United States Seaport Multiyear Security Enhancement Act

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to note that folded into the SAFE Port Act is the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act which is one of the most important pieces of family legislation this Congress has ever considered.

Internet gambling restraints have been under review for four Congresses. This evening we are finally poised to act decisively on this subject, and I want to extend my personal appreciation to the Speaker; to the majority leader, Mr. Boehner; and to the Senate majority leader, Mr. Frist, for their steadfast support.

Companion legislation to the House product was forthrightly led in the Senate by John Kyl of Arizona. Many Members have played an important part over the years in this legislation, particularly Mike Oxley and Spencer Bachus from the Financial Services Committee and Bob Goodlatte and Chris Cannon from Judiciary.

But I want to stress this is bipartisan legislation. The majority of Democrats voted for it just a few weeks ago. Indeed, all of us can be proud of this legislation. It should be considered a significant accomplishment of this Congress. After all, with each passing day we learn of friends and neighbors touched by devastating losses from Internet gambling. Never has it been so easy to lose so much so quickly at such a young age.

As a professor of business at the University of Illinois has noted, Internet gambling is crack cocaine for gamblers. There are no needle marks; you just click the mouse and lose your house.

The reason the NCAA, the NFL and the NBA, the NHL, and Major League Baseball support this legislation is their concern for the integrity of the games. The reason the religious community from Baptists and Methodists to Muslims has rallied to this cause is because it is concerned for the unity of the American family.

The reason we should adopt this approach is that we must be mindful of our obligations to the American family.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support for this legislation, and I will submit for the Record at this point its legislative history.

Legislative History for the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act

Section 801. Short title

This Act may be cited as the `Unlawful Internet Gambling

Enforcement Act of 2006.'

Section 802. Prohibition on acceptance of any payment instrument for

unlawful Internet gambling

Subsection (a) adds a new `Subchapter IV--Prohibition on

Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling' to Chapter 53 of Title

31 (Monetary Transactions). The new subchapter will come

immediately after subchapter III, covering Money Laundering

and Related Financial Crimes.

Section 5361. Congressional findings and purpose

(a) Findings. The Congressional findings note that: (1)

Internet gambling is primarily funded through the personal

use of payment system instruments, credit cards, and wire

transfers; (2) the National Gambling Impact Study Commission

in 1999 recommended the passage of legislation to prohibit

wire transfers to Internet gambling sites or the banks which

represent such sites; (3) Internet gambling is a growing

cause of debt collection problems for insured depository

institutions and the consumer credit industry; and (4) new

mechanisms for enforcing gambling laws on the Internet are

necessary because traditional law enforcement mechanisms are

often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions on the

Internet, especially where such gambling crosses State or

national borders.

(b) Rule of Construction. No provision is to be construed

as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State law

or Tribal-State compact prohibiting, permitting or regulating

gambling within the United States. This is intended to

alleviate fears that this bill could have the effect of

changing the legality of any gambling-related activity in the

United States.

Section 5362. Definitions

This defines the term `bet or wager' as the staking or

risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome

of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject

to chance with the agreement that the winner will receive

something of value in the event of a certain outcome. This

subsection clarifies that `bet or wager' does not include

bona fide business transactions such as securities trading or

buying or selling insurance contracts, or participation in a

simulation sports game or educational game. ``Something of

value'' does not include personal efforts of the participants

in playing the game or contest, or points or credits that the

sponsor of the game or contest provides to participants free

of charge and that can be used or redeemed only for

participation in games or contests offered by the sponsor.

Defines the term `unlawful Internet gambling' as placing,

receiving, or transmitting a bet or wager by any means which

involves the use of the Internet, where such bet or wager is

unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the

State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is

initiated, received, or otherwise made. Clarifies that

purely intrastate transactions conducted in accordance

with state laws with appropriate security controls will

not be considered unlawful internet gambling. Likewise,

transactions solely within Tribal lands complying with

similar security requirements and the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act will not be considered unlawful. Section

5362(10)(D) addresses transactions complying with

Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) which will not be

considered unlawful, because the IHA only regulates legal

transactions that are lawful in each of the states

involved. Also clarifies that intermediate routing of data

packets does not determine the location in which bets or

wagers are made.

The Internet gambling provisions do not change the legality

of any gambling-related activity in the United States. For

instance, if use of the Internet in connection with dog

racing is approved by state regulatory agencies and does not

violate any Federal law, then it is allowed under the new

section 5362(10)(A) of title 31.

The Internet gambling provisions do not interfere with

intrastate laws. New section 5362(10)(B) creates a safe

harbor from the term ``unlawful Internet gambling'' for

authorized intrastate transactions, if the state law has

adequate security measures to prevent participation by minors

and persons located out of the state. The safe harbor would

leave intact the current interstate gambling prohibitions

such as the Wire Act, federal prohibitions on lotteries, and

the Gambling Ship Act so that casino and lottery games could

not be placed on websites and individuals could not access

these games from their homes or businesses. The safe harbor

is intended to recognize current law which allows states

jurisdiction over wholly intrastate activity, where bets or

wagers, or information assisting in bets or wagers, do not

cross state lines. This would, for example, allow retail

lottery terminals to interact with a processing center within

a state, and linking of terminals between separate casinos

within a state if authorized by the state.

Tribal gaming laws are similarly preserved. Transactions

solely within tribal lands complying with similar security

requirements and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act will not be

considered unlawful, under section 5362(10)(C). Moreover, the

principle of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is that state

governments cannot apply discriminatory laws against gaming

authorized by tribal governments within the state. If a state

authorizes use of the Internet for gambling pursuant to this

section and the tribal government also authorizes this,

gambling businesses located on tribal lands within that state

would be permitted to ``export'' gambling services to persons

in the rest of the state, off of tribal lands, if the

``exported'' game complies with state law, pursuant to

section 5362(10)(B). This does not give the state

jurisdiction over the operation of the tribal gambling

business, including licensing requirements, and does not

allow the state to dictate tribal gaming laws. Only the game

itself--including the method for playing the game--must

comply with state law if a person physically located off of

tribal lands places a bet that is received by a tribal

gambling business. This principle also applies in reverse: if

a person on tribal lands plays a gambling game with a state-

based gambling

business, the game must not violate tribal law.

Section 5362 also defines the terms `business of betting or

wagering,' `designated payment system,' `Internet,' and

`restricted transaction.' Several additional terms are

defined by reference to other sections of the U.S. Code.

Section 5363. Prohibition on acceptance of any financial instrument for

unlawful Internet gambling

Prohibits persons engaged in the business of betting or

wagering from knowingly accepting credit, funds, bank

instruments, or proceeds of any other form of financial

transaction in connection with the participation of another

person in unlawful Internet gambling. This is called a

'restricted transaction' according to the definitions

section.

Section 5364. Policies and procedures to identify and prevent

restricted transactions

(a) Regulations and (b) Requirements for Policies and

Procedures. Requires the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Federal Reserve Board, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney

General, to prescribe regulations within nine months

requiring any payment system to establish policies and

procedures reasonably designed to identify and block

restricted transactions, or otherwise prevent restricted

transactions from entering its system.

(c) Compliance and (d) Liability. Provides persons

operating financial systems with immunity from civil

liability for blocking transactions that they reasonably

believe are restricted transactions, or in reliance on the

regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department and

Federal Reserve. Though a financial institution may block

additional transactions based on reasonable belief, it has no

duty to do so, and may rely solely on the regulations to

fully discharge its obligations.

(e) Enforcement. The Federal functional regulators and the

Federal Trade Commission are given the exclusive authority to

enforce this section.

Section 5365. Civil remedies

Authorizes the U.S. Attorney General and State Attorneys

General to pursue civil remedies, including a preliminary

injunction or injunction against any person to prevent or

restrain a violation of this legislation. It clarifies that

the bill does not alter, supersede or otherwise affect the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; generally limits responsibility

of an interactive computer service to the removal or

disabling of access to an online site violating this section,

upon proper notice; restricts the ability to bring injunctive

cases against financial transaction provider activities.

Internet gambling operators primarily use the resources of

two types of businesses to conduct their unlawful

enterprises: payment systems and interactive computer

services. The unlawful use of payment systems is addressed by

section 5364, not by injunctions. The legislation addresses

the unlawful use of interactive computer services through

injunctions, but with appropriate limits to avoid imposing

any duty to censor or monitor on these computer services.

Section 5365(c)(2) also extends to interactive computer

services the same immunity from liability that common

carriers are afforded when complying with a notice from law

enforcement pursuant to section 1084(d) of title 18 to

discontinue service to a gambling business.

Section 5366. Criminal penalties

Authorizes criminal penalties for violating section 5363,

including fines or imprisonment for not more than five years

or both. Also authorizes permanently enjoining a person

convicted under this section from engaging in gambling

activities.

Section 5367. Circumventions prohibited

Provides that, notwithstanding the safe harbor provided in

section 5362(2), a financial intermediary or interactive

computer service or telecommunications service that has

actual knowledge and control of bets and wagers, and operates

or is controlled by an entity that operates, an unlawful

Internet gambling site can be held criminally liable under

this subchapter.

Section 803. Internet gambling in or through foreign jurisdictions

Subsection (a) provides that, in deliberations between the

U.S. Government and any other country on money laundering,

corruption, and crime issues, the U.S. Government should

encourage cooperation by foreign governments in identifying

whether Internet gambling operations are being used for money

laundering, corruption, or other crimes, advance policies

that promote the cooperation by foreign governments in the

enforcement of this Act, and encourage the Financial Action

Task Force on Money Laundering to study the extent to which

Internet gambling operations are being used for money

laundering. It also requires the Secretary of the Treasury to

submit an annual report to Congress on the deliberations

between the United States and other countries on issues

relating to Internet gambling.

Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to

submit an annual report to Congress on any deliberations

between the United States and other countries on tissues

relating to Internet Gambling.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1064, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4954) to improve maritime and cargo security through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight in strong support of the conference report on H.R. 4954, the SAFE Port Act.

This is a night of a true success in the area of homeland security and port security. This is an issue which the country was focused on earlier this year with the whole Dubai Ports issue. It is an issue which the Homeland Security Committee addressed head on. We passed the bill out of committee. It passed the full House floor by a vote of 421- 2; and now we are here tonight, Mr. Speaker, for final passage.

Let me at the outset commend the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, for the tremendous cooperation that he gave throughout the committee process on this bill; Subcommittee Chairman Lungren on our side for his work, the leadership he demonstrated; and also Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Harman. This was definitely and truly a bipartisan effort, and we are here tonight because both parties came together, we worked together, we realized the importance of this. We realized that homeland security should not be a partisan issue.

Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to go on at great length, but I will give just some of the highlights of the bill. It provides $400 million a year in dedicated port security grant programs, three pilot programs for 100 percent screening for nuclear and radiological material. It enhances the Container Security Initiative, CSI. It codifies and strengthens CTPAT. It also establishes the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. It also sets deadlines for TWIC.

Mr. Speaker, this is legislation which encompasses so much of the issues that we have to address with port security. It is legislation whose time has come. It is legislation which makes our country safer or makes our ports more secure. It will enable the commerce of the country to go forward. And it is a bill which distinctly addresses the concerns raised by the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would just note that I was listening very carefully to the gentleman's remarks, and I really heard nothing at all critical of the port security bill. We are talking about other bills that maybe should be covered or other items. The fact is, on the issue of port security, this is the port security bill. It did receive wide bipartisan support. And I think, rather than go on extraneous issues and talking and talking about fences, we are talking about port security.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the prime sponsor of the port security bill, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach).

Mr. Speaker, could I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

Could I inquire of the gentleman from Mississippi how many speakers he has remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me first of all thank the gentleman from Michigan for his undying affection that he shows for me so often, especially tonight. It really warms my heart, and I want to thank him especially for it.

I would, however, just like to touch on a few things. First of all, this is the SAFE Port Act. I have listened as carefully as I possibly can. I have listened; I have asked Mr. Lungren to listen; I have asked staff to listen. I have not heard even one remote criticism of the port security aspects of this bill. This is a port security bill. We had staff negotiations going on day after day after day.

Now, the gentleman from Michigan raised the question of last night. Let us explain this right now. It was explained before. We will try again.

The fact is last night there was no legislative text incorporating the staff recommendations. The Senate assured us they would provide it. The Senate did not have it last night. The Senate refused to provide it. The first we saw it was 3 o'clock this afternoon. What is going on in the Senate is up to them, but that is where the final text was.

Now, if the gentleman is saying that when they came back in at 3 o'clock this afternoon, rather than take advantage of a bill which has been worked on for 6 months, which has gone through subcommittee, which has gone through committee and which has gone through the House floor, which was worked out so carefully with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and Senator Murray, which had strong bipartisan support, that because of the fact that the Senate language was not over here in time for the gentleman from Michigan, that we should put that aside, and taking the risk of not taking advantage of this moment, of not seizing the moment and passing this historic legislation to save our Nation, I have heard of people who cannot take ``yes'' for an answer.

We said last March, let us put together a port security bill. We did it. We put together a good bill and all we get tonight is begrudgery. Well, it is good, it is this, it is that, but it is not good enough because it does not cover rail, it does not cover transit or it does not cover this. Also, as the gentleman from California reminded me, it does not contain the cure for cancer either.

But the fact is it is a very good port security bill. As the gentlewoman from California said, it is the real deal. If you want to turn your back on the real deal, if you want to vote and say I really wanted something else, this is not good enough for me, the real deal should be good enough for me.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, again I inquire as to how much time remains.

The Speaker pro tempore. The gentleman from New York has 15\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Mississippi has 10\1/2\ minutes remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I would add that, again, I have been listening and listening, and there is no criticism at all of the port security. And again, rather than to take yes for an answer, we are talking about going around our committee process. The fact is, one of the reasons this bill is so good is because it was at the subcommittee level, the committee level, and then it went to the floor.

This was a long process on the port security aspect of it. Rather than just accept something coming over from the Senate at the last minute, I have enough respect for the integrity of the process of our committee that I want to replicate that when we are dealing with transit and when we are dealing with rail and working, of course, with Mr. Young. I don't want to get him nervous while he is sitting here. But it is essential that we do do it in a deliberative process.

Again, it is beyond me why, after a 6-month process where there was such bipartisanship, such working together, both here and in the Senate, that the begrudgers of the world have arrived on

the floor tonight and all they can say is there is something here that is good, though they are afraid to acknowledge it, and then they talk about something which was never part of our bill to begin with.

We dedicated ourselves to port security, and we got it done. We should be proud of that. And, again, there is a special place in life for begrudgers.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his kind remarks about the bill, and I especially want to tell him how much it means to me that he commented on my great Irish singing voice as I was delivering my oration tonight. So, Mr. Pascrell, you are a man of great ethnic perspicacity and my admiration for you is unbounded.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker will the gentlewoman yield?

First of all, I am not responsible for the germaneness rules in the Senate. Secondly, this is the bill that came back to us from the Senate.

I would just add, if the gentlewoman will yield, this is the bill that came back to us from the Senate, and I would remind the gentlewoman that unlike the transit and rail provisions, which never passed this House, the Internet gambling bill legislation did pass this House by a vote of 317-93. There was at least some nexus which was lacking with the others.

Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I was just trying to answer the gentlewoman's question. She thought I was giving her a break.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on the matter under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I assure the House I will not use the 14 minutes.

I also at this stage would like to commend the staff for the tremendous work they have done throughout this process. I would like to thank Mandy Bowers, Matt McCabe, Amanda Halpern, Kevin Gronberg, Diane Berry, Sterling Marchand, Kerry Kinirons, Mark Klaassen, Mike Power, and also the people on the minority staff.

In saying that, let me just say, Mr. Markey brought us into the new day, his eloquence, his soaring rhetoric brought us into the new day, but he uses the same tired arguments of yesterday, the arguments we hear time and again, the tired metaphors, the lame similes, he goes on and on.

He says Democrats were kept out of the process. Democrats were involved every step of the way, every minute, until the Internet gambling came over, which we found out about for the first time at the same time he did. Now, he may want to talk to the minority leader in the Senate and ask him why he consented to this being in, why they wanted it in. That is not my problem.

But the fact is, it is really wrong to suggest that there was any moment at all throughout the past 10 or 12 days, when at every stage of the way we ensured that the Democratic staff was there reporting back to their principals, I don't know where the gentleman from Massachusetts was. Maybe he was out buying a dog. I don't know. But the fact is if he had spoken with his staff, if he had spoken to the committee staff, if he had spoken to the ranking member, he would have known what was going on.

Also, I waited patiently for 29\1/2\ minutes listening to the opposition trying to hear one person say one negative word about the port security bill. Finally, Mr. Markey came up with his argument and he was talking about detecting radiation overseas.

The fact is, again in the spirit of bipartisanship and bicameralism, we adopted the language put forth by Senator Lautenberg in the Senate to have three pilot projects. So there we are agreeing with the Senator from New Jersey, which I guess is not good enough for the gentleman from Massachusetts.

I would also say that this legislation goes right to the heart of the issues that we are trying to address. The gentleman from Massachusetts cannot accept that.

But I will say for the other Members, certainly Mr. Pascrell, for the contributions that he made to this bill, to the ranking member, to Mr. Langevin, who has really been a leader in the whole issue of radiation portal monitors, they have been there.

So I would again say let us celebrate the fact that we are passing historic port security legislation tonight. Let us respect the fact that our committee, which is only in its second year, has passed major legislation. Let us respect the fact and acknowledge the fact that our committee paved the way. We showed the way for the Senate. We passed a bill which has been virtually intact, from the subcommittee to the committee to the House floor and now here tonight with the conference report.

And rather than begrudging, rather than saying it could have been this or it could have been that, rather than let the perfect be the enemy of the good, let's accept this good legislation, let's go forward, let us realize we made the American people far safer. And we did it because of a bipartisan effort, which should have been bipartisan right to the last moment. Unfortunately, the naysayers tried to take this over. The fact is they cannot deny the reality. This is excellent legislation that makes our country safe. We should be proud.

I urge the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman. As there is a great deal of admiration in this room, let me say that I too admire the staff and the authors of this bill, Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Harman, Mr. Thompson, and the work of Mr. Lungren and Mr. King, but it is obvious we could have done more. And I listened to the distinguished gentleman talking about regular order. We have not had regular order this entire day.

I do want to say the good work shows that we are concerned about port security, with $400 million in port security grants, training for port workers, such as longshoremen, transportation workers' I.D. cards, screening of the 22 busiest airports, establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, additional Customs and border protection personnel and port security plans.

But I am very proud of the language of training residents of seaport communities, that the conferees agreed that it is crucial to involve communities in disaster preparedness by providing for an annual community update to the homeland security training program described in this bill. This was language that I included because of the area in which we live in Houston where there is sizable populations living around the community.

The port security training program is designed for the purpose of enhancing the capabilities of each of the Nation's commercial seaports to prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and recover from threatened or actual acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The language I contributed extends this training program to include communities and neighborhoods in proximity of the seaports by educating, training, and involving population at-risk neighborhoods around ports, including training on an annual basis to learn what to watch for.

However, I would hope that we would move toward in the next few months 100 percent screening of container cargo, which we have not done.

I also hope that we realize, as my colleagues have said and as Mr. Thompson's overwhelming motion to instruct said, we have to be concerned about rail security. I mentioned during his motion to instruct that rail security is

not just people riding Amtrak. It is the railroads that travel through neighborhoods throughout the regions of the Nation, including the South.

I would also note that I live around a very large port, and this will have a positive impact on the Houston port. I ask my colleagues to support it, though I am disappointed, Mr. Speaker, that we have extraneous material, such as the Internet gambling, on this bill.

I rise in support of the Conference Report to the SAFE Port Act of 2006, H.R. 4954, which represents a significant step forward toward national security and safety for our seaports. I am proud of my colleagues who have crafted this bill to be inclusive of many issues that members of the Committee on Homeland Security and other Members of the Congress have expressed over the last few years, and more intensely over the last few months.

All of us share the common goal of all Americans of making the movement of cargo through the global supply chain as secure as possible, and are committed to doing everything feasible to ensure the security of the Nation's ports.

Many elements of this legislation are beneficial: $400 million in port security grants for each of fiscal years 2007-2012; training for port workers, such as longshoremen; Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) cards to workers with access to secure areas of ports and background checks; screening at the 22 busiest seaports; establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection office, DNDO, within the Department of Homeland Security; additional Customs and Border Protection personnel; requires port security plans to include training for residents of neighborhoods around facilities.

Safe and secure seaports are an essential element in building efficient and technologically advanced supply chains that move cargo quickly to distribution centers, stores, and factories around the world. Although we have made progress since the 9/11 attacks in enhancing the security of the nation's ports, we cannot afford to be complacent.

Incorporated Amendment: Training for Residents of Seaport Communities

I am proud and thankful that the conferees agreed that it is crucial to involve communities in disaster preparedness by providing for an annual community update to the Homeland Security Training Program described in this bill.

The Port Security Training Program is designed for the purpose of enhancing the capabilities of each of the Nation's commercial seaports to prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and recover from threatened or actual acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies.

The language I contributed extends this training program to include communities and neighborhoods in proximity of the seaports by educating, training, and involving populations of at-risk neighborhoods around ports, including training on an annual basis to learn what to watch for.

Many communities across the country have a ``Neighborhood Watch'' program that teaches citizens to watch for suspicious activity or other signs of danger. This language provides for a similar ``citizens corps'' preparation program in anticipation of a national security threat. The intent is to mimic the Citizen Corps initiative begun by the White House and the Department of Homeland Security in 2002.

While 44 percent of Americans say their neighborhood has a plan to help reduce crime, only 13 percent report having a neighborhood plan for disasters. Nearly two-thirds of respondents, 63 percent, believe it is important for neighborhoods to have a way to work together on emergency preparedness.

Fifty-two states and territories have formed state level Citizen Corps Councils to support local efforts. My hope is that before the next disaster, our citizens will be aware and trained to react effectively and timely, and perform as local responders themselves.

More Must Be Done 100% screening

While there are good elements of this bill, I am compelled to discuss the fact that this bill could have been so much more, and could have definitively contributed to national security efforts. I am dismayed at the fact that there are gaps in this report wide enough to let terrorists through.

Apparently, it is not important to know what is arriving by sea cargo.

This bill fails to require 100 percent scanning of contents bound for our borders before they leave other nations. By the time they arrive and are unloaded onto our soil, it is too late.

We have the technology to do this--the ports of Hong Kong and Boston already screen most inbound cargo for both radiation and lead shielding (to hide the radiological materials) using commercially available technology without interrupting the flow of commerce. As we continue to fight to protect our borders, we need to continue to develop cutting edge technologies to detect and defeat next generation threats to port security.

According to security expert Steve Flynn, the cost would be about $50--$100 per container--minimal compared to the $4000 per container it costs to ship from Asia to the U.S., and to the $66,000 in average worth that each container carries. This is accessible, technologically feasible, and necessary. It is beyond me why it is not a part of this bill.

rail and mass transit

It is unacceptable to consider rail and mass transit security, as Secretary Chertoff stated, ``goulash.'' I fear the day when a tragedy will strike on a subway, or on a bus, and we will suddenly discover how large a mistake it was to miss this opportunity . We know how easy a target mass transportation can be-witness Israel, London, Madrid, and Mumbai amongst so many others. We have focused so much effort on securing our borders. I wonder why Republicans are not just as concerned with securing us.

I am disappointed that this provision is not included in this conference report. At the very least, yesterday's Motion to Instruct the Conferees, which passed 281-170, instructed the conferees to accept the rail and mass transit provisions from the Senate. It takes gall to ignore an on-record vote of the House of Representatives.

Houston Port and Economic Data

The Port of Houston is a 25-mile-long complex of public and private facilities located just a few hours' sailing time from the Gulf of Mexico. The port is ranked first in the United States in foreign waterborne commerce, second in total tonnage, and sixth in the world.

About 200 million tons of cargo moved through the Port of Houston in 2005. A total of 7,057 vessel calls were recorded at the Port of Houston during the year 2003.

Economic studies reveal that ship channel-related businesses support more than 287,000 direct and indirect jobs throughout Texas while generating nearly $11 billion in economic impact. Additionally, more than $649 million in state and local tax revenues are generated by business activities related to the port. Approximately 87,000 jobs are connected with the Port of Houston itself, and over 80% of those people live in the Houston metropolitan area.

Centrally located on the Gulf Coast, Houston is a strategic gateway for cargo originating in or destined for the U.S. West and Midwest. Houston lies within close reach of one of the nation's largest concentrations of consumers. More than 17 million people live within 300 miles of the city, and approximately 60 million live within 700 miles.

Conclusion

The danger is very real that we may be escorting a weapon of mass destruction to its target. For every mile along the Houston Ship Channel that dangerous cargo passes, an additional 2000 people are at risk. Clearly, once the cargo reaches the city, the risk is greatest.

There are many such cities and states across the country that are vulnerable and need the federal government's leadership for security and protection. The legislation is a good start, yet it will not be sufficient. I challenge my colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee to consider this only the first step in securing and protecting our nation's ports, and a necessary gateway to addressing the vulnerabilities of rail and mass transit.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the time and for the very strong statement he made earlier, the very straightforward and candid assessment of the process to which this legislation has been subjected.

While I appreciate the work of the gentleman from New York, chairman of the committee of conference, and also Chair of the Homeland Security Committee, and the gentleman from Mississippi who have done stellar work on this legislation, I am disappointed with the outcome.

There are two issues here. There are substance and process. On the substance, sure, I will vote for the conference report because what is in the bill will improve port security. What is left out is what is troubling and disappointing.

When the bill cleared the House, there was the expectation, as there always is when we pass a part in one bill and have a comparable in the other, that the missing links will be addressed in a conference committee, and in this case, the missing links in security will be addressed in conference. That did not happen.

This bill does not make improvements in rail and transit security, even though the Senate version had good provisions to address transit and intercity passenger rail security. For reasons I do not understand and no one has explained, the House Republican leadership apparently determined late at night last night that it would not attempt to work out rail and transit security in conference.

The committee of conference held a meeting. Conferees elected a chairman and made opening statements, and that was it. The supporters of rail and transit security improvements were never permitted to make proposals or offer amendments to improve rail and transit security. We expected that we were going to be able to do that, but it never happened.

The security needs in rail and transit are huge, $700 million for Amtrak, $6 billion for transit. In the wake of the Madrid, London, and Mumbai bombings, the leadership of the other party should not have passed up an opportunity to protect millions who use intercity rail and transit each day.

There is much more that we could have and should have done. We should not be kicking it over to the next Congress. That is the disappointment. We have an opportunity to make an improvement. You should seize that opportunity and move ahead.

As far as it goes, it is a useful bill. It is not what it should be.

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure wrote the original Marine Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). That landmark legislation significantly improved security at our Nation's ports. The conference report before us fine tunes that original security act and gives added direction to the Administration in how to carry out its multiple port security programs. It also provides a statutory framework for many regulatory initiatives established by the Department of Homeland Security, including the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (CT-PAT).

Republicans rejected the Nadler-Oberstar amendment offered during House consideration of the bill. That amendment would have required 100 percent of containers to be scanned for nuclear weapons before a container destined for the United States was loaded in a foreign port. I am pleased that the conference report adopts the Senate provision to authorize a pilot program for 100 percent scanning of containers in three foreign ports. I am also encouraged that the conference report requires the Secretary to scan 100 percent of containers entering the 22 largest container ports in the United States. What I don't understand is if we can scan 100 percent of containers when they are offloaded from a ship in a U.S. port, why can't we scan those same containers before they are loaded on that same ship in the foreign port? Why can't we continue to work to ``push the borders out''?

While the conference report goes a long way toward strengthening port security, it does not do a thing for rail and transit security and other issues, which were covered in the Senate bill, and should have been included in this conference report.

Last night, the House passed, by a vote of 281-140, a motion to instruct conferees on

H.R. 4954 to adopt the Senate provisions on rail and transit security, as well as other security measures. Less than an hour later, the Conference Committee met and conferees were allowed to make statements, but not amendments to a draft conference report. In fact, the conferees had no legislative text to consider. It was obvious to all that there was no interest among House Republican conferees to have a serious discussion about including rail and transit security in this bill.

One by one, Members of the Conference Committee--House and Senate-- asked the Conference Committee Chairman when we were going to be able to review the final conference report and when Members were going to be able to offer amendments to it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. King)--and I quote--stated, ``The expectation is we will receive the final documents, go to debate and consider amendments and go forward at that time.''

Two hours later, Mr. King's staff advised members that there would be no further meetings of the conferees. What could have possibly happened in those two hours to create such a great delay that the documents were not available for a meeting today? Why do Republicans consistently prevent Democrats from offering amendments that will make our country safer?

In the wake of the Madrid, London, and Mumbai bombings, Congress has a responsibility to the American people to assure the safety and security of our Nation's rail and transit systems. This year, the Federal government will invest $4.7 billion in aviation security improvements, while spending only $150 million on rail and transit security, even though five times as many people take trains as planes every day.

Amtrak has requested more than $100 million in security upgrades and nearly $600 million for fire and life-safety improvements to tunnels on the Northeast Corridor in New York, Maryland, and Washington, DC. The American Public Transportation Association, which represents transit agencies and commuter railroads, has well-documented transit security needs that exceed $6 billion (including more than $5.2 billion of capital investment security needs).

The Senate-passed port security bill would have helped meet those needs, and the conferees should have been granted the right to vote on them before they were stripped from the final version of the bill. Do we have to wait for an attack before we take action to secure our nation's railroads and transit systems? What is wrong with providing funding for critical rail and transit security needs? What is wrong with hiring more inspectors? There are only 100 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) rail inspectors responsible for the security of our Nation's 144,000-mile freight and passenger railroad system. What is wrong with requiring development and implementation of a national rail and transit security plan to clarify the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local agencies in securing rail and transit systems? What is wrong with ensuring that key workers have the necessary support and training required to protect our rail and public transit systems? Nothing, the House Republican Leadership just did not want to do it.

Another example of what should have been included in this conference report and wasn't: Removal of the cap of 45,000 on TSA screeners. That cap is both arbitrary and counterintuitive, and it is also impairing security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks requires 100 percent electronic baggage screening. Yet, there is evidence that staffing shortages are undermining electronic screening efforts.

Staffing shortages often require TSA to use alternative screening procedures to screen checked bags, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that TSA's use of alternative screening procedures involves trade-offs in security effectiveness.

While the number of airport screeners remains static, passenger traffic grows. Airlines are expected to carry more than one billion passengers by 2015, increasing from approximately 700 million in 2004. TSA currently screens 522 million bags per year. GAO reports that TSA could be screening as many as 96 million more bags than it now screens--an 18 percent increase--by as early as 2010. According to TSA data, the use of alternative screening procedures will increase at some airports because of rising passenger traffic.

All of these issues should have been dealt with in this conference report. While I support the port security bill, it has left much work undone.

I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman King for his leadership, Ranking Member Thompson, the ranking member of my subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, and Congresswoman Harman for all of the hard work in passing this important bill to protect our ports.

Mr. Speaker, I must say that I guess I must have gotten very tired tonight, because I think I misheard my good friend, Mr. Thompson, in his description of this bill and about some play we are at.

I remember act one, act two, act three being consultation with the other side. I remember working very closely with Members of the other side of the aisle and their staffs. I recall us spending months working this out. I recall early morning meetings with Ms. Harman, joining Congresswoman Harman to go across the Rotunda to the other side, to try and see if we could begin our journey together, that is, to see that our bill would be close in terms of its tone, in terms of its breadth, in terms of its direction with that of our colleagues on the other side.

I can recall the next act when we brought it to the subcommittee, and I can recall getting a unanimous vote out of the subcommittee. I can recall the next act, which was the full committee. We had a 29-0 vote; and where I come from, that is pretty doggone close to unanimous.

We then had the further act which was acting on the floor of the House, and we got a 421-2 vote. It was totally bipartisan. Even the two who voted against it split one Republican and one Democrat. You cannot get much more bipartisan than that.

We have worked together to preserve the essence or the guts of the bill that we have crafted through our committee structure and which we passed on the floor. I am proud to stand here and say that we have accomplished something that many people thought could not be accomplished.

The Senate began their journey several months before we did in terms of a formed bill. Yet we leapfrogged over them in the work that was done in our subcommittee and committee. And I do believe that the actions of this House nudged, if I might use that term, our colleagues on the other side of the Rotunda such that we are able to bring this bill to the floor for completed action tonight on this side of the Rotunda and the other side of the Rotunda.

Rather than create an act of political statement, we have created an act of law. That is, this will go to the President, and the President will sign this. So I hope that all who are here in this Chamber will think of the spirit of bipartisanship with which we started this journey that will be part of the end of this journey.

Today, we have taken a solid step forward in securing our Nation. I do not think there can be any doubt about that. This is not a half measure. This is a major measure.

The sums of money authorized in here are significant. The grant program is a stream of $400 million a year for 5 years. That is a $2 billion grant program for our ports across this Nation. That is something we have been looking for for some time.

We now authorize it. We authorize other programs that Members on both sides of this aisle have spoken for for a long period of time, all to secure this Nation and particularly to secure our ports.

Our enemies have stated that they want to disrupt our economy, murder our citizens, and destroy our way of life. By passing this bill, we do not make a statement, we actually begin to protect our Nation's ports, safeguard the American people, and increase the confidence in our international trade routes.

The American people expect us to take action to protect our ports, and with this bill we have done precisely that. We have addressed the possibility of our enemies using our open society and free economy against us. We have taken away a potential weapon, one capable of causing major disruption to our economy.

In passing this bill tonight, we are taking rational action to harden our domestic critical infrastructure, ensuring that those who wish to harm us are unable to have access to those critical facilities.

But this bill is more than just protecting our local facilities. Securing international maritime trade is incredibly complex. At any one time there are hundreds of vessels and literally hundreds of thousands of containers crossing the oceans on the way to our ports.

With this bill, we have developed a strategy to implement a system to scan each container before it enters our domestic stream of commerce. We will be able to identify and track containers destined for our shores, using training and technology to identify any that may pose a risk.

We are pushing out our borders beyond our geographical limits to make a rational approach to stopping the opportunity that those who would kill us and maim us and destroy our economy would otherwise have.

We have reached out in this way to our trading partners to include them in this strategy to keep international trade flowing with minimal disruption. This strategy allows us to integrate security into international commerce, allowing us to facilitate trade rather than hinder it, so that we do not allow the terrorists to succeed.

We have given the Department of Homeland Security the tools it needs to protect against the potential of weapons of mass destruction being delivered to our shores. We have created a program for our best minds to develop even more effective and less intrusive scanning technology to make security completely transparent, seamless and even more effective.

Recognizing that technology is only as good as the people who use it, we provided a multitude of grants available to our local port facilities so that they can train their employees in emergency procedure and response. That is something that we very much wanted to emphasize, and I would like to give Congressman Reichert credit for pursuing that in such a strong way.

The bill also provides for more Customs and border protection agents, which should enable the Department to continue its mission of both building security and facilitating legitimate trade that is critical to the Nation.

We provided for the Coast Guard to create joint port security operational centers in our Nation's major ports to coordinate effective response to any incident that threatens the security of these ports.

Some may wish to focus on what the bill does not do, when we should appreciate it for what it does. It strengthens our port facilities, it enhances the security of the international supply chain, increases the resiliency and confidence in our economy.

By doing all of this, the significant piece of legislation and all of those that worked so hard to bring it to passage, including Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Congresswoman Harman, Ranking Member Sanchez and our colleagues in the Senate all have joined together to increase the security of our Nation; and I, for one, am proud to have been involved.