Expressing the sense of Congress that the crisis regarding the Iranian nuclear program should be primarily resolved through diplomatic means.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless the international community acts quickly and decisively, the world's chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror ever created.

A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council.

The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated by the civilized world.

Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy. I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state policy.

I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping Israel from the map.

Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya. Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb blueprints, as Libya used to do.

Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.

Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, ``the West needs us more than we need them.''

With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran over the nuclear issue.

Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary. The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon material production capabilities.

But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act. Responsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.

Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate incentives by the international community to stop business as usual with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.

Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman from Florida, and myself.

Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson: playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime against Tehran.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished ranking member of our Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors meeting on February 4.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing

condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to

the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.

My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming

majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through

adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination

that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.

The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in

noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to

Article XII.C.

That resolution also found that pursuant to Article

III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall

within the competence of the UNSC.

At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting

Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to

choose diplomacy over confrontation.

Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a

result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process

begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past

findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.

I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that

today's report to the Security Council will not divest the

IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.

We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's

nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look

forward to the Director General's implementation report in

March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to

the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.

By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to

add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role,

reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran

to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a

course of confrontation.

The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear

safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the

rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to

address matters that raise questions of international peace

and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.

That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the

Security Council's involvement in such instances of

noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in

September that such a report is mandatory.

In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush

emphasized that, ``the Iranian government is defying the

world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the

world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear

weapons.''

We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and

clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a

nuclear weapons capability.

We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not

envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.

Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of

diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of

the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear

activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our

concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and

confrontation.

Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran

persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine

its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.

And through this path Iran can also start to restore its

standing in the international community to the benefit of the

Iranian people.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic

of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006

the board of governors

(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on

Iran's nuclear programme,

(b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,

(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in

the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and

II of the Treaty,

(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for

their professional and impartial efforts to implement the

Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding

safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by

Iran of the suspension,

(e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as

a special verification case,

(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the

Director General noted that after nearly three years of

intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a

position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's

nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared

nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

(g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its

obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and

the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is

exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history

of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of

those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's

verification of declarations made by Iran since September

2002,

(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that

Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the

Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/

67),

(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's

cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment,

materials and activities which have applications in the

conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well

as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director

General in GOV/2005/67),

(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General

reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related

to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to

metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining

of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into

hemispherical forms,

(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear

programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of

confidence-building is required from Iran,

(1) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for

a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and

(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would

contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to

realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of

mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be

resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to

the calls for confidence building measures which the Board

has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for

Iran to:

re-establish full and sustained suspension of all

enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including

research and development, to be verified by the Agency;

reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated

by heavy water;

ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional

Protocol;

pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with

the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed

on 18 December 2003;

implement transparency measures, as requested by the

Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend

beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement

and Additional Protocol, and include such access to

individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use

equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and

development as the Agency may request in support of its

ongoing investigations;

2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security

Council of the United Nations that these steps are required

of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council

all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to

this issue;

3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in

a position to clarify some important issues relating to

Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in

its possession a document on the production of uranium metal

hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this

process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components; and, noting that the decision to put this

document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran

to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a

full copy to the Agency;

4. Deeplv regrets that, despite repeated calls from the

Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment

related and reprocessing activities which the Board has

declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran

resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility

on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment

activities on 10 January 2006;

5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of

confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a

fissile material production capability against the background

of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous

Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its

position in relation to confidence-building measures, which

are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a

constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can

result in increased confidence;

6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to

the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable

and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify

possible activities which could have a military nuclear

dimension;

7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's

declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to

continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's

Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional

Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with

a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence

of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to

pursue additional transparency measures required for the

Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and

reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's

past nuclear activities;

8. Requests the Director General to report on the

implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next

regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and

immediately thereafter to convey, together with any

Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security

Council; and

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a brief by the Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in

the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's

Suspension of Enrichment-Related and Reprocessing Activities

The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the

developments that have taken place since November 2005 in

connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the

Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of

enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief

provides factual information concerning those developments;

it does not include any assessments thereof.

Iran has continued to facilitate access under its

Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act

as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by

providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and

access to locations.

1. Enrichment Programme

As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November

2005, during meetings that took place in October and November

2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional

information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme.

Responses to some of these requests were provided during

discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between

Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy

Director General for Safeguards. This information is

currently being assessed.

1.A. Contamination

As part of its assessment of the correctness and

completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment

activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the

source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some

high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at

locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components

had been manufactured, used and/or stored.

1.B. The 1987 offer

As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency

in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document

reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by

a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a

disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and

specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings,

specifications and calculations for a ``complete plant''; and

materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also

made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive

equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and

purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for

mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium

re-conversion and casting capabilities.

On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page

document was the only remaking documentary evidence relevant

to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this

to the secret nature of the programme and the management

style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at

that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists,

such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports,

personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its

statements concerning that offer.

1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network

between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key

members of the network about the events leading to the mid-

1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this

context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification

of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI

staff members in the mid-1990s.

P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran

has been unable to supply any documentation or other

information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of

500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The

Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and

contents of these shipments.

P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a

result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the

mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2

centrifuge components (which contained no supporting

specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered

along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to

assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during

the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this

period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2

centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge

components. In light of information available to the Agency

indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which

information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November

2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made

after 1995.

In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design

said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting

company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that

the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased,

magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is

still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to

acquire such magnets. 2.

2. Uranium Metal

Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to

have been the drawings, specifications and supporting

documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of

which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these

was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the

reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and

the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into

hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other

specifications for machined pieces for such components.

According to Iran, this document had been provided on the

initiative of the network, and not at the request of the

AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the

Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency

during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document

again and to place it under Agency seal.

3. Transparency Visits and Discussions

On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a

military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances

regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities at that site, where several environmental samples

were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of

the analysis of those samples.

Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional

information and clarifications related to efforts made by the

Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at

Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment

that could be used in uranium enrichment and

conversion activities. The Agency has also requested

interviews with the individuals involved in the

acquisition of those items.

On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency

documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts

by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a

number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment,

power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye

laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation

suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had

actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical

university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor.

However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency

for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request

to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential

for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use

of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass

spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment

(equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium

enrichment).

On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list

of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to

see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in

situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on

the Agency's list was presented at a technical university,

and environmental samples were taken from it.

On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification

about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use

material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium

and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005.

High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and

environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that

the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing,

but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran

agreed to provide additional information on inquiries

concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and

special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's

acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and

filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31

January 2006 for environmental sampling.

On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a

meeting to discuss information that had been made available

to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the

Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium

dioxide into UF4 (``green salt''), as well as

tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile

re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear

dimension and which appear to have administrative

interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the

``issues related to baseless allegations.'' Iran agreed on 23

January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the

clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to

address the other topics during that meeting. In the course

of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the

Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow

diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications

related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national

nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the

allegations were baseless and that it would provide further

clarifications later.

4. Suspension

The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements

of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and

reprocessing activities.

In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency

that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006,

``those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which

ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and

non-legally binding suspension'' (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7

January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran

requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz,

Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of

suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/

2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January

2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.

Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it

refers to as ``small scale R&D''. As of 30 January 2006,

Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or

assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF 6

material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of

the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel

Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of

components and some rotor testing is being conducted at

Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the fact that all

centrifuge-related raw materials and components are without

IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities

being carried out by Iran cannot be effective except at PFEP,

where containment and surveillance measures are being applied

for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz

containing UF6, from which seals had been removed

on 10 January 2006, were again placed under Agency

containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.

The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November

2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All

UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under

Agency containment and surveillance.

Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to

monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the

Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.

Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot stand by.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in opposition.

I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in opposition.

This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who I have to say I do respect greatly is eerily reminiscent of the debate in this House prior to the United States authorizing an attack on Iraq. I think we can look back today and say that the U.S. rushed into war against Iraq, only to find that there were no weapons of mass destruction.

Madam Speaker, I will include for the Record an article from the Washington Post dated August 2, 2005, which says, ``A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredients for nuclear weapons, roughly doubling the previous estimate of 5 years.'' It goes on to say that ``this carefully hedged assessment, which represents consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrasts with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted but have not offered proof that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal.''

I also include for the record the remarks of Angela Merkel, who is the leader of Germany, who says that we have not used all of our available windows of opportunity. She saw an opportunity for a negotiated settlement. As a matter of fact, in this news dispatch out of Berlin from yesterday, the German chancellor says there are real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's nuclear program.

Madam Speaker, I include for the record a news report out of Moscow and Tehran of yesterday which says that Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran in the Russian territory. This would avert what is a building crisis.

Madam Speaker, I include for the record an analysis that was done of the joint resolution on Iraq, this was done by myself, that pointed out the flaws in a resolution that was presented to this House. This is an analysis from October 2, 2002, that relates to analyzing the Iraq resolution. I think this would be very valuable when you compare it side by side with the resolution that we have now.

Madam Speaker, I want to call to the Members' attention the same article that Mr. Paul called to Members' attention, section 3 of the enactment clause, which calls on members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the report of Iran's noncompliance. This is in response to a report of Iran's noncompliance and fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to respond and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security.

The importance of this point and this amendment is that this point undermines and sets aside the only possibility for a peaceful resolution of this crisis, namely the offer by Russia to enrich uranium for Iran to use in its nuclear power plants. Iran would not operate any enrichment processing facilities of its own, so we have an opportunity to put aside this crisis if we see what is developing now. This resolution, unfortunately, would scuttle the Russian-led negotiated settlement. I ask Members to consider that this resolution would put us on the threshold of war.

Now, I stand with Mr. Lantos in defense of the right of Israel to survive. I voted for legislation yesterday that challenges any nation that would call for the destruction of Israel, and we should do that. But we don't have to go to war against Iran or to set the stage for a war against Iran when we have diplomatic means of resolving this. We should continue to pursue diplomacy.

Madam Speaker, I include the articles referred to earlier for the Record.

[From washingtonpost.com, Aug. 2, 2005]

Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb

(By Dafna Linzer)

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is

about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for

a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of

five years, according to government sources with firsthand

knowledge of the new analysis.

The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus

among US. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful

public statements by the White House. Administration

officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that

Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The

new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran

over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he

wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that ``all

options are on the table.''

The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the

intelligence community views as credible indicators that

Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the

sources said there is no information linking those projects

directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that

Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and

mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.

The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's

ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear

arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior

intelligence official familiar with the findings said that

``it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left

to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear

weapons.''

At no time in the past three years has the White House

attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as

it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion.

Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and

questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would

require a large-scale nuclear energy program.

The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative

views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are

based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have

not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited

elements of the estimate and only on the condition of

anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of

the evidence on which it is based.

Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several

administration officials said, as the White House formulates

the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and

competing strategies. For three years, the administration has

tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by

focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have

been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the

intelligence.

The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in

January, is the first major

review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about

Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first

term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by

advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the

intelligence judgments.

One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current

officials said was commissioned by national security adviser

Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the

possibility for ``regime change'' in Iran. Those findings

described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward

democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that

process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's

classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.

The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question

of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer

whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control

by the time the country is capable of producing fissile

material. The administration keeps ``hoping the mullahs will

leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability,'' said

an official familiar with policy discussions.

Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president

of national security developments and help guide policy. The

new Iran findings were described as well documented and well

written, covering such topics as military capabilities,

expected population growth and the oil industry. The

assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate

annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders.

``It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and

what assumptions we have,'' a U.S. source said.

Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February

testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the

capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S.

officials have continually estimated Iran to be ``within five

years'' from reaching that same capability. So far, it has

not.

The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran

will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly

enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon,

before ``early to mid-next decade,'' according to four

sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the

shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical

limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line

with recently revised British and Israeli figures.

The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but

there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be

ready by then with an implosion device, sources said.

The time line is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect

a program moving full speed ahead without major technical

obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has

suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a

tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced

yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the

European talks fall short of expectations.

Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of

suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own

separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence

of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge

research and development that could be linked to a nuclear

program, four sources said.

Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile

program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings

obtained last November. The documents include design

modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room

required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials

said.

``If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he

has really good connections, he'll get that program

through,'' said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's

nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the

presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. ``But

that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear

weapon.''

The commission found earlier this year that U.S.

intelligence knows ``disturbingly little'' about Iran, and

about North Korea.

Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through

analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the

work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for

more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for

uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium

tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan--all of

which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an

energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran

possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear

weapons program.

The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence

community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that

then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass

destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The

judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush

administration as it sought to build support for invading

Iraq five months later.

At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V.

Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that

new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIBs and that

there would be ``a higher tolerance for ambiguity,'' even if

it meant producing estimates with less definitive

conclusions.

The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and

alternative theories that could explain some of the

suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three

years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for

energy production, not weapons.

Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public

explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18

years, because it feared attack by the United States or

Israel if the work was exposed.

In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney

suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that

Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23

years earlier in Iraq.

In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton--then the

administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and

now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador--said: ``If

we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be

too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.''

But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and

intelligence, appears to have shifted.

Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a

nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G.

Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: ``I

don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have

perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian

records what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to

conclude that we have to be highly skeptical.''

Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order of the House, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 341) condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Reserving the right to object, we understand that the ranking member is on his way, and he seeks time on the bill. Therefore, accordingly, I would object to that request.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 341, a resolution that I had the pleasure of drafting with my good friends, the distinguished chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Henry Hyde, and our ranking member, Congressman Tom Lantos.

I want to express my appreciation to our leadership for recognizing the importance for the House to be heard on this important issue and for moving this resolution expeditiously to the floor today.

Madam Speaker, for at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert nuclear program using multiple approaches and technology to achieve a nuclear status. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges, including at facilities owned by military industrial organizations.

It has sought completion of a heavy water reactor that would be well suited for plutonium production, while seeking uranium enrichment through the use of lasers.

The Iran saga within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency began almost 4 years ago. Every step along the way, Iran has demonstrated contempt for the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has mocked the EU 3 nations composed of France, Great Britain and Germany, as they provided incentives to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activities.

It is important to quickly summarize the sequence of events of the last few years, Madam Speaker, in order to fully comprehend the need for this resolution as a basis for stronger legislative action regarding Iran.

In November of 2003, for example, the IAEA reported that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for close to two decades and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, had carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, it had separated plutonium, and it had concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities.

That same month, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of its decision to temporarily suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. It stated that the suspension would cover all activities in the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed material for enrichment and the importation of any enrichment- related items.

But that was not to be, Madam Speaker. Iran continuously reinterpreted its commitment. By September of 2004, Iran announced that it had resumed large-scale uranium conversion. The International Atomic Energy Agency called on Iran to stop. Then Secretary of State Colin Powell called for the Iran case to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions to be imposed.

Faced with this possibility, Iran temporarily halts these activities in those nuclear facilities known to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the EU 3.

By April of 2005, Iran announces that it will resume uranium conversion in the Isfahan facility. This was met with a warning from the EU 3 that their negotiations on trade and economic incentives with Iran would end if Iran acted on this threat.

In August of 2005, the new radical leader is installed as Iran's new president. Immediately following, Iran proceeded to remove the International Atomic Energy Agency seals on the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, announced that it could successfully use biotechnology for its nuclear program, decreasing the cost for the production of the feed material for nuclear weapons. It announced that it would provide nuclear technology to other Islamic states. Iran's defense minister said that it is Iran's absolute right to have access to nuclear arms, and Iran's leader publicly stated his willingness to share nuclear expertise with other Islamic nations.

The IAEA inspectors were finally allowed into the Parchin military site. However, after all the time Iran was

given to sanitize this site, that is to hide, to remove all signs of their nuclear activities, even IAEA inspectors and foreign diplomats acknowledged in news reports that they did not expect the inspections to yield any firm results.

Experts further noted that there may be no nuclear material present at Parchin if the Iranians did dry testing of nuclear bomb simulations.

Fast forward to Tuesday of this very week. Madam Speaker, on Valentine's Day, 2006, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced it has restarted uranium enrichment efforts which could also be developed for use in nuclear weapons.

In sum, referral of the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council has been a long time coming. We are gratified that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors earlier this month voted to report the Iran case to the Security Council, but it should not stop there, Madam Speaker.

H. Con. Res. 341 therefore calls on all members of the U.N. Security Council to immediately consider the report and take the necessary steps to address Iran's behavior. The resolution frames the debate by condemning in the strongest possible terms the Iranian regime's repeated violations of its international obligations.

More importantly, it underscores that, as a result of these violations, Iran no longer has the right to develop any aspect of a nuclear fuel cycle.

As President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and the infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.

H. Con. Res. 341 reiterates previous U.S. calls to responsible members of the international community to impose economic sanctions to deny Iran the resources and the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

But the grave threat posed by Iran is not limited to its nuclear pursuit. H. Con. Res. 341 therefore refers to Iran's support for Islamic jihadist activities worldwide.

Madam Speaker, it includes language highlighting that Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for over two decades and, according to our own State Department reports on global terrorism, it remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism worldwide.

Madam Speaker, too much time has already passed. Let us not waste anymore. Let us begin by adopting this resolution and send a strong message to the Iranian regime and other potential proliferators that this behavior will not be tolerated.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).

Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul), a member of the International Relations Committee.

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to refute some of the statements that have been made against the resolution.

Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 clearly outlines the Iran threat, not just as assessed by the United States, not just as assessed by the Europeans, but by the International Atomic Energy Agency. After dealing with the Iran case for over 3 years, it reaffirms the position of the United States, of the U.S. Congress, as articulated through the passage of previous measures, that Iran has forfeited any right

for any access to nuclear technology or materials.

In response to previous statements regarding this resolution and sanctions, stating that it would isolate the Iranian people, on the contrary, Madam Speaker, sanctions would empower the Iranian people because it would weaken this regime.

More importantly, due to the Iran economy's vulnerabilities, the sanctions and the denial of billions of dollars of oil investments would deny the regime in Tehran the funds that they need to carry out this nuclear program and to continue with its extremist terrorist activities.

In closing, I would like to remind my colleagues that in the summer of 2001 Iran's ayatollah expressed Iran's commitment to bring America to its knees. Those were his statements. He added that ``the giant will fall,'' the giant being the United States of America.

Combine this with what the director of the National Intelligence Agency, John Negroponte, said in his recent testimony. He said, while the assessment of when Iran would go nuclear is about 5 to 10 years from now, he also expressed grave concerns that we did not really know the extent of Iran's nuclear activities. He said that Iran's 20-year pursuit of a covert program means that we cannot truly confirm any specific timeframe.

Mr. Negroponte also said that Iran's missile program, with a nuclear capability, posed a serious concern for our U.S. security interests.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume in closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), for his wise words. It is always a pleasure to work with him as well as with our chairman, Henry Hyde.

Mr. Speaker the International Atomic Energy Agency in its February 4, 2006 resolution said that after nearly 3 years the agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.

Iran needs to hear our message loud and clear. The United Nations Security Council now has the Iran case after 20 years of Iran's covert activities and after 3 years of mocking the international community. Let us send a message loud and clear today. Let us pass this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. Iran has obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, to not carry out a nuclear weapons program. Iran has ignored its obligations by carrying out a covert uranium enrichment program. It is becoming increasingly clear that this enrichment program is not merely aimed at producing nuclear fuel for a civilian energy program. According the IAEA, Iran has documents in their possession for casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres--something which has no legitimate civilian purpose and which appears clearly to be related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. Possession of these documents is a violation of the NPT.

I support the work of the IAEA to monitor Iran's nuclear program, to press for Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol for enhanced monitoring and inspection of that program. The British, the French, and the Germans have tried for years to convince Iran to move away from nuclear weapons capability and to agree to increased international monitoring of its nuclear activities. Iran has rejected their efforts and made it clear that it is not willing to accept the type of negotiated solution proposed by the Europeans.

Right now we face a crisis that challenges the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. If the international community cannot address the issue of Iran, then we risk the collapse of the NPT.

I hope the U.N. Security Council can resolve this issue. Now that this matter has been referred to the Security Council, the international community needs to begin a dialogue about how best to respond to Iran's action. We need to start thinking about tough and enforceable sanctions that can send a clear signal to Tehran that ignoring the will of the international community on this issue has consequences.

As we call upon Iran to stop their clandestine program, however, we must remember the United States also has obligations to the NPT. We can not ask the world to enforce regulation on Iran while we shirk our obligations to the NPT by opening up nuclear trade with India, a country which has not signed the Treaty. If we seek special exemptions from international and domestic nonproliferation law for India while simultaneously seeking strict enforcement of such laws for Iran, an NPT signatory, we will undermine our credibility as a leader on nonproliferation. Iran will accuse us of hypocrisy, and other nations may seek similar special exemptions.

For example, we know that China has long had a close relationship with Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan has already asked the U.S. to make special exemptions for them from international and domestic nonproliferation law. China has called for that as well. Are we going to also exempt Pakistan from the international system of controls and safeguards established by the NPT and by U.S. law? Are we going to stand by and do nothing if China goes ahead and sends the same type of nuclear technology and materials that we are talking about sending to India?

We also know that Russia has historically had a close relationship with the Iranian nuclear program. They've been trying to get the Iranians to agree to a nuclear fuel supply arrangement in return for foregoing a domestic Iranian enrichment program. But what if Moscow decides now to go far beyond that and afford Iran broader access to controlled nuclear technology, citing what we're proposing to do with India?

I think that if we want to send a strong signal to Iran that its flouting of international nuclear nonproliferation norms is unacceptable and will have adverse consequences, then now is not the time to be thinking of granting selective exemptions from nonproliferation laws and treaties for other nations, even if they are our friends. We need to be principled leaders on the most important of all issues facing our country. We do not want Iran, with a regime that has made it clear that it desires the destruction of Israel, a regime that is known to have provided material support to terrorist groups, to obtain its own nuclear arsenal.

The time for us to act as an international community is now. There are forces within Iran that want to move away from extremism. We need to send a strong signal that the international community does not accept the current Iranian government's nuclear aspirations, and that there will be consequences, there will be sanctions, if Tehran persists in its current course of action.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This resolution is closely modeled on a resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, Senator Frist, csponsored by Senator Reid, the minority leader, Senators Lugar and Biden, and a bipartisan group totaling 32 Senators, and adopted unanimously on January 27. Our colleague, Representative Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, has worked with me and other members of the House Committee on International Relations, including our distinguished ranking Democrat, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, on this resolution. She has updated the text of the Senate resolution in the light of recent events and in the light of the understanding that we in the House have about Iran's actions and intentions.

This House may be divided on precisely how to respond to every aspect of the Iranian challenge, but we are certainly united, as our vote will show, in our support for the current efforts to bring the weight of the Security Council of the United Nations to bear against Iran's continuing violations of its formal and informal obligations concerning its nuclear activities.

These efforts are not only American efforts, but ones which involve many responsible members of the international community. The administration deserves credit for coaxing some of the reluctant states to this point: the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has indeed reported to the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear program. Although the IAEA may make additional reports during the next month, the die is cast: the Security Council is in a position to take action, and it should do so. It should respond to what is clearly a threat to international peace and security--and making such responses in a collective way is precisely the purpose it is meant to serve.

The administration deserves credit for having brought along the IAEA Board of Governors and, in particular, all of the permanent members of the Security Council, to this stage in the process. The signal to Iran could not have been more stark.

Critical to arriving at this point was the support extended by the Bush administration for the so-called ``ED-3'' process, in which Britain, France, and Germany conducted negotiations with Iran-- negotiations that ultimately failed to contain Iran's efforts, to be sure, but which succeeded in keeping the international community moving forward in unison.

At this point, we need to continue to keep the pressure on, but let us keep the pressure on the recalcitrant party--the Iranians--and not begin internecine warfare among the Western powers. It is only with the cooperation of other States that we can truly pressure Iran.

As we consider other legislation in the next months--and the consideration of this resolution does not, in my mind, prejudice the ability of the House to consider other legislation--we should bear in mind that we need allies in this struggle. Sticking our finger in the eye of other states which are, in general terms, ``on our side'' will do nothing to bring Iran to heel.

Another reason to work with our friends is that if the Security Council does not achieve consensus on how to deal with Iran, we will need to work with them to arrive at a ``Plan B,'' as an alternative. That plan should consist, in all likelihood, of a series of comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions.

Those sanctions should be designed to serve several purposes. First, they should make it clear to the Iranian people that their leaders' course of action needs to change. Second, they should serve to inflict some pain on the Iranian leadership in an effort to coerce those leaders to behave in a responsible way. Finally, they should reduce the resources available to the Iranian state to continue their nuclear weapons program.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, this is an important resolution; it indicates quite clearly that we are behind the administration's approach. I hope that we will continue to support it in the days ahead.