Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

Madam Speaker, it has been 3 years since the U.S. launched its war against Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Of course, now almost everybody knows there were no weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein posed no threat to the United States. Though some of our soldiers serving in Iraq still believe they are there because Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11, even the administration now acknowledges that there was no connection.

Indeed, no one can be absolutely certain why we invaded Iraq. The current excuse, also given for staying in Iraq, is to make it a democratic state friendly to the United States. There are now fewer denials that securing oil supplies played a significant role in our decision to go into Iraq and stay there. That certainly would explain why the U.S. taxpayers are paying such a price to build and maintain numerous, huge, permanent military bases in Iraq. There are also funding a new $1 billion embassy, the largest in the world.

The significant question we must ask ourselves is, what have we learned from these 3 years in Iraq? With plans now being laid for regime change in Iran, it appears we have learned absolutely nothing. There still are plenty of administration officials who daily paint a rosy picture of the Iraq we have created. But I wonder, if the past 3 years were nothing more than a bad dream and our Nation suddenly awakened, how many would for national security reasons urge the same invasion? Or would we instead give a gigantic sigh of relief that it was only a bad dream, that we need not relive the 3-year nightmare of death, destruction, chaos and stupendous consumption of tax dollars? Conceivably, we would still see oil prices under $30 a barrel, and, most importantly, 20,000 severe U.S. casualties would not have occurred. My guess is 99 percent of all Americans would be thankful it was only a bad dream and would never support the invasion knowing what we know today.

Even with the horrible results of the past 3 years, Congress is abuzz with plans to change the Iranian government. There is little resistance to the rise and clamor for democratization in Iran, even though their current President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is an elected leader.

Though Iran is hardly a perfect democracy, its system is far superior to most of our Arab allies, about which we never complain. Already the coordinated propaganda has galvanized the American people against Iran for the supposed threat it poses to us with weapons of mass destruction that are no more present than those Saddam Hussein was alleged to have had.

It is amazing how soon after being thoroughly discredited over the charges levied against Saddam Hussein the neoconservatives are willing to use the same arguments against Iran. It is frightening to see how easily Congress, the media and the people accept many of the same arguments against Iran that were used to justify an invasion of Iraq.

Since 2001, we have spent over $300 billion and occupied two Muslim nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. We are poorer, but certainly not safer, for it. We invaded Afghanistan to get Osama bin Laden, the ringleader behind 9/11. This effort has been virtually abandoned. Even though the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan, most of the country is now occupied and controlled by warlords who manage a drug trade bigger than ever before. Removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan actually served the interests of Iran, the Taliban's arch-enemy, more than our own.

The long time neocon goal to remake Iraq prompted us to abandoned the search for Osama bin Laden. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was hyped as a noble mission, justified by misrepresentation of intelligence concerning Saddam Hussein and his ability to attack us and his neighbors. This failed policy has created the current chaos in Iraq, chaos that many describe as a civil war.

Saddam Hussein is out of power, and most people are pleased. Yet some

Iraqis who dream of stability long for his authoritarian rule. But, once again, Saddam Hussein's removal benefited the Iranians, who considered Saddam Hussein an arch-enemy.

Our obsession with democracy, which is clearly conditional when one looks at our response to the recent Pakistani elections, will allow the majority Shia to claim leadership title if Iraq's election actually leads to an organized government. This delights the Iranians, who are close allies of the Iraqi Shia.

Talk about unintended consequences. This war has produced chaos, civil war, death and destruction and huge financial costs. It has eliminated two of Iran's worst enemies and placed power in Iran's best friends.

Even this apparent failure of policy does nothing to restrain the current march towards a similar confrontation with Iran. What will it take for us to learn from our failures? Common sense tells us the war in Iraq soon will spread to Iran. Fear of imaginary nuclear weapons or an incident involving Iran, whether planned or accidental, will rally the support needed for us to move on Muslim country number three.

All the past failures and unintended consequences will be forgotten. Even with deteriorating support for the Iraq war, new information, well-planned propaganda, or a major incident will override the skepticism and heartache of our frustrating fight. Vocal opponents of an attack on Iran again will be labeled unpatriotic, unsupportive of the troops, and sympathetic to Iran's radicals.

Instead of capitulating to these charges, we should point out that those who maneuver us into war do so with little concern for our young people serving in the military and theoretically think little of their own children if they have any. It is hard to conceive that political supporters of the war would consciously claim that a preemptive war for regime change where young people are sacrificed is only worth it if the deaths and the injuries are limited to other people's children. This I am sure would be denied, which means their own children are technically available for the sacrifice that is so often praised and glorified for the benefit of families who have lost so much. If so, they should think more of their own children. If this is not so and their children are not available for such sacrifice, the hypocrisy is apparent. Remember, most neocon planners fall into the category of chicken hawks.

For the past 3 years, it has been inferred that, if one is not in support of the current policy, one is against the troops and supports the enemy. Lack of support for the war in Iraq was said to be supportive of Saddam Hussein and his evil policies. This is an insulting and preposterous argument. Those who argued for the containment of the Soviets were never deemed sympathetic to Stalin or Kruschev. Lack of support for the Iraq war should never be used as an argument that one was sympathetic to Saddam Hussein. Containment and diplomacy are far superior to confront an enemy, and are less costly and far less dangerous, especially when there is no evidence that our national security is being threatened.

Although a large percentage of the public now rejects the various arguments for the Iraq war 3 years ago, they were easily persuaded by the politicians and media to fully support the invasion. Now, after 3 years of terrible pain for so many, even the troops are awakening from their slumber and sensing the fruitlessness of our failing effort. Seventy-two percent of our troops now serving in Iraq say it is time to come home. Yet, the majority still cling to the propaganda that they are there because of the 9/11 attacks, something even the administration has ceased to claim. Propaganda is pushed on our troops to exploit their need to believe in a cause that is worth the risk to life and limb.

I smell an expanded war in the Middle East and pray that I am wrong. I sense that circumstances will arise that demand support regardless of the danger and the cost. Any lack of support once again will be painted as being soft on terrorism and al Qaeda. We will be told we must support Israel, support patriotism, support the troops, defend freedom. The public too often only smells the stench of war after the killing starts. Public objection comes later on, but eventually it helps to stop the war.

I worry that before we can finish the war we are in and extricate ourselves, the patriotic fervor for expanding into Iran will drown out the cries of, ``Enough already.'' The agitation and congressional resolutions painting Iran as an enemy about to attack us have already begun. It is too bad we cannot learn from our mistakes. This time, there will be a greater pretense of an international effort sanctioned by the U.N. before the bombs are dropped. But even without support from the international community, we should expect the plan for regime change to continue. We have been forewarned that all options remain on the table, and there is little reason to expect much resistance from Congress. So far there is little resistance expressed in Congress for taking on Iran than there was prior to going into Iraq.

It is astonishing that after 3 years of bad results and tremendous expense there is little indication, we will reconsider our traditional non-interventionist foreign policy. Unfortunately, regime change, nation-building, policing the world, protecting our oil still constitutes an acceptable policy by the leaders of both major parties. It is already assumed by many in Washington I talk to that Iran is dead serious about obtaining a nuclear weapon and is a much more formidable opponent than Iraq. Besides, Mahmud Ahmadinejad threatened to destroy Israel, and that cannot stand. Washington sees Iran as a greater threat than Iraq ever was, a threat that cannot be ignored.

Iran's history is being ignored just as we ignored Iraq's history. This ignorance or deliberate misrepresentation of our recent relationship to Iraq and Iran is required to generate the fervor needed to attack once again a country that poses no threat to us. Our policies toward Iran have been more provocative than those toward Iraq. Yes, President Bush labeled Iran part of the axis of evil and unnecessarily provoked their anger at us. But our mistakes with Iran started a long time before this President took office. In 1953, our CIA, with the help of the British, participated in overthrowing the democratic-elected leader, Mohammed Mossadegh. We placed in power the Shah. He ruled ruthlessly but protected our oil interests, and for that, we protected him. That is, until 1979. We even provided him with Iran's first nuclear reactor.

Evidently, we did not buy the argument that his oil supplies precluded a need for civilian nuclear energy. From 1953 to 1979, his authoritarian rule served to incite a radical opposition led by the Ayatollah Khomeini who overthrew the Shah and took our hostages in 1979. This blow-back event was slow in coming, but Muslims have long memories. The hostage crisis and overthrow of the Shah by the Ayatollah was a major victory for the radical Islamists. Most Americans either never knew about or easily forgot about our unwise meddling in the internal affairs in Iran in 1953.

During the 1980s, we further antagonized Iran by supporting the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran. This made our relationship with Iran worse, while sending a message to Saddam Hussein that invading a neighboring country is not all that bad. When Hussein got the message from our State Department that his plan to invade Kuwait was not of much concern to the United States, he immediately preceded to do so. We, in a way, encouraged him to do it almost like we encouraged him to go into Iran. Of course, this time our reaction was quite different, and all of a sudden, our friendly ally, Saddam Hussein, became our arch enemy.

The American people may forget this flip-flop, but those who suffered from it never forgot. And the Iranians remember well our meddling in their affairs. Labeling the Iranians part of the axis of evil further alienated them and contributed to the animosity directed toward us.

For whatever reasons the neoconservatives might give, they are bound and determined to confront the Iranian government and demand changes in its leadership. This policy will further spread our military presence and undermine our security. The sad truth is that the supposed dangers posed by Iran are no more real than

those claimed about Iraq. The charges made against Iran are unsubstantiated and amazingly sound very similar to the false charges made against Iraq. One would think promoters of the war against Iraq would be a little bit more reluctant to use the same arguments to stir up hatred toward Iran. The American people and Congress should be more cautious in accepting these charges at face value, yet it seems the propaganda is working since few in Washington object as Congress passes resolutions condemning Iran and asking for U.N. sanctions against her.

There is no evidence of a threat to us by Iran and no reason to plan and initiate a confrontation with her. There are many reasons not to do so: Iran does not have a nuclear weapon and there is no evidence that she is working on one, only conjecture. Even if Iran had a nuclear weapon, why would this be different from Pakistan, India, and North Korea having one? Why does Iran have less right to a defensive weapon than these other countries? If Iran had a nuclear weapon, the odds of her initiating an attack against anybody, which would guarantee her own annihilation are zero, and the same goes for the possibility she would place weapons in the hands of a nonstate terrorist group.

Pakistan has spread nuclear technology throughout the world, and in particular, to the North Koreans. They flaunt international restrictions on nuclear weapons, but we reward them just as we reward India. We needlessly and foolishly threaten Iran, even though they have no nuclear weapons, but listen to what a leading Israeli historian, Martin van Creveld had to say about this: ``Obviously we do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and I do not know if they are developing them. But if they are not developing them, they are crazy.''

There has been a lot of misinformation regarding Iran's nuclear program. This distortion of the truth has been used to pump up emotions in Congress to pass resolutions condemning her and promoting U.N. sanctions. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has never reported any evidence of undeclared sources or special nuclear material in Iran or any diversion of nuclear material. We demand that Iran prove it is not in violation of nuclear agreements, which is asking them impossibly to prove a negative. ElBaradei states Iran is in compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty required IAEA safeguards agreement.

We forget that the weapons we feared Saddam Hussein had were supplied to him by the United States, and we refused to believe U.N. inspectors and the CIA that he no longer had them. Likewise, Iran received her first nuclear reactor from us; now we are hysterically wondering if some day she might decide to build a bomb in self-interest. Anti-Iran voices beating the drums of confrontation distort the agreement made in Paris and the desire of Iran to restart the enrichment process. Their suspension of the enrichment process was voluntary and not a legal obligation. Iran has an absolute right under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to develop and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and this is now said to be an egregious violation of the NPT. It is the U.S. and her allies that are distorting and violating the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

Likewise, our proliferation of nuclear material to India is a clear violation of the nuclear proliferation treaty as well.

The demand for U.N. sanctions is now being strongly encouraged by Congress. The Iran Freedom Support Act, H.R. 282 passed in the International Relations Committee and recently the House passed H. Con. Res. 341, which inaccurately condemned Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations. At present, the likelihood of reason prevailing in Congress is minimal. Let there be no doubt, the neoconservative warriors are still in charge and are conditioning Congress, the media, and the American people for a preemptive attack on Iran, never mind that Afghanistan has unraveled and Iraq is in a Civil War.

Serious plans are being laid for the next distraction which will further spread this war in the Middle East. The unintended consequences of this effort surely will be worse than any of the complications experienced in the 3-year occupation of Iraq.

Our offer of political and financial assistance to foreign and domestic individuals who support the overthrow of the current Iranian government is fraught with danger and saturated with arrogance. Imagine how Americans citizens would respond if China supported similar efforts here in the United States to bring about regime change. How many of us would remain complacent if someone like Timothy McVeigh had been financed by a foreign power? Is it any wonder the Iranian people resent us and the attitude of our leaders?

Even though ElBaradei and his IAEA investigations have found no violations of the NPT required IAEA safeguard agreement, the Iran Freedom Support Act still demands that Iran prove they have no nuclear weapons, refusing to acknowledge that proving a negative is impossible. Let there be no doubt, though, the words ``regime change'' are not found in the bill. That is precisely what they are talking about. Neoconservative Michael Ladine, one of the architects of the Iraq fiasco, testifying before the International Relations Committee in favor of the Iraq Freedom Support Act stated it plainly. ``I know some members would prefer to dance around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this country, but anyone looking closely at the language and the context of the Iraq Freedom Support Act and its close relative in the Senate can clearly see that this is, in fact, the essence of the matter.

You can't have freedom in Iran without bringing down the mulahs.''

Sanctions, along with financial and political support to persons and groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian government, are acts of war. Once again, we are unilaterally declaring a preemptive war against a country and a people that have not harmed us and do not have the capacity to do so. And do not expect Congress to seriously debate a declaration of war. For the past 56 years, Congress has transferred to the executive branch the power to go to war as it pleases, regardless of the tragic results and costs.

Secretary of State Rice recently signaled a sharp shift toward confrontation in Iran's policy as she insisted on $75 million to finance propaganda, through TV and radio broadcasts into Iran. She expressed this need because of the so-called ``aggressive'' policies of the Iranian government. We are 7,000 miles from home, telling the Iraqis and the Iranians what kind of government they will have, backed up by the use of our military force, and we call them the aggressors? We fail to realize the Iranian people, for whatever faults they may have, have not in modern times invaded any neighboring country. This provocation is so unnecessary, costly and dangerous.

Just as the invasion of Iraq inadvertently served the interests of the Iranians, military confrontation with Iran will have unintended consequences. The successful alliance engendered between the Iranians and the Iraqi majority Shiia will prove a formidable opponent for us in Iraq as that civil war spreads. Shipping in the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz may well be disrupted by the Iranians in retaliation for any military confrontation. Since Iran would be incapable of defending herself by conventional means, it seems logical that they might well resort to terrorist attacks on us here at home. They will not passively lie down, nor can they be easily destroyed.

One of the reasons given for going into Iraq was to secure our oil supplies. This backfired badly. Production in Iraq is down 50 percent, and world oil prices have more than doubled to $60 per barrel. Meddling with Iran could easily have a similar result. We could see oil at $120 a barrel and gasoline at $6 a gallon. The obsession the neo-cons have with remaking the Middle East is hard to understand. One thing that is easy to understand is none of those who plan these wars expect to fight in them, nor do they expect their children to die in some IED explosion.

Exactly when an attack will occur is not known, but we have been forewarned more than once that all options are on the table. The sequence of events now occurring with regards to Iran are eerily reminiscent of the hype to our preemptive strike against Iraq. We should remember the saying: ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice,

shame on me.'' It looks to me like the Congress and the country is open to being fooled once again.

Interestingly, many early supporters of the Iraq War are now highly critical of the President, having been misled as to reasons for the invasion and occupation. But these same people are only too eager to accept the same flawed arguments for our need to undermine the Iranian government.

The President's 2006 National Security Strategy, just released, is every bit as frightening as the one released in 2002 endorsing preemptive war. In it he claims, ``We face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.'' He claims the Iranians have for 20 years hidden key nuclear activities, though the IAEA makes no such assumption, nor has the Security Council in at least 20 years ever sanctioned Iran. The clincher in the National Security Strategy document is if diplomatic efforts fail, confrontation will follow. The problem is the diplomatic effort, if one wants to use that term, is designed to fail by demanding the Iranians prove an unprovable negative. The West, led by the U.S., is in greater violation by demanding Iran not pursue any nuclear technology, even peaceful, that the NPT guarantees is their right.

The President states: Iran's ``desire to have a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.'' A desire is purely subjective and cannot be substantiated nor disproved. Therefore, all that is necessary to justify an attack is if Iran fails to prove it does not have a desire to be like the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, Pakistan, North Korea, India and Israel whose nuclear missiles surround Iran. Logic like this to justify a new war, without the least consideration for a congressional declaration of war, is indeed frightening.

Commonsense telling us Congress, especially given the civil war in Iraq and the mess in Afghanistan, should move with great caution in condoning a military confrontation with Iran.

Madam Speaker, there are reasons for my concern and let me list those. Most Americans are uninterested in foreign affairs until we get mired down in a war that costs too much, lasts too long, and kills too many U.S. troops. Getting out of a lengthy war is difficult, as I remember all too well with Vietnam while serving in the U.S. Air Force in 1963 to 1968. Getting into war is much easier.

Unfortunately, the legislative branch of our government too often defers to the executive branch and offers little resistance to war plans, even with no significant threat to our security. The need to go to war is always couched in patriotic terms and falsehoods regarding an imaginary, imminent danger. Not supporting the effort is painted as unpatriotic and wimpish against some evil that is about to engulf us. The real reason for our militarism is rarely revealed and hidden from the public. Even Congress is deceived into supporting adventurism they would not accept if fully informed.

If we accepted the traditional American and constitutional foreign policy of nonintervention across the board, there would be no temptation to go along with these unnecessary military operations. A foreign policy of intervention invites all kinds of excuses for spreading ourselves around the world. The debate shifts from nonintervention versus intervention, to where and for what particular reason should we involve ourselves. Most of the time, it is for less than honorable reasons. Even when cloaked in honorable slogans, like making the world safe for democracy, the unintended consequences and the ultimate costs cancel out the good intentions.

One of the greatest losses suffered these past 60 years from interventionism becoming an acceptable policy of both major parties is respect for the Constitution. Congress flatly has reneged on its huge responsibility to declare war. Going to war was never meant to be an executive decision, used indiscriminately with no resistance from Congress. The strongest attempt by Congress in the past 60 years to properly exert itself over foreign policy was the passage of the Foley amendment, demanding no assistance be given to the Nicaraguan contras. Even this explicit prohibition was flaunted by an earlier administration.

Arguing over the relative merits of each intervention is not a true debate, because it assumes that intervention per se is both moral and constitutional. Arguing for a Granada-type intervention because of its success and against the Iraq War because of its failure and cost is not enough. We must once again, understand the wisdom of rejecting entangling alliances and rejecting Nation building. We must stop trying to police the world and, instead, embrace noninterventionism as the proper moral and constitutional foreign policy of our country.

The best reason to oppose interventionism is that people die, needlessly, on both sides. We have suffered over 20,000 American casualties in Iraq already, and Iraqi civilian deaths probably number over 100,000 by all reasonable counts.

The next best reason is that the rule of law is undermined, especially when military interventions are carried out without a declaration of war. Whenever a war is ongoing, civil liberties are under attack at home. The current war in Iraq and the misnamed war on terror have created an environment here at home that affords little constitutional protection of our citizens' rights. Extreme nationalism is common during war. Signs of this are now apparent.

Prolonged wars, as this one has become, have profound consequences. No matter how much positive spin is put on it, war never makes a society wealthier. World War II was not a solution to the Depression, as many claim. If $1 billion is spent on weapons of war, the GDP records positive growth in that amount, but the expenditure is consumed by destruction of the weapons or bombs it bought, and the real economy is denied $1 billion to produce products that would have raised someone's standard of living.

Excessive spending to finance the war causes deficits to explode. There are never enough tax dollars available to pay the bills, and since there are not enough willing lenders and dollars available, the Federal Reserve must create new money out of thin air and new credit for buying Treasury bills to prevent interest rates from rising too rapidly. Rising rates would tip off everyone that there are not enough savings or taxes to finance the war.

This willingness to print whatever amount of money the government needs to pursue the war is literally inflation. Without a fiat monetary system, wars would be very difficult to finance since the people would never tolerate the taxes required to pay for it. Inflation of the money supply delays and hides the real cost of war. The result of the excessive creation of new money leads to the higher cost of living everyone decries and the Fed denies. Since taxes are not levied, the increase in prices that results from printing too much money is technically the tax required to pay for the war.

The tragedy is that the inflation tax is borne more by the poor and the middle class than the rich. Meanwhile, the well-connected rich, the politicians, the bureaucrats, the bankers, the military industrialists and the international corporations reap the benefits of war profits.

A sound economic process is disrupted with a war economy and monetary inflation. Strong voices emerge blaming the wrong policies for our problems, prompting an outcry for protectionist legislation. It is always easier to blame foreign producers and savers for our inflation, our lack of savings, excessive debt and loss of industrial jobs. Protectionist measures only make economic conditions worse. Inevitably these conditions, if not corrected, lead to a lower standard of living for most of our citizens.

Careless military intervention is also bad for the civil disturbance that results. The chaos in the streets of America in the 1960s while the Vietnam War raged, aggravated by the draft, was an example of domestic strife caused by an ill-advised unconstitutional war that could not be won. The early signs of civil discord are now present. Hopefully, we can extricate ourselves from Iraq and avoid a conflict in Iran before our streets explode, as they did in the 1960s.

In a way, it is amazing there is not a lot more outrage expressed by the American people. There is plenty of complaining but no outrage over policies that are not part of our American tradition. War based on false pretenses, 20,000 American casualties, torture policies, thousands jailed without due

process, illegal surveillance of citizens, warrantless searches, and yet no outrage. When the issues come before Congress, executive authority is maintained or even strengthened while real oversight is ignored.

Though many Americans are starting to feel the economic pain of paying for this war through inflation, the real pain has not yet arrived. We generally remain fat and happy with a system of money and borrowing that postpones the day of reckoning. Foreigners, in particular the Chinese and Japanese, gladly participate in the charade. We print the money and they take it, as do the OPEC Nations, and provide us with consumer goods and oil. Then they loan the money back to us at low interest rates, which we use to finance the war and our housing bubble and excessive consumption. This recycling and perpetual borrowing of inflated dollars allow us to avoid the pain of high taxes to pay for our war and welfare spending. It is fine until the music stops and the real costs are realized, with much higher interest rates and significant price inflation. That is when outrage will be heard and the people will realize we cannot afford the humanitarianism of the neo-conservatives.

The notion that our economic problems are principally due to the Chinese is nonsense. If the protectionists were to have it their way, the problem of financing the war would become readily apparent and have immediate ramifications, none good.

Today's economic problems, caused largely by our funny money system, won't be solved by altering exchange rates to favor us in the short run or by imposing high tariffs. Only sound money with real value will solve the problems of competing currency devaluations and protectionist measures.

Economic interests almost always are major reasons for wars being fought. Noble and patriotic causes are easier to sell to a public who must pay and provide cannon fodder to defend the financial interests of a privileged class. The fact that Saddam Hussein demanded Euros for oil in an attempt to undermine the U.S. dollar is believed by many to be one of the ulterior motives for our invasion and occupation of Iraq. Similarly, the Iranian oil burse now about to open may be seen as a threat to those who depend on maintaining the current monetary system with the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

The theory and significance of ``peak oil'' is believed to be an additional motivating factor for the United States and Great Britain wanting to maintain firm control over the oil supplies in the Middle East. The two nations have been protecting our oil interests in the Middle East for nearly 100 years. With diminishing supplies and expanding demands, the incentive to maintain a military presence in the Middle East is quite strong. Fear of China and Russia moving in to this region to consume more control alarms those who don't understand how a free market can develop substitutes to replace diminishing resources. Supporters of the military efforts to maintain control over large regions of the world to protect oil fail to count the real cost of energy once the DOD budget is factored in. Remember, invading Iraq was costly and oil prices doubled. Confrontation in Iran may evolve differently, but we can be sure it will be costly and oil prices will rise significantly.

There are long-term consequences or blowback from our militant policies of intervention around the world. They are unpredictable as to time and place. 9/11 was a consequence of our military presence on Muslim holy lands; the Ayatollah Khomeini's success in taking over the Iranian government in 1979 was a consequence of our CIA overthrowing Mossadech in 1953. These connections are rarely recognized by the American people and never acknowledged by our government. We never seem to learn how dangerous interventionism is to us and to our security.

There are some who may not agree strongly with any of my arguments, and instead believe the propaganda Iran and her President, Mahmoud Almadinejad, are thoroughly irresponsible and have threatened to destroy Israel. So all measures must be taken to prevent Iran from getting nukes, thus the campaign to intimidate and confront Iran.

First, Iran doesn't have a nuke and it is nowhere close to getting one, according to the CIA. If they did have one, using it would guarantee almost instantaneous annihilation by Israel and the United States. Hysterical fear of Iran is way out of proportion to reality. With a policy of containment, we stood down and won the Cold War against the Soviets and their 30,000 nuclear weapons and missiles. If you are looking for a real kook with a bomb to worry about, North Korea would be high on the list. Yet we negotiate with Kim Jong Il. Pakistan has nukes and was a close ally of the Taliban up until 9/11. Pakistan was never inspected by the IAEA as to their military capability. Yet we not only talk to her, we provide economic assistance, though someday Musharraf may well be overthrown and a pro-al Qaeda government put in place. We have been nearly obsessed with talking about regime change in Iran, while ignoring Pakistan and North Korea. It makes no sense and it is a very costly and dangerous policy.

The conclusion we should derive from this is simple. It is in our best interest to pursue a foreign policy of nonintervention. A strict interpretation of the Constitution mandates it. The moral imperative of not imposing our will on others, no matter how well intentioned, is a powerful argument for minding our own business. The principle of self- determination should be respected. Strict nonintervention removes the incentives for foreign powers and corporate interests to influence and control our policies overseas. We can't afford the cost that intervention requires, whether through higher taxes or inflation. If the moral arguments against intervention don't suffice for some, the practical arguments should.

Intervention just doesn't work. It backfires and ultimately hurts the American citizens both at home and abroad. Spreading ourselves too thin around the world actually diminishes our national security through a weakened military. As the only superpower of the world, a constant interventionist policy is perceived as arrogant, and greatly undermines our ability to use diplomacy in a positive manner.

Conservatives, libertarians, constitutionalists, and many of today's liberals have all at one time or another endorsed a less interventionist foreign policy. There is no reason a coalition of these groups might not once again present the case for a pro-American nonmilitant noninterventionist foreign policy dealing with all nations. A policy of trade and peace, and a willingness to use diplomacy is far superior to the foreign policy that has evolved over the past 60 years. It is time for a change.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless the international community acts quickly and decisively, the world's chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror ever created.

A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council.

The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated by the civilized world.

Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy. I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state policy.

I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping Israel from the map.

Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya. Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb blueprints, as Libya used to do.

Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.

Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, ``the West needs us more than we need them.''

With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran over the nuclear issue.

Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary. The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon material production capabilities.

But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act. Responsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.

Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate incentives by the international community to stop business as usual with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.

Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman from Florida, and myself.

Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson: playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime against Tehran.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished ranking member of our Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors meeting on February 4.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing

condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to

the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.

My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming

majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through

adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination

that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.

The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in

noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to

Article XII.C.

That resolution also found that pursuant to Article

III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall

within the competence of the UNSC.

At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting

Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to

choose diplomacy over confrontation.

Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a

result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process

begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past

findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.

I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that

today's report to the Security Council will not divest the

IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.

We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's

nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look

forward to the Director General's implementation report in

March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to

the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.

By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to

add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role,

reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran

to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a

course of confrontation.

The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear

safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the

rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to

address matters that raise questions of international peace

and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.

That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the

Security Council's involvement in such instances of

noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in

September that such a report is mandatory.

In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush

emphasized that, ``the Iranian government is defying the

world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the

world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear

weapons.''

We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and

clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a

nuclear weapons capability.

We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not

envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.

Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of

diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of

the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear

activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our

concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and

confrontation.

Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran

persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine

its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.

And through this path Iran can also start to restore its

standing in the international community to the benefit of the

Iranian people.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic

of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006

the board of governors

(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on

Iran's nuclear programme,

(b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,

(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in

the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and

II of the Treaty,

(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for

their professional and impartial efforts to implement the

Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding

safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by

Iran of the suspension,

(e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as

a special verification case,

(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the

Director General noted that after nearly three years of

intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a

position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's

nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared

nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

(g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its

obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and

the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is

exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history

of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of

those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's

verification of declarations made by Iran since September

2002,

(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that

Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the

Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/

67),

(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's

cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment,

materials and activities which have applications in the

conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well

as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director

General in GOV/2005/67),

(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General

reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related

to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to

metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining

of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into

hemispherical forms,

(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear

programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of

confidence-building is required from Iran,

(1) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for

a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and

(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would

contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to

realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of

mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be

resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to

the calls for confidence building measures which the Board

has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for

Iran to:

re-establish full and sustained suspension of all

enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including

research and development, to be verified by the Agency;

reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated

by heavy water;

ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional

Protocol;

pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with

the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed

on 18 December 2003;

implement transparency measures, as requested by the

Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend

beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement

and Additional Protocol, and include such access to

individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use

equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and

development as the Agency may request in support of its

ongoing investigations;

2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security

Council of the United Nations that these steps are required

of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council

all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to

this issue;

3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in

a position to clarify some important issues relating to

Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in

its possession a document on the production of uranium metal

hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this

process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components; and, noting that the decision to put this

document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran

to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a

full copy to the Agency;

4. Deeplv regrets that, despite repeated calls from the

Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment

related and reprocessing activities which the Board has

declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran

resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility

on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment

activities on 10 January 2006;

5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of

confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a

fissile material production capability against the background

of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous

Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its

position in relation to confidence-building measures, which

are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a

constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can

result in increased confidence;

6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to

the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable

and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify

possible activities which could have a military nuclear

dimension;

7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's

declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to

continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's

Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional

Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with

a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence

of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to

pursue additional transparency measures required for the

Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and

reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's

past nuclear activities;

8. Requests the Director General to report on the

implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next

regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and

immediately thereafter to convey, together with any

Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security

Council; and

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a brief by the Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in

the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's

Suspension of Enrichment-Related and Reprocessing Activities

The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the

developments that have taken place since November 2005 in

connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the

Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of

enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief

provides factual information concerning those developments;

it does not include any assessments thereof.

Iran has continued to facilitate access under its

Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act

as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by

providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and

access to locations.

1. Enrichment Programme

As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November

2005, during meetings that took place in October and November

2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional

information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme.

Responses to some of these requests were provided during

discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between

Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy

Director General for Safeguards. This information is

currently being assessed.

1.A. Contamination

As part of its assessment of the correctness and

completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment

activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the

source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some

high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at

locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components

had been manufactured, used and/or stored.

1.B. The 1987 offer

As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency

in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document

reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by

a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a

disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and

specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings,

specifications and calculations for a ``complete plant''; and

materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also

made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive

equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and

purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for

mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium

re-conversion and casting capabilities.

On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page

document was the only remaking documentary evidence relevant

to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this

to the secret nature of the programme and the management

style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at

that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists,

such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports,

personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its

statements concerning that offer.

1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network

between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key

members of the network about the events leading to the mid-

1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this

context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification

of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI

staff members in the mid-1990s.

P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran

has been unable to supply any documentation or other

information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of

500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The

Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and

contents of these shipments.

P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a

result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the

mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2

centrifuge components (which contained no supporting

specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered

along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to

assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during

the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this

period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2

centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge

components. In light of information available to the Agency

indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which

information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November

2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made

after 1995.

In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design

said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting

company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that

the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased,

magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is

still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to

acquire such magnets. 2.

2. Uranium Metal

Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to

have been the drawings, specifications and supporting

documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of

which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these

was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the

reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and

the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into

hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other

specifications for machined pieces for such components.

According to Iran, this document had been provided on the

initiative of the network, and not at the request of the

AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the

Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency

during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document

again and to place it under Agency seal.

3. Transparency Visits and Discussions

On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a

military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances

regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities at that site, where several environmental samples

were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of

the analysis of those samples.

Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional

information and clarifications related to efforts made by the

Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at

Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment

that could be used in uranium enrichment and

conversion activities. The Agency has also requested

interviews with the individuals involved in the

acquisition of those items.

On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency

documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts

by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a

number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment,

power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye

laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation

suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had

actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical

university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor.

However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency

for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request

to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential

for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use

of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass

spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment

(equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium

enrichment).

On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list

of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to

see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in

situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on

the Agency's list was presented at a technical university,

and environmental samples were taken from it.

On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification

about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use

material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium

and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005.

High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and

environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that

the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing,

but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran

agreed to provide additional information on inquiries

concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and

special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's

acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and

filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31

January 2006 for environmental sampling.

On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a

meeting to discuss information that had been made available

to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the

Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium

dioxide into UF4 (``green salt''), as well as

tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile

re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear

dimension and which appear to have administrative

interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the

``issues related to baseless allegations.'' Iran agreed on 23

January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the

clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to

address the other topics during that meeting. In the course

of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the

Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow

diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications

related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national

nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the

allegations were baseless and that it would provide further

clarifications later.

4. Suspension

The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements

of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and

reprocessing activities.

In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency

that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006,

``those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which

ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and

non-legally binding suspension'' (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7

January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran

requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz,

Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of

suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/

2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January

2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.

Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it

refers to as ``small scale R&D''. As of 30 January 2006,

Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or

assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF 6

material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of

the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel

Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of

components and some rotor testing is being conducted at

Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the fact that all

centrifuge-related raw materials and components are without

IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities

being carried out by Iran cannot be effective except at PFEP,

where containment and surveillance measures are being applied

for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz

containing UF6, from which seals had been removed

on 10 January 2006, were again placed under Agency

containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.

The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November

2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All

UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under

Agency containment and surveillance.

Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to

monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the

Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.

Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot stand by.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I know of no circumstance in the world in which more options are all bad than this particular one. We all have to be clear-headed about the challenge of Iran. It is a more difficult society to deal with, a more difficult government than Iraq.

It is absolutely clear that Iran does seek nuclear capacity. It is absolutely clear that Iran has been the greatest State promulgator of terrorist activity in the Middle East. Those are bases that we all have to understand.

Then we have to think through what is our response and what are the kinds of strategies that the United States should develop and are there lessons that exist today that might lend to this circumstance.

One of the lessons is that some things we do as a society can be counterproductive. All of us are concerned with the security and the fate of the State of Israel as well as the American national security, but if we think it through, does our policy in Iraq advance the security of Israel? Does a preemption of Iran advance the security of Israel? Does it advance the security of the United States?

If the United States acts militarily, for instance, in Iran, do we spark and ensure the great prediction, that none of us want to come to pass, that we will enter into one of these clashes of civilization made inevitable by another war of the West against another Muslim State? Muslims would view this as a circumstance that the Judeo-Christian world is attacking the world of Muslim culture. We have to think deeply and seriously about this.

Then when it comes to nuclear weapons, it is bad for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but there are things that are worse. One of the things that is worse is to give them reason to use that nuclear weapon, whether it be against ourselves or an ally of the United States.

The administration has informed the committee of jurisdiction that it profoundly opposes this piece of legislation and that it prefers a tack of stressing international diplomacy, and it is suggested to the committee in the strongest possible terms that this type of legislation undercuts their effort to be multilateral.

And so, while many Members of this body, many members of the public have objected to this administration for being too unilateral, this Congress is saying, with this kind of legislation, that we will be more unilateral than the administration wishes to be. In other words, with an administration that no one of any stripe would argue is not muscular--it is a very muscular administration--this Congress is trying to out-macho the muscular. That is something we should all think very seriously about.

Then we ought to think through what it means if we go forth in a given kind of direction, which words like ``regime change'' imply. What does preemption mean? It is clear that if we

move in a muscular direction and, for example, preemptively strike Iraq, that that will slow down the capacity of Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon. But will it stop it? Not necessarily, partly because of the capacities Iran has to develop WMD capacity in a more decentralized way than Iraq once did, but there are other ways of getting nuclear weapons. One can get nuclear weapons through the ``loose nuke'' dilemma of purchase or theft. And if one gives Iran reason to attack, it will, and it will in many ways that are now available in the world through decentralized terrorist activities, but also potentially through nuclear. And the potential of nuclear use increases if they are attacked.

Now we have the other option which is stressed in this bill--but the first, force being implied, but what is stressed is economic sanctions. So our two options are to shoot Iran or to shoot ourselves in the foot economically. And I will tell you that I can't think of anything that is more outrageous in logic. So I think we have to think through new types of approaches involving new ways of dialogue, new ways of international pressure of a very different nature than are proposed by this committee at this time.

While I have enormous respect for the proponents of this legislation, particularly the distinguished chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and our distinguished ranking member on the full committee (Mr. Lantos), I am convinced that in its present form the approach brought before this body complicates ongoing diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the building crisis with Iran.

Indeed, it is for this reason that the Department of State indicated that the Administration would be unable to support the legislation. As noted in a letter to Chairman Hyde, the bill would ``narrow in important ways the President's flexibility in the implementation of Iran sanctions, create tensions with countries whose help we need in dealing with Iran, and shift the focus away from Iran's actions and spotlight differences between us and our allies. This could play into Iran's hands, as it attempts to divide the U.S. from the international community as well as to sow division between the EU-3, China, and Russia. It would also create dissension among UNSC members, as the Council considers the Iran nuclear dossier.''

There are few areas of the world with a more troubling mix of geopolitical problems than the Middle East. The irony is that the war in Iraq which has consumed so much of our country's political and economic capital may hold less far-reaching consequences than challenges posed in neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

To the West, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off remains the sorest point in world relations, complicated by the incapacitation of Ariel Sharon and the rise of a Hamas-led government in the occupied territories. To the East, the sobering prospect of Iran joining the nuclear club stands out.

In life, individuals and countries sometimes face circumstances in which all judgments and options are bad. The Iranian dilemma is a case- in-point. But it is more than just an abstract bad-option model because at issue are nuclear weapons in the hands of a mullah-controlled society which has actively aided and abetted regional terrorists for years.

Indeed, the issue has become even more acute with the election in Iran of its hard-line, populist President, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, who suggested late last year that the murder of six million European Jews by the Nazis did not occur and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

In reference to recent disclosures of enhanced Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems to carry such weapons, concerned outside parties are actively reviewing options.

The Europeans have led with diplomatic entreaties; neo-con strategists in the U.S. with open-option planning--including, if investigative journalist Seymour Hersh is to be believed--the possible use of nuclear weapons.

In the background are references to the 1981 preemptive strike by the Israeli Air Force against Iraq's Osirak reactor.

At issue is the question of whether preemption is justified; if so, how it should be carried out; and, if carried out, whether intervention would lead to a more conciliatory, non-nuclear Iran or whether the effects of military action would be short-term, perhaps pushing back nuclear development a year or two, but precipitating a new level of hostility against the U.S. and Israel in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world which could continue for decades, if not centuries.

Since the American hostage crisis which so bedeviled the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, we have had a policy of economic sanctions coupled with comprehensive efforts to politically isolate Iran.

Six years ago, Senator Arlen Specter and I invited Iran's U.N. Ambassador to Capitol Hill, the first visit to Washington by a high- level Iranian representative since the hostage crisis.

On the subject of possible movement toward normalization of relations with Iran, I told the ambassador that while many would like to see a warming of relations, it would be inconceivable for the U.S. to consider normalizing our relationship so long as Iran continued its support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador forthrightly acknowledged that Iran provided help to both these terrorist organizations, but also noted, in what for some might be considered the most optimistic thing he said that day, that his government was prepared to cease support to anti-Israeli terrorist groups the moment a Palestinian state was established with borders acceptable to Palestinians.

For decades in the Muslim world, debate has been on-going whether to embrace a credible two-state (Israel and Palestine) approach or advance an irrevocable push-Israel-to-the-sea agenda. The implicit Iranian position, as articulated by the ambassador, was support for a two-state approach, but if the U.S. on its own, or Israel as a perceived surrogate, were to attack Iran, the possibility that such a compromise can ever become possible deteriorates.

While angst-ridden, the Muslim world understands the rationale for our intervention in Afghanistan where the plotting for the 9/11 attack on the U.S. occurred. It has no sympathy for our engagement in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, but if these two interventions were followed by a third in Iran, the likelihood is that such would be perceived in the vocabulary of the Harvard historian, Samuel Huntington, as an all-out ``clash of civilizations,'' pitting the Judeo-Christian against the Muslim world. In the Middle East it would be considered a war of choice precipitated by the United States. We might want it to be seen as a short-term action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, but the Muslim world would more likely view it as a continuance of the Crusades: a religious conflict of centuries' dimensions, with a revived future.

If military action is deemed necessary, the U.S. broadly has only three tactical options: (a) full-scale invasion a la Iraq; (b) surgical strikes of Iranian nuclear and missile installations; or (c) a surrogate strike by Israel, modeled along the lines of Osirak.

The first can be described as manifestly more difficult than our engagement in Iraq, particularly a post-conflict occupation. The second presents a number of difficulties, including the comprehensiveness of such a strike and the question of whether all aspects of a program that is clandestine can be eliminated. The third makes the U.S. accountable for Israeli actions, which themselves are likely to be more physically destructive but less effective than the 1981 strike against Osirak.

In thinking through the consequences of military action, even if projected to be successfully carried out, policymakers must put themselves in the place of a potential adversary. A strike that merely buys time may also be a strike that changes the manner and rationale of Iranian support for terrorist organizations. It may also change the geo-strategic reason and methodology for a country like Iran to garner control of nuclear weapons. ``Loose nukes'' abound. Countries with money and will can garner almost anything in the world despite efforts by the U.S. and others to make theft or sale difficult.

It is presumed that the major reasons that Iran currently seeks nuclear weapons relates to: (1) Pride: a belief that a 5,000 year-old society has as much right to control the most modern of weapons systems as a younger civilization like America or its neighbors to the west, Israel, and to the east, Pakistan; (2) Power: the implications of control of nuclear weapons with regard to its perceived hegemony as the largest and most powerful country in the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to its nemesis, Iraq, which not only once attacked Kuwait, but Iran itself using chemical weapons; (3) Politics: the concern that Israeli military dominance is based in part on the control of weapons that cannot be balanced in the Muslim world, except by a very distant Pakistan.

The issue of the day from an American perspective is weapons of mass destruction, their development and potential proliferation to nation- states and non-national terrorist groups. The question that cannot be ducked is whether military action against Iran might add to the list of reasons Iran may wish to control such weapons: their potential use against the United States. Perhaps as significantly, American policymakers must think through the new world of terrorism and what might be described as lesser weapons of mass destruction.

Any strike on Iran would be expected to immediately precipitate a violent reaction in the

Shi'a part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support today. With ease, Iranian influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make our ability to constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near hopeless.

And there should be little doubt that in a world in which ``tit for tat'' is the norm, a strike on Iran would increase the prospect of counter-strikes on American assets around the world and American territory itself. The asymmetrical nature of modem warfare is such that traditional armies will not be challenged in traditional ways. Nation- states which are attacked may feel they have little option except to ally themselves with terrorist groups to advance national interests.

We view terrorism as an illegitimate tool of uncivilized agents of change. In other parts of the world, increasing numbers of people view terrorist acts as legitimate responses of societies and, in some cases, groups within societies who are oppressed, against those who have stronger military forces.

If Afghanistan, an impoverished country as distant from our shores as any in the world, could become a plotting place for international terrorism, such danger would increase manifoldly with an increase in Iranian hostility, especially if based on an American attack.

If there exists today something like a one-in-three chance of another 9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in the next few years, a preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to double or triple such a prospect.

And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its power the ability not only to destabilize world politics, but world economies as well. Oil is, after all, the grease of economic activity, and an Iranian-led cutback in supply precipitated by us or them cannot be ruled out.

Given the risk, if not the untenability, of military action, policymakers are obligated to review other than military options. One, which has characterized our post-hostage taking Iranian policy for a full generation, is isolation of Iran. This policy can be continued, but as tempting as it is, there is little prospect of ratcheting it up much more, except in ways, such as a naval embargo on Iranian oil, that would be difficult to garner international support for and would, in any regard, damage us more than Iran.

The only logical alternative is to consider increasing dialogue without abandoning the possibility of future sanctions with this very difficult government.

Iran--its government and people--has to be fully engaged, and I am pleased that U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad has been authorized to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq. The Iranians played a stabilizing role regarding Afghanistan just several years ago, and logically they have a stake in a stable Iraq. I would urge the leadership in Tehran to re-think its apparent decision to close the door on this potentially productive avenue for dialogue.

With respect to the Iranian nuclear program, however, it is difficult to see how confrontation can be avoided if we will not talk directly with Tehran in appropriate foras about this and other matters. The stakes could not be higher. If diplomacy fails, there is a credible prospect that Iran will follow the North Korean model of rapid crisis escalation, including the cessation of international inspections, with a wholly unsupervised nuclear program leading in time to the production of nuclear weapons and the dangerously unpredictable regional consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq- like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and alarming consequences both regionally and world-wide.

A proposal that might be suggested is negotiation of a Persian Gulf nuclear-free zone, which would reduce, although given the high possibility of cheating, not eliminate entirely one of the reasons Iran presumably seeks nuclear weapons--fear that it may be at a disadvantage in a conflict with an oil-rich neighbor. In this context, Iran, the EU and Russia, with U.S. support, might agree on a proposal under which Iran would indefinitely and verifiably suspend domestic enrichment activity in exchange for an internationally guaranteed fuel supply, U.S.-backed security assurances, and a gradual lifting of sanctions by and resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., including expanded country-to-country cultural ties.

Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been educated in the United States. The people, although not the government of Iran, have democratic proclivities. While real power in Iran is controlled by the mullahs. Few societies in the world have if given a chance more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction than Iran. And just as it is hard to believe that outside military intervention would lead to anything except greater ensconcement of authoritarian mullah rule, a bettering of U.S. relations with Iran provide a greater prospect of progressive change in Iranian society.

There is nothing the new government of Iran, or for that matter Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda movement, benefit more from than an aggressive, interventionist U.S. policy toward Iran.

Finally, a note about arms control. If the U.S. wishes to lead in multilateral restraint, we might want to consider joining rather than rebuking the international community in development of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). All American administrations from Eisenhower on favored negotiation of a CTB. This one has taken the position the Senate took when it irrationally rejected such a ban seven years ago. The Senate took its angst against the strategic leadership of the Clinton Administration out on the wrong issue. This partisan, ideological posturing demands reconsideration. We simply cannot expect others to restrain themselves when we refuse to put constraints on ourselves.

We are in a world where use of force can not be ruled out. But we are also in a world where alternatives are vastly preferable. They must be put forthrightly on the table.

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting me to speak on this resolution.

One of the reasons, Madam Speaker, that I argued against our invasion of Iraq long before the war began was because I felt we needed to face far more serious threats like the danger posed by Iran. In the 3 years since that attack, the threat from Iran has grown, and our capacity to meet that threat has diminished. Now Iran has a President who exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate power and has threatened to wipe Israel off the map. Our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should Iran launch a new wave of terrorism.

We have done nothing to break our dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest ability now to blackmail us and other countries.

I appreciate the leadership of my good friend Mr. Lantos and others bringing the resolution forward to spotlight the problems with Iran. I appreciate their working with us to improve the bill.

For instance, now the bill will not allow us to deal with terrorist groups on our own watch list. I think that is very, very important. Unfortunately, this legislation does not provide solutions. Instead it limits the administration's flexibility to pursue diplomacy without providing any new tools not already at their disposal.

We need allies and partners to address the Iranian threat. We need the cooperation of the European Union, of China and, yes, Russia, since we have no more unilateral sanctions to place on Iran.

Our global standing is at a low point. Yet this bill sanctions not Iran, but the very countries we need for a strong diplomatic effort. This bill tragically gives equal weight to overthrowing the Iranian Government as it does to the immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.

Now, I am strongly opposed to this regime, but preventing them from developing nuclear weapons capacity must be our first priority, not prioritizing behavior change over regime change. We pull the rug out from underneath anybody in the current Iranian leadership who values survival over the nuclear program, and it clearly works to eliminate incentives for diplomatic solutions.

I have a sense of deja vu when I think back to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 which did not explicitly authorize the use of force, but certainly got the ball rolling that led to the tragedy of this Iraq war. Knowing what they know today, how many Members of this House would have voted differently 8 years ago?

I am very worried about where all this ends. We have heard reports from the Pentagon of plans to attack Iran, indeed plans for a nuclear strike on Iran, the repercussions of which should make us all recoil with horror. Now, the administration dismisses these news reports, but the American people

and this Congress got better information about what happened in Iraq from reporters like Seymour Hirsch than it got from, sadly, the President, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice.

I do not pretend to imagine the horrific things that Iran would do with nuclear weapons. We are all opposed to that. That is why we need a strong, smart, constructive diplomatic strategy. This bill does not provide it.

For over half a century, Madam Speaker, we have made a series of mistakes regarding Iran, starting in 1953 when the United States led the charge to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Iran and replace them with a dictatorship in the person of the Shah. Our support for that dictatorship and its repressive policies fueled the reaction that led to the Iranian revolution. It was part of what happened with the hostage crisis in Iran.

More recently there are very credible reports that diplomatic feelers extended by the Iranian Government were dismissed by this administration 2 and 3 years ago. I sincerely hope that we do not overwhelmingly and unthinkingly pass a resolution today that makes us feel good because we all hate this regime, but instead sets in motion a process that actually is destabilizing and makes the peaceful future that we all seek harder.

Madam Speaker, I do think this is an important conversation for us to have on this floor. I am pleased that the debate time was extended, and I hope our colleagues will take the time to scroll through the information that is available and think of the consequences.

For instance, I would enter into the record, a letter from Under Secretary of State Nick Burns to Chairman Hyde. I will just quote a little and then insert the rest in the Record.

We have enormous concerns about this proposed legislation,

particularly title II. These provisions would impair our

ability to continue working closely and successfully with our

allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.

Nobody here, nobody here, apologizes for this regime. And my good friend from Indiana is correct, there is a lot of shared interest and deep concern. The notion that this despotic regime would have control of nuclear weapons is terrifying, absolutely terrifying.

We long for the day that the Iranian people are free, in no small measure because the United States' history with the Iranian people over more than half a century is one where we have not always been on the side of democracy for the Iranian people, overthrowing their democratically elected regime in 1953. That was not a proud moment in our history when we helped install a dictator, but we called him the Shah.

We are united in our commitment to deal meaningfully with this problem. This legislation, as the administration has made clear, falls short of the mark. It is not tightening our sanctions against Iran.

We have done that.

There have been administrations, both Republican and Democrat, who have maybe not been as zealous in implementing those sanctions; but that is on the books. We have done it.

What this talks about doing is extending sanctions against the very people whose cooperation we need to solve this problem. We are confusing our goals. Is it more important to threaten a regime change and thereby consolidate it? This Government of Iran by all indications is not monolithic. There are people who disagree with the sad and repulsive face of the current leader. There are a vast number of young people in Iran who are not at this point violently anti-American. They are pro-Western. There is interest in the United States. If we misplay this, we can end up turning another generation against us in Iran.

We have had empty threats against North Korea that did not stop them from going full speed ahead developing nuclear weapons, in fact, we are probably less safe today because we have not been focused and effective.

I do strongly identify with the words of my friend, the gentleman from Iowa

(Mr. Leach). I have been one who has been somewhat critical of this administration in its actions in the past. I would find it absolutely inappropriate to not reinforce when I think they are trying to reposition themselves vis-a-vis Iran. There are many people on our side of the aisle who were against the rush to war in Iraq and many more who have found that it was a mistake to do so. We have supported more diplomatic initiatives, and this is the opportunity we have now.

This legislation is not each-handed. It is not focused. The administration does not want it. It sanctions our allies. I strongly urge that we do things that are coming down the pike now that we in Congress can do that will make a difference in Iran. Think about how we deal with India and nuclear weapons. This is a decision that is looming ahead of us that will make a difference for China and other countries that have nuclear technology about how we treat them in that situation.

And for heaven's sake, when people have suddenly discovered $3-a- gallon gasoline and that we are addicted to foreign oil, which is part of Iran's strength right now, maybe we in Congress can forget the goofy energy bill we passed and get serious about conservation, alternative energy, increasing fuel standards and giving full value to the American public for our oil and gas resources. These are things that we can do now that will make a difference. Let the administration do its job diplomatically; provide oversight, but do not go over the edge with this legislation.

Department of State,

Washington, DC.

Hon. Henry J. Hyde,

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of

Representatives.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to comment on HR 282, the

``Iran Freedom Support Act of 2005,'' that currently is

pending before your Committee.

We have serious concerns about this proposed legislation,

particularly Title II, which would amend the Iran and Libya

Sanctions Act (ILSA). These provisions would impair our

ability to continue working closely and successfully with our

allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.

The Iran issue is sensitive and critically important. The

September 24 IAEA resolution, tabled by the EU-3 (Germany,

the UK, and France), was an important step forward. We are

going to have to continue working with our international

partners to isolate Iran and to build and maintain an

international coalition to ensure that Iran does not acquire

a nuclear weapons capability. In doing so, the President

needs the flexibility that HR 282 would impede.

I note that one portion of the bill, Title IV, regarding

support for democracy in Iran, could, with relatively minor

modifications, make a positive contribution to our Iran

objectives, and we would welcome the opportunity to work with

Congress in developing this approach.

Sincerely,

R. Nicholas Burns,

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Madam Speaker, I would like to include the following article, which I referenced on the floor, in the Record of the debate on H.R. 282, the ``Iran Freedom Support Act.''

[From the Asia Times, March 30, 2006]

Neo-Con Cabal Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks

(By Gareth Porter)

Washington.--The George W. Bush administration failed to

enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in

May 2003 because neo-conservatives who advocated

destabilization and regime change were able to block any

serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to

former administration officials.

The same neo-conservative veto power also prevented the

administration from adopting any official policy statement on

Iran, those same officials said.

Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to secretary of

state Colin Powell, said the failure to adopt a formal Iran

policy in 2002-03 was the result of obstruction by a ``secret

cabal'' of neo-conservatives in the administration, led by

Vice President Dick Cheney.

``The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with

Tehran,'' Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to Inter Press Service

(IPS). The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the

State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in

Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S.

concerns about its nuclear program, although it made no

specific concession in advance of the talks, according to

Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior

director for Middle East Affairs.

Iran's offer also raised the possibility of cutting off

Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting

Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organization,

according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to

Powell's demand in late March that Iran ``end its support for

terrorism''.

In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the U.S.

to address security questions, the lifting of economic

sanctions and normalization of relations, including support

for Iran's integration into the global economic order.

Leverett also recalls that the Iranian offer was drafted

with the blessing of all the major political players in the

Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

Khomeini.

Realists, led by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage,

were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer.

Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State

Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed

on the offer.

Exactly how the decision was made is not known. ``As with

many of these issues of national security decision-making,

there are no fingerprints,'' Wilkerson told IPS. ``But I

would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W.

Bush.''

As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of

what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's ``grand

bargain'' initiative was a result of the administration's

inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.

A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran

calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of

interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a

source who asked to remain unidentified.

But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD,

the source recalled, because officials in Cheney's office and

in under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith's

Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and

kept trying to amend it.

Opponents of the neo-conservative policy line blame

Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, for the

failure of the administration to override the extremists in

the administration. The statutory policymaker process on

Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in an e-mail, was ``managed by a

national security adviser incapable of standing up to the

cabal . . .''

In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps

struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the

administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that

had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-02. They

believed Iran could be helpful in stabilizing postconflict

Iraq, because the Iraqi Shi'ite militants whom they expected

to return from Iran after Saddam Hussein's overthrow owed

some degree of allegiance to Iran.

The neo-conservatives tried to block those meetings on

tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. ``They were

saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't

want to owe them,'' he recalled.

Nevertheless, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay

Khalilzad (now envoy in Iraq) was authorized to begin meeting

secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq.

The neo-conservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by

introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking

al-Oaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.

Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be

given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush

administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002

of refusing to share any information with Iran on al-Oaeda or

other terrorist organizations.

On May 3,2003, as the Iranian ``grand bargain'' proposal

was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in

Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue,

according to Leverett: if the U.S. gave Iran the names of the

cadres of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) who were being held by

U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the U.S. the names of

the al-Oaeda operatives they had detained.

The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from

Iraqi territory during the Hussein regime and had been named

a terrorist organization by the U.S. But it had capitulated

to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neo-conservatives

now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to

destabilize the Iranian regime.

The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative

draft NSPD drawn up by neo-conservatives in the

administration.

The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's

staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had

begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the

liking of the Israeli Embassy.

(Franklin eventually pleaded guilty to passing classified

information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel

lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in

prison.)

Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News

reported on May 30, 2003, that the Pentagon was calling for

the destabilization of the Iranian government by ``using all

available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including

backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services

of the Mujahideen-e Khalq . . .''

Nevertheless, Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong

with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK

should not be repatriated to Iran. ``I have it on good

authority,'' Leverett told IPS, ``that Bush's initial

reaction was, `But we say there is no such thing as a good

terrorist.' '' Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the

Iranian proposal.

By the end of May, the neo-conservatives had succeeded in

closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to

push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the

Franklin indictment, Franklin told an Israeli Embassy officer

in October that work on the NSPD had been stopped.

But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic

contact between Iran and the U.S., the neo-conservatives had

a clear path to raising tensions and building political

support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United

States.

Madam Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither gentleman is opposed to the bill.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Madam Speaker, I sought the time in opposition mainly because it is a very opportune time to talk about our foreign policy and the disadvantages that intervention poses for us.

There are two types of foreign policy we can have: interventionism, where we tell other people what to do; and the more traditional American foreign policy of nonintervention and not using force to tell other people what to do. The policy of foreign intervention has been around a long time, and it is not only one party that endorses it. In 1998 we had a similar bill come up to the floor. It was called the Iraqi Freedom Act. And that was the preliminary stages of leading to a war, which is a very unpopular, very expensive, and deadly war going on right now in Iraq. So this is a similar bill moving in that direction.

The 1998 resolution, which required regime change and laid the plans out for regime change, did not come up under this administration. That occurred with the previous administration.

But I have no qualms about the goals of the authors of this legislation. They would like to see freedom in Iran. I would, too. It is just that I believe the use of force backfires on us, and when we use force such as sanctions and subsidizing and giving money to dissidents, what we really do is the opposite of what we want. Those individuals who are trying to promote more freedom in Iran actually are forced to ally themselves with the radicals, so instead of undermining the system, it has made it worse. It is always argued that they will welcome us when we march in as liberators, and Iraq proved that that was not the case. Iran won't be much better.

But let me just say a few things about interventionism. Interventionism, which is essentially something that was gradually developed over the 20th century, led to a century of war and killing and was very expensive to the American people in costs. It means that we assume the moral right and the constitutional authority to be involved in the internal affairs of other nations, and yet there is no moral right for us to get involved in the internal affairs of other countries, and there is no constitutional authority for us to do so.

We are not designated as ``the nation builder.'' No matter how well- intended it is, it doesn't work, and we don't have this authority to do this. We have not been designated the ``policeman of the world,'' although we have assumed that role more so every year, and that has been going on for several decades.

There are always more costs than anybody imagines. Iraq was supposed to cost $50 billion. It is now hundreds of billions of dollars. There is economic harm done. There is inflation that it causes. Yet it continues, and instead of coming to an end, it tends to spread. That is why I fear this so much.

I see the way we are dealing with Iran as just spreading a problem that we contributed to in the Middle East. Too many innocent lives are lost, innocent American lives, GIs that go over and are killed so needlessly, especially since we don't achieve the goal of bringing freedom and liberty and democracy to these countries.

Interventionism endorses the principle that we have this authority to change regimes. We have been doing it for more than 50 years through activities of the CIA in a secret manner, and now we are doing it in a much more open manner where we literally invade countries. We initiate the force. We start the war because we believe that we have a monopoly on goodness that we can spread and teach other people to understand and live with.

There are too many unintended consequences, too much blow-back. It comes back to harm us in the long run. At one time we were an ally of Saddam Hussein. At one time we were an ally of Osama bin Laden. These things don't work out the way we think they are going to.

The one thing that interventionism endorses, which I strongly disagree with, it really deemphasizes diplomacy. It deemphasizes it to the point where if we don't feel like it, we are not willing to talk to people. When we feel like it, we might demagogue it and pretend we are talking. But it really doesn't encourage diplomacy.

Another reason why interventionism is so bad for us, it encourages special interests to get behind our foreign policy and endorse what we are doing and influence what we are doing, possibly another country and possibly some industry that might influence us.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 20 seconds for a quick quote, and then I am going to yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

The quote: ``The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Baghdad communiques are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. We are today not far from a disaster.''

This comes from Lawrence of Arabia, 1920. We should learn from our mistakes and other countries' mistakes.

Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Madam Speaker, this bill authorizes strong sanctions as well as funding to dissident groups inside Iraq to overthrow that government. In my interpretation that is the use of force, and I yield 6\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute before I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

I want to quote from Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty of which Iran is a signator: ``Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.''

Our position is that they do not have the right to enrich. Those who deny the right to enrich are more in violation of the NPT Treaty than Iran itself.

What do we do for those who are totally in defiance to international law in the NPT Treaty, like India and Pakistan? We reward them and subsidize them. At the same time, there is no proof that there has been any violation of this treaty by Iran, and yet the rewards go to those who are in total defiance.

Madam Speaker, I would yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach).

(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, there has been talk in the media and elsewhere about the necessity of bombing Iran, and we are talking today about regime change, which is an act of force, yet some of us believe we are acting too hastily. Others deny that; that something imminently is going to happen. But I want to read a little quote here from John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence. He says, ``Our assessment at the moment is that even though we believe that Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, we believe that it is still a number of years before they are likely to have enough fissile material to assemble into or put into a nuclear weapon; perhaps into the next decade. So I think it is important that this issue be kept in perspective.'' This is John Negroponte. And I think those who are so eager to pass this legislation and move toward regime change are moving in the wrong direction too hastily, and there are a lot of analogies to this and to Iraq, so we caution you about that.

Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Madam Speaker, there has been a lot of talk here about what this bill is doing and that it does not authorize the use of force. As a matter of fact, the language in the bill says this does not authorize the use of force. But my contention is it is a contradiction to the bill itself because the bill itself does authorize the use of force. No, not tanks and airplanes and bombs yet, but we know that all these options are still on the table.

But what it does authorize is something that is equivalent to force, and that is sanctions. Sanctions are used as an act of war.

Also, this bill has money in it, and it is open-ended, an authorization of appropriation. There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. And what is this section talking about? Subsidies and funding of dissident groups to go in there and undermine the Iranian government.

Yes, we quote Ahmadinejad about his vitriolic statements, and they are horrible, but how do you think they interpret other statements when we say we are going to wipe their regime off the face of the Earth? We are going to have regime change. So from their viewpoint we are saying the same thing, and we should not be blinded to that and pretend, because our language is not quite as violent. We are saying the same thing, because look at the result of the violence in Iraq as a result of our efforts of regime change.

Now, one of the major authors of the Iraqi war, a leader of the neoconservative movement, came before the committee when this resolution was debated and when we had hearings on it. I want to read a quote from him because it clarifies this issue. The quote comes from Michael Ledeen, and he wants regime change. This is what he had to say. ``There is much that is praiseworthy in the Iran Freedom Support Act. I think it can be improved by more openly embracing a policy of regime change in Iran and allocating an adequate budget to demonstrate our seriousness in this endeavor. I know some Members would prefer to dance around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this country, but anyone looking closely at the language, and that is what I have done, and content of the Iran Freedom Support Act and its close relative in the Senate can clearly see that it is, in fact, the essence of the matter. You can't have freedom in Iran, that is, we can't have our way, without bringing down the mullahs.''

That is an outright threat. That is the testimony of a neoconservative who led us and promoted and pushed the war in Iraq, and nothing would please him and others who are behind this type of resolution to see regime change. There is no denial of that.

The question is how do we do it? Are we going to do it pussyfooting around? Or are we going to use force and violence? We did, we used bombs for a long time against Iraq. But we had a bill in 1998 that said explicitly we are going to get rid of the Iraqi government, and it took a few years to get the war going.

Both parties are involved in this. It is not just this administration that has promoted this type of foreign policy, which, quite frankly, I see is not in the best interest of our country. This is why I am a strong advocate of minding our own business. Don't get involved in nation building. Don't police the world. Don't get involved in the internal affairs of the other nations. Otherwise, we have a big job ahead of us.

What about the fact that Kim Jong Il is still in power? We are talking to him. We talked to Qadaffi. Mao was in power, and he had nuclear weapons. What did we do; did we attack him? No. What did we do with Stalin? Stalin and Khrushchev had 30,000 nuclear weapons. Were we ready to use force and intimidation and yelling and screaming? And Khrushchev was ready to wipe us off the face of the Earth also.

But I am asking you to reconsider the fact that moving in this direction is the same thing as we did against Iraq, and it won't do us any good. It is going to cost us a lot of money, and it is going to cost a lot of lives, and it is un-American. It is not constitutional. It is not moral. We should not pursue this type of foreign policy. We should take care of ourselves, and we should be more friendly with nations. We should be willing to trade. And if you are concerned about the world, why not set a good example? When our house is clean, when we have a good democracy and a worthy Republic, and we do well, believe me, they will want to emulate us.

But attacking and intimidating other nations, the way we go at it now, literally backfires on us. What is it doing to the dissidents, those who would love to overthrow the Islamic radicals in Iran right now? It unifies them. Did we become unified in this country when we were attacked on 9/11? Do you think Republicans and Democrats were divided on 9/11 and 9/12? No, it brings them together. So this policy does exactly the opposite of what you pretend that you want to do, and that is encourage those people who don't like their government. But by doing it this way, you literally are doing the very opposite.

So I just plead with you to be more cautious. Negroponte says there is no rush. Take some time. They are not about to have a nuclear weapon. And

whether or not that is their plan or not probably at this moment is irrelevant. I mean, if we stood down all these nations and all these nuclear weapons in the past, why can't we practice more diplomacy to resolve our differences. I was talking to somebody the other day and they said, well, maybe in 10 years they might have a nuclear weapon, so we must act now. Get the bombs ready. They are talking about a nuclear attack on Iran in order to stop them from producing a nuclear bomb. It is time to step back and look at the policy. The policy of nonintervention and peaceful relations with the world and peaceful trade is the American way to go, and it will lead to peace and prosperity.

I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio.