Rural Housing Hurricane Relief Act of 2005

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding me this time.

It is not so much what is in this bill; it is what is not in this bill. What we have here is a bill which does not, in fact, deal with all of the threats which are posed by al Qaeda.

Right now, across our country, it is harder to get into some night clubs in New York City than it is to get into chemical facilities across our country. There are 23 States that have over 100 facilities that could cause injuries or deaths to 1 million people. This bill still does not mandate armed guards at chemical facilities.

The nuclear power industry still does not have a permanent upgrade of the protections which are needed against an al Qaeda attack, even though we know that al Qaeda has nuclear power plants at the top of their terrorist target list.

Public transit. While $18 billion has been spent on airlines, only a small fraction of that has been spent on mass transit to protect against al Qaeda attacks, even though we have been warned in Madrid, warned in London, and even today, New York is in fear that there could be an attack on that city.

LNG: What the Republicans have done this year is they have told mayors they have no say over where LNG facilities would go. Governors have no say. And the Coast Guard has no say. Only the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, dealing with the wish lists of the oil and gas industry, can decide where they go, but in the City of Boston and in dozens of cities across our country, they are going to have a homeland security nightmare trying to protect if al Qaeda attacked an LNG facility.

When it comes to hazardous material shipments, this majority Republican Party still refuses to have a mandate that there is a rerouting of those dangerous chemicals, the chlorines and the others that, if they were attacked, would cause catastrophic injuries in our country.

And in aviation, still only a small fraction of all of the cargo that goes on passenger planes in our country is inspected. So the people in our country must take off their shoes, put their computer through, their bags go through, all of it is screened, and they are sitting in the passenger section of the plane, and then underneath their feet will come all of this cargo that has not been screened.

This bill has only a very slight increase in its budget, but the budget itself does not determine whether or not we have good homeland security. This Republican majority still refuses to tell the chemical, the nuclear, the LNG, the hazardous material industry, the aviation industry that there is a regulatory black hole through which al Qaeda can come to attack the very list of targets that they put at the top of their terrorist target list. Not enough money and no mandates on the industry.

Mr. Speaker, catastrophe is bred by complacency, and that is what this bill is.

Mr. Speaker, the conference report we are considering today on the House Floor fails to close dangerous homeland security loopholes that continue to put Americans at risk more than 4 years after the 9/11 attacks.

Despite the urgent need to increase protections against terrorists determined to strike our country, serious vulnerabilities persist in a range of major areas:

Chemical plant security: More than 100 facilities in 23 States could threaten 1 million or more people if terrorists attacked the facility. There are no federal security requirements for chemical plants--the industry secures itself if it decides, on its own, to do so. ``60 Minutes'' did a segment where they literally walked right through an open front gate into a chemical plant outside downtown Pittsburgh. At one facility, the reporter climbed up onto a tank containing toxic material and shouted ``hello, I'm on your tank.'' There were no guards and no one tried to stop him. There are nightclubs in New York City that are harder to get into than some of our chemical plants.

Leaks of toxic chemicals can be devastating. In India in 1984, a leak at a chemical plant in Bhopal killed at least 4,000 people and injured hundreds of thousands more.

Transportation of extremely hazardous materials: Shipments of extremely hazardous materials such as chlorine routinely travel through

densely populated areas of our country. These shipments are mobile chemical weapons that often share the same track as urban passenger rail systems and could kill or injure 100,000 people within half an hour.

In a report released by the Teamsters Rail Conference last week that surveyed rail employees, 63 percent of those surveyed indicated that their train or equipment was delayed or left unattended for an extended period of time that day, and of those, 55 percent indicated that there were hazardous materials aboard that train.

LNG Security: One of Millennium Bomb plotters planning to attack Los Angeles International Airport was smuggled into the country on an LNG tanker docking in Everett, MA in my Congressional District. Terrorists may target LNG tankers and terminals, resulting in catastrophic consequences for surrounding communities. In 1979, my bill to require such remote siting was signed into law. But the Bush Administration is trying to undermine it, opening up the possibility an LNG plant would be placed, like a sitting duck, in the middle of an urban area, where an attack or accident would cause incredible devastation. Energy Bill signed into law in August 2005 froze out local officials from site decision-making process, so now convenience for energy companies, rather than security safeguards for surrounding community, will determine where facilities are built. Last month, I offered an amendment to the Coast Guard reauthorization bill to require the involvement of the Coast Guard, which is part of the Homeland Security Department, in siting decisions. My amendment was defeated on the House Floor.

Republicans claim to support local control and the right of states to fend off federal encroachments. But when it comes to LNG siting, Republicans cut out mayors and governors and state homeland security officials from carrying out one of their most important responsibilities--protecting the public.

Aviation: Approximately 22 percent of all cargo transported by air in the United States is carried on passenger planes. This cargo consumes about half of the space in the cargo bay on a typical flight, and almost none of it is ever inspected! In the past, this cargo loophole has been exploited with deadly results, such as when Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb hidden in unscreened baggage. I asked Secretary Chertoff if he would support a requirement that 100 percent of the cargo carried on passenger planes be inspected, just as all checked bags, carry-on bags and passengers are currently inspected before boarding? He said ``No.''

Why should the booties of babies be scrutinized for bombs, but no one checks the cargo bound for the belly of a Boeing? The Bush administration says we should trust the shipper. But we must apply the Reagan Doctrine to cargo security--Trust, but verify.

Public transit: The attacks in London and Madrid clearly demonstrated our vulnerability to similar strikes against our transit systems here in the United States. Despite these wake-up calls, this conference report provides only slightly more funding than what is being provided today. Ranking Members Obey and Sabo offered amendments during the conference to increase funding for public transit security, but these amendments were defeated by the unanimous opposition from Republicans on the conference committee.

The American Public Transportation Association has identified $6 billion in transit security needs for U.S. public transportation systems, approximately the same amount of money we're spending each month in Iraq. Since September 11, the Federal Government has spent $18 billion on passenger air security, but only $250 million on transit security. Yet, Americans take public transportation 32 million times a day--16 times more than they fly.

Biological Weapons: Four years after the unsolved anthrax attacks on the Capitol that killed innocent workers, DHS has only completed material threat assessments on four of the biological, chemical and radiological agents that it is required to assess under Project Bioshield. I asked Secretary Chertoff if he would commit to completing the rest of these threat assessments within 60 days. He said ``no.''

Today's conference report does not adequately address these issues. This bill does not:

Require chemical plants to be protected by armed guards trained to prevent attacks by sophisticated, suicidal terrorists or require chemical companies to substitute safer technologies and chemicals in their processes whenever possible, so if terrorists penetrate a plant, damage they could cause would be dramatically reduced.

Require re-routing of extremely hazardous materials whenever possible to reduce the threat of an attack on a chemical shipment in a densely populated area.

Mandate that LNG facilities should be built in remote locations far away from population centers or ensure that security officials, including State and local government representatives are involved in siting process.

Require that all the commercial cargo carried on passenger planes be inspected for bombs, just as all passengers and their luggage are.

Direct the Department of Homeland Security to complete all of the 60 material threat assessments and purchase all of the vaccine doses required under Project Bioshield.

Republicans continue to nickel and dime homeland security while writing a blank check for the war in Iraq. Specifically, the discretionary funding provided in this bill is $1.3 billion, only 4.5 percent more than last year, which is just slightly more than the rate of inflation. When Ranking Members Obey and Sabo attempted to add $1.7 billion for FEMA disaster mitigation programs, emergency management grants, chemical, transit and port security, and other critical security programs such as aviation security and Coast Guard operations, they were defeated by Republicans on a party-line vote.

Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita washed away the illusion that the Federal Government is better prepared to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack than it was on 9/11. Not only are we not prepared for a natural or man-made disaster, we are not taking the preventive measures to reduce the risk of these devastating events. This conference report does not provide for qualified, experienced leadership at FEMA, nor does it return FEMA to the staffing levels of the 1990s.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot support this conference report, which fails to address pressing, well-known homeland security weaknesses. I urge a ``no'' vote.

Mr. Speaker, the conference report we are considering today on the House Floor fails to close dangerous homeland security loopholes that continue to put Americans at risk more than four years after the 9/11 attacks.

Despite the urgent need to increase protections against terrorists determined to strike our country, serious vulnerabilities persist in a range of major areas:

Nuclear terrorism: Non-proliferation expert Graham Allison has said that ``more likely than not'' there will be an act of nuclear terrorist attack in our country. Al Qaeda views obtaining nuclear weapons as a religious duty. There are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons-worth of highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union, but we do not have the technology that can reliably detect it at our ports of entry.

Chemical plant security: More than 100 facilities in 23 States could threaten 1 million or more people if terrorists attacked the facility. There are no federal security requirements for chemical plants--the industry secures itself if it decides, on its own, to do so. ``60 Minutes'' did a segment where they literally walked right through an open front gate into a chemical plant outside downtown Pittsburgh. At one facility, the reporter climbed up onto a tank containing toxic material and shouted ``hello, I'm on your tank.'' There were no guards and no one tried to stop him. There are nightclubs in New York City that are harder to get into than some of our chemical plants.

Leaks of toxic chemicals can be devastating. In India in 1984, a leak at a chemical plant in Bhopal killed at least 4,000 people and injured hundreds of thousands more.

Transportation of extremely hazardous materials: Shipments of extremely hazardous materials such as chlorine routinely travel through densely populated areas of our country. These shipments are mobile chemical weapons that often share the same track as urban passenger rail systems and could kill or injure 100,000 people within half an hour. In a report released by the Teamsters Rail Conference last week that surveyed rail employees, 63 percent of those surveyed indicated that their train or equipment was delayed or left unattended for an extended period of time that day, and of those, 55 percent indicated that there were hazardous materials aboard the train.

LNG Security: One of Millenium Bomb plotters planning to attack Los Angeles International Airport was smuggled into the country on an LNG tanker docking in Everett, MA in my Congressional District. Terrorists may target LNG tankers and terminals, resulting in catastrophic consequences for surrounding communities. In 1979, my bill to require such remote sitting was signed into law. But the Bush Administration is trying to undermine it, opening up the possibility an LNG plant would be placed, like a sitting duck, in the middle of an urban area, where an attack or accident would cause incredible devastation. Energy Bill signed into law in August 2005 froze out local officials from site decision-making process, so now convenience for energy companies, rather than security safeguards for surrounding community, will determine where facilities are built. Last month, I offered an amendment to the Coast Guard reauthorization bill to require the involvement of the Coast Guard, which is part of the Homeland Security Department, in siting decisions. My amendment was defeated on the House Floor.

Republicans claim to support local control and the right of states to fend off federal encroachments. But when it comes to LNG siting, Republicans cut out mayors and governors and state homeland security officials from carrying out one of their most important responsibilities--protecting the public.

Aviation: Approximately 22 percent of all cargo transported by air in the United States is carried on passenger planes. This cargo consumes about half of the space in the cargo bay on a typical flight, and almost none of it is ever inspected! In the past, this cargo loophole has been exploited with deadly results, such as when Pam Am Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb hidden in unscreened baggage. I asked Secretary Chertoff if he would support a requirement that 100 percent of the cargo carried on passenger planes be inspected, just as all checked bags, carry-on bags and passengers are currently inspected before boarding? He said ``No.''

Why should the booties of babies be scrutinized for bombs, but no one checks the cargo bound for the belly of a Boeing? The Bush Administration says we should trust the shipper. But we must apply the Reagan Doctrine to cargo security--Trust, but verify.

Public transit: The attacks in London and Madrid clearly demonstrated our vulnerability to similar strikes against our transit systems here in the United States. Despite these wake-up calls, this conference report provides only slightly more funding than what is being provided today. Ranking Members Obey and Sabo offered amendments during the conference to increase funding for public transit security, but these amendments were defeated by the unanimous opposition from Republicans on the conference committee.

The American Public Transportation Association has identified $6 billion in transit security needs for U.S. public transportation systems, approximately the same amount of money we're spending each month in Iraq. Since September 11, the federal government has spent $18 billion on passenger air security, but only $250 million on transit security. Yet, Americans take public transportation 32 million times a day--16 times more than they fly.

Biological Weapons: Four years after the unsolved anthrax attacks on the Capitol that killed innocent workers, DHS has only completed material threat assessments on FOUR of the biological, chemical and radiological agents that it is required to assess under Project Bioshield. I asked Secretary Chertoff if he would commit to completing the rest of these threat assessments within 60 days. He said ``No.''

Today's conference report does not adequately address these issues. This bill does not:

Require chemical plants to be protected by armed guards trained to prevent attacks by sophisticated, suicidal terrorists or require chemical companies to substitute safer technologies and chemicals in their processes whenever possible, so if terrorists penetrate a plant, damage they could cause would be dramatically reduced.

Requiring re-routing of extremely hazardous materials whenever possible to reduce the threat of an attack on a chemical shipment in a densely populated area.

Mandate that LNG facilities should be built in remote locations far away from population centers or ensure that security officials, including state and local government representatives are involved in siting process.

Require that all the commercial cargo carried on passenger planes be inspected for bombs, just as all passengers and their luggage are.

Direct the Department of Homeland Security to complete all of the 60 material threat assessments and purchase all of the vaccine doses required under Project Bioshield.

Republicans continue to nickel and dime homeland security while writing a blank check for the war in Iraq. Specifically, the discretionary funding provided in this bill is $1.3 billion, only 4.5 percent more than last year, which is just slightly more than the rate of inflation. When Ranking Members Obey and Sabo attempted to add $1.7 billion for FEMA disaster mitigation programs, emergency management grants, chemical, transit and port security, and other critical security programs such as aviation security and Coast Guard operations, they were defeated by Republicans on a party-line vote.

Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita washed away the illusion that the Federal government is better prepared to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack than it was on 9/11. Not only are we not prepared for a natural or man-made disaster such as a dirty bomb, we are not taking the preventive measures to reduce the risk of these devastating events. This conference report does not provide for qualified, experienced leadership at FEMA, nor does it return FEMA to the staffing levels of the 1990s.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot support this conference report, which fails to address pressing, well-known homeland security weaknesses. I urge a ``no'' vote.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 474, I call up the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2360) making appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2006, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the conference report to accompany the bill, H.R. 2360, and that I may include tabular material on the same.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, we are pleased today to present for consideration the conference agreement on the funding for the Department of Homeland Security. Five weeks ago this Nation experienced perhaps the worst natural disaster in our history.

Ninety thousand square miles were declared a disaster area. Ninety thousand square miles, an area twice the size of my home State of Kentucky. I believe Hurricane Katrina was a wake-up call. It showed us we are not indestructible. Vulnerabilities clearly exist. We were reminded that there are many threats to the homeland security beyond terrorism.

There are obviously many lingering and important questions about Hurricane Katrina, all of which need to be and will be addressed in the upcoming months. We witnessed firsthand in Katrina the immediate response was inadequate. We also saw how responses varied across State lines and at different levels of government.

But while the response to Katrina was plagued by problems, the preparation response to Hurricane Rita was not. We observed a substantially more organized preparation and response, demonstrating how the Department of Homeland Security can and does work

as an effective organization. The fact is for many within the Department, the response to these disasters has been nothing short of remarkable.

For instance, in the week immediately following Katrina, the Coast Guard saved more than 33,000 lives, more than the Coast Guard saved over the past 5 years. Over 4,000 Coast Guard, 12,000 FEMA, 2,500 Federal law enforcement personnel have been sent to support Hurricane Katrina and Rita relief operations, and their work continues even as we speak.

The bill before us supports these efforts and more. It provides the funds the Department needs to prevent, prepare and respond to disasters, both natural and man-made. It provides a balance among Homeland Security programs and ensures the Department has the resources it needs to carry out its missions. This bill maintains a steady course towards keeping our communities safe and making our Nation more secure.

In total, the 2006 conference agreement provides $30.8 billion, $1.4 billion above the current year and $1.3 billion above what the President asked of us. This includes more than $19.1 billion for border protection and immigration enforcement; $3.3 billion for our Nation's first responders; $6.33 billion for transportation security; $1.5 billion for research, development and deployment of innovative technologies; and $625 million for protecting our national critical infrastructure and key assets.

In the interest of time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to highlight just a few of these items that I know are of interest to all the Members.

There is $3.3 billion for our first responders. This agreement strikes a balance between funding high-risk communities and providing support for States and localities to achieve and maintain minimum levels of preparedness. The bill includes $950 million for basic formula and law enforcement terrorism prevention grants and $1.2 billion for security in our urban and most populated areas, including $390 million for transportation and infrastructure security grants. Some people say the amount of money for first responders is below the current level, and it is true. It is. The reason for that is they have got $6.6 billion in the pipeline, not yet allocated; so why add to the reservoir when the river is running full?

The bill provides $19.1 billion for border protection, immigration enforcement and related activities, which is $1.2 billion over the current year and almost a half billion over what the President asked of us. That includes $1.8 billion for border security and control; $3.4 billion for Immigration and Customs Enforcement; $340 million for the US-VISIT program; $2.9 billion for Coast Guard operations; fully funding Deepwater at $933.1 million; and $40 million for the implementation of the REAL ID Act.

So I think the agreement, Mr. Speaker, will go a long way towards improving the integrity of our borders. When we combine what we have in this bill with the 2005 supplemental, we will have 1,500 new Border Patrol agents and 568 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents across the land to be hired in fiscal year 2006. The bill also supports a total of 20,300 detention beds for housing people who are locked up, having come across the border.

The conference agreement supports security for all modes of transportation, including $6.3 billion for the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Air Marshals and $150 million in rail security grants.

There is $85 million for air cargo security, which will support the hiring of 100 new air cargo inspectors, the development of new cargo screening technology and the expansion of canine enforcement teams. The bill also continues to provide strong oversight of TSA's progress towards inspecting all cargo that is transported on passenger aircraft.

There is $1.5 billion for science and technology, including $318 million for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office that will coordinate our Nation's efforts against the smuggling of nuclear materials into our country. This is a brand new agency, and this is brand new funding. We also continue to fully fund research and development for antimissile devices that might be used against commercial aircraft.

Mr. Speaker, the important work of the Department of Homeland Security cannot be emphasized enough. As we continue to watch the recovery efforts in the Gulf States and our hearts go out with our money to those regions, it is clear that the assets we have given the Department over the past 3 years are being put to good use. I believe this conference agreement builds on the Department's progress and substantially furthers the protection of our homeland, and I urge all of my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, who has been enormously helpful in this bill all the way through.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Latham), one of the hard-working members of our subcommittee whose work helped make this bill happen.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter), another hard-working member of our subcommittee whom I rely upon very much.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).

Mr. Speaker, before I yield back, I think it is important that the gentleman from Minnesota and I express our thanks to staff. They make us look good, because they are the ones who produce these products, the staff that is seated here with me and the staff on the minority side. These people have done yeoman's work day and night for the last year on this bill. I want to thank them for all of the great work that they have done.

I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the conference report, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, let me first of all acknowledge the very hard work of the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and I recognize that this is a difficult challenge.

As a member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and now the authorizing committee for two terms, I believe that those of us who have studied the details of the structure of homeland security can speak with a degree of information, if you will, of both the assets of this appropriation but also some elements that are obviously missing.

Spending a lot of time walking through the cots and amongst those who were survivors of Hurricane Katrina, having now in our community almost 125,000, I know the fear and the devastation of the lack of preparedness of this government. So it is to my dismay that the acceptance of Secretary Chertoff's reorganization plan was not put on hold so that we could truly find out what were the funding needs.

I join my colleagues in wanting more dollars for rail security. I have joined my colleagues in offering new legislation today that was articulated by the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson). I join my colleagues in the concerns of the limited regulation of chemical plants. But, most of all, I speak to issues that I think would save additional lives.

There are 1,100 persons dead and still counting in the Hurricane Katrina backdrop of Mississippi, Alabama and in New Orleans. We have yet to mourn those who have lost their lives. But certainly the director for preparedness and response is not the answer. FEMA needs to be independent, self-sufficient, well-funded and a separate component to Homeland Security, even to the extent of being its own cabinet.

I realize that Michael Brown has been singled out, and I am delighted that Director Paulson is the Acting Director, but I can assure my colleagues, having been to Beaumont and Port Arthur after Hurricane Katrina, we did not have our act together then. We did not have our time and our organization together, even then. FEMA was not there timely. Generators that were needed were not there. Ice and water was not there. The National Guard did not have orders, and no one knew who was in charge. So, frankly, I believe there is much work to be done.

In the backdrop of the potential epidemic of bird flu, I believe there needs to be more resources and efforts than a chief medical officer. We need to boost up under Homeland Security the public health system. The sense of Congress that Immigration and Customs and border protection should be merged, I

do not know if that is a well-thought-out plan. In fact, we need to investigate some of the failings of these entities before we begin to merge one entity into another.

I am grateful that we have provided dollars for transportation security, but it is not enough. Whistleblower protection is good, but there is not enough funding, if you will, to establish an independent, strong FEMA. That is what we need to be focusing on, and the reorganization plan should not be accepted in the backdrop and the failures of Hurricane Katrina.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this appropriations measure because this Nation desperately needs all the resources it can get. According to the Department of Defense, over 15,000 of our troops have been injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have about 18,000 American troops deployed in Afghanistan and about 149,000 in Iraq for the current war effort. During the August recess, 85 American troops were killed in Iraq, and nearly 2,000 have been killed since September. To further exacerbate matters, the price tag for the war has already exceeded $196 billion, broken down to about $5 billion per month. These monies and bodies have been and are being expended on an effort that is not bringing the relief that is currently needed right here on American soil.

With these motions in mind, Mr. Speaker, I will ultimately support the underlying legislation under the Conference Report, but I recognize that it has many shortfalls that will affect this Nation's ability to respond to a new and substantial set of circumstances--namely the aftermath of Katrina and Rita. I speak not only from the standpoint of a Representative of an area that experienced compound effects of both Katrina and Rita, but I speak as a mother, wife, and a person who understands the pains of economic hardship.

I applaud the Conferees for giving agencies such as ICE an appropriation of $3.175 billion--which was a $216 million increase over the FY05 level of $2.95 billion. Furthermore, of the $4.6 billion allocated to TSA, $2.54 billion is allocated to cover the passenger and baggage screener workforce. The number of TSA screeners is capped at 45,000--which will constrain our efforts to compensate for the effects of the two hurricanes. Within this account, privatized screening operations are funded at $140 million. The conferees also extended liability protection to airports with private and TSA screeners for ``any act of negligence, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing'' committed by a Federal or private screener--which will be a good element.

While I support many of the allocations set forth in this measure, it is my feeling that, overall, the initiative to implement the departmental facelift called for in the Secretary's Second Stage Review is the wrong focus at this time. Katrina and Rita have created more pressing issues that could be addressed with this bill.

To compound the severe need for resources and administrative services caused by the hurricanes, there are major departmental changes that have been made that could weaken our ability to address those needs. The proposed transfer of all state and local grants and associated activities to the new Preparedness Directorate must be given oversight analysis before it is implemented. After having seen firsthand the cries for ice, potable water, food, and other subsistence items in Baton Rouge, LA and in my own backyard of Port Arthur, I know that this bill does not do all that it can to make us more prepared for incidents similar to Katrina and Rita.

Unfortunately, the underlying bill is not exactly on-point or up-to- date vis-a-vis Hurricane Rita. Many of the problems that we face are new, late breaking, and developing in front of our eyes.

In emergency situations such as occurred in the Gulf States, communications capabilities are essential. Emergency responders must have the equipment that will allow essential communications efforts to continue in case of the major damage to infrastructure we have seen in New Orleans.

Clearly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency needs to change-- from the bottom to the top. We need to look at whether the tasks charged to FEMA are too large to be included with 21 other agencies under the Department. Before some of the very substantial changes set forth in H.R. 2360 are passed into law, we need to seriously consider separating FEMA so that from top to bottom--especially given the recent resignation of former Director, Michael Brown, whose credentials as an emergency manager had been widely questioned.

Funds that we appropriate to FEMA must be prioritized for disaster preparedness, and we need substantial oversight in order to prevent catastrophic aftermaths.

Mr. Speaker, today the House is considering the conference agreement on H.R. 2360, the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill for FY 2006. I am pleased by some of the provisions in this conference report, but I am also troubled by a number of other provisions.

We had several days to prepare before Hurricane Katrina ravaged the gulf coast--much longer than we will have before a potential terrorist attack. But the administration's incompetence meant that extra time was almost wasted and lives were lost. In April, we had a successful terrorism response exercise in New Jersey called TOPOFF 3, bringing together Federal, State and local authorities to respond to simulated terrorist attacks. What we need are more exercises like these, not fewer; more and better planning, not less. But this conference report cuts pre-disaster mitigation by $50 million over last year and by $100 million from even the administration's request. If we had spent money ahead of time--if we had pre-positioned assets in the gulf coast region before Katrina struck--we could have saved lives and billions of dollars. As our Nation faces a variety of threats, both manmade and natural, we need to think seriously about these cuts.

After watching the Federal Emergency Management Agency seriously mishandle their response to Hurricane Katrina there is a clear need to restructure the Agency. However, we will not be doing that today. This legislation does nothing to reform FEMA--it doesn't improve the leadership, it doesn't return staffing levels to the highs of the 1990s, it doesn't even require that FEMA report directly to the president. FEMA is the Federal Government's first line of defense and response to disasters, and it needs to be reformed. And this bill doesn't provide the money either. This conference report even cuts funding for FEMA by 12 percent from last year's funding level.

It also slashes funding for state and local preparedness grants by $585 million below FY 2005 levels. We know that New Jersey is a target for terrorists. In a bioterrorism attack just after September 11, 2001, postal workers in Hamilton were sickened with anthrax. Last year, the Prudential Plaza building in Newark was named as a target after an Al Qaeda laptop computer containing information on the building was found in Pakistan. And, of course, four of the 9/11 hijackers passed through Newark Liberty International Airport and 700 residents of the State were killed on that terrible day. Funds for State and local preparedness are crucial to keep New Jersey and our Nation safe. The police officers who notice something suspicious, the community leaders who develop evacuation plans, the first responders on the scene immediately after an attack--these people are local authorities, and we need to give them the tools they need to do their jobs.

There have been two major terrorist attacks in the West since September 11, and both have been aimed at mass transit--the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings, and the July 2005 London bombings. But the President did not request any specific funds for mass transit. Fortunately, the conference agreement adds $150 million dollars for transit security. New Jersey Transit, the Nation's third largest transit authority, with 220 million riders a year, 40 percent inbound to New York City, runs several trains and buses through my district. Princeton Junction, located in my district, is the fourth busiest station in New Jersey Transit's system. We need more funding for mass transit, and this is a start.

This conference report also begins to address one of our greatest vulnerabilities to terrorism, one that the Bush administration continues to ignore. It allocates $30 million for initial programs for better screening of passenger stowed luggage on commercial flights. The conference report also provides for adequate independent oversight of Secure Flight, the next generation of the air passenger prescreening program. This will allow us to balance security and privacy.

It also provides $655 million for fire grants, $155 million more than President Bush requested. As we all know, our local fire departments are the backbone of our first responder network. Fire fighters are some of the first to arrive at disasters, be they natural or man-made. I am glad that the conference report provides much needed funds for fire grants.

New Jersey is home to what terrorism experts call the ``most dangerous two miles'' in America--the chemical plants, highways, and railroads that lie between Newark Liberty International Airport and the Port of Elizabeth. And in a 14-mile radius around the site, there are 12 million people living and working. The House earlier this year voted to increase funding to help secure these sites. But the conference report does not include this desperately needed funding increase. Rather, it contains only $95 million for the necessary chemical countermeasures that would help secure industrial materials, and provide safety and peace of mind to millions of New Jerseyans.

Mr. Speaker, this bill leaves too much undone. Cutting funding for local preparedness and first responders is more than enough justification for New Jerseyans to oppose this bill.

We can do better in planning for disasters, reforming FEMA, and assisting state and local governments. And though the conference report does more for transit and air cargo screening, these efforts are just down-payments on what will be a long-term project.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

When the House passed the 2006 Homeland Security appropriations bill, I said that the bill represented a substantial improvement over the President's budget request. The conference report does as well. I said that the bill included better funding for border enforcement, separate programs for transit and port security. This conference report does those same things.

I said that the House bill toughened up air cargo screening, privacy safeguards and the designation of security-sensitive information. This conference report includes these initiatives.

However, I also said that I had reservations about some parts of the House bill, and I continue to have those concerns. I have more reservations because of changes made to the bill in conference.

I am a strong minority who has strong reservations about the shift in distributing State and local grant funds from being based on population to being based on the Department of Homeland Security's assessment of risk and threat. These are funds that flow to State governments to be reallocated, at least 80 percent to local government. Last year, less than 40 percent of these grant funds went out by threat. This year 78 percent of the funding will go out by this threat measurement. I wonder how the DHS risk model and threat model will assess and treat Michigan, a border State, as compared to North Carolina, a hurricane-prone State.

Only two of the Department's 15 threat scenarios are based on natural disasters. As a result, I worry that our Nation may be less prepared for the disasters that we know will occur. My observation of the Department over the last several years leave me with little confidence that they are going to make fair judgments or correct judgments in making their allocation.

I am disappointed that this agreement does not do more to strengthen chemical plant security. In the conference, I offered an amendment, a simple amendment, to give the Homeland Security Secretary the authority he needs to issue requirements for security standards and plans for facilities he determines to present the greatest security risk. We should demand the Department get serious about hardening these chemical facilities. However, my amendment failed on a party-line vote.

I also have reservations about Secretary Chertoff's reorganization proposal, which is rubber stamped by this conference report. This reorganization plan was submitted to Congress barely 3 months ago, and we have not taken the time to evaluate it carefully. This reorganization was developed before the Department's poor Hurricane Katrina performance. It further weakens FEMA by severing its relationship to preparedness programs. I strongly believe that this is a mistake.

So, Mr. Speaker, as in so many bills, there are good things and bad things in this conference report. Members must make their own judgment. On balance, I will vote ``yes.''

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), the ranking member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

(Mr. OBERSTAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Speaker, the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act suggests that a number of factors are considered to measure the severity, magnitude and impact of a disaster and authorizes FEMA to provide individual assistance. I would be happy to work with the gentlewoman from Florida to get this corrected within current FEMA statutory authorities and provide equitable assistance to all victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).

(Mrs. MALONEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Speaker, I rise in total agreement.