A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Senate strongly supports the nonproliferation programs of the United States.

Madam President, on March 6, 2003, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty on strategic nuclear arms reductions. The 97 to 0 vote belied significant weaknesses in the treaty: it contains no verification procedures, it does not require the destruction of any warheads or missiles, and it expires on the same day that it goes into effect.

Those weaknesses should not be ignored. I joined with my colleagues in voting to approve a formal treaty on U.S. and Russian arms reductions in order to send a message that more work is needed to reduce, control, and secure the most dangerous weapons that mankind has created. The Moscow Treaty is a modest step away from the Cold War threat of nuclear holocaust, but more steps need to be taken.

The resolution that I offer represents the Senate's next step in pushing for more action in the control of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. I am grateful to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, for his support of the resolution as its principal cosponsor. The Byrd-Lugar resolution urges the administration and the Russian Federation to do more to implement nonproliferation programs.

The United States has a good record in working with the countries of the former Soviet Union on nonproliferation programs. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, conceived by former Senator Sam Nunn and of Senator Richard Lugar, has an astounding record of success. That program has destroyed more than 6,000 Soviet-era nuclear weapons and more than 800 ballistic missiles. The program helped to remove all nuclear warheads from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. It has made significant progress in securing nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.

The Byrd-Lugar resolution states the sense of the Senate on three important issues relating to U.S. non-proliferation programs.

First, the resolution states clearly the strong support of the Senate for non-proliferation programs that ``are intended to reduce the threat posed by

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that remain unsecured in the Russian Federation and elsewhere.''

Second, the resolution urges the Russian Federation to increase access to key weapons facilities and to share more information about its weapons programs. According to General Accounting Office testimony delivered to the House Armed Services Committee on March 5:

Russia will not allow DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE

[Department of Energy] the level of access they require to

design security improvements [at weapons storage sites],

verify their installation, and ensure their proper operation.

As a result, agencies have been unable to help protect

substantial portions of Russia's nuclear weapons. . . In

addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous

biological pathogens remain off-limits. (GAO testimony, 3/5/

03, GAO-03-526T)

Third, the resolution urges our country to redouble efforts to achieve full implementation of nonproliferation programs, under effective management, and with full use of the funds that Congress may appropriate for nonproliferation activities.

Critics have been active in pointing out that poor management of some nonproliferation projects has resulted in wasted money and lost time. Most recently, some have leveled criticism at two projects that were intended to eliminate Russian rocket fuel. The United States spent $200 million to build two facilities to eliminate fuel that was left over from destroyed Russian missiles, only to find that the fuel was diverted into the Russian civil space program. As a result, these facilities are left with no rocket fuel to destroy.

It is a very serious issue when such a great amount of money is devoted to an unsuccessful program. There is no excuse for poor planning and management. We should not lose sight of the importance of nonproliferation programs, and to ensure their success we must not ignore such examples of mismanagement. That is why the Byrd-Lugar resolution makes a point about the need for effective management in our nonproliferation programs.

But just as management improvements are needed, the Executive Branch has been slow to implement nonproliferation programs. There has been delay after delay in spending funds that Congress appropriates for these projects.

According to the administration's fiscal year 2004 budget, $543 million in DOD nonproliferation funds will remain unexpended this year. To put that figure in perspective, the White House has requested $439 million for these programs in its fiscal year 2004 budget. I support that request, but that money--like the half a billion dollars that remains in our coffers--will do nothing to improve our security unless it is spent by the administration. Whatever funds that Congress appropriates to nonproliferation programs should be used in a timely manner that recognizes the serious nature of the threat posed by loose nuclear weapons in Russia.

The Byrd-Lugar resolution underscores the important nonproliferation tasks ahead of us by spotlighting problems that need to be addressed by the United States and Russia. Just as this resolution follows up on the Moscow Treaty, there is much more work to do after this resolution. These are matters on which the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, and the Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Lugar is chairman, should continue to work together.

One issue that is particularly deserving of increased attention is expansion of non-proliferation programs to countries outside of the former Soviet Union. The supplemental appropriations bill passed by the Senate on April 3, 2003, included temporary authority for the President to spend up to $50 million in nonproliferation funds outside of the former Soviet Union during this fiscal year. Unfortunately, this provision was not included in the final version of that bill that was signed into law by the President on April 16, 2003.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency warned the Armed Services Committee on February 11 of a new nuclear arms race among smaller countries. Let us look beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union to address the heart of the growing menace of nuclear proliferation, and start thinking about how to leverage the success in Russia of the Nunn-Lugar programs into results in other countries.

The Nunn-Lugar programs have greatly reduced the chance that a poorly secured Russian military facility may serve as a one-stop shop for terrorists seeking a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. I count myself as a consistent and strong supporter of these programs.

But there is much more work to do. The Moscow Treaty, which requires that thousands of nuclear warheads be removed from deployment, but not necessarily destroyed, renews the need for a cooperative program to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists. The Byrd-Lugar resolution sends a message to the White House and to the Kremlin that we need to fix the problems that have surfaced in the nonproliferation programs between our countries and accelerate our work to secure and destroy unneeded and unwanted weapons of mass destruction.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of the following measures en bloc: Calendar No. 173, S. Res. 62; Calendar No. 174, S. Res. 149; Calendar No. 187, S. Res. 90.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolutions be agreed to, the amendments to the preambles, where applicable, be agreed to, and the preambles, as amended, if amended, be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements regarding these matters be printed in the Record.