Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding me time.

This bill that we are considering is an historic mistake, a mistake which will come back to haunt the United States and the world. India has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

We are asking the U.N. to isolate Iran, to force it to comply with its signature on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, not to use civilian nuclear materials in order to create a military nuclear weapon.

What are we doing here today? We are saying to India, you do not have to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at all. You never signed it, we put it on the books because of India, we know that it created an arms race with Pakistan, and instead of enforcing our own law, our own law, we are now out here going to carve out an exception.

Now, what do the experts say? Well, the experts say that India produces approximately seven nuclear bombs per year, but they have a limited amount of nuclear material. What are we doing? We are going to provide the nuclear materials for their civilian nuclear program so that it will free up their domestic nuclear materials for their weapons program.

What do the experts say? The experts say that is going to increase India's capacity to make nuclear weapons to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs per year. Now, people here say, well, that is fine. Why worry about it? India is a country that we trust. Well, you know who does not trust India? I will tell you who does not trust India: Pakistan does not trust India. Pakistan, the home of al-Qaeda. Pakistan, the home of A.Q. Khan, the nuclear Pied Piper, the nuclear Johnny Appleseed, who spread nuclear weapons material across the world.

Here is what we have learned now: We have learned that Pakistan is constructing its own nuclear weapons manufacturing facility that will increase their capacity from 2 to 3 nuclear bombs per year to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs per year.

Now, the Bush administration, as we all know, has already made a mess of our nuclear nonproliferation policy in North Korea, a mess of our nuclear nonproliferation policy in Iraq, a mess of our nuclear nonproliferation policy in Iran. And the world is now looking at us. Pakistan is looking at us. Iran is looking at us. North Korea, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. How will we handle this challenge on the Asian subcontinent? The answer: We are just going to do away with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, because that is what this vote will be on the House floor today.

We are just basically saying: It is all over. The rest of the world will not listen to us again. The consequences, the domino effect, the nuclear weapons domino effect begins here, ladies and gentlemen. It begins today. It begins with a policy that says that it is not enough for the United States to have high-tech commerce with India, to have outsourcing of our jobs to India, to have massive increases in diplomatic relations and dozens of other areas with India. No, as a gesture of our friendship with India, we are going to gut our own nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Now, back in the debates of 2004, there was really only one thing that George Bush and John Kerry agreed upon, and that was that the most important issue in the world was nuclear nonproliferation. And here we are on the last day of the Republican era in the United States Congress gutting the most important policy, the policy which has kept the reins imperfectly but significantly on the spread of nuclear weapons over the last generation.

And this is in a way almost the exclamation point on the end of this Republican era, on the Bush administration's efforts to control nuclear weapons. This era will be looked back at as the era where the Bush administration and the Republicans in this Congress said: Anything goes. Anything for trade with India. When asked, we will surrender our nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Pakistan is now in a massive escalation of its nuclear weapons program. Al-Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan. A.Q. Khan lives in Pakistan in a palace, still not under arrest, still not in prison, his people who helped to spread these nuclear weapons still walking the streets of Pakistan. What kind of administration do we have that instead of saying, we are going to put together a conference that deals with that issue which will threaten us here in the United States, because these materials will escalate massively in the Asian subcontinent.

This is in many ways comical. I mean, it really is comical. We are going to debate the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the United States for an hour on the last day of Congress. It is comical. I am scraping here to get an extra minute out of this paltry amount of time to debate what the consequences are of what we are doing. And so, yeah, this is a going-away present to the Bush administration. There has been such a mismanagement of the nuclear nonproliferation policy over these last 6 years that this probably does represent, in a crazy kind of a way, you know, the final statement.

But I will tell you, we are going to come back and we will rue this day, because the Pakistanis and the Iranians, they are not going to sit on their hands and allow this to happen. They are going to look at us and they are going to say: These Americans, they preach temperance from a bar stool. They are going to say that this is an era of historic hypocrisy, where the United States expects the rest of the world to listen to us when we tell them that they should not pursue nuclear weapons, while we selectively grant exceptions to countries that never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the first place.

It is a nonsustainable policy. It will come back to haunt us, not today, not tomorrow, but there will be a day in 5 years or 10 years when everyone here today will be able to point back to this moment and say that is the day the historic mistake was made

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this conference report.

For over three decades it has been the policy of the United States to restrict nuclear trade with India. Why? Because in 1974 India violated its pledges to the United States and Canada to use American and Canadian nuclear technologies only for peaceful purposes.

Instead, India used our technology to develop and explode a nuclear bomb.

Despite that history, despite the refusal of India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or to honor its contractual obligations to the United States, this Administration has now undertaken to ignore the past and to ask Congress to approve legislation that will, according to nonproliferation experts from across the political spectrum, enhance India's nuclear bomb-making capacity from 7 bombs a year to over 40 bombs a year.

This is exactly the reverse of what we should be doing if we are serious about reducing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. In fact, it was India's blatant misuse of peaceful American nuclear technologies for a weapons program that prompted the Congress to radically strengthen our nonproliferation laws. And when we were done with that, we went to our allies and established new international guidelines to prevent any other country from doing what India had done: misusing imported nuclear technologies for a secret weapons program. And now, in an act fraught with hypocrisy, irony, and hubris, the Congress will approve a sweeping exception from our nonproliferation laws for the very country that prompted us to strengthen those laws.

I fully support strengthening American ties with India on trade, high-tech, military cooperation, and so many other issues, but why do we need to gut our nonproliferation laws at the same time? The simple fact is that we DON'T have to gut our nonproliferation laws in order to improve our relationship with India, but the President took us into the nuclear Twilight Zone, instead.

During the Conference, the Bush Administration, reportedly at New Delhi's urging, tried to strip out the few good nonproliferation provisions that the Congress inserted into what is a deeply flawed piece of legislation.

Last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote a letter asking Congress to remove a requirement that India help us prevent Iran from going nuclear. I don't know what the administration was thinking, telling the Congress that we can't ask for India's help on Iran's nuclear program.

I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) for fighting to ensure that at least an ongoing assessment of India's cooperation with U.S. and international efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions be performed, both at the time that the formal nuclear cooperation agreement is submitted to Congress and every year thereafter. While the Gentleman and I may disagree on the underlying legislation, I appreciate his efforts, and those of Chairman Hyde, to try to address this issue and to try to mitigate some of the damage that this agreement may do to our nation's nuclear nonproliferation policies.

But the bottom line is that under the President's plan to fuel India's nuclear power reactors, we're going to free up their nuclear material for weapons. And just this summer, we learned that India's arch-rival Pakistan is building a huge new reactor to make nuclear bomb material.

There's a nuclear arms race on in South Asia, and the United States is about to become an accomplice to this arms race.

If we want the rest of the world to stop fueling the proliferation of new nuclear weapons, we had better stop throwing gasoline on the fire ourselves. The India Nuclear Deal is bad for U.S. security. It undermines U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts around the world, and it risks fueling an accelerated nuclear arms race in South Asia.

Madam Speaker, this is a watershed moment for the world. If the United States goes soft on nuclear weapons proliferation, the entire world will go soft. Countries which in good faith abstained from nuclear weapons development will have a green light to go ahead following the India-U.S. model. In my view, this is a prelude to catastrophe. I cannot imagine that the House will ever again confront a vote that is so central to our leadership, our standing, our moral authority on the issue of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. I urge my colleagues to vote against this Conference Report.

Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference report, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, India today is the preeminent state in South Asia. It is becoming a political and economic powerhouse of over 1.1 billion people with a thriving economy and a vibrant democracy. By these and other measures, India is a state that should be at the very center of our foreign policy and our attention. Regrettably, during the Cold War our two countries were unnaturally estranged by the dynamics of the international system. Slowly, during the 1990s our countries' interests began to converge and our relationship warmed.

Then, Mr. Speaker, 6\1/2\ years ago President Clinton made a historic trip to India and ushered in a new era of cooperation between our two great democratic nations. Washington and New Delhi have wisely built upon the foundations that President Clinton laid. Today they expand this mighty architecture of cooperation and friendship by approving, on a strongly bipartisan basis, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.

With this legislation, the House of Representatives steps forth into the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new relationship, civilian nuclear cooperation, and it establishes the process by which Congress will in the near future review and vote on the final agreement to implement such cooperation. This expansion of peaceful nuclear trade with India will usher in a new partnership between India and the United States based on our shared objective of preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear technology to countries and groups that would use it for evil purposes.

This is not the administration's bill, Mr. Speaker. Their original proposal sought to give the President complete authority to waive all restrictions under current law that would have complicated implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear trade and to severely limit congressional oversight by securing a preapproval for whatever agreement the U.S. and India conclude. There would have been no effective subsequent review by the Congress. By contrast, at our insistence, this legislation strikes the right balance between giving the President the necessary flexibility to negotiate the best agreement possible with New Delhi while at the same time preserving congressional oversight and the right of consent to the resulting agreement.

Mr. Speaker, this conference report follows the model laid out in the Hyde-Lantos legislation overwhelmingly approved by the House last July. It ensures that Congress will have the final word on whether or not the final agreement for cooperation with India can become law. This conference report will provide the President with only partial authority to waive current provisions of U.S. law to allow peaceful nuclear-related trade with India to take place. But cooperation could only take place after Congress has approved the agreement of cooperation itself.

Mr. Speaker, the legislation will help fashion a partnership with India to further U.S. nonproliferation goals. The passage of the conference report will also adopt the implementing legislation for the U.S.-IAEA additional protocol. That legislation will finally allow us to bring that protocol in force which will promote the U.S. goal of all states adopting the enhanced safeguards contained in the additional protocol.

Mr. Speaker, this is a historic day for this House and for the United States. I urge all of my colleagues to give their full support to this conference report and to help usher in a new day in U.S.-India relations.

Mr. Speaker, it is only fitting that on the last day of this session of Congress, Chairman Hyde is chairing a bipartisan agreement done with cooperation in both Chambers. H.R. 5682 represents the right way of legislating, ample preparation, consideration of all ideas, bipartisan cooperation, cordial relations with the other body, and keen attention to institutional prerogatives. It is especially fitting that it will be forever identified with the outgoing chairman of the House International Relations Committee. And if it weren't for his astonishing array of accomplishments, the Henry J. Hyde United States- India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act could easily become known as the crowning achievement of the gentleman from Illinois.

But the fact is, Mr. Speaker, this groundbreaking legislation is but one of the innumerable milestones in Henry Hyde's impressive record of public service. Henry is retiring from Congress after choosing not to seek a 17th consecutive term. He would have loved to stay with us longer, but as he recently told an interviewer, Father Time and Mother Nature have a way of beating up on me.

By contrast, Mr. Speaker, I am confident that history will be kind to Henry Hyde. A member of the International Relations Committee since 1982, Henry has been a key figure in crucial debates and decisions about war and peace, international arms control, the expansion of NATO, United Nation's reform, and halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, which he has astutely compared to the bubonic plague in its tragic scope.

Henry has also served with great distinction on the Judiciary and the Intelligence Committees, but I will let another speak to his achievements there, and of course the continued, devoted support by his constituents through 16 terms in Congress speak volumes about his work on behalf of his district.

It was in the political caldron of Chicago that Henry Hyde became entranced with politics early in life. He grew up as an Irish Catholic Democrat, but strayed from the faith in time to vote for Dwight David Eisenhower for President, so he became a Republican sometime in the 1940s.

But, Mr. Speaker, I prefer not to dwell on the things that divide me from my dear friend, Henry Hyde. Rather, I would like to point out that both of us came of age during the Second World War, and this has formed our world views and forged our common value, and it is on this basis that we have often seen eye to eye and found ourselves shoulder to shoulder in struggles that consistently have been of service to our national security from the intricacies of key institutional agreements to the staggeringly complex issues involved in the fight against global terrorism.

Henry has held a firm grip on the gavel in the International Relations Committee these past 6 years, through some of the most pivotal and riveting challenges of our times. He wielded his authority with fairness, intellectual honesty and no small amount of wit. As The Washington Post noted in 1998, he has managed to maintain a reputation for evenhandedness, for patience and restraint, a remarkable feat for someone known both for his savagely held beliefs and for his keen sense which way the wind blows.

Mr. Speaker, the International Relations Committee flourished under Henry Hyde's direction. It will be daunting for me to take up the gavel as Henry Hyde leaves us, Mr. Speaker. Anyone who knows him will understand how much Henry will be missed in our committee and in this House.

Earlier this week, we commemorated Henry's contributions by lending his name to a room in this very building of the Capitol. He will, therefore, always have a place here, and what is far more important, he will have a place in the hearts of his colleagues.

Some of us may disagree with some of his policies, but he is one of the institutional treasures around here, a true gentleman of the House.

Mr. Speaker, section 104(b)(2) requires that the President determine that India and the IAEA have completed all legal steps required prior to signature for an IAEA-India safeguards. That agreement must apply safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices. It references IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973) as one of the IAEA guiding documents relating to standards for perpetuity of safeguards. I attach that document for the Record.

Safeguards

(b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a senior distinguished member of the International Relations Committee and one of our outstanding experts on U.S.-India relations.

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), a distinguished member of the International Relations Committee, my good friend, a recognized expert on U.S.-India relations.

Yes, we do.

We are very grateful for your gesture. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson- Lee), my friend.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.

I share my opponent's concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation. This legislation is the exact opposite of nuclear proliferation. It opens up for the first time in history all of India's current civilian nuclear plants and all future nuclear plants to international control. This is a control measure. It is a measure which will dramatically enhance the historic strategic cooperation between the democratic state of India and the United States of America. When historians will look at this historic vote we are about to take, they will view this as the most significant vote for democracy, peace, and control of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

The Senate voted 85 to 15 for this legislation. It passed the House on a bipartisan basis, overwhelmingly. Tonight we have an opportunity to reaffirm that vote, and I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this legislation.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to claim the time in opposition to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

First, let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hyde. Like Mr. Hyde, I was born a Democrat and baptized a Catholic just 7 days later. So I know how big a decision it must have been to have abandoned that Democratic birthright. But he has been a historic figure in this institution. I want to associate myself with everything that the gentleman from California said about you.

But I do believe that this bill is a historic mistake. The world is looking at this institution this evening. It is wondering what in the world the United States is thinking in giving an exemption to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act to a country which is a nonsignatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

What is the signal that that will send to Pakistan? What is the signal that that will send to Iran, to Syria, to Egypt, to Venezuela, to North Korea? What is the signal that we are sending with regard to the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime which has served this world well since the 1960s?

I think that the message they are receiving is that there is going to be a double standard, and a double standard which, unfortunately, from my perspective, is going to lead to a rapid escalation of the development of nuclear weapons programs in country after country around the world.

Right now, India has a nuclear weapons program that experts estimate produces approximately 7 per year. Because the nuclear fuel, which this bill will make possible, frees up the domestic uranium supply in India, experts estimate that it will increase to 40 to 50 the number of nuclear weapons which India can produce per year, because we, the United States, in passing this legislation, will ensure the supply of their civilian nuclear energy needs.

Why should we care about that? Well, the reason that we should care about that is that Pakistan is now developing and building their own nuclear material production facility, which experts indicate will increase from two to three nuclear bombs per year to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs per year. That is what a nuclear arms race looks like. That is what the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union looked like in the 1950s, in the 1960s and in the 1970s, and what we are doing out here is pouring fuel onto this fire, rather than calling an international conference to bring together these parties and others in order to put in place a real nuclear weapons control regime. Instead we are turning a blind eye to the reality of what is going on in the South Asian continent.

So, ladies and gentlemen, this is a historic moment, a moment that we will look back on, not perhaps tomorrow, or next week, but 5 years from now, 10 years from now. People will point back to this night, this last night of the Republican control of Congress, this last night when the Republican-controlled House and Senate can produce for President Bush this anti-nuclear weapons control policy that he has been engaging in for the last 6 years and say this was the moment that crossed the line where ever country said to themselves, why should we, as signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, abide by those rules when the United States selectively gives exemptions to countries that are not signatories to the nuclear nonproliferation policy.

You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. The hypocrisy coefficient is at historic heights when the United States believes that the rest of the world will listen to us as we preach that they should not be interested in nuclear weapons, even as they are helping to facilitate the Indians in developing an ever greater capacity to produce nuclear weapons inspect that country.

Why should we care? We should care because A. Q. Khan, the nuclear Johnny Appleseed, the nuclear Pied Piper, who spread nuclear weapons from North Korea through the Middle East, is still living in Pakistan, living in a palace, still not in prison. His associates, his men, still walking the streets of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan, still unapprehended.

What is the message that we are sending? We are sending a message that the nuclear arms sellers are back on the road, selling to anyone who will purchase. That is the message that we are sending.

So tonight is a historic vote. It is a vote that will be looked back at as one of the most important that we have ever cast here in Congress. Sadly, it is

not going to receive even a fraction of the attention which it deserves.

But I tell you this, ladies and gentlemen, when and if this nuclear war breaks out, we will look back. At least we should be able to say we tried, we really tried to put an end to the nuclear arms race on the South Asian continent. This is what this debate tonight is all about.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/6\ minutes to the gentlelady from California (Ms. Lee).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu).

Mr. Speaker, could you advise us how much time is remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).

Could we get a final review here of where we are, Mr. Speaker?

I am the last speaker, so I reserve my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

This is an historically bad deal. President Bush has done a far better job in negotiating with the Congress to gain acceptance for this deal than he did with the Indians and getting them to accept the essentials of a real nuclear nonproliferation agreement.

In this agreement, as we send nuclear materials to India and free up so that the Russians and others can do so as well, here is what is not inspected: Six of India's plutonium-producing reactors will not be inspected. Their heavy-water production facets, not inspected. Plutonium separation facilities, not inspected. Uranium mines, not inspected. Uranium enrichment facilities, not inspected. In other words, their nuclear weapons program, not inspected.

This is the deal which we are cutting. This is the deal which the Congress is being asked tonight to bless. Do you know who would accept a deal like that? A.Q. Kahn would accept a deal like that for Pakistan. In fact, President Musharraf of Pakistan said to President Bush on his visit to Pakistan right after his visit to India, he said to President Bush, ``I too would like that deal that you are offering to India.'' President Bush said, ``We cannot give you that deal.''

What are we going to say when China offers that deal to Pakistan? Because they will, ladies and gentlemen. What will we say when all of those plutonium-producing reactors are not inspected? What will we say in 2 years when the Russians offer that same deal to the Iranians? What will we say to the Russians, to the Iranians?

If we don't set the standard for nuclear nonproliferation here in the United States in our negotiations with our allies, do not expect there to be higher standards in the negotiations between the Chinese and their allies or the Russians and their allies. Wherever we set the standard, that is going to be the global standard. And when we turn to these other countries and we tell them, no, your standards are not high enough, they are going to call us hypocrites.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is an historic night, it is an historic vote. People will look back at this as the moment when the nuclear nonproliferation regime of the world was destroyed. Vote ``no''. Vote ``no'' for history. Vote ``no'' for your conscience. When you look back, this will be one of those moments when you are glad that you voted ``no.''

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member of the committee, and I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee, and I believe this may be Mr. Hyde's last time as chairman on the International Relations Committee, and I want to offer to him my sincerest appreciation for his service to America. I have had the honor and privilege of serving with him on the Judiciary Committee, and I thank him for his service.

I thank Mr. Lantos for the cooperative spirit that has been evidenced by this conference report and certainly congratulate him on his ascending to be Chair in this next Congress of the International Relations Committee.

I listened to Lee Hamilton and Jim Baker as they began to try to bridge the gap and the schism in the Iraq war. One of the most, or more stranger, recommendations for many was the engagement of Syria and Iran, for many were aghast that we would talk to those who have been so reckless in their relationship with the United States. I believe in engagement, but is it not interesting that a democracy, the largest, a nation that has embedded itself in democracy since its birth, India, is a friend of the United States, and yet we are hesitant to engage India.

That is what this legislation represents. It is an engagement of a friend, working with them on the civilian use of nuclear power, addressing the concerns of enormous population and enormous poverty. Although the middle class of India is growing, this legislation will begin the engagement of a friend, and it will provide a fixture in the South Asian community that has both the capabilities to use nuclear materials in a friendly way and it will be an engagement of a friend with the United States.

I happen to be, of course, engaged with the people of Pakistan, and I am grateful that my amendment remained in this legislation that said that we continue to engage in the South Asian region with India and Pakistan. For even though there may be citing of the inequities or the issues as it relates to Pakistan, they too should be engaged with.

But what we are doing today is a start. And I am very grateful, Mr. Lantos, that there are bridges and firewalls in this legislation. This legislation allows the vetting of India to begin. It allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to vet this program. And before the President goes forward, he must be convinced or she must be convinced that this is an appropriate step to make. If we can engage with Iran and Syria, though it is a difficult proposition for many, why not engage with a democracy and a friend who will benefit by the utilization of nuclear power? And so I would hope that we would look at this in a manner that says this is a good step for there is control over what is being utilized, unlike so many of those who have the access to nuclear power. I hope my colleagues will support this forward step and that they will see the checks and balances that are so necessary and continue to support the South Asia region that includes not only India but Pakistan.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank the Rules Committee for making consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 5682, the ``United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006'' in order.

The United States' relationship with India and Pakistan is of paramount importance to our Nation's political and economic future. With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the world, with all nation-states. It is in the national interest for the United States to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchange which has served the Nation well in the past, particularly in the South Asia region.

It is important that we are considering this conference report today. I also want to thank my colleagues for adopting my amendment to H.R. 5682. My bipartisan amendment, which was endorsed and co-sponsored by Congressman Burton, simply stated that the ``South Asia region is so important that the United States should continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan.''

Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on terror. Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United States. Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's relationship with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it may give pause to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason why it is vital for the United States to continue to engage both Pakistan and India in ongoing political engagement, economic and technological collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring the United States closer to these two vitally important democracies in the South Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each other.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation between the India and the United States.

This landmark legislation serves both our strategic interests and our long-standing nonproliferation objectives. We should heed the sage words of the Iraq Study Group which recommends engaging rather than abandoning the possibilities dialogue offers. Our engagement and subsequent abandonment of Iran has resulted in their current pursuit of nuclear technology. We should not make the same mistake in South Asia. We need to remain engaged with India and Pakistan so that they remain our most important allies rather than our adversaries.

We are on the path to fostering an enduring relationship of mutually beneficial cooperation with India. The new realities of globalization and interdependence have brought a convergence of interests between the world's largest democracy and the world's most powerful one. I accompanied President Clinton in his groundbreaking trip to India marking a new phase in the bonds that bind our two countries. This conference report builds on this relationship by permitting an invigorated relationship in the field of nuclear cooperation, an area of critical importance given India's increasing energy demands.

This conference report incorporates a host of important nonproliferation measures that will anchor India in the international nonproliferation framework by including: safeguards between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); end use monitoring of

U.S. exports to India; and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which are the group of countries that restrict nuclear proliferation throughout the world.

In addition, this conference report maintains Congressional oversight over the ongoing relationship of nuclear cooperation between U.S.- India. By implementing this legislation, we are furthering our critical nonproliferation objectives of advancing the IAEA's Additional Protocol by allowing the U.S. to become a party to this critical nonproliferation arrangement. We will enhance our nonproliferation policy and bolster our argument that the rest of the world should agree to this robust inspection regime.

In conclusion, I support the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 with my Amendment, and this conference report. I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Madam Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1101 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Madam Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern); pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

(Mr. BISHOP of Utah asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, House Resolution 1101 allows for consideration of the conference report on House Resolution 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. It provides for a closed rule with 1 hour general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. It waives all points of order against the conference report and against its consideration, and it provides that the conference report shall be considered as read.

The underlying bill is not only an excellent bipartisan bill, but also a tribute to the skill and wisdom of one of the body's most distinguished and respected representatives, the Honorable Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, a representative from Illinois's Sixth Congressional District for the last 32 years.

It is fitting that this underlying bill is named after Chairman Hyde, in recognition for his long and faithful service and commitment to American ideals as well as nonproliferation activities. Yesterday we had many people pay their respect to this great man, and this is a fitting conclusion with this bill today.

I would also be remiss if I did not also thank the ranking member, Representative Lantos of California, for his repeated efforts and his strong efforts in pushing this legislation forward and the hard work he also put in, in a dedicated and respected manner, to come up with a truly bipartisan bill and a bipartisan conference report.

We should also thank the conferees for their efforts to come in here with a conference report that is focused, that is clean, that is direct and without extraneous materials added to it. It is one that actually goes to the heart of the issue in a very direct report and is a very good conference report.

To the substance of the bill, which was passed on July 26 of this year by an overwhelming majority, with 359 of our colleagues supporting the bill, it contained a myriad of important measures, beginning with a Sense of Congress Resolution that the preventing of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives

of United States foreign policy, and that sustaining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, is the keystone of the United States' nonproliferation policy.

We live in an uncertain world where any number of demagogues would pay any price to obtain the technology to inflict pain and suffering on the world's inhabitants.

Because of that it is important that India's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and America's commitment is the same, and it makes the world a safer place.

This bill, with additions added by the Senate, and one of those unique elements actually strengthens the overall bill itself. It provides for the administration to report to Congress of its activities in forwarding this particular agreement. It provides for an affirmative response by Congress to that agreement that is there. And it provides for greater control on nonproliferation efforts between both of our countries in this very uncomfortable and unstable world.

I have to commend Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, the entire conference committee that did a wonderful job, excellent work with this particular committee report.

With that, I urge adoption of the rule and the underlying legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, without speaking to the merits of the allegations made by gentleman from Ohio, he should indeed be happy with this particular resolution and conference report coming to us. For not only does it take the country of India that did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and provide that both the United States and India will work together to try and combine ourselves so we are working within the parameters of that treaty, it also provides for the administration to present any results of their negotiation back to Congress, and forcing Congress to actually take an affirmative approach ``yea'' or ``nay'' on the results of those negotiations, which once again will allow all Members of Congress to again have some kind of say in the ultimate process.

I also appreciate once again what the conferees did with this report in trying to narrow the focus down to the specifics of how the United States and India deal together in separating civilian and military uses of this new type of energy, and not trying to expand it into other areas which may indeed

make the process much more complex and the questions much more difficult to answer.

Madam Speaker, this once again is a very clean, specific and focused conference report

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I commend the gentlewoman from Texas for her very articulate expression of what this resolution and this conference report does indeed do, and refocusing the debate on the specifics that brought an unusual harmony together from both sides of the aisle and to a specific report and specific conference report that is here.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.

Madam Speaker, in closing, I would like to urge Members' support of the rule, providing for the consideration of the conference report for this particular piece of legislation. It is a bipartisan bill. It was based in a bipartisan and bicameral fashion, which is a unique combination we have.

It is a nice, harmonious way to actually end this particular session of Congress on something that does move us forward when you focus in on what the bill is actually about, and the issues that are actually handled in this particular report

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.