Mr. Speaker, I was honored to support H. Res. 190, a resolution passed April 6 that commended the life and achievements of His Holiness Pope John Paul II. Likewise, I am proud to say I was the lead…
Mr. Speaker, I was honored to support H. Res. 190, a resolution passed April 6 that commended the life and achievements of His Holiness Pope John Paul II. Likewise, I am proud to say I was the lead sponsor of legislation that was passed by the House and Senate in 2003, House Concurrent Resolution 313, that urged President Bush to present the Presidential Medal of Freedom to the Pope. Thankfully, President Bush did just that in June of last year.
In a time when many leaders look to the polls and test political winds for guidance, Pope John Paul II stood unflinching at the center of the most controversial moral debates of our time, and held firm, always supporting the sanctity and dignity of every human life. His presence will be sorely missed, but his accomplishments will long be relished.
Mr. Speaker, as a reminder of the Pope's enduring and historic contributions to world peace, human freedom and to the security and national interests of the United States, I request that the following remarks that I delivered on the House floor on November 18, 2003 be printed in the Record.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman
from Florida. I rise to pay tribute to His Holiness, Pope
John Paul II, who in October marked his 25th year as Bishop
of Rome and Supreme Pastor of the Catholic Church.
I also wish to offer my sincere appreciation to all my
friends and colleagues in the House who have joined together
to urge the President to present the Medal of Freedom to Pope
John Paul II.
The celebration of the Silver Jubilee of Pope John Paul
II's pontificate is but the latest in a series of remarkable
milestones that have characterized his life and his ministry.
From his birth on May 18, 1920, Karol Jozef Wojtyla's life
has been intertwined with the fate of his native Poland and
synonymous with the struggle for his individual freedom and
dignity.
In 1978 when then-Cardinal Wojtyla, the Archbishop of
Krakow, was elected Pope, the world was a much different
place. For the more than 3 decades since Winston Churchill
delivered his famous ``Iron Curtain'' speech, people around
the world prepared for what many regarded as the inevitable
new war that would someday engulf the East and the West. To
win the Cold War, geopolitical strategists honed and
implemented various policies including the doctrines of
containment and mutual-assured destruction.
At this pivotal moment in history, when the status quo
included the subjugation of half the populations of Europe
and the omnipresent threat of nuclear annihilation, a
remarkable and energetic new Pope set foot on the world
stage. To many in the West, this new Polish Pope was an
unknown entity. While we recognized immediately his energy,
courage and leadership, these same qualities were reviewed
with suspicion by some in the East, particularly the
communist rulers in Poland.
Pope John Paul II's commitment to freedom, his affection
for his native Poland, and the devotion of his countrymen to
him were never more evident than the summer of 1980. That
August, the Solidarity Workers Union, which Cardinal Wojtyla
had nurtured and protected, organized a peaceful strike at
the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk.
With the Pope's portrait suddenly appearing everywhere and
the admonition from his inaugural sermon, ``Do not be
afraid,'' on the lips of the workers, his support and
reassurance provided vital sustenance for the strikers and
ignited a spiritual spark in their struggle to secure dignity
and freedom. Ultimately, that spark would lead to the demise
of Soviet communism and the liberation of hundreds of
millions in Eastern and Central Europe.
History has recorded the remarkable achievement of Pope
John Paul II and his relentless advocacy in pursuit of
individual dignity, freedom, and peace. The Pope has not
confined his efforts solely to the struggle against
totalitarianism. He has engaged wherever people are
downtrodden and oppressed.
Mr. Speaker, the Congress should pass House Concurrent
Resolution 313 and urge the President to present the Medal of
Freedom, our Nation's highest civilian award, to His
Holiness.
In authorizing the first Medals of Freedom in 1963,
President Kennedy proclaimed that persons who have made
especially meritorious contributions to the security or
national interests of the United States, world peace or
cultural or other significant public or private endeavors
should be so recognized. By any measure it is apparent that
there is no individual more deserving of this recognition
than Pope John Paul II.
Two other recipients of the Medal of Freedom, President
Ronald Reagan and Lady Margaret Thatcher, shared the Pope's
commitment to Solidarity in the 1980s. In my estimation,
their leadership changed the course of human history. In
1984, while welcoming the Pope to the United States,
President Reagan spoke of the connection between freedom, the
founding of our own Nation, and America's debt to His
Holiness.
President Reagan stated, ``I can assure you, Your Holiness,
that the American people seek to act as a force for peace in
the world and to further the cause of human freedom and
dignity. Indeed, an appreciation for the unalienable rights
of every human being is the very concept that gave birth to
this Nation. Few have understood better than our Nation's
founding fathers that claims of human dignity transcend the
claims of any government, and this transcendent right itself
has a transcendent source.''
The President went on to state, ``To us, Your Holiness, the
Holy See and your pastorate represent one of humanity's
greatest moral and spiritual forces,'' and ``your words, your
prayers and your example have made you, for those who suffer
oppression or the violence of war, a source of solace,
inspiration and hope.'' It is no exaggeration to recognize
that this remarkable man has brought hope, comfort and faith
to literally billions of people around the world during the
course of his ministry.
Three weeks ago today I was honored to be joined by 30
Members of the House in introducing this resolution. Since
that time we have gained additional support for which I am
grateful, and I particularly appreciate the work of the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) and the Committee on
Government Reform who reported our resolution to the floor in
such a timely manner.
As stated previously, our bipartisan resolution calls upon
the President on behalf of all the people of the United
States, to present the Medal of Freedom to Pope John Paul II
as a sign of our gratitude for his significant, enduring, and
historic contributions to the causes of freedom, human
dignity, and peace. We urge the President to do so without
delay.
Finally, I include an article by Carl Bernstein entitled
``The Holy Alliance,'' which appeared in the February 24,
1992, edition of Time, as well as an article by Father Robert
A. Sirico entitled ``The Cold War's Magnificent Seven; Pope
John Paul II; Awakener of the East,'' which was published in
the Winter 1992 edition of Policy Review.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I would invoke President Reagan
once more. When asked his assessment of the Pope before
meeting him the first time, the President replied, ``He is an
example of what so many people have always said about
Christian and Judaic tradition, and that is, that when really
needed, God provides a man. And I think in Pope John Paul he
did just that.''
Billions around the world are thankful that God has
provided such a man.
The articles referred to are as follows:
[From Time Magazine, Feb. 24, 1992]
The Holy Alliance
(By Carl Bernstein)
Only President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II were
present in the Vatican Library on Monday, June 7, 1982. It
was the first time the two had met, and they talked for 50
minutes. In the same wing of the papal apartments, Agostino
Cardinal Casaroli and Archbishop Achille Silvestrini met with
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Judge William Clark,
Reagan's National Security Adviser. Most of their discussion
focused on Israel's invasion of Lebanon, then in its second
day; Haig told them Prime Minister Menachem Begin had assured
him that the invasion would not go farther than 25 miles
inside Lebanon.
But Reagan and the Pope spent only a few minutes reviewing
events in the Middle East. Instead they remained focused on a
subject much closer to their heart: Poland and the Soviet
dominance of Eastern Europe. In that meeting, Reagan and the
Pope agreed to undertake a clandestine campaign to hasten the
dissolution of the communist empire. Declares Richard Allen,
Reagan's first National Security Adviser: ``This was one of
the great secret alliances of all time.''
The operation was focused on Poland, the most populous of
the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and the birthplace of
John Paul II. Both the Pope and the President were convinced
that Poland could be broken out of the Soviet orbit if the
Vatican and the U.S. committed their resources to
destabilizing the Polish government and keeping the outlawed
Solidarity movement alive after the declaration of martial
law in 1981.
Until Solidarity's legal status was restored in 1989 it
flourished underground, supplied, nurtured and advised
largely by the network established under the auspices of
Reagan and John Paul II. Tons of equipment--fax machines (the
first in Poland), printing presses, transmitters, telephones,
shortwave radios, video cameras, photocopiers, telex
machines, computers, word processors--were smuggled into
Poland via channels established by priests and American
agents and representatives of the AFL-CIO and European labor
movements. Money for the banned union came from CIA funds,
the National Endowment for Democracy, secret accounts in the
Vatican and Western trade unions.
Lech Walesa and other leaders of Solidarity received
strategic advice--often conveyed by priests or American and
European labor experts working undercover in Poland--that
reflected the thinking of the Vatican and the Reagan
Administration. As the effectiveness of the resistance grew,
the stream of information to the West about the internal
decisions of the Polish government and the contents of
Warsaw's communications with Moscow became a flood. The
details came not only from priests but also from spies within
the Polish government.
down with yalta
According to aides who shared their leaders' view of the
world, Reagan and John Paul II refused to accept a
fundamental political fact of their lifetimes: the division
of Europe as mandated at Yalta and the communist dominance of
Eastern Europe. A free, noncommunist Poland, they were
convinced, would be a dagger to the heart of the Soviet
empire; and if Poland became democratic, other East European
states would follow.
``We both felt that a great mistake had been made at Yalta
and something should be done,'' Reagan says today.
``Solidarity was the very weapon for bringing this about,
because it was an organization of the laborers of Poland.''
Nothing quite like Solidarity had ever existed in Eastern
Europe, Reagan notes, adding that the workers' union ``was
contrary to anything the Soviets would want or the communists
[in Poland] would want.''
According to Solidarity leaders, Walesa and his lieutenants
were aware that both Reagan and John Paul II were committed
to Solidarity's survival, but they could only guess at the
extent of the collaboration. ``Officially I didn't know the
church was working with the U.S.,'' says Wojciech Adamiecki,
the organizer and editor of underground Solidarity newspapers
and now a counselor at the Polish embassy in Washington. ``We
were told the Pope had warned the Soviets that if they
entered Poland he would fly to Poland and stay with the
Polish people. The church was of primary assistance. It was
half open, half secret. Open as far as humanitarian aid--
food, money, medicine, doctors' consultations held in
churches, for instance--and secret as far as supporting
political activities: distributing printing machines of all
kinds, giving us a place for underground meetings, organizing
special demonstrations.''
At their first meeting, Reagan and John Paul II discussed
something else they had in common: both had survived
assassination attempts only six weeks apart in 1981, and both
believed God had saved them for a special mission. ``A close
friend of Ronald Reagan's told me the President said, `Look
how the evil forces were put in our way and how Providence
intervened,' '' says Pio Cardinal Laghi, the former apostolic
delegate to Washington. According to National Security
Adviser Clark, the Pope and Reagan referred to the
``miraculous'' fact that they had survived. Clark said the
men shared ``a unity of spiritual view and a unity of vision
on the Soviet empire: that right or correctness would
ultimately prevail in the divine plan.''
``Reagan came in with very simple and strongly held
views,'' says Admiral Bobby Inman, former deputy director of
the CIA. ``It is a valid point of view that he saw the
collapse [of communism] coming and he pushed it--hard.''
During the first half of 1982, a five-part strategy emerged
that was aimed at bringing about the collapse of the Soviet
economy, fraying the ties that bound the U.S.S.R. to its
client states in the Warsaw Pact and forcing reform inside
the Soviet empire. Elements of that strategy included:
The U.S. defense buildup already under way, aimed at making
it too costly for the Soviets to compete militarily with the
U.S. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative--Star Wars--became
a centerpiece of the strategy.
Covert operations aimed at encouraging reform movements in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Financial aid to Warsaw Pact nations calibrated to their
willingness to protect human rights and undertake political
and free-market reforms.
Economic isolation of the Soviet Union and the withholding
of Western and Japanese technology from Moscow. The
Administration focused on denying the U.S.S.R. what it had
hoped would be its principal source of hard currency in the
21st century: profits from a transcontinental pipeline to
supply natural gas to Western Europe. The 3,600-mile-long
pipeline, stretching from Siberia to France, opened on time
on Jan. 1, 1984, but on a far smaller scale than the Soviets
had hoped.
Increased use of Radio Liberty, Voice of America and Radio
Free Europe to transmit the Administration's messages to the
people of Eastern Europe.
Yet in 1982 neither Reagan nor the Pope could anticipate
the accession of a Soviet leader like Mikhail Gorbachev, the
father of glasnost and perestroika; his efforts at reform
unleashed powerful forces that spun out of his control and
led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Washington-
Vatican alliance ``didn't cause the fall of communism,''
observes a U.S. official familiar with the details of the
plot to keep Solidarity alive. ``Like all great and lucky
leaders, the Pope
and the President exploited the forces of history to their
own ends.''
the crackdown
The campaign by Washington and the Vatican to keep
Solidarity alive began immediately after General Wojciech
Jaruzelski declared martial law on Dec. 13, 1981. In those
dark hours, Poland's communications with the noncommunist
world were cut; 6,000 leaders of Solidarity were detained;
hundreds were charged with treason, subversion and
counterrevolution; nine were killed; and the union was
banned. But thousands of others went into hiding, many
seeking protection in churches, rectories and with priests.
Authorities took Walesa into custody and interned him in a
remote hunting lodge.
Shortly after Polish security forces moved into the
streets, Reagan called the Pope for his advice. At a service
of meetings over the next few days, Reagan discussed his
options. ``We had a massive row in the Cabinet and the
National Security Council about putting together a menu of
counteractions,'' former Secretary of State Haig recalls.
``They ranged from sanctions that would have been crushing in
their impact on Poland to talking so tough that we would have
risked creating another situation like Hungary in '56 or
Czechoslovakia in '68.''
Haig dispatched Ambassador at Large Vernon Walters, a
devout Roman Catholic, to meet with John Paul II. Walters
arrived in Rome soon after, and met separately with the Pope
and with Cardinal Casaroli, the Vatican secretary of state.
Both sides agreed that Solidarity's flame must not be
extinguished, that the Soviets must become the focus of an
international campaign of isolation, and that the Polish
government must be subjected to moral and limited economic
pressure.
According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Pope had
already advised Walcsa through church channels to keep his
movement operating underground, and to pass the word to
Solidarity's 10 million members not to go into the streets
and risk provoking Warsaw Pact intervention or civil war with
Polish security forces. Because the communists had cut the
direct phone lines between Poland and the Vatican, John Paul
II communicated with Jozef Cardinal Glemp in Warsaw via
radio. He also dispatched his envoys to Poland to report on
the situation. ``The Vatican's information was absolutely
better and quicker than ours in every respect,'' says Haig.
``Though we had some excellent sources of our own, our
information was taking too long to filter through the
intelligence bureaucracy.''
In the first hours of the crisis, Reagan ordered that the
Pope receive as quickly as possible relevant American
intelligence, including information from a Polish Deputy
Minister of Defense who was secretly reporting to the CIA.
Washington also handed over to the Vatican reports and
analysis from Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior member of
the Polish general staff, who was a CIA informant until
November 1981, when he had to be smuggled out of Poland after
he warned that the Soviets were prepared to invade if the
Polish government did not impose martial law. Kuklinski had
issued a similar warning about a Soviet military action in
late 1980, which led the outgoing Carter Administration to
send secret messages to Leonid Brezhnev informing him that
among the costs of an invasion would be the sale of
sophisticated U.S. weapons to China. This time, Kuklinski
reported to Washington, Brezhnev had grown more impatient,
and a disastrous harvest at home meant that the Kremlin did
not need mechanized army units to help bring in the crops and
instead could spare them for an invasion. ``Anything that we
knew that we thought the Pope would not be aware of, we
certainly brought it to his attention,'' says Reagan.
``Immediately.''
the catholic team
The key Administration players were all devout Roman
Catholics--CIA chief William Casey, Allen, Clark, Haig,
Walters and William Wilson, Reagan's first ambassador to the
Vatican. They regarded the U.S.-Vatican relationship as a
holy alliance: the moral force of the Pope and the teachings
of their church combined with their fierce anticommunism and
their notion of American democracy. Yet the mission would
have been impossible without the full support of Reagan, who
believed fervently in both the benefits and the practical
applications of Washington's relationship with the Vatican.
One of his earliest goals as President, Reagan says, was to
recognize the Vatican as a state ``and make them an ally.''
According to Admiral John Poindexter, the military
assistant to the National Security Adviser when martial law
was declared in Poland, Reagan was convinced that the
communists had made a huge miscalculation: after allowing
Solidarity to operate openly for 16 months before the
crackdown, the Polish government would only alienate its
countrymen by attempting to cripple the labor movement and,
most important, would bring the powerful church into direct
conflict with the Polish regime. ``I didn't think that this
[the decision to impose martial law and crush Solidarity]
could stand, because of the history of Poland and the
religious aspect and all,'' Reagan says. Says Cardinal
Casaroli: ``There was a real coincidence of interests between
the U.S. and the Vatican.''
The major decisions on funneling aid to Solidarity and
responding to the Polish and Soviet governments were made by
Reagan, Casey and Clark, in consultation with John Paul
II. ``Reagan understood these things quite well, including
the covert side,'' says Richard Pipes, the conservative
Polish-born scholar who headed the NSC's Soviet and East-
European desks. ``The President talked about the evil of
the Soviet system--not its people--and how we had to do
everything possible to help these people in Solidarity who
were struggling for freedom. People like Haig and Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige and James Baker [White House
chief of staff at the time] thought it wasn't realistic.
George Bush never said a word. I used to sit behind him,
and I never knew what his opinions were. But Reagan really
understood what was at stake.''
By most accounts, Casey stepped into the vacuum in the
first days after the declaration of martial law in Poland
and--as he did in Central America--became the principal
policy architect. Meanwhile Pipes and the NSC staff began
drafting proposals for sanctions. ``The object was to drain
the Soviets and to lay blame for martial law at their
doorstep,'' says Pipes. ``The sanctions were coordinated with
Special Operations [the CIA division in charge of covert task
forces], and the first objective was to keep Solidarity alive
by supplying money, communications and equipment.''
``The church was trying to modulate the whole situation,''
explains one of the NSC officials who directed the effort to
curtail the pipeline. ``They [church leaders] were in effect
trying to create circumstances that would head off the
serious threat of Soviet intervention while allowing us to
get tougher and tougher; they were part and parcel of
virtually all of our deliberations in terms of how we viewed
the evolution of government-sponsored repression in Poland--
whether it was lessening or getting worse, and how we should
proceed.''
As for his conversations with Reagan about Poland, Clark
says they were usually short. ``I don't think I ever had an
in-depth, one-on-one, private conversation that existed for
more than three minutes with him--on any subject. That might
shock you. We had our own code of communication. I knew where
he wanted to go on Poland. And that was to take it to its nth
possibilities. The President and Casey and I discussed the
situation on the ground in Poland constantly: covert
operations; who was doing what, where, why and how; and the
chances of success.'' According to Clark, he and Casey
directed that the President's daily brief--the PDB, an
intelligence summary prepared by the CIA--include a special
supplement on secret operations and analysis in Poland.
The Pope himself, not only his deputies, met with American
officials to assess events in Poland and the effectiveness of
American actions and sent back messages--sometimes by letter,
sometimes orally--to Reagan. On almost all his trips to
Europe and the Middle East, Casey flew first to Rome, so that
he could meet with John Paul II and exchange information. But
the principal emissary between Washington and Rome remained
Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA who worked
easily with Casey. Walters met with the Pope perhaps a dozen
times, according to Vatican sources. ``Walters was sent to
and from the Vatican for the specific purpose of carrying
messages between the Pope and the President,'' says former
U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican Wilson. ``It wasn't supposed
to be known that Walters was there. It wasn't all
specifically geared to Poland; sometimes there were also
discussions about Central America or the hostages in
Lebanon.''
Often in the Reagan years, American covert operations
(including those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola)
involved ``lethal assistance'' to insurgent forces: arms,
mercenaries, military advisers and explosives. In Poland the
Pope, the President and Casey embarked on the opposite path:
``What they had to do was let the natural forces already in
place play this out and not get their fingerprints on it,''
explains a analyst. What emerges from the Reagan-Casey
collaboration is a carefully calibrated operation whose scope
was modest compared with other CIA activities. ``If Casey
were around now, he'd be having some smiles,'' observes one
of his reluctant admirers. ``In 1991 Reagan and Casey got the
reordering of the world that they wanted.''
the secret directive
Less than three weeks before his meeting with the Pope in
1982, the President signed a secret national-security-
decision directive (NSDD 32) that authorized a range of
economic, diplomatic and covert measures to ``neutralize
efforts of the U.S.S.R.'' to maintain its hold on Eastern
Europe. In practical terms, the most important covert
operations undertaken were those inside Poland. The primary
purposes of NSDD 32 were to destabilize the Polish government
through covert operations involving propaganda and
organizational aid to Solidarity; the promotion of human
rights, particularly those related to the right of worship
and the Catholic Church; economic pressure; and diplomatic
isolation of the communist regime. The document, citing the
need to defend democratic reform efforts throughout the
Soviet empire, also called for increasing propaganda and
underground broadcasting operations in Eastern Europe,
actions that Reagan's aides and dissidents in Eastern Europe
believe were particularly helpful in chipping away at the
notion of Soviet invincibility.
As Republican Congressman Henry Hyde, a member of the House
Intelligence Committee from 1985 to 1990, who was apprised of
some of the Administration's covert actions, observes, ``In
Poland we did all of the things
that are done in countries where you want to destabilize a
communist government and strengthen resistance to that. We
provided the supplies and technical assistance in terms of
clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money,
organizational help and advice. And working outward from
Poland, the same kind of resistance was organized in the
other communist countries of Europe.''
Among those who played a consulting role was Zbigniew
Brzezinski, a native of Poland and President Jimmy Carter's
National Security Adviser. ``I got along very well with
Casey,'' recalls Brzezinski. ``He was very flexible and very
imaginative and not very bureaucratic; if something needed to
be done, it was done. To sustain an underground effort takes
a lot in terms of supplies, networks, etc., and this is why
Solidarity wasn't crushed.''
On military questions, American intelligence was better
than the Vatican's, but the church excelled in its
evaluations of the political situation. And in understanding
the mood of the people and communicating with the Solidarity
leadership, the church was in an incomparable position. ``Our
information about Poland was very well founded because the
bishops were in continual contact with the Holy See and
Solidarnosc,'' explains Cardinal Silvestrini, the Vatican's
deputy secretary of state at that time. ``They informed us
about prisoners, about the activities and needs of Solidarity
groups and about the attitude and schisms in the
government.'' All this information was communicated to the
President or Casey.
``If you study the situation of Solidarity, you see they
acted very cleverly, without pressing too much at the crucial
moments, because they had guidance from the church,'' says
one of the Pope's closest aides. ``Yes, there were times we
restrained Solidarnosc. But Poland was a bomb that could
explode--in the heart of communism, bordered by the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Too much pressure,
and the bomb would go off.''
casey's cappuccino
Meanwhile, in Washington a close relationship developed
between Casey, Clark and Archbishop Laghi. ``Casey and I
dropped into his [Laghi's] residence early mornings during
critical times to gather his comments and counsel,'' says
Clark. ``We'd have breakfast and coffee and discuss what was
being done in Poland. I'd speak to him frequently on the
phone, and he would be in touch with the Pope.'' Says Laghi:
``They liked good cappuccino. Occasionally we might talk
about Central America or the church position on birth
control. But usually the subject was Poland.''
``Almost everything having to do with Poland was handled
outside of normal State Department channels and would go
through Casey and Clark,'' says Robert McFarlane, who served
as a deputy to both Clark and Haig and later as National
Security Adviser to the President. ``I knew that they were
meeting with Pio Laghi, and that Pio Laghi had been to see
the President, but Clark would never tell me what the
substance of the discussions was.''
On at least six occasions Laghi came to the White House and
met with Clark or the President; each time, he entered the
White House through the southwest gate in order to avoid
reports. ``By keeping in such close touch, we did not cross
lines,'' says Laghi. ``My role was primarily to facilitate
meetings between Walters and the Holy Father. The Holy Father
knew his people. It was a very complex situation--how to
insist on human rights, on religious freedom, and keep
Solidarity alive without provoking the communist authorities
further. But I told Vernon, `Listen to the Holy Father. We
have 2,000 years' experience at this.' ''
Though William Casey has been vilified for aspects of his
tenure as CIA chief, there is no criticism of his instincts
on Poland. ``Basically, he had a quiet confidence that the
communists couldn't hold on, especially in Poland,'' says
former Congressman Edward Derwinski, a Polish-speaking expert
on Eastern Europe who counseled the Administration and met
with Casey frequently. ``He was convinced the system was
falling and doomed to collapse one way or another--and Poland
was the force that would lead to the dam breaking. He
demanded a constant [CIA] focus on Eastern Europe. It wasn't
noticed, because other stories were more controversial and
were perking at the moment--Nicaragua and Salvador.''
In Poland, Casey conducted the kind of old-style operation
that he relished, something he might have done in his days at
the Office of Strategic Services during World War II or in
the early years of the CIA, when the democracies of Western
Europe rose from the ashes of World War II. It was through
Casey's contacts, his associates say, that elements of the
Socialist International were organized on behalf of
Solidarity--just as the Social Democratic parties of Western
Europe had been used as an instrument of American policy by
the CIA in helping to create anticommunist governments after
the war. And this time the objective was akin to creating a
Christian Democratic majority in Poland--with the church
and the overwhelmingly Catholic membership of Solidarity
as the dominant political force in a post communist
Poland. Through his contacts with leaders of the Socialist
International, including officials of socialist
governments in France and Sweden, Casey ensured that
tactical assistance was available on the continent and at
sea to move goods into Poland. ``This wasn't about
spending huge amounts of money,'' says Brzezinski. ``It
was about getting the message out and resisting: books,
communications equipment, propaganda, ink and printing
presses.''
Look for the Union Label
In almost every city and town, underground newspapers and
mimeographed bulletins appeared, challenging the state-
controlled media. The church published its own newspapers.
Solidarity missives, photocopied and mimeographed on
American-supplied equipment, were tacked to church bulletin
boards. Stenciled posters were boldly posted on police
stations and government buildings and even on entrances to
the state-controlled television center, where army officers
broadcast the news.
The American embassy in Warsaw became the pivotal CIA
station in the communist world and, by all accounts, the most
effective. Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO, which had been the largest
source of American support for Solidarity before martial law,
regarded the Reagan Administration's approach as too slow and
insufficiently confrontational with the Polish authorities.
Nonetheless, according to intelligence sources, AFL-CIO
president Lane Kirkland and his aide Tom Kahn consulted
frequently with Poindexter, Clark and other officials at the
State Department and the NSC on such matters as how and when
to move goods and supplies into Poland, identifying cities
where Solidarity was in particular need of organizing
assistance, and examining how Solidarity and the AFL-CIO
might collaborate in the preparation of propaganda materials.
``Lane Kirkland deserves special credit,'' observes
Derwinski. ``They don't like to admit [it], but they
literally were in lockstep [with the Administration]. Also
never forget that Bill Clark's wife is Czechoslovak, as is
Lane Kirkland's wife. This is one issue where everybody was
aboard; there were no turf fights or mavericks or
naysayers.''
But AFL-CIO officials were never aware of the extent of
clandestine U.S. assistance, or the Administration's reliance
on the church for guidance regarding how hard to push Polish
and Soviet authorities. Casey was wary of ``contaminating''
the American and European labor movements by giving them too
many details of the Administration's efforts. And indeed this
was not strictly a CIA operation. Rather, it was a blend of
covert and overt, public policy and secret alliances. Casey
recognized that in many instances the AFL-CIO was more
imaginative than his own operatives in providing
organizational assistance to Solidarity and smuggling
equipment into the country. According to former deputy CIA
director Inman, Casey decided that the American labor
movement's relationship with Solidarity was so good that much
of what the CIA needed could be financed and obtained through
AFL-CIO channels. ``Financial support wasn't what they
needed,'' says Inman. ``It was organization, and that was an
infinitely better way to help them than through classic
covert operations.''
The Solidarity office in Brussels became an international
clearinghouse: for representatives of the Vatican, for CIA
operatives, for the AFL-CIO, for representatives of the
Socialist International, for the congressionally funded
National Endowment for Democracy, which also worked
closely with Casey. It was the place where Solidarity told
its backers--some of whose real identities were unknown to
Solidarity itself--what it needed, where goods and
supplies and organizers could be most useful. Priests,
couriers, labor organizers and intelligence operatives
moved in and out of Poland with requests for aid and with
detailed information on the situation inside the
government and the underground. Food and clothing and
money to pay fines of Solidarity leaders who were brought
before Polish courts poured into the country. Inside
Poland, a network of priests carried messages back and
forth between the churches where many of Solidarity's
leaders were in hiding.
In the summer of 1984, when the sanctions against Poland
seemed to be hurting ordinary Poles and not the communists,
Laghi traveled to Santa Barbara to meet with Reagan at the
Western White House and urge that some of the sanctions be
lifted. The Administration complied. At the same time, the
White House, in close consultation with the Vatican, refused
to ease its economic pressures on Moscow--denying technology,
food and cultural exchanges as the price for continuing
oppression in Poland.
Much of the equipment destined for Solidarity arrived in
Poland by ship--often packed in mismarked containers sent
from Denmark and Sweden, then unloaded at Gdansk and other
ports by dockers secretly working with Solidarity. According
to Administration officials, the socialist government of
Sweden--and Swedish labor unions--played a crucial role in
arranging the transshipment of goods to Poland. From the
Polish docks, equipment moved to its destination in trucks
and private cars driven by Solidarity sympathizers who often
used churches and priests as their point of contact for
deliveries and pickups.
``solidarity lives!''
``The Administration plugged into the church across the
board,'' observes Derwinski, now Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. ``Not just through the church hierarchy but through
individual churches and
bishops. Monsignor Bronislaw Dabrowski, a deputy to Cardinal
Glemp, came to use often to tell us what was needed: he would
meet with me, with Casey, the NSC and sometimes with
Walters.'' John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia, whose father
was born in Poland, was the American churchman closest to the
Pope. He frequently met with Casey to discuss support for
Solidarity and covert operations, according to CIA sources
and Derwinski. ``Krol hit it off very well with President
Reagan and was a source of constant advice and contact,''
says Derwinski. ``Often he was the one Casey or Clark went
to, the one who really understood the situation.''
By 1985 it was apparent that the Polish government's
campaign to suppress Solidarity had failed. According to a
report by Adrian Karatnycky, who helped organize the AFL-
CIO's assistance to Solidarity, there were more than 400
underground periodicals appearing in Poland, some with a
circulation that exceeded 30,000. Books and pamphlets
challenging the authority of the communist government were
printed by the thousands. Comic books for children recast
Polish fables and legends, with Jaruzelski pictured as the
villain, communism as the red dragon and Walesa as the heroic
knight. In church basements and homes, millions of viewers
watched documentary videos produced and screened on
the equipment smuggled into the country.
With clandestine broadcasting equipment supplied by the CIA
and the AFL-CIO, Solidarity regularly broke into the
government's radio programming, often with the message
``Solidarity lives!'' or ``Resist!'' Armed with a transmitter
supplied by the CIA through church channels, Solidarity
interrupted television programming with both audio and visual
messages, including calls for strikes and demonstrations.
``There was a great moment at the half time of the national
soccer championship,'' says a Vatican official. ``Just as the
whistle sounded for the half, a Solidarity Lives! banner went
up on the screen and a tape came on calling for resistance.
What was particularly ingenious was waiting for the half-time
break; had the interruption come during actual soccer play,
it could have alienated people.'' As Brzezinski sums it up,
``This was the first time that communist police suppression
didn't succeed.''
``Nobody believed the collapse of communism would happen
this fast or on this timetable,'' says a cardinal who is one
of the Pope's closest aides. ``But in their first meeting,
the holy Father and the President committed themselves and
the institutions of the church and America to such a goal.
And from that day, the focus was to bring it about in
Poland.''
Step by reluctant step, the Soviets and the communist
government of Poland bowed to the moral, economic and
political pressure imposed by the Pope and the President.
Jails were emptied, Walesa's trial on charges of slandering
state officials was abandoned, the Polish communist party
turned fratricidal, and the country's economy collapsed in a
haze of strikes and demonstrations and sanctions.
On Feb. 19, 1987, after Warsaw had pledged to open a
dialogue with the church, Reagan lifted U.S. sanctions. Four
months later, Pope John Paul II was cheered by millions of
his countrymen as he traveled across Poland demanding human
rights and praising Solidarity. In July 1988, Gorbachev
visited Warsaw and signaled Moscow's recognition that the
government could not rule without Solidarity's cooperation.
On April 5, 1989, the two sides signed agreements legalizing
Solidarity and calling for open parliamentary elections in
June. In December 1990, nine years after he was arrested and
his labor union banned, Lech Walesa became President of
Poland.
[Correction (Apr. 27, 1992): A short article accompanying
our report on the cooperative effort of President Reagan and
Pope John Paul II to assist Poland's Solidarity movement
[Cover, Feb. 24] incorrectly stated the U.S. position on
financial aid for family planning in foreign countries. The
U.S. announced in 1984 that it would withhold funds for
abortion or coerced birth control--but not for all family
planning.]