A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that one of the most grave threats facing the United States is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to underscore the need for a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this threat, and to set forth basic principles that should underpin this strategy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, in a few moments, I will send an amendment to the desk. Before I do so, I will make some general comments on the Moscow Treaty which is before the Senate.

I first wish to congratulate and commend our good friends from Indiana and Delaware for their great work on this treaty. As on so many other issues, they have worked together well in the national interest. The document which is before us, as well as the Resolution of Ratification, represents a lot of significant work on their part. I applaud them for it.

The treaty before us is a modest but a positive step in the United States-Russia relationship. It is particularly important we have this treaty. At some point it was suggested the agreement not be in the form of a treaty. As a matter of fact, the administration finally decided--I think wisely so, and I believe with the support of the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--that we have a legally binding treaty rather than relying on unilateral steps that are not binding on future administrations and can be easily changed.

Having a treaty ensures that the Senate is going to be able to fulfill its constitutional role, giving due consideration of any treaty and providing advice and consent before ratification.

I view this treaty as a starting point for further nuclear arms reductions and a useful boost to our new and developing and evolving relationship with Russia. There is much more work to be done to continue to improve our mutual security with Russia, and that work includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence, transparency, and cooperation with Russia on nuclear weapon matters.

This treaty, while important, is also somewhat unusual. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between

1,700 and 2,200 some 10 years from now. There are no gradual steps. It is just at a moment in time, 10 years from now, that level of between 1,700 and 2,200 must be reached. It could be a reduction in the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads for a very brief period, providing 10 years from the date of ratification that level is reached, and then the treaty expires.

Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does not require reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems. In fact, it does not require the elimination of a single warhead. Under this treaty, both sides can simply remove warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free to keep every warhead so removed and to store these warheads indefinitely for possible redeployment. The only limitations that will bind the United States and Russia are the limitations on nuclear weapon delivery systems under START I, and that is at least until 2009.

After December 5, 2009, when the START I treaty is scheduled to expire, it is not clear what will happen. At least in the case of START I, the delivery systems must be destroyed.

As the Senate fulfills its constitutionally mandated role in the treaty process and considers whether to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, there are a number of questions about the proper role of the Senate in the treaty-making process. These are questions to which I know our managers--our chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--have given a great deal of time, attention, and thought, and many others in the Senate have as well.

Some of these questions are as follows:

Do we want to agree to ratify a treaty if the executive branch does not clearly commit itself to submitting a substantive change in that treaty as an amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent? And do we want to approve a treaty where there is doubt that the executive branch could extend or withdraw from the treaty without even notifying or consulting with the Senate, without that guarantee, that commitment being written into a Resolution of Ratification?

These are highly significant questions that apply to the treaty- making power and to the advice and consent power of the United States. I want to address those issues in the amendments that I have to offer this afternoon.

The first amendment deals specifically with the question of whether the Resolution of Ratification should provide that the Senate must be notified and consulted prior to the withdrawal from that treaty or the agreement to extend that treaty by the President of the United States.

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that this treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

Paragraph 3 of article 4 states:

Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may

withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to

the other Party.

These are somewhat unusual provisions, as are the administration's statements about them. Previously, extending a treaty was considered something that would require Senate advice and consent.

In the seminal study written in 2001 by the Congressional Research Service for the Foreign Relations Committee called ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,'' the issue of extending treaties is clearly presented:

Modifying and extending an international agreement amount

to the making of a new agreement that should be done by the

same method as the original agreement. For treaties, this

means with the advice and the consent of the Senate.

In its article-by-article analysis of the Moscow Treaty, the administration asserts that ``Extension of the Treaty is not automatic and must be done by agreement of the parties.''

The article-by-article analysis continues, with the administration writing:

Since such an extension is authorized by Treaty, it would

constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would

accordingly not be subject to Senate advice and consent.

That is the extension issue.

On the matter of treaty withdrawal, the administration's article-by- article analysis states:

Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal

clause is not tied to a party's determination that

extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national

interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more

general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each

party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

So the withdrawal clause permits either party to withdraw from the treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest.

The Resolution of Ratification addresses this issue of withdrawal or extension with a declaration numbered 6, which:

Urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to

taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article IV of

the treaty.

So the resolution before us, and before my amendment is considered, simply urges the President--it is precatory language that says, Mr. President, we urge you, whether it is you or your successor, to consult with the Senate prior to taking the actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3, the extension or the withdrawal from a treaty.

The declaration urges the President to consult with the Senate, but it does not protect the interests of the Senate because it is not binding. A President--this President or his successor--could simply decide to extend or withdraw from this treaty without notice or consultation with the Senate.

The U.S. should not either enter into a treaty or withdraw from a treaty lightly and either action--either entering into a treaty, withdrawing from a treaty, or extending a treaty's operations--should be done only with the involvement of the Senate. We have to give our advice and consent to permit ratification in the first place.

We, the Members of this Senate, have the responsibility to assure that involvement. That constitutional responsibility rests in our hands, and we should not leave that constitutional mandate and responsibility up to the discretion of the executive branch. We want the executive branch to consult, and we are going to urge them to consult in a Resolution of Ratification. The question is whether we are going to require that resolution. Barring some circumstances, which I will describe in a minute, we are going to require a chief executive to consult with this body, to give us notice, and to consult, not to seek ratification--that is a second-degree amendment which my friend from Wisconsin will be offering in a moment--but the proposal in my amendment is that we simply require there be notice and consultation of the Senate before there is withdrawal from a treaty which we have ratified, or extension of a treaty which we have ratified. That is the least we can do. That is a middle course, short of saying we have to ratify an extension or withdrawal, which I think is also an appropriate course of action which has been much debated over the years. Short of that, which it seems to me is a matter which is going to be of some debate between the executive and legislative branch, I think a middle course, which we all ought to be able to agree upon, is that a Resolution of Ratification require there be notice to the Senate so we can exercise whatever action we decide to take at that point--no guarantee that we would have to ratify it before it actually occurs but assurance we will be given notice and an opportunity to give our advice, or take whatever action we want, prior to the withdrawal from a treaty or prior to the life of the treaty being extended.

The amendment I am going to be offering is very straightforward. I do not know if this amendment is at the desk. If not, I will send it on behalf of myself, Senator Feingold, and Senator Akaka, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

I will explain it at this point. This amendment is straightforward. It says that prior to taking any action to extend or withdraw from this treaty, the President shall provide not less than 60 days' notice to the Senate and shall consult with the Senate.

Now, what happens if there is some national security need which prevents the President from providing such notice or consultation? The amendment foresees that possibility and has a waiver provision in case there is some unforeseen national security need that would prevent the President from immediately requiring to notify and consult with the Senate. So there is considerable flexibility given to the President if it is needed for national security reasons.

There has been a lot written about whether or not the Senate must actually ratify a withdrawal from a treaty. There has been much debate on that subject. In a Congressional Research treatise on treaties, written in 1993 and then republished more recently with the same language, this is what the Research Service says about the issue of withdrawal from a treaty and the Senate role in that process, that the U.S. Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. The matter is not discussed in the debates of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Briefly:

While the Constitution tells us who can make treaties, the

President shall have the power, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, to make treaties.

It does not say who can unmake them. As a consequence of the Constitution's silence in this regard, there has been some confusion of doctrine upon this point and a variety in practice.

A little later on in this study, the Congressional Research Service says the same: Whether the President alone can terminate a treaty's domestic effect remains an open question. As a practical matter, however, the President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect. The same result may apply to a congressional termination, particularly if it is regarded as a declaration of war.

So according to the Congressional Research Service, the issue of whether the President alone can terminate a treaty is an open question. This amendment does not intend to resolve that question. A second- degree amendment, however, will be offered which will address that issue. My amendment does not. My amendment simply says--and it seems to me this is a very modest amount of protection for the Senate's constitutional responsibility in the treaty-making process--unless there is some national security reason why you cannot give notice to the Senate that you are intending to withdraw or extend the treaty, give us 60 days' notice so we can take whatever action we deem is appropriate, so we can give consultation and advice on the question of withdrawal or extension. It does not prevent the administration from extending or withdrawing from the treaty. It does not--``it'' being my amendment--require Senate approval of extension, even though that is the policy and practice to date often as elaborated by that study.

It does not require Senate approval of withdrawal from a treaty. It simply says the President shall notify and consult with the Senate before extending or withdrawing from the treaty.

This amendment is consistent with what the Foreign Relations Committee wrote in its report about the treaty relative to the issue of consultation on arms control treaties. It is a very thorough report. The committee that we have before us, on page 22, says the following:

The Senate and this committee have an institutional

interest in the close observation of arms control

negotiations and the successful implementation of resulting

agreements. Past administrations have recognized that

consultations with the Senate prior to taking actions

relating to assigning, amending, or withdrawing from such

agreements may avert serious disagreements.

On the specific question of withdrawal, the committee report says: Should it become necessary for a party to withdraw from the treaty, article 4 provides for 3 months' notice of such a decision. Events can well occur between submissions of the annual report required in condition 2 that would warrant informing and consulting with the Senate. In any circumstance, the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

So the parties, the two countries involved, must give each other 3 months' notice prior to the withdrawal. But relative to the Senate, the report simply says the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

I could not agree more with that statement: ``desire.'' But it is not enough to say we desire a consultation. If we are going to protect the constitutional responsibilities of this body, we must assure our constitutional responsibility and the operation of treaties is going to be protected and our role under the Constitution is, in fact, honored-- not just honored in the breach but in the actual life of the treaty. I believe this is the minimum we should do.

We should write into our Resolution of Ratification a requirement in the absence of some national security reason that the President, whoever the President might be at the time, do give us the notice and give us the opportunity to take whatever action or consult as we deem might be appropriate relative to the issue of withdrawal or extension of this treaty prior to the administration making that decision giving that notice to the other party to this treaty.

The amendment is consistent with what the administration says it is willing to do. Secretary Powell stated: While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.

That is a welcome statement of intent. We should incorporate that assurance. We should enshrine that assurance. We should embody that assurance. Intentions and administrations change. The obligation of this body to the Constitution endures. It is a solemn responsibility. It does not change. The intention of the President or a new President with new intentions changes. Language of the Constitution, relative to what this body's responsibility is relevant to treaties, is unchanging.

This amendment simply requires notification and consultation which Secretary Powell and the committee indicate they want and would expect would happen. It simply assures that, in fact, in the absence of some national security need, which is unexpected, which would permit a waiver of the notice requiring that a President would notify this body before withdrawal or extension of a treaty would occur.

The committee report concludes that: Declaration (6), while not binding on the President, is a formal request that the executive branch maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of State's answer to the question--which I gave above that the administration intends to discuss. That is what the committee report says Declaration (6) provides, which is in the Resolution of Ratification. It is a request to the executive branch. That is not strong enough in terms of our obligations to the Constitution and to our responsibility relative to the treaty-making power.

If we want to really assure what we are requesting is, in fact, part of the operation of this treaty, we should include in this Resolution of Ratification a condition which my amendment offers, which is that the President would

do what the committee said it really wants and really desires and really urges, to use the words of the report, and that is to notify, consult with the Senate prior to taking action to withdraw from or extend a treaty.

I yield the floor.

Let me thank my colleagues for their comments. Some of what they say frankly amazes me and startles me.

How the administration could possibly walk away from this treaty because a Resolution of Ratification contains the requirement that they give us 60 days' notice before withdrawing, when in fact they say they are intending to give us that notice, amazes me. The administration has represented to the Senate by Secretary Powell that it is their intention to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress. That is their intention.

How it can be suggested they are going to walk away from a treaty which simply puts into our ratification resolution and embodies what they intend to do, anyway, is a complete mystery to me. It raises the question, are they serious about that intention? Can't we take them seriously? Can't we assure ourselves that maybe the next administration, because it might not have the same intention, should be bound by us? Do we have to leave this requirement to give notice of withdrawal from a treaty up to the absolute discretion of an executive branch? That is not protecting the constitutional role and requirement and obligation and responsibility of the Senate.

The question was raised by my dear friend from Delaware about what the word ``consult'' means in the amendment. It means the same thing as in the language which the Foreign Relations Committee has given us. In declaration 6 of the resolution, it says the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate. We define ``consult'' in the way the Foreign Relations Committee defines it.

I am happy to.

That is the important difference. But the word is the same word.

The important fact is it is not binding.

That is what it comes down to. This is not an issue as to who has the power to withdraw from a treaty. Both the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Delaware make arguments about that issue. That is not resolved in this amendment. Both of their remarks address that issue, as did my remarks. I am the first one to acknowledge that as a matter of fact the Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. That is the quote I used before that came from the Congressional Research Service. The Constitution is silent. There has not been a resolution of this issue.

There is the Goldwater case that can be interpreted as the Senator from Delaware did. We do not resolve that issue in this amendment. This amendment does not remove from the President, nor does it purport to remove from the President, the power to terminate or extend a treaty. That issue is a major constitutional issue.

I cannot believe, and I did not hear that either of our colleagues suggested, that there is a constitutional problem with my amendment because my amendment does not require the President to get the advice and consent of the Senate to withdraw from the treaty. My amendment simply says: Before you exercise your right to withdraw, give 60 days' notice to the Senate. I don't think there is the slightest constitutional infirmity in simply providing what the President says he intends to do and what the committee says is desirable be done in the language of the committee ratification resolution, that we urge a formal request that the executive branch consult with the Senate of the United States.

There is no constitutional issue with my amendment. With the Senator from Wisconsin's second-degree amendment, which has been withdrawn, there was a very serious constitutional issue, one which we could spend days on in the Senate, as to whether or not we can require in a ratification resolution that the President obtain our consent to the withdrawal from a treaty. That is a major, massive constitutional issue. That one has resonated around the country for a couple hundred years. That was not going to be resolved in this Resolution of Ratification. I hope some day it is resolved in a lengthy debate.

But what I am proposing is simply the most modest step to give some protection to the obligation and responsibility of this institution relative to treaty-making power, which is that we just be given notice, 60 days' notice, and consultation prior to a decision of

the President to withdraw from a treaty.

I have not heard today, and I don't believe that there is, a serious argument that my amendment raises constitutional issues. As a matter of fact, almost by definition, it cannot, since the President says he is intending to consult with us and since the committee says it is desirable that he do so.

I have not heard that argument. Again, I don't believe it could be a serious argument, that we could simply not do what this amendment does, which is to require that there be 60 days' notice and consultation.

But how the suggestion could be made that the President would walk away from this treaty if the Resolution of Ratification contains language that embodies what the intention of the administration is to do anyway, and what the committee is urging the administration to do anyway, is a complete mystery to me. That one befuddles me--the idea that this administration, which has proposed and signed this treaty, would walk away from the treaty if the Senate says in a ratification resolution that the administration will give us the same notice that the administration says it intends to give us. That one, it seems to me, is not a credible argument.

So there is going to be disagreement as to whether or not the Senate has the power to put in a ratification resolution a provision that the President must, before extension or withdrawal, get the approval of the Senate. If that were part of my amendment, I could understand why there would be a massive debate over that issue--mainly between the White House, which I think would say no way, and many Members of the Senate would say that is the only way we can protect the constitutional obligation of the Senate. But that is not this amendment. That was the Feingold amendment, which was withdrawn.

This amendment walks a middle road and says we want to get a commitment in this resolution that we be given the notice and consultation which the administration says it intends to give us. It cannot bind future administrations. This administration--I don't have any doubt--intends to do what it says it intends to do. Secretary Powell says he intends to give notice. I take him at his word. He is an honorable man. But administrations come and go and intentions change with future administrations. That is the relevance of this amendment-- to put in our ratification resolution what the committee says is desirable, and what the committee says it urges the administration to do, and what the administration says it intends to do, and about which I have not heard a constitutional argument, for good reason, because here we are not limiting the power of the President to withdraw from a treaty.

The President has the same power to withdraw from a treaty before or after my amendment is defeated or accepted. That power doesn't change. What changes, however, with this amendment, would be to say that the Senate, as part of its treaty obligation and responsibility, wants to be informed prior to the withdrawal from or extension of a treaty that the executive branch enters into.

That is, again, a summary of the amendment. I hope, even though obviously the leaders of the Foreign Relations Committee oppose this for the reasons they give--and I don't think there are two Members of the Senate for whom I have greater respect than these two Members. We have worked together on these issues. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and I have worked together on so many issues over the years that I have lost count. My respect and regard for them is boundless. But I think this is an issue of important principle that the Senate should address--whether or not we want to be given notice before a President withdraws from this treaty that we are about to ratify, hopefully.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Will the Senator yield for a question?

This is a procedural inquiry. We are trying to determine-- to assist a colleague who has an urgent, unusual need--if we can set a time on this amendment at 4:05; would that be amenable? I hate to interrupt my friend.

That is what is difficult. The earlier we are able to set a time, the earlier we will be able to vote. If we set it 10 minutes from now, it would have to be 4:15 instead of 4:05.

Mr. President, I believe the yeas and nays have not been ordered. I modify my amendment by striking the word ``any'' on line 5 and striking the word ``relevant'' on line 5 and substituting the word ``pursuant'' for the word ``relevant'' on line 5. The modification is at the desk.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Kennedy be added as a cosponsor to the amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, I expect to take just a few minutes. I will be offering an amendment and then having a colloquy. I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Daschle, Senator Akaka, and Senator Nelson of Florida.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, condition 2 of the Resolution of Ratification requires the President to submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee an annual report that would include, among other things, the following: A, a listing of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year; B, a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year.

The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that those elements of the report should include certain important information on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

I have discussed this matter with Senators Lugar and Biden, and I think we can address the issue satisfactorily with a colloquy between myself and Senators Lugar and Biden.

My question of Senator Lugar is the following: Will the committee urge the administration to include under the annual reporting requirements required by conditions 2(a) and 2(b), that the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services would receive information on the following: During the calendar year of the report, the specific number and type of warheads that are planned to be no longer operationally deployed; secondly, during that current calendar year, the planned total size and makeup of the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads by number and by type; and as to the past year, the report would then, hopefully, include and be urged to include by Senators Lugar and Biden the total number and type of any warheads that were dismantled during the preceding calendar year?

I thank both Senators for the assurance that they will urge the administration that the reporting provided for under the Resolution of Ratification would hopefully include the information I have just outlined.

Amendment No. 256, Withdrawn

Mr. President, I now withdraw the amendment.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I do so reluctantly because of my high regard for the Senator and his work on arms control, which has been indefatigable. His wisdom I respect.

As a rule, we are on the same side. I, however, wish to oppose the amendment for the reasons I will relate in this testimony. I read, in my opening statement yesterday, words that the Foreign Relations Committee addressed to this issue in the Resolution of Ratification. The Senator has referenced that fact.

It was drafted by us in an attempt to address concerns put forward by the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Wisconsin, and others regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause contained in article 4.

Our text is based on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

It is worth repeating, especially in light of the amendment offered today, the answer Secretary Powell submitted for the record on the issue of treaty withdrawal. The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary:

What role will the Congress have in any decision to

withdraw from this treaty?

Will the administration agree to at least consult closely

with this committee--

That is the Foreign Relations Committee--

before making any such decision?

The Secretary responded:

While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the

administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from

the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee prior to announcing any such action.

This was a carefully considered answer of Secretary Powell for the record.

Past Senate consideration of this issue has resulted in the view that one of the bases on which a President may terminate a treaty without congressional participation is when a decision to withdraw is taken in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. The Moscow Treaty, as it stands, provides for this.

I am aware of Senators' concerns and arguments about the need to insert the Senate into the process. Many of the arguments we have heard about withdrawal stem from President Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. That decision was taken in full compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty. The President made no secret about his desire to do so, and Congress held innumerable hearings and public statements about the need to take the action.

I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives. The process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the issue of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven of these treaties were multilateral, all of them terminated by the President.

Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona challenged President Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated.

The White House legal adviser has long argued that the President is the principal spokesman of the Nation in foreign affairs, and restrictions on that power have been strictly construed. Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envision such a role for the Senate.

Proponents of a senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot, on his own authority, terminate a treaty because it is the law of the land. Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

Historically, there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided:

Notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a

concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

On that occasion, the Vice President of the United States, Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers, a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. The resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century--I might say, until today.

Beyond the legal issues that underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that article 4 differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires 3 months' notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out the START treaty allows the parties to withdraw after giving 6 months' notice, and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest.''

The withdrawal clause is reflective of the changed nature of our relationship with Russia, not a desire to rob the Senate of its role in the treaty-making process. As the administration's article-by-article analysis sent to the Senate with the treaty states--this is the analysis by the administration as it submits the treaty:

Unlike some other arms control agreements, the withdrawal

clause is not tied to a Party's determination that

extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national

interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more

general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each

Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

Indeed, as we have related in this debate, the Moscow Treaty arose from a desire on the part of the United States unilaterally to destroy its nuclear weapons and likewise a similar desire by the Russians. Finding these coincident interests, they have joined in this treaty; nevertheless, there is no timetable. Some critics have pointed out that the nature of this treaty is substantially different. It is one that comes from the volition of the two without specific verification procedures.

I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.- Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

In sum Mr. President, I was hopeful that our resolution of ratification would have resolved this issue. For the benefit of the Senate let me again read the text of our resolution of ratification.

Given the Senate's continuing interest in the Treaty and in

continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest

possible levels consistent with national security

requirements and alliance obligations of the United States,

the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate

prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 or

Article IV of the Treaty.

This text was negotiated closely with Administration officials with the goal of striking a compromise that would preserve Senate prerogatives while not infringing upon the power provided to the President by the Constitution. I believe we succeeded in doing so.

For these reasons, I oppose the amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, again, I will simply say that in our Resolution of Ratification--and this is what we have before the Senate now:

Given the Senate's continuing interest in the treaty and in

continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest

possible levels consistent with national security

requirements and the alliance obligation of the United

States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the

Senate prior to taking action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3

of article 4 of the treaty.

It seems to me the language is clear. We have spelled it out. In addition, we have had testimony and have queried Secretary Powell regarding his interpretation of the role of the Congress, and he has assured us that there would be consultation.

Yes.

Yes, that would be very satisfactory. In fact, I even will propose a time sooner than that if that is in the realm of the possible.

Let me make a proposal and, in fact, offer a unanimous consent at this time to that effect.

I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Levin amendment No. 252 occur at 4:05 today, and that the time until then be equally divided in the usual form; further, that no second-degree amendments be in order prior to the vote.

I thank the Senator from Michigan for that suggestion.

I will conclude by indicating that the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Wisconsin proposed a serious constitutional issue. At the initiation of this debate, I indicated that this is not a settled law. I also argue that this is not the treaty on which to attempt to settle. There has been precedent--at least in terms of activity that both the distinguished Senator from Delaware and I have decided. I pointed out 30 treaties terminated by the President since 1980. This is a lot of treaties. That has been the regular practice.

I referred to a debate on this issue indicated in 1919 on the Versailles Treaty on which the Vice President of the United States addressed the Senate. The Senate did not come up with a two-thirds vote to change the fact that the Constitution is silent.

I accept the fact that the Senator from Michigan pointed out at some point in our history--and I think the Senator from Delaware made the same point--we may want to have this debate, but I hope not on this treaty at this time, given the assurance by the Secretary of State, and likewise by the committee, in our article 4 to this treaty.

For the benefit of Senators, there are about 26 minutes left and, essentially, we will leave it to the Chair how that should be divided.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum equally divided.

Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 254

Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about our mutual quest and support.

I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non- proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems, materials, and expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material.

Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty.

Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I believe that this information already is provided as part of the overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as well as five-year cost estimates.

I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the Defense authorization bill.

Mr. President, let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts by reviewing, once again, the origins of the Moscow Treaty. At the time that President Putin and President Bush met in May of last year, Russia had made the decision that the distinguished Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergei Ivanov, announced that the Russians would be destroying warheads in a matter of course, dismantling them from missiles. President Bush had indicated that as a matter of fact, unilaterally, the United States was prepared to do the same. For a variety of reasons--some economic, some safety--both countries had decided upon a course of action. When the two Presidents came together to formulate their joint announcement, the Moscow Treaty was formed.

As has been pointed out, first it was not clear that a treaty would be formulated, but ultimately both leaders decided that was the best course. That is why the treaty is simple. It, clearly, does not cover all of the objectives of arms control that can be covered in further negotiations, and many of us hope there will be further negotiations, not only in the nuclear area but in the biological area where in the course of this we have pointed out there is still a lack of transparency on the part of the Russians, as we perceive it at certain military facilities.

In the case of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts as a way of shoring up a treaty that he has criticized, let me say that the major verification procedure now in place is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, very specifically. At Surovatika, Senators and Members of the House have witnessed four missiles coming into that plant each month. They are destroyed. Clearly, the warheads have been separated from the missiles prior to that destruction. That four-a-month situation is going to continue unless for reasons of our own parliamentary procedure we stop the funding.

Clearly, you can verify the missiles. In my last visit to the site, I was accompanied by the governor of the territory, the mayors of various towns and radio stations in Russia. Why? Because this is a jobs issue. Russians employ people destroying missiles. Nothing very secret about it; they are swarming around. A television station from Indianapolis, channel 13, accompanied me on that occasion, took pictures of the entire process and put it on a remarkable documentary on Indianapolis television.

We need to catch up with where verification is in the world. It is on the ground, with Americans working in cooperative threat reduction with Russians.

The missiles that come in are interchangeable SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS- 19s. We visited with plant officials about their further planning on SS-24s and 25s. This is the comprehensive scope of what we are talking about. These are, in fact, the missiles on which the warheads were located and from which they have been separated.

In a future treaty the United States and Russia may decide they wish to go much further with regard to the destruction of the warheads themselves. That point has been made by many Senators that the treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads. But, in fact, warheads are being destroyed by Russia and by the United States.

In terms of both of our countries, we have decided not to have transparency to the point that both nations are inspecting that process, but we are able to verify the results. I point out that the intelligence report that perhaps the Senator is calling for may be covered in large part by the cooperative threat reduction annual report to Congress. This one is for fiscal year 2002, a detailed summary not only of nuclear dismantlement and demolition but, likewise, anything we are doing in chemical and biological, too.

I admit there are areas, as I have said earlier, that we are not into yet, and we wish we were. My hope is we will be successful as two nations in seeing eye to eye on movement in that direction.

When it comes, however, to the verification of this Moscow Treaty, it flows from the fact that both nations of their own will want to destroy the missiles and separate the warheads and thus reduce the viability of these situations. We have indicated at our own time, at our own speed, we will do that. And the linchpin from the beginning, it seems to me, is the fact not only of the START requirements that do expire in 2009 but the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the ground which has no expiration unless Congress decides to terminate it. That is a different debate and a different set of decisions.

I am hopeful Senators will understand that. I appreciate the fervent plea for verifiability for all of us. As I say, I admit, I wish we had a better insight into the disposition of all of the warheads, but even here both Russians and Americans indicate in the fullness of time that these warheads have to be destroyed. In large part that is because sometimes the fuel components in them are unstable. They become a danger for the nation that is simply holding them.

This is not a sporting goods situation of inert matter on shelves. These, unfortunately, are far too living, viable, dynamic instruments. This is why we have worked with Russia on the fissile material that comes from the destruction of these warheads; to provide storage for that. It is a whole new set of problems.

Some arms control people have suggested that while the warhead is on the missile, you do not have the problem of fissile material that might get loose and be bought or sold. It is contained. That is still true while it is in the warhead. As it comes out of the warhead, a whole new set of problems is created--

of storage and of accountability. We are working with the Russians through our Department of Energy on these accountability projects, which are intense and vigorous.

For these reasons, I oppose the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I hope other Senators will oppose it. It appears to me to be unnecessary. I would say, simply, other criticisms of the treaty are certainly a matter of the opinion of the Senator, but it was a modest treaty. It came from the volition and the will of both countries coming together at their own time, at their own speed, and with procedures that seem to me to offer an adequate amount of verifiability, much of it on the site and through the eyes of the Russian press, as well as our own.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Kerry amendment, No. 255, occur at 5:40 today, and the time until then be equally divided in the usual form, provided that no further second-degree amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

Mr. President, I add one final argument, and that is the actual text of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts requires these intelligence reports on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation to the requirements of the treaty.

The treaty does not require insight into the warhead destruction. That is a desirable aim, and I have indicated in due course we may be able to negotiate that, but that is not a part of this treaty. Therefore, the report that is being asked for really asks for information that is not covered by the treaty.

I repeat, the information that is covered by the treaty, it seems to me, is really adequately monitored by the cooperative threat reduction personnel.

I yield the floor.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I am pleased to respond to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. Our report does not require information on those warheads that are not operationally deployed. We would urge the administration to provide this information.

During our hearings on the treaty, a number of witnesses expressed concern about the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. As the United States and Russia enter a new era of friendship and cooperation, we must take a close look at what we can do, in a safe and effective manner, to take nuclear weapons off alert status and prevent an accidental nuclear launch due to a false alarm or a miscalculation. I know our friend and former colleague Senator Sam Nunn expressed hope in our hearings that we might address the cold war-era nuclear postures of the United States and Russia as a critical next step following ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

The Senator from Delaware is correct, and while we have not determined precisely how to proceed, I expect that we will want to encourage action by the President before we move on our own. Such a measure could be offered as an amendment to major legislation such as the Department of State authorization bill.

I can say with confidence that Senator Biden and I are agreed that we should continue to pursue this initiative in ways that will provide productive results.

I share the concern voiced by the senior Senator from North Dakota on the potential proliferation threats posed by non- strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. As the Senator knows, the United States has voiced serious concerns about the safety and security of these dangerous weapons stored at multiple locations around Russia. I believe the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal represents an area of concern and needs attention.

I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his work on this important issue and his thoughtful invitation. I would ask that the Senator from North Dakota withhold his amendment with the understanding that the Foreign Relations Committee will make a serious effort to elevate the matter of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a top priority on our Nation's arms control and threat reduction agenda.

The ranking member and I have plans to hold hearings on the continued proliferation challenges in Russia. Clearly the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons would be an important topic to be discussed and investigated in that forum. I believe that tactical nuclear warhead reductions should be a top United States priority in our new relationship with Russia.

I thank the Senator for his thoughts. This issue was raised repeatedly during our hearings on the Treaty. I am confident of the administration's efforts to engage Russia on this issue. I would be happy to reinforce the committee's views on these issues with the appropriate Administration officials.

My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has a statement.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Resolution of Ratification.

I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator Biden for his leadership and management of this treaty and to all Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the distinguished occupant of the Chair, and also Senators who contributed constructively to, I believe, a very important achievement.

I specifically mention staff Members who were most supportive and helpful: Tom Moore, Ed Levine, Jofi Joseph, Brian McKenan, Jason Hamm, Ken Myers, Sr., and Kenny Myers, Jr. We are appreciative of staff on both sides of the aisle for a remarkable piece of work.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, let me begin by saying I agree with the Senator from Michigan as well as my colleague from Wisconsin in that I believe--and, as the old joke goes, I have history to prove it--that the Senate has in the treaty power in the treaty clause of the U.S. Constitution an equal responsibility with the President of the United States.

As the old joke goes, if you want to learn a subject, teach it. For the last 10 years, I have been teaching a three-credit course at the Widener University Law School on Saturday mornings on separation of powers issues. In one of

the three parts of the course, ``What is treaty power? And who has what authority under the Constitution?'' I come down clearly on the side that the Senate has the authority to insist that any extension, or withdrawal, for that matter, from a treaty be confirmed by the Senate. We have a right to do that, I believe. But it is an open constitutional question.

I will, unless we are ready to go to a second amendment, be happy to take a few minutes and go through what I believe to be constitutional law and history on this point.

Let me cut through that for a moment and go to the place where I think it is not worth the fight on this particular treaty. I believe this treaty is so open ended and so, in some sense, amorphous and rests so much upon not merely the goodwill--I assume goodwill on the part of the administration--but on the intensity with which the administration believes this treaty should come to fruition that a provision that marginally increases the substance of the possibility of a substantive outcome which I support--which is getting down to 1,700 or below 2,200--that to jeopardize this treaty that rests on an awful lot on good faith over a genuinely serious constitutional fight which I think someday has to be resolved, that it is not worth the candle on this treaty and may in fact in turn, if we were to prevail--and I don't think we have the votes to prevail, but if we did prevail on this-- would be sufficient in my view for this administration to not pursue through the treaty mechanism this agreement.

I want to remind everybody, the administration made it clear from the outset that they did not want a treaty. They did not want to have to come back to us with this treaty.

Because of the steadfastness of Senator Helms, we agreed on the principle that we would insist that any agreement--we knew it was being negotiated in Moscow--be brought back before the Senate.

So my concern is that this agreement, which the administration unilaterally and bilaterally supports--that is, with the Russians or without the Russians, and they don't really much care what we think about it anyway, whether it be in terms of a treaty--that they would be prepared to walk away from this over a genuine, legitimate, significant, constitutional issue and debate.

White House Counsel in this administration and in Democratic administrations who have suggested that Senator Feingold, Senator Levin, and I are wrong about the prerogative of the Senate, I suggest, would be inclined to say to the President: You are going to do this anyway unilaterally--that is, move down to these ranges--you have said you are going to do it anyway; the treaty is so loose, it doesn't bind you much at all anyway; forget the treaty; just proceed on this course, and don't sign onto this principle on this fight.

I was asked by the press how I could not be willing to go to the wall on this issue since I was the guy who went to the wall that resulted in the so-called Biden condition on interpretation of treaties, which was initially added to the INF Treaty in 1988. There was a simple reason. There was a lot more at stake in that treaty in terms of the substantive impact upon the strategic balance and doctrine. We also had a circumstance where the administration very much wanted that treaty. And it was an opportunity to set in law, in principle, the principles of treaty interpretation.

So it was worth the fight, the stakes were high enough, and the administration was not likely to reject the underlying treaty if it passed, which it did. That is the practical distinction I would make.

But let me speak just another 5 minutes or so to the constitutional side of this argument. Although it is not specified in the Constitution, I believe there is a concurrent power both the President and the Senate have; and that is, the power with regard to the termination of a treaty.

Our history for over 200 years of practice is, though, decidedly mixed. At various times in our history, the Congress has directed or authorized the President to terminate a treaty.

On a few occasions, the Senate alone has done that, terminated a treaty. The President has terminated a treaty without prior congressional authorization but then received subsequent approval by the Congress and the Senate. And the President has terminated treaties unilaterally.

For example, Presidents have done so with several commercial treaties in the first half of the 20th century. President Lyndon Johnson gave notice of his intent to have the United States withdraw from a multilateral treaty on international aviation known as the Warsaw Convention. Although this notice was subsequently withdrawn, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty at issue, and did not challenge President Johnson's power to withdraw from it.

More recently, President Carter unilaterally terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in connection with diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. President Carter also gave notice of the termination of several other treaties, most related to immigration. President Clinton withdrew from multilateral agreements, including our membership in the United Nations's Industrial Development Organization.

The question of who has the power to terminate a treaty has never been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. President Carter's decision to terminate the Taiwan Treaty was challenged by several of our Republican colleagues, and that case reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision, though, does not provide much legal precedent, though perhaps it gives us some guidance as to how the Court might rule today.

In Goldwater v. Carter--that was the case about withdrawing from the Taiwan Treaty, when we recognized the People's Republic of China--the Supreme Court vacated a decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit, a decision which had affirmed the President's power to unilaterally terminate a treaty.

By vacating the lower court ruling, though, no legal precedent was left to stand. The Supreme Court decision commanded no majority. Four Justices invoked what I know my colleagues on the floor and the Presiding Officer fully understand; they invoked what is called the Political Question Doctrine and thereby decreed the case not a matter for the courts.

The fifth Justice held the case should not be before the Supreme Court because it was not ripe for judicial review.

The only Justice who addressed the merits of the case, Justice Brennan, held for the President's power in that case because he thought termination of the treaty with Taiwan was an act that necessarily flowed from the recognition of the People's Republic of China. He argued further that recognition power is clearly held by the President within the Constitution.

The leading scholarly authority on the subject, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, of which the noted scholar, Columbia Law Professor Lou Henkin was a chief reporter, states: ``The President has authority unilaterally to suspend or terminate'' a treaty ``in accordance with its terms, or to make the determination that would justify . . . terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by another party or because of supervening events.'' The Restatement concludes that this power of the President is based upon his constitutional power to conduct foreign relations.''

The Restatement concedes, however, that the Senate has concurrent authority, and it could circumscribe the President's power by conditioning its consent--which is what I understood in the withdrawn amendment by my friend from Wisconsin--by conditioning its consent to that treaty on a requirement that the termination clause only be exercised with the consent of the Senate, which I happen to think we have the power to do as well.

But without turning this into a seminar--which all of my colleagues understand this full well; I am not educating anybody on this floor as to something they do not already know--without going into any more of it, I believe the Senate has concurrent power it could exercise.

I believe there will come a treaty which is of such consequence that the Senate will determine it must exercise that power. But whether it is wise to do so as is done in the Levin-Feingold amendment is another matter, in my view.

In closing, I think Senators Levin and Feingold raise important legal and substantive concerns. I think it would prompt, in this case-- because it goes, in a sense, beyond this treaty the precedent we would be establishing--I think it would prompt--and obviously I don't know-- strong executive branch opposition, and all done at this point to make a legal point. No matter how much I agree with it, it is to make a legal point that does not substantively have much impact here. I think it is really better made for a treaty of more substance and consequence than this one.

Let me make it real clear what I mean by that. I do not want to belittle this treaty. I do not mean to imply it is of no value. But I think, quite frankly, if we are to go to the point to take this to the wall, and we were to pass this amendment--and I realize it has been changed now; it is not as consequential as both the Senators would have liked, because the Feingold provision has been withdrawn, and as much as I would like it if we were going to set down a principle here, I think the consequence of its passage, if it resulted in this administration walking away from this treaty, would do much more harm than any possible good could be done by our adopting this amendment.

The point made by the chairman is we are no worse off constitutionally on this unresolved, substantive issue because of the language unanimously added in the committee. So essentially what we are saying here--what I am saying here, and I think the chairman--and I am not suggesting he should associate himself with my remarks as to what the President's and the Senate's power is--but we are basically saying we have agreed to fight this fight another day on another treaty at another time.

How do you define in treaty language what ``consult'' means? In declaration 6, we use the term ``consult,'' but it needs much less specificity there because it is even more vague. So I think you build in confusion, difficult to define, in even adding the Levin language.

This is an uncomfortable position for me to be in, both intellectually and politically, to be not supporting this amendment. I want my colleagues to understand why. I want to make it clear, even though I agreed with the chairman that I would not, as the ranking member, support amendments beyond what we had agreed to in order to get this done, I want to make it clear to my Democratic colleagues, I am not in any way asking anyone to be bound by that. I am not trying to speak for the Democrats on that issue. I am giving my best advice as to how I think, for what it is worth, we can enhance the prospect that we really will, through this treaty, accomplish a momentum that relates to reducing the number of nuclear weapons each side has at its disposal.

And ultimately, hopefully by the provisions we have in some of the declarations, we will not stop at this treaty. We will not stop at this methodology. We will try to move on to everything, including tactical weapons at some point down the road.

That is my reasoning, for what it is worth. I am not going to support even the less constitutionally controversial provision of the Levin- Feingold amendment for the reasons I have stated.

I pledge to my colleagues, assuming I am around and assuming we have the opportunity, God willing, to be able to establish this principle on a really significant agreement that we make, a mutual agreement or multilateral agreement with other parties in the world that promotes everything from arms reduction to our interest, this fight has to be made at some point. I just don't think it is worth the candle on this at this moment.

I yield the floor.

If the Senator will yield.

The difference is the declaration is not binding.

It is the same word, but the need for precision in a nonbinding declaration is a lot less important, in a judicial sense, than it is in a binding provision. That is the only point I was making.

Yes.

Mr. President, I have a minor point, but the Record should be clarified. When I was referring to what my friend from Michigan said about the difference between the declaration and his condition--one being binding, one not--I referred to the word ``consult.'' It goes beyond that. The ambiguous language really is in the declaration. In his proposal is ``any action relevant'' to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 4 of the treaty, which is the action relevant to the extension or withdrawal--that is the language that was taken by him, properly so, from the declaration, and that is the part that is ambiguous, not the word ``consult.''

At any rate, it is a distinction without a great difference.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I will be very brief. Let me, as we say in this body, associate myself with the remarks of my colleague and say it in a slightly different way. The Senator is asking us to have the intelligence community monitor something that there is no capacity to monitor because there is no provision in the treaty requiring the monitoring. It is a little bit like saying we would like the President to report to us, on a yearly basis, the cost of the destruction or dismantling or taking off of alert or removing from a silo every missile that is removed by the Russians.

That would be great, but it is not in the treaty. There is no provision.

Regarding the ultimate criticism, the primary criticism the Senator from Massachusetts makes of the treaty is accurate. There is not much to this treaty. There is not much to it. As I said in my very long opening statement, the administration, when they testified before the committee, said: Look, we were going to do this anyway. We were going to do this anyway. So we told the Russians, in effect paraphrasing the Secretary of State, we told the Russians if you want to come along, come along; if you don't, you don't.

The whole rationale of this administration is the bet that the cold war is over, it is truly and forever behind us. I hope they are right. This treaty affords few protections in the event of a heightened mistrust that develops, or a crisis. It doesn't have any protections. So we are not kidding each other, between now and 2012 the Russians could go out, if they were capable of doing it financially, and build 10,000 more nuclear weapons. They could dig 40,000 more holes for silos, if they had the money. There is nothing in this treaty that prevents that.

I know we are all railing against what the treaty should have been; what, if we personally were negotiating it, we would have done. But, unfortunately, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, he has a tough call the rest of us must make. If you don't like what is in it, and there is a great deal that is not in it that we would like to have in it, vote against it. Vote against it. But you can't fix something that is not broken, in effect--the treaty has no verification. It has no requirement the warheads be destroyed. There is no requirement they be accounted for. There is no requirement that there, in fact, be any progress shown until December 31, 2012.

If you view all of these deficiencies as fatal flaws, then vote no, just flat vote no because you cannot fix them. You cannot fix them. The only way I think we could fix them is if we get the administration and Russia and the United States on a positive track here. We have them on a track. The track is that upon which we have agreed. As Sam Nunn said, this is a good-faith treaty. That is the bottom line.

The reason I am for this treaty is failure to ratify it, I believe, will be read as bad faith. Ratifying it demonstrates good faith, and our hortatory language--the message we have sent personally in terms of each individual Senator speaking to the administration--the language in our declarations and conditions and the amendments on the floor makes it clear to the administration that there is clearly a majority of Members of the Senate who would like to see more done. We are not criticizing what has been done. We just would like more done.

I understand the frustration. Believe me. I understand the frustration. The greatest concern--and I think we have taken care of it--is if, in fact, the Russians do not have the engineering and/or financial capability of meeting the commitment they have made to reduce their deployed forces, we will help them. That is the best thing we can do. That is what we have done.

I suggest we should support this treaty and we should oppose this amendment.

Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague, I am not sure whether condition 2 requires the executive branch to list force reductions or force levels by warhead types. But I certainly think it is a good idea to do so, and I would urge the administration to do so.

In addition, I think the administration should make a decision on warhead dismantlement. Quite frankly, my support for ratification of this treaty is based in part on the administration's assurance before our committee that at least some warheads removed under the treaty will be destroyed or dismantled, and I fully expect the administration to live up to this. So I think the Senator is making a very valid point.

Mr. President, I think that the new relationship between the United States and Russia can only be improved by taking nuclear weapons off alert status. By giving decision makers more time to react to disturbing information, this would lower the risk of a nuclear war caused by one side's mistaken belief that the other was attacking it. I am especially impressed, moreover, by the fact that Gen. Eugene Habiger, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command feels that the time has come to do this. I would note, however, that General Habiger warned that existing specific de-alerting proposals were often not viable.

The Foreign Relations Committee's report encourages the President to establish a commission of weapon system experts to undertake the review that General Habiger proposed. It adds that if the President does not do so, Congress could usefully act on its own, either to establish such a commission or, perhaps, to commission the National Academy of Sciences to set up such a group.

I agree with the Senator from North Dakota and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar. During hearings last year on the Treaty of Moscow now before the Senate, several of our distinguished witnesses mentioned Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile, including former Senator Nunn. The smaller size and greater number of these weapons puts them at higher risk for theft by, or illicit sale to, terror networks such as al-Qaida.

Let me echo the comments on the chairman. After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and non-proliferation objective of the United States Government. I look forward to joining the chairman in holding hearings on this matter and in writing to the administration with the Senators from Indiana and North Dakota. A comprehensive approach to this problem, as the senior Senator from North Dakota suggests, is sorely needed.

Madam President, I rise to express my support for the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty, which

was signed by President Bush and President Putin on May 24, 2002. This treaty is important because it signifies that Russia and the United States are committed to and cooperating on the reduction of nuclear weapons. It carries the weight of law and will remain in force for a decade. It is also important because it binds the United States and the Russian Federation to each reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012.

Presently, the United States has approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons and the Russian Federation has almost 5,500 nuclear weapons. The Moscow Treaty is a step forward, reducing the danger of large numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons. This treaty is a good step, but it is only a small step. Much more must be done. Russia entered into negotiations seeking a legally binding document that would limit strategic nuclear warheads, and in their words ``provide transparency and predictability'' by containing definitions, and counting and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Ultimately, Russia wanted to ensure that this process would be irreversible; in their words, that it would ensure the ``irreversibility of the reduction of nuclear forces.''

This administration, however, had different goals. Russia had to convince the United States to sign a legally binding document rather than a less formal exchange of letters. The United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would have required the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads, stating that it wanted flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. So while this treaty changes the status of some operationally deployed warheads, it does not require the dismantling of a single weapon. Once this treaty is fully implemented, the United States will still have approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons. There will just be more weapons in storage. And similarly, the Russians could have approximately 5,500 nuclear weapons, but they would be nonoperational according to the lines of this treaty.

The treaty does not bind either party to any schedule for deactivation. It only requires that cuts be completed by December 31, 2012, the day the treaty expires. This means that either side can stop or even reverse the reduction process over the decade as long as both parties comply by the final date of the treaty.

The treaty does not specifically address the problems of tactical nuclear weapons or MIRV'd ICBMs. The number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons is believed to be between 8,000 and 15,000, while the United States has approximately 2,000. Russian tactical nuclear weapons are subject to fewer safeguards and are more prone to theft and proliferation. These are the proverbial suitcase weapons, often discussed in the press, which are the ones that are most mobile, most difficult to trace and detect. And the treaty does not deal with these weapons at all.

In addition, the Moscow Treaty effectively ends START II, which I will discuss in more detail later, which means that Russia will likely keep its weapons MIRV'd, meaning they will have multiple warheads on their weapons. Since MIRV'd weapons are fewer and more vulnerable, it increases the perceived need for a first strike.

Another shortcoming of the Moscow Treaty is that it includes no verification procedures. START I verification procedures will remain in place until 2009. But there was never agreement between the parties about which, if any, procedures could be used in the Moscow Treaty. Discussion of verification procedures is supposed to continue, but the administration recently stated: We have determined that specific additional transparency measures are not needed and will not be sought at this time.

I also believe the treaty withdrawal provisions are too lax. Parties can withdraw from the Moscow Treaty with 3-months notice without giving any reason. This means a party needs no compelling reason to stop complying with the terms of this treaty.

Finally, the terms of this treaty must be met by December 31, 2012, but that is the day the treaty expires. It is possible that it could be extended, but another agreement would have to be reached to do that. On the other hand, it could also lapse so the parties could raise the numbers of operationally deployed warheads above 2,200 on January 1, 2013. In effect, they could go through the term of the treaty without significant reductions, let the treaty lapse, and nothing would have been affected by the treaty. I hope certainly that doesn't happen.

I commend my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden. They have done a remarkable job of adding some detail to the treaty.

The resolution we are considering today contains two important conditions. The first condition requires a report and recommendation on how cooperative threat reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to the efficient implementation of the treaty and maintain the security and accurate accounting of Russia's nuclear weapons and materiel. As I will discuss in detail later, the CTR program is the most effective tool to counter proliferation, and we must do all we can to maintain it.

Secondly, the resolution requires an annual implementation report which will include, among other items, a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels for both parties, a detailed description on strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current year, and how these reductions will be achieved, verification and transparency measures taken or proposed by each party, and actions taken or proposed to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the treaty.

There are also several nonbinding declarations, most of which request reports to Congress and encourage the President to continue to work to reduce nuclear weapons. These conditions and declarations make the treaty more substantial and, I believe, more effective.

I will support this treaty strengthened by this resolution. I want to say to the administration, however, that this is simply not enough. The rise of rogue nations and rogue nonstate actors, has made the threat of proliferation even more urgent. One of the legacies of the cold war is the abundance of nuclear weapons and fissionable material that is no longer under the clear control of the Russian Federation or other former states of the Soviet Union. Moreover, many of these nuclear weapons are housed in nations which are struggling economically and are susceptible to offers from rogue actors to acquire these materials.

As Graham Allison of Harvard, former dean at the Kennedy School, stated:

The single largest threat to American lives and liberties

going forward for the next decade is terrorism, particularly

terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The one that I

have been most concerned about is loose nukes.

We must do everything possible to counter proliferation through protection, containment, and interdiction. In 1991, former Senator Sam Nunn and Chairman Richard Lugar recognized the risk presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They created--history will record this--one of the most important initiatives that has been seen in this Senate, in this country in many years; that is, the counterproliferation program, the cooperative threat reduction program.

The programs they established in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, have had significant success in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through these programs, the United States has secured tons of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; helped deactivate, dismantle, or destroy thousands of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems; and helped provide employment for hundreds of Russian scientists and engineers with expertise in building nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, who otherwise might be tempted to sell their expertise to unfriendly nations or terrorist organizations. This is an extraordinary accomplishment, but so much needs to be done in addition.

Even though only about $1 billion of the $400 billion defense budget is annually allocated to support these programs, they have been among the most successful of all nonproliferation efforts undertaken by this country.

Given the success of the programs, it is difficult to understand why securing adequate funding has been a significant challenge in the Bush administration.

I also want to add my voice to those of my many colleagues who believe the United States and the international community are capable of doing, and must do, much more in this regard. Let me quote once again from the expert, Senator Lugar, who in his article in the December 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, said:

It is critical that the United States lead in establishing

a global coalition capable of exerting pressure on states to

cooperate with the safeguarding, accounting, and (where

possible) destruction of weapons and materials of mass

destruction. Given that a war is being contemplated with Iraq

over the question of their weapons programs, it is reasonable

to ask why more is not being done on a global scale to

control other proliferation risks.

I agree with the chairman. I also agree with his statement:

We must not only accelerate dismantlement efforts in

Russia, we must broaden our capability to address

proliferation risks elsewhere and build a global coalition to

support such efforts.

Clearly, undeniably, there is a lot of work to be done in these programs, not the least of which is to make up for time lost to these programs over the past 2 years.

The Bush administration put most of the nonproliferation programs on hold during fiscal year 2001, in order to conduct a review to determine the validity of the programs. Luckily, most of the programs survived the review, and some were even strengthened; but little progress was made as very little work was done during this yearlong review.

Then, at the completion of the review, the fiscal year 2002, and all previous years, funds for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program were frozen for over a year because the Bush administration failed to make the required certification to spend the money.

Just recently, these funds have been released as a result of waiver authority included in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Act. This is waiver authority that the Republicans in the other body wanted to severely restrict and limit to 1 year, but luckily, in the end, the Senate was able to prevail and provide an unrestricted waiver for 3 years.

These two events, the program review and the inability to certify, effectively stopped the Nunn-Lugar programs for approximately 2 years. The effectiveness of some of these programs has clearly been inhibited, if not damaged. The challenge now is to work to regain and then increase their effectiveness.

The sheer magnitude of the problem of proliferation dictates that we must find an international consensus and work through multilateral arrangements.

Despite the bureaucracy and delay that accompanies international cooperation, I believe it is necessary, especially in the area of arms control regimes, to have a multilateral approach.

A report by the Rand Corporation to the then-President-elect Bush pointed out:

Without our democratic allies, many emerging global issues

will likely prove to be beyond our ability to manage, but

together with them, the United States will gain unparalleled

ability to respond to tomorrow's demands and shape the

future.

Regrettably, the Bush administration has demonstrated a distrust of international organizations.

Since President Bush took office, the administration has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty and walked away from meaningful negotiations concerning START II.

Indeed, in the preamble and article 2 of the Moscow Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is referred to as START, not START I. START II is evident only in its absence from this treaty.

Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch has said:

I think we have sort of moved beyond START II.

Many Russian officials have recognized what appears to be the inevitability of this and indicated they are considering START II dead--meaning that Russia is no longer obligated to eliminate its MIRV'd ICBMs.

We must recognize that in many areas, including arms control, the United States cannot go it alone, and we have to not only encourage but actively work to create an international coalition, particularly with respect to proliferation of these weapons and nuclear materials.

I am also concerned that recent actions by the United States seems to indicate that while we talk about nonproliferation in principle, in practice we seem to be somewhat ambivalent. This is exacerbated when it appears that the U.S. is increasing the importance of nuclear weapons in our defense policy.

While the nonproliferation programs were being held up, the administration was working on a new nuclear posture review that would put more emphasis on nuclear weapons. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out a framework which includes maintaining the current size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, not reducing it; blurring the distinction between nuclear offensive strike and conventional offensive strike; introducing the notion that new nuclear weapons might be needed to meet changing security requirements; holding open the possibility of resuming nuclear weapons testing, either to develop nuclear weapons, or to maintain the current stockpile; supporting a robust nuclear weapons complex, not just to implement the stockpile stewardship program, but to manufacture hundreds of new plutonium pits per year, and to be able to design a new weapon if needed; and increase ``test readiness''--the level of readiness to conduct a nuclear weapons test, reducing that time period from 36 months to 18 months, essentially leaning further forward to the possibility of resuming nuclear tests. In addition, the Bush administration sought $15.5 million in its fiscal year 2003 request for a robust nuclear earth penetrator to use against hardened and deeply buried targets. This RNEP would modify an existing nuclear weapon with yields up to a megaton. Despite the fact that the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act requires a report of the plan for this weapon before funds are released, there is an additional $15 million requested for this program in the fiscal year 2004 budget, indicating that the administration is still determined to try to develop this new variety of nuclear weapon.

There has also been a renewed interest in the development of small nuclear weapons. Even though there is clearly no military requirement for such a weapon, again in its fiscal year 2004 legislative proposal, the Department of Defense seeks the total repeal of a current ban on research and development that could lead to production of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

DOD states that this law, in their words, ``has negatively affected U.S. Government efforts to support the national strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction and undercuts efforts that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to, new or emerging threats.''

Frankly, this adds up to a very disturbing path of legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in a world in which we are dramatically concerned with the possibility that Iraq is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons, a world in which the North Koreans are beginning to flaunt their ability to produce nuclear weapons, in which India and Pakistan are on the brink of conflict with nuclear weapons. The idea that we are lowering our own threshold to deploy, to use, to consider in our doctrine the use of nuclear weapons is, I think, an unfortunate and very dangerous approach. These continued efforts, both in the posture review, in requests for new weapons, in requests to investigate and do research on new types of nuclear weapons, and this legitimacy for the use of nuclear weapons, will have profound and detrimental consequences throughout the world.

It is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to urge other nations to forswear the development and use of nuclear weapons if we are so routinely talking about the development and use of nuclear weapons. This is a very disturbing development.

We have to look at nonproliferation as part of our overall defense policy. Advocating new or usable nuclear weapons destroys, inhibits, and damages the credibility of the United States as we seek to restrain the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. I hope that message comes through in not only today's discussions, but in this treaty.

I am also concerned with another aspect of the current situation. We are talking about our approach to Iraq as a need to disarm Saddam before he acquires nuclear weapons. Yet we have moved rather gingerly and pushed over to the United Nations the problem of North Korea which is on the verge of beginning to operate its reprocessing facilities, with the capability of building nuclear devices within months, if not weeks.

I think this leads many people, and not just those who follow these policy debates but most ordinary Americans, to wonder what is the difference. Why is the situation in Iraq so compelling, even though there is little evidence that Saddam is on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon, that we engage in a military conflict, while, on the other hand, when there is glaring evidence of the ability of the North Koreans to produce such a weapon, we have moved this along into the category of not a crisis, something the U.N. can handle? That intellectual dilemma is puzzling many people throughout this country.

I believe there is a crisis in North Korea, and I believe it is a crisis that requires the prompt attention of the President. If one looks at the strategic vision we have to embrace, it can perhaps be divided into several major tasks.

The first is to preempt terrorists and, indeed, we saw this week an effective use of our military and intelligence forces and our allies in Pakistan. Then we have to interdict, contain, and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The North Koreans, in my mind, pose a much more difficult challenge to us than the Iraqis at the moment. Not only are they on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon because they have the nuclear material, they also have a history of selling anything to anyone because their major cash crop is selling weapons to anyone who will buy them.

We are here today to conclude a very small but a very important step forward with the support of the Moscow Treaty, but we have much more to do when it comes to particularly supporting efforts by our country in an international coalition to preempt, to interdict, to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and I think to reexamine carefully and thoroughly the new emphasis we are putting on the development and use of nuclear weapons in our inventory.

I believe we will regret the day we give legitimacy to the potential use of nuclear weapons by any power, including the United States.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty that has been under consideration for a couple of days, also known as the Moscow Treaty, is, in my judgment, in the 18 years I have been here thinking about arms control and certainly as part of the debate in the Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor in the ratification of treaties, as flimsy a treaty as the Senate has ever considered. I believe its faults are many. At best, its defenders contend that it does no harm, but I find fault even in that assessment, and I find fault ultimately in this treaty.

The Moscow Treaty promises to reduce the deployed offensive weapons of the United States and Russia to a range of between 1,700 to 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. As far as the treaty goes, that is the highlight.

I think, under certain circumstances, one would certainly say that reducing its own number of deployed missiles is a worthy goal and something we want to achieve, but in the world we live in today, simply reducing their deployment, where they are sometimes under better control than they are going to be if they are not deployed, it may, in fact, be taking a dangerous situation and perhaps lending itself to the greater dangers of this particular moment of history.

In my assessment, regrettably, the treaty amounts to little more than a series of missed opportunities. Let me be precise about that point.

It does not mandate a reduction in total warheads. None must be dismantled. The treaty merely requires both parties to reduce the number of warheads in their operationally deployed arsenals. It provides no timetable for the planned reductions in deployed forces prior to the treaty's 2012 target date. It never requires the destruction of a single launcher.

In effect, the treaty allows each side to upload, download, and mix weapons in and out of storage. It contains no verification procedures, and the vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads in this country and in Russia remain unchanged.

Nuclear weapons, as we all know, are the legacy of the cold war, the most pressing single threat that we face today as we contemplate dealing with Saddam Hussein and as we wish we were dealing with North Korea. The most pressing threat, however, is really that nuclear weapons, or their lethal components, might fall into the hands of terrorists or irresponsible governments at the head of rogue regimes. This fact makes the provisions of this treaty even more troubling.

Instead of requiring the dismantlement of warheads or launchers, the treaty simply requires that on one day in 2012, the sides are to have no more than the 1,700 or 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons. The remaining thousands of weapons will be held in reserve, stockpiled for some other unforeseen need, a need, I might say, in the context of the threats we are looking at in the year 2003 that is extraordinarily hard to explain, particularly when those stockpiled weapons become the risk of stolen, bartered, sold, or blackmailed materials. By their continued existence, they present a tempting target for thieves and for terrorists.

It is no secret that there are those who are eager to capitalize on a deadly market for weapons-usable nuclear materials. The GAO has documented numerous failed attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of Russia. I say to

my colleagues that out of 20 of these incidents over the last decade, the materials involved in 13 of the 20 that we know about, and possibly as many as 15, were traced back to Russian sources.

I will tell my colleagues from my experience as a law enforcement official that if you know you caught 20 and you know you are operating with limited capacities to detect, anyone ought to be asking the question, How many did we miss and how many will we miss in the future?

The great security challenge of our day is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of those who would do us harm, but this treaty only expands the stockpile of nondeployed warheads in Russia, and in this country for that matter. It may advance some old cold war calculus for arms control, but it is not a part of a broader comprehensive approach to our nuclear relationship with Russia, particularly in the area of threat reduction, and there I think the treaty runs the risk of increasing the danger of nuclear theft by stockpiling thousands of warheads.

Obviously, it is the task of all of us to try to make the world more secure, not less secure. As I have said previously, we need to revitalize the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program by giving it the sustained leadership, attention, and funding it deserves.

Over the last decade, the United States has spent about $7.5 billion to deactivate 6,000 warheads and destroy thousands of delivery vehicles. Why would we spend $7.5 billion to deactivate and destroy and then bring a treaty to the floor of the Senate which does neither? We have to make good on our pledge of $10 billion over the next 10 years to the G-8 threat reduction partnership, and we need to encourage the good faith participation of our allies. But we know that even those efforts are not going to be enough.

In 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission concluded that for our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons materials and expertise to succeed, we will have to spend $30 billion over the next 10 years. That is a challenge we ought to be meeting as a primary goal prior even to the implementation of this treaty.

The treaty's supporters have noted that its brevity is important, as if the length of a treaty somehow constitutes a real accomplishment, and that provisions in it are a reflection of our new relationship with Russia.

My question is, if we are in a new environment with Russia, then why not include verification and transparency measures that reflect that new environment? The treaty does not mandate the dismantlement or destruction of warheads or launchers. Yet the provisions of this treaty turn upon themselves and the very logic underpinning the treaty as argued by its proponents. For instance, they argue, as Secretary Rumsfeld did before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last summer, that no arms control treaty in the history of our country has ever required the destruction of warheads.

Well, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we live in a different time, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that the cold war is really over, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we have a new and better relationship with Russia and that we therefore can look to a new period, why then keep these warheads in storage for another day when the numbers we are reducing to under any SIOP or any warfighting plan we have ever seen are sufficient to destroy the world several times over? It simply does not make sense.

Why expand the stockpiles of stored nuclear warheads and materials when we know to a certainty, as the CIA tells us, we do not have the capacity today to safeguard those materials? Why would we do that when we are prepared to go to war against Iraq to prevent Iraq from illicitly receiving the very kinds of materials that we are about to encourage the capacity for others to seek out in the same way as we have seen others do in those 20 examples I cited a few moments ago?

The logic escapes anybody who stops to really think about what we are doing with this treaty. If we have really entered a new age and a new relationship with Russia--and I believe we have in fact--then neither Russia nor the United States should hedge on a commitment to real and meaningful arms reduction to an agreement that addresses in its very fabric the new and real threat of proliferation by theft or diversion. By doing so, we would send a signal to Saddam Hussein and to the rest of the world that we are not hedging our bets; that, in fact, we are serious and we are setting an example, and that the rest of the world is earning the justification for moving to disarm another nation for moving to nuclearization.

Those same supporters who say we need to hold on to vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads ironically argue that the profoundly changed nature of the relationship with Russia means we need not have negotiated verification regimes for this treaty.

There are still those in this country, as surely there are some in Russia, who continue to view our former cold war adversary with some measure of suspicion and distrust.

This treaty had the potential to deepen Russian-American cooperation and confidence building. If it had included verification measures, the treaty would have silenced skeptics of our new relationship by demonstrating mutual weapons reductions through inspection and verification. But, regrettably, it does not. Both sides understand that each has the potential to redeploy all of these weapons unless we can verify, at a minimum, their location. So by this feature alone, this treaty contains the seeds of future doubt and suspicion.

Verification ought to be a crucial aspect of our effort to secure nuclear weapons and materials, and if we cannot be certain that the numbers of deployed warheads have been reduced, we will not be certain of the magnitude of the challenge of securing those materials.

Since the height of the arms control negotiations, now almost two decades ago, the cry of many of my colleagues on the other side of this aisle--which I remember well for years as we tried to move through various arms control treaties--was appropriately, as Ronald Reagan said, ``trust but verify.''

This treaty exhibits a lot of trust but no verification. Accordingly, I am offering an amendment to help address the critical issue of verification. It is a very simple amendment, and it really ought not to present a problem to colleagues. If we are to have more confidence in this treaty, we should be working with the Russians now to achieve a viable regime to verify that reductions are indeed taking place on both sides and that they are taking place in a way that safeguards those materials. In the absence of any mutually agreed upon verification regime, we are left to rely on national means and methods to determine whether or not Russia is making the reductions promised on a reasonable schedule to meet the December 2012 target date.

My amendment adds a new condition to the Resolution of Ratification requiring an annual report prepared by the intelligence community on our ability to monitor Russia's compliance with the Moscow Treaty. For all those who have worried about trusting, verifying, and knowing what is happening, this is a very simple requirement, that we learn from our own intelligence community about our capacity to safeguard the interests of the United States of America. This national intelligence estimate must also provide an assessment of the ability of the United States to monitor compliance with the SORT treaty through the verification regime of the START I treaty and our ability to monitor compliance after the START I verification regime terminates in 2009.

Perhaps most notably, under my amendment the intelligence community is required to inform us of the mechanisms they need to verify treaty compliance with a high degree of confidence, including consideration of further agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation, mutual data exchanges between the two countries, improvements in the transparency of reductions that are called for in this treaty, technological improvements, and other appropriate mechanisms.

I have long viewed this treaty's lack of verification measures as a source of grave concern. I spoke out in the Foreign Relations Committee on each occasion that this treaty was considered. Last summer, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on

the treaty, I noted the huge contradiction in it, the lack of verification and accountability in the reduction, and the fear that these weapons or materials might fall into the hands of terrorists.

While I understand that we cannot mandate the dismantlement of warheads or the security of nuclear materials without renegotiating this treaty, it is critical we have an understanding, in order to protect the security interests of our country, of our own ability to monitor Russian compliance, where that ability might fall short and to understand a perspective on what we simply do not know. Without meaningful verification, there is a great deal that we will not know. And in this case, what we don't know can, indeed, hurt us in this dangerous world that we live in today.

Last month, I voted in committee to bring the treaty to the full Senate but not without reservation. At that time, I registered my serious concern about the treaty's lack of verification measures, about the lack of milestones or targets other than the 2012 date, and about the peculiarity of a treaty that expires on the very same day that it reaches its intended goal.

The amendment I offer today is intended to drive at the heart of the verification issue. I know several of my colleagues have offered or talked about other important fixes to address the shortcomings of this treaty, and I applaud their efforts, but at its heart this treaty represents a missed opportunity. It almost represents a treaty for the sake of a treaty without regard to the longer term security interests and strategic interests of the United States.

We missed an opportunity to help make the world safer for our children in the long term. We missed an opportunity to eliminate thousands of nuclear weapons for the long term, and not just to reduce deployed weapons for the short term. We missed an opportunity to advance American-Russian relations in a way that, in fact, builds a stronger foundation of trust between our two great countries.

By addressing the verification issue as envisioned in my amendment, I believe we can at least learn from our own intelligence community-- which we ought to be willing to trust--what more needs to be done to provide the transparency and verification so essential to any agreement of this nature. If we are to make America safer, and we must, it will take more than cosmetic treaties that leave Russia's nuclear arsenal in place. As Ronald Reagan told the Nation, ``History has shown that peace will not come, nor will our freedoms be preserved, by good will alone.''

We have work still to be done to meet today's challenges, and I believe one of those challenges is to fix the Moscow Treaty.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, as the chairman of the committee knows, I have so much respect for him. We rarely have disagreements.

In essence, he sort of made my case just now. I have never argued about the destruction of some of the missiles that are going in. I talked about the warheads and fissionable material. Fissionable material is not in the missile; it is in the warhead. The distinguished chairman just said, I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of those warheads. I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of those warheads.

All I am asking for is that we ask our intelligence communities. Is the Senate scared of asking its own intelligence community for a report on our capacity to know where those materials are and what is happening? That is all I am asking.

On the floor of the Senate, I cannot go into what we have heard in private, in classified sessions. But this amendment is based on my knowledge of what our intelligence community is concerned about and what I believe we ought to be concerned about in this country. So as the chairman says, I wish we had a better sense of what is happening to those warheads.

If we are willing to go to war in Iraq because we think it is dangerous for that man to have nuclear warheads, and we know that 15 out of some 20 efforts to transfer this material has come from Russia, we better be concerned about these warheads. That is what this is about. That is precisely what involves the security of the people of the United States of America, and that is what this amendment is about.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the distinguished ranking Member. Let me be very clear. I am not asking for anything to be done here that isn't monitoring of this treaty. If you look on page 2 of my amendment, it says I am looking for ``an estimate, for each strategic nuclear weapons system in the Russian Federation, of the confidence of the United States, whether low, medium, or high, in the capability of the United States to monitor the deployed warheads of such systems.''

I am looking for ``an assessment of the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty.''

This is to make sure we can see that this treaty, as the minority ranking Member has called it, as limited as it is--I am trying to making sure we can comply and know that we have the ascertainment of our intelligence community with respect thereto.

That is precisely what my amendment does.

I yield my time.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.