Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the Senate's passage of H.R. 3402, the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. My comments are directed at Title X of…
Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the Senate's passage of H.R. 3402, the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. My comments are directed at Title X of the bill, the ``DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005.'' This provision is nearly identical to S. 1606, a bill of the same name that Senator Cornyn and I introduced earlier this year. The DNA Fingerprint Act was added to the Senate version of VAWA reauthorization, S. 1197, in the Senate Judiciary Committee on a Kyl/Cornyn amendment that was accepted by voice vote. I am pleased to see that this provision has been maintained in the final bill.
The DNA Fingerprint Act will allow State and Federal law enforcement to catch rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals whom it otherwise would be impossible to identify and arrest. The principal provisions of the bill make it easier to include and keep the DNA profiles of criminal arrestees in the National DNA Index System, where that profile can be compared to crime-scene evidence. By removing current barriers to maintaining data from criminal arrestees, the Act will allow the creation of a comprehensive, robust database that will make it possible to catch serial rapists and murderers before they commit more crimes.
The impact that this act will have on preventing rape and other violent crimes is not merely speculative. We know from real life examples that an all-arrestee database can prevent many future offenses. In March of this year, the City of Chicago produced a case study of eight serial killers in that city who would have been caught after their first offense--rather than after their fourth or tenth--if an all-arrestee database had been in place. This study is included in the congressional record at the conclusion of my introduction of S. 1606, at 151 Cong. Rec. S9529-9531 (July 29, 2005).
The first example that the Chicago study cites involves serial rapist and murderer Andre Crawford. In March 1993, Crawford was arrested for felony theft. Under the DNA Fingerprint Act, the State of Illinois would have been able to take a DNA sample from Crawford at that time and upload and keep that sample in NDIS, the national DNA database. But at that time--and until this bill may be enacted--Federal law makes it difficult to upload an arrestee's profiles to NDIS, and bars States from keeping that profile in NDIS if the arrestee is not later convicted of a criminal offense. As a result, Crawford's DNA profile was not collected and it was not added to NDIS. And as a result, when Crawford murdered a 37-year-old woman on September 21, 1993, although DNA evidence was recovered from the crime scene, Crawford could not be identified as the perpetrator. And as a result, Crawford went on to commit many more rapes and murders.
On December 21, 1994, a 24-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned building on the 800 block of West 50th place in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the September 1993 murder, and this December 1994 murder could have been prevented.
On April 3, 1995, a 36-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned house on the 5000 block of South Carpenter Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the two earlier murders that he had committed, and this April 1995 murder could have been prevented.
On July 23, 1997, a 27-year-old woman was found murdered in a closet of an abandoned house on the 900 block of West 51st Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the three earlier murders that he had committed, and this July 1997 murder could have been prevented.
On December 27, 1997, a 42-year-old woman was raped in Chicago. As she walked down the street, a man approached her from behind, put a knife to her head, dragged her into an abandoned building on the 5100 block of South Peoria Street, and beat and raped her. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the four earlier murders that he had committed, and this December 1997 rape could have been prevented.
In June 1998, a 31-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned building on the 5000 block of South May Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the four earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this June 1998 murder could have been prevented.
On August 13, 1998, a 44-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned house on the 900 block of West 52nd Street. Her clothes were found in the alley. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the five earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this August 1998 murder could have been prevented.
Also on August 13, 1998, a 32-year-old woman was found murdered in the attic of a house on the 5200 block of South Marshfield. Her body was decomposed, but DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the six earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this additional murder could have been prevented.
On December 8, 1998, a 35-year-old woman was found murdered in a building on the 1200 block of West 52nd Street. She had rope marks around her neck and injuries to her face. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the seven earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this December 1998 murder could have been prevented.
On February 2, 1999, a 35-year-old woman was found murdered on the 1300 block of West 51st Street. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the eight earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this February 1999 murder could have been prevented.
On April 21, 1999, a 44-year-old woman was found murdered in the upstairs of an abandoned house on the 5000 block of South Justine Street. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the nine earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this April 1999 murder could have been prevented.
And on June 20, 1999, a 41-year-old woman was found murdered in the attic of an abandoned building on the 1500 block of West 51st Street. DNA evidence was recovered from blood on a
nearby wall, indicating a struggle. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the ten earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this additional murder could have been prevented.
As the City of Chicago case study concludes:
In January 2000, Andre Crawford was charged with 11 murders
and 1 Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. If his DNA sample
had been taken on March 6, 1993, the subsequent 10 murders
and 1 rape would not have happened.
The City of Chicago study goes on to discuss the cases of 7 other serial rapists and murders from that city. Each of these criminals had a prior arrest that could have been a basis for a DNA collection but had no prior conviction. Collectively, together with Andre Crawford, these 8 serial rapists and killers represent 22 murders and 30 rapes that could have been prevented had an all-arrestee database been in place.
The DNA Fingerprint Act eliminates current Federal statutory restrictions that prevent states from adding and keeping arrestee profiles in NDIS. In effect, the Act would make it possible to build a comprehensive, robust national all-arrestee DNA database.
Here is how the DNA Fingerprint Act works. First, the Act eliminates current Federal statutory restrictions that prevent an arrestee's profile from being included in NDIS at the same time that fingerprints are taken and added to the national database. Under current law, as soon as someone is arrested, fingerprints can be taken as part of the booking procedure and uploaded to the national database. But DNA cannot be uploaded until the arrestee is charged in an indictment or information, which can take weeks. Allowing local authorities to collect and upload DNA at the same time as fingerprints--as part of a unified procedure--establishes a clear and straightforward process, making it easier and thus more likely that states will move to an all- arrestee database.
Second, current law places the burden on the State to remove an arrestee DNA sample from NDIS if the arrestee later is acquitted or charges are dismissed. The U.S. Justice Department has criticized this as an unwieldy requirement to impose on State labs--it effectively requires lab administrators to track the progress of individual criminal cases. Under the DNA Fingerprint Act, an arrestee will be required to take the initiative to have his profile removed form NDIS if he does not want it compared to future crime-scene evidence. The arrestee will be required to file a certified copy of a final court order establishing that all indexable charges have been dismissed, have resulted in acquittal, or that no charges were filed within the applicable time period. This is the same system that some States use if an arrestee wants to have an arrest struck from his record. And it is more restrictive of law enforcement than the rule for fingerprints-- there is no expungement of fingerprints from the national database, even if the arrestee is acquitted or charges are dismissed.
The bureaucratic burden imposed by the current system discourages States from creating and maintaining comprehensive, all-arrestee DNA databases. It also effectively precludes the creation of a genuine national all-arrestee database; only convicts' DNA profiles can be kept in the national database over the long term.
Some critics have complained that this expungement provisions in the DNA Fingerprint Act do not require expungement for State offenses that have no statute of limitations--i.e., for offenses for which the ``applicable time period'' does not expire. Others have complained that some States may not make certified court orders available for all of the scenarios under which expungement is contemplated under this bill. The answer to all of these complaints is that these are questions for the States to resolve. If a state chooses to abolish its statute of limitations for murder, rape, or other crimes, that is the State's decision to make. Certainly a person arrested for a serious crime in a State with no statute of limitation for the offense would be more significantly burdened the fact that he may be subject to further arrest and prosecution at any time than by the fact that his DNA is in the national database and may identify him if he commits a crime. Similarly, it is up to the States to decide when certified court orders should be made available to memorialize particular events. All that the DNA Fingerprint Act requires is that if the State does make such an order available to an arrestee--for example, for purposes of having an arrest struck from his record--then the arrestee could also use that order to have his DNA profile removed from NDIS.
Third, the DNA Fingerprint Act would allow expanded use of Federal DNA grants. Current law only allows these grants to be used to build databases of convicted felons. The DNA Fingerprint Act permits these grants to be used to analyze and database any DNA sample whose collection is permitted by State or local law.
Fourth, the DNA Fingerprint Act allows the Federal Government to take and keep DNA samples from Federal arrestees and from non-U.S. persons who are detained under Federal authority. (A ``United States person'' is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See 50 U.S.C. 1801(i).) The act gives the Attorney General the authority to issue regulations requiring the collection of such DNA profiles--including requiring other Federal agencies to collect the profiles. As the National Immigration Law Center noted in its October commentary on this section of the Act, ``[u]nder this provision, the attorney general could authorize the Dept. of Homeland Security and its immigration agencies to collect DNA samples from immigrants who are arrested and `non-United States persons' who are detained under the authority of the United States.'' And as the NILC's commentary also notes, the word ```detained' covers a wide spectrum of circumstances. The dictionary definition of `detained' is to keep from proceeding or to keep in custody or temporary confinement.''
Finally, the act tolls the statute of limitations for Federal sex offenses. Current law generally tolls the statute of limitations for felony cases in which the perpetrator is implicated in the offense through DNA testing. The one exception to this tolling is the sexual- abuse offenses in chapter 109A of title 18. When Congress adopted general tolling, it left out chapter 109A, apparently because those crimes already are subject to the use of ``John Doe'' indictments to charge unidentified perpetrators. The Justice Department has made clear, however, that John Doe indictments are ``not an adequate substitute for the applicability of [tolling].'' The Department has criticized the exception in current law as ``work[ing] against the effective prosecution of rapes and other serious sexual assaults under chapter 109A,'' noting that it makes ``the statute of limitation rules for such offenses more restrictive that those for all other Federal offenses in cases involving DNA identification.'' The DNA Fingerprint Act corrects this anomaly by allowing tolling for chapter 109A offenses.
Further evidence of the potential effectiveness of a comprehensive, robust DNA database is available from the recent experience of the United Kingdom. The British have taken the lead in using DNA to solve crimes, creating a database that now includes 2,000,000 profiles. Their database has now reached the critical mass where it is big enough to serve as a highly effective tool for solving crimes. In the U.K., DNA from crime scenes produces a match to the DNA database in 40 percent of all cases. This amounted to 58,176 cold hits in the United Kingdom 2001. (See generally ``The Application of DNA Technology in England and Wales,'' a study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice.) A broad DNA database works. The same tool should be made available in the United States.
Some critics of DNA databasing argue that a comprehensive database would violate criminal suspects' privacy rights. This is simply untrue. The sample of DNA that is kept in NDIS is what is called ``junk DNA''-- it is impossible to determine anything medically sensitive from this DNA. For example, this DNA does not allow the tester to determine if the donor is susceptible to particular diseases. The
Justice Department addressed this issue in its statement of views on S. 1700, a DNA bill that was introduced in the 108th Congress (See Letter of William Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Orrin Hatch, April 28, 2004):
[T]here [are no] legitimate privacy concerns that require
the retention or expansion of these [burdensome expungement
provisions]. The DNA identification system is already subject
to strict privacy rules, which generally limit the use of DNA
samples and DNA profiles in the system to law enforcement
identification purposes. See 42 U.S.C. 14132(b)-(c).
Moreover, the DNA profiles that are maintained in the
national index relate to 13 DNA sites that do not control any
traits or characteristics of individuals. Hence, the
databased information cannot be used to discern, for example,
anything about an individual's genetic illnesses, disorders,
or dispositions. Rather, by design, the information the
system retains in the databased DNA profiles is the
equivalent of a ``genetic fingerprint'' that uniquely
identifies an individual, but does not disclose other facts
about him.
In its September 29 Statement of Views on S. 1197, this year's Senate VAWA bill, the Justice Department commented favorably on the inclusion of the DNA Fingerprint Act in that bill. The Department noted:
Title X of the bill contains provisions we strongly support
that will strengthen the ability of the Nation's justice
systems to identify and prosecute sexually violent offenders
and other criminals through the use of the DNA technology.
These reforms have generally been proposed or endorsed by the
Department of Justice in previous communications to Congress.
See Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E.
Moschella to the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch concerning H.R.
3214, at 3-7 (April 28, 2004); Letter from Assistant Attorney
General William E. Moschella to the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
concerning S. 1700, at 5-6 (April 28, 2004).
Section 1002 would remove unjustified restrictions on the
DNA profiles that can be included in the National DNA Index
System (``NDIS''), including elimination of language that
generally excludes from NDIS the DNA profiles of arrestees.
Section 1003 is a parallel amendment to allow the use of DNA
backlog elimination funding to analyze DNA samples collected
under applicable legal authority, not limited (as currently
is the case) to DNA samples collected from convicted
offenders. Section 1004 would authorize the Attorney General
to extend DNA sample collection to Federal arrestees and
detainees. A number of States (including California,
Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana) already have authorized
arrestee DNA sample collection under their laws. Section 1004
would create legal authority to extend this beneficial reform
to the Federal jurisdiction. Section 1005 would strike
language in 18 U.S.C. section 3297 that currently makes that
provision's statute of limitations tolling rule for cases
involving DNA identification uniquely inapplicable to sexual
abuse offenses under chapter 109A of the Federal criminal
code.
In one respect, the amendments in section 1002, which are
absolutely critical to the future development and
effectiveness of the DNA identification system in the United
States, fall short of our recommendations. They moderate
existing expungement provisions requiring the removal of DNA
profiles from NDIS in certain circumstances, but do not
completely repeal the expungement provisions of 42 U.S.C.
14132(d), as we have recommended. Paragraph (2) of section
1002 should be amended so that it simply repeals subsection
(d) of 42 U.S.C. 14132. We have previously observed:
``States usually do not expunge fingerprint records . . .
if the defendant is not convicted, or if the conviction is
ultimately overturned, nor are they required to remove
fingerprint records in such cases from the national . . .
criminal history records systems. There is no reason to have
a contrary Federal policy mandating expungement for DNA
information. If the person whose DNA it is does not commit
other crimes, then the information simply remains in a secure
database and there is no adverse effect on his life. But if
he commits a murder, rape, or other serious crime, and DNA
matching can identify him as the perpetrator, then it is good
that the information was retained.''
Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella
to the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch concerning H.R. 3214, supra,
at 5; see 150 Cong. Rec. S10914-15 (Oct. 9, 2004) (remarks of
Senator Cornyn).
We note with approval that the Committee has made the
salutary reforms of title X that expand the collection and
indexing of DNA samples and information generally applicable,
and has not confined the application of these reforms to
cases involving violent felonies or some other limited class
of offenses. The experience with DNA identification over the
past fifteen years has provided overwhelming evidence that
the efficacy of the DNA identification system in solving
serious crimes depends upon casting a broad DNA sample
collection net to produce well-populated DNA databases. For
example, the DNA profile which solves a rape through database
matching very frequently was not collected from the
perpetrator based upon his prior conviction for a violent
crime, but rather based upon his commission of some property
offense that was not intrinsically violent. As a result of
this experience, a great majority of the States, as well as
the Federal jurisdiction, have adopted authorizations in
recent years to collect DNA samples from all convicted
felons--and in some cases additional misdemeanant categories
as well--without limitation to violent offenses. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. 14135a(d)(l). The principle is equally applicable
to the collection of DNA samples from non-convicts, such as
arrestees. By rejecting any limitation of the proposed
reforms to cases involving violent felonies or other limited
classes, the Committee has soundly maximized their value in
solving rapes, murders, and other serious crimes.
(Letter of William Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Arlen Specter, September 29, 2005.)
I note with pride that in addition to receiving the strong support of the Justice Department, the DNA Fingerprint Act is endorsed by the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network, Debbie and Rob Smith, and the California District Attorneys Association. I include in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks letters from these individuals and organizations supporting the DNA Fingerprint Act.
I would also like to comment on an issue that I chose not to address in the DNA Fingerprint Act but that I may need to address in future legislation. This matter concerns the efficient use of the limited Federal dollars available for offender DNA analysis. Some State crime laboratories recently have been required to remove criminal offender profiles from the national DNA database system because of Federal regulations that require a 100 percent technical review of offender DNA samples tested by private DNA laboratories, rather than review of a random sampling. Given that private laboratories must meet the same accreditation and quality assurance standards as public laboratories in order to test samples for CODIS, and given that these quality assurance standards include the same reviews of DNA analysis reports which are required of public laboratories, I question why the additional 100 percent review is required.
Moreover, offender DNA samples are not themselves considered evidence. After matched to an unsolved case on CODIS, regulations require that the offender sample be reanalyzed to confirm the match and then a new sample is collected from the suspect and tested anew to reconfirm the match. DNA cases with named suspects tested by accredited private laboratories are routinely brought directly to court without the duplicated public laboratory review requirement. If these private laboratories can be trusted to perform quality analysis for the thousands of DNA cases that have resulted in conviction for over 15 years, then it stands to reason that they could also be trusted with database samples which will be reanalyzed twice after a match is made.
While I understand the concern that potential incorrect results from an offender's sample could lead to a missed opportunity to solve a crime, I also am concerned about the potential for additional crimes to occur while an offender's profile is queued in a laboratory review backlog. It has been brought to my attention that there are other forensic disciplines, such as drug chemistry, in which laboratories use statistically based formulas to achieve a high degree of certainty without requiring a 100 percent review of all samples. I also am aware that the National Institute of Justice already requires that outsourced DNA samples include a requirement for five percent of a given batch to be blind samples.
This duplicated requirement for review of samples tested at private laboratories appears to be an inefficient use of federal funds and, more importantly, delays justice for victims seeking a name for their attacker. Before--and ideally, instead of--my introducing legislation to address what appears to be a non-statutory problem, I would suggest that the Attorney General and the FBI reevaluate the necessity for this regulation. The Justice Department also ought to consider the possibility of permitting accredited private laboratories limited but direct ability to upload data to the national DNA Index System, similar to the permission granted to private laboratories in the United Kingdom's DNA database system.
Finally, I would like to thank those who have made it possible to enact the
DNA Fingerprint Act as part of this year's VAWA reauthorization bill. This includes my colleague, Senator Cornyn, with whom I introduced S. 1606 and who offered the Kyl amendment on my behalf at the Judiciary Committee's executive meeting; Chip Roy and Reed O'Connor of Senator Cornyn's staff; and Lisa Owings and Brett Tolman of Chairman Specter's staff. It is my understanding that absent some aggressive staffing by Mr. Tolman at various stages of the legislative process, the effort to have the DNA Fingerprint Act enacted into law as part of VAWA this year would not have succeeded. His contribution is duly noted and appreciated.
I ask unanimous consent that the following letters be printed in the Record.