. This bill hardly measures up to that.
The Byrd amendment--and I commend the Senator--would increase our efforts in transit security by $57 million. Frankly, based upon the testimony I heard last year before my committee, this is literally the proverbial drop in the bucket. There are some estimates--one by the American Public Transportation Association--that the needs for transit security through all the transit systems in this country would amount to $6 billion, primarily in the areas of communication, surveillance, detection systems, personnel, and training.
For the benefit of my colleagues, I will state that in the wake of the tragedy of 9/11, there was something remarkable taking place that minimized our casualities both in New York City and in Washington, DC. Particularly in Washington, DC, the subway system was the major source or route of evacuation for literally thousands and thousands of people. This system in Washington has been the beneficiary of a great deal of attention. It might be because of the proximity to the appropriators but, indeed, it had effective communications, it had a well-managed and well-trained group of operators, and they were able to move people literally underneath the Pentagon even though that building had been attacked. In New York City, the transit operators, these individual transit police officers and station masters, were able successfully to evacuate the subways and move people out because of communication systems, because of training, because of the infrastructure already there.
Those two systems--New York City and Washington, DC--are some of the most sophisticated in the country. Other parts of the country, other areas do not have the communication systems; they do not have the training; they do not have the expertise. That would go for probably every system, to varying degrees, throughout my country.
In my home State of Rhode Island, we have a statewide bus system, which is a good system, but they would be the first to say they need more training; they need more communications equipment; they need redundant communication systems in the event of an emergency so they can get through to the operators and the operators can get through to their dispatchers and controllers. That is just one example of the tremendous need for help for transit security.
There are approximately 6,000 transit agencies in the United States. These transit agencies provide over 9 billion trips per year, representing 43 billion passenger miles.
Yet there is very minimal funding in this bill for transit security.
Once again, if you believe, as I, that our adversaries are cunning, ruthless, and will strike at the most vulnerable portions of our country, transit is a target that I am sure is being considered. We have to do something to protect our riders, the literally millions of riders a year.
I hope we can support enthusiastically the Byrd amendment. It would represent a significant increase in our homeland security. It would address the areas that have been neglected in this bill sent to us by the administration.
Once again I emphasize, particularly in the area of transit security, even if we were to pass the Byrd amendment, if we wanted to ensure that all of our transit systems have the most up-to-date equipment and communications, that all of their personnel were well trained, we would be talking not about an additional several million dollars but we would be talking about literally billions of dollars.
I commend the Senator from West Virginia for his leadership. This is not the first time he has come to this floor to argue eloquently and passionately that we should defend our homeland. I am sure it will not be the last. I hope we can support this amendment.
I yield.
I yield the floor.
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Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague, Senator DeWine, to introduce legislation which will help maintain our leadership in a field Thomas Edison invented over 100 years ago, lighting. The…
Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague, Senator DeWine, to introduce legislation which will help maintain our leadership in a field Thomas Edison invented over 100 years ago, lighting.
The title of this bill is the Next Generation Lighting Initiative, or NGLI. The NGLI's purpose is to develop a partnership between our government, industry, and the research community, to enable the U.S. lighting to illuminate our surroundings using energy efficient semiconductors. This bill is structured along the lines of the well known government--industry semiconductor partnership called SEMATECH which the Congress authorized in the 1988 National Defense Authorization Act.
Lighting currently accounts for roughly 19 percent of the energy use in the United States. Lighting is a $40 billion dollar global industry. The United States occupies roughly one-third of that market. Today's lighting market primarily consists of two technologies. The first technology is incandescent
lighting, that's the one Thomas Edison invented over 100 years ago. Incandescent lighting relies on running a current through a wire to heat it up and illuminate your surroundings, but only 5 percent of the electricity in a conventional bulb is converted into visible light. The second type of lighting is fluorescent lights, which use a combination of chemical vapors, mainly mercury, to discharge light when current is passed through it. Fluorescent lights are six times more efficient than a light bulb.
In 1998, electricity from lighting cost about 47 billion dollars, which accounted for about 100 million tons of carbon equivalent from fossil energy plants.
Today, this paradign is changing, because some scientists recently made a leap ahead in lighting research. Technology leaps displace, very quickly, traditional markets. We know the stories all too well, the horse courier, the telegraph, the telephone and finally the Internet.
That's why we are proposing this legislation, because some advances have been made in the areas of solid state lighting that require a national investment that no one lighting industry can match. This emerging technology has the capability to disrupt our existing lighting markets. So quickly in fact, that other countries have formed consortia between their governments, industries, laboratories and universities. Solid state lighting is being taken very seriously around the world.
Let me describe solid state lighting. The best examples are red light emitting diodes, or ``LED's'', found in digital clocks. LED's produce only one color but they do not burn up a wire like a bulb and are seven times more efficient.
Until recently LED's were limited to yellow or red. That all changed in 1995. In 1995, some Japanese researchers developed a blue LED. Soon other bright colors started to emerge, such as green. That is when things started to change. Because, white light is a combination of red, blue, the recent Japanese breakthrough, and green or yellow. The recent Japanese breakthrough of that simple blue LED has now made it possible to produce white light from LED's ten times more efficient than a light bulb.
If it's successful, white light LED's will revolutionize lighting technology and will disrupt the existing industries. It's imperative that we move quickly on these advances. We need a consortia between our government, industry, research labs and academia to develop the necessary pre-competitive research to maintain our leadership role in this field.
I'd like to mention one other technology that will change lighting. That technology is found in your cell phone and on your computer screen. It's called conductive polymers. Three Nobel Prizes were just awarded for this technology. Conductive polymers offer the possibility of covering large surface areas and replacing fluorescent lamps. These materials will not only provide white light, but can display text or programmed color pictures. These technologies can be Internet controlled to adjust building lighting across the country.
Let me describe the Next Generation Lighting Initiative Act. If enacted, it will allow our country to capture these revolutionary mergers between lighting and information. It will supply the necessary pre-competitive R&D which no one industry alone can provide, and, which we as holders of the public trust of basic research owe a duty to further. It will keep the United States in a leadership role for commercial lighting and promote energy efficiency that is ten times that of incandescent lights and twice that of fluorescent lights. We need to enact this legislation now.
The Next Generation Lighting Initiative authorizes the Department of Energy to grant up to $460 million over ten years to a consortium of the United States lighting industry and research institutions. The goals of the Act are to have a 25 percent penetration of solid state lighting into the commercial markets by the 2013. The Next Generation's consortium will perform the basic and manufacturing research. The lighting industry will take this R&D and develop the necessary technologies to make it commercially viable.
This is precompetitive research. It is research that no one industry by itself can perform and which we have a duty to promote together with industry. It has implications for our country's energy policy far broader than economic competitiveness. The potential reduction in energy consumption makes it a national initiative. Once the pre- competitive research is transitioned to industry then it should be terminated, we think that will take about 10 years.
If this initiative is successful, then by 2025, it can reduce our energy consumption by roughly 17 billion watts of power or eliminate the need for 17 large electricity generating plants. That's as much as 17 million homes consume in a single day. That's more homes than in California, Oregon, and Washington combined.
Almost all of the language of this bill was worked out in detail with the House during the 107th Congress as part of the energy bill conference. We feel it is not only bipartisan but bicameral, and we hope that in this Congress it becomes law.
So let me conclude, by saying that the Next Generation Lighting Initiative will carry that U.S. lighting industry into the twenty-first century. It capitalizes on technologies that have the potential to displace our lighting industry. This Initiative will reduce our nation's energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The research necessary to advance this technology requires a national investment that must be in partnership with industry.
I encourage my colleagues to review this bill, offer their comments, and join us in its support. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:
I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 76, S. 165, the air cargo security improvement bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading…
I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 76, S. 165, the air cargo security improvement bill.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, the Air Cargo Security Act will make such a difference in our Nation's air security. I think we have done a lot since 9/11. Since the 9/11 attacks, we have made tremendous progress in transportation security. We have created a new Department of Homeland Security. We have established the Transportation Security Agency and invested heavily in personnel and equipment. However the one thing we have not done in the same way that we have protected the top of the airplane and the airport, is that we have not yet secured the belly of the aircraft. This is where the cargo is shipped. That is what the bill we are passing today would do.
The Air Cargo Security Act would establish a reliable known-shipper program, mandate inspections of cargo facilities, direct the Transportation Security Agency to work with foreign countries to have regular checks at facilities that bring cargo into the United States. The legislation develops a training program for air cargo handlers, and give TSA the power to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder whose practices are unsound.
As the Senator from California mentioned, her amendment will allow cargo pilots to participate in the same security training as airline pilots and the legislation will require background checks for all noncitizens who would undergo flight training. These are just a few of the provisions that I think will go a long way to securing the entire aircraft and our country.
I think we have seen a dramatic improvement in the safety of our aircraft and our airports.
I want to make sure that America has the safest aviation system in the world. I think we can do it. This air cargo bill will make a difference. This bill passed the Senate last year, and I hope very much that the House will pass the bill this year and the President will sign it. Then we will give TSA the authority it needs to do this very important work.
Today, there is no doubt in my mind that the traveling public is considerably safer than we were on September 10, 2001. That is important to recognize. Our screeners undergo background checks, training and testing. Checked bags are scrutinized. Flight crew training has been improved. We all are traveling under a more secure system.
While our efforts in the 107th Congress have dramatically enhanced security, we in the 108th must continue to strive for seamless operations. This responsibility includes closing the cargo security loophole. It makes no sense to inconvenience airline passengers with security screening and baggage checks if we do not establish controls over the cargo traveling in the belly of the same plane. Currently, twenty-two percent of all air cargo in the U.S. is carried on passenger flights, only a tiny fraction of which is inspected. That is inexcusable.
Last year, Senator Feinstein and I commissioned a GAO report on the security of our existing air cargo system, and the Commerce Committee held a closed hearing on this issue. The report reveals some very troubling facts. Security considerations prevent the report from getting too specific. But the GAO found that air cargo is vulnerable to theft and tampering while it is in
transit, and while it is in supposedly secure cargo facilities.
According to the report, identification cards used by cargo workers are generally not secured with fingerprints or other biometric identifiers. They can be counterfeited. Background checks for cargo employees are inadequate.
Perhaps the weakest link in the cargo security chain is the freight forwarder. These are the middlemen who collect cargo from shippers and deliver it to the air carrier. Regulations governing these companies are lax, and the TSA is finding security violations as it conducts inspections. Under current law, however, TSA lacks the authority to revoke the shipping privileges of freight forwarders that repeatedly violate security and procedural rules. The Air Cargo Security Act gives TSA that power.
Air cargo security is not a new problem. In 1988, Pan Am 103 went down over Lockerbie, Scotland because of explosives planted inside a radio in the cargo hold of a passenger airplane. The 1996 Valujet crash in the Everglades was caused by high-pressure tanks that never should have been place aboard a passenger aircraft.
This legislation will strengthen air cargo security on all commercial flights. Specifically, this bill establishes a more reliable known shipper program by requiring inspections of facilities, creating an accessible shipper database, and providing for tamper-proof identification cards for airport personnel. It also gives the TSA the tools required to hold shippers accountable for the contents they ship by allowing the administration to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder engaged in unsound or illegal practices.
This Air Cargo Security Act also requires the TSA to develop a comprehensive training program for cargo professionals as well as an approved cargo security plan. The rules and procedures in this bill were developed in consultation with the TSA, the airlines, and the cargo carriers to ensure that the requirements are aggressive, but will not cause hardship to an already-stressed industry. In 2001, cargo accounted for about $13 billion, or 10 percent, of the passenger airlines' total revenue.
I helped craft the assistance package set forth in the recent Supplemental Appropriations bill, and I applaud the way the unions have stepped to the plate and engaged in good faith negotiations to relieve financial stress on the carriers. I will fight to protect the one million aviation-related jobs nationwide. However, the aviation industry can never afford another 9/11. Air cargo is the largest loophole left in our aviation security network. It must be closed.
We will oversee the bill's implementation to ensure that it is accomplished with a minimum of expense to our critical, yet endangered aviation industry.
To strengthen air cargo security and passenger safety, I urge my collegues to support the Air Cargo Security Act.
I thank all of my colleagues for their support. I thank the chairman of the committee, Mr. McCain, and all of those who worked with me on this. I think we are doing a great job. Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, has worked with me on this. We have worked with the airlines. We don't want to burden the airlines at this time because they have had many shocks to their system. So we have worked with them to make sure that the actions we take are done in a responsible way.
I ask my colleagues for their support.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, before she leaves the floor, let me commend our colleague from Texas, Senator Hutchison, who has spent an enormous amount of time on this issue. It has been particularly helpful to…
Mr. President, before she leaves the floor, let me commend our colleague from Texas, Senator Hutchison, who has spent an enormous amount of time on this issue. It has been particularly helpful to this Senator as I worked on some of the privacy issues I will be discussing. I thank my colleague for all of her good work.
Earlier this year I spoke on the floor about what I think has been the most important privacy issue of our time. That is the proposal for what is known as the Total Information Awareness Program. This would constitute the biggest surveillance program in American history. In the U.S. Senate, Senators Inouye, Stevens, and Feinstein have been working on a bipartisan basis with our colleagues in both political parties. We put in place sensible restrictions so as to ensure accurate congressional oversight.
What we called for was a requirement that first there be a report by the proponents of the program and the agencies involved on how the program would work.
Second, there is a requirement that to deploy any of the technology under the Total Information Awareness Program, there would have to be explicit congressional approval. This was a momentous step for the Senate to pass this legislation unanimously.
I am rising today to discuss what I think is yet another very significant privacy question which is an issue that needs debate in committee on this particular bill: the air cargo security legislation. The air cargo security legislation includes a proposal that I offered regarding what is known as CAPPS II, the passenger prescreening system that the Transportation Security Administration is developing. This program would do a computer search on each airline passenger to determine who should be subject to more careful security screening and, in some cases, who shouldn't be allowed to get on a plane.
All of us in the U.S. Senate understand that it is critically important to protect the security and safety of those who fly, and we certainly want to look at ways to do it that are smart and, particularly, target resources in an efficient way. But to set up a system that seeks information on each and every aircraft traveler and uses that system to assign scores to every individual--a score as to who might possibly be a threat--does raise some very significant privacy questions for the Senate.
The American people will want to know whether that system is narrowly limited for a specific purpose or whether it would become an all- purpose electronic snooping system. The public wants to know whether there are accurate safeguards to be sure the system won't be abused and sound procedures to provide passengers with the means to address mistakes.
Verbal assurances that these technologies will be used only on ``lawfully collected information'' are not enough. For one thing, ``lawfully collected information'' can include almost anything--my medical information, financial information, the books I have read, places I have visited. This same information--for each of my distinguished colleagues and millions of law-abiding citizens--can also be ``lawfully collected.''
In order to protect our civil liberties and right to privacy, Congress must be fully and publicly briefed on these types of new technological efforts.
As the New York Times editorial page said earlier this year, identifying travelers who may pose a terrorist threat is ``a worthy goal'' but also ``raises serious privacy and due process concerns, which the government needs to address in a forthright manner.'' I ask unanimous consent that the text of this article be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, this article identifies the issue with respect to travelers. I spoke about those who may pose a terrorist threat. It is a worthy goal. But I also said that this issue raises serious privacy concerns which the government needs to address in a forthright way, and addressing privacy concerns in a forthright manner is what the legislation now does as a result of the amendment involving this passenger prescreening program.
What you are going to have under the legislation now is a chance to get the key questions answered with respect to how this program would work. It is my intention that the information with respect to how this program would work would be available for public scrutiny as well.
I met with those at the TSA who spearhead this passenger prescreening program. They certainly raise a number of issues with respect to privacy protections which they would like to include. But at this point, the only written information that we have on CAPPS II was published in the Federal Register on January 15 of this year.
That program outlines a broad-based initiative that would house records such as ``risk assessment reports,'' financial and transactional data, public source information, proprietary data, and information from law enforcement and intelligent sources.
This broad array of information may then be disclosed to ``Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local, international, or foreign agencies.'' Suffice it to say, based on the Federal Register description on January 15, 2003, the public is concerned about how this kind of program is going to work.
Clearly, our country wants to fight terrorism ferociously. We want to take the steps necessary to protect our airline passengers. But something which is as sweeping and as broad as the proposal that was outlined in the Federal Register for screening airline passengers certainly ought to give the American people and the U.S. Senate pause.
I think it is important that the public not be kept in the dark on this issue. That is why the legislation on the program which I was able to include in the air cargo security bill is important. It is going to bring some sunshine to this issue--some long overdue sunshine.
I hope my colleagues will continue to work with me and others in a bipartisan basis on the privacy issues. We made very significant progress with respect to the limitations that were put on the Total Information Awareness Program. The effort that is now underway with respect to screening airline passengers presents some other very significant privacy issues. We ought to continue to make sure that as we take steps to protect the public safety, we remember that it is critically important to protect privacy rights and civil liberties. We now are making an effort to do that in the air cargo security legislation.
I urge my colleagues to support the bill tonight.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I am pleased to support my colleague's amendment to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on improving aviation security. Senator McCain and I have worked closely over the…
Mr. President, I am pleased to support my colleague's amendment to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on improving aviation security. Senator McCain and I have worked closely over the last several years to strengthen our aviation security network. Although I strongly agree with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for improving aviation security, I believe that Congress must go further than the Commission's recommendations if we are to continue to improve our aviation security system.
It is for this reason that I have filed my bill, S. 2393, the Aviation Security Advancement Act, as an amendment to this legislation as well. I would note that Senator McCain is a cosponsor of my bill. In addition, to incorporating the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, my bill also includes specific requirements to improve air cargo and general aviation security, which I have long felt to be significant gaps in our security system and the 9/11 Commission specifically cited as a weakness. My bill also authorizes funding for these new security requirements.
This legislation was passed unanimously out of the Commerce Committee last week. This legislation is also supported by the airline industry. I hope that the Senate will consider this legislation later this week. My amendment is cosponsored by Senators Hollings, Lautenberg, Snowe, and Schumer.
Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered by Senator Specter. I do so with regret but with conviction. Regarding the phrase ``direct and control their day-to-day operations,'' if somebody wants to make the national intelligence director strong, that will certainly do it. The question is, what does that mean? What are the implications? That goes into the law, and then people have to interpret what that law means. I think if there is anywhere we want to be quite clear, we want the American people, through public law, to understand how far the national intelligence director can go and, on the other hand, to what point can that particular person not go.
We give that person all kinds of authority, and I think the appropriate authority, but when we get into managing and direct control of the day-to-day operations, that is a phrase which concerns me greatly, and I say so not as one Senator from West Virginia but as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
My understanding is that this was brought up in the Governmental Affairs Committee and was defeated by a vote of 12 to 5, which is not nip and tuck.
I think the recommendations that were central to the 9/11 Commission were very forthright, and Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have reflected in their bill, which I am proud to cosponsor, very strong measures: a unified budget--oh, there are some people around town who are not very happy about that, which is all right--personnel, management authority over the national intelligence programs.
But then we come back to the phrase ``direct and control their day- to-day operations,'' and that makes me go to an argument which I am quite sure, since I was not on the floor, was used by both good Senators who are managing this bill. And that is, what I think they tried to do is they figured some people would want to have the national intelligence director stronger than what they proposed, and others would want to have the national intelligence director weaker than what they proposed. I heard cases on both sides.
As I hear those cases, I am drawn more back to the possibility of the one I think is the more sensible approach as a person who has been in government for a long time but also, quite frankly, I am interested in passing a bill and passing a bill that we are pretty sure will be doing no harm as a result of the passing of that bill. I am not sure the Specter amendment meets that particular test.
We have all these agencies, and we want to create some sense of order, but we do not want to get unnecessarily in the way in places where we should not of the combatant commanders, which Senator Collins mentioned in her excellent opening statement yesterday. There are some things which the military should be able to make decisions about outside of the national intelligence director, and they are allowed to so do on a modest basis, but on an important basis, by this bill.
The Collins-Lieberman bill strikes exactly the correct balance on this matter, and I think balance, generally speaking, is what works in this country and balance is generally what gets bills passed in a closely divided Senate.
Their bill explicitly acknowledges the connection and, at times, the tension with what I have just spoken about, and that is the needs of the military and the needs of the intelligence community.
The Collins-Lieberman bill accommodates the uniformed military's legitimate need to control its operations. I think that is right without shortchanging the consumers of the intelligence, such as the President of the United States, Congress, and senior officials throughout the Government, such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Their bill correctly recognizes the new national intelligence director will have to rely on the expertise of his newly created deputies which are left, to my way of thinking, in their bill very intelligently just floating a bit so that he can decide wisely how best to do that rather than decide everything in a period of a week or two.
I think Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have endorsed the approach contained in the Collins-Lieberman bill. That would be good
enough for me on most matters, and it certainly is on this matter. The notion that the national intelligence director established under this bill would not be sufficiently empowered to effectively manage the intelligence community is not borne out when one reads this legislation, and that is what they are doing. They are doing the managing of the national intelligence aspect.
Without going on at great length, I like the balance. It is the nature of this body to seek out that kind of balance. We have to be realistic that we are faced in the days ahead with some fairly strong probable assaults upon this bill by those from the Armed Services Committee and perhaps some from other committees, and our strength in being able to get a bill passed, in knowing we passed a good bill, is by sticking to a moderate and centrist course which, in fact, is quite radical in terms of everything which has taken place since the National Security Act of 1947. This bill is an enormous update.
I just wish to be understood as being strongly for the approach of Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to repeal the death tax permanently, effective January 1, 2005. While I strongly believe that Congress must make all of the tax cuts enacted in 2001…
Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to repeal the death tax permanently, effective January 1, 2005. While I strongly believe that Congress must make all of the tax cuts enacted in 2001 permanent, and I have introduced S. 96, the ``Contract with Investors,'' that would make this and other important tax law changes, I want to make a separate and special case for repealing the death tax forever.
It is an unfair, inefficient, economically unsound and, frankly, immoral tax that should not come back. In 2001, President Bush and Congress agreed to repeal the death tax. Repeal was tremendously popular. Even though most Americans may never be subject to the death tax, the vast majority know it is terribly unfair to allow Washington to seize more than half of a person's assets when he or she dies. According to a 2001 McLaughlin and Associates poll, 79 percent of respondents approve of the idea of abolishing the death tax.
It is unfair, first of all, to the decedent and to his or her heirs. A person who works hard throughout his or her life, perhaps starts a business, and buys a home in a fast-growing metropolitan area where real estate values are skyrocketing. Or perhaps the person owns a farm or just works hard in a company owned by others, but that person saves and invests and eventually accumulates a small but respectable nest egg. The American dream is to be able to leave these assets to one's children so that they might enjoy a slightly better life than their parents. It is simply unfair and immoral for the government to take more than half of these assets at death.
The impact of the death tax on small, family-owned businesses highlights another inequity, that small businesses often pay taxes at the highest individual rate, currently set at 38.6 percent, while the highest corporate tax rate is 35 percent. When the owner of a small business dies, the heirs may be forced to sell off the business to pay the applicable death tax. When the head of a C corporation dies, his or her heirs may have to sell some assets to pay the death taxes, but generally there is no need for the business to be sold. While Congress has tried to make provisions to ease the impact of the death tax on family businesses, the rules are so restrictive that a business owner can never be sure if he or she qualifies. Furthermore, the family business provisions restrict the size to which the business can grow and still quality for special treatment, creating a disincentive for businesses to expand and create new jobs. A far better solution is to repeal the death tax entirely and permanently.
The death tax also causes collateral damage. Take our small entrepreneur described above. Suppose the business employs 25, maybe 30 people, all of whom rely on the business for their livelihood, health insurance, and retirement savings. The entrepreneur's heirs may not have enough cash to pay the applicable death tax and, therefore, may be forced to liquidate the business. All its employees must now find other jobs. Or suppose the heirs cannot find a ready purchaser for the business and must sell it off in pieces. All of the companies that sold items to or bought items from this business must find other suppliers or customers, leaving a hole in the economy. Although the death tax brings in only about one-and-a-half percent of the Federal Government's annual revenue, it inflicts a disproportionately large and negative impact on the economy.
Not only does the death tax cost jobs directly when heirs are forced to liquidate businesses, it actually reduces Federal revenues by weakening the incentive to save and invest. One of the biggest problems our economy is facing now is that individuals are unwilling to invest at sufficient levels, leading to lower profits, interest, dividends and capital gains, not to mention reduced productivity and lower taxable wages. Economists Gary and Aldona Robbins estimate that repeal of the death tax would increase gross domestic product to such an extent that in 10 years' time, Federal tax revenue would be higher than it would be if the tax were retained. Of course, if the tax comes back after only one year of repeal, this growth will go unrealized.
Beyond lost jobs, liquidated businesses, and confiscatory tax rates, the death tax is inefficient because people pay tremendous sums to tax- planners in hopes of avoiding as much of the tax as possible. Alicia Munnell, a former member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors, estimates that the costs of complying with death tax laws are roughly equal to the revenue raised, or about $23 billion in 1998.
In addition to being unfair and a drag on the economy, the current plan for repealing the death tax and then reinstating it the next year is incomprehensible to most Americans. Under current law, the exemption is $1 million in 2003, gradually raising to $3.5 million in 2009. At the same time, the tax rate drops from its original high of 55 percent down to 45 percent by 2007 and stays there until the death tax is repealed in 2010. In that year, heirs will only be taxed on any inherited property when they sell or otherwise dispose of the property, applying carryover basis, and then at capital gains rates and with an exemption of $1.3 million, and an additional $3 million for a surviving spouse. But, the entire death tax returns the following year at the 2001 rate of 55 percent, with the 2001 exemption of $675,000. The American people know that this makes absolutely no sense. We must fix this problem now and fix it permanently.
My legislation, the Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2003, abolishes the death tax permanently, effective January 1, 2005. I suggest 2005 to give people time to plan for the altered date of repeal. I believe that fairness and sound economic policy require that we enact my legislation as soon as possible, so that people will know that when the death tax disappears, it will disappear for good. As Edward J. McCaffrey, a law professor from the University of Southern California and self-described liberal, said in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee a few years back: ``Polls and practices show that we like sin taxes, such as on alcohol and cigarettes. . . . The estate tax is an anti-sin, or a virtue, tax. It is a tax on work and savings without consumption, on thrift, on long term savings.'' We must end this tax on virtue, work, savings, job creation and the American dream, and we must end it permanently.
Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Clean Water Infrastructure Financing Act of 2003, legislation which will reauthorize the highly successful, but undercapitalized, Clean Water State…
Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Clean Water Infrastructure Financing Act of 2003, legislation which will reauthorize the highly successful, but undercapitalized, Clean Water State Revolving Loan Fund, SRF, Program administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA. As many of my colleagues know, the Clean Water SRF Program is an effective and immensely popular source of funding for wastewater collection and treatment projects. Congress created the SRF in 1987 to replace the direct grants program that was enacted as part of the landmark 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or, as it is also known, the Clean Water Act. State and local governments have used the Federal Clean Water SRF to help meet critical environmental infrastructure financing needs. The program operates much like a community bank, where each State determines which projects are built.
The performance of the Clean Water SRF Program has been spectacular. Total Federal capitalization grants have been nearly doubled by non- Federal funding sources, including State contributions, leveraged bonds, and principal and interest payments. Communities of all sizes are participating in the program, and approximately 11,000 low-interest loans totaling more than $34.3 billion have been approved to date. As in many States, Ohio has needs for public wastewater system improvements which greatly exceed typical Clean Water SRF funding levels. For instance, in fiscal year 2002, a level of $1.35 billion was appropriated for the Clean Water [SRF program nationwide. However, according to the EPA's 1996 Clean Water] Needs Survey, Ohio's 20-year capital investment needs for publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities are $7.4 billion. Of that amount,
over $4 billion of improvements have been identified as necessary to address combined serve overflow, CSO, problems in over 100 communities in Ohio. The city of Akron, for example, has proposed to spend $377 million over 30 years to fix the city's CSO problems.
Due to the CSO problem, many Ohio communities face millions of dollars worth of wastewater infrastructure improvements and the likelihood of increased sewer rates without receiving outside funding. In recent years, Ohio cities and villages also have been spending more on maintaining and operating their systems in order to postpone the inevitable upgrades. Nevertheless, their systems are aging and will soon need to be replaced.
While the Clean Water SRF Program's track record is excellent, the condition of our Nation's overall environmental infrastructure remains alarming. A 20-year needs survey conducted by the EPA in 1996 documented $139 billion worth of wastewater capital needs nationwide. In 1999, the national assessment was revised upward to nearly $200 billion, in order to more accurately account for expected sanitary sewer needs. Private studies demonstrate that total needs exceed $300 billion, when anticipated replacement costs are considered. EPA's most recent Clean Water Gap Analysis projected a $6 billion per year capital payments gap for clean water over the next two decades.
Authorization for the Clean Water SRF expired at the end of fiscal year 1994, and the failure of Congress to reauthorize the program sends an implicit message that wastewater collection and treatment is not a national priority. The longer we wait to re-authorize this program, the longer it creates uncertainty about the program's future in the eyes of borrowers, which could delay or in some cases prevent project financing. In order to allow any kind of substantial increase in spending, reauthorization of the Clean Water SRF program is necessary.
The bill that I am introducing today will authorize a total of $15 billion over the next five years for the Clean Water SRF. Not only would this authorization help bridge the enormous infrastructure funding gap, the investment also would pay for itself in perpetuity by protecting our environment, enhancing public health, creating jobs and increasing numerous tax bases across the country. Additionally, the bill will provide technical and planning assistance for small systems, expand the types of projects eligible for loan assistance, and offer financially-distressed communities extended loan repayment periods and principal subsidies. The bill also will allow states to give priority consideration to financially-distressed communities when making loans.
The health and well-being of the American public depends on the condition of our nation's wastewater collection and treatment systems. Unfortunately, the facilities that comprise these systems are often taken for granted absent a crisis. Let me emphasize to my colleagues that the costs of poor environmental infrastructure cannot be ignored. Last year marked the 30th Anniversary of the Clean Water Act. We have come a long way since the Clean Water Act's implementation in 1972. Yet, we still have a long way to go. After 30 years since the passage of the Clean Water Act approximately 45 percent of U.S. waters are still not clean enough for fishing or swimming. The 30th Anniversary of the Clean Water Act is cause for celebration of our accomplishments. It is also an opportunity to recommit ourselves to achieving the goals of the Clean Water Act. The Federal Government must maintain a strong partnership with States and local communities and share in the financial burden of sustaining hard-won water quality gains and making additional improvements to the quality of the Nation's waters.
In just over a decade, the Clean Water SRF Program has helped thousands of communities meet their wastewater treatment needs. My bill will help ensure that the Clean Water SRF Program remains a viable component in the overall development of our Nation's infrastructure for years to come. I urge my colleagues to join me in cosponsoring this legislation, and I urge its speedy consideration by the Senate.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I rise today in support of legislation before the Senate that addresses what I feel is one of the most glaring loopholes in our homeland security net: that of the lax air cargo…
Mr. President, I rise today in support of legislation before the Senate that addresses what I feel is one of the most glaring loopholes in our homeland security net: that of the lax air cargo security infrastructure in our country.
In 2001, with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
we reinvented aviation security. We overturned the status quo, and I am proud of the work we did. We put the Federal Government in charge of security and we have made significant strides toward restoring the confidence of the American people that it is safe to fly. We no longer have a system in which the financial ``bottom line'' interferes with protecting the flying public. We also addressed the gamut of critical issues, including baggage screening, additional air marshals, cockpit security, and numerous other issues.
There is more work to be done. We must not lose focus, and we must maintain a continuity of commitment. If we are to fulfill our obligations to confront the aviation security challenges we face in the aftermath of September 11, we must remain aggressive. We need a ``must- do'' attitude, not excuses about what ``can't be done,'' because we are only as safe as the weakest link in our aviation security system.
I am a strong supporter of legislation that we are considering today, the Air Cargo Security Act, a bill intended to strengthen the air cargo security system in this country. According to the GAO, a full 22 percent of all the cargo shipped by air in this country in 2000 was shipped on passenger flights--and half of the hull of a typical passenger plane is filled with cargo. The Department of Transportation Inspector General has recommended that current air cargo controls be tightened, particularly the process for certifying freight forwarders and assessing their compliance with security requirements, and has warned that the existing screening system is ``easily circumvented.'' This must not be allowed to stand.
Moreover, according to a Washington Post report last year, internal TSA documents warn of an increased risk of an attack designed to exploit this vulnerability because TSA has been focused primarily on meeting its new mandates to screen passengers and luggage. This is clear evidence that cargo security needs to be bolstered. And time is not on our side.
At many of the Senate Commerce Committee's aviation security hearings since 9/11, I have expressed concern about the significant outstanding air cargo security issues that we face. On January 23, I introduced legislation which would require TSA to put together a comprehensive air cargo security plan. And while TSA was developing their plan, my bill mandated that interim security measures be put into place, which include random cargo screening, greater scrutiny of shippers and a training regime for air cargo handlers.
The bill before us today, the Air Cargo Security Act, incorporates many of the provisions of my bill. First of all, it would require TSA to establish a system to ensure the security of all cargo transported in the U.S. on both passenger aircraft and cargo aircraft, which must be finalized within 6 months of enactment. It is essential that TSA have a comprehensive plan in place as soon as possible, so that they can go after the most glaring security loopholes in the air cargo system. Secondly, the bill includes language I authored establishing a pilot program would be to allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to test various techniques for screening cargo being loaded onto passenger planes including random physical screening. Today, virtually no cargo loaded onto airliners is screened, and it is vital that TSA settle soon on the best method of cargo screening with an eye towards deploying those methods in airports around the country.
Also, in response to concerns that I had raised about security at foreign cargo facilities that ship to the U.S. by air, the legislation includes a provision requiring TSA to work with foreign countries to conduct regular inspections at facilities transporting air cargo to the U.S. Finally, the bill also includes a provision from my bill to develop a detailed training program for all persons that handle air cargo. This will ensure that the cargo is properly handled and safe- guarded from security breaches.
The Air Cargo Security Act would also require TSA to establish an industrywide database of shippers who ship on passenger planes. I know that the TSA has already been working on this database. The bill also seeks to greatly increase oversight of indirect air carriers, ``freight forwarders,'' complete with a system of random TSA inspections.
On last September 11, terrorists exposed the vulnerability of our commercial aviation network in the most horrific fashion. The landmark aviation security legislation was a major step in the right direction, but we must always stay one step ahead of those who would commit vicious acts of violence on our soil aimed at innocent men, women, and children.
The bill before us works towards that goal, and therefore I am pleased to support it.
Mr. President, as another semester begins, many college students are worrying not only about their course loads and class work, but about how they will pay for school. Today, the average cost of…
Mr. President, as another semester begins, many college students are worrying not only about their course loads and class work, but about how they will pay for school. Today, the average cost of room, board and tuition at a public four-year college has jumped to over $9,000. Tuition and fees alone jumped 9.6 percent from last year. The average cost of room, board and tuition at a private four-year college has jumped to just over $25,000 with tuition and fees having risen 5.8 percent.
What do the rising costs of attending a college or university mean for American families? It means that despite their best efforts to save and plan ahead, hard working families have to spend a larger percentage of their income than ever before to send their children to school. To attend my alma mater, the University of Delaware, it costs nearly 20 percent of a Delaware family's average annual income to cover costs. In fact just a few months ago, tuition was increased from the Fall to Spring semester by $120 to make up for an expected $3.1 cut in state aid to the university. If a Delaware family wants to send their child to a private university, approximately 50 percent of their income is required.
To help counteract these spiraling costs, I come to the floor today to reintroduce ``The Tuition Assistance for Families Act,'' a comprehensive package of tax credits and deductions, grants and scholarships that will assist American families in sending their children to college. Building upon the previous efforts of mine and others, this legislation will provide more families with much needed assistance so that the decision to send one's child to school will not be overshadowed by the decision of how to pay for it.
Specifically, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will raise the current tuition tax deduction for higher education expenses from $3,000 to $12,000. Based on legislation that I previously sponsored with Senator Schumer, this $9,000 increase will go a long way in helping middle class American families afford tuition.
The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' expands tuition tax credits already in law, the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit. Currently, the Lifetime Learning Credit allows a 20 percent tax credit on the first $10,000 of one's higher education expenses. Under my bill, this percentage jumps to 25 percent while the amount of expenses subjected to the credit rises to $12,000. This means that a student who files a return in tax year 2003 under my plan could get up to $3,000 back in taxes. This is $1,000 more than the $2,000 maximum allowable credit available under current law. That means that under my plan, up to an additional $1,000 can go directly back into a student's pocket to pay for books, a computer or tuition. To maximize the utility of the tax credits, my bill also raises the income limits for both the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Credit to up to $130,000 per family, per year. This will allow more families to access the help that they need.
My bill reintroduces the idea of a $1,000 merit scholarship to be awarded to each high school senior graduating in the top 5 percent of his or her class. These types of scholarships not only reward student achievement, they help to ensure that the best and brightest students have the ability to go on to college thereby increasing the pool of well-qualified Americans in the workforce.
Finally, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will increase the maximum Pell Grant award from $4,000 to $4,500. During the 2001- 2002 school year, the maximum Pell Grant award covered approximately 42 percent of the average tuition, room and board at a public four-year university. During the 1975-76 it covered 84 percent of these same costs. Clearly, the purchasing power of these grants has declined dramatically over the years. As such, the debt load of American students and American families has increased as students have looked to federal and private loans to finance their education. Shockingly but not surprisingly, 64
percent of today's college students graduate with student loan debt at an average of $16,928, double the debt load of 1994.
It is the dream of every American parent to provide for their child a better life than they had themselves. Part of doing this involves sending your kids to college. This is why I have spent a great deal of my time in the Senate fighting to provide tax relief for middle class American families struggling with college costs. And while I was pleased when some of the ideas I advocated were adopted in the 1997 tax cut bill, it is clear that as tuition costs rise dramatically, Americans need additional assistance. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will provide extra help so that more families can afford to give their children a brighter and better future. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' goes one step further in committing the federal government to making college more affordable for Americans.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I know we have been notified that one Senator is on the way over here to speak on this amendment before the Senator makes his point of order. We have at least one, maybe two Senators…
Mr. President, I know we have been notified that one Senator is on the way over here to speak on this amendment before the Senator makes his point of order. We have at least one, maybe two Senators who wish to speak on this amendment.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Will the Senator yield for a question?
I appreciate very much the statement of the Senator from New York. Senator Byrd and I were talking earlier. No State has suffered as did New York as a result of the September 11 incident. We all know that. But I bring to the Senator's attention that I offered an amendment earlier today saying that one of the facts that should be taken into consideration is how many tourists are in the community within any given time. Of course, New York is a tourist-oriented community. People are there all the time for various reasons-- conventions, just wanting to see the Big Apple. Even today that is in fact the case.
One of the facts I brought to the attention of the Senate the other day is that in Las Vegas, on any given day, there are about 300,000 tourists, and the Senator would agree, I am sure, that the people of Las Vegas--law enforcement, fire, emergency medical responders, first- line responders generally--have as much of an obligation to take care of someone visiting Las Vegas from New York as they do someone who lives there on a full-time basis. The Senator would agree with that, would she not?
I also ask the Senator this: One of the other considerations I brought to the attention of the Senate is that on any given day in Las Vegas there are about 75,000 people from foreign countries. But in looking at some of the statistics I have, even though we have almost 2\1/2\ million people who visit Las Vegas yearly who come from other countries, New York City--not the State of New York but New York City--has 5\1/2\ million people who come from foreign countries to visit. So on any given day in New York City, instead of the 75,000 we have in Las Vegas, the Senator has 150,000, approximately.
Now, would the Senator agree that someone who is visiting New York City from Turkey, Germany, or Japan, the first-line responders have an obligation to make sure they are taken care of in the event of an emergency just as someone who is a New York resident?
I hope there is some consideration given to people who are in New York City, Las Vegas, all of the States--Orlando, FL, where we have Disney World--that have these large numbers of tourists come from various parts of our country and around the world, and I hope the American people understand that. I compliment the Senator from New York for her outstanding statement in bringing to the attention of the people of this country and the Senate the information that only can come from someone who represents the State of New York.
Mr. President, I know the Senator from Mississippi has been very patient today. We have one additional Senator who says he is on his way. I am confident he is. So if the Senator from Mississippi would be patient, he should be here shortly.
I note the absence of a quorum.
I am happy to withhold. Of course I will.
I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Leahy), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Leahy) would each vote ``yea.''
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, for his work on this important Homeland Security appropriations bill. As the Senator knows, I am pleased that the bill we are discussing today includes within the Transportation Security Administration ``$13 million for the hazardous materials permit program and truck tracking system to provide for nationwide coverage.'' As you are aware, the Federal Government has issued warnings that terrorists may exploit the 800,000 daily hazardous waste and dangerous goods shipments in new attacks on the U.S.--either as weapons of mass destruction or in the manufacture of such weapons. So the funding you and Chairman Cochran have included in this bill is very timely and important.
I want to ask the Senator if he is aware that the University of Nevada Las Vegas is working to initiate development of a National Hazardous Materials Transportation Monitoring and Response Center that would build upon existing commercially available satellite based nationwide truck monitoring and communications technology. The center would ensure a secure location for nationwide hazardous material truck monitoring. It would also link, for the first time, the ability to remotely identify an incident anywhere in the country with the ability to immediately alert the appropriate emergency responders and law enforcement officials.
I thank my colleague from West Virginia and the Chairman Cochran for their support of those efforts and look forward to working with the committee on this important issue.
Mr. President, I thank Senator Hutchison for her work on the Air Cargo Security Act. Last year this bill passed the Senate and I look forward to passing this legislation again today. Hopefully the…
Mr. President, I thank Senator Hutchison for her work on the Air Cargo Security Act. Last year this bill passed the Senate and I look forward to passing this legislation again today. Hopefully the House will take up this legislation promptly and send it to the President's desk.
Earlier this year Senator Hutchison and I released a report from the General Accounting Office that demonstrates why the Congress and the Transportation Security Administration must--together--move quickly to shore up our vulnerabilities to protect against another terrorist attack.
I strongly believe that we must increase our defenses across the board to anticipate the next attack, not just correct the vulnerabilities that were already exploited by terrorists on September 11.
After September 11, Congress moved quickly to federalize the airport security screening workforce to prevent more hijackings, but we have not done enough to increase our air cargo security.
The General Accounting Office report shows that Congress must require the TSA to develop a strategic plan to screen and inspect air cargo to protect our Nation's air transportation system. According to this report, our air cargo system remains vulnerable to a terrorist attack because:
First, there aren't enough safeguards in place to ensure that someone shipping air cargo under the ``known shipper'' program has taken the proper steps to protect against use by terrorists;
Second, cargo tampering is possible at various points where cargo transfers from company to company;
Third, air cargo handlers are not required to have criminal background checks, and they do not always have their identification verified;
Fourth, and most importantly, most cargo shipped by air is never screened.
To address these problems, the GAO recommends that the Transportation Security Administration develop a comprehensive plan for improving air cargo security.
The air cargo legislation we are passing today, directs the TSA to: Develop a strategic plan to ensure the security of all air cargo; establish an industry-wide pilot program database of known shippers; set up a training program for handlers to learn how to safeguard cargo from tampering; and inspect air cargo shipping facilities on a regular basis.
The Aviation Security Act Congress passed after September 11 required the Transportation Security Administration to screen and inspect air cargo ``as soon as practicable.'' The GAO report shows we cannot wait any longer. The time is now for the Senate to again take up this legislation, again pass this legislation, and for the TSA to prevent terrorists from tampering with the cargo loaded into the underbelly of our airplanes.
The General Accounting Office recommends that the Under Secretary for Transportation develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that includes priority actions identified on the basis of risk, costs, deadlines for completing those actions, and performance targets.
The TSA has a great deal of options at its disposal. The TSA could: Screen air cargo for explosives; secure cargo with high-tech seals; control access to holding areas containing cargo; use cargo tracking systems; install more cameras in cargo areas at airports; use blast resistant containers; have more bomb-sniffing dogs; put cargo in decompression chambers before loading it onto an aircraft; require the identity of people making air cargo deliveries to be checked; establish an industrywide computer profiling system; require criminal background checks for employees at freight forwarders and consolidators; and require third party inspections.
We do not expect the TSA to X-ray and scan all cargo for explosives because shippers and carriers would be able to process only 4 percent of cargo received daily, which would severely disrupt the air cargo industry. However, the Federal Government can deploy a combination of the techniques I have listed to implement a comprehensive security plan for air cargo.
Since one half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is typically filled with cargo and 22 percent of all cargo transported by plane is loaded on passenger flights, I believe air cargo security is just as important as passenger security. In fact, you cannot keep passengers safe without stronger air cargo security.
Each time there is a major jet crash or bombing, we reexamine our aviation security. I hope it will not take another accident or attack for us to finally pass this legislation into law.
I thank Senator Hutchison, Senator McCain, and Senator Hollings for their leadership on this issue of transportation security, and I look forward to this bill being signed into law.
Mr. President, Senator Hollings asked me if I would be the Democratic manager here. I want to say to Senator Hutchison, thank you so much for all your hard work. I also thank Senator Hollings and…
Mr. President, Senator Hollings asked me if I would be the Democratic manager here. I want to say to Senator Hutchison, thank you so much for all your hard work. I also thank Senator Hollings and Senator Rockefeller, Senator Wyden--frankly, the whole committee. This is one committee that does work on a bipartisan basis and it is very refreshing, I might say.
S. 165 takes needed steps to respond to concerns that have been raised about the status of air cargo security in the U.S., and will act to close a loophole that has left our aviation system vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
Last year, Admiral James Loy, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, expressed his concern, in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, that air cargo security needed to be strengthened or it would remain a potential backdoor open for terrorists to exploit. These concerns are well-founded as, prior to September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation Inspector General's--DOT IG--Office had confirmed that it was possible to ship dangerous items on aircraft without ever having the contents of packages screened. Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, significant changes have occurred to the cargo industry in response to this security loophole, but more must be done. Last year, the Senate passed a comprehensive cargo security bill, but time ran out on the 107th Congress before the House could properly consider it. We need to pass S. 165 now, and make certain the foundation for addressing this matter is put into law.
S. 165 will instruct the Transportation Security Administration-- TSA--to establish an inspection program for all cargo that is transported through the Nation's air transportation system. The bill includes language from the legislation which passed in the Senate last year requiring the creation of an industry-wide database of known shippers of cargo on passenger aircraft and an assessment of the current indirect air carrier program, random inspections of indirect air carrier facilities, and a report to Congress on the random audit system. In addition, S. 165 authorizes the appropriation of necessary sums for TSA to carry out an air cargo security program, and mandates the development of a training program for all air cargo handlers.
We have come close to closing the loopholes in cargo security before, but the process must be completed. This issue is critical to the future of aviation security, air travelers and our economy. Congress should act now to pass this legislation before a tragic, avoidable incident forces our hand.
I close by thanking the committee for adding actually four amendments that we worked on. I thank my staff for working so hard on this as well.
First of all, we have in this bill made sure the cargo pilots have the same opportunity to protect the cockpit as pilots in commercial planes. They are going to be part of this program now. I am very pleased about that.
Second, there is a study in here on the best way to proceed on blast- resistant containers. I have seen Kevlar material which will contain a bomb blast so that it doesn't wreak havoc and cause a horrible tragedy. So we are looking at that.
Third, something that Senator McCain mentioned, we have included a study to look at the best defense for shoulder-fired missiles. During the break, I went to San Diego and I stood on the roof of a parking garage at the airport and, believe me, I felt like I could touch the aircraft as they came in for a landing. I looked around and realized this is a great vulnerability. Many terrorist groups have these shoulder-fired missiles, or they can buy them for as little as $8,000. We have defenses we have on Air Force One, on military planes, with which El Al has their fleet protected. We need to protect our fleet.
We have a study in this particular bill just in case the study that is going on via the supplemental emergency bill gets bogged down. So it is a backup.
Last, I was very concerned to learn fake IDs are very easy to use, when you check into an airport. We have a study here to come up with a plan on how to use high technology to spot a fake ID.
I am very pleased to be here. Again, I thank Senator Hollings for giving me this honor to express my support. I believe we are going to have a voice vote. I am very happy about it and I look forward to seeing this bill become law.
With that, I yield the floor. I know my friend from Texas, the author of this bill, has a good deal to say about this important piece of legislation.
Bill Text
4 versions available
[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 165 Referred in House (RFH)]
1st Session
S. 165
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 9, 2003
Referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To improve air cargo security.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Air Cargo Security Improvement
Act''.
SEC. 2. INSPECTION OF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.
Section 44901(f) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``(f) Cargo.--
``(1) In general.--The Under Secretary of Transportation
for Security shall establish systems to screen, inspect, or
otherwise ensure the security of all cargo that is to be
transported in--
``(A) passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier
or foreign air carrier in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation; or
``(B) all-cargo aircraft in air transportation and
intrastate air transportation.
``(2) Strategic plan.--The Under Secretary shall develop a
strategic plan to carry out paragraph (1) within 6 months after
the date of enactment of the Air Cargo Security Improvement
Act.
``(3) Pilot program.--The Under Secretary shall conduct a
pilot program of screening of cargo to assess the effectiveness
of different screening measures, including the use of random
screening. The Under Secretary shall attempt to achieve a
distribution of airport participation in terms of geographic
location and size.''.
SEC. 3. AIR CARGO SHIPPING.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 44922. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping facilities
``The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall
establish a system for the regular inspection of shipping facilities
for shipments of cargo transported in air transportation or intrastate
air transportation to ensure that appropriate security controls,
systems, and protocols are observed, and shall enter into arrangements
with the civil aviation authorities, or other appropriate officials, of
foreign countries to ensure that inspections are conducted on a regular
basis at shipping facilities for cargo transported in air
transportation to the United States.''.
(b) Additional Inspectors.--The Under Secretary may increase the
number of inspectors as necessary to implement the requirements of
title 49, United States Code, as amended by this subtitle.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 449 of
title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``44922. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping facilities''.
SEC. 4. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, United
States Code, is further amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 44923. Air cargo security
``(a) Database.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
shall establish an industry-wide pilot program database of known
shippers of cargo that is to be transported in passenger aircraft
operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation
or intrastate air transportation. The Under Secretary shall use the
results of the pilot program to improve the known shipper program.
``(b) Indirect air carriers.--
``(1) Random inspections.--The Under Secretary shall
conduct random audits, investigations, and inspections of
indirect air carrier facilities to determine if the indirect
air carriers are meeting the security requirements of this
title.
``(2) Ensuring compliance.--The Under Secretary may take
such actions as may be appropriate to promote and ensure
compliance with the security standards established under this
title.
``(3) Notice of failures.--The Under Secretary shall notify
the Secretary of Transportation of any indirect air carrier
that fails to meet security standards established under this
title.
``(4) Withdrawal of security program approval.--The Under
Secretary may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending,
or revoking approval of a security program of an indirect air
carrier that fails to meet security requirements imposed by the
Under Secretary if such failure threatens the security of air
transportation or commerce. The affected indirect air carrier
shall be given notice and the opportunity to correct its
noncompliance unless the Under Secretary determines that an
emergency exists. Any indirect air carrier that has the
approval of its security program amended, modified, suspended,
or revoked under this section may appeal the action in
accordance with procedures established by the Under Secretary
under this title.
``(5) Indirect air carrier.--In this subsection, the term
`indirect air carrier' has the meaning given that term in part
1548 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
``(c) Consideration of Community Needs.--In implementing air cargo
security requirements under this title, the Under Secretary may take
into consideration the extraordinary air transportation needs of small
or isolated communities and unique operational characteristics of
carriers that serve those communities.''.
(b) Assessment of Indirect Air Carrier Program.--The Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security shall assess the security
aspects of the indirect air carrier program under part 1548 of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, and report the result of the
assessment, together with any recommendations for necessary
modifications of the program to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure within 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act. The Under Secretary may submit the report and
recommendations in classified form.
(c) Report to Congress on Random Audits.--The Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security shall report to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on random screening,
audits, and investigations of air cargo security programs based on
threat assessments and other relevant information. The report may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 449 of
title 49, United States Code, as amended by section 3, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``44923. Air cargo security''.
SEC. 5. TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CARGO HANDLERS.
The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish
a training program for any persons that handle air cargo to ensure that
the cargo is properly handled and safe-guarded from security breaches.
SEC. 6. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
shall establish a program requiring that air carriers operating all-
cargo aircraft have an approved plan for the security of their air
operations area, the cargo placed aboard such aircraft, and persons
having access to their aircraft on the ground or in flight.
(b) Plan Requirements.--The plan shall include provisions for--
(1) security of each carrier's air operations areas and
cargo acceptance areas at the airports served;
(2) background security checks for all employees with
access to the air operations area;
(3) appropriate training for all employees and contractors
with security responsibilities;
(4) appropriate screening of all flight crews and persons
transported aboard all-cargo aircraft;
(5) security procedures for cargo placed on all-cargo
aircraft as provided in section 44901(f)(1)(B) of title 49,
United States Code; and
(6) additional measures deemed necessary and appropriate by
the Under Secretary.
(c) Confidential Industry Review and Comment.--
(1) Circulation of proposed program.--The Under Secretary
shall--
(A) propose a program under subsection (a) within
90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) distribute the proposed program, on a
confidential basis, to those air carriers and other
employers to which the program will apply.
(2) Comment period.--Any person to which the proposed
program is distributed under paragraph (1) may provide comments
on the proposed program to the Under Secretary not more than 60
days after it was received.
(3) Final program.--The Under Secretary of Transportation
shall issue a final program under subsection (a) not later than
90 days after the last date on which comments may be provided
under paragraph (2). The final program shall contain time
frames for the plans to be implemented by each air carrier or
employer to which it applies.
(4) Suspension of procedural norms.--Neither chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code, nor the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the program required by this
section.
SEC. 7. REPORT ON PASSENGER PRESCREENING PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the
Attorney General, shall submit a report in writing to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on the
potential impact of the Transportation Security Administration's
proposed Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening system, commonly
known as CAPPS II, on the privacy and civil liberties of United States
citizens.
(b) Specific Issues To Be Addressed.--The report shall address the
following:
(1) Whether and for what period of time data gathered on
individual travelers will be retained, who will have access to
such data, and who will make decisions concerning access to
such data.
(2) How the Transportation Security Administration will
treat the scores assigned to individual travelers to measure
the likelihood they may pose a security threat, including how
long such scores will be retained and whether and under what
circumstances they may be shared with other governmental, non-
governmental, or commercial entities.
(3) The role airlines and outside vendors or contractors
will have in implementing and operating the system, and to what
extent will they have access, or the means to obtain access, to
data, scores, or other information generated by the system.
(4) The safeguards that will be implemented to ensure that
data, scores, or other information generated by the system will
be used only as officially intended.
(5) The procedures that will be implemented to mitigate the
effect of any errors, and what procedural recourse will be
available to passengers who believe the system has wrongly
barred them from taking flights.
(6) The oversight procedures that will be implemented to
ensure that, on an ongoing basis, privacy and civil liberties
issues will continue to be considered and addressed with high
priority as the system is installed, operated and updated.
SEC. 8. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS REGARDING TRAINING TO OPERATE
AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--Section 44939 of title 49, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 44939. Training to operate certain aircraft
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Waiting period.--A person subject to regulation under
this part may provide training in the United States in the
operation of an aircraft to an individual who is an alien (as
defined in section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3))) or to any other individual specified
by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and
Transportation Security only if--
``(A) that person has notified the Under Secretary
that the individual has requested such training and
furnished the Under Secretary with that individual's
identification in such form as the Under Secretary may
require; and
``(B) the Under Secretary has not directed, within
30 days after being notified under subparagraph (A),
that person not to provide the requested training
because the Under Secretary has determined that the
individual presents a risk to aviation security or
national security.
``(2) Notification-only individuals.--
``(A) In general.--The requirements of paragraph
(1) shall not apply to an an alien individual who holds
a visa issued under title I of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) and who--
``(i) has earned a Federal Aviation
Administration type rating in an aircraft or
has undergone type-specific training, or
``(ii) holds a current pilot's license or
foreign equivalent commercial pilot's license
that permits the person to fly an aircraft with
a maximum certificated takeoff weight of more
than 12,500 pounds as defined by the
International Civil Aviation Organization in
Annex 1 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation,
if the person providing the training has notified the
Under Secretary that the individual has requested such
training and furnished the Under Secretary with that
individual's visa information.
``(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) does not apply
to an alien individual whose airman's certificate has
been suspended or revoked under procedures established
by the Under Secretary.
``(3) Expedited processing.--The waiting period under
paragraph (1) shall be expedited for an individual who--
``(A) has previously undergone a background records
check by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force;
``(B) is employed by a foreign air carrier
certified under part 129 of title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, that has a TSA 1546 approved security
program and who is undergoing recurrent flight
training;
``(C) is a foreign military pilot endorsed by the
United States Department of Defense for flight
training; or
``(D) who has unescorted access to a secured area
of an airport designated under section
44936(a)(1)(A)(ii).
``(4) Investigation authority.--In order to determine
whether an individual requesting training described in
paragraph (1) presents a risk to aviation security or national
security the Under Secretary is authorized to use the
employment investigation authority provided by section
44936(a)(1)(A) for individuals applying for a position in which
the individual has unescorted access to a secured area of an
airport designated under section 44936(a)(1)(A)(ii).
``(5) Fee.--
``(A) In general.--The Under Secretary may assess a
fee for an investigation under this section, which may
not exceed $100 per individual (exclusive of the cost
of transmitting fingerprints collected at overseas
facilities) during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. For
fiscal year 2005 and thereafter, the Under Secretary
may adjust the maximum amount of the fee to reflect the
costs of such an investigation.
``(B) Offset.--Notwithstanding section 3302 of
title 31, United States Code, any fee collected under
this section--
``(i) shall be credited to the account in
the Treasury from which the expenses were
incurred and shall be available to the Under
Secretary for those expenses; and
``(ii) shall remain available until
expended.
``(b) Interruption of Training.--If the Under Secretary, more than
30 days after receiving notification under subsection (a)(1)(A) from a
person providing training described in subsection (a)(1) or at anytime
after receiving notice from such a person under subsection (a)(2)(a),
determines that an individual receiving such training presents a risk
to aviation or national security, the Under Secretary shall immediately
notify the person providing the training of the determination and that
person shall immediately terminate the training.
``(c) Covered Training.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term -
`training'--
``(1) includes in-flight training, training in a simulator,
and any other form or aspect of training; but
``(2) does not include classroom instruction (also known as
ground school training), which may be provided during the 30-
day period described in subsection (a)(1)(B).
``(d) Interagency Cooperation.--The Attorney General, the Director
of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall cooperate with the Under Secretary in implementing
this section.
``(e) Security Awareness Training for Employees.--The Under
Secretary shall require flight schools to conduct a security awareness
program for flight school employees, and for certified instructors who
provide instruction for the flight school but who are not employees
thereof, to increase their awareness of suspicious circumstances and
activities of individuals enrolling in or attending flight school.''.
(b) Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Border and Transportation Security shall promulgate an
interim final rule to implement section 44939 of title 49,
United States Code, as amended by subsection (a).
(2) Use of overseas facilities.--In order to implement
section 44939 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by
subsection (a), United States Embassies and Consulates that
possess appropriate fingerprint collection equipment and
personnel certified to capture fingerprints shall provide
fingerprint services to aliens covered by that section if the
Under Secretary requires fingerprints in the administration of
that section, and shall transmit the fingerprints to the Under
Secretary or other agency designated by the Under Secretary.
The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall cooperate
with the Under Secretary in carrying out this paragraph.
(3) Use of united states facilities.--If the Under
Secretary requires fingerprinting in the administration of
section 44939 of title 49, United States Code, the Under
Secretary may designate locations within the United States that
will provide fingerprinting services to individuals covered by
that section.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) takes
effect on the effective date of the interim final rule required by
subsection (b)(1).
(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure a report
on the effectiveness of the activities carried out under section 44939
of title 49, United States Code, in reducing risks to aviation security
and national security.
SEC. 9. PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security, in consultation with the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration, appropriate law enforcement, security, and
terrorism experts, representatives of air carriers and labor
organizations representing individuals employed in commercial aviation,
shall develop guidelines to provide air carriers guidance for detecting
false or fraudulent passenger identification. The guidelines may take
into account new technology, current identification measures, training
of personnel, and issues related to the types of identification
available to the public. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.) shall not apply to any meeting held pursuant to this subsection.
(b) Air Carrier Programs.--Within 60 days after the Under Secretary
issues the guidelines under subsection (a) in final form, the Under
Secretary shall provide the guidelines to each air carrier and
establish a joint government and industry council to develop
recommendations on how to implement the guidelines.
(c) Report.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
shall report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure within 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act on the actions taken under this section.
SEC. 10. PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION VERIFICATION.
(a) Program Required.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security may establish and carry out a program to require the
installation and use at airports in the United States of the
identification verification technologies the Under Secretary considers
appropriate to assist in the screening of passengers boarding aircraft
at such airports.
(b) Technologies Employed.--The identification verification
technologies required as part of the program under subsection (a) may
include identification scanners, biometrics, retinal, iris, or facial
scanners, or any other technologies that the Under Secretary considers
appropriate for purposes of the program.
(c) Commencement.--If the Under Secretary determines that the
implementation of such a program is appropriate, the installation and
use of identification verification technologies under the program shall
commence as soon as practicable after the date of that determination.
SEC. 11. BLAST-RESISTANT CARGO CONTAINER TECHNOLOGY.
Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, and the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, shall jointly
submit a report to Congress that contains--
(1) an evaluation of blast-resistant cargo container
technology to protect against explosives in passenger luggage
and cargo;
(2) an examination of the advantages associated with the
technology in preventing damage and loss of aircraft from
terrorist action and any operational impacts which may result
from use of the technology (particularly added weight and
costs);
(3) an analysis of whether alternatives exist to mitigate
the impacts described in paragraph (2) and options available to
pay for the technology; and
(4) recommendations on what further action, if any, should
be taken with respect to the use of blast-resistant cargo
containers on passenger aircraft.
SEC. 12. ARMING PILOTS AGAINST TERRORISM.
(a) Findings and Purpose.--
(1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(A) During the 107th Congress, both the Senate and
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed
measures that would have armed pilots of cargo
aircraft.
(B) Cargo aircraft do not have Federal air
marshals, trained cabin crew, or determined passengers
to subdue terrorists.
(C) Cockpit doors on cargo aircraft, if present at
all, largely do not meet the security standards
required for commercial passenger aircraft.
(D) Cargo aircraft vary in size and many are larger
and carry larger amounts of fuel than the aircraft
hijacked on September 11, 2001.
(E) Aircraft cargo frequently contains hazardous
material and can contain deadly biological and chemical
agents and quantities of agents that caused
communicable diseases.
(F) Approximately 12,000 of the Nation's 90,000
commercial pilots serve as pilots and flight engineers
on cargo aircraft.
(G) There are approximately 2,000 cargo flights per
day in the United States, many of which are loaded with
fuel for outbound international travel or are inbound
from foreign airports not secured by the Transportation
Security Administration.
(H) aircraft transporting cargo pose a serious risk
as potential terrorist targets that could be used as
weapons of mass destruction.
(I) Pilots of cargo aircraft deserve the same
ability to protect themselves and the aircraft they
pilot as other commercial airline pilots.
(J) Permitting pilots of cargo aircraft to carry
firearms creates an important last line of defense
against a terrorist effort to commandeer a cargo
aircraft.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a
member of a flight deck crew of a cargo aircraft should be
armed with a firearm to defend the cargo aircraft against an
attack by terrorists that could result in the use of the
aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction or for other
terrorists purposes.
(b) Arming Cargo Pilots Against Terrorism.--Section 44921 of title
49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``passenger'' in subsection (a) each place
that it appears;
(2) by striking ``or,'' and all that follows in subsection
(k)(2) and inserting ``or any other flight deck crew member.'';
and
(3) by adding at the end of subsection (k) the following:
``(3) All-cargo air transportation.--For the purposes of
this section, the term air transportation includes all-cargo
air transportation.''.
(c) Implementation.--
(1) Time for implementation.--The training of pilots as
Federal flight deck officers required in the amendments made by
subsection (b) shall begin as soon as practicable and no later
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) Effect on other laws.--The requirements of subparagraph
(1) shall have no effect on the deadlines for implementation
contained in section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, as
in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 13. REPORT ON DEFENDING AIRCRAFT FROM MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEMS (SHOULDER-FIRED MISSILES).
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue a
report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure on how best to defend turbo and jet passenger aircraft
from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (shoulder-fired missiles).
(b) Issues To Be Addressed.--The report shall include an analysis
of--
(1) actions taken to date, countermeasures, risk
mitigation, and other activities;
(2) existing military countermeasure systems and how those
systems might be adapted to commercial aircraft applications;
(3) means of reducing the costs of military countermeasure
systems by modifying them for use on commercial aircraft; and
(4) the extent of the threat and the need for
countermeasures.
(c) Report Format.--The report may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 14. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Homeland Security such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act
and sections 44901(f), 44922, and 44923 of title 49, United States
Code, for fiscal years 2004 through 2008.
Passed the Senate May 8, 2003.
Attest:
EMILY J. REYNOLDS,
Secretary.