Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005

Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about the almost daily series of alarming developments in Iran and Syria. Both are state sponsors of terrorism. Both have worked to undermine our rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Tehran and Damascus both have a history of refusing to comply with global nonproliferation standards, and experts routinely cite disturbing trends that suggest these governments are aggressively pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iran clearly has the intention to develop nuclear weapons and is well on its way to doing so. It has been belligerent and dishonest in its dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency and our European partners who are negotiating with Tehran. This led to the historic vote on September 24 of this year, when the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran had breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted Iran's policy of concealing its nuclear work and facilities. What was Tehran's response to the international community? More defiance and the outrageous comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be ``wiped off the map.''

Since coming into office, this administration has mostly allowed these problems with Iran and Syria to fester while its focus was elsewhere. It has paid only intermittent attention when crises flare up and has not formulated a long-term and comprehensive strategy for dealing with the proliferation threat presented by these regimes. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent--with the rapid nuclear developments in Iran, the increasing proliferation risk that it and Syria pose, the undermining of our work in Iraq, and the extreme statements and actions recently taken by both Tehran and Damascus--that we must take immediate action.

Congress took action to augment the U.S. nonproliferation regime in 2000 when it overwhelmingly passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INA, in response to repeated transfers of ballistic missile technology and know-how from Russia and other countries to Iran. Known and suspected assistance from Russia, China, and Pakistan has also helped Iran make progress in its nuclear program. I believe that the 2000 legislation has winnowed the pool of transgressors by highlighting the most egregious among them; however, determined governments, industries, and individuals continue to find it a worthwhile risk to trade in goods and technology that can contribute to an Iranian WMD program. Clearly, it is time to strengthen the INA to prevent these transactions. A more robust INA can also serve as a model for curbing proliferation involving other countries--starting with Syria, whose policies may still be influenced by such determined and effective measures.

Congress is on the cusp of adopting some important changes to the INA with S. 1713. If enacted, the reporting and sanctions provisions of the statute would also apply to transactions involving Syria. In addition, the law would also target exports of WMD and missile technology from these two countries. The revamped Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, ISNA, would be a positive step. However, we must do more.

Today, I along with my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, introduce the Iran Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2005. This bill would intensify and broaden the sanctions provisions in the INA. First, it requires mandatory sanctions for violators, an approach that Congress favored overwhelmingly when it passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Second, it requires a more detailed justification from the President if he chooses to exercise a national security waiver. Third, it introduces requirements that make parent companies subject to INA sanctions, in addition to their proliferator subsidiaries. And fourth, it expands the list of sanctions to include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for proliferators, in addition to the current arms and dual use export prohibitions.

The current sanctions mechanism is too weak. Under the INA, sanctions are authorized rather than required. Since 2000, the administration has chosen to impose INA sanctions on foreign companies or individuals on 65 occasions, with some entities having been sanctioned several times. The State Department has not revealed in unclassified form how many entities were reported but not sanctioned and why they were not sanctioned.

If we accept that a successful Iranian or Syrian WMD program poses a major threat, then we must get serious about our sanctions and make them mandatory. Our bill does just that. Making sanctions mandatory has precedents. As I previously noted, Congress overwhelmingly approved mandatory sanctions against foreign persons and entities engaged in missile proliferation to Iran as part of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, largely because at that time his administration was engaged in negotiations with Russia over export controls. The sense was that the newly formed government needed time to develop its controls over Russian business. In the end, the administration exercised its Executive order authority to impose broad sanctions on several Russian companies. However, we must let the international community know that the threat from proliferation is great and that export controls must be in place and enforced. Making sanctions mandatory sends that message.

Furthermore, nonproliferation legislation should ensure that national security waivers are issued only under the most compelling of circumstances. The current national security waiver is too broad, and the administration can simply classify the reason for the waiver in order to remove almost all scrutiny. The message sent to those assisting Iran and Syria with WMD development is that, even if the United States catches them, there is only a small chance that we will actually do anything about it. There are legitimate reasons for classifying parts of these responses and that is why our bill allows the administration to submit part of the waiver explanation in a classified annex. However, our bill requires the Administration to provide more detailed explanations for such waivers and an explanation of why a justification is classified.

Currently, the INA sanctions restrict only U.S. arms and dual-use exports to violators, and an Executive order authorizes some additional restrictions. Our bill will ensure that all the significant tools in our sanctions arsenal are brought to bear on proliferators. It broadens INA sanctions to also include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for violators, and if S. 1713 is enacted, also ban their imports into the United States. In an example identified by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation, CATIC, which was sanctioned under the INA in 2002 and 2004, has subsidiaries that export to the U.S. Under our bill, the investment sanction would prevent U.S. companies from making new capital investments in CATIC factories. It would also forbid the purchase by U.S. persons of shares of CATIC Shenzhen Holdings and CATIC International Holdings, two CATIC- controlled companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The new import ban would block the sale of CATIC products in the United States, cutting off an important source of revenue. Put simply, this bill would make it clear for companies like CATIC that they must make a choice--profit from their dealings with the vast U.S. market or continue to assist Iran or Syria with their WMD and missile programs. It is long past due that companies make such a choice.

Under the INA, parent companies can continue to do business with the U.S. and profit from our economy, even if their subsidiaries openly assist Iran with missile and WMD-related activities. Our bill attempts to end this aberration by expanding the scope of the sanctions to include the parent companies. The Wisconsin Project has identified serial proliferators who have flouted U.S. law because they know they cannot be touched by the current INA. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, CASC, for example, has had three subsidiaries sanctioned--two of them repeatedly--for missile technology transfers to Iran. Meanwhile, CASC is marketing its commercial satellite launch program in our country. This amendment would force CASC to choose between selling missile technology to Iran and the business potential in future U.S. satellite launches. The bill's ban on investment would also affect the subsidiaries CASC has listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Similarly, the Chinese oil giant Sinopec has been selling glass-lined vessels useful for making poison gas to Iran through its subsidiaries. While INA sanctions were imposed on one of its subsidiaries, however, Sinopec remained free to raise billions of dollars on the New York Stock Exchange and even receive U.S. technology and U.S. foreign aid. This is absurd, and will no longer be possible if our bill becomes law.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the urgency of this matter. The intelligence community expects that Iran will be able to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade, and the CIA has highlighted concern about Iran's robust missile program. Iran has pursued various methods for enriching uranium and experimented with separating plutonium. Iran's WMD program is making news headlines again, and the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with the NPT. The Congressional Research Service reported in its review of the INA that Iran's efforts to acquire foreign WMD technology seem to have continued unabated. Similarly, Syria continues to rely on technology and assistance from abroad to develop its ballistic missile program. According to recent unclassified CIA reports, Syria's chemical weapon program also depends on equipment and precursor chemicals it receives from foreign sources.

We need to make a serious effort to inhibit WMD development by Iran and Syria. Strengthening the INA is one concrete way to do that for Iran, and when S. 1713 is enacted, also for Syria. We must make clear to the world that assisting Tehran and Damascus in developing the most dangerous weapons cannot and will not be tolerated. For example, China is a country with which we continue to build closer ties. However, a recent Rand study concluded that although China has improved its export control system on paper, it does not consistently and effectively implement these controls. Russia is also an important partner, but it has continued to provide Iran with nuclear technology. India is another nation with which the United States continues to grow closer, and the President has even committed to helping it with nuclear energy technology. Yet India also has very close ties to Iran. We must make clear to these nations and to the entire world that it is in the best interest of the international community that Iran and Syria do not expand their WMD capabilities. We must also make it crystal clear that if you assist these nations with their quest for weapons, there will be serious consequences for you in your relationship and dealings with the United States. Strengthening the INA as we suggest will make that message clear and further our national security goals.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither gentleman is opposed to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in opposition to the bill, but I want to make it very clear that the portion of the bill that the gentleman from California was speaking about I strongly endorsed. Matter of fact, I had a similar bill that would have made the same corrections, but I would like to make two points about this portion of the bill.

The one is that the corrections were necessary because we had placed sanctions on Iran, and there was an unintended consequence. It actually harmed NASA and harmed our relationships with Russia. This is making a correction and I think that is good, and I strongly support that part of the bill.

But it goes to show that sanctions per se are not necessarily good. We might just use as an example not having sanctions on a country like China. We do better talking with and getting along with China as we become trading partners rather than adversaries. So even countries that seem to be adversarial, there are some downsides to putting on sanctions.

Actually, the portion of the bill that I rise in objection to is the portion that was amended dealing with Syria. I consider this a significant change in our law. There has been very little discussion on this. This makes the bill quite different from the Senate bill. But once again, I think it is doing things that could come back to haunt us, and that is expanding our authority and the President's authority to place sanctions on Syria, of course always with good intentions; but too often bad things can happen.

In 1998, a bill came up on the suspension calendar. It was considered noncontroversial and was called the Iraq Liberation Act. It passed overwhelmingly, but at that particular time, I took the time in opposition to point out that there could be some unintended, or maybe some intended, consequences that at that time the Congress was not admitting to, and that it could lead to war. And, of course, that was the first stepping stone to the current war that we are in.

Although this particular bill is not nearly as strong as what the Iraq Liberation Act was, this nevertheless is a step as far as I am concerned in the wrong direction.

The basic thing that happens here is we are expanding tremendously the power to place sanctions on Syria, and this comes in light of the publication of the U.N. investigation on Hariri's murder, and there is a tremendous move right now to move on to the next regime change in the Middle East. To me, I believe we are overstepping our bounds and looking for more trouble.

We have essentially zero right to decide who should head foreign states. Once we decide that we know what is best for foreign countries and we can actually pick a head of state, I think it leads to trouble. I could give Members every bit of reason why we ought to change the King of Saudi Arabia, as we should change the King of Syria; and yet Saudi Arabia gets a lot of support from us.

There was a recent report in a newspaper today, whether it is factual or not it is still frightening, it said that the administration was actually putting feelers out and asking Israel and Italy to nominate a replacement for Assad. This means we are moving in that direction.

One of the reasons we are supposed to be doing this and looking closely to Syria is they present a destabilizing element in the Middle East. That in itself is stretching it. They are struggling to stabilize and survive with the pounding they are getting internationally. We forget that Syria actually sent troops into the first Persian Gulf war dealing with Kuwait. But those kinds of things are easily forgotten.

The truth is the Mehlis Report is rather vague. There is no way it ties it to Assad. There is no proof of that whatsoever. As a matter of fact, Der Spiegel, a German magazine, reported today that the most important information that the Mehlis Report cites comes from an informer who was a convicted swindler and felon. That is one of the sources of the information they are using to try to tie this into Syria.

If you want to talk about destabilization of a region, all we have to do is look at 150,000 troops in a country 6,000 miles from our borders. If we talk about the responsibility of somebody being assassinated, we might ask the question how many dozens of Iraqi administrators have been assassinated in Iraq since we have been in charge. So there are two different ways we can look at that. My deep concern is that we are moving in the direction of expanding our presence and expanding the war in that region.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to reiterate that the portion of the bill that deals with our ability to pursue our space program I strongly endorse. It is the portion that deals with Syria that was added on at the last minute that I am concerned about.

I want to say that portion of the bill, I believe, further destabilizes the Middle East and we should move with great caution. We have been warned. We should be prepared for a broader war in the Middle East as plans are being laid for the next U.S.-led regime change in Syria.

A U.N. report of the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri elicited this comment from a senior U.S. policy maker: ``Out of a tragedy comes an extraordinary strategic opportunity.'' This statement reflects the continued neoconservative, Machiavellian influence on our foreign policy.

The ``opportunity'' refers to the long-held neoconservative plan for regime change in Syria, similar to what was carried out in Iraq.

This plan for remaking the Middle East has been around for a long time. Just as 9/11 served the interests of those who longed for changes in Iraq, the sensationalism surrounding Hariri's death is being used to advance plans to remove Assad.

Congress already has assisted these plans by authorizing the sanctions placed on Syria last year. Harmful sanctions, as applied to Iraq in the 1990s, inevitably represent a major step toward war since they bring havoc to so many innocent people. Syria already has been charged with developing weapons of mass destruction based on no more evidence than was available when Iraq was similarly charged.

Syria has been condemned for not securing its borders by the same U.S. leaders who cannot secure our own borders. Syria was castigated for placing its troops in Lebanon, a neighboring country, although such action was invited by an elected government and encouraged by the United States. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon elicited no suicide terrorist attacks, as was suffered by Western occupiers.

Condemning Syria for having troops in Lebanon seems strange considering most of the world sees our 150,000 troops in Iraq as unwarranted foreign intervention. Syrian troops were far more welcome in Lebanon.

Secretary Rice likewise sees the problem in Syria that we helped to create as an opportunity to advance our Middle Eastern agenda. In recent testimony she stated that it was always the administration's intent to redesign the greater Middle East, and Iraq was only part of that plan. And once again we have been told that all options are still on the table for dealing with Syria, including war.

The statement that should scare all Americans and the world is the assurance by Secretary Rice that the President needs no additional authority from Congress to attack Syria. She argues that authority already has been granted by the resolutions on 9/11 and Iraq. This is not true, but if Congress remains passive to the powers assumed by the executive branch, it will not matter. As the war spreads, the only role for the Congress will be to provide funding lest they be criticized for not supporting the troops. In the meantime, the Constitution and our liberties here at home will be further eroded as more Americans die.

This escalation of conflict with Syria comes as a result of the U.N. report concerning Hariri's death. When we need an excuse for our actions, it is always nice to rely on the organization our administration routinely condemns, one that brought us the multi- million-dollar oil-for-food scandal and the sexual crimes by U.N. representatives.

It is easy to ignore the fact that the report did not implicate Assad, who is targeted for the next regime change. The U.N. once limited itself to disputes between nations; yet now it assumes the U.N., like the United States, has a legal and moral right to inject itself into the internal policies of sovereign nations. Yet what is the source of this presumed wisdom? Where is the moral imperative that allows us to become the judge and jury of a domestic murder in a country 6,000 miles from our shores?

Moral, constitutional, and legal arguments for a less aggressive foreign policy receives little attention in Washington, but the law of unintended consequences serves as a thorough teacher for the slow learners and the morally impaired.

Is Iraq not yet a headache for the proponents of the shock and awe policy? Are 2,000 lives lost not enough to get their attention? How many hundreds of billions of dollars must be drained from our economy before it is noticed? Is it still plausible that deficits do not matter? Is the apparent victory for Iran in the Shiite theocracy we have created in Iraq not yet seen as a disturbing consequence of the ill-fated Iraq regime change effort? When we have our way with the next election in Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes a governing party, what do we do then?

If our effort to destabilize Syria is no more successful than our efforts in Iraq, then what? If destabilizing Syria leads to the same in Iran, what are our options? If we cannot leave now, we will surely not leave then. We will be told we must stay to honor the fallen to prove the cause was just.

We should remember Ronald Reagan's admonition regarding this area of the world. Ronald Reagan reflected on Lebanon in his memoirs, describing the Middle East as a ``jungle'' and Middle Eastern politics as ``irrational.'' It forced him to rethink his policy in the region. It is time we do some rethinking as well.

This bill today does not help.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to be equally divided between the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), and I ask

unanimous consent that they be allowed to control that time.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill (S. 1713) to make amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 related to International Space Station payments, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 1713, the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and ask unanimous consent that he control that time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and, of course, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for the leadership that has been demonstrated in getting this legislation to the floor.

One of America's challenges as we seek global security and stability is stopping the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies.

Several years ago, we enacted the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to give the United States several tools in our fight against proliferation to Iran, one of which was a restriction on U.S.-Russian space cooperation. As a member of both the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science, I was deeply involved in that aspect of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.

While many of the INA's tools have helped and should be continued, the limitation on space cooperation has not been effective and is now counterproductive. So, today, we have an opportunity to both correct and strengthen that legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the amended version of Senate bill 1713. First and foremost, the bill strengthens the tools available to fight proliferation to, and from, Iran. This bill also provides urgently needed relief for NASA so that the United States can maintain a continued presence on the International Space Station and enables cost-effective commercial partnerships to support the Space Station. This latter benefit also strengthens non-proliferation, because over the past decade we have learned that commercial ties between the United States and Russian aerospace companies have been an effective tool against proliferation. We need to employ such carrots along with our non-proliferation sticks.

The changes put in place by S. 1713 will prevent a major setback for America's space program, and that is one of the most important things we are talking about today. It will prevent this setback by ensuring a continued and uninterrupted presence, an American presence, on the International Space Station.

Cooperation with Russia, just as similar cooperation with Russia by the State of Israel in terms of space policy, will help us achieve America's space goals while maintaining our commitment to non- proliferation.

This bill needs to be passed. There is a time element here, and I would like to thank all those who have been involved in trying to get this legislation to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from

Texas (Mr. DeLay), a Member whose leadership has been a major factor in the passage of so much historic legislative reform that has gone through this body.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), a Member who was both the senior member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as serving as chairman of the Committee on Science.

(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

First of all, thank you very much to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and all those on the other side of the aisle and the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), who has done such great work in our committee and on issues dealing with Iran and trying to secure the safety of our country as well as the Middle East. The gentleman has my respect; and as he knows, he has had my cooperation in the past, and we appreciate his cooperation on this effort as well.

This legislation needed to come to the floor, and we needed that type of bipartisan cooperation as well as cooperation with the Members on this side of the aisle and the hard work of the staff of both the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science to ensure that we were able to get this legislation passed in time to prevent what would have been an embarrassment, a major embarrassment, to the United States of America, which would have done irreparable damage to our credibility.

Our space program would have been humiliated by the elimination of America's presence on the International Space Station, having an International Space Station, which we paid for, then to be occupied and controlled by Russians. We have, by this effort today, and by this cooperation, prevented that shortcoming, that humiliation from happening.

But let me note, it was never the intent of the authors of this part of the Iran Nonproliferation Act that we should ever come to a crisis like this. I can say that with certainty, because I was the one who was involved with writing this portion of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. I felt at that time we should have taken care of this issue a long time ago with carrots rather than sticks.

I went to both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration years ago to ask them to offer Russia an alternative to being involved with Iran in terms of building nuclear facilities. The Clinton administration did not act and the Bush administration did not act to prevent this crisis that we are averting right now at the last minute from happening.

Thus, for the record, let us note that, yes, we have averted a crisis; but a long time ago, positive and responsible actions by either the Clinton administration or the Bush administration could have prevented this from happening in a most important way.

Let me note, cooperation with Russia in the space program is not inherently bad. It is something that is inherently good. It places the Russian scientists working on positive programs such as cooperation with America's space program. Israel itself is very involved with the Russians in their space program. Russian rockets launch Israeli satellites. Thus, we know that it is not inherently tied to Iran, the cooperation with Russia in space matters.

But let us make sure that by passing this today we in no way are belittling the argument about the importance of dealing with Iran's development of nuclear weapons. This should be of concern to each and every one of us, and passage of this bill does not lessen that concern whatsoever.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to clarify a confusing or mistaken impression that may have been left by one of my colleagues during the House floor debate on S. 1713, the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005, for which I served as the majority floor manager.

The purpose of enacting S. 1713, as amended by the House, is twofold: to strengthen our nonproliferation tools in dealing with Iran and also Syria, and at the same time enable necessary cooperation between NASA and U.S. businesses with their Russian counterparts on the International Space Station. Just to be clear, in no way does S. 1713 favor our space goals at the expense of effectiveness in nonproliferation. In fact, the time-limited authority we give NASA to purchase, either directly or through U.S. companies, Russian space goods and services, is in my view a net plus for nonproliferation, not a minus.

That said, I want to stress that the legislation the House adopted, and the intent of that legislation, allows NASA significant flexibility in using Russian space goods and services to support the assembly and operation of the International Space Station between now and January 1, 2012. NASA is free to make payments pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement on ISS ``or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related thereto.'' As Chairman Hyde pointed out in his floor statement, this means that after enactment of this legislation, NASA can enter into new arrangements to meet our needs regarding ISS, but that NASA will not enter into new obligations beyond or unrelated to the ISS.

The primary limitations with respect to ISS payments are the sunset date of January 1, 2012, and the existing statutory requirement that the specific Russian entities to be paid have not been sanctioned as proliferators under the earlier sections of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.

I point all of this out because my friend and colleague, Mr. Sherman, mistakenly suggested during the floor debate that the phrase ``necessary to meet United States obligations'' added to the Hyde- Lantos substitute to S. 1713 implies that NASA could not purchase Russian goods or services if any other alternative was available. That is certainly not the plain meaning of the phrase, nor the intent behind it. However, because Mr. Sherman explicitly invited correction, I am doing so here in some detail.

Here are three examples of arrangements that are wholly consistent with the legislative text, the Senate and House floor statements by the architects of this legislation, and the Administration's request for relief, but which would not be allowed under Mr. Sherman's interpretation.

First, NASA has stated it wants to use the Russian Soyuz crew capsule to exchange long-term ISS research crews, even during the time the Space Shuttle is flying, because this will allow the Shuttle astronauts to focus on the job of assembling the Space Station to meet our international partner commitments during the Shuttle's limited remaining lifetime. Under the previously negotiated agreements between our countries, Russia is no longer obligated to provide NASA with Soyuz crew transport seats. Therefore, in this example, NASA would not be paying Russia for an obligation they have promised to us. However, because NASA could theoretically use the Space Shuttle as an alternative to carry out crew transfer, albeit at some risk and a cost to our other ISS commitments, Mr. Sherman's inference would suggest NASA cannot do this. Given that the primary exigency for adopting this legislation is enabling continued U.S. occupation of ISS beyond April of next year, which requires payment for training and launch to ISS of a NASA astronaut on the next Soyuz launch, Mr. Sherman's interpretation is incorrect.

Second, Chairman Hyde's statement explicitly makes clear that cargo resupply services to ISS using technology developed by Russian companies would be legal under the amended Act, again within the limitations I stated above. This would be the case regardless of whether the Space Shuttle might technically be available to deliver cargo to ISS, namely through the middle of 2010.

Third, some bidders may wish to use a very reliable and capable U.S. launch vehicle, one which the Defense Department uses right now to launch critical military satellites, and which happens to incorporate Russian rocket engines. Nothing in this bill was meant to preclude such activities, even though there might be similar launch vehicles which do not use Russian rocket engines. Mr. Hyde's statement makes this clear.

Beyond those examples, I would offer the words of House Science Committee Chairman Boehlert as further disputation of Mr. Sherman's reading. In his floor statement, Chairman Boehlert declares that ``by setting a specific end date for our current relationship with the Russians'' the bill ``encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are not dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future.'' While I may disagree with that goal or a sunset date's effectiveness as a management tool, if Mr. Sherman's reading were true, the sunset date would be superfluous, because once a U.S. provider whose service had no Russian content emerged, NASA would be barred from any further payments, let alone purchases, from companies which do use

some Russian content. Clearly Chairman Boehlert's interpretation is the same as Chairman Hyde's and my own: Russian content is allowed up until the January 1, 2012 date.

Finally, I would just echo the comments made by Chairman Calvert during the floor debate: the ISS program requires long-term flexibility for NASA to safely and cost-effectively execute both for our taxpayers and to meet our international commitments. We are partners with Russia in the Space Station. Both NASA and its commercial providers need to be able to exchange goods and services at ISS with nonproliferation compliant Russian entities for the lifetime of the station, particularly as we seek to engage the U.S. private sector in ISS operations. Last week the House made clear that even in a time of great concern over the manifest threat from Iran, we want NASA and industry to have this ability at least through January 1, 2012.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this amended version of S. 1713.

Let me start by thanking the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) for working so cooperatively with us for so long on this issue, which is of great concern to both of our committees over which both of our committees have jurisdiction. I also want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert), the chairman of our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, who, as always, has helped to keep our eye on the ball and has pressed to make sure we got this done. The gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the gentleman from California's (Mr. Calvert) predecessor, who serves on both committees, played a similarly dogged role. And if one has been exposed to the Rohrabacher machine, they know he is persistent. All of us have cosponsored the bill before us today.

Finally, I want to thank the administration, including NASA and the State Department and the National Security Council, for being willing to consider a variety of approaches, and I want to thank the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon), my ranking Democrat on the Committee on Science, for being a thoughtful participant as we examined different ways to deal with this issue.

The puzzle we had to solve with dealing with the Iran Nonproliferation Act was how to enable the U.S. to continue to man the international space station without reducing our vigilance with regard to nonproliferation. I have been clear all along that, for me, maintaining nonproliferation is a far more important goal than is continuing to have Americans aboard the space station.

But from the point of view of space policy, we had another goal here, too. We wanted to make sure that Russia, or any other foreign nation, could not bring our space program to a screeching halt or whatever the equivalent would be in the vacuum of space. Therefore, we wanted to try to write this bill in a way that would create an incentive for NASA to contract with new suppliers that would not be dependent on foreign technology to get U.S. personnel or supplies to and from the Space Station.

These are all tough goals, goals that have had their critics, goals that create winners and losers, goals that seek to balance competing national needs. And I think with this version of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, we have come as close as anyone possibly could to accomplishing our goals.

The bill enables the U.S. to continue to use the International Space Station unimpeded. The bill, in effect, allows the status quo to continue until 2012, when presumably the U.S. will have access to a new crew exploration vehicle to carry astronauts and commercial firms to move cargo. We will see if the budget enables that to actually happen on that schedule, but it is a plausible position.

The bill encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are not dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future by setting a specific end date for our current relationship with the Russians. And the bill minimizes the harm to the nonproliferation regime by requiring the act to be reviewed again in 2012, by making it clear that no individual entity that violates the act can receive U.S. money and by adding Syria to the countries listed in the act, and, finally, by requiring clear reporting of payments under the act.

The Senate deserves credit for moving all parties toward compromise; and our version, I would say, perfects that compromise by adding Syria and by making it clear that we have a true deadline. Under our bill, no funds can be used in violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act after 2012, even if the funds are made available before 2012 and even if they are made available pursuant to an agreement that existed before that date.

So I think we are where we have to be on this bill in order that we are going to protect the space program while protecting the world from nuclear weapons. These issues are never easy and nonproliferation necessarily involves a lot of guesswork about what is and what is not working; but this is a responsible, thoughtful compromise.

In closing, let me again thank the Members of the Committee on International Relations and their staff, particularly Walker Roberts, for working so cooperatively with us and for continuing to push for tighter, but reasonable, language.

I want to thank our staff on the Committee on Science, particularly Bill Adkins, for ensuring that we always took into account all the implications of the proposed language.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, which incorporates a truly thoughtful and effective compromise.