Iran Freedom Support Act

Mr. Speaker, today I enter into the Congressional Record a report by the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) entitled, ``U.S. Policy Options for Iran.'' The IPC found that Iran presents a growing challenge to U.S. interests and values in a number of areas. The report examines the U.S. policy options for addressing these concerns and calls for change in Iran based on internal Iranian opposition.

We need to foster greater awareness and dialogue in Congress about this critical situation. To that end, I urge my colleagues to review this report and join me developing an effective U.S. policy on Iran.

U.S. Policy Options for Iran

Prepared by: Iran Policy Committee (IPC)

co-chairs

Ambassador James Akins, (ret.)

Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), CEO, wvc3, inc.

Paul Leventhal, Founder and President Emeritus, Nuclear

Control Institute

Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc.

Bruce McColm, President, Institute for Democratic

Strategies and Former President, International Republican

Institute

Lt. General (ret.) Thomas McInerney Former Assistant Vice

Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Captain Chuck Nash (ret.) President, Emerging Technologies

International

Lt. General Edward Rowny (ret.) Former Ambassador Strategic

Arms Reduction Talks

Professor Raymond Tanter Former Staff Member, National

Security Council

Major General (ret.) Paul Vallely, Military Committee

Chairman, Center for Security Policy

Executive Director: Clare Lopez Strategic Policy and

Intelligence Analyst

U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Executive Summary

Iran poses six threats to American interests and ideals:

Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.

Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist

networks.

Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace

process.

Disruptive role in Iraq.

Expansionist radical ideology.

Denial of basic human rights to its own population.

With respect to these threats from Iran, Washington circles

largely divide between two alternatives--those who favor

engagement with and those who support military strikes

against the regime Few favor regime change as an end in

itself.

While the Bush administration does not yet explicitly call

for changing the regime, it advocates working with the

Iranian people as opposed to the unelected theocracy in

Tehran, which is an implicit policy of regime change.

By calling for change in Tehran based on the Iranian

opposition instead of the U.S. military, the Iran Policy

Committee (IPC) highlights a third alternative: Keep open

diplomatic and military options, while providing a central

role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy

initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign

Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),

and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In

contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that

Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in

U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Comprised of former officials who have worked on the Middle

East in the White House, State Department, Pentagon,

intelligence agencies, Congress, and experts from think tanks

and universities, IPC welcomes the occasion to support the

Iranian people in pursuit of U.S. national interests. But

continued designation since 1997 of the main Iranian

opposition group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), as a foreign

terrorist organization by the State Department assures Tehran

that regime change is off the table. Removing the MEK's

terrorist designation would be a tangible signal to Tehran

and to the Iranian people that a new option is implicitly on

the table--regime change.

U.S. Policy Options for Iran

Introduction

`` . . . liberty in our land depends on the success of

liberty in other lands . . . . So it is the policy of the

United States to seek and support the growth of democratic

movements and institutions in every nation and culture.--

President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005.

``As you stand for liberty, America stands with you.''--

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2

February 2005.

Using the theme of liberty in general from his Inaugural

Address, President Bush refers directly to the Iranian people

in his State of the Union Address. In so doing, he tacitly

``targets'' the regime in Tehran.

The question is what means should the President use to

decrease threats posed by Iran:

Continued negotiations, including positive and negative

incentives.

Future military action.

Support for the Iranian opposition.

These options are neither mutually exclusive nor logically

exhaustive; but they do reflect courses of action being

considered in Washington.

Because the Iranian regime's policies pose direct threats

to national security interests

and ideals of the United States Government (USG) and those of

its allies and friends, Iran is on the front burner of

American foreign policy.

Consider these six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and

ideals:

Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.

Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist

networks.

Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace

process.

Disruptive role in Iraq.

Expansionist radical ideology.

Denial of basic human rights to its own population.

The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) analyzes these dangers and

makes recommendations to meet them. It is not the intention

of the IPC to duplicate analysis already receiving

consideration in policymaking circles; rather, this policy

paper offers a distinct perspective and recommends a course

of action that is different in key aspects from what has been

proposed to date. IPC seeks to build upon the President's

disposition to work with the Iranian people by broadening

options for American policymakers regarding Iran.

For too long, Washington has been divided between those who

favor engagement with and those who support military strikes

against the Iranian regime. The Committee stresses the

potential for a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and

military options, while providing a central role for the

Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

President Bush's 2005 State of the Union Address ignores

the leadership in Iran in order to converse directly with

Iranian people. And it is not his first time doing so;

indeed, the President's radio address of December 2002 began

the process of having a conversation with the people instead

of diplomatic discourse with the regime.

The IPC urges the administration to acknowledge the threat

posed to American national security interests by the

totalitarian theocracy in Tehran and to adopt a policy that

proactively steps forward to defend those interests.

Furthermore, the IPC believes that Washington should

support the Iranian people in their efforts to participate

meaningfully in a representative government that is

responsive to their concerns; implicit in such support is the

recognition that the Iranian people have the right to choose

and change their own government, as they see fit.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy

initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign

Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),

and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In

contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that

Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in

U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Themes running through these think tank reports include the

following reasons for dissatisfaction with American policy

toward Iran. Critics hold that U.S. policy is not well

articulated because of bureaucratic differences; there are

too many or too few carrots in relation to sticks; and

American policy is not linked enough with Europe's approach

to Iran. The reports view the threat of sanctions and force

as well as the promise of diplomacy as complementary tools

in the Western arsenal. At issue is the mix between

negative and positive incentives, a formula for which

there is little accord among transatlantic partners.

While some place the burden on Washington to resolve Iran's

nuclear proliferation activities and its state sponsored

international terrorism, few place that responsibility

directly on the Iranian people. With the possible exception

of the CPD, there is too little acknowledgment of a role for

Iranians in general and groups opposed to the regime in

particular.

As a result, there is a niche for the Iran Policy Committee

to address Iranian threats from the perspective of

encouraging the people to be principal agents change. Without

the active participation of Iranians, moreover, regime change

from the outside is unlikely to succeed.

En route to her first overseas mission to Europe on

February 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice held

that the Iranian people should have a chance to ``change

their own future,'' a statement IPC considers as a euphemism

for regime change.

Summing up the U.S. government's principal concerns with

respect to Iran, Rice further stated that, ``The goal of the

administration is to have a regime in Iran that is responsive

to concerns that we have about Iran's policies, which are

about 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this

point.''

While the debate in Washington concerns whether to make

explicit its tacit policy of regime change for Iran, the

debate in the region is the race between two clocks--a

diplomatic and a nuclear timepiece.

On one hand, at issue is whether negotiations can slow down

Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons status before Iran

acquires such status. The Committee holds that the diplomacy

is moving too slowly in relation to nuclear weapons progress.

On the other hand, unless working with the Iranian people

rapidly leads to regime change in Tehran, the pace of nuclear

weapons development might leave Washington with what he

Committee believes is the least desirable option of waging

military strikes against Iran.

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Regarding impact in the region, the nature of the regime in

Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons

capability: An Iran with representative institutions with a

nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as

nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist

theocracy. The best outcome is a freely-elected,

representative government without nuclear weapons; only with

such a government would such an outcome be possible.

The nightmare scenario is that a nuclear weapons capability

in the hands of an aggressive and repressive regime in Tehran

raises the possibility that it could and would collaborate

with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism.

In any event, of the six critical threats posed by Iran, its

drive to acquire nuclear weapons is the first and most

urgent.

According to June 2004 testimony by Undersecretary of State

for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton,

defense experts in the United States strongly believe that

Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons.

Speaking in January 2005, moreover, Bolton told reporters

that Iran's repeated support for terrorism makes it

particularly dangerous if Tehran were to acquire nuclear

weapons.

There have been new revelations about the rapid pace of

Iran's nuclear weapons progress since 2002. It is known that

Iran is developing its indigenous uranium mines; has built a

uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in central Iran; is

building a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz,

which is designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges

plus numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water

production plant at Arak, and a laser enrichment facility.

Revelations by diplomatic sources on February 3, 2005

suggest that Iran is testing components of its centrifuge

rotors, despite a November 2004 pledge to freeze all such

activities related to enrichment. That pledge led to an

agreement among Iran's European interlocutors and the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put a hold on

U.S. attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council for

violations of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT). The new revelations deal a serious blow to any

hopes that Iran intends to forego uranium enrichment en route

to a nuclear weapons capability.

In separate developments on February 3, a spokesman for the

main Iranian opposition group charged that Iran has obtained

materials and expertise to make neutron initiators

(``triggers'') for an atomic bomb. A senior official of the

National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), speaking in

Paris, cited secret sources inside Iran's nuclear development

programs. This person accused Tehran of conducting a secret

program to develop a nuclear triggering mechanism using

smuggled materials. He claimed that Iran has produced or

purchased from abroad quantities of polonium-210 and

beryllium, two elements required for building a ``neutron

initiator,'' which is an integral part of a nuclear bomb.

The facility where this work allegedly is taking place is a

military installation on the outskirts of Tehran, known as

Lavizan II. Remarkably, the IAEA has not inspected Lavizan II

yet, nor does it appear to be pressing for inspections there,

despite the site first being identified by the NCRI in

November 2004.

The NCRI has been instrumental in exposing Iran's secret

nuclear facilities in the past. By relying on its network

inside Iran of a member organization, the Mujahedeen e-Khalq

(MEK), the NCRI revealed a number of significant nuclear

sites including Natanz, Arak, Ab-Ali, and Lavizan.

Despite the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT,

Tehran has repeatedly violated its provisions and continues

to play fast and loose with IAEA efforts to monitor

compliance. The regime appears to be counting on the

apparently inexhaustible patience of the IAEA and the

Europeans, who have agreed to compromise after compromise

with Iran, to avoid having the issue brought before the

United Nations (UN) Security Council, as pursued by the

United States. The longer this negotiation takes, the more

time Iran has to engage in covert activities, enabling it to

acquire fissile materials to build and test nuclear weapons.

In other words, time is on Iran's side. The world cannot

wait for proof ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' of an Iranian

bomb. The risks of delay are too high. The international

community should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries

of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities.

Discoveries over the past two years, along with the

revelations by Iranian opposition groups that Iran is

developing a nuclear trigger, constitute ``clear and present

evidence'' of illicit activities that, unless halted, may

lead to bomb-making.

The general view among the experts is that, if left

undeterred, Iran is only one to three years away from

producing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, there are reports from a

secret meeting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

has ordered technicians to accelerate Iran's nuclear

program in order to achieve nuclear weapons status by the

end of 2005.

There is a notion in certain policy circles that, if Iran

feels threatened, the hard-line clerics will be further

induced to go nuclear. They propose offering additional

security assurances to Iran as an incentive to convince it to

give up its nuclear weapons program.

Given the nature and behavior of the regime, the more

plausible argument is that unless they feel threatened, the

Iranian clerical rulers will continue their nuclear weapons

program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the

prospect of severe consequences threatening the very

existence of the regime could induce them to forego nuclear

weapons out of fear of the consequences.

nuclear delivery systems: the iranian missile program

Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in

the Middle East. It has acquired complete missile systems and

developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously.

During military exercises held in September 2004, the Iranian

Revolutionary Guards successfully test-fired a ``strategic

missile,'' likely the Shahab-3 rocket, which reportedly has a

range of up to 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a

760-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Revolutionary Guards is

officially armed with the Shahab-3 missiles.

Taken in combination with Iran's drive to achieve a nuclear

weapons capability, its continuing support for radical

Islamist terrorist groups and avowed opposition to the

existence of Israel, Iran's demonstrated capability to field

an intercontinental ballistic missile raises much concern

among defense officials of many countries.

In December 2004, Iran's main opposition coalition, the

National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uncovered a

new missile program secretly pursued by Iran, as well as a

program to develop a nuclear warhead. The new secret missile,

produced at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in

northeast Tehran, is named Ghadar, NCRI reported. North

Korean experts are believed to be assisting the Iranian

program at this complex.

The Ghadar missile may have a range of 2,500 to 3,000

kilometers (1,550 to 1,860 miles). NCRI also reported that

Iran has improved the guidance and control system of its

Shahab-4 missiles, based on a system acquired from China.

In late January 2005, a Ukrainian legislator alleged that

Kiev sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China

during the period from 1999-2001. The Kh-55 cruise missile

has a range of 3,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a

200-kiloton nuclear warhead.

In addition to Iran's nuclear weapons program and its

advanced delivery system, a second threat posed by the regime

is its support for and involvement with international

terrorist networks.

regime support for international terrorism

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's number one

state-sponsor of terror. It created Hizballah, supports al

Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Tehran operates at the heart of a

network of terrorist organizations engaged in murder,

kidnapping, bombing, and other atrocities calculated to sap

the will of the United States and the West to resist.

Iran's logistical, financial and operational assistance

takes the form of providing terrorists safehaven, travel

documents such as passports, weapons, training and technical

expertise.

Information reveals a pattern of operational contacts

between the Iranian government and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda

organization. These contacts include: joint planning of

terrorist operations, military training of bin Laden

operatives inside Iran and by Iranian IRGC and MOIS officers

in Syria and Lebanon, financial assistance to clandestine

terrorist and surveillance cells, false passports, and

communications.

The 9/11 Commission report documented in great detail the

logistical, operational, and material support provided by

Iran and Hizballah to al Qaeda. This report, released in July

2004, echoes the earlier federal grand jury findings about

links between Iran and al Qaeda. The Commission's report

stated that Iran's support of al Qaeda dates back to 1991,

when operatives from both sides met in Sudan; by 1993, ``al

Qaeda received advice and training from Hezbollah'' in

intelligence, security, and explosives, especially in how to

use truck bombs. The training took place in the Beka'a

Valley, Hizballah's stronghold in Lebanon.

According to the 9/11 commission report, there is strong

evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda

members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that

some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. Iran's support

for al Qaeda has continued.

Iran's Opposition to the Arab-Israel Peace Process

Tehran was instrumental in the creation of Lebanese

Hizballah, which formed in 1982 under the sponsorship of

Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who arrived in

Lebanon as the vanguard of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.

Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, equipment,

training locations, and refuge from extradition. Its overall

financial support to Hizballah and Hamas totals tens of

millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year.

Iranian Designs in Iraq

Demography and geography facilitate the impact of Iran's

expansionist ideology. With a population three times Iraq's

and a contiguous territory four times Iraq's, Iran exerts a

naturally powerful influence on its western neighbor. Iraq's

longest border is with Iran (over 900 miles), and the vast

majority of the Iraqi population lives within a 100-mile

distance from the Iranian border, placing it well within the

sphere of Tehran's expansionist ideology.

Shiite pilgrims began flowing once again after 2003 between

the holy places in Iran and those in Iraq, especially the

holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Iranian intelligence

agents also flooded the country. They quietly and effectively

set up a network of agents across Iraq, recruiting and

training local village people, former Iraqi military

officers, politicians, and young men to collect intelligence

on Coalition forces and facilities.

A long period of secular Ba'athist domination in Iraq

punctuated by a savage eight-year war between Iran and Iraq

countered Iranian political influence in the region. During

this time, westward expansion of Iran's theocratic ideology

declined. With the April 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's

regime and ensuing breakup of existing security and border

patrol forces, Iran seized the chance to spread its influence

and launched a multifaceted military, intelligence, and

political campaign in Iraq.

Along with intelligence agents, the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS)

also sent suicide bombers, money, and weapons to support

insurgents fighting against Coalition forces in Iraq.

Testimony and documentary evidence show that officials at

the highest level of the Iranian regime have been involved

with planning and providing support for terrorists and

suicide bombers affiliated not only with the upstart

Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, but with the forces of

wanted Jordanian terrorist and al Qaeda associate, Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ba'athist loyalists as well.

In late January 2004, an Iraqi terrorist leader captured in

Falluja and accused of carrying out beheadings and deadly

attacks, claimed that his group was linked to Tehran. In

footage aired January 8, 2005 on the U.S.-run television

channel, AI-Hurra, Ahmed Yassin, a leader of the Jaish

Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) and a former colonel in Saddam

Hussein's army, said two members of his group went to Iran in

April or May, where they met a number of Iranian intelligence

officials and Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iranian

officials provided money, weapons, and even ``car bombs.''

During December 2004, the Najaf police chief said that the

commander of three terrorists arrested in connection with a

car bomb that exploded in the holy city on December 26, had

extensive connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.

Tehran also recruited over four thousand volunteers for

suicide operations in Iraq in public ceremonies in Iran

attended by prominent Revolutionary Guards commanders.

Iranian intelligence services have pumped millions of

dollars and hundreds of operatives into Iraq. In a press

conference in October 2004, Iraq's national intelligence

chief, Mohammed Al Shahwani, accused Iran's Baghdad embassy

of recruiting elements for sabotage operations and

assassinations of his intelligence agents. He said that

documents showed Iran had a $45-million budget for sowing

chaos in Iraq. At least 27 people working in the Iranian

embassy in Baghdad were coordinating intelligence gathering

operations and assassinations, the spy chief added.

Iranian meddling is aimed at frustrating the emergence of a

stable and representative government in Iraq and also at

keeping the United States so occupied in dealing with the

insurgency that it would have neither the will nor the

resources to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. In the

months and weeks leading up to national elections in January

2005, both Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and Jordan's King

Abdullah charged that Iran was heavily involved in attempting

to influence the outcome to produce a Shiite dominated

government similar to Iran's. In an interview with the

Kuwaiti daily, Al-Qabas on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Defense

Minister Hazem Shaalan accused the Iranian regime of

``interfering [in Iraq] with money, guns, and

intelligence.''

With the apparent success of the Iraqi elections, Iraq has

now entered a new phase. Only a day after the January 2005

elections, Iranian media and web sites claimed victory,

comparing the Shiites' gain in the elections with the Iranian

revolution that brought an Islamic system to power or with

the rise of Hizballah in the Lebanese political scene in the

Middle East.

The first and most pressing post-election challenge is to

ensure the selection of a representative National Assembly

that would draft a modern, broadminded constitution for Iraq.

The aim would be to reflect Iraq's Islamic soul but avoid a

narrow formula for governance based solely on Sharia law. It

is to be expected that Iran will seek to influence the

members of the National Assembly and their drafting of this

constitution.

The makeup of the future interim government is equally

important and might succeed to avoid Iranian dominance by

seeking as diverse participation as possible from all sectors

of Iraqi society. In the transitional period before the

constitution comes up for a vote and a permanent government

and military and security structure is in place, it will be

critical to monitor Iranian efforts to influence the process.

Expansionist Radical Ideology

Iran's ``Velayat e-Faqih'' system poses both an immediate

and continuing threat to neighbors because of its aggressive

policy of expansion. This policy is evident in Iranian

actions in Lebanon and Iraq, where calculated cultivation of

terrorism is an inseparable characteristic of the theocratic

system.

Export of terrorism and extremism is an intrinsic attribute

of Iran's theocratic system. Tehran's rulers believe their

power lies in awakening the Islamic world to their Islamist

ideology. Iran's leadership clearly believes the Islamic

Republic's survival depends on the support of such a global

force.

Denial of Basic Human Rights to its own citizen

The human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated

severely over the past year. Ironically, the European Union's

``human rights dialogue'' has had the opposite effect from

that intended because the regime has continued its

suppression of the Iranian citizenry.

In December 2004, the United Nations in a resolution

criticized Iran for public executions, arbitrary sentencing,

flogging, stoning, and systematic discrimination against

women. The measure also condemned ``the execution of minors

below eighteen years of age, and the use of torture and other

forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.'' It also

rebuked Iran for discrimination against minorities, including

Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and the Baha'is.

Gender discrimination and violence against women in Iran

continue to give cause for grave concern. The parliament has

called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and on

their social freedoms. Deputies have also called for

segregating men and women at universities and for other

limits on women's activities. The number of publications

closed down and of people arrested, prosecuted and sentenced

for the peaceful expression of their opinion has increased.

While the human rights situation deteriorated in Iran, the

public discontent has been on the rise.

Political Dissent in Iran

Over the past year, hundreds of anti-government

demonstrations were held in Iran, further destabilizing the

regime. Originating with complaints over municipal issues, a

series of anti-regime demonstrations that erupted in 2004 in

many provincial cities, such as Feraydoun Kenar, Boukan, and

the earthquake-stricken city of Barn, reportedly targeted

government buildings, vehicles, and security forces.

In December 2004, students at Tehran University gave

President Khatami an angry and humiliating reception when he

admitted to the role he played in preserving the regime. They

shouted, ``Shame, shame'' while calling him a liar and

demanding his resignation.

The anti-regime movement, partly derailed by the false

expectations aroused as a result of the election of Khatami

as president in 1997, has now gained a new momentum. The

disillusionment of the population with Khatami took place in

July 1999, when he failed to support a student demonstration

that turned into a six -day popular uprising, spreading to 19

cities and shaking the foundations of the regime. In the

midst of a bloody crackdown on the students, Khatami opted to

stand by the establishment; many believe he may have

ordered some of the crackdown himself.

The opposition movement meanwhile continued its expansion,

and since 1999, many student demonstrations and popular

protests have rocked Tehran and other cities.

In Search of a New Approach toward Iran: Options

Some American policy advisors urge the administration to

refrain from taking a hard line with Tehran because they

interpret recent developments inside Iran as pointing to an

impending collapse of the system, much like the Soviet

implosion that led to the end of the communist regime in the

USSR. Other policymakers advocate engagement with the ruling

clerics in Tehran in order to solve controversial issues

outstanding between the two countries.

In a difficult atmosphere of diplomatic gridlock, internal

and international ideological divisions, and faced with an

unappealing slate of military options, the United States

needs a broad set of options. This paper outlines a full

spectrum of approaches toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy

and moving through increasingly more coercive measures,

culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.

Diplomacy

Proponents of the diplomatic approach hold that the United

States has not offered enough carrots to Iran to address its

security concerns. In addition, it is necessary to convince

Tehran that it is in its own interests to abandon outlaw

behavior, they contend.

There are several carrots that might be offered to the

Iranian regime in the hope that a good-faith demonstration by

the West to an approach of engagement would elicit desired

compliance with international norms of behavior. Most of

these incentives have already been placed on the table.

This diplomatic approach requires that Washington cooperate

with Europeans to present a united front to the regime. With

the example of U.S. resolve in Afghanistan and Iraq before

them, the Iranian leadership might be persuaded to reach the

appropriate conclusions, if the principal European

interlocutors were to emphasize the limits of their ability

to influence, much less control, American foreign policy

decisions. In a version of ``good cop-- bad cop,'' the

message would be conveyed that there are consequences for

noncompliance that are beyond European ability to control.

An effort to acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian national

desires for a civilian nuclear power program might provide

Iran an opportunity to demonstrate its peaceful intentions,

according to diplomatic approach.

To enhance the acknowledged benefit of exchange programs

that bring foreign students and business leaders to the

United States for study and travel opportunities, Washington

should look for ways to expand such exchange programs,

consistent with the requirements of homeland security.

Coercive Diplomacy

A frank evaluation of the track record so far on attempts

at diplomatic engagement with the ruling regime in Tehran

must conclude that such an approach is not working and

probably will not ever succeed, if not stiffened with more

stringent measures. Such measures would begin exacting

penalties from Iran if it does not comply.

At the top of the list of penalties are economic sanctions,

which will not succeed unless applied in concerted and

cooperative fashion by all of Iran's major Western trading

partners. Such sanctions would include oil; ban on airline

travel; prohibition of financial transaction, bilateral or

multilateral economic assistance, and general trade.

Increased funding and strong congressional backing for

radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran would

send the message that Washington wants to reach out to the

Iranian people. Public statements of support from American

officials in favor of imprisoned and exiled Iranian political

leaders would be an encouraging sign of support for the

people.

The U.S. State Department can send a strong message of

disapproval to the regime in Tehran by refusing to issue

visas to its United Nations representatives that would permit

them to travel beyond the immediate radius surrounding New

York City (as occasionally has been done).

In the same vein, the activities of Iran's diplomatic

representation at the regime's interest section in the

Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, as well as at the regime's

UN mission in New York, should continue to be closely

observed by the appropriate domestic intelligence and other

agencies for possible unlawful activities that may include

espionage, threat, intimidation, or unlawful lobbying with

Members of Congress.

Also relevant is a threat of action by an international

tribunal for Iranian leadership crimes. It might charge the

leaders with support for transnational terrorism and human

rights abuses. This threat might be made tangible by bringing

a legal case against Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Most important of all, the United States must stay the

course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold,

which is representative, committed to fairness for all

Iraqis, and intolerant only of terrorism and violence.

Helping the voices of moderate Iraqi Muslims to be heard and

protecting them from intimidation by agents of Iranian terror

should go a long way to encourage emergence of like-minded

moderates within Iran.

As efforts on the diplomatic front are under way, the

United States should accelerate its outreach to the Iranian

people, as part of the process to help them change their

future.

Destabilization

Application of the diplomatic measures may not alter the

regime's behavior on those issues of paramount concern to the

international community, such as support for terror, pursuit

of WMD programs, meddling inside Iraq, and violation of its

citizens' human rights. If not, then Washington should be

prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military

action, but which might have the best chance for success.

The middle option would open a campaign of destabilization,

whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime

over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition

groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change

the regime. To the extent that any or all of the foregoing

diplomatic measures, coercive or not, are deemed useful,

their application should be sustained during a

destabilization phase.

However implausible or unlikely to be taken seriously, an

American call for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and his

cohorts ``to return to the mosque'' might set the stage and

be used as a point of departure for further negotiations.

Such a call might give the international community a

foundation upon which to build a case against the regime.

The next stage of an American-led campaign to compel

conformity to international norms of behavior would be to

encourage Iranian opposition groups. This is an option that

has never actually been on the table and has not been

explored sufficiently; this option relies on the Iranian

opposition to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign

for regime change and establishing representative

institutions.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on her

February 2005 European trip, ``The Iranian people should be

no different from the Palestinians or Iraqis or other peoples

around the world.'' That is, the people of Iran are not

immune to the wave of democracy in the Middle East.

In January 2005, six prominent members of the U.S.

Congress, led by House International Relations subcommittee

chair for

Middle East and Central Asia, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), as

well as Tom Lantos (D-CA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Howard Berman

(D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), and Gary Ackerman (D-NY),

introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 282), with more

than 50 co-sponsors. It would provide U.S. assistance to

independent broadcasts into Iran and to pro-democracy groups.

The best-known of the Iranian opposition groups is the

Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). Founded in the 1960s by college

students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against

the Shah, but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini, who

executed thousands of its members and leaders. Following the

start of mass executions in June 1981, the group went

underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981

to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.

While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with

tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns,

implementing cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime.

The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations

against the Revolutionary Guards and other government

targets. The MEK has represented a significant security

threat to the Iranian regime ever since the end of the Iran-

Iraq War and could continue to do so, were it released from

its circumscribed status in Iraq.

United States policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and

controversial over the years and reached a nadir in 1997,

when the Department of State placed the MEK on its Foreign

Terrorist Organizations list. This inclusion was primarily a

goodwill gesture to Mohammad Khatami, the newly-elected

Iranian president, whose administration was looked to with

much hope for its reformist promise. Despite the State

Department's accusations that the MEK murdered Americans in

mid 1970s and supported the U.S. embassy takeover in

Tehran in 1980--charges the organization denies--the MEK

has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979

Iranian revolution.

Nevertheless, the State Department added the major

political wing of the Iranian opposition, NCRI, to the

Department's terrorist designation; previously, NCRI had

operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered

organization.

Before surrendering hundreds of tanks and armored personnel

carriers to the U.S. military, the MEK had notable mechanized

and infantry capabilities. The fledgling Iraqi Army uses some

of this equipment, since 2004.

The MEK seems to have an impressive network in Iran, where

it has been gathering intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons

program as well as its activities in Iraq. The MEK published

a book detailing the particulars and pictures of nearly 22

thousand people--mostly associated with the MEK--executed for

political charges by the Iranian government.

There is sizable support among the exile Iranian community

for the MEK, which often draws large crowds to its rallies

and demonstrations in western capitals.

the MEK's relationship with the u.s. military in iraq

Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United

States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its

perceived involvement in the conflict that might have

complicated the situation in the region. Washington,

therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing

and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with

Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in

late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily

bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing

dozens of fighters and wounding many more.

U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with

the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its

forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States

decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated

2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces,

air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles

formerly in the MEK's possession.

In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to

Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the

offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.

Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK

activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes

the dissident group most seriously. European governments and

some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to

improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the

November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran

includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group,

which addressed Iran's security concerns.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the

level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, this organization is

indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian

opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in

Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute

nearly a third of its rank and file.

As of February 2005, the State Department still listed the

MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for

its removal from the list by many members of the U.S.

Congress and others.

The MEK and other Opposition Groups Support of U.S. Interests

The lack of viable intelligence about Iran continues to

plague analysts and planners. As stated earlier, the MEK and

NCRI revealed much of the information that has been verified

about Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. In this respect,

Washington might consider using intelligence made available

from opposition groups as lead information, i.e., to be

verified using independent means.

A 16-month investigation by the State Department and other

government agencies of the MEK members in Iraq culminated in

the 2004 judgment that they were ``protected persons under

the Fourth Geneva Convention,'' and that there was no basis

to charge any of them with terrorist actions.

At this juncture in 2005, therefore, a review of U.S.

policy concerning the MEK and the overall Iranian opposition

is in order. The designation of the MEK as a foreign

terrorist organization by the State Department has served,

since 1997, as an assurance to the Iranian regime that the

United States has removed the regime change option from the

table. Removing the terrorist designation from the MEK could

serve as the most tangible signal to the Iranian regime, as

well as to the Iranian people, that a new option is now on

the table. Removal might also have the effect of supporting

President Bush's assertion that America stands with the

people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves.

In the same way that the United States was receptive to

South African anti-apartheid leaders and the Soviet Union's

anti-communist activists, Washington should invite prominent

opposition figures both in Iran and in exile to the United

States. They might meet with U.S. officials, Members of

Congress, academics, think tanks, and the media. The European

Parliament offered such an example in December 2004, when it

invited Maryam Rajavi, the president of the NCRI to its

headquarters in Strasburg, where she offered an alternative

view to that of the Iranian regime. Tehran's angry reaction

to this invitation served to highlight the effectiveness of

such measures.

As an additional step, the United States might encourage

the new Iraqi government to extend formal recognition to the

MEK, based in Ashraf, as a legitimate political organization.

Such recognition would send yet another signal from

neighboring Iraq that the noose is tightening around Iran's

unelected rulers.

In light of the MEK's status as protected persons under the

Fourth Geneva Convention and the continued protection that

the U.S. military provides the group in Iraq, Washington has

an opportunity to decide whether to return to the MEK its

weapons, which would relieve responsibility from the American

military for the protection of its camps and personnel. Such

a move also would send an unambiguous signal to the Iranian

regime that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on

its borders.

Iranian groups, whether domestic or internationally-based,

which seek to broadcast or publish pro-democracy messages

inside the country might be provided with equipment,

facilities, funding, and support. Relatively modest

expenditures on such purposes can spell the difference

between a capability for such groups to get their message out

to international publics and in Iran.

The United States should make it official policy to protest

publicly cases of human rights violations, crackdown on

Iranian student demonstrators, and application of inhumane

and degrading punishments, such as stoning to death,

flogging, eye gouging, and amputation. Washington should be

particularly vigilante in providing political and moral

support to student demonstrators in Iran and hold Tehran

accountable for the arrest and killing of students during

anti-government demonstrations.

Should the United States reach a decision to support an

explicit policy of regime change in Iran, a Presidential

Finding would be a necessary first step, enabling many

activities by U.S. entities that cannot take place without

such a finding.

The United States should ensure that Iran understands that

neither it nor the Iranian opposition will take any option

off the table, if Iran remains unwilling to address

adequately international concerns about its nuclear programs

in particular. The goal is to ensure that democracy,

tolerance, and the rule of law are established in an Iran

that abjures use of WMD, terrorism, and threats against its

neighbors. Bringing Tehran's flagrant non-compliance with the

NPT before the U.N. Security Council would be an important

first step.

In Search of a New Approach: The Military Option

``We do not want American armies marching on Tehran,''

then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 2004.

Despite the official position of the administration, there

are some who suggest that given the failure of the engagement

option over the past quarter century and the urgency to

counter the Iranian threat, Washington should adopt a

military option. Despite its risks and implications, they are

willing to absorb the costs and consequences. Proponents of

strikes believe that United States interests are better

served by taking preventive military action in the present

than facing the future nightmare of a nuclear Iran with

extensive regional dominance armed with the ideology of hate.

Conventional force military options have a broad spectrum

upon which to draw, which

individually or collectively might evoke different results

and/or responses from the Iranian regime.

Air options include low-end, minimal-risk overflights of

unmanned aerial vehicles into Iranian airspace for purposes

of reconnaissance, psychological impact, testing of Iranian

response and capabilities. In addition, maximum options

consist of airstrikes by manned aircraft and drones as well

as cruise missile attacks against targeted facilities,

installations, bases, and command or research centers.

Naval options range from low end overt open waters

surveillance and harassment of Iranian shipping to maximum

options such as introduction of major forces into theater and

a full blockade of Iranian ports and waters.

On one hand, ground forces options include a low-end

approach of pressuring Iran through the buildup of

conventional ground forces and supporting logistics

capability along borders and at strategic locations within

the region. On the other hand, there are high-end options,

such as a well-planned, fully-coordinated and -executed

ground assault into Iran.

On one hand, Special Operations Forces options include low-

end clandestine ground operations supported by air insertion/

extraction to acquire target information, emplace sensors or

precision guidance beacons, or preposition arms/equipment for

local insurgents. On the other hand, high-end options consist

of direct action missions against pre-selected targets, link-

up with indigenous forces to engage and attack government

facilities, bases, and personnel. In total context,

combinations of the various minimal to maximum options

provide a wide array of choices that can exert significant

impact on Tehran and influence the regime economically,

diplomatically, and politically.

Given the above capabilities, potential military options

include:

Limited Actions: Clandestine insertions of Special

Operations Forces to acquire precision target information,

emplace remote sensors, and preposition arms/equipment. Such

actions offer the ability to gather unobtrusively more

reliable information than currently available through other

military means; these actions also might establish

sustainability for future operations. But, such actions do

not cause the regime to react as long as such actions remain

clandestine and the regime unaware. There is the possibility

of extremely negative reaction from various entities

internationally and in Iran if such activity were compromised

or uncovered.

Moderate Actions: Limited naval blockade that overtly

conducts surveillance and harasses Iranian flagged shipping;

overt overflights of Iranian airspace by U.S. surveillance

aircraft and unmanned platforms; limited buildup of U.S.

forces, supplies, and equipment in friendly countries

adjacent to Iran; stationing of U.S. Marine amphibious forces

off the coast; overt equipping of Iranian dissident groups;

limited precision strikes or special operations activities

against known WMD targets or munitions factories.

As such measures become increasingly visible to the

international public, a negative reaction might occur from

many quarters, including, of course, Iran, which would seek

diplomatic support in world forums to oppose U.S. activities.

Assuming the effectiveness of any actual military strikes

that cause damage to Iran's WMD or other indigenous military

capabilities, such offensive measures would degrade Iran's

ability to employ/deploy its weapons against United States

or other friendly interests.

Outrage from some corners of the globe is to be expected;

the possibility of loss or capture of some U.S. service

personnel might create a new dimension to the problem;

outright military action also might toughen the resolve of

the Iranian regime and even turn some of the Iranian people

against the attacking forces. Serious consideration must be

given to the likelihood that under the extreme stress of

being attacked, Iran might unleash Hizballah and other

terrorist organizations around the world to launch terrorist

attacks against United States and/or other friendly

interests. The ultimate potential for pulling Washington into

a full-scale military confrontation with Iran must be weighed

before any military action, however limited, is considered.

Maximum actions: Full-scale naval blockade, the landing of

U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces at strategic locations,

introduction of airborne, Ranger, Green Beret, or SEAL forces

to seize key objectives, and crossborder invasion by land

forces. All these actions would be fully supported by

preparatory airstrikes intended to disable and destroy

command and control centers, anti-aircraft capabilities, as

well as key military and logistics centers.

Full-scale military invasion on the scale of Iraq or

Afghanistan would be a very serious step, embarked upon with

only one ultimate objective in mind: the overthrow of the

regime in Tehran and the forcible occupation of the country.

In addition to the destruction of regular army, IRGC, and

MOIS military units together with their armaments, such an

invasion would also number among its objectives the

elimination of Iran's WMD programs, and thereby, the ending

of WMD threats from Iran.

Full-scale military invasion of Iran, even if supported by

an international coalition, would be likely to elicit outrage

from many corners of the globe. An invasion would be likely

to incur higher casualties and a much longer period of

intense, widespread conflict than that experienced in Iraq.

Given the size and population of Iran, a full-scale invasion

would require a force several times the size of the force in

Iraq; continued strain on the overall U.S. military structure

and its available resources would affect long-term

sustainability of any such operation and the overall ability

of U.S. armed forces to respond to crises elsewhere.

Conclusion:

Recall the nuclear time clock that is ticking down as Iran

drives to reach nuclear weapons capability. If the regime

continues to prove intransigent with respect to fulfilling

its obligations under the NPT, the international community

may not have the luxury of pursuing only a regime change

policy. The theocratic leadership in Tehran must know that

they will not be permitted to achieve a nuclear bomb status.

A military option, which could include limited strikes

against Iran's nuclear program infrastructure, clearly would

be a last option but must clearly be understood to remain on

the table.

Given the realities in the region and the fact that the

United States continues to be engaged in Afghanistan and

Iraq, a full-scale military invasion is the least appealing

of all the options on the table for dealing with Iran.

Nevertheless, as the ultimate means of ensuring U.S. national

security interests, such military action must remain

unambiguously among the options at U.S. disposal.

The moderate action option that includes limited military

strikes would at best buy time while leaving intact or even

enhancing the overall threat of the regime in areas like

terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process, and

involvement in Iraq. Nevertheless, limited, precision

military strikes, executed according to high quality

targeting information with minimal collateral damage and

casualties might not only set back Iran's nuclear program to

a significant degree but likely would also help destabilize

the regime.

In addition, diplomacy pursued by the Europeans and several

U.S. administrations has produced little tangible result over

the past quarter century. And unless the potential for U.N.

Security Council sanctions is on the table, diplomacy is

likely to yield few results in the future.

While keeping open diplomatic and military options,

Washington should consider a third alternative, one that

provides a central role for the Iranian opposition to

facilitate regime change.

Appendix

Iran Policy Committee (IPC)--Co-Chair Biographies

James Akins, Ambassador (ret.): James Akins was U.S.

ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration.

An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy

issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for

a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a

prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab

politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has

called Akins ``the westerner who knows the most about the

Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with

its leaders.''

Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.:

Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas

of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military

special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan

spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in

Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in

numerous operations in the Middle East in response to

terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in

Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of

the Beirut hostages drama, including international

negotiations leading to their release in 1991.

In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working

with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and

successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in

the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-

occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and

a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland

security services, support and technologies to government and

commercial clients.

Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control

Institute: Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control

Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22

years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President

in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and

lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues,

including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge

University's Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing

NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United

States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.

Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government

Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear

Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the

investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of

two landmark nuclear laws--the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also

served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of

the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant

Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal

holds a bachelor's degree from Franklin and Marshall College

and a master's degree from the Columbia University Graduate

School of Journalism.

Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc., an

international risk management and business solutions company,

headquartered in Washington. Livingstone is author of nine

books on terrorism and national security topics and more than

200 articles that have appeared in such publications as The

Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street

Journal. He serves on numerous corporate and other advisory

boards, and has appeared on more than 1100 television

programs. He holds an A.B. from the College of William and

Mary, three master's degrees, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher

School of Law and Diplomacy.

R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic

Strategies and Former President, International Republican

Institute: McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies,

a non-profit organization committed to strengthening

democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has

been actively involved in the global movement toward

democracy and has written extensively on political

transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He

has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a

trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups.

McColm served as president of the International Republican

Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to

provide technical assistance on economic and political reform

around the world, introducing the use of information

technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked

in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based

human rights organization and also was elected a member of

the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights by the General

Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm

was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the

University of Chicago.

Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.): General

McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRTT

(Government Reform Through Technology) in January 2000.

Working with high-tech companies that do business with

federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps

them introduce advanced technology into the private

sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McInerney was Chief Executive

Officer and President of Business Executives for National

Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of

business and professional leaders, with headquarters in

Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McInerney was Vice

President of Command and Control for Loral Defense

Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic

Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot,

commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States

Air Force. Gen. McInerney retired from military service as

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as

Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR),

reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity,

he led the Pentagon's ``reinventing government'' effort,

visiting more than 100 leading edge commercial companies

to assimilate their ideas about business reengineering.

Gen. McInerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the

U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in

international relations from George Washington University in

1972. He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the

National War College in 1973. Gen. McInerney is a member of

several Boards of Directors.

Captain Charles T. ``Chuck'' Nash, USN (ret.) is the

founder and President of Emerging Technologies International,

Inc. (ETII). The company's focus is to understand military

requirements and then actively search out and identify high

leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly

and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients

include government laboratories and commercial technology

companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President,

Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research,

Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an

officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of

flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different

aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety

of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon

and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S.

and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern

Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air

Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic

Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He

was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike

Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory

(JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards

of Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the

Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the

President and CEO of Vision Technologies International,

Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks

College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University

and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair

in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military

Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to

discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.

Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.): General Rowny began

his military career following graduation from the Johns

Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters

degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American

University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam,

commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served

in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and

as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the

rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor

for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W.

Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential

Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is ``one

of the principal architects of America's policy of peace

through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential

advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in

the cause of peace and freedom.'' In 1991, Ambassador Rowny

retired from government and currently consults on

international affairs.

Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member,

National Security Council: Raymond Tanter is Visiting

Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses

on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is adjunct

scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and

was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in

Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran

at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana

University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern,

Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was

a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the

Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a

Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter

spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American

Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption

scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In

1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at

the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department

of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel,

Chief of Naval Operations, 1980-1981. He served at the White

House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In

1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of

Defense to arms control talks in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm,

and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign

Relations. Among Tanter's publications is Rogue Regimes:

Terrorism and Proliferation, New York: St. Martin's Press,

1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign

Relations, Committee on the Present Danger, American

Political Science Association, and the Iran Policy

Committee.

Major General Paul E. Vallely, USA (Ret.): General Vallely

retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding

General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Vallely

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and

was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished

career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas

theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as

well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S.

security assistance missions on civilian-military relations

in locales around the world. Gen. Vallely is a graduate of

the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster

School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial

College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His

combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry

company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer,

military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years

experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-

Military Operations. Gen. Vallely was one of the first

nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st

Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a

consultant to the Commanding General of the Special

Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-

Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Vallely is a

military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many

nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest

lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book

entitled The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror.

Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director, IPC is a strategic

policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East,

homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism

issues. Based for the last five years in the private sector

environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her

career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in

a variety of assignments. Lopez served as a Senior

Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program

Manager for the Alexandria, VA firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC.

Lopez previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for

U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of

Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior

Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. During

Lopez's CIA career, she served under diplomatic cover in

various postings around the world, acquiring extensive

regional expertise with a career focus on the former

Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

She has served in or visited over two dozen nations

worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish,

Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Lopez began a

study of Arabic in 2003 at the Department of Agriculture

Graduate School before transferring to the Middle East

Institute (MEI) in downtown Washington.

Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from

Notre Dame College of Ohio

and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell

School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps

Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before

declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a

Visiting Researcher and an occasional guest lecturer on

counterterrorism, national defense, and international

relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a member of the

International Association of Counterterrorism and Security

Professionals (IACSP), Women in International Security (WIIS)

and the Middle East Institute (MEI).

Madam Speaker, it has been 3 years since the U.S. launched its war against Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Of course, now almost everybody knows there were no weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein posed no threat to the United States. Though some of our soldiers serving in Iraq still believe they are there because Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11, even the administration now acknowledges that there was no connection.

Indeed, no one can be absolutely certain why we invaded Iraq. The current excuse, also given for staying in Iraq, is to make it a democratic state friendly to the United States. There are now fewer denials that securing oil supplies played a significant role in our decision to go into Iraq and stay there. That certainly would explain why the U.S. taxpayers are paying such a price to build and maintain numerous, huge, permanent military bases in Iraq. There are also funding a new $1 billion embassy, the largest in the world.

The significant question we must ask ourselves is, what have we learned from these 3 years in Iraq? With plans now being laid for regime change in Iran, it appears we have learned absolutely nothing. There still are plenty of administration officials who daily paint a rosy picture of the Iraq we have created. But I wonder, if the past 3 years were nothing more than a bad dream and our Nation suddenly awakened, how many would for national security reasons urge the same invasion? Or would we instead give a gigantic sigh of relief that it was only a bad dream, that we need not relive the 3-year nightmare of death, destruction, chaos and stupendous consumption of tax dollars? Conceivably, we would still see oil prices under $30 a barrel, and, most importantly, 20,000 severe U.S. casualties would not have occurred. My guess is 99 percent of all Americans would be thankful it was only a bad dream and would never support the invasion knowing what we know today.

Even with the horrible results of the past 3 years, Congress is abuzz with plans to change the Iranian government. There is little resistance to the rise and clamor for democratization in Iran, even though their current President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is an elected leader.

Though Iran is hardly a perfect democracy, its system is far superior to most of our Arab allies, about which we never complain. Already the coordinated propaganda has galvanized the American people against Iran for the supposed threat it poses to us with weapons of mass destruction that are no more present than those Saddam Hussein was alleged to have had.

It is amazing how soon after being thoroughly discredited over the charges levied against Saddam Hussein the neoconservatives are willing to use the same arguments against Iran. It is frightening to see how easily Congress, the media and the people accept many of the same arguments against Iran that were used to justify an invasion of Iraq.

Since 2001, we have spent over $300 billion and occupied two Muslim nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. We are poorer, but certainly not safer, for it. We invaded Afghanistan to get Osama bin Laden, the ringleader behind 9/11. This effort has been virtually abandoned. Even though the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan, most of the country is now occupied and controlled by warlords who manage a drug trade bigger than ever before. Removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan actually served the interests of Iran, the Taliban's arch-enemy, more than our own.

The long time neocon goal to remake Iraq prompted us to abandoned the search for Osama bin Laden. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was hyped as a noble mission, justified by misrepresentation of intelligence concerning Saddam Hussein and his ability to attack us and his neighbors. This failed policy has created the current chaos in Iraq, chaos that many describe as a civil war.

Saddam Hussein is out of power, and most people are pleased. Yet some

Iraqis who dream of stability long for his authoritarian rule. But, once again, Saddam Hussein's removal benefited the Iranians, who considered Saddam Hussein an arch-enemy.

Our obsession with democracy, which is clearly conditional when one looks at our response to the recent Pakistani elections, will allow the majority Shia to claim leadership title if Iraq's election actually leads to an organized government. This delights the Iranians, who are close allies of the Iraqi Shia.

Talk about unintended consequences. This war has produced chaos, civil war, death and destruction and huge financial costs. It has eliminated two of Iran's worst enemies and placed power in Iran's best friends.

Even this apparent failure of policy does nothing to restrain the current march towards a similar confrontation with Iran. What will it take for us to learn from our failures? Common sense tells us the war in Iraq soon will spread to Iran. Fear of imaginary nuclear weapons or an incident involving Iran, whether planned or accidental, will rally the support needed for us to move on Muslim country number three.

All the past failures and unintended consequences will be forgotten. Even with deteriorating support for the Iraq war, new information, well-planned propaganda, or a major incident will override the skepticism and heartache of our frustrating fight. Vocal opponents of an attack on Iran again will be labeled unpatriotic, unsupportive of the troops, and sympathetic to Iran's radicals.

Instead of capitulating to these charges, we should point out that those who maneuver us into war do so with little concern for our young people serving in the military and theoretically think little of their own children if they have any. It is hard to conceive that political supporters of the war would consciously claim that a preemptive war for regime change where young people are sacrificed is only worth it if the deaths and the injuries are limited to other people's children. This I am sure would be denied, which means their own children are technically available for the sacrifice that is so often praised and glorified for the benefit of families who have lost so much. If so, they should think more of their own children. If this is not so and their children are not available for such sacrifice, the hypocrisy is apparent. Remember, most neocon planners fall into the category of chicken hawks.

For the past 3 years, it has been inferred that, if one is not in support of the current policy, one is against the troops and supports the enemy. Lack of support for the war in Iraq was said to be supportive of Saddam Hussein and his evil policies. This is an insulting and preposterous argument. Those who argued for the containment of the Soviets were never deemed sympathetic to Stalin or Kruschev. Lack of support for the Iraq war should never be used as an argument that one was sympathetic to Saddam Hussein. Containment and diplomacy are far superior to confront an enemy, and are less costly and far less dangerous, especially when there is no evidence that our national security is being threatened.

Although a large percentage of the public now rejects the various arguments for the Iraq war 3 years ago, they were easily persuaded by the politicians and media to fully support the invasion. Now, after 3 years of terrible pain for so many, even the troops are awakening from their slumber and sensing the fruitlessness of our failing effort. Seventy-two percent of our troops now serving in Iraq say it is time to come home. Yet, the majority still cling to the propaganda that they are there because of the 9/11 attacks, something even the administration has ceased to claim. Propaganda is pushed on our troops to exploit their need to believe in a cause that is worth the risk to life and limb.

I smell an expanded war in the Middle East and pray that I am wrong. I sense that circumstances will arise that demand support regardless of the danger and the cost. Any lack of support once again will be painted as being soft on terrorism and al Qaeda. We will be told we must support Israel, support patriotism, support the troops, defend freedom. The public too often only smells the stench of war after the killing starts. Public objection comes later on, but eventually it helps to stop the war.

I worry that before we can finish the war we are in and extricate ourselves, the patriotic fervor for expanding into Iran will drown out the cries of, ``Enough already.'' The agitation and congressional resolutions painting Iran as an enemy about to attack us have already begun. It is too bad we cannot learn from our mistakes. This time, there will be a greater pretense of an international effort sanctioned by the U.N. before the bombs are dropped. But even without support from the international community, we should expect the plan for regime change to continue. We have been forewarned that all options remain on the table, and there is little reason to expect much resistance from Congress. So far there is little resistance expressed in Congress for taking on Iran than there was prior to going into Iraq.

It is astonishing that after 3 years of bad results and tremendous expense there is little indication, we will reconsider our traditional non-interventionist foreign policy. Unfortunately, regime change, nation-building, policing the world, protecting our oil still constitutes an acceptable policy by the leaders of both major parties. It is already assumed by many in Washington I talk to that Iran is dead serious about obtaining a nuclear weapon and is a much more formidable opponent than Iraq. Besides, Mahmud Ahmadinejad threatened to destroy Israel, and that cannot stand. Washington sees Iran as a greater threat than Iraq ever was, a threat that cannot be ignored.

Iran's history is being ignored just as we ignored Iraq's history. This ignorance or deliberate misrepresentation of our recent relationship to Iraq and Iran is required to generate the fervor needed to attack once again a country that poses no threat to us. Our policies toward Iran have been more provocative than those toward Iraq. Yes, President Bush labeled Iran part of the axis of evil and unnecessarily provoked their anger at us. But our mistakes with Iran started a long time before this President took office. In 1953, our CIA, with the help of the British, participated in overthrowing the democratic-elected leader, Mohammed Mossadegh. We placed in power the Shah. He ruled ruthlessly but protected our oil interests, and for that, we protected him. That is, until 1979. We even provided him with Iran's first nuclear reactor.

Evidently, we did not buy the argument that his oil supplies precluded a need for civilian nuclear energy. From 1953 to 1979, his authoritarian rule served to incite a radical opposition led by the Ayatollah Khomeini who overthrew the Shah and took our hostages in 1979. This blow-back event was slow in coming, but Muslims have long memories. The hostage crisis and overthrow of the Shah by the Ayatollah was a major victory for the radical Islamists. Most Americans either never knew about or easily forgot about our unwise meddling in the internal affairs in Iran in 1953.

During the 1980s, we further antagonized Iran by supporting the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran. This made our relationship with Iran worse, while sending a message to Saddam Hussein that invading a neighboring country is not all that bad. When Hussein got the message from our State Department that his plan to invade Kuwait was not of much concern to the United States, he immediately preceded to do so. We, in a way, encouraged him to do it almost like we encouraged him to go into Iran. Of course, this time our reaction was quite different, and all of a sudden, our friendly ally, Saddam Hussein, became our arch enemy.

The American people may forget this flip-flop, but those who suffered from it never forgot. And the Iranians remember well our meddling in their affairs. Labeling the Iranians part of the axis of evil further alienated them and contributed to the animosity directed toward us.

For whatever reasons the neoconservatives might give, they are bound and determined to confront the Iranian government and demand changes in its leadership. This policy will further spread our military presence and undermine our security. The sad truth is that the supposed dangers posed by Iran are no more real than

those claimed about Iraq. The charges made against Iran are unsubstantiated and amazingly sound very similar to the false charges made against Iraq. One would think promoters of the war against Iraq would be a little bit more reluctant to use the same arguments to stir up hatred toward Iran. The American people and Congress should be more cautious in accepting these charges at face value, yet it seems the propaganda is working since few in Washington object as Congress passes resolutions condemning Iran and asking for U.N. sanctions against her.

There is no evidence of a threat to us by Iran and no reason to plan and initiate a confrontation with her. There are many reasons not to do so: Iran does not have a nuclear weapon and there is no evidence that she is working on one, only conjecture. Even if Iran had a nuclear weapon, why would this be different from Pakistan, India, and North Korea having one? Why does Iran have less right to a defensive weapon than these other countries? If Iran had a nuclear weapon, the odds of her initiating an attack against anybody, which would guarantee her own annihilation are zero, and the same goes for the possibility she would place weapons in the hands of a nonstate terrorist group.

Pakistan has spread nuclear technology throughout the world, and in particular, to the North Koreans. They flaunt international restrictions on nuclear weapons, but we reward them just as we reward India. We needlessly and foolishly threaten Iran, even though they have no nuclear weapons, but listen to what a leading Israeli historian, Martin van Creveld had to say about this: ``Obviously we do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and I do not know if they are developing them. But if they are not developing them, they are crazy.''

There has been a lot of misinformation regarding Iran's nuclear program. This distortion of the truth has been used to pump up emotions in Congress to pass resolutions condemning her and promoting U.N. sanctions. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has never reported any evidence of undeclared sources or special nuclear material in Iran or any diversion of nuclear material. We demand that Iran prove it is not in violation of nuclear agreements, which is asking them impossibly to prove a negative. ElBaradei states Iran is in compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty required IAEA safeguards agreement.

We forget that the weapons we feared Saddam Hussein had were supplied to him by the United States, and we refused to believe U.N. inspectors and the CIA that he no longer had them. Likewise, Iran received her first nuclear reactor from us; now we are hysterically wondering if some day she might decide to build a bomb in self-interest. Anti-Iran voices beating the drums of confrontation distort the agreement made in Paris and the desire of Iran to restart the enrichment process. Their suspension of the enrichment process was voluntary and not a legal obligation. Iran has an absolute right under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to develop and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and this is now said to be an egregious violation of the NPT. It is the U.S. and her allies that are distorting and violating the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

Likewise, our proliferation of nuclear material to India is a clear violation of the nuclear proliferation treaty as well.

The demand for U.N. sanctions is now being strongly encouraged by Congress. The Iran Freedom Support Act, H.R. 282 passed in the International Relations Committee and recently the House passed H. Con. Res. 341, which inaccurately condemned Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations. At present, the likelihood of reason prevailing in Congress is minimal. Let there be no doubt, the neoconservative warriors are still in charge and are conditioning Congress, the media, and the American people for a preemptive attack on Iran, never mind that Afghanistan has unraveled and Iraq is in a Civil War.

Serious plans are being laid for the next distraction which will further spread this war in the Middle East. The unintended consequences of this effort surely will be worse than any of the complications experienced in the 3-year occupation of Iraq.

Our offer of political and financial assistance to foreign and domestic individuals who support the overthrow of the current Iranian government is fraught with danger and saturated with arrogance. Imagine how Americans citizens would respond if China supported similar efforts here in the United States to bring about regime change. How many of us would remain complacent if someone like Timothy McVeigh had been financed by a foreign power? Is it any wonder the Iranian people resent us and the attitude of our leaders?

Even though ElBaradei and his IAEA investigations have found no violations of the NPT required IAEA safeguard agreement, the Iran Freedom Support Act still demands that Iran prove they have no nuclear weapons, refusing to acknowledge that proving a negative is impossible. Let there be no doubt, though, the words ``regime change'' are not found in the bill. That is precisely what they are talking about. Neoconservative Michael Ladine, one of the architects of the Iraq fiasco, testifying before the International Relations Committee in favor of the Iraq Freedom Support Act stated it plainly. ``I know some members would prefer to dance around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this country, but anyone looking closely at the language and the context of the Iraq Freedom Support Act and its close relative in the Senate can clearly see that this is, in fact, the essence of the matter.

You can't have freedom in Iran without bringing down the mulahs.''

Sanctions, along with financial and political support to persons and groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian government, are acts of war. Once again, we are unilaterally declaring a preemptive war against a country and a people that have not harmed us and do not have the capacity to do so. And do not expect Congress to seriously debate a declaration of war. For the past 56 years, Congress has transferred to the executive branch the power to go to war as it pleases, regardless of the tragic results and costs.

Secretary of State Rice recently signaled a sharp shift toward confrontation in Iran's policy as she insisted on $75 million to finance propaganda, through TV and radio broadcasts into Iran. She expressed this need because of the so-called ``aggressive'' policies of the Iranian government. We are 7,000 miles from home, telling the Iraqis and the Iranians what kind of government they will have, backed up by the use of our military force, and we call them the aggressors? We fail to realize the Iranian people, for whatever faults they may have, have not in modern times invaded any neighboring country. This provocation is so unnecessary, costly and dangerous.

Just as the invasion of Iraq inadvertently served the interests of the Iranians, military confrontation with Iran will have unintended consequences. The successful alliance engendered between the Iranians and the Iraqi majority Shiia will prove a formidable opponent for us in Iraq as that civil war spreads. Shipping in the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz may well be disrupted by the Iranians in retaliation for any military confrontation. Since Iran would be incapable of defending herself by conventional means, it seems logical that they might well resort to terrorist attacks on us here at home. They will not passively lie down, nor can they be easily destroyed.

One of the reasons given for going into Iraq was to secure our oil supplies. This backfired badly. Production in Iraq is down 50 percent, and world oil prices have more than doubled to $60 per barrel. Meddling with Iran could easily have a similar result. We could see oil at $120 a barrel and gasoline at $6 a gallon. The obsession the neo-cons have with remaking the Middle East is hard to understand. One thing that is easy to understand is none of those who plan these wars expect to fight in them, nor do they expect their children to die in some IED explosion.

Exactly when an attack will occur is not known, but we have been forewarned more than once that all options are on the table. The sequence of events now occurring with regards to Iran are eerily reminiscent of the hype to our preemptive strike against Iraq. We should remember the saying: ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice,

shame on me.'' It looks to me like the Congress and the country is open to being fooled once again.

Interestingly, many early supporters of the Iraq War are now highly critical of the President, having been misled as to reasons for the invasion and occupation. But these same people are only too eager to accept the same flawed arguments for our need to undermine the Iranian government.

The President's 2006 National Security Strategy, just released, is every bit as frightening as the one released in 2002 endorsing preemptive war. In it he claims, ``We face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.'' He claims the Iranians have for 20 years hidden key nuclear activities, though the IAEA makes no such assumption, nor has the Security Council in at least 20 years ever sanctioned Iran. The clincher in the National Security Strategy document is if diplomatic efforts fail, confrontation will follow. The problem is the diplomatic effort, if one wants to use that term, is designed to fail by demanding the Iranians prove an unprovable negative. The West, led by the U.S., is in greater violation by demanding Iran not pursue any nuclear technology, even peaceful, that the NPT guarantees is their right.

The President states: Iran's ``desire to have a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.'' A desire is purely subjective and cannot be substantiated nor disproved. Therefore, all that is necessary to justify an attack is if Iran fails to prove it does not have a desire to be like the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, Pakistan, North Korea, India and Israel whose nuclear missiles surround Iran. Logic like this to justify a new war, without the least consideration for a congressional declaration of war, is indeed frightening.

Commonsense telling us Congress, especially given the civil war in Iraq and the mess in Afghanistan, should move with great caution in condoning a military confrontation with Iran.

Madam Speaker, there are reasons for my concern and let me list those. Most Americans are uninterested in foreign affairs until we get mired down in a war that costs too much, lasts too long, and kills too many U.S. troops. Getting out of a lengthy war is difficult, as I remember all too well with Vietnam while serving in the U.S. Air Force in 1963 to 1968. Getting into war is much easier.

Unfortunately, the legislative branch of our government too often defers to the executive branch and offers little resistance to war plans, even with no significant threat to our security. The need to go to war is always couched in patriotic terms and falsehoods regarding an imaginary, imminent danger. Not supporting the effort is painted as unpatriotic and wimpish against some evil that is about to engulf us. The real reason for our militarism is rarely revealed and hidden from the public. Even Congress is deceived into supporting adventurism they would not accept if fully informed.

If we accepted the traditional American and constitutional foreign policy of nonintervention across the board, there would be no temptation to go along with these unnecessary military operations. A foreign policy of intervention invites all kinds of excuses for spreading ourselves around the world. The debate shifts from nonintervention versus intervention, to where and for what particular reason should we involve ourselves. Most of the time, it is for less than honorable reasons. Even when cloaked in honorable slogans, like making the world safe for democracy, the unintended consequences and the ultimate costs cancel out the good intentions.

One of the greatest losses suffered these past 60 years from interventionism becoming an acceptable policy of both major parties is respect for the Constitution. Congress flatly has reneged on its huge responsibility to declare war. Going to war was never meant to be an executive decision, used indiscriminately with no resistance from Congress. The strongest attempt by Congress in the past 60 years to properly exert itself over foreign policy was the passage of the Foley amendment, demanding no assistance be given to the Nicaraguan contras. Even this explicit prohibition was flaunted by an earlier administration.

Arguing over the relative merits of each intervention is not a true debate, because it assumes that intervention per se is both moral and constitutional. Arguing for a Granada-type intervention because of its success and against the Iraq War because of its failure and cost is not enough. We must once again, understand the wisdom of rejecting entangling alliances and rejecting Nation building. We must stop trying to police the world and, instead, embrace noninterventionism as the proper moral and constitutional foreign policy of our country.

The best reason to oppose interventionism is that people die, needlessly, on both sides. We have suffered over 20,000 American casualties in Iraq already, and Iraqi civilian deaths probably number over 100,000 by all reasonable counts.

The next best reason is that the rule of law is undermined, especially when military interventions are carried out without a declaration of war. Whenever a war is ongoing, civil liberties are under attack at home. The current war in Iraq and the misnamed war on terror have created an environment here at home that affords little constitutional protection of our citizens' rights. Extreme nationalism is common during war. Signs of this are now apparent.

Prolonged wars, as this one has become, have profound consequences. No matter how much positive spin is put on it, war never makes a society wealthier. World War II was not a solution to the Depression, as many claim. If $1 billion is spent on weapons of war, the GDP records positive growth in that amount, but the expenditure is consumed by destruction of the weapons or bombs it bought, and the real economy is denied $1 billion to produce products that would have raised someone's standard of living.

Excessive spending to finance the war causes deficits to explode. There are never enough tax dollars available to pay the bills, and since there are not enough willing lenders and dollars available, the Federal Reserve must create new money out of thin air and new credit for buying Treasury bills to prevent interest rates from rising too rapidly. Rising rates would tip off everyone that there are not enough savings or taxes to finance the war.

This willingness to print whatever amount of money the government needs to pursue the war is literally inflation. Without a fiat monetary system, wars would be very difficult to finance since the people would never tolerate the taxes required to pay for it. Inflation of the money supply delays and hides the real cost of war. The result of the excessive creation of new money leads to the higher cost of living everyone decries and the Fed denies. Since taxes are not levied, the increase in prices that results from printing too much money is technically the tax required to pay for the war.

The tragedy is that the inflation tax is borne more by the poor and the middle class than the rich. Meanwhile, the well-connected rich, the politicians, the bureaucrats, the bankers, the military industrialists and the international corporations reap the benefits of war profits.

A sound economic process is disrupted with a war economy and monetary inflation. Strong voices emerge blaming the wrong policies for our problems, prompting an outcry for protectionist legislation. It is always easier to blame foreign producers and savers for our inflation, our lack of savings, excessive debt and loss of industrial jobs. Protectionist measures only make economic conditions worse. Inevitably these conditions, if not corrected, lead to a lower standard of living for most of our citizens.

Careless military intervention is also bad for the civil disturbance that results. The chaos in the streets of America in the 1960s while the Vietnam War raged, aggravated by the draft, was an example of domestic strife caused by an ill-advised unconstitutional war that could not be won. The early signs of civil discord are now present. Hopefully, we can extricate ourselves from Iraq and avoid a conflict in Iran before our streets explode, as they did in the 1960s.

In a way, it is amazing there is not a lot more outrage expressed by the American people. There is plenty of complaining but no outrage over policies that are not part of our American tradition. War based on false pretenses, 20,000 American casualties, torture policies, thousands jailed without due

process, illegal surveillance of citizens, warrantless searches, and yet no outrage. When the issues come before Congress, executive authority is maintained or even strengthened while real oversight is ignored.

Though many Americans are starting to feel the economic pain of paying for this war through inflation, the real pain has not yet arrived. We generally remain fat and happy with a system of money and borrowing that postpones the day of reckoning. Foreigners, in particular the Chinese and Japanese, gladly participate in the charade. We print the money and they take it, as do the OPEC Nations, and provide us with consumer goods and oil. Then they loan the money back to us at low interest rates, which we use to finance the war and our housing bubble and excessive consumption. This recycling and perpetual borrowing of inflated dollars allow us to avoid the pain of high taxes to pay for our war and welfare spending. It is fine until the music stops and the real costs are realized, with much higher interest rates and significant price inflation. That is when outrage will be heard and the people will realize we cannot afford the humanitarianism of the neo-conservatives.

The notion that our economic problems are principally due to the Chinese is nonsense. If the protectionists were to have it their way, the problem of financing the war would become readily apparent and have immediate ramifications, none good.

Today's economic problems, caused largely by our funny money system, won't be solved by altering exchange rates to favor us in the short run or by imposing high tariffs. Only sound money with real value will solve the problems of competing currency devaluations and protectionist measures.

Economic interests almost always are major reasons for wars being fought. Noble and patriotic causes are easier to sell to a public who must pay and provide cannon fodder to defend the financial interests of a privileged class. The fact that Saddam Hussein demanded Euros for oil in an attempt to undermine the U.S. dollar is believed by many to be one of the ulterior motives for our invasion and occupation of Iraq. Similarly, the Iranian oil burse now about to open may be seen as a threat to those who depend on maintaining the current monetary system with the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

The theory and significance of ``peak oil'' is believed to be an additional motivating factor for the United States and Great Britain wanting to maintain firm control over the oil supplies in the Middle East. The two nations have been protecting our oil interests in the Middle East for nearly 100 years. With diminishing supplies and expanding demands, the incentive to maintain a military presence in the Middle East is quite strong. Fear of China and Russia moving in to this region to consume more control alarms those who don't understand how a free market can develop substitutes to replace diminishing resources. Supporters of the military efforts to maintain control over large regions of the world to protect oil fail to count the real cost of energy once the DOD budget is factored in. Remember, invading Iraq was costly and oil prices doubled. Confrontation in Iran may evolve differently, but we can be sure it will be costly and oil prices will rise significantly.

There are long-term consequences or blowback from our militant policies of intervention around the world. They are unpredictable as to time and place. 9/11 was a consequence of our military presence on Muslim holy lands; the Ayatollah Khomeini's success in taking over the Iranian government in 1979 was a consequence of our CIA overthrowing Mossadech in 1953. These connections are rarely recognized by the American people and never acknowledged by our government. We never seem to learn how dangerous interventionism is to us and to our security.

There are some who may not agree strongly with any of my arguments, and instead believe the propaganda Iran and her President, Mahmoud Almadinejad, are thoroughly irresponsible and have threatened to destroy Israel. So all measures must be taken to prevent Iran from getting nukes, thus the campaign to intimidate and confront Iran.

First, Iran doesn't have a nuke and it is nowhere close to getting one, according to the CIA. If they did have one, using it would guarantee almost instantaneous annihilation by Israel and the United States. Hysterical fear of Iran is way out of proportion to reality. With a policy of containment, we stood down and won the Cold War against the Soviets and their 30,000 nuclear weapons and missiles. If you are looking for a real kook with a bomb to worry about, North Korea would be high on the list. Yet we negotiate with Kim Jong Il. Pakistan has nukes and was a close ally of the Taliban up until 9/11. Pakistan was never inspected by the IAEA as to their military capability. Yet we not only talk to her, we provide economic assistance, though someday Musharraf may well be overthrown and a pro-al Qaeda government put in place. We have been nearly obsessed with talking about regime change in Iran, while ignoring Pakistan and North Korea. It makes no sense and it is a very costly and dangerous policy.

The conclusion we should derive from this is simple. It is in our best interest to pursue a foreign policy of nonintervention. A strict interpretation of the Constitution mandates it. The moral imperative of not imposing our will on others, no matter how well intentioned, is a powerful argument for minding our own business. The principle of self- determination should be respected. Strict nonintervention removes the incentives for foreign powers and corporate interests to influence and control our policies overseas. We can't afford the cost that intervention requires, whether through higher taxes or inflation. If the moral arguments against intervention don't suffice for some, the practical arguments should.

Intervention just doesn't work. It backfires and ultimately hurts the American citizens both at home and abroad. Spreading ourselves too thin around the world actually diminishes our national security through a weakened military. As the only superpower of the world, a constant interventionist policy is perceived as arrogant, and greatly undermines our ability to use diplomacy in a positive manner.

Conservatives, libertarians, constitutionalists, and many of today's liberals have all at one time or another endorsed a less interventionist foreign policy. There is no reason a coalition of these groups might not once again present the case for a pro-American nonmilitant noninterventionist foreign policy dealing with all nations. A policy of trade and peace, and a willingness to use diplomacy is far superior to the foreign policy that has evolved over the past 60 years. It is time for a change.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless the international community acts quickly and decisively, the world's chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror ever created.

A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council.

The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated by the civilized world.

Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy. I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state policy.

I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping Israel from the map.

Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya. Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb blueprints, as Libya used to do.

Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.

Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, ``the West needs us more than we need them.''

With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran over the nuclear issue.

Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary. The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon material production capabilities.

But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act. Responsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.

Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate incentives by the international community to stop business as usual with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.

Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman from Florida, and myself.

Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson: playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime against Tehran.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished ranking member of our Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors meeting on February 4.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing

condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to

the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.

My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming

majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through

adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination

that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.

The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in

noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to

Article XII.C.

That resolution also found that pursuant to Article

III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall

within the competence of the UNSC.

At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting

Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to

choose diplomacy over confrontation.

Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a

result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process

begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past

findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.

I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that

today's report to the Security Council will not divest the

IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.

We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's

nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look

forward to the Director General's implementation report in

March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to

the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.

By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to

add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role,

reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran

to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a

course of confrontation.

The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear

safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the

rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to

address matters that raise questions of international peace

and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.

That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the

Security Council's involvement in such instances of

noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in

September that such a report is mandatory.

In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush

emphasized that, ``the Iranian government is defying the

world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the

world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear

weapons.''

We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and

clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a

nuclear weapons capability.

We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not

envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.

Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of

diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of

the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear

activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our

concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and

confrontation.

Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran

persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine

its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.

And through this path Iran can also start to restore its

standing in the international community to the benefit of the

Iranian people.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic

of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006

the board of governors

(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on

Iran's nuclear programme,

(b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,

(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in

the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and

II of the Treaty,

(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for

their professional and impartial efforts to implement the

Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding

safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by

Iran of the suspension,

(e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as

a special verification case,

(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the

Director General noted that after nearly three years of

intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a

position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's

nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared

nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

(g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its

obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and

the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is

exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history

of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of

those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's

verification of declarations made by Iran since September

2002,

(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that

Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the

Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/

67),

(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's

cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment,

materials and activities which have applications in the

conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well

as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director

General in GOV/2005/67),

(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General

reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related

to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to

metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining

of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into

hemispherical forms,

(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear

programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of

confidence-building is required from Iran,

(1) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for

a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and

(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would

contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to

realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of

mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be

resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to

the calls for confidence building measures which the Board

has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for

Iran to:

re-establish full and sustained suspension of all

enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including

research and development, to be verified by the Agency;

reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated

by heavy water;

ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional

Protocol;

pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with

the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed

on 18 December 2003;

implement transparency measures, as requested by the

Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend

beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement

and Additional Protocol, and include such access to

individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use

equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and

development as the Agency may request in support of its

ongoing investigations;

2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security

Council of the United Nations that these steps are required

of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council

all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to

this issue;

3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in

a position to clarify some important issues relating to

Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in

its possession a document on the production of uranium metal

hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this

process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components; and, noting that the decision to put this

document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran

to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a

full copy to the Agency;

4. Deeplv regrets that, despite repeated calls from the

Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment

related and reprocessing activities which the Board has

declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran

resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility

on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment

activities on 10 January 2006;

5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of

confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a

fissile material production capability against the background

of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous

Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its

position in relation to confidence-building measures, which

are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a

constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can

result in increased confidence;

6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to

the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable

and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify

possible activities which could have a military nuclear

dimension;

7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's

declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to

continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's

Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional

Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with

a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence

of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to

pursue additional transparency measures required for the

Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and

reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's

past nuclear activities;

8. Requests the Director General to report on the

implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next

regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and

immediately thereafter to convey, together with any

Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security

Council; and

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a brief by the Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in

the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's

Suspension of Enrichment-Related and Reprocessing Activities

The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the

developments that have taken place since November 2005 in

connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the

Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of

enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief

provides factual information concerning those developments;

it does not include any assessments thereof.

Iran has continued to facilitate access under its

Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act

as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by

providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and

access to locations.

1. Enrichment Programme

As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November

2005, during meetings that took place in October and November

2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional

information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme.

Responses to some of these requests were provided during

discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between

Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy

Director General for Safeguards. This information is

currently being assessed.

1.A. Contamination

As part of its assessment of the correctness and

completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment

activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the

source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some

high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at

locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components

had been manufactured, used and/or stored.

1.B. The 1987 offer

As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency

in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document

reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by

a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a

disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and

specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings,

specifications and calculations for a ``complete plant''; and

materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also

made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive

equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and

purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for

mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium

re-conversion and casting capabilities.

On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page

document was the only remaking documentary evidence relevant

to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this

to the secret nature of the programme and the management

style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at

that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists,

such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports,

personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its

statements concerning that offer.

1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network

between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key

members of the network about the events leading to the mid-

1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this

context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification

of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI

staff members in the mid-1990s.

P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran

has been unable to supply any documentation or other

information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of

500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The

Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and

contents of these shipments.

P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a

result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the

mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2

centrifuge components (which contained no supporting

specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered

along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to

assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during

the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this

period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2

centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge

components. In light of information available to the Agency

indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which

information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November

2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made

after 1995.

In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design

said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting

company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that

the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased,

magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is

still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to

acquire such magnets. 2.

2. Uranium Metal

Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to

have been the drawings, specifications and supporting

documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of

which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these

was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the

reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and

the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into

hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon

components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other

specifications for machined pieces for such components.

According to Iran, this document had been provided on the

initiative of the network, and not at the request of the

AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the

Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency

during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document

again and to place it under Agency seal.

3. Transparency Visits and Discussions

On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a

military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances

regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities at that site, where several environmental samples

were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of

the analysis of those samples.

Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional

information and clarifications related to efforts made by the

Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at

Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment

that could be used in uranium enrichment and

conversion activities. The Agency has also requested

interviews with the individuals involved in the

acquisition of those items.

On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency

documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts

by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a

number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment,

power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye

laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation

suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had

actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical

university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor.

However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency

for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request

to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential

for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use

of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass

spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment

(equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium

enrichment).

On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list

of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to

see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in

situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on

the Agency's list was presented at a technical university,

and environmental samples were taken from it.

On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification

about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use

material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium

and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005.

High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and

environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that

the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing,

but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran

agreed to provide additional information on inquiries

concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and

special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's

acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and

filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31

January 2006 for environmental sampling.

On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a

meeting to discuss information that had been made available

to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the

Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium

dioxide into UF4 (``green salt''), as well as

tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile

re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear

dimension and which appear to have administrative

interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the

``issues related to baseless allegations.'' Iran agreed on 23

January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the

clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to

address the other topics during that meeting. In the course

of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the

Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow

diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications

related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national

nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the

allegations were baseless and that it would provide further

clarifications later.

4. Suspension

The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements

of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and

reprocessing activities.

In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency

that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006,

``those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which

ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and

non-legally binding suspension'' (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7

January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran

requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz,

Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of

suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/

2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January

2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.

Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it

refers to as ``small scale R&D''. As of 30 January 2006,

Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or

assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF 6

material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of

the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel

Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of

components and some rotor testing is being conducted at

Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the fact that all

centrifuge-related raw materials and components are without

IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities

being carried out by Iran cannot be effective except at PFEP,

where containment and surveillance measures are being applied

for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz

containing UF6, from which seals had been removed

on 10 January 2006, were again placed under Agency

containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.

The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November

2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All

UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under

Agency containment and surveillance.

Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to

monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the

Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.

Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot stand by.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I know of no circumstance in the world in which more options are all bad than this particular one. We all have to be clear-headed about the challenge of Iran. It is a more difficult society to deal with, a more difficult government than Iraq.

It is absolutely clear that Iran does seek nuclear capacity. It is absolutely clear that Iran has been the greatest State promulgator of terrorist activity in the Middle East. Those are bases that we all have to understand.

Then we have to think through what is our response and what are the kinds of strategies that the United States should develop and are there lessons that exist today that might lend to this circumstance.

One of the lessons is that some things we do as a society can be counterproductive. All of us are concerned with the security and the fate of the State of Israel as well as the American national security, but if we think it through, does our policy in Iraq advance the security of Israel? Does a preemption of Iran advance the security of Israel? Does it advance the security of the United States?

If the United States acts militarily, for instance, in Iran, do we spark and ensure the great prediction, that none of us want to come to pass, that we will enter into one of these clashes of civilization made inevitable by another war of the West against another Muslim State? Muslims would view this as a circumstance that the Judeo-Christian world is attacking the world of Muslim culture. We have to think deeply and seriously about this.

Then when it comes to nuclear weapons, it is bad for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but there are things that are worse. One of the things that is worse is to give them reason to use that nuclear weapon, whether it be against ourselves or an ally of the United States.

The administration has informed the committee of jurisdiction that it profoundly opposes this piece of legislation and that it prefers a tack of stressing international diplomacy, and it is suggested to the committee in the strongest possible terms that this type of legislation undercuts their effort to be multilateral.

And so, while many Members of this body, many members of the public have objected to this administration for being too unilateral, this Congress is saying, with this kind of legislation, that we will be more unilateral than the administration wishes to be. In other words, with an administration that no one of any stripe would argue is not muscular--it is a very muscular administration--this Congress is trying to out-macho the muscular. That is something we should all think very seriously about.

Then we ought to think through what it means if we go forth in a given kind of direction, which words like ``regime change'' imply. What does preemption mean? It is clear that if we

move in a muscular direction and, for example, preemptively strike Iraq, that that will slow down the capacity of Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon. But will it stop it? Not necessarily, partly because of the capacities Iran has to develop WMD capacity in a more decentralized way than Iraq once did, but there are other ways of getting nuclear weapons. One can get nuclear weapons through the ``loose nuke'' dilemma of purchase or theft. And if one gives Iran reason to attack, it will, and it will in many ways that are now available in the world through decentralized terrorist activities, but also potentially through nuclear. And the potential of nuclear use increases if they are attacked.

Now we have the other option which is stressed in this bill--but the first, force being implied, but what is stressed is economic sanctions. So our two options are to shoot Iran or to shoot ourselves in the foot economically. And I will tell you that I can't think of anything that is more outrageous in logic. So I think we have to think through new types of approaches involving new ways of dialogue, new ways of international pressure of a very different nature than are proposed by this committee at this time.

While I have enormous respect for the proponents of this legislation, particularly the distinguished chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and our distinguished ranking member on the full committee (Mr. Lantos), I am convinced that in its present form the approach brought before this body complicates ongoing diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the building crisis with Iran.

Indeed, it is for this reason that the Department of State indicated that the Administration would be unable to support the legislation. As noted in a letter to Chairman Hyde, the bill would ``narrow in important ways the President's flexibility in the implementation of Iran sanctions, create tensions with countries whose help we need in dealing with Iran, and shift the focus away from Iran's actions and spotlight differences between us and our allies. This could play into Iran's hands, as it attempts to divide the U.S. from the international community as well as to sow division between the EU-3, China, and Russia. It would also create dissension among UNSC members, as the Council considers the Iran nuclear dossier.''

There are few areas of the world with a more troubling mix of geopolitical problems than the Middle East. The irony is that the war in Iraq which has consumed so much of our country's political and economic capital may hold less far-reaching consequences than challenges posed in neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

To the West, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off remains the sorest point in world relations, complicated by the incapacitation of Ariel Sharon and the rise of a Hamas-led government in the occupied territories. To the East, the sobering prospect of Iran joining the nuclear club stands out.

In life, individuals and countries sometimes face circumstances in which all judgments and options are bad. The Iranian dilemma is a case- in-point. But it is more than just an abstract bad-option model because at issue are nuclear weapons in the hands of a mullah-controlled society which has actively aided and abetted regional terrorists for years.

Indeed, the issue has become even more acute with the election in Iran of its hard-line, populist President, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, who suggested late last year that the murder of six million European Jews by the Nazis did not occur and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

In reference to recent disclosures of enhanced Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems to carry such weapons, concerned outside parties are actively reviewing options.

The Europeans have led with diplomatic entreaties; neo-con strategists in the U.S. with open-option planning--including, if investigative journalist Seymour Hersh is to be believed--the possible use of nuclear weapons.

In the background are references to the 1981 preemptive strike by the Israeli Air Force against Iraq's Osirak reactor.

At issue is the question of whether preemption is justified; if so, how it should be carried out; and, if carried out, whether intervention would lead to a more conciliatory, non-nuclear Iran or whether the effects of military action would be short-term, perhaps pushing back nuclear development a year or two, but precipitating a new level of hostility against the U.S. and Israel in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world which could continue for decades, if not centuries.

Since the American hostage crisis which so bedeviled the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, we have had a policy of economic sanctions coupled with comprehensive efforts to politically isolate Iran.

Six years ago, Senator Arlen Specter and I invited Iran's U.N. Ambassador to Capitol Hill, the first visit to Washington by a high- level Iranian representative since the hostage crisis.

On the subject of possible movement toward normalization of relations with Iran, I told the ambassador that while many would like to see a warming of relations, it would be inconceivable for the U.S. to consider normalizing our relationship so long as Iran continued its support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador forthrightly acknowledged that Iran provided help to both these terrorist organizations, but also noted, in what for some might be considered the most optimistic thing he said that day, that his government was prepared to cease support to anti-Israeli terrorist groups the moment a Palestinian state was established with borders acceptable to Palestinians.

For decades in the Muslim world, debate has been on-going whether to embrace a credible two-state (Israel and Palestine) approach or advance an irrevocable push-Israel-to-the-sea agenda. The implicit Iranian position, as articulated by the ambassador, was support for a two-state approach, but if the U.S. on its own, or Israel as a perceived surrogate, were to attack Iran, the possibility that such a compromise can ever become possible deteriorates.

While angst-ridden, the Muslim world understands the rationale for our intervention in Afghanistan where the plotting for the 9/11 attack on the U.S. occurred. It has no sympathy for our engagement in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, but if these two interventions were followed by a third in Iran, the likelihood is that such would be perceived in the vocabulary of the Harvard historian, Samuel Huntington, as an all-out ``clash of civilizations,'' pitting the Judeo-Christian against the Muslim world. In the Middle East it would be considered a war of choice precipitated by the United States. We might want it to be seen as a short-term action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, but the Muslim world would more likely view it as a continuance of the Crusades: a religious conflict of centuries' dimensions, with a revived future.

If military action is deemed necessary, the U.S. broadly has only three tactical options: (a) full-scale invasion a la Iraq; (b) surgical strikes of Iranian nuclear and missile installations; or (c) a surrogate strike by Israel, modeled along the lines of Osirak.

The first can be described as manifestly more difficult than our engagement in Iraq, particularly a post-conflict occupation. The second presents a number of difficulties, including the comprehensiveness of such a strike and the question of whether all aspects of a program that is clandestine can be eliminated. The third makes the U.S. accountable for Israeli actions, which themselves are likely to be more physically destructive but less effective than the 1981 strike against Osirak.

In thinking through the consequences of military action, even if projected to be successfully carried out, policymakers must put themselves in the place of a potential adversary. A strike that merely buys time may also be a strike that changes the manner and rationale of Iranian support for terrorist organizations. It may also change the geo-strategic reason and methodology for a country like Iran to garner control of nuclear weapons. ``Loose nukes'' abound. Countries with money and will can garner almost anything in the world despite efforts by the U.S. and others to make theft or sale difficult.

It is presumed that the major reasons that Iran currently seeks nuclear weapons relates to: (1) Pride: a belief that a 5,000 year-old society has as much right to control the most modern of weapons systems as a younger civilization like America or its neighbors to the west, Israel, and to the east, Pakistan; (2) Power: the implications of control of nuclear weapons with regard to its perceived hegemony as the largest and most powerful country in the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to its nemesis, Iraq, which not only once attacked Kuwait, but Iran itself using chemical weapons; (3) Politics: the concern that Israeli military dominance is based in part on the control of weapons that cannot be balanced in the Muslim world, except by a very distant Pakistan.

The issue of the day from an American perspective is weapons of mass destruction, their development and potential proliferation to nation- states and non-national terrorist groups. The question that cannot be ducked is whether military action against Iran might add to the list of reasons Iran may wish to control such weapons: their potential use against the United States. Perhaps as significantly, American policymakers must think through the new world of terrorism and what might be described as lesser weapons of mass destruction.

Any strike on Iran would be expected to immediately precipitate a violent reaction in the

Shi'a part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support today. With ease, Iranian influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make our ability to constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near hopeless.

And there should be little doubt that in a world in which ``tit for tat'' is the norm, a strike on Iran would increase the prospect of counter-strikes on American assets around the world and American territory itself. The asymmetrical nature of modem warfare is such that traditional armies will not be challenged in traditional ways. Nation- states which are attacked may feel they have little option except to ally themselves with terrorist groups to advance national interests.

We view terrorism as an illegitimate tool of uncivilized agents of change. In other parts of the world, increasing numbers of people view terrorist acts as legitimate responses of societies and, in some cases, groups within societies who are oppressed, against those who have stronger military forces.

If Afghanistan, an impoverished country as distant from our shores as any in the world, could become a plotting place for international terrorism, such danger would increase manifoldly with an increase in Iranian hostility, especially if based on an American attack.

If there exists today something like a one-in-three chance of another 9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in the next few years, a preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to double or triple such a prospect.

And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its power the ability not only to destabilize world politics, but world economies as well. Oil is, after all, the grease of economic activity, and an Iranian-led cutback in supply precipitated by us or them cannot be ruled out.

Given the risk, if not the untenability, of military action, policymakers are obligated to review other than military options. One, which has characterized our post-hostage taking Iranian policy for a full generation, is isolation of Iran. This policy can be continued, but as tempting as it is, there is little prospect of ratcheting it up much more, except in ways, such as a naval embargo on Iranian oil, that would be difficult to garner international support for and would, in any regard, damage us more than Iran.

The only logical alternative is to consider increasing dialogue without abandoning the possibility of future sanctions with this very difficult government.

Iran--its government and people--has to be fully engaged, and I am pleased that U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad has been authorized to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq. The Iranians played a stabilizing role regarding Afghanistan just several years ago, and logically they have a stake in a stable Iraq. I would urge the leadership in Tehran to re-think its apparent decision to close the door on this potentially productive avenue for dialogue.

With respect to the Iranian nuclear program, however, it is difficult to see how confrontation can be avoided if we will not talk directly with Tehran in appropriate foras about this and other matters. The stakes could not be higher. If diplomacy fails, there is a credible prospect that Iran will follow the North Korean model of rapid crisis escalation, including the cessation of international inspections, with a wholly unsupervised nuclear program leading in time to the production of nuclear weapons and the dangerously unpredictable regional consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq- like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and alarming consequences both regionally and world-wide.

A proposal that might be suggested is negotiation of a Persian Gulf nuclear-free zone, which would reduce, although given the high possibility of cheating, not eliminate entirely one of the reasons Iran presumably seeks nuclear weapons--fear that it may be at a disadvantage in a conflict with an oil-rich neighbor. In this context, Iran, the EU and Russia, with U.S. support, might agree on a proposal under which Iran would indefinitely and verifiably suspend domestic enrichment activity in exchange for an internationally guaranteed fuel supply, U.S.-backed security assurances, and a gradual lifting of sanctions by and resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., including expanded country-to-country cultural ties.

Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been educated in the United States. The people, although not the government of Iran, have democratic proclivities. While real power in Iran is controlled by the mullahs. Few societies in the world have if given a chance more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction than Iran. And just as it is hard to believe that outside military intervention would lead to anything except greater ensconcement of authoritarian mullah rule, a bettering of U.S. relations with Iran provide a greater prospect of progressive change in Iranian society.

There is nothing the new government of Iran, or for that matter Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda movement, benefit more from than an aggressive, interventionist U.S. policy toward Iran.

Finally, a note about arms control. If the U.S. wishes to lead in multilateral restraint, we might want to consider joining rather than rebuking the international community in development of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). All American administrations from Eisenhower on favored negotiation of a CTB. This one has taken the position the Senate took when it irrationally rejected such a ban seven years ago. The Senate took its angst against the strategic leadership of the Clinton Administration out on the wrong issue. This partisan, ideological posturing demands reconsideration. We simply cannot expect others to restrain themselves when we refuse to put constraints on ourselves.

We are in a world where use of force can not be ruled out. But we are also in a world where alternatives are vastly preferable. They must be put forthrightly on the table.

Madam Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 774 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Madam Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

(Mr. PUTNAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, House Resolution 774 is a structured rule that provides for consideration of H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to bring this resolution to the floor for its consideration. This is the fifth intelligence authorization bill that this House has considered since the tragic events of September 11, which changed this institution's outlook on intelligence. It has certainly changed our intelligence community's approach to collection and analysis.

H.R. 5020 is the first intelligence authorization that is based on a budget request fully determined by our new Director of National Intelligence, again reflecting the changes, reflecting the evolution, the progress of our approach to keeping America secure, protecting our citizens, protecting our forces abroad through an ever-changing architecture.

The DNI, created in H.R. 10, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, created this new Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a responsible authority that would oversee and orchestrate a coordinated effort by the entire intelligence community composed of 15 different intelligence agencies. This legislation today continues the sustained effort and long-term strategy to achieve optimum performance in human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, open-source intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.

This bill authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. In addition to funding these agency activities, the legislation contains other noncontroversial intelligence community housekeeping matters that will help create a more efficient and effective intelligence community. The legislation reflects recent administrative action and formally includes the Drug Enforcement Administration in the intelligence community and authorizes its activities conducted within the National Intelligence Program. It also requires the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence, to conduct a regular strategic review of intelligence capabilities against threats, similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review, and limits the DNI's authority to hire civilian personnel in excess of the specifically authorized numbers to no more than 2 percent of the authorized amount of employees.

To more formally increase oversight, the bill specifically provides that reporting requirements contained in the classified annex will be considered as required by the underlying law. Additionally, it requires a comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted within the National Intelligence Program to be provided to the committee in classified format. This provision was included in the House-passed bill for fiscal year 2006 as well.

The underlying bill also contains language offered by the ranking member, Ms. Harman, that expresses the sense of the Congress that the DNI should promptly examine the need for establishing and overseeing the implementation of a multilevel security clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages that are deemed critical to our Nation's security.

I am pleased with the efforts of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Chairman Hoekstra and his ranking member, Ms. Harman, have done yeoman's work, with the assistance of their committee, on a bipartisan basis to produce this bill. It is a perfect example of how Congress can achieve a bipartisan product that meets the needs of our Nation. I commend them for their hard work.

I urge the Members to support the rule and the underlying bill.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I am glad that the gentleman acknowledged in the beginning of his remarks that this is a bipartisan bill that enjoyed unanimous support coming out of committee. As we move forward on the other issues of contention, we certainly look forward to that debate.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to one of this institution's experts on national security, a member of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a graduate of one of America's fine service academies.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I would like to address three of the points that the distinguished ranking member made, and I would point out that we appreciate her bipartisan efforts in crafting this bill, the underlying bill that the rule addresses, that came out of the committee on a voice vote.

First, the program that she categorized, that has been categorized, I apologize, Madam Speaker, the program that has been categorized as an ``illegal eavesdropping program'' had in a previous press release been characterized in this way: ``As the ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee, I have been briefed since 2003 on a highly classified NSA foreign collection program that targeted al Qaeda. I believe the program is essential to U.S. national security and that its disclosure has damaged critical intelligence capabilities.''

That was the statement of the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee as it relates to what has now been characterized by saying it is illegal eavesdropping.

Secondly, this question of Iran reports, the Iran crisis scares the dickens out of me. It is a very serious issue for this entire Chamber, for this entire Nation. It is a country that is not only engaged in what could be a speculative threat against its neighbors and the United States and the world as a whole, but are bringing in cameras to show that they are breaking IAEA seals, along with their red-hot rhetoric coming out of their President calling for the destruction of our ally, bragging about the uranium enrichment capabilities, talking about the difference between P-1 and P-2 centrifuges.

It is a very serious issue, one that all Members of Congress should make themselves aware of. As chairman of the policy committee, I was joined by my Energy Subcommittee in going to New York on Monday to receive such a briefing, the kind of briefing that every Member of Congress is entitled to. As members of the House Intelligence Committee, they are entitled to even higher-level briefings on the Iranian situation at their request.

So, the requirement, the responsibility, for us to engage the administration, to engage the Intelligence Community, to engage the appropriate persons who are tracking this crisis is on us. And it is not a mere every-90-day

exercise. It should be an ongoing exercise as developments come in through the media and through other open sources that call on us to further update our awareness of what is a very dangerous situation.

Thirdly, this idea of zero funding for the Civil Liberties Protection Board, that is an issue within the White House budget. It is not germane to the intelligence authorization bill, it is not an issue that we can fund, and it was ruled out of order for that reason. It is a matter for the appropriators who are dealing with the White House budget line, not for the Intelligence Community's overall budget.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's comments on the concern about Iran. As I said earlier, it is a huge issue and a major international crisis for all of us to be tracking on a very routine basis, especially those members of the Intelligence Committee who have access to a higher level of information than the rest of us.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.

Madam Speaker, I want to address this issue of leaks briefly. Before presenting this rule to the House, I took it upon myself to read the bill. And because of the nature of the bill, it is only available in Intelligence Committee space. And all Members have the opportunity to review the material that we are going to be voting on later today.

In the context of this discussion about leaks, I was reminded that at the beginning of every Congress, upon our election, we, all Members of this House, have to sign something saying that we recognize that House rules prevent us from disclosing classified information.

In addition, when you go to read the bill that we are here today to consider, you sign another form reaffirming that you have taken this oath, this obligation to not disclose classified information. That is what Members of Congress have to do.

When you join the CIA, you sign a standard secrecy agreement that says that you are going to keep the things that you are working on secret to protect the interests of our Nation. You

are not going to go writing books about it, you are not going to make a movie about it, you are not going to cash in on this Nation's security.

When you have access to sensitive compartmented information, you sign yet another nondisclosure agreement, again to drive home the point to the employees who are guarding the very secrets that keep us safe and free that you cannot capitalize on America's secrets.

This was very clear to the leaker. This was made very clear to Members of Congress. There is no double standard. What the individual did was against the law, was a complete breach of the secrecy agreement that that individual signed upon becoming an employee and then having progressively higher levels of access to more and more sensitive information. It is abundantly clear that what she did was wrong.

I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, I respect the gentleman's perspective.

That is why this bill is so important, number one; and number two, it is why it is so vitally important that our representatives on that committee, that our House Members on both sides of the aisle on the House Permanent Select Subcommittee on Intelligence, ask the correct questions, are given the proper orientation, dig into these issues, make this committee a priority, because they are the rest of this House's eyes and ears on those very sensitive issues.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, the cultural differences in this House are intriguing. Hailing from the South, we would label ``cockamamie'' a theory where the President would conspire to break the law and invite Members of the other party in on the deal. We would call that a pretty cockamamie theory.

And so when the President, in an effort to keep America safe and to monitor members of al Qaeda who are communicating with people inside our borders, probably not checking the weather, probably not seeing how the Yankees or the Mets are doing, but plotting very dangerous, tragic, consequential events to destroy our way of life, to cause mayhem, to cause loss of life, we want to know what they are up to.

And the President, under this cockamamie theory, conspired to protect us, in the gentleman's words illegally protect us; but he did so in a way that brought in a team of lawyers, reviewed the program every 45 days, and invited members of leadership from both parties, from both Houses of the legislative branch, to be in on that discussion.

That is a cockamamie theory that he was conspiring to break the law in that regard. He was fulfilling his oath to protect this Nation.

I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Reclaiming my time, I recognize that the gentleman's use of ``cockamamie'' was directed at another aspect of this debate. But I stand by my comment that the President of the United States did not conspire to engage in any illegal, inappropriate activity by, first, calling a team of lawyers and, second, calling the leadership of the opposite party.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), another member of the House Intelligence Committee, another leader on national security issues for us.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The gentleman from New Jersey is a very capable member of the Intelligence Committee, and surely he is not suggesting that covert actions of the United States Government should be made available to every single Member of Congress. Surely the gentleman is not suggesting that every classified program that this United States is engaged in should be available to every single Member.

I would invite the gentleman to respond. Would the Manhattan Project have been available to every single Member who asked about its cost, the number of employees, where the activity was going on, how many people were involved? Would the gentleman have suggested that every Member of Congress would have been clued in on that, even when the Vice President wasn't?

I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Reclaiming my time, I think the gentleman, by his answer, has answered the question that clearly we have an Intelligence Committee specifically for the purpose of being our eyes and ears, because we do not empower every single Senator and every single House Member with every single detail of every activity going on in the intelligence community, and there are very strong reasons for that. So, clearly, that would not be the proper course of action.

Under longstanding committee tradition, the chair and the ranking member of both Houses were brought into a different level of awareness on certain activities that were going on. Under Democratic and Republican control, that was the case.

As a result of the terrorist surveillance program, the Senate created an entire new subcommittee to deal with the issue, and the House expanded access to that information to 11 Members, an unprecedented number of Members going beyond the historical, under the Democratic model, four Members who had been given access to those types of programs and activities.

Mr. Speaker, relaiming my time, the gentleman had suggested that the other 420 Members of the House had not had access to the information, and that is precisely how it is set up, that they would not have access to that information. That is why we have talented Members like yourself on the committee, and that is why we have expanded access to information about that program to more members of the committee than ever before.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, setting aside the fact that the amendment the gentlewoman refers to is not germane to this bill, I point out to the gentlewoman that the amendment that she refers to creates a commission that, A, already exists; and, B, the chair and vice chair have already been confirmed by the Senate, and the members have been appointed.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to another member of the House Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Renzi).

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the remaining time.

I have no further speakers, Mr. Speaker, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, my friend from Massachusetts had me with Iran and lost me with Iraq. Everything that he said regarding the seriousness of the threat from Iran, a nuclear-capable Iran, is unacceptable to our interests. Everything he said is absolutely correct.

And I can save him the vote on the previous question by asking him to turn to page 22 of the public version of the intelligence authorization bill, where it says, under the subheading Reporting Regarding Iran and North Korea, ``The committee has conducted regular and ongoing oversight of these efforts and expects the DNI to ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to provide timely, detailed, and frequent reporting on the current intentions and capabilities on Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and missile programs, as well as the Intelligence Community's capabilities to understand and evaluate these programs. In particular, the committee is interested in receiving, on an ongoing basis current assessments of Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and missile programs; information on new intelligence developed, including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources; and full discussion of any gaps in knowledge, dissents, caveats, and other information that would tend to reduce confidence in the overall assessment. The committee believes these reports will provide timely information to help better inform Congress as it is asked to make decisions regarding U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea.''

The reporting requirement is in the bill. Mr. Speaker, this is a very important issue. I urge the gentleman, I urge the Congress to support the rule, support the underlying bill, and support the hardworking men and women.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.