Vietnam Veterans Memorial Visitor Center Deadline Enforcement Act

I will take 15 minutes, Senator Kennedy 30 minutes, Senator Levin 15 minutes, and Senator Clinton 5 minutes.

Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Kennedy, Feingold, Dorgan, Levin, Wyden, Clinton, Mikulski, Lautenberg, Boxer, Reed, Harkin, and Biden, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I was 13 years old when I saw this picture. When we discuss nuclear weapons, this is the picture I remember. The only country on Earth that has ever used nuclear weapons is our own. It has been debated ever since whether this was positive because it saved American troops and ended the war or whether it has launched our country and other countries into a race which well could prove disastrous for all of us.

This is a photograph of Hiroshima after the nuclear bomb was dropped on the city on August 6, 1945. Mr. President, 80,000 people died from the initial blast and 60,000 people died from radiation poisoning, for a total of 140,000 people dead. And that bomb was 15 kilotons.

The second photograph is of Nagasaki after August 9, 1945. Approximately 75,000 of the city's 240,000 residents were killed instantly. In total, approximately 100,000 people died in the blast.

I rise today once again to address a critical issue that is related to the security of the American people and our nuclear proliferation efforts: the renewed push by this administration to reopen the nuclear door, including funding for a 100-kiloton nuclear bunker buster.

I have argued this on the Senate floor before, that such actions, combined with the policy of unilateralism and preemption, run counter to our values and nonproliferation efforts and put U.S. national security interests and American lives at risk. Therefore, those of us who are cosponsors of this amendment wish to delete the $4 million, for the study and development of the robust nuclear earth penetrator. The amendment redirects the funds for debt reduction.

The time has come for this Senate, like the House has done in this bill, to send a clear and unambiguous message to the White House and the Pentagon: We will not support funding for programs to develop new nuclear weapons.

Congress made a strong statement last year in deleting funding for the development of this nuclear bunker buster by eliminating $27.5 million for the bunker buster, $9 million for the advanced concepts initiative, which included the study of the development of low-yield weapons. This action was due in no small part to the leadership of Representative David Hobson, chairman of the House Appropriations Energy Committee. The House took a strong position of opposition and they are to be commended.

In fact, the House removed new nuclear weapons from all bills, including the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense authorization bill, the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense appropriations bill, and the 2006 Energy appropriations bill. This was a consequential victory for those of us who believe the United States sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world by reopening the nuclear door and beginning the testing and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. That is why I was so disappointed to learn that the administration requested funds this year to resume the nuclear earth penetrator study.

As a matter of fact, this year Secretary Rumsfeld asked the Department of Energy to place the $4 million in the energy budget and $4.5 million in the defense budget, thereby splitting the amount requested for the bunker buster. He hoped to weaken opposition and split the budget between two Departments so that if it could not get funding in one, he could get it in the other. The House had the foresight to reject this idea and has reasserted its determination not to move forward with the bunker buster study.

During its markup on the 2006 Defense authorization bill, the House Armed Services Committee eliminated all the Department of Energy funding for the RNEP, and transferred the $4 million to the Air Force budget for work on a conventional nonnuclear version of the bunker buster. The House Armed Services Committee member, Silvestre Reyes, stated: The committee took the ``N,'' or ``nuclear,'' out of the RNEP program.

Following the Armed Services Committee action, Chairman Hobson and Representative Ellen Tauscher led the effort to eliminate the Department of Energy funding of $4 million for the bunker buster in its markup in the 2006 Energy and Water appropriations bill. That bill also eliminated funding for the modern pit facility and banned site selection for the facility in 2006.

Finally, the House 2006 Defense appropriations bill limits research for a bunker buster to a conventional program. These three actions by authorizers and appropriators, Republicans and Democrats alike, have dealt another blow to the administration's plans to develop new nuclear weapons and reinforced the clear intent of Congress that we should not go down that path because it will only encourage the very proliferation we are trying to prevent.

Why should the Senate continue to fund programs that are rapidly losing support in the House and the administration? Now the Senate has an opportunity to follow the House's lead. Senator Kennedy and I and others have come to the floor to offer this amendment to do just that.

During previous debates on this issue, we have argued that according to the laws of physics, it is simply not possible for a missile casing on a nuclear warhead to survive a thrust into the earth to take out a hard and deeply buried military target without spewing millions of tons of cubic feet of radiation into the atmosphere. Consider this: A 1- kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 25 to 50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air.

Given the insurmountable physics problems associated with burrowing a warhead deep into the earth, one would need a weapon with more than 100 kilotons of yield to destroy an underground target at a depth of 1,000 feet.

Now let me explain. The maximum feasible depth of a bunker buster is 35 feet. At that depth, a 100-kiloton bunker buster would scatter 100 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the atmosphere. There is no known missile casing that can survive a 1,000-foot thrust into the Earth and avoid overwhelming and catastrophic consequences. That is a fact. There is not a single scientist who will say that.

The head of the National Nuclear Security Administration agrees.

At the March 2, 2005, House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher asked Ambassador Linton Brooks, the following question:

I just want to know is there any way a [robust nuclear

earth penetrator] of any size that we would drop would not

produce a huge amount of radioactive debris?

The Ambassador replied:

No, there is not.

When Congresswoman Tauscher asked him how deep he thought a bunker buster could go, he answered:

. . . a couple of tens of meters, maybe. I mean certainly--

I must apologize for my lack of precision if we in the

administration have suggested that it was possible to have a

bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don't

believe that--I don't believe the law of physics will ever

let that be true.

Here is the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration saying there is no way one can drive a missile casing deep enough to prevent radioactive spewing.

Let me just show what this means. For a 100-kiloton weapon, one would have to drive it 800 feet deep into the earth to contain the nuclear fallout. One can only drive it a small distance: 35 feet. So the result is 1.5 million tons of radioactivity. If it is 5 kilotons, one would have to drive it 320 feet. One could only drive it 35 feet. The spewing of radioactive debris is 200,000 tons. If it is 1 kiloton, one would have to drive it 220 feet. One could only drive it 35 feet and the radioactivity is 60,000 tons. If it is .2 kilotons, one would have to drive it 120 feet. One can only drive it 35 feet, and the radioactive spewing is 25,000 tons.

This is not from me. This is the National Academy of Sciences, nuclear scientists, physicists, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration. There is widespread agreement about this. So why are we doing it?

On April 27, the National Academies of Sciences study commissioned by Congress to study the anticipated health and environmental effects of the Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapon found that current experience and empirical predictions indicate that the Earth-penetrating weapons cannot penetrate to depths required for total containment of the effects of a nuclear explosion. It would take a 300-kiloton weapon at a penetration of 3 meters, or 10 feet, to destroy hard and deeply buried targets at 200 meters, or 656 feet.

To destroy a hard and deeply buried target at 300 meters you would need a 1-megaton weapon--not kiloton, megaton. The number of casualties from an Earth penetrator weapon detonated at a few meters depth is, for all practical purposes, equal to that of a surface burst of the same weapon yield.

That is what the National Academies of Sciences studies say. For attacks near or in densely populated areas, using Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons on hard and deeply buried targets, the number of casualties can range from thousands to more than a million, depending primarily on weapon yield.

The bottom line is that a bunker buster cannot penetrate into the Earth deeply enough to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of millions of cubic feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. It would result in the death of up to a million people or more if used in a densely populated area.

This chart shows that. The source is the National Resources Defense Council and the EPA. What it shows is the predicted radioactive fallout from a B61-11 300-kiloton explosion in West Pyongyang, North Korea, using historical weather data for the month of May.

Here is the blast, here is Seoul, here is the radioactive fallout.

Why are we doing this? It makes no sense.

I think this is the strongest evidence to date that we should not move forward with this study and that we should put a stop to it once and for all. In reality, this has never been about a study. It has been about the intent of this administration to develop new nuclear weapons. While the administration is silent this year on how much it plans to spend on the program in the future, last year's budget request totaled $485 million on the robust nuclear earth penetrator over 5 years. This 5-year figure was omitted this year.

Let's look, for a brief moment, at the policies underlying this request, for they, too, have not been changed. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review places nuclear weapons----

Mr. President, I yield myself another 5 minutes.

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review places nuclear weapons as part of the strategic triad. Therefore, the aim is to blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. This makes them easier to use.

National Security Directive 17 indicates that the United States would engage in a first use of nuclear weapons--a historic statement in itself. We have never had a first-use policy. We have always had strategic ambiguity, but we have never before said we would ever countenance a first use of nuclear weapons. In Security Directive 17 it is said in response to a chemical or biological attack--and seven nations are actually named--we would consider a nuclear response. In essence, these policies encourage other nations, and they have encouraged North Korea and they have encouraged Iran--those are two of the nations suggested--to develop their own nuclear weapons, thereby putting American lives and our own national security interests at risk.

We are telling the world, when it comes to nuclear weapons: Do as we say, not as we do. I object to that policy. It is hypocrisy.

There are alternatives. I have just been briefed by Northrop Grumman on a program they are working on with Boeing to develop a conventional bunker buster, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is designed to go deeper than any nuclear bunker buster and take out 25 percent of underground and deeply buried targets. This 30,000-pound weapon, 20 feet in length, with 6,000 pounds of high explosives, will be delivered from a B-2 or a B-52 bomber. It can burrow 60 meters into the ground through 5,000 psi of reinforced concrete. It will burrow 8 meters into the ground through 10,000 psi reinforced concrete.

We have already spent $6 million on this program, and design and ground testing are scheduled to be completed next year.

We should focus on conventional programs. The House has said this. The Senate should concur.

We have a solemn obligation to spend our resources in the most effective manner and to make this country safer and more secure. That is why I am so concerned about this administration's decision to come back to Congress and request additional funds for new nuclear weapons.

I would like to give my kudos and congratulations to the House of Representatives. They truly have their heads on straight. I am delighted that they have eliminated the authorization and the funding for this entire program in the 2006 appropriation. I urge us to do the same on just one part of this, which is the nuclear bunker buster, $4 million.

I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy.

The Senator is right. I change that to a half-hour.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I thought the remarks were excellent. I think they were really right on. The tragedy of this is that people do not listen. I hope, Senator Kennedy, your words were heard.

Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin.

Yes.

I thank the Senator. I think I had consent for a half- hour. I do not expect to use it all.

First, I commend my friend and colleague, Senator Feinstein, for her attention to this issue. She has long been an advocate for sensible and responsible nuclear arms policy. Again, this evening, she is leading the way in the Senate. All of us are grateful for her leadership. I welcome the opportunity to join with her in offering this amendment.

It is intended to reverse a reckless proposal by the Bush administration to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons.

We do not ``provide for the common defense,'' as called for in our Constitution, by launching a new nuclear arms race and making the world more dangerous, but that is precisely what the administration plans to do.

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld want to develop a new tactical nuclear weapon called the robust nuclear earth penetrator, and their hope is that these bunker busters can crash deep into the Earth and destroy bunkers and weapons caches. They hold the dangerous and misguided belief that our Nation's interests and values are served by developing what they consider a more easily usable nuclear bomb.

I think most Americans believe that is wrong. Our challenge in addressing nuclear nonproliferation issues is not that there are too few nuclear weapons in the world but that there are too many; not that they are too difficult to use but that they are too easy to use.

North Korea has them and is rattling its nuclear saber every day. Iran is moving forward on the development of nuclear capability. We all hope and pray that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups never ever get their hands on a nuclear weapon.

So why on Earth, in this dangerous nuclear world, with the specter of a nuclear cloud at the hands of terrorists and rogue states, should the United States be adding more nuclear weapons to the global arsenal? What moral authority do we have to ask others to give up their nukes if we are determined to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons of our own?

For the past 2 years, Congress has raised major doubts about the program and significantly cut back on its funding. But the administration still presses forward for more work on these robust nuclear earth penetrators. Last year, the administration requested $15 million for it and Congress reluctantly provided half that amount. For 2005, they requested another $27 million and submitted a 5-year request for nearly $500 million. But cooler heads prevailed, and the House Appropriations Committee rejected the request. As the committee report stated,

The Committee continues to oppose the diversion of

resources and intellectual capital away from the most serious

issues that confront the management of the nation's nuclear

deterrent . . . The Committee remains unconvinced by the

Department's superficial assurance that the RNEP activity is

only a study . . . The Committee notes that the management

direction for the fiscal year 2004 sent to the directors of

the weapons design laboratories left little doubt that the

objective of the program was to advance the most extreme new

nuclear weapon goals irrespective of any reservations

expressed by Congress.

This year, nothing has changed. The FY06 budget request from the President includes $4 million for the Department of Energy to study the bunker buster and $4.5 million to the Department of Defense for the same purpose. Thankfully our colleagues in the House were wiser and decided to eliminate its funding.

The administration obviously is still committed to this reckless approach. Secretary Rumsfeld made his position clear in January, when he wrote to Secretary Abraham:

I think we should request funds in FY06 and FY07 to

complete the RNEP study . . . You can count on my support for

your efforts to revitalize the nuclear weapons infrastructure

and to complete the RNEP study.

The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds only to complete the feasibility study for these new nuclear weapons. But we already know what the next step is. In the budget they sent us last year, the administration stated in plain language that they intend to develop it.

Ambassador Linton Brooks, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, claims those future budget projections are merely placeholders, ``in the event the President decides to proceed with development and Congress approves.'' But their fiscal year 2005 budget clearly shows the administration's unmistakable intention to develop, and ultimately produce, this weapon.

The Bush administration would like us to believe that this is a clean, surgical nuclear weapon. They say it will burrow into underground targets and destroy them with no adverse consequences for the environment. They can believe all they want, but the science says their claims are false.

The National Academy of Sciences confirms exactly what most of us thought--that these nuclear weapons, like other nuclear bombs, result in catastrophic nuclear fallout. The fallout can poison tens of millions of people and create radioactive lands for years and years to come.

The study goes on to say, ``Current experience and empirical predictions indicate that earth-penetrator weapons cannot penetrate to depths required for total containment of the effects of a nuclear explosion. . . .

To be fully contained, a 300 kiloton weapon would have to be detonated at the bottom of a carefully stemmed emplacement hole about 800 meters deep. Because the practical penetration depth for an earth penetrating weapon is a few meters--a small fraction of the depth for the full containment--there will be blast, thermal, initial nuclear radiation, and fallout effects from use of an EPW.

This chart simulates the likely nuclear fallout from a one megaton bunker-buster detonated at a hypothetical underground target 20 kilometers east of an Iranian air force base in Dezful. This model uses the same simulation program as the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency. During summer months, the nuclear fallout is predicted to travel 150 to 200 miles, across Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The radiation could kill up to 650,000 people.

Even the person in charge of the program, Linton Brooks, conceded at a House Armed Services Committee Hearing on March 2 that the robust nuclear earth penetrator could not be used without significant nuclear fallout. He stated:

I really must apologize for my lack of precision if we in

the Administration have suggested that it was possible to

have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I

don't believe that--I don't believe the laws of physics will

ever let that be true.

This chart depicts a 400 kiloton bunkerbuster hitting underground facilities at North Korea's Air Base at Nuchon-ni. Fallout from this explosion would blow southeast across the DMZ towards Seoul. This attack could kill over 4 million people.

Even if the United States were willing to accept the catastrophic damage a nuclear explosion would cause, the bunkerbuster would still not be able to destroy all of the buried bunkers the intelligence community has identified.

So we would have a new bomb that can kill and poison tens of millions of civilians, spread fallout for more than a thousand miles, make their lands radioactive, but still not destroy its target.

The huge, one megaton weapon that the administration is contemplating cannot reach deeper than 400 meters. All an adversary would have to do is bury its bunker below that depth.

Bunkerbusters also require pinpoint accuracy to hit deeply-buried, hardened bunkers. This requires precise intelligence on the location of the target. As the National Academy Study emphasized, an attack by a nuclear weapon would be effective in destroying weapon or weapons materials, including nuclear materials and chemical or biological agents, only if it's detonated in the actual chamber where the weapons or materials are located. Even more disturbing, if the bomb is even slightly off target, the detonation may cause the spread of such deadly chemicals and germs, in addition to the radioactive fallout.

As we know from the Iraq experience, our intelligence isn't always accurate. In fact, the Bush administration told us there were weapons of mass destruction and there and we had to send in troops to take them out. If we had robust nuclear earth penetrators at the time, what if this White House had used them against suspected chemical or biological bunkers--which turned out not to exist? Charles Duelfer, the head of the Iraqi Survey Group, shows us how dangerous this approach could have been when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee last October that, we were almost all wrong on Iraq. Despite the administration's claims, Mr. Duelfer's Comprehensive Report on Iraq's WMD stated, ``There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical weapons.

The intelligence community still faces many challenges in getting its intelligence right. In their report in March for the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Laurence Silberman and Chuck Robb found that The flaws we found in the Intelligence Community's Iraq performance are still all too common. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten years ago.

How can we contemplate using a weapon of this destructive power, if our intelligence can't guarantee where an underground target really is?

Finally, if it were clear that this weapon is needed to protect our troops, then I believe many more in Congress would support it. But that's not the case. At the House Armed Services

Committee hearing in March, program chief Linton Brooks once again was asked if there was a military requirement for the bunker buster. He stated categorically, No, there is not.

Robert Peurifoy, the retired Vice President of Sandia National Laboratory, one of our premier nuclear weapons labs, had this to say: If you can find somebody in a uniform in the Defense Department who can talk about the need for nuclear bunker busters without laughing, I'll buy him a cup of coffee. It's outlandish. It's stupid. It is an effort to maintain a payroll at the weapons labs.

The administration's effort to build a new class of nuclear weapon is only further evidence of their reckless nuclear policy. This action contradicts the spirit of our obligations under the nonproliferation treaty to disarm our stockpiles.

It demonstrates the administration's contempt for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the foundation of all current global nuclear arms control. The nonproliferation treaty, signed in 1968, has long stood for the fundamental principle that the world will be safer if nuclear proliferation does not extend the five nations that nations lan possessed nuclear weapons at the does not extend beyond the five nations that possessed nuclear weapons at that time--the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France. It reflected the worldwide consensus that the greater the number of nations with nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of nuclear war.

The Bush administration's policy jeopardizes the entire structure of nuclear arms control so carefully negotiated by world leaders over the past half century, starting with the Eisenhower administration. This is just another example of the administration's Do as I say, not as I do policy.

How can we ask Iran and North Korea to halt their nuclear research, when we fail to halt our own? By proceeding with the Robust Nuclear Earth penetrator, we are headed in the wrong direction. Our efforts will only encourage other nations to follow our example and produce nuclear weapons of their own.

We have studied this issue long enough. It is ridiculous for the administration to try to keep this program going, and it could be suicidal for the Nation and for our troops. If we need this kind of weapons system, we ought to follow the conventional weapons research that is being undertaken and not support this proposal. I hope the Senate will reject it.

Mr. President, I yield the time back to the Senator from California.

Mr. President, before the Senator from Arizona leaves, before we started, we were aware of only one person--until the Senator from Arizona spoke, and we understand Senator McCain is going to see what he wants to do--who wanted a rollcall vote. Now we will look for any others and will be glad to work with the Senator's people. If he will tell us now, we will share anything he would like as soon as possible.

For the information of the Senate, Senator Feinstein--permit me to editorialize a minute--has offered this amendment, or something like it, a couple times. We have voted on it, but she wants substantial time, and certainly that is her privilege. We will not take much time in opposition.

For the benefit of our colleagues, how long does the Senator from California intend to take?

There will be no others?

On our side, unless somebody else wants time--on this amendment, do you want time?

In opposition?

Mr. President, that is 15 minutes in opposition, plus 5 minutes for me. There will be 20 minutes in opposition.

It is eight items. We will give them all to the Senator from Arizona. We have given them to him already.

Mr. President, it is my pleasure to bring the Energy and Water bill for fiscal year 2006 to the floor for consideration. Thanks to Chairman Cochran and his ranking member, Senator Robert Byrd, the subcommittee allocation is $31.2 billion, an amount that is $1.5 billion over the President's request.

Chairman Cochran has been generous to this subcommittee, and I am committed to supporting priorities that have been neglected or underfunded in past budgets.

There are two priorities within this bill, and they are water and science.

The first priority is water. As all the Members know, the request cut water projects below the current year level.

In addition, the budget has imposed an OMB-originated formula to establish priorities among water projects. I don't believe the OMB formula is fair, and we have ignored it for purposes of identifying worthy Corps projects in this bill.

I would also like to point out that there is an extensive discussion in the report regarding this committee's support of the Corps' ability to reprogram funds and utilize continuing contracts as an effective tool to manage the over 2,200 Corps projects and studies. The House has proposed to eliminate the Corps reprogramming authority and restrict its ability to focus resources on critical construction priorities.

Each construction project is different with numerous challenges, including weather, water flows and construction logistics, including manpower and materials, that may cause significant delays. On the other hand, some projects are able to accelerate their schedule. Using the reprogramming authority the Corps is able to keep accelerated projects on track by reprioritizing funds from delayed projects.

I have been contacted by many Members and heard from numerous communities who oppose the House language. I share their concerns and believe the House proposal is unworkable and would eliminate the Corps' ability to prioritize work. These reforms are in the best interest of the Corps or taxpayers.

The subcommittee has also provided funds to offset the $521 million in unfunded legislative assumptions included in the budget request associated with the management of the Power Marketing Administration.

The second priority in this bill is science. Funding for both the both Office of Science and the Stockpile Stewardship R&D accounts within NNSA received increases.

The budget request reduced the Office of Science funding by $136 million. This mark restores the cut and more, providing an increase of $240 million above the request.

I am also concerned about the funding reductions to the science-based stockpile steward ship accounts. I have attempted to restore this scientific capability that is essential to the certification of our nuclear deterrent without the validation of underground testing.

For the benefit of the Senate, I will review the highlights of this bill.

The mark provides $5.29 billion for the Army Corps of Engineers which is $966 million above the budget request.

We have included new construction projects and initiated new study starts.

This bill ignores the OMB-developed formulation for the Corps as it would negatively impact rural projects and projects that have already begun construction.

This mark also ignores the administration's decision not to fund beach renourishment. These projects are very important to many communities and likewise members of the Senate.

For the Bureau of Reclamation, this bill provides just over $1.08 billion, an increase of $130 million above the President's request. This project support water projects in 17 Western States and provides $60 million for Animas La Plata, an increase of $8 million over the reuestst. The committee provides full funding for Cal Fed of $37 million, and provides the current year funding for Water 2025.

For the Department of Energy, the mark provides $25.04 billion.

For nuclear weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration), NNSA, the bill provides $6.55 billion, which is $76 million under the President's request.

This decrease is a result of the $222 million transfer of cleanup operations out of the NNSA to the Office of Environmental Management and a reduction in the NIF construction program.

The committee mark increases are targeted to the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. Funding for the science, engineering and advanced computing campaigns are up $164 million.

For nuclear nonproliferation activities the Senate bill provides $1.7 billion, which is $91.8 million above the request and $236 million above the current year level.

I think it is also important to mention that this subcommittee mark fully funds the plutonium disposition program, including $362.5 million for the construction of both the Pit Disassembly facility and well as Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina.

This facility is our only pathway to permanently eliminate excessive and dangerous plutonium supplies. The NNSA spends tens of millions of dollars to protect this material that will not be necessary if we are able to turn plutonium into commercial nuclear fuel. It is our Nation's best opportunity to undertake reprocessing.

The administration is making good headway in negotiations with the Russians, which I believe warrants full funding of this critical project.

For the Yucca Mountain project, the Senate bill provides $577 million, which is consistent with current year funding and $65 million below the President's request.

This mark does not take a position on developing an interim storage facility. While I personally believe that a central interim storage facility makes sense, this bill is not the proper vehicle to have this debate.

For the Energy Supply and Conservation Programs the subcommittee mark provides $1.9 billion, an increase of $195 million above the request.

For nuclear energy R&D, the bill provides $499.9 million, which is $60 million above the President's request and $64 million over the current year levels.

Also, Nuclear Power 2010, $76 million, an increase of $20 million and Advanced Fuel Concepts Initiative, $85 million is provided, an increase of $15 million.

For the Office of Science, the bill provides $3.7 billion, an increase of $240 million above the request and $102 million above the current year level. We have provided $100 million to ensure that DOE facilities operate at 100 percent capacity. A $40 million increase has been provided to accelerate the four planned facilities under the Genomes to Life program. And $30 million is provided to establish a nanotechnology transfer account.

For independent agencies, the mark provides: $67 million for the Denali Commission; $65.5 million for the Appalachian Regional Commission; $12 million for the Delta Regional Authority, an increase of $6 million over the President's request; and $734 million for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an increase of $41 million over the current year level.

Mr. President, to reiterate, I suggest there are many here worried about water projects and the Corps of Engineers. This is the bill for all American water projects, the Corps, the Bureau of Land Management, and any others. This bill funds that at a level of $1.8 billion. That is $130 million more than the President and $63 million more than current level.

This bill covers the Department of Energy. It covers all of the stockpile stewardship activities. It covers nonproliferation activities. That is one for which the President has asked for substantial money.

Renewable R&D is in this bill with very substantial funding. There is nuclear research and development and, most importantly, we have substantially increased basic science research. This bill and this Department does a little more than one-third of the entire Nation's basic science funding. We thought this was a year to increase it, not decrease it. We have been told this is a time to increase it because we have increased funding for health sciences over the past 10 to 12 years but not basic science. We found money from other places to increase that.

This bill also includes money for nuclear waste disposal. That has been very difficult. It also has Yucca Mountain and has the cleanup. It also has three or four independent agencies.

Will the Senator yield?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so that I may offer a managers' amendment which has been cleared on both sides.

I send to the desk a series of amendments, all of which have been approved on both sides, some of which are technical, some are otherwise, but there are no objections.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I thank the Senators from California and Massachusetts and others who have come to the floor at this late hour to argue and debate an issue which is so critical to the security of this Nation.

We will be a lot less secure if we go down this nuclear road. We know other countries are going down the nuclear road. We know we are even threatening those countries--such as Iran and North Korea--that we will not let them go down that road. We are even holding out the prospect that they would be the subject of military attacks if they go down the nuclear road.

But at the same time we are doing this, that we are telling the world, we are telling Iran, we are telling North Korea, ``Do not walk down that nuclear road,'' the administration is proposing to take another step down our nuclear road. It is a decision which, if upheld by this body, will make us less secure. It will make it more likely that North Korea and Iran will say to us, and say to the world: The United States threatens us if we go to nuclear weapons, but they themselves are relying more and more and more on nuclear weapons.

The administration has asked for $4 million to restart the feasibility study for the robust nuclear earth penetrator. I emphasize ``restart'' because we ended this mistake in fiscal year 2004. We should not restart this. We did not need it in 2005. We do not need it in 2006.

The $4 million that the Department of Energy seeks for fiscal year 2006 will not finish the study. An additional $14 million will still be needed in fiscal year 2007, just to finish the RNEP study.

What is it that the Department of Energy wants to study? What is the weapon they want to study? What is the RNEP appropriation for? It is to look at modification of a nuclear bomb called the B83. That is what is being looked at as a possible earth-penetrating weapon, the RNEP. The B83 is a large nuclear bomb. It is huge. It has a maximum yield on the order of 1 megaton. And 1 megaton is the equivalent of 71 Hiroshima bombs.

So the weapon they are looking at, or want to look at, to modify for this function, is a bomb that has the power, the yield, as they call it, of 71 Hiroshima bombs. The goal of that feasibility study is to increase the penetrating capability of the B83. The yield, the power, of the B83, would stay the same. That is not being reduced. So the idea is to see whether or not that B83--that bomb with the power of 71 Hiroshimas--can be made to penetrate the earth.

According to the report of the National Academy of Sciences, it will not be possible, no matter how good the design. The deepest that an RNEP could ever penetrate is about 12 feet. And when an RNEP detonates at 12 feet, 12 feet in the earth, it will generate, according to the National Academy of Sciences, more fallout than if it were exploded in the air. So if we go down this road, we will be looking at a weapon which cannot penetrate deeper than 12 feet in the earth and will have greater fallout than if it were exploded in the air, according to the National Academy of Sciences.

We talk about collateral damage as though it is some kind of a cold term. This is damage which is so massive. We think of a weapon 71 times the size of Hiroshima, with more fallout than if it were exploded in the air, which--no matter what its design; even if this study is successful--cannot penetrate more than about 12 feet in the ground, and we are telling the rest of the world, ``Do not go down that nuclear road,'' when we ourselves are thinking--thinking--about designing a weapon which has that kind of a power and that kind of a fallout.

It is not the hundreds of millions of dollars which this would cost to implement, assuming this study is completed, it is the absurdity, it is the utter nonsense, it is the danger to U.S. security that would be created if we take this step down the road, telling the world: Do not do what we urge you to do because we are not doing it ourselves. That is the message. We can tell the world, Do not do it, do not go nuclear, but what they are going to say to us is: Hey, you are going nuclear further than you already are. You are modifying weapons to try to make them ``usable'' against deeply buried targets. And you are telling us and the rest of the world we should not go nuclear when you are looking for more and more uses for nuclear weapons?

We asked the National Academy of Sciences to look at this program. We asked them how much yield would an RNEP have to have to hold a deeply buried target at risk, and what would the effects be of using an RNEP? So the Academy reviewed the universe of hard and deeply buried targets and found you would have to have a huge yield to have any effect on deeply buried targets. What the Academy concluded was that yields in the range of several hundreds of kilotons to a megaton are needed to effectively hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk.

This report was issued this year, in April of 2005. What it said is that to be effective against a target 1,000 feet deep, an RNEP would have to have a yield of 1 megaton.

There are 10,000 hard and deeply buried targets in the world, about 10,000. According to the National Academy of Sciences, 2,000,--2,000-- of those targets would have some strategic significance. But the Academy finds that on the order of only about 100 deeply buried targets would be potential targets for RNEP. And many others--many others-- would be too deep to even reach with a 1-megaton yield such as RNEP has.

So what this study would have us do is spend more millions, take us down a road which endangers us because of the message it sends to countries that are contemplating nuclear weapons. It endangers our security to study a weapon that cannot succeed in achieving its goal of hitting many deeply buried targets. And it would have an extensive fallout because of its huge size, 71 times the size of Hiroshima.

I would be happy to yield.

I am happy to yield for a question.

I thank my friend from Virginia for the question. First of all, it is not three Senators who are making these assertions. It is the National Academy of Sciences which has made these assertions we are quoting. That is No. 1. No. 2, the message which is being sent by going down this road endangers the security of the United States. We are telling other countries--North Korea, Iran--do not go nuclear. That is our message. It is a very clear message. The President is even threatening military action. He is saying he is going to have to put that option on the table if they go nuclear. Then at the same time the administration wants to restart a program, the program in this case being a study of a deeply penetrating nuclear weapon that has 70 times the power of Hiroshima in order to get to deeply buried targets. There are 10,000 of those targets, according to the National Academy of Sciences, and perhaps 100 of them would be held at risk by this weapon.

So the idea that we are taking another step--you call it a study, but it is a step down the road, because the purpose of the study is to at least consider doing something. What we are saying, what the National Academy of Sciences has said, is this cannot accomplish its purpose. It will have a huge fallout. And what we are saying is the possibility that you could ever consider doing this is so far outweighed by the danger to us, by the message which is being sent to the world, that we are walking down a road we are telling others do not walk. That is the danger.

I would expect the administration would say something like that. But common sense tells us otherwise. Common sense tells you that if you are sitting down with people, in this case the Europeans, telling them we have to try to persuade Iran, don't go down that road, with the Japanese and the Russians and the Chinese sitting down with the North Koreans, do not go down that road, each of us has some experience as human beings. It seems to me it is absolute common sense that we will be confronted by those countries saying: You are lecturing us, threatening us, when you yourself are now looking at the possibility of redesigning a weapon 70 times the size of Hiroshima so that you can more deeply penetrate into the ground. It undermines our position. It weakens our position. It seems to me that means it weakens our security.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the growing success of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and legislation I have introduced to expand Health Savings Accounts.

In a positive action, Congress created Health Savings Accounts as part of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). Health Savings Accounts are an alternative to traditional health insurance--a savings product that offers a different and attractive way for consumers to pay for their health care. HSAs enable an individual to pay for current health expenses and save for future qualified medical and retiree health expenses on a tax-free basis.

An individual must have coverage under an HSA qualified health plan to open and contribute to an HSA. HSA qualified health plan premiums generally costs less than traditional health care coverage. Therefore, an individual can put the money he or she saves on insurance into a personal Health Savings Account.

I've always described myself as a common sense Jeffersonian conservative, which means I trust free people and free enterprise more than a meddlesome, burdensome government and that's why I'm such a strong advocate for Health Savings Accounts. Individuals own and control the money in their HSAs. Unlike a Flexible Spending Account, funds remain in the account from year to year, just like an IRA. There are no ``use it or lose it'' rules for HSAs. HSAs can become, over time, a strong, affordable health insurance product providing a savings ``nest egg'' for health care expenses.

In addition, HSAs allow individuals to make decisions on how to spend their money without relying on a third party. More specifically, the individual makes decisions about how much. money he or she wants to put into the account, whether to save for future medical expenses, or pay expenses that health insurance plans may not cover.

The individual also decides what types of investments to make with the money in the account that will allow the account appreciate and grow in value. I want to make clear right here that the individual does not have to invest their money if he or she doesn't want to. This is only an option. The bottom line is that Health Savings Accounts give people the freedom to make the health care choices that best fit their needs and that best represent Mr. Jefferson's ideals and my own.

Now, there are critics of health savings accounts. However, there is convincing evidence that HSAs have proven effective in controlling health care costs and providing an affordable option for Americans without health Insurance coverage.

Critics who claim that rich people gain most from the tax breaks of HSAs should look at the facts. Of the 3 million Americans who have enrolled in HSA plans, 32 percent were previously uninsured, and the uninsured are not typically wealthy. Critics suggest HSAs will drive up the cost of premiums. However, a recently released study from the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions showed HSA qualified plans had a 2.8 percent annual premium increase, compared to 8 percent for all other plans. This low rate of increase is another reason HSA qualified plans are affordable to those with lower incomes.

Another common criticism of HSAs is that the tax break benefits are ``too generous.'' But the President's proposal offering both a tax deduction and tax credit for money used to fund HSAs is no more generous than current tax benefits for employer-sponsored health coverage. However, our laws and proposal only level the playing field.

Proponents of HSAs do not pretend that HSAs are going to ``fix'' the entire health care system, although they may go a long way toward doing so with more individual responsibility and opportunity. HSAs are an additional option--one that is affordable and chips away at part of the problem: the millions of uninsured Americans. Individuals need health insurance, especially for costly medical services, not only tax deductions for out-of-pocket spending. It is the combination of two products--the HSA and HSA-qualified health insurance plan--that has allowed over one million previously uninsured Americans to afford real health coverage.

I am very pleased to see the positive results of Health Savings Accounts. But we cannot let this momentum slow down. We must do more to promote HSAs and give individuals more control over their health care needs--and that is why I am here today. I am introducing legislation that would increase the maximum amount individuals can contribute to their HSA.

Under current law, an individual's contributions are limited to the lesser of the amount of the deductible or $2700 for self-only coverage, ($5450 for family coverage), for 2006. Under this proposal, a person could contribute--without paying income or payroll taxes on the contribution--up to the plan's out-of-pocket maximum, which is higher than the deductible. So for an individual, the maximum out-of-pocket for 2006 cannot exceed $5250 or $10500 for a family. It is important to note though, that each HSA qualified health plan sets their own limit on out of pocket expenses, therefore, for an individual their out-of- pocket expenses may be lower than maximum $5250 but more than the current limit of $2700. Nevertheless, this legislation allows individuals to save more money for their current and future health care needs and I am proud to be introducing it.

Moreover, this proposal will remove the tax bias against consumer- directed

health plans. Today, the tax code subsidizes health care purchased through insurance but generally does not subsidize health care paid out-of-pocket. This encourages excessive reliance on insurance for even predictable, non-catastrophic care, which in turn reduces consumer sensitivity to the cost of health care. My proposal would help improve the efficiency and slow the growth of our nation's health care spending.

Studies estimate that the average retiree will require hundreds of thousands of dollars of savings for out-of-pocket old-age health costs. HSAs provide strong tax incentives to encourage such savings. On a side note, I have introduced legislation, the Long-Term Care Act that compliments this HSA proposal. Under the Long-Term Care Act, we would allow individuals to use their 401(k) savings to pay for long-term care insurance. Both proposals provide commonsense approaches that will encourage individuals to plan for their future health care needs and reduce individuals' reliance on programs such as Medicaid.

HSAs have proven to be an effective health cost containment tool. While there is a cost to the federal government associated with the tax benefit portion of HSA plans, we must weigh that cost against the cost of doing nothing and allowing cost shifting to those with insurance. Our health care system needs to switch to a preventive care system, which will keep future health care costs down rather than our current costly reactionary system. If we continue down our current path and make no significant changes to our health care system, the unfunded liability of entitlement spending will reach $26 trillion by the year 2030, consuming the entire federal budget. We're at a crucial point, and I believe my legislation, and HSAs in general, offer a step in the right direction for personal responsibility in fostering affordable health care and savings.