A bill to permit the televising of Supreme Court proceedings.

Mr. President, I seek recognition to introduce legislation that will give the public greater access to our Supreme Court. This bill requires the high Court to permit television coverage of its open sessions unless it decides by a vote of the majority of Justices that allowing such coverage in a particular case would violate the due process rights of one or more of the parties involved in the matter.

The purpose of this legislation is to open the Supreme Court doors so that more Americans can see the process by which the Court reaches critical decisions of law that affect this country and everyday Americans. Because the Supreme Court of the United States holds power to decide cutting-edge questions on public policy, thereby effectively becoming a virtual ``super legislature,'' the public has a right to know what the Supreme Court is doing. And that right would be substantially enhanced by televising the oral arguments of the Court so that the public can see and hear the issues presented to the Court. With this information, the public would have insight into key issues and be better equipped to understand the impact of the Court's decisions.

In a very fundamental sense, televising the Supreme Court has been implicitly recognized--perhaps even sanctioned--in a 1980 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States entitled Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. In this case, the Supreme Court noted that a public trial belongs not only to the accused, but to the public and the press as well; and that people now acquire information on court procedures chiefly through the print and electronic media.

That decision, in referencing the electronic media, appears to anticipate televising court proceedings, although I do not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court is in agreement with this legislation. I should note that the Court could, on its own motion, televise its proceedings but has chosen not to do so, which presents, in my view, the necessity for legislating on this subject.

When I argued the case of the Navy Yard, Dalton v. Specter, back in 1994, the Court proceedings were illustrated by an artist's drawings. Now, however, the public gets a substantial portion, if not most, of its information from television and the internet. While many court proceedings are broadcast routinely on television, the public has little access to the most important and highest court in this country. The public must either rely on the print media, or stand in long lines outside the Supreme Court in Washington DC in order to get a brief glimpse of the open session from the public gallery.

Justice Felix Frankfurter perhaps anticipated the day when Supreme Court arguments would be televised when he said that he longed for a day when: The news media would cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly as it did the World Series, since the public confidence in the judiciary hinges on the

public's perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media's portrayal of the legal system.

When I spoke in favor of this legislation in September of 2000, I said, ``I do not expect a rush to judgment on this very complex proposition, but I do believe the day will come when the Supreme Court of the United States will be televised. That day will come, and it will be decisively in the public interest so the public will know the magnitude of what the Court is deciding and its role in our democratic process.'' Today, I believe the time has come and that this legislation is crucial to the public's awareness of Supreme Court proceedings and their impact on the daily lives of all Americans.

I pause to note that it was not until 1955 that the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, first began permitting audio recordings of oral arguments. Between 1955 and 1993, there were apparently over 5,000 recorded arguments before the Supreme Court. That roughly translates to an average of about one hundred thirty two (132) arguments annually. But audio recordings are simply ill suited to capture the nuance of oral arguments and the sustained attention of the American citizenry. Nor is it any response that people who wish to see open sessions of the Supreme Court should come to the Capital and attend oral arguments. For, according to one source: Several million people each year visit Washington, D.C., and many thousands tour the White House and the Capital. But few have the chance to sit in the Supreme Court chamber and witness an entire oral argument. Most tourists are given just three minutes before they are shuttled out and a new group shuttled in. In cases that attract headlines, seats for the public are scarce and waiting lines are long. And the Court sits in open session less than two hundred hours each year. Television cameras and radio microphones are still banned from the chamber, and only a few hundred people at most can actually witness oral arguments. Protected by a marble wall from public access, the Supreme Court has long been the least understood of the three branches of our federal government.

In light of the increasing public desire for information, it seems untenable to continue excluding cameras from the courtroom of the Nation's highest court. As one legal commentator observes: An effective and legitimate way to satisfy America's curiosity about the Supreme Court's holdings, Justices, and modus operandi is to permit broadcast coverage of oral arguments and decision announcements from the courtroom itself.

Televised court proceedings better enable the public to understand the role of the Supreme Court and its impact on the key decisions of the day. Not only has the Supreme Court invalidated Congressional decisions where there is, in the views of many, simply a difference of opinion to what is preferable public policy, but the Court determines novel issues such as whether AIDS is a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, whether Congress can ban obscenity from the Internet, and whether states can impose term limits upon members of Congress. The current Court, like its predecessors, hands down decisions which vitally affect the lives of all Americans. Since the Court's historic 1803 decision, Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has the final authority on issues of enormous importance from birth to death. In Roe v. Wade (1973), the Court affirmed a Constitutional right to abortion in this country and struck down state statutes banning or severely restricting abortion during the first two trimesters on the grounds that they violated a right to privacy inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the court refused to create a similar right to assisted suicide. Here the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not recognize a liberty interest that includes a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.

In the seventies, the Court first struck down then upheld state statutes imposing the death penalty for certain crimes. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Court struck down Georgia's death penalty statute under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and stated that no death penalty law could pass constitutional muster unless it took aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account. This decision led Georgia and many states to amend their death penalty statutes and, four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's amended death penalty statute.

Over the years, the Court has also played a major role in issues of war and peace. In its opinion in Scott v. Sanford (1857)--better known as the Dredd Scott decision--the Supreme Court held that Dredd Scott, a slave who had been taken into ``free'' territory by his owner, was nevertheless still a slave. The Court further held that Congress lacked the power to abolish slavery in certain territories, thereby invalidating the careful balance that had been worked out between the North and the South on the issue. Historians have noted that this opinion fanned the flames that led to the Civil War.

The Supreme Court has also ensured adherence to the Constitution during more recent conflicts. Prominent opponents of the Vietnam War repeatedly petitioned the Court to declare the Presidential action unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had never given the President a declaration of war. The Court decided to leave this conflict in the political arena and repeatedly refused to grant writs of certiorari to hear these cases. This prompted Justice Douglas, sometimes accompanied by Justices Stewart and Harlan, to take the unusual step of writing lengthy dissents to the denials of cert.

In New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)--the so called ``Pentagon Papers'' case--the Court refused to grant the government prior restraint to prevent the New York Times from publishing leaked Defense Department documents which revealed damaging information about the Johnson Administration and the war effort. The publication of these documents by the New York Times is believed to have helped move public opinion against the war.

In its landmark civil rights opinions, the Supreme Court took the lead in effecting needed social change, helping us to address fundamental questions about our society in the courts rather than in the streets. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court struck down the principle of ``separate but equal'' education for blacks and whites and integrated public education in this country. This case was then followed by a series of civil rights cases which enforced the concept of integration and full equality for all citizens of this country, including Garner v. Louisiana, 1961, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 1961, and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 1963.

In recent years Marbury, Dred Scott, Furman, New York Times, and Roe, familiar names in the lexicon of lawyerly discussions concerning watershed Supreme Court precedents, have been joined with similarly important cases like Hamdi, Rasul and Roper all cases that affect fundamental individual rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004, the Court concluded that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The Court reaffirmed the nation's commitment to constitutional principles even during times of war and uncertainty. Similarly, in Rasul v. Bush, 2004, the Court held that the federal habeas statute gave district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the U.S. War on Terrorism. Earlier this year in Roper v. Simmons, 2005, the Court held that executions of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In June of this year, the Supreme Court issued Kelo v. City of New London, 2005, a highly controversial opinion in which a majority of the justices held that a city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan satisfied the Constitution's Fifth Amendment ``public use'' requirement despite the absence of any blight. Moreover, on June 27, 2005, the High Court issued two rulings regarding the public display of the Ten Commandments. Each opinion was backed by a different coalition of four, with Justice Breyer as the swing vote.

The only discernible rule seems to be that the Ten Commandments may be displayed outside a public courthouse, Van Orden v. Perry, but not inside (McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union) and may be displayed with other documents, but not alone. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Supreme Court permitted a display of the Ten Commandments to remain on the grounds outside the Texas State Capitol. However, in McCreary County v. ACLU, a bare majority of Supreme Court Justices ruled that two Kentucky counties violated the Establishment Clause by erecting displays of the Ten Commandments indoors for the purpose of advancing religion. While the multiple concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases serve to explain some of the confounding differences in outcomes, it would have been extraordinarily fruitful for the American public to watch the Justices as they grappled with these issues during oral arguments that, presumably, reveal much more of their deliberative processes than mere text.

Irrespective of ones view concerning the merits of these decisions, it is clear beyond cavil that they have a profound effect on the interplay between the government, on the one hand, and the individual on the other. So, it is with these watershed decisions in mind that I introduce legislation designed to make the Supreme Court less esoteric and more accessible to common men and women who are so clearly affected by its decisions.

When deciding issues of such great national import, the Supreme Court is rarely unanimous. In fact, a large number of seminal Supreme Court decisions have been reached through a vote of 5-4. Such a close margin reveals that these decisions are far from foregone conclusions distilled from the meaning of the Constitution and legal precedents. On the contrary, these major Supreme Court opinions embody critical decisions reached on the basis of the preferences and views of each individual justice. In a case that is decided by a vote of 5-4, an individual justice has the power by his or her vote to change the law of the land.

Some would argue that the Court has even played a significant role in deciding political contests as well. Who can forget the Court's dramatic decision in Bush v. Gore that enabled the country to move on from a bitterly fought presidential race. That decision, with its enormous repercussions for the Nation, cried out for greater public scrutiny of the process by which the Justices heard arguments and all but decided the fate of the 2000 presidential race.

Given the enormous significance of each vote cast by each Justice on the Supreme Court, televising the proceedings of the Supreme Court will allow sunlight to shine brightly on these proceedings and ensure greater public awareness and scrutiny.

In a democracy, the workings of the government at all levels should be open to public view. With respect to oral arguments, the more openness and the more real the opportunity for public observation the greater the understanding and trust. As the Supreme Court observed in the 1986 case of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, ``People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.''

It was in this spirit that the House of Representatives opened its deliberations to meaningful public observation by allowing C-SPAN to begin televising debates in the House chamber in 1979. The Senate followed the House's lead in 1986 by voting to allow television coverage of the Senate floor.

Beyond this general policy preference for openness, however, there is a strong argument that the Constitution requires that television cameras be permitted in the Supreme Court.

It is well established that the Constitution guarantees access to judicial proceedings to the press and the public. In 1980, the Supreme Court relied on this tradition when it held in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that the right of a public trial belongs not just to the accused, but to the public and the press as well. The Court noted that such openness has ``long been recognized as an indisputable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.''

Recognizing that in modern society most people cannot physically attend trials, the Court specifically addressed the need for access by members of the media: Instead of acquiring information about trials by first hand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of acting as surrogates for the public. [Media presence] contributes to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system.

To be sure, a strong argument can be made that forbidding television cameras in the court, while permitting access to print and other media, constitutes an impermissible discrimination against one type of media over another. In recent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly held that differential treatment of different media is impermissible under the First Amendment absent an overriding governmental interest. For example, in 1983 the Court invalidated discriminatory tax schemes imposed only upon certain types of media in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue. In the 1977 case of ABC v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit rejected the contention by the two candidates for mayor of New York that they could exclude some members of the media from their campaign headquarters by providing access through invitation only. The Court wrote that: Once there is a public function, public comment, and participation by some of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be tenable.

In the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the denial of television coverage of trials violates the equal protection clause. In the same opinion, the Court held that the presence of television cameras in the Court had violated a Texas defendant's right to due process. Subsequent opinions have cast serious doubt upon the continuing relevance of both prongs of the Estes opinion.

In its 1981 opinion in Chandler v. Florida, the court recognized that Estes must be read narrowly in light of the state of television technology at that time. The television coverage of Estes' 1962 trial required cumbersome equipment, numerous additional microphones, yards of new cables, distracting lighting, and numerous technicians present in the courtroom. In contrast, the court noted, television coverage in 1980 can be achieved through the presence of one or two discreetly placed cameras without making any perceptible change in the atmosphere of the courtroom. Accordingly, the Court held that, despite Estes, the presence of television cameras in a Florida trial was not a violation of the rights of the defendants in that case. By the same logic, the holding in Estes that exclusion of television cameras from the courts did not violate the equal protection clause must be revisited in light of the dramatically different nature of television coverage today.

Given the strength of these arguments, it is not surprising that over the last two decades there has been a rapidly growing acceptance of cameras in American courtrooms which has reached almost every court except for the Supreme Court itself. Ironically, it was the Chandler decision which helped spur the spread of television cameras in the courts. Shortly after Chandler, the American Bar Association revised its canons to permit judges to authorize televising civil and criminal proceedings in their courts.

Following the green lights provided by the Supreme Court and the ABA, nearly all the States have decided to permit electronic coverage of at least some portion of their judicial proceedings. In 1990, the Federal Judicial Conference authorized a three-year pilot program allowing television coverage of civil proceedings in six federal district courts and two federal circuit courts. The program began in July, 1991, and ran through December 31, 1994. The Federal Judicial Center monitored the program and issued a positive final evaluation. In particular, the Judicial Center concluded that: Overall, attitudes of judges toward electronic media coverage of civil proceedings were initially neutral and became more favorable after experience under the pilot program.

The Judicial Center also concluded that: Judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media coverage under the program generally reported observing small or no effects of camera presence on participants in the proceedings, courtroom decorum, or the administration of justice.

Despite this positive evaluation, the Judicial Conference voted in September 1994, to end the experiment and not to extend the camera coverage to all courts. This decision was made in the aftermath of the initial burst of television coverage of O.J. Simpson's pretrial hearing. Some have argued that the decision was unduly influenced by this outside event. In March 1996, the Judicial Conference revisited the issue of television cameras in the federal courts and voted to permit each Federal court of appeals to ``decide for itself whether to permit the taking of photographs and radio and television coverage of appellate arguments.'' Since that time, two circuit courts have enacted rules permitting television coverage of their arguments. It is significant to note that these two circuits were the two circuits which participated in the federal experiment with television cameras a few years earlier. It seems that once judges have an experience with cameras in their courtroom, they no longer oppose the idea.

On September 6, 2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts held a hearing titled ``Allowing Cameras and Electronic Media in the Courtroom.'' The primary focus of the hearing was Senate bill S. 721, legislation introduced by Senators Grassley and Schumer that would give Federal judges the discretion to allow television coverage of court proceedings. One of the witnesses at the hearing, Judge Edward Becker, Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, spoke in opposition to the legislation and the presence of television cameras in the courtroom. The remaining five witnesses, however, including a Federal judge, a State judge, a law professor and other legal experts, all testified in favor of the legislation. They argued that cameras in the courts would not disrupt proceedings but would provide the kind of accountability and access that is fundamental to our system of government.

In my judgment, Congress, with the concurrence of the President, or overriding his veto, has the authority to require the Supreme Court to televise its proceedings. Such a conclusion is not free from doubt and is highly likely to be tested with the Supreme Court, as usual, having the final word. As I see it, there is clearly no constitutional prohibition against such legislation.

Article 3 of the Constitution states that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested ``in one Supreme Court and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'' While the Constitution specifically creates the Supreme Court, it left it to Congress to determine how the Court would operate. For example, it was Congress that fixed the number of justices on the Supreme Court at nine. Likewise, it was Congress that decided that any six of these justices are sufficient to constitute a quorum of the Court. It was Congress that decided that the term of the Court shall commence on the first Monday in October of each year, and it was Congress that determined the procedures to be followed whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of his office.

Beyond such basic structural and operational matters, Congress also controls more substantive aspects of the Supreme Court. Most importantly, it is Congress that in effect determines the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Although the Constitution itself sets out the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, it provides that such jurisdiction exist ``with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.'' In the early days of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Durousseau v. United States, recognized that the power to make exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction is the equivalent of the power to grant jurisdiction, since exceptions can be ``implied from the intent manifested by the affirmative description [of jurisdiction].''

The Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to control its appellate jurisdiction in a dramatic way in the famous 1868 case of Ex Parte McCardle. In this case, McCardle, a newspaper editor, was being held in custody by the military for trial on charges stemming from the publication of articles alleged to be libelous and incendiary. McCardle petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court heard his case but, before it rendered its opinion, Congress repealed the statute that gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the habeas appeal. In light of this Congressional action, the Supreme Court felt compelled to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Some objections have been raised to televised proceedings of the Supreme Court on the ground that it would subject justices to undue security risks. My own view is such concerns are vastly overstated. Well-known members of Congress, walk on a regular basis in public view in the Capitol complex. Other very well-known personalities, presidents, vice presidents, cabinet officers, all are on public view with even incumbent presidents exposed to risks as they mingle with the public. Such risks are minimal in my view given the relatively minor exposure that Supreme Court justices would undertake through television appearances.

As I explained earlier, the Supreme Court could, of course, permit television through its own rule but has decided not to do so. Congress should be circumspect and even hesitant to impose a rule mandating the televising of Supreme Court proceedings and should do so only in the face of compelling public policy reasons. The Supreme Court has such a dominant role in key decision-making functions that their proceedings ought to be better known to the public; and, in the absence of Court rule, public policy would be best served by enactment of legislation requiring the televising of Supreme Court proceedings.

This legislation embodies sound policy and will prove valuable to the public. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objective, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. President, I seek recognition to introduce legislation that will give the public greater access to our Supreme Court. This bill requires the high Court to permit television coverage of its open sessions unless it decides by a vote of the majority of Justices that allowing such coverage in a particular case would violate the due process rights of one or more of the parties involved in the matter.

The purpose of this legislation is to open the Supreme Court doors so that more Americans can see the process by which the Court reaches critical decisions of law that affect this country and everyday Americans. Because the Supreme Court of the United States holds power to decide cutting-edge questions on public policy, thereby effectively becoming a virtual ``super legislature,'' the public has a right to know what the Supreme Court is doing. And that right would be substantially enhanced by televising the oral arguments of the Court so that the public can see and hear the issues presented to the Court. With this information, the public would have insight into key issues and be better equipped to understand the impact of the Court's decisions.

In a very fundamental sense, televising the Supreme Court has been implicitly recognized--perhaps even sanctioned--in a 1980 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States entitled Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. In this case, the Supreme Court noted that a public trial belongs not only to the accused, but to the public and the press as well; and that people now acquire information on court procedures chiefly through the print and electronic media.

That decision, in referencing the electronic media, appears to anticipate televising court proceedings, although I do not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court is in agreement with this legislation. I should note that the Court could, on its own motion, televise its proceedings but has chosen not to do so, which presents, in my view, the necessity for legislating on this subject.

When I argued the case of the Navy Yard, Dalton v. Specter, back in 1994, the Court proceedings were illustrated by an artist's drawings. Now, however, the public gets a substantial portion, if not most, of its information from television and the internet. While many court proceedings are broadcast routinely on television, the public has little access to the most important and highest court in this country. The public must either rely on the print media, or stand in long lines outside the Supreme Court in Washington DC in order to get a brief glimpse of the open session from the public gallery.

Justice Felix Frankfurter perhaps anticipated the day when Supreme Court arguments would be televised when he said that he longed for a day when: The news media would cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly as it did the World Series, since the public confidence in the judiciary hinges on the

public's perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media's portrayal of the legal system.

When I spoke in favor of this legislation in September of 2000, I said, ``I do not expect a rush to judgment on this very complex proposition, but I do believe the day will come when the Supreme Court of the United States will be televised. That day will come, and it will be decisively in the public interest so the public will know the magnitude of what the Court is deciding and its role in our democratic process.'' Today, I believe the time has come and that this legislation is crucial to the public's awareness of Supreme Court proceedings and their impact on the daily lives of all Americans.

I pause to note that it was not until 1955 that the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, first began permitting audio recordings of oral arguments. Between 1955 and 1993, there were apparently over 5,000 recorded arguments before the Supreme Court. That roughly translates to an average of about one hundred thirty two (132) arguments annually. But audio recordings are simply ill suited to capture the nuance of oral arguments and the sustained attention of the American citizenry. Nor is it any response that people who wish to see open sessions of the Supreme Court should come to the Capital and attend oral arguments. For, according to one source: Several million people each year visit Washington, D.C., and many thousands tour the White House and the Capital. But few have the chance to sit in the Supreme Court chamber and witness an entire oral argument. Most tourists are given just three minutes before they are shuttled out and a new group shuttled in. In cases that attract headlines, seats for the public are scarce and waiting lines are long. And the Court sits in open session less than two hundred hours each year. Television cameras and radio microphones are still banned from the chamber, and only a few hundred people at most can actually witness oral arguments. Protected by a marble wall from public access, the Supreme Court has long been the least understood of the three branches of our federal government.

In light of the increasing public desire for information, it seems untenable to continue excluding cameras from the courtroom of the Nation's highest court. As one legal commentator observes: An effective and legitimate way to satisfy America's curiosity about the Supreme Court's holdings, Justices, and modus operandi is to permit broadcast coverage of oral arguments and decision announcements from the courtroom itself.

Televised court proceedings better enable the public to understand the role of the Supreme Court and its impact on the key decisions of the day. Not only has the Supreme Court invalidated Congressional decisions where there is, in the views of many, simply a difference of opinion to what is preferable public policy, but the Court determines novel issues such as whether AIDS is a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, whether Congress can ban obscenity from the Internet, and whether states can impose term limits upon members of Congress. The current Court, like its predecessors, hands down decisions which vitally affect the lives of all Americans. Since the Court's historic 1803 decision, Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has the final authority on issues of enormous importance from birth to death. In Roe v. Wade (1973), the Court affirmed a Constitutional right to abortion in this country and struck down state statutes banning or severely restricting abortion during the first two trimesters on the grounds that they violated a right to privacy inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the court refused to create a similar right to assisted suicide. Here the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not recognize a liberty interest that includes a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.

In the seventies, the Court first struck down then upheld state statutes imposing the death penalty for certain crimes. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Court struck down Georgia's death penalty statute under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and stated that no death penalty law could pass constitutional muster unless it took aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account. This decision led Georgia and many states to amend their death penalty statutes and, four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's amended death penalty statute.

Over the years, the Court has also played a major role in issues of war and peace. In its opinion in Scott v. Sanford (1857)--better known as the Dredd Scott decision--the Supreme Court held that Dredd Scott, a slave who had been taken into ``free'' territory by his owner, was nevertheless still a slave. The Court further held that Congress lacked the power to abolish slavery in certain territories, thereby invalidating the careful balance that had been worked out between the North and the South on the issue. Historians have noted that this opinion fanned the flames that led to the Civil War.

The Supreme Court has also ensured adherence to the Constitution during more recent conflicts. Prominent opponents of the Vietnam War repeatedly petitioned the Court to declare the Presidential action unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had never given the President a declaration of war. The Court decided to leave this conflict in the political arena and repeatedly refused to grant writs of certiorari to hear these cases. This prompted Justice Douglas, sometimes accompanied by Justices Stewart and Harlan, to take the unusual step of writing lengthy dissents to the denials of cert.

In New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)--the so called ``Pentagon Papers'' case--the Court refused to grant the government prior restraint to prevent the New York Times from publishing leaked Defense Department documents which revealed damaging information about the Johnson Administration and the war effort. The publication of these documents by the New York Times is believed to have helped move public opinion against the war.

In its landmark civil rights opinions, the Supreme Court took the lead in effecting needed social change, helping us to address fundamental questions about our society in the courts rather than in the streets. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court struck down the principle of ``separate but equal'' education for blacks and whites and integrated public education in this country. This case was then followed by a series of civil rights cases which enforced the concept of integration and full equality for all citizens of this country, including Garner v. Louisiana, 1961, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 1961, and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 1963.

In recent years Marbury, Dred Scott, Furman, New York Times, and Roe, familiar names in the lexicon of lawyerly discussions concerning watershed Supreme Court precedents, have been joined with similarly important cases like Hamdi, Rasul and Roper all cases that affect fundamental individual rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004, the Court concluded that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The Court reaffirmed the nation's commitment to constitutional principles even during times of war and uncertainty. Similarly, in Rasul v. Bush, 2004, the Court held that the federal habeas statute gave district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the U.S. War on Terrorism. Earlier this year in Roper v. Simmons, 2005, the Court held that executions of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In June of this year, the Supreme Court issued Kelo v. City of New London, 2005, a highly controversial opinion in which a majority of the justices held that a city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan satisfied the Constitution's Fifth Amendment ``public use'' requirement despite the absence of any blight. Moreover, on June 27, 2005, the High Court issued two rulings regarding the public display of the Ten Commandments. Each opinion was backed by a different coalition of four, with Justice Breyer as the swing vote.

The only discernible rule seems to be that the Ten Commandments may be displayed outside a public courthouse, Van Orden v. Perry, but not inside (McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union) and may be displayed with other documents, but not alone. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Supreme Court permitted a display of the Ten Commandments to remain on the grounds outside the Texas State Capitol. However, in McCreary County v. ACLU, a bare majority of Supreme Court Justices ruled that two Kentucky counties violated the Establishment Clause by erecting displays of the Ten Commandments indoors for the purpose of advancing religion. While the multiple concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases serve to explain some of the confounding differences in outcomes, it would have been extraordinarily fruitful for the American public to watch the Justices as they grappled with these issues during oral arguments that, presumably, reveal much more of their deliberative processes than mere text.

Irrespective of ones view concerning the merits of these decisions, it is clear beyond cavil that they have a profound effect on the interplay between the government, on the one hand, and the individual on the other. So, it is with these watershed decisions in mind that I introduce legislation designed to make the Supreme Court less esoteric and more accessible to common men and women who are so clearly affected by its decisions.

When deciding issues of such great national import, the Supreme Court is rarely unanimous. In fact, a large number of seminal Supreme Court decisions have been reached through a vote of 5-4. Such a close margin reveals that these decisions are far from foregone conclusions distilled from the meaning of the Constitution and legal precedents. On the contrary, these major Supreme Court opinions embody critical decisions reached on the basis of the preferences and views of each individual justice. In a case that is decided by a vote of 5-4, an individual justice has the power by his or her vote to change the law of the land.

Some would argue that the Court has even played a significant role in deciding political contests as well. Who can forget the Court's dramatic decision in Bush v. Gore that enabled the country to move on from a bitterly fought presidential race. That decision, with its enormous repercussions for the Nation, cried out for greater public scrutiny of the process by which the Justices heard arguments and all but decided the fate of the 2000 presidential race.

Given the enormous significance of each vote cast by each Justice on the Supreme Court, televising the proceedings of the Supreme Court will allow sunlight to shine brightly on these proceedings and ensure greater public awareness and scrutiny.

In a democracy, the workings of the government at all levels should be open to public view. With respect to oral arguments, the more openness and the more real the opportunity for public observation the greater the understanding and trust. As the Supreme Court observed in the 1986 case of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, ``People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.''

It was in this spirit that the House of Representatives opened its deliberations to meaningful public observation by allowing C-SPAN to begin televising debates in the House chamber in 1979. The Senate followed the House's lead in 1986 by voting to allow television coverage of the Senate floor.

Beyond this general policy preference for openness, however, there is a strong argument that the Constitution requires that television cameras be permitted in the Supreme Court.

It is well established that the Constitution guarantees access to judicial proceedings to the press and the public. In 1980, the Supreme Court relied on this tradition when it held in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that the right of a public trial belongs not just to the accused, but to the public and the press as well. The Court noted that such openness has ``long been recognized as an indisputable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.''

Recognizing that in modern society most people cannot physically attend trials, the Court specifically addressed the need for access by members of the media: Instead of acquiring information about trials by first hand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of acting as surrogates for the public. [Media presence] contributes to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system.

To be sure, a strong argument can be made that forbidding television cameras in the court, while permitting access to print and other media, constitutes an impermissible discrimination against one type of media over another. In recent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly held that differential treatment of different media is impermissible under the First Amendment absent an overriding governmental interest. For example, in 1983 the Court invalidated discriminatory tax schemes imposed only upon certain types of media in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue. In the 1977 case of ABC v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit rejected the contention by the two candidates for mayor of New York that they could exclude some members of the media from their campaign headquarters by providing access through invitation only. The Court wrote that: Once there is a public function, public comment, and participation by some of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be tenable.

In the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the denial of television coverage of trials violates the equal protection clause. In the same opinion, the Court held that the presence of television cameras in the Court had violated a Texas defendant's right to due process. Subsequent opinions have cast serious doubt upon the continuing relevance of both prongs of the Estes opinion.

In its 1981 opinion in Chandler v. Florida, the court recognized that Estes must be read narrowly in light of the state of television technology at that time. The television coverage of Estes' 1962 trial required cumbersome equipment, numerous additional microphones, yards of new cables, distracting lighting, and numerous technicians present in the courtroom. In contrast, the court noted, television coverage in 1980 can be achieved through the presence of one or two discreetly placed cameras without making any perceptible change in the atmosphere of the courtroom. Accordingly, the Court held that, despite Estes, the presence of television cameras in a Florida trial was not a violation of the rights of the defendants in that case. By the same logic, the holding in Estes that exclusion of television cameras from the courts did not violate the equal protection clause must be revisited in light of the dramatically different nature of television coverage today.

Given the strength of these arguments, it is not surprising that over the last two decades there has been a rapidly growing acceptance of cameras in American courtrooms which has reached almost every court except for the Supreme Court itself. Ironically, it was the Chandler decision which helped spur the spread of television cameras in the courts. Shortly after Chandler, the American Bar Association revised its canons to permit judges to authorize televising civil and criminal proceedings in their courts.

Following the green lights provided by the Supreme Court and the ABA, nearly all the States have decided to permit electronic coverage of at least some portion of their judicial proceedings. In 1990, the Federal Judicial Conference authorized a three-year pilot program allowing television coverage of civil proceedings in six federal district courts and two federal circuit courts. The program began in July, 1991, and ran through December 31, 1994. The Federal Judicial Center monitored the program and issued a positive final evaluation. In particular, the Judicial Center concluded that: Overall, attitudes of judges toward electronic media coverage of civil proceedings were initially neutral and became more favorable after experience under the pilot program.

The Judicial Center also concluded that: Judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media coverage under the program generally reported observing small or no effects of camera presence on participants in the proceedings, courtroom decorum, or the administration of justice.

Despite this positive evaluation, the Judicial Conference voted in September 1994, to end the experiment and not to extend the camera coverage to all courts. This decision was made in the aftermath of the initial burst of television coverage of O.J. Simpson's pretrial hearing. Some have argued that the decision was unduly influenced by this outside event. In March 1996, the Judicial Conference revisited the issue of television cameras in the federal courts and voted to permit each Federal court of appeals to ``decide for itself whether to permit the taking of photographs and radio and television coverage of appellate arguments.'' Since that time, two circuit courts have enacted rules permitting television coverage of their arguments. It is significant to note that these two circuits were the two circuits which participated in the federal experiment with television cameras a few years earlier. It seems that once judges have an experience with cameras in their courtroom, they no longer oppose the idea.

On September 6, 2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts held a hearing titled ``Allowing Cameras and Electronic Media in the Courtroom.'' The primary focus of the hearing was Senate bill S. 721, legislation introduced by Senators Grassley and Schumer that would give Federal judges the discretion to allow television coverage of court proceedings. One of the witnesses at the hearing, Judge Edward Becker, Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, spoke in opposition to the legislation and the presence of television cameras in the courtroom. The remaining five witnesses, however, including a Federal judge, a State judge, a law professor and other legal experts, all testified in favor of the legislation. They argued that cameras in the courts would not disrupt proceedings but would provide the kind of accountability and access that is fundamental to our system of government.

In my judgment, Congress, with the concurrence of the President, or overriding his veto, has the authority to require the Supreme Court to televise its proceedings. Such a conclusion is not free from doubt and is highly likely to be tested with the Supreme Court, as usual, having the final word. As I see it, there is clearly no constitutional prohibition against such legislation.

Article 3 of the Constitution states that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested ``in one Supreme Court and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'' While the Constitution specifically creates the Supreme Court, it left it to Congress to determine how the Court would operate. For example, it was Congress that fixed the number of justices on the Supreme Court at nine. Likewise, it was Congress that decided that any six of these justices are sufficient to constitute a quorum of the Court. It was Congress that decided that the term of the Court shall commence on the first Monday in October of each year, and it was Congress that determined the procedures to be followed whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of his office.

Beyond such basic structural and operational matters, Congress also controls more substantive aspects of the Supreme Court. Most importantly, it is Congress that in effect determines the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Although the Constitution itself sets out the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, it provides that such jurisdiction exist ``with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.'' In the early days of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Durousseau v. United States, recognized that the power to make exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction is the equivalent of the power to grant jurisdiction, since exceptions can be ``implied from the intent manifested by the affirmative description [of jurisdiction].''

The Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to control its appellate jurisdiction in a dramatic way in the famous 1868 case of Ex Parte McCardle. In this case, McCardle, a newspaper editor, was being held in custody by the military for trial on charges stemming from the publication of articles alleged to be libelous and incendiary. McCardle petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court heard his case but, before it rendered its opinion, Congress repealed the statute that gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the habeas appeal. In light of this Congressional action, the Supreme Court felt compelled to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Some objections have been raised to televised proceedings of the Supreme Court on the ground that it would subject justices to undue security risks. My own view is such concerns are vastly overstated. Well-known members of Congress, walk on a regular basis in public view in the Capitol complex. Other very well-known personalities, presidents, vice presidents, cabinet officers, all are on public view with even incumbent presidents exposed to risks as they mingle with the public. Such risks are minimal in my view given the relatively minor exposure that Supreme Court justices would undertake through television appearances.

As I explained earlier, the Supreme Court could, of course, permit television through its own rule but has decided not to do so. Congress should be circumspect and even hesitant to impose a rule mandating the televising of Supreme Court proceedings and should do so only in the face of compelling public policy reasons. The Supreme Court has such a dominant role in key decision-making functions that their proceedings ought to be better known to the public; and, in the absence of Court rule, public policy would be best served by enactment of legislation requiring the televising of Supreme Court proceedings.

This legislation embodies sound policy and will prove valuable to the public. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objective, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill to provide solutions to the health care challenges wrought by Hurricane Katrina. As chairman of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, I am proud to be joined by my friend Senator Kennedy, the ranking minority member of the committee, in introducing this legislation. I am also honored that several fellow committee members are sponsoring this bill as well, including Senators Alexander, Dodd, Burr, Mikulski, DeWine, and Clinton. This bill is truly committee product in the best sense of the term.

We are introducing this legislation in response to the information that has been shared with us from a variety of sources. Some of the provisions of this bill were added as a result of the testimony that we received during a roundtable discussion before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. Others spring from the suggestions that were forwarded to us or were posted on our committee's Web site. Others came from our discussions with local, State and Federal officials who shared their firsthand knowledge and experience with us. Still others were added as a result of our visit to the area. This legislation will not accomplish everything that must be done, but it will provide another valuable step in the effort to provide a comprehensive package to address the needs of those whose lives were forever changed by the wrath of Hurricane Katrina.

Just a few days ago, several of my colleagues and I traveled to the New Orleans area to see the damage that was done by the storm for ourselves. I don't think any of us were fully prepared for what we saw. As startling as the images were that we had seen in the paper and on television, they didn't fully portray what had happened and the reality that confronted us on the ground. The devastation that the storm had brought to the lives of those who lived there was readily apparent. It was a tragedy that was even worse than any of us had thought was possible. It will not be easy to use the limited resources we have at our disposal to meet the almost unlimited need, but we are all determined to try.

Nationwide, there are people from the gulf coast region spread throughout the country who have had to rely on the kindness and goodwill of people they have never met before. Wyoming and so many other States have welcomed these people with open arms and open hearts. Seeing so many Americans, from all walks of life, respond as they have and reach out to other Americans in need, gives me a clearer picture than I have ever seen before of what is right with America. It is a scene that gives me confidence that we will be able to rebuild what was lost and breathe new life into the communities that were devastated by the storm.

Now, here in Congress, we will continue to do our part, and one of the most important things we can do is to assure mothers and fathers all over the country that the health care needs of their family will be met, that they will not have to go without or navigate through a complex bureaucracy to get the care they need, and that their Federal Government has the necessary authority to respond to this crisis.

The Public Health and Health Insurance Emergency Response Act of 2005 will strengthen and improve America's ability to address the ongoing public health and mental health needs faced by the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by Hurricane Katrina. It will also help those evacuees and their employers continue to afford their health insurance premiums as they put their lives and their businesses back together.

As we know, the public health emergency created by Hurricane Katrina will take months to resolve. That means we need to cut whatever Federal redtape might stand in the way of a long-term public health recovery effort.

In this legislation, therefore, we strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive laws that hinder the fullest possible response to a major disaster like Hurricane Katrina. These laws include vaccination eligibility laws and requirements related to State and local matching funds, as well laws that limit the Secretary's flexibility in designating health professional shortage areas.

To ensure a comprehensive public health response in the months ahead, this critical legislation facilitates long-term Federal-State cooperation and coordination in a public health emergency, and assists with expanding and strengthening the health care safety net by increasing access to and resources for sites at which people displaced by Hurricane Katrina can receive primary and preventive care. It ensures immediate availability of mental health funding in the event of major disasters by directing special emergency mental health funding to affected areas, and directs additional outreach and assistance to individuals with disabilities, including funds to States during an emergency to ensure that individuals with disabilities have access to advocacy and support services.

Additionally, the bill we are introducing today clarifies appropriate protocols for emergency response by requiring additional data collection and analysis for use in this and future responses to major disasters.

Finally, my committee has also worked diligently to create a solution to another crisis created by Hurricane Katrina. This devastating natural disaster has changed lives and disrupted businesses all across the gulf coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Families and employers are going to need our help getting the basic necessities of food, water, shelter, and clothing while they decide how to move forward and rebuild their lives and livelihoods.

Hundreds of thousands of the gulf coast evacuees have health insurance that they purchased on their own or that their employer provided and funded. Many of these people are now without a job, and many of these businesses are hanging on as they clean up and wait for their customers to return to the region. Some people have lost almost everything they owned, and now

they are in danger of losing their health insurance if they can't pay their premiums.

Congress can and will help them. The bill we are introducing will provide short-term premium relief to people displaced by Hurricane Katrina so they can keep their private health insurance.

Under this bill, the Department of Health and Human Services, in consultation with State insurance commissioners, will administer a program to provide 3 months of health insurance premium relief to individuals who have purchased their own policies, and to small businesses and their employees. Such individuals and businesses will be eligible if, as of the date of the hurricane, they held health insurance in counties federally designated major disaster areas and their ability to pay premiums has been severely disrupted. Enrollment in the program will occur automatically upon either nonpayment of premiums or if communication to an insurer or policyholder indicates distress.

To facilitate swift enrollment, there is no prospective application process. However, the program does provide for a retrospective randomized audit process, whereby HHS may retroactively seek collection of premium assistance if such assistance was made in error.

To complete this short-term protection for those individuals and businesses affected by Hurricane Katrina, the bill will prohibit insurers from canceling policies or raising rates during the 3-month emergency period.

The Public Health and Health Insurance Emergency Response Act of 2005 will provide immediate health insurance premium relief for individuals and businesses affected by Hurricane Katrina, and provide the Federal Government the authority it needs to respond effectively to the public health needs of people displaced by this terrible disaster.

After we pass this bill, our work in response to Hurricane Katrina is not over. This is our emergency response. In the upcoming months, working with Senator Burr, the chairman of our Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, and my other committee colleagues, I want to examine fully our preparedness and response capabilities as they relate to public health, mental health, and health care. I also want to focus on how best to rebuild the critical health care and public health infrastructure that was destroyed as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

These are some of the long-term challenges we must tackle. But in the short term, we must address the immediate needs and emergent challenges imposed by Hurricane Katrina. I urge my colleagues to join me as sponsors of the Public Health and Health Insurance Emergency Response Act of 2005, and I look forward to seeing the Senate pass this bill in the very near future.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce The Katrina Worker Safety and Filing Flexibility Act of 2005.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina we face a nearly unprecedented recovery and reconstruction process along our Gulf Coast. This is a challenge that we will meet. We are a people that always act with strength and purposefulness when circumstances such as this demand.

While we undertake this massive effort, we must bear in mind the safety of the men and women who will be on the front lines of recovery and reconstruction. These individuals will face numerous and uncommon worksite hazards; and ones with which they will have little training and experience.

To address this situation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has deployed its safety and health professionals to the affected areas to provide necessary technical assistance. Their efforts in this regard are being guided by the Worker Health and Safety Annex contained in the National Response Plan as adopted by the Department of Homeland Security.

I am pleased today to be introducing this legislation with my distinguished colleague and ranking member of the Committee, Senator Kennedy. He and I share a commitment to protecting the health and safety of all workers, including those engaged in the hurricane recovery effort.

The legislation we are introducing today not only encourages the implementation of all aspects of the Worker Safety Annex, it encourages OSHA to play a central role in communicating the nature of these unique worksite hazards, and in cooperating with State, local and tribal governments, as well as other Federal agencies to enhance the safety of recovery and reconstruction personnel. In addition, the legislation grants the Secretary of Labor authority to extend the deadline for filing certain forms with the Department until March of 2006 in light of the difficulties in meeting any earlier deadlines as a result of the hurricane.

We believe the bill is an important step in providing the necessary protection to recovery and reconstruction workers; and providing the necessary degree of flexibility with regard to required Federal filings.

Mr. President, today, I join Senator Enzi in introducing a relief bill that will bring aid to hundreds of thousands of people affected by Hurricane Katrina. I commend Chairman Enzi and our colleagues on the Committee for moving so quickly to meet the many urgent health needs of the victims.

We have all seen the images of despair of those who felt so abandoned by their government in their time of need. We have also seen hope reborn in the faces of families reunited after surviving this massive catastrophe. We have seen great heroism too, not only in the spectacular images of rescues by helicopter, but in the quiet courage of neighbors helping neighbors survive the heavy winds and rising waters.

It's been three weeks since Hurricane Katrina brought havoc to the Gulf Coast. Every day, we have a clearer picture of physical destruction of beloved American communities, and a deeper understanding of what our fellow citizens have lost. Survivors have begun the slow and difficult process of rebuilding their lives. Most have , only the clothing they wore as they tried to cope with the hurricane.

Another picture is also emerging--a report card filled with failing grades for government at every level in the preparations and response for such an emergency. The natural disaster was compounded many fold by the inadequate response, despite the bravery and sacrifice of relief workers, rescue personnel, and the hurricane survivors themselves.

With new destruction in Texas and Louisiana from Hurricane Rita, we had little time to learn from these past lessons. Already, we responded sooner by insisting on the evacuation of people in flood-prone areas and shipping food and supplies quickly into the hard hit areas. Unfortunately, this means that many Hurricane Katrina evacuees had to relocate again. They halted their individual rebuilding processes, and once again, now find themselves in unfamiliar surroundings dealing with anguish, fear, loss, and uncertainty.

The recent evacuations reveal additional lessons to be learned. Massive gridlock on evacuation routes, gasoline shortages, and overwhelmed airports are just the beginning of many challenges that lie ahead. We need to learn faster and learn better, so that we can prepare more effectively before disasters happen, react more effectively as they take place, and respond more effectively in the aftermath.

I commend Chairman Enzi for convening two roundtable discussions that provided impressive expertise about what can be done immediately to protect the health of those affected by the hurricane and help them begin to rebuild their lives.

Our committee listened carefully and prepared a relief package to address the immediate health needs of the survivors for the next 90 days. We have a long road ahead of us, but this bill is an important start. As the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita continues to unfold, we will learn of additional needs, and be reminded again and again that we have much more to do to improve the nation's ability to respond to disasters, whether man-made or natural.

In this legislation, we are focusing on what we can do to immediately remove the perennial red tape and make sure that each and every survivor has access to good health care. For those with health insurance, the bill provides temporary assistance on premiums, so that individuals and small businesses affected by the hurricanes maintain their existing coverage. I'm hopeful we can work together to extend similar help to persons in larger firms who need temporary assistance.

We also authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to extend insurance deadlines, so that hurricane survivors have time to make important decisions about their coverage.

In preventing disease outbreaks and epidemics, time is of the essence. The bill removes barriers to existing public health programs, such as by allowing the Vaccines for Children Program to contribute to the vaccination campaign already under way, in order to prevent outbreaks of disease in responders and in persons relying on the same shelter.

It is especially urgent to monitor the survivors and responders, in order to identify both the short-term and the long-term risks they face. I will continue to work with my colleagues to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to work closely with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, to begin monitoring health outcomes and exposure to environmental toxins, and to develop a registry of people screened, so that we can identify long- term consequences.

As we focus on preventing and treating physical illness, we must not ignore the emotional challenges ahead for both survivors and responders. Thousands are facing the silent battle of coping with bereavement and catastrophe. All are at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder. Today, we are reauthorizing the emergency mental health services program of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's and giving priority to awarding its grants to states and areas most affected by the hurricanes.

This measure is only the beginning. It ends restrictions on existing Federal programs, so that we can help immediately with the relief efforts and expand access to health care for the survivors.

I'm encouraged by how well our colleagues have worked together to rapidly develop this relief package, and I urge the Majority Leader and the full Senate to make passing this legislation a priority and bring help to the thousands affected by the hurricane.

I'm also optimistic that our bipartisan cooperation here will lead to further relief measures that fully address the longer term health needs of the victims, and prevent the kind of mistakes that happened in connection with Katrina and Rita from happening again.

Congress has a major responsibility to help the survivors of this tragic ordeal rebuild their communities and their lives. Today, we make a clear commitment to the survivors. Our promise to them should not simply be to turn back the clock a month or two--it should be to fulfill the true promise of the American Dream by committing ourselves to better health, better education and better job opportunities for survivors, and for all Americans as well.

Mr. President, today Senator Enzi and I are introducing legislation to protect the workers who are laboring to clean up the Gulf Coast after its recent disasters.

The heroism of America's workers in the wake of Hurricane Katrina is unparalleled. As they did in response to our national disaster on September 11, thousands of men and women have been working around the clock to find and rescue families, to provide them with food and shelter, and to evacuate them from the area. In the coming days thousands more will be on the ground reestablishing communications, cleaning up debris, restoring services, and rebuilding infrastructure. They are now facing additional challenges because of the new damage and flooding from Hurricane Rita, but they continue to make progress in cleaning and rebuilding New Orleans and the entire disaster area.

This work is critical, but it is also dangerous. Many of these tasks pose significant safety and health threats: conditions in New Orleans are of particular concern, where the widespread flooding has led to widespread biological and chemical contamination. We learn more each day about the oil spills, the Superfund sites, and exposure to E. coli that these workers are facing. It is imperative that workers and volunteers be protected from these serious hazards.

That is why our legislation includes language to protect the health and safety of workers. It urges OSHA and other health and safety agencies to follow the Worker Health and Safety Annex protections of our National Response Plan. This includes keeping track of workers who are being exposed, coordinating health and safety training for workers and volunteers, and monitoring the hazards that workers and volunteers are facing. It also authorizes funds to be spent for additional personnel, enforcement of health and safety standards, critical safety information for workers and employers, and safety and health training. I hope that as Congress continues to allocate money for disaster relief that we also provide money to protect our workers and volunteers.

We need to track how our efforts are working, and so we have provided for Congressional oversight. OSHA will be required to brief the HELP Committee in six months, and provide a written report within nine months, so we can see what progress has been made and what still needs to be done. We have also mandated oversight by the Executive Branch. The Inspector General of the Department of Labor will audit and investigate the Department's efforts to implement the protections established in this bill, and will report back to both Houses of Congress on the success of these response and recovery efforts.

Finally, the bill also provides temporary relief to many companies, unions and individuals who are required to meet financial and other reporting obligations during the next few months, but cannot satisfy these obligations due to record destruction and other problems associated with Katrina.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 8, 2006, at 2:30 p.m., to receive testimony on the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on Wednesday, March 8 at 10:00 a.m. to consider pending calender business.

Agenda

Agenda Item 3: S. 476--To authorize the Boy Scouts of America to exchange certain land in the State of Utah acquired under the Recreation and Public Purposes Act.

Agenda Item 8: S. 1131--To authorize the exchange of certain Federal land within the State of Idaho, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 9: S. 1288--To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to enter into cooperative agreements to protect natural resources of units of the National Park System through collaborative efforts on land inside and outside of units of the National Park System.

Agenda Item 10: S. 1346--To direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study of maritime sites in the State of Michigan.

Agenda Item 11: S. 1378--To amend the National Historic Preservation Act to provide appropriation authorization and improve the operations of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.

Agenda Item 13: S. 1913--To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease a portion of the Dorothy Buell Memorial Visitor Center for use as a visitor center for the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 14: S. 1970--To amend the National Trails System Act to update the feasibility and suitability study originally prepared for the Trail of Tears National Historic Trail and provide for the inclusion of new trail segments, land components, and campgrounds associated with that trail, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 15: S. 2197--To improve the global competitiveness of the United States in science and energy technology, to strengthen basic research programs at the Department of Energy, and to provide support for mathematics and science education at all levels through the resources available through the Department of Energy, including at the National Laboratories.

Agenda Item 16: S. 2253--To require the Secretary of the Interior to offer the 181 Area of the Gulf of Mexico for oil and gas leasing.

Agenda Item 17: S. Con. Res. 60--Designating the Negro Leagues Baseball Museum in Kansas City, MO, as America's National Negro Leagues Baseball Museum.

Agenda Item 18: S.J. Res. 28--Approving the location of the commemorative work in the District of Columbia honoring former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Agenda Item 19: H.R. 318--To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and feasibility of designating Castle Nugent Farms located on St. Croix, Virgin Islands, as a unit of the National Park System, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 20: H.R. 326 (S. 505)--To amend the Yuma Crossing National Heritage Area Act of 2000 to adjust the boundary of the Yuma Crossing National Heritage Area.

Agenda Item 21: H.R. 409 (S. 179)--To provide for the exchange of land within the Sierra National Forest, CA, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 23: H.R. 1129 (S. 100)--To authorize the exchange of certain land in the State of Colorado.

Agenda Item 24: H.R. 1728 (S. 323)--To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and feasibility of designating the French Colonial Heritage Area in the State of Missouri as a unit of the National Park System, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 25: H.R. 2107--To amend Public Law 104-329 to modify authorities for the use of the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Maintenance Fund, and for other purposes.

Agenda Item 26: H.R. 3443 (S. 1498)--To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain water distribution facilities to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District.

In addition, the Committee may turn to any other measures that are ready for consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on

Finance be authorized to meet during the session on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 10 a.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building, to hear testimony on ``Taking a checkup on the nation's health care tax policy: a prognosis''.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 10 a.m. to hold a hearing on Nominations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations' Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. to hold a hearing on The Impact on Latin America of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions meet in executive session during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 10 a.m. in SD-430.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. for a hearing titled, ``Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Indian Affairs be authorized to meet on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building to conduct a hearing on S. 2078, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments of 2005.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a markup on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. in Senate Dirksen Building Room 226.

Agenda

I. Nominations: Steven G. Bradbury to be an Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel; John F. Clark to be Director of the United States Marshals Service; Donald J. DeGabrielle, Jr. to be U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas; John Charles Richter to be U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma; Amul R. Thapar to be U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky; Mauricio J. Tamargo to be Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States.

II. Bills: S. , Comprehensive Immigration Reform [Chairman's Mark]; S. 1768, a bill to permit the televising of Supreme Court proceedings; Specter, Leahy, Cornyn, Grassley, Schumer, Feingold, Durbin; S. 829, Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2005; Grassley, Schumer, Cornyn, Leahy, Feingold, Durbin, Graham, DeWine, Specter; S. 489, Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act; Alexander, Kyl, Cornyn, Graham, Hatch; S. 2039, Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act of 2005; Durbin, Specter, DeWine, Leahy, Kennedy, Feinstein, Feingold; S. 2292, A bill to provide relief for the Federal judiciary from excessive rent charges; Specter, Leahy, Cornyn, Feinstein, Biden.

III. Matters: S.J. Res. 1, Marriage Protection Amendment; Allard, Sessions, Kyl, Hatch, Cornyn, Coburn, Brownback.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 8, 2006 at 2:30 p.m. to hold a closed briefing.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security be authorized to meet on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. for a hearing regarding ``Crime Victims Fund Rescission: Real Savings or Budget Gimmick?''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 8, 2006, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on ``Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the subcommittee on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Development be authorized to meet on Wednesday, March 8, 2006, at 2:30 p.m., on the ``Impact of Piracy and Counterfeiting of American Goods and Intellectual Property in China.''