Security Enhancement Act of 2003

        [Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1864 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

Calendar No. 390
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1864

To enhance the security of the United States and United States allies.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

November 14 (legislative day, November 12), 2003

Mr. Lugar (for himself and Mr. Biden) introduced the following bill;
which was read the first time

November 17, 2003

Read the second time and placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance the security of the United States and United States allies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Security
Enhancement Act of 2003''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--DEFENSE TRADE COOPERATION

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Findings.
Sec. 103. Definitions.
Sec. 104. Exception to bilateral agreement requirements for transfers
of defense items within Australia and the
United Kingdom.
Sec. 105. Certifications for the United Kingdom and Australia.
Sec. 106. Notification of regulations permitting bilateral licensing
exemptions.
Sec. 107. Report on issues raised in consultations pursuant to
bilateral agreements with Australia and the
United Kingdom.
Sec. 108. Special reports on unauthorized end-use or diversion.
TITLE II--RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT REDUCTION

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Findings.
Sec. 203. Definitions.
Sec. 204. International storage facilities for radioactive sources.
Sec. 205. Discovery, inventory, and recovery of radioactive sources.
Sec. 206. Radioisotope thermal generator power units in the independent
states of the former Soviet Union.
Sec. 207. Foreign first responders.
Sec. 208. Threat assessment reports.
Sec. 209. Availability of funds.
TITLE III--GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE

Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Findings; purposes.
Sec. 303. Definitions.
Sec. 304. Priority for certain countries.
Sec. 305. Restriction.
Sec. 306. Fellowship program.
Sec. 307. In-country training in laboratory techniques and syndrome
surveillance.
Sec. 308. Assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health
laboratory equipment.
Sec. 309. Assistance for improved communication of public health
information.
Sec. 310. Assignment of public health personnel to United States
missions and international organizations.
Sec. 311. Expansion of certain United States Government laboratories
abroad.
Sec. 312. Assistance for regional health networks and expansion of
foreign epidemiology training programs.
Sec. 313. Availability of funds.
TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 401. Authority to transfer naval vessels to certain foreign
countries.
Sec. 402. Transfer of certain obsolete or surplus defense articles in
the war reserve stockpiles for allies to
Israel.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Defense articles.--The term ``defense articles'' has
the meaning given the term in section 47 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).
(3) Defense services.--The term ``defense services'' has
the meaning given the term in section 47 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).
(4) Secretary.--Unless otherwise provided, the term
``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State.

TITLE I--DEFENSE TRADE COOPERATION

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Defense Trade Cooperation Act of
2003''.

SEC. 102. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Close defense cooperation between the United States and
each of the United Kingdom and Australia requires
interoperability among the armed forces.
(2) The need for interoperability must be balanced with the
need for the appropriate and effective regulation of trade in
defense articles and defense services.
(3) The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)
represents a delegation to the executive branch of the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations.
(4) Agreements to gain exemption from the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations must be submitted to Congress for
review.

SEC. 103. DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.

In this title, the term ``International Traffic in Arms
Regulations'' means the regulations maintained under sections 120
through 130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor
regulations.

SEC. 104. EXCEPTIONS TO BILATERAL AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR AUSTRALIA
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(a) Exceptions.--Subsection (j) of section 38 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph (4):
``(4) Exceptions from bilateral agreement requirements.--
``(A) Australia.--Subject to the provisions of the
Defense Trade Cooperation Act of 2003, the requirements
for a bilateral agreement described in paragraph (2)(A)
shall not apply to such a bilateral agreement between
the United States Government and the Government of
Australia with respect to transfers or changes in end
use within Australia of defense items that will remain
subject to the licensing requirements of this Act after
such agreement enters into force.
``(B) United kingdom.--Subject to the provisions of
the Defense Trade Cooperation Act of 2003, the
requirements for a bilateral agreement described in
paragraphs (1)(A)(ii), (2)(A)(i), and (2)(A)(ii) shall
not apply to such a bilateral agreement between the
United States Government and the Government of the
United Kingdom for an exemption from the licensing
requirements of this Act.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of such subsection is
amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking ``A
bilateral agreement'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph
(4), a bilateral agreement''.

SEC. 105. CERTIFICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA.

Not later than 30 days before authorizing an exemption from the
licensing requirements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
in accordance with any bilateral agreement entered into with the United
Kingdom or Australia under section 38(j) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2778(j)), as amended by section 104 of this Act, the
President shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees
that such agreement--
(1) is in the national interest of the United States and
will not in any way affect the goals and policy of the United
States as outlined in section 1 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2751);
(2) does not adversely affect the ability of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations to provide consistent
and adequate controls for licensed exports of United States
defense items; and
(3) will not adversely affect the duties or requirements of
the Secretary under the Arms Export Control Act.

SEC. 106. NOTIFICATION OF REGULATIONS PERMITTING
BILATERAL LICENSING EXEMPTIONS.

Not later than 30 days before authorizing an exemption from the
licensing requirements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
in accordance with any bilateral agreement entered into with the United
Kingdom or Australia under section 38(j) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2778(j)), as amended by section 104 of this Act, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
text of the regulations that authorize such a licensing exemption.

SEC. 107. REPORT ON ISSUES RAISED IN CONSULTATIONS PURSUANT TO
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM.

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act
and annually thereafter for each of the following 5 years, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on issues raised during the previous year in consultations
conducted under the terms of any bilateral agreement with Australia, or
under the terms of any bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom, for
exemption from the licensing requirements of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). Each report shall contain detailed
information--
(1) on any notifications or consultations between the
United States and the United Kingdom under the terms of any
agreement with the United Kingdom, or between the United States
and Australia under the terms of any agreement with Australia,
concerning the modification, deletion, or addition of defense
items on the United States Munitions List, the United Kingdom
Military List, or the Australian Defense and Strategic Goods
List;
(2) listing all United Kingdom or Australia persons and
entities that have been designated as qualified persons
eligible to receive United States origin defense items exempt
from the licensing requirements of the Arms Export Control Act
under the terms of such agreements, and listing any
modification, deletion, or addition to such lists, pursuant to
the requirements of any agreement with the United Kingdom or
any agreement with Australia;
(3) on consultations or steps taken pursuant to any
agreement with the United Kingdom or any agreement with
Australia concerning cooperation and consultations with either
government on the effectiveness of the defense trade control
systems of such government;
(4) on provisions and procedures undertaken pursuant to--
(A) any agreement with the United Kingdom with
respect to the handling of United States origin defense
items exempt from the licensing requirements of the
Arms Export Control Act by persons and entities
qualified to receive such items in the United Kingdom;
and
(B) any agreement with Australia with respect to
the handling of United States origin defense items
exempt from the licensing requirements of the Arms
Export Control Act by persons and entities qualified to
receive such items in Australia;
(5) on any new understandings, including the text of such
understandings, between the United States and the United
Kingdom concerning retransfer of United States origin defense
items made pursuant to any agreement with the United Kingdom to
gain exemption from the licensing requirements of the Arms
Export Control Act;
(6) on consultations with the Government of the United
Kingdom or the Government of Australia concerning the legal
enforcement of any such agreements;
(7) on United States origin defense items with respect to
which the United States has provided an exception under the
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the
United Kingdom and any agreement between the United States and
Australia from the requirement for United States Government re-
export consent that was not provided for under United States
laws and regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act; and
(8) on any significant concerns that have arisen between
the Government of Australia or the Government of the United
Kingdom and the United States Government concerning any aspect
of any bilateral agreement between such country and the United
States to gain exemption from the licensing requirements of the
Arms Export Control Act.

SEC. 108. SPECIAL REPORTS ON UNAUTHORIZED END-USE OR DIVERSION.

The Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees, in a manner consistent with ongoing efforts to investigate
and bring civil or criminal charges regarding such matters, not later
than 90 days after receiving any credible information regarding the
unauthorized end-use or diversion of United States exports made
pursuant to any agreement with a country to gain exemption from the
licensing requirements of the Arms Export Control Act. Such
notification may be made in classified or unclassified form and shall
include--
(1) a description of the good or service;
(2) the United States origin of the good or service;
(3) the authorized recipient of the good or service;
(4) a detailed description of the unauthorized end-use or
diversion of the good or service, including any knowledge by
the United States exporter of such unauthorized end-use or
diversion;
(5) any enforcement action taken by the Government of the
United States; and
(6) any enforcement action taken by the government of the
recipient nation.

TITLE II--RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT REDUCTION

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Radiological Terrorism Threat
Reduction Act of 2003''.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) It is feasible for terrorists to obtain and disseminate
radioactive material by using a radiological dispersion device
(RDD) or by emplacing discrete radioactive sources in major public
places.
(2) An attack made in the United States or against United
States interests by terrorists using radiological material
could cause catastrophic economic and social damage, although
it might kill few, if any, Americans.
(3) The first line of defense against radiological
terrorism is preventing the acquisition of radioactive material
by terrorists.

SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Byproduct material.--The term ``byproduct material''
has the meaning given the term in section 11 e. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)).
(2) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(3) Independent states of the former soviet union.--The
term ``independent states of the former Soviet Union'' has the
meaning given the term in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act
(22 U.S.C. 5801).
(4) Radioactive material.--The term ``radioactive
material'' means--
(A) source material and special nuclear material,
but does not include natural or depleted uranium;
(B) nuclear byproduct material;
(C) material made radioactive by bombardment in an
accelerator; and
(D) all refined isotopes of radium.
(5) Radioactive source.--The term ``radioactive source''
means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a
capsule or closely bonded and includes any radioactive material
released if the source is leaking or stolen, but does not
include any material within the nuclear fuel cycle of a
research or power reactor.
(6) Radioisotope thermal generator.--The term
``radioisotope thermal generator'' means an electrical
generator which derives its power from the heat produced by the
decay of a radioactive source by the emission of alpha, beta,
or gamma radiation. The term does not include nuclear reactors
deriving their energy from the fission or fusion of atomic
nuclei.
(7) Source material.--The term ``source material'' has the
meaning given the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).
(8) Special nuclear material.--The term ``special nuclear
material'' has the meaning given the term in section 11 aa. of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

SEC. 204. INTERNATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.

(a) Agreements on Temporary Secure Storage.--The Secretary is
authorized to propose that the IAEA conclude agreements with up to 8
countries under which agreement each country would provide temporary
secure storage for orphaned, unused, surplus, or other radioactive
sources (other than special nuclear material, nuclear fuel, or spent
nuclear fuel). Such agreements shall be consistent with the IAEA Code
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and shall
address the need for storage of such radioactive sources in countries
or regions of the world where convenient access to secure storage of
such radioactive sources does not exist.
(b) Voluntary Contributions to IAEA Authorized.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to make
voluntary contributions to the IAEA for use by the Department
of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA to fund the United States share
of the costs of activities associated with or under agreements
under subsection (a).
(2) United states share in fiscal year 2004.--The United
States share of the costs of activities under agreements under
subsection (a) in fiscal year 2004 may be 100 percent of the
costs of such activities in that fiscal year.
(c) Technical Assistance.--The Secretary is authorized to provide
the IAEA and other countries with technical assistance to carry out
activities under agreements under subsection (a) in a manner that meets
the standards of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources.
(d) Applicability of Environmental Laws.--
(1) Inapplicability of nepa to facilities outside united
states.--The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply with respect to any
temporary secure storage facility constructed outside the
United States under an agreement under subsection (a).
(2) Applicability of foreign environmental laws.--The
construction and operation of a facility described in paragraph
(1) shall be governed by any applicable environmental laws of
the country in which the facility is constructed.

SEC. 205. DISCOVERY, INVENTORY, AND RECOVERY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.

(a) Authority.--The Secretary is authorized to provide assistance,
including through voluntary contributions to the IAEA under subsection
(b), to support a program of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety
of the Department of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA to promote the
discovery, inventory, and recovery of radioactive sources in member
nations of the IAEA.
(b) Voluntary Contributions to IAEA Authorized.--The Secretary is
authorized to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA to fund the
United States share of the program described in subsection (a).
(c) Technical Assistance.--The Secretary is authorized to provide
the IAEA and other countries with technical assistance to carry out the
program described in subsection (a).

SEC. 206. RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR POWER UNITS IN THE INDEPENDENT
STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

(a) Substitution With Other Power Units.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to assist the
Government of the Russian Federation to substitute solar (or
other non-nuclear) power sources for radioisotope thermal power units
operated by the Russian Federation and other independent states of the
former Soviet Union in applications such as lighthouses in the Arctic,
remote weather stations, and for providing electricity in remote
locations.
(2) Technology requirement.--Any power unit utilized as a
substitute power unit under paragraph (1) shall, to the maximum
extent practicable, be based upon tested technologies that have
operated for at least one full year in the environment where
the substitute power unit will be used.
(b) Consultation.--The Secretary shall consult with the Secretary
of Energy to ensure that substitute power sources provided under this
section are for facilities from which the radioisotope thermal
generator power units have been or are being removed.
(c) Activities Outside Former Soviet Union.--The Secretary may use
not more than 20 percent of the funds available for carrying out this
section in any fiscal year to replace dangerous radioisotope thermal
power facilities that are similar to the facilities described in
subsection (a) in countries other than the independent states of the
former Soviet Union.

SEC. 207. FOREIGN FIRST RESPONDERS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary is authorized to assist foreign
countries, or to propose that the IAEA assist foreign countries, in the
development of appropriate national response plans and the training of
first responders to--
(1) detect, identify, and characterize radioactive
material;
(2) understand the hazards posed by radioactive
contamination;
(3) understand the risks encountered at various dose rates;
(4) enter contaminated areas safely and speedily; and
(5) evacuate persons within a contaminated area.
(b) Considerations.--In carrying out activities under subsection
(a), the Secretary shall take into account the findings of the threat
assessment report required by section 208 and the location of any
storage facilities for radioactive sources described in section 204.

SEC. 208. THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS.

(a) Reports Required.--The Secretary shall, at the times specified
in subsection (c), submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report--
(1) detailing the preparations made at United States
diplomatic missions abroad to detect and mitigate a
radiological attack on United States missions and other United
States facilities under the control of the Secretary;
(2) setting forth a rank-ordered list of the Secretary's
priorities for improving radiological security and consequence
management at United States missions; and
(3) providing a rank-ordered list of the missions where
such improvement is most important.
(b) Budget Request.--Each report under subsection (a) shall also
include a proposed budget to carry out the improvements listed in such
report pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
(c) Timing.--
(1) First report.--The first report under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(2) Subsequent reports.--Subsequent reports under
subsection (a) shall be submitted with the budget justification
materials submitted by the Secretary to Congress in support of
the budget of the President for the fiscal year (as submitted
under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) for each
fiscal year after fiscal year 2005.
(d) Form.--Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.

SEC. 209. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

(a) In General.--Of the funds appropriated to the Department of
State for fiscal year 2004, up to $15,000,000 may be used to carry out
this title.
(b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available under
subsection (a)--
(1) $4,000,000 may be used to carry out section 204;
(2) $4,000,000 may be used to carry out section 205;
(3) $5,000,000 may be used to carry out section 206; and
(4) $2,000,000 may be used to carry out section 207.

TITLE III--GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE

SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance Act
of 2003''.

SEC. 302. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to
the United States. The insidious nature of the threat, the
likely delayed recognition in the event of an attack, and the
underpreparedness of the domestic public health infrastructure
may produce catastrophic consequences following a biological
weapons attack upon the United States.
(2) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon
and developed, tested, produced, or released in another country
can quickly spread to the United States. Given the realities of
international travel, trade, and migration patterns, a
dangerous pathogen released anywhere in the world can spread to
United States territory in a matter of days, before any
effective quarantine or isolation measures can be implemented.
(3) To effectively combat bioterrorism and ensure that the
United States is fully prepared to prevent, diagnose, and
contain a biological weapons attack, measures to strengthen the
domestic public health infrastructure and improve domestic
surveillance and monitoring, while absolutely essential, are
not sufficient.
(4) The United States should enhance cooperation with the
World Health Organization, regional health organizations, and
individual countries, including data sharing with appropriate
United States departments and agencies, to help detect and
quickly contain infectious disease outbreaks or bioterrorism
agents before they can spread.
(5) The World Health Organization has done an impressive
job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks around the
world, including the recent emergence of the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, particularly with the
establishment in April 2000 of the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response network.
(6) The capabilities of the World Health Organization are
inherently limited by the quality of the data and information
it receives from member countries, the narrow range of diseases
(plague, cholera, and yellow fever) upon which its disease
surveillance and monitoring is based, and the consensus process
it uses to add new diseases to the list. Developing countries
in particular often cannot devote the necessary resources to
build and maintain public health infrastructures.
(7) In particular, developing countries could benefit
from--
(A) better trained public health professionals and
epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns;
(B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis
of pathogens;
(C) disease reporting that is based on symptoms and
signs (known as ``syndrome surveillance'') and affords
the earliest possible opportunity to conduct an
effective response;
(D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in
syndrome surveillance capabilities and real-time
information dissemination to public health officials;
and
(E) appropriate communications equipment and
information technology to efficiently transmit
information and data within national and regional
health networks, including inexpensive, Internet-based
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and relevant
telephone-based systems for early recognition and
diagnosis of diseases.
(8) An effective international capability to monitor and
quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will offer
dividends not only in the event of biological weapons
development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the
more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease
outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a
robust surveillance system will serve to deter terrorist use of
biological weapons, as early detection will help mitigate the
intended effects of such malevolent uses.
(b) Purpose.--The purposes of this title are as follows:
(1) To enhance the capability and cooperation of the
international community, including the World Health
Organization and individual countries, through enhanced
pathogen surveillance and appropriate data sharing, to detect,
identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether the
cause of those outbreaks is intentional human action or natural
in origin.
(2) To enhance the training of public health professionals
and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in
advanced Internet-based and other electronic syndrome
surveillance systems, in addition to traditional epidemiology
methods, so that they may better detect, diagnose, and contain
infectious disease outbreaks, especially those due to pathogens
most likely to be used in a biological weapons attack.
(3) To provide assistance to developing countries to
purchase appropriate public health laboratory equipment
necessary for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis.
(4) To provide assistance to developing countries to
purchase appropriate communications equipment and information
technology, including, as appropriate, relevant computer
equipment, Internet connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-
based applications to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit
public health information for infectious disease surveillance
and diagnosis.
(5) To make available greater numbers of United States
Government public health professionals to international health
organizations, regional health networks, and United States
diplomatic missions where appropriate.
(6) To establish ``lab-to-lab'' cooperative relationships
between United States public health laboratories and
established foreign counterparts.
(7) To expand the training and outreach activities of
overseas United States laboratories, including Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and Department of Defense
entities, to enhance the disease surveillance capabilities of
developing countries.
(8) To provide appropriate technical assistance to existing
regional health networks and, where appropriate, seed money for
new regional networks.

SEC. 303. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological
Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed
at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.
(2) Eligible developing country.--The term ``eligible
developing country'' means any developing country that--
(A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying
with requirements of the World Health Organization on
reporting public health information on outbreaks of
infectious diseases;
(B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for
purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to have repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, unless the
Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in the national
interest of the United States to provide assistance under the
provisions of this Act;
(C) is a state party to the Biological Weapons
Convention; and
(D) is determined by the United States Government
not to have an offensive biological weapons program.
(3) Eligible national.--The term ``eligible national''
means any citizen or national of an eligible developing country
who--
(A) is eligible to receive a visa under the
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); and
(B) is not currently or previously affiliated with
or employed by a laboratory or entity determined by the
United States Government to be involved in offensive
biological weapons activities.
(4) International health organization.--The term
``international health organization'' includes the World Health
Organization and the Pan American Health Organization.
(5) Laboratory.--The term ``laboratory'' means a facility
for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical,
immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological,
pathological, or other examination of materials derived from
the human body for the purpose of providing information for the
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human
beings.
(6) Select agent.--The term ``select agent'' has the
meaning applied in the administration of section 72.6 of title
42, Code of Federal Regulations.
(7) Syndrome surveillance.--The term ``syndrome
surveillance'' means the recording of symptoms (patient
complaints) and signs (derived from physical examination)
combined with simple geographic locators to track the emergence
of a disease in a population.

SEC. 304. PRIORITY FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.

Priority in the provision of United States assistance for eligible
developing countries under all the provisions of this title shall be
given to those countries that permit personnel from the World Health
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to
investigate outbreaks of infectious diseases on their territories,
provide early notification of disease outbreaks, and provide pathogen
surveillance data to appropriate United States departments and agencies
in addition to international health organizations.

SEC. 305. RESTRICTION.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no foreign
national participating in programs authorized under this title shall
have access, during the course of such participation, to select agents
that may be used as, or in, a biological weapon, except in a supervised
and controlled setting.

SEC. 306. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) Establishment.--There is established a fellowship program
(hereafter in this section referred to as the ``program'') under which
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall award
fellowships to eligible nationals to pursue public health education or
training, as follows:
(1) Master of public health degree.--Graduate courses of
study leading to a master of public health degree with a
concentration in epidemiology from an institution of higher
education in the United States with a Center for Public Health
Preparedness, as determined by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.
(2) Advanced public health epidemiology training.--Advanced
public health training in epidemiology to be carried out at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (or equivalent State
facility), or other Federal facility (excluding the Department
of Defense or United States National Laboratories), for a
period of not less than 6 months or more than 12 months.
(b) Specialization in Bioterrorism.--In addition to the education
or training specified in subsection (a), each recipient of a fellowship
under this section (hereafter in this section referred to as a
``fellow'') may take courses of study at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and
containment of likely bioterrorism agents.
(c) Fellowship Agreement.--
(1) In general.--In awarding a fellowship under the
program, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, shall require the recipient to enter
into an agreement under which, in exchange for such assistance,
the recipient--
(A) will maintain satisfactory academic progress
(as determined in accordance with regulations issued by
the Secretary and confirmed in regularly scheduled
updates to the Secretary from the institution providing
the education or training on the progress of the
recipient's education or training);
(B) will, upon completion of such education or
training, return to the recipient's country of
nationality or last habitual residence (if it is an
eligible developing country) and complete at least four
years of employment in a public health position in the
government or a nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity
in that country or, with the approval of the Secretary,
complete part or all of this requirement through
service with an international health organization
without geographic restriction; and
(C) agrees that, if the recipient is unable to meet
the requirements described in subparagraph (A) or (B),
the recipient will reimburse the United States for the
value of the assistance provided to the recipient under the fellowship,
together with interest at a rate determined in accordance with
regulations issued by the Secretary but not higher than the rate
generally applied in connection with other Federal loans.
(2) Waiver authority.--The Secretary may waive the
application of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) if
the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of
the United States to do so.
(d) Implementation.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, is authorized to enter into an
agreement with any eligible developing country under which the country
agrees--
(1) to establish a procedure for the nomination of eligible
nationals for fellowships under this section;
(2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a
professional public health position within the country upon
completion of his studies; and
(3) to certify to the Secretary when a fellow has concluded
the minimum period of employment in a public health position
required by the fellowship agreement, with an explanation of
how the requirement was met.
(e) Participation of United States Citizens.--On a case-by-case
basis, the Secretary may provide for the participation of United States
citizens under the provisions of this section if the Secretary
determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to
do so. Upon completion of education or training as a fellow under this
section, a United States citizen shall complete at least 5 years of
employment in a public health position in an eligible developing
country or an international health organization.

SEC. 307. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECHNIQUES AND SYNDROME
SURVEILLANCE.

(a) In General.--In conjunction with the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and the Department of Defense, the Secretary
shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, support short
training courses in-country (not in the United States) for laboratory
technicians and other public health personnel from eligible developing
countries in laboratory techniques relating to the identification,
diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens responsible for possible
infectious disease outbreaks. Training under this section may be
conducted in overseas facilities of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention or in Overseas Medical Research Units of the Department of
Defense, as appropriate. The Secretary shall coordinate such training
courses, where appropriate, with the existing programs and activities
of the World Health Organization.
(b) Training in Syndrome Surveillance.--In conjunction with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of
Defense, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of
appropriations, establish and support short training courses in-country
(not in the United States) for public health personnel from eligible
developing countries in techniques of syndrome surveillance reporting
and rapid analysis of syndrome information using Geographic Information
System (GIS) and other Internet-based tools. Training under this
subsection may be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate
facilities as determined by the Secretary. The Secretary shall
coordinate such training courses, where appropriate, with the existing
programs and activities of the World Health Organization.

SEC. 308. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT.

(a) Authorization.--The President is authorized, on such terms and
conditions as the President may determine, to furnish assistance to
eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain public health
laboratory equipment described in subsection (b).
(b) Equipment Covered.--Equipment described in this subsection is
equipment that is--
(1) appropriate, where possible, for use in the intended
geographic area;
(2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify
expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including mutant
strains, which may cause disease outbreaks or may be used as a
biological weapon;
(3) compatible with general standards set forth, as
appropriate, by the World Health Organization and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, to ensure interoperability
with regional and international public health networks;
(4) necessary to secure and monitor pathogen collections
containing select agents; and
(5) not defense articles or defense services.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from
compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes).
(d) Limitation.--Funds made available to carry out this section
shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of
equipment that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred or
subject to special conditions under the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes).
(e) Host Country's Commitments.--The assistance provided under this
section shall be contingent upon the host country's commitment to
provide the resources, infrastructure, and other assets required to
house, maintain, support, secure, monitor, and maximize use of this
equipment and appropriate technical personnel.

SEC. 309. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
INFORMATION.

(a) Assistance for Purchase of Communication Equipment and
Information Technology.--The President is authorized to provide, on
such terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to
eligible developing countries for the purchase and maintenance of
communications equipment and information technology described in
subsection (b), and supporting equipment, necessary to effectively
collect, analyze, and transmit public health information.
(b) Covered Equipment.--Equipment (and information technology)
described in this subsection is equipment that--
(1) is suitable for use under the particular conditions of
the area of intended use;
(2) meets appropriate World Health Organization standards
to ensure interoperability with like equipment of other
countries and international health organizations; and
(3) is not defense articles or defense services.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from
compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes).
(d) Limitation.--Funds made available to carry out this section
shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of
equipment that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the
Arms Export Control Act or likely be barred or subject to special
conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes).
(e) Assistance for Standardization of Reporting.--The President is
authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President
may determine, technical assistance and grant assistance to
international health organizations to facilitate standardization in the
reporting of public health information between and among developing
countries and international health organizations.
(f) Host Country's Commitments.--The assistance provided under this
section shall be contingent upon the host country's commitment to
provide the resources, infrastructure, and other assets required to
house, support, maintain, secure, and maximize use of this equipment
and appropriate technical personnel.

SEC. 310. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO UNITED STATES
MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) In General.--Upon the request of a United States chief of
diplomatic mission or an international health organization, and with
the concurrence of the Secretary, the head of a Federal agency may
assign to the respective United States mission or organization any
officer or employee of the agency occupying a public health position
within the agency for the purpose of enhancing disease and pathogen
surveillance efforts in developing countries.
(b) Reimbursement.--The costs incurred by a Federal agency by
reason of the detail of personnel under subsection (a) may be
reimbursed to that agency out of the applicable appropriations account
of the Department of State if the Secretary determines that the
relevant agency may otherwise be unable to assign such personnel on a
non-reimbursable basis.

SEC. 311. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES
ABROAD.

(a) In General.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of
Defense shall each--
(1) increase the number of personnel assigned to
laboratories of the Centers or the Department, as appropriate,
located in eligible developing countries that conduct research
and other activities with respect to infectious diseases; and
(2) expand the operations of those laboratories, especially
with respect to the implementation of on-site training of
foreign nationals and regional outreach efforts involving
neighboring countries.
(b) Cooperation and Coordination Between Laboratories.--Subsection
(a) shall be carried out in such a manner as to foster cooperation and
avoid duplication between and among laboratories.
(c) Relation to Core Missions and Security.--The expansion of the
operations of overseas laboratories of the Centers or the Department
under this section shall not--
(1) detract from the established core missions of the
laboratories; or
(2) compromise the security of those laboratories, as well
as their research, equipment, expertise, and materials.

SEC. 312. ASSISTANCE FOR REGIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS AND EXPANSION OF
FOREIGN EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS.

(a) Authority.--The President is authorized, on such terms and
conditions as the President may determine, to provide assistance for
the purposes of--
(1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting capabilities
of the World Health Organization and existing regional health
networks; and
(2) developing new regional health networks.
(b) Expansion of Foreign Epidemiology Training Programs.--The
Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to establish new
country or regional Foreign Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible
developing countries.

SEC. 313. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

(a) In General.--Of the funds appropriated to the Department of
State for fiscal year 2004, up to $35,000,000 may be used to carry out
this title.
(b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available under
subsection (a)--
(1) $25,000,000 may be used to carry out sections 306, 307,
308, and 309;
(2) $500,000 may be used to carry out section 310;
(3) $2,500,000 may be used to carry out section 311; and
(4) $7,000,000 may be used to carry out section 312.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall, in conjunction with
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of
Defense, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing--
(1) a description of the implementation of programs under
this title that has been undertaken or is planned; and
(2) an estimate of the level of funding required to carry
out those programs at a sufficient level.

TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER NAVAL VESSELS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES.

(a) Authority To Transfer by Grant.--The President is authorized to
transfer vessels to foreign countries on a grant basis under section
516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321(j)) as
follows:
(1) The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigate
USS GEORGE PHILIP (FFG 12) to the Government of Bahrain.
(2) The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigate
USS SIDES (FFG 14) to the Government of Portugal.
(b) Authority To Transfer by Sale.--The President is authorized to
transfer the SPRUANCE class destroyer FLETCHER (DD 992) to the
Government of Chile on a sales basis under section 21 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761).
(c) Grants Not Counted Against Aggregate Value of Transferred
Excess Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another
country on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j) pursuant to authority provided by
subsection (a) shall not be counted for the purposes of subsection (g)
of that section in the aggregate value of excess defense articles
transferred to countries under that section in any fiscal year.
(d) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States
in connection with a transfer authorized to be made on a grant basis
under subsection (a) shall be charged to the recipient (notwithstanding
section 516(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (2 U.S.C.
2321j(e)(1))).
(e) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--To the
maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition
of the transfer of a vessel under this section, that the country to
which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of
that country, performed at a shipyard located in the United States,
including a United States Navy shipyard.
(f) Expiration of Authority.-- The authority to transfer a vessel
under this section shall expire at the end of the 2-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN OBSOLETE OR SURPLUS DEFENSE ARTICLES IN
THE WAR RESERVE STOCKPILES FOR ALLIES TO ISRAEL.

(a) Transfers for Concessions.--
(1) Authority.--Notwithstanding section 514 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may
transfer to Israel, in exchange for concessions to be
negotiated by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of
the Secretary, any or all of the items described in paragraph
(2).
(2) Covered items.--The items referred to in paragraph (1)
are armor, artillery, automatic weapons ammunition, missiles,
and other munitions that--
(A) are obsolete or surplus items;
(B) are in the inventory of the Department of
Defense;
(C) are intended for use as reserve stocks for
Israel; and
(D) as of the date of enactment of this Act, are
located in a stockpile in Israel.
(b) Value of Concessions.--The value of concessions negotiated
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be at least equal to the fair market
value of the items transferred. The concessions may include cash
compensation, services, waiver of charges otherwise payable by the
United States, and other items of value.
(c) Advance Notification of Transfers.--Not later than 30 days
before making a transfer under the authority of this section, the
President shall transmit a notification of the proposed transfer to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committees on International Relations and Armed Services of the
House of Representatives. The notification shall identify the items to
be transferred and the concessions to be received.
(d) Expiration of Authority.--No transfer may be made under the
authority of this section more than 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.

Calendar No. 390

108th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 1864

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A BILL

To enhance the security of the United States and United States allies.

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November 17, 2003

Read the second time and placed on the calendar