Convention Against Torture Implementation Act of 2005

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Law Enforcement Officers' Protection Act of 2005. This act will guarantee tough, mandatory punishment for criminals who murder or assault police officers, firefighters, judges, court employees, ambulance-crew members, and other public-safety officers in the course of their duties. Attacks on police officers and judges are serious crimes. They merit the toughest penalties. LEOPA imposes the following terms of imprisonment for attacks on public-safety officers: (1) second degree murder, 30 years to life; (2) voluntary manslaughter, 15 to 40 years; (3) assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 15 to 40 years; (4) assault with a dangerous weapon, 15 to 40 years; and (5) assault resulting in bodily injury, 5 to 20 years. The act also imposes commensurate penalties for retaliatory murders, kidnappings, and assaults committed against the family members of public-safety officers.

LEOPA includes additional provisions that will deter attacks upon police officers. The act expedites Federal-court review of state convictions for murder of a public-safety officer; it limits the damages that can be recovered by criminals for any injuries experienced during their arrest; it removes arbitrary barriers to retired officers' right to carry concealed weapons under Federal law; it makes it a crime to publicize a public-safety officer's identity in order to threaten or intimidate him; and it increases existing penalties for obstruction of justice and interference with court proceedings.

Aggravated assaults against police officers are a serious national problem. According to the most recent F.RI. report on the subject, 52 law-enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the United States in 2003. In the 10 year period from 1994 through 2003, a total of 616 lawenforcement officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty in the United States.

These officers' assailants unquestionably are among the worst criminals. Of those individuals responsible for unlawful killings of police officers between 1994 and 2003, 521 had a prior criminal arrest, including 153 who had a prior arrest for assaulting a police officer or resisting arrest. The individuals who commit these types of offenses are among the most dangerous members of the criminal class. Tough sentences for these criminals not only protect those who risk their lives to protect us; they also directly protect the public at large by removing a dangerous class of criminals from society.

Ordinary assaults against police officers have become a widespread problem. More than 57,000 law enforcement officers were assaulted in the course of their duties in 2003, and more than a quarter of these assaults resulted in injury to the officer. These numbers represent more than one of every 10 officers serving in the United States. Our society apparently has reached a point where criminals feel entitled to assault a police officer when they are being arrested. LEOPA is designed to change that understanding, to show criminals that assaults against police officers are unacceptable.

It bears mention that because of improvements in technology, recent years' numbers of officers killed in the line of duty even understate the extent of the violence that officers face. As the Los Angeles Times noted in 1994, ``the number of officers killed--an average of 60 to 70 a year since the late 1980s--would have broken records, too, if not for the advent of bulletproof vests, police experts say; about 400 officers have survived shootings over the last decade because they were wearing protective armor.'' (Faye Fiore & Miles Corwin, Toll of Violence Haunts Families of Police Officers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1994, at 1). As the executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police noted recently, ``there's less respect for authority in general and police officers specifically. The predisposition of criminals to use firearms is probably at the highest point in our history.'' (Jerry Nachtigal, Crime Down, but Number of Police Officers Killed Holds Steady, Associated Press Newswires, Apr. 11, 1999).

Violence against police officers also inhibits effective law enforcement. It breeds caution among officers and hinders robust investigation. LEOPA is designed to restore balance to the law. It is designed to ensure that police officers do not fear for their safety when enforcmg the law, but instead, that criminals fear the consequences of breaking the law.

Finally, aside from their broader effects on law enforcement and society, aggravated assaults and murders of police officers simply are terrible crimes. The victims often are young and in the prime of life, leaving behind young children, spouses, and grieving parents. A few recent incidents in the news serve to illustrate the horrific toll that these homicides take on the surviving victims:

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Shayne York, 26 years old, was murdered during an invasion robbery while waiting for his fiancee at a hair salon on August 16, 1997. He was killed solely because of his status as a police officer. The Los Angeles Times gave the following account of the crime from the testimony at the killer's trial:

The robbers yelled racial slurs and ordered customers and

employees to the floor, snatching valuables from everyone

inside. When one of the bandits found a law enforcement badge

in York's wallet, he kicked York as he lay on the ground,

according to testimony from [York's fiancee], also a Los

Angeles County sheriff's deputy. The gunman asked York if he

ever mistreated blacks and Crips gang members at Los Angeles

County's Pitchess Detention Center, where York worked. York

responded, ``No, sir.'' [The killer,] an alleged Crips gang

member, then pointed a pistol at the back of York's head and

squeezed the trigger, prosecutors said. [York's fiancee]

testified she saw York's body go limp as she felt his blood

flowing onto her legs. She said she heard the gunman say, ``I

always wanted to kill a pig.'' (Jack Leonard & Monte Morin,

Man Guilty of Killing Off-Duty Deputy, L.A. Times, Aug. 23,

2000, at B1.)

Deputy York's killer never expressed any remorse over this senseless crime. When jurors read their verdict at his trial, he shouted at them, ``May Allah kill you all, pagans, infidels.'' (Stuart Pfeifer & Richard Marosi, Jury Recommends Death for Robber Who Killed Deputy, L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 2000, at B7.)

California Highway Patrol Officer Don Burt, 25 years old, was shot seven times by a member of a street gang during a traffic stop on July 13, 1996. As Officer Burt lay wounded on the ground, the killer shot him in the head. The Los Angeles Times, covering the killer's trial, gave the following account of the testimony describing the devastating impact of Officer Burt's death on his family:

[Don Burt's father] relived some of his happiest memories

with his son--the wedding of his son and [daughter-in-law]

Kristin, and the day he was told he was going to be a

grandfather. But the proudest moment for both father and son

was when the younger Burt joined the Highway Patrol. ``I

pinned on his badge and 1 hugged him,'' the father said,

tearfully. ``The proudest I'd ever seen him. The gleam he had

in his eye--he was so proud.''

It was a quiet summer night the night his son died, [Burt's

father] told the 12-member jury. He and his wife had just

finished dinner. The telephone rang. It was their daughter-

in-law's father, also a CHP officer, saying there had been a

shooting in the area that the younger Burt patrolled. The

elder Burt, a 30-year veteran trooper, called the CHP

dispatch center to learn more. A patrol car arrived to take

the parents to the hospital. ``We drove [to the hospital] in

dead silence,'' Burt said. ``I knew my son was dead and 1

couldn't tell my wife. She was sitting there with hope and 1

couldn't tell her.''

Jeannie Burt said she didn't realize how serious her son's

injuries were until a few minutes after they arrived at the

hospital. ``I thought he wasn't hurt too bad, that everything

was going to be all right,'' Jeannie Burt told jurors. But

then, ``I saw Kristin's brother and he just shook his head.

And 1 knew my son was dead.'' Tears streamed down Jeannie

Burt's cheeks through most of her testimony. ``He wasn't

perfect, but pretty close to it,'' the mother said through

her tears. ``I'm grateful 1 had my son for the 25 years 1 had

him. 1 wouldn't trade that with anything. I'm just so sad

that my daughter-in-law has lost the love of her life. That

his son does not have a father.''

Kristin Burt, widow of the slain officer, said she was

seven months pregnant with their first child when her husband

of nearly three years was killed. She took the stand Monday,

faltering and fighting back tears as she described how the

coroner told her that her husband was dead. The coroner

``held my hand and slipped Don's wedding ring into my hand,''

Kristin Burt said. (Louis Roug & Meg James, Rage in the

Courtroom, L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 2000, at B1.)

Officer Burt's son, Cameron, was born two months after he was killed.

Compton Police Officers Kevin Burrell and James MacDonald were shot and killed by a wanted criminal during a traffic stop on February 22, 1993. Newspapers gave the following account of the crime: ``The officers were wearing bulletproof vests when they stopped a red pickup truck about 11 p.m., but were knocked to the ground by bullet wounds to their limbs. With the officers lying in the rain-soaked street, [the killer] pumped bullets into their heads, execution-style.'' (Jodi Wi1goren, Killer of 2 Compton Police Officers Sentenced to Death, L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1995, at 1.)

Officers Burrell and MacDonald were both young men, with all of their parents still living, at the time of their deaths. At the killer's trial, their families described the deep trauma that the crime created. The Los Angeles Times gave the following account:

One after another, the mothers and fathers of Officers

James Wayne MacDonald and Kevin Michael Burrell took the

stand to cry out their losses. Three could not complete their

testimony without breaking down so badly that court recessed.

Burrell's mother told how she had heard the shots that killed

her son a few blocks from her home. MacDonald's father,

sobbing uncontrollably, blurted, ``Come home, Jimmy, let me

trade places with you,'' when he was asked what he would tell

his son if he could bring him back.

James and Tonia MacDonald told how they visit their son's

grave twice each day in their hometown of Santa Rosa, just to

chat. Clark and Edna Burrell told how neither of them can

bear to visit the cemetery where their son now lies.

``I heard the shots,'' Edna Burrell said. Then she told how

she reasoned that her son had been hit. ``I was listening to

my police scanner,'' she said, ``and I knew it was Kevin

because I didn't hear them call his name'' on other dispatch

calls. ``So when she (a police officer) knocked on my door,

all I could do is scream, 'Oh God, they shot my baby. ``,

With that, Edna Burrell broke down. Overwhelmed, she was led

from the courtroom, past where [ the killer] sat staring

straight ahead. Sobbing softly, she repeated what she had

said on the stand: ``How could he do that? How could he do

that?''

Both sets of parents said the deaths of their sons left

them feeling empty, lost and angry. ``The whole time I was

praying, just to let Jimmy live until I could see him

again,'' Tonia MacDonald sobbed, remembering the hours after

she was told about the

shooting. ``And then I was so mad at God. All I wanted was to

see him one more time.''

All four parents said old friends have fallen away as grief

consumed their lives. Mother's Day, James MacDonald

testified, has become unbearable. ``This year, when I got up,

I didn't tell her (his wife) 'Happy Mother's Day' because

it's a tough day,'' he said. ``I could see the tears in her

eyes.'' (Emily Adams, Slain Officers'' Parents Tell of Pain,

L.A. Times, June 1, 1995, at 1.)

It bears mention that all of the criminals responsible for the murders described here were convicted of capital offenses, and will be subject to the expedited federal review provisions in section 6 of LEOPA once they complete their State appeals.

Section 6 of the bill is named for Dr. John B. Jamison, a Coconino County, AZ, Reserve Sheriffs Deputy who was murdered while responding to a fellow deputy's call for assistance on September 6, 1982. The killer fired 30 rounds from an assault rifle into Dr. Jamison's car, killing the deputy before he could reach his gun or even unbuckle his seatbelt. Dr. Jamison was survived by his 13-year-old son and 10-year- old daughter. State courts completed their review of the killer's conviction and sentence in 1985. Federal courts then delayed the case for an additional 15 years. One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit even tried to postpone the killer's final execution date on the alleged basis that the killer was wrongfully denied state funds to investigate a rare neurological condition that his lawyer had learned of while watching television. Dr. Jamison's killer ultimately was executed in 2000--18 years after the crime occurred, and 15 years after federal habeas-corpus proceedings began.

Section 6 is designed to prevent these kinds of delays in Federal review of cases involving state convictions for the murder of a public- safety officer. In the district court, parties will be required to move for an evidentiary hearing within 90 days of the completion of briefing, the court must act on the motion within 30 days, and the hearing must begin 60 days later and last no longer than 3 months. All district-court review must be completed within 15 months of the completion of briefing. In the court of appeals, the court must complete review within 120 days of the completion of briefing. In most cases, these limits will ensure that federal review of a defendant's appeal is completed within less than 2 years. This section also makes these deadlines practical and enforceable by limiting federal review to those claims presenting meaningful evidence that the defendant did not commit the crime--defendants would be barred from re-litigating claims unrelated to guilt or innocence. (Defendants still will be permitted to litigate all their legal claims in state court on direct review and state-habeas review, and in petitions for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.)

The need for this provision is particularly stark in the judicial circuit that includes my home state of Arizona. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's pattern of blocking capital punishment for all murderers--including those who kill police officers--is well documented. A recent committee report of the U.S. Senate, for example, notes that: ``Data for the last ten years show that outside of the Ninth Circuit, usually 70 to 80 percent of death sentences are affirmed by a [federal] Court of Appeals on collateral review. In almost every year, however, the Ninth Circuit has reversed the majority of death sentences that it reviews. Moreover, this percentage has climbed sharply in recent years . . . In the last three years, the Ninth Circuit has reversed 88 percent, 80 percent, and 86 percent of the death sentences that it has reviewed.'' (S. Rep. No. 107-315 (2002), at 72-73) The Senate report also notes that a core group of Ninth Circuit judges vote to reverse virtually every death sentence that they review. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, for example, had reviewed 31 death sentences by 2002, and voted to reverse every single one. Other Ninth Circuit judges have similar records.

As Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski has noted, ``there are those of my colleagues who have never voted to uphold a death sentence and doubtless never wil1.'' He continued: ``Refusing to enforce a valid law is a violation of the judges' oath--something that most judges consider a shameful breach of duty. . . . [But] to slow down the pace of executions by finding fault with every death sentence is considered by some to be highly honorable.'' (Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, The New Yorker, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48-53)

This pattern of behavior extends to the Ninth Circuit's review of death sentences imposed for the murder of police officers. In the nine States under the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction, 34 criminals have been sentenced to death for murdering police officers since the late 1970's. Only one--the man who killed Dr. Jamison--has ever been executed. The Ninth Circuit consistently has obstructed all other death sentences for criminals convicted of murdering police officers in the western States.

As one Orange County newspaper columnist notes, these numbers reflect poorly on our society's commitment to ensuring justice for slain police officers and their families:

When California voters reinstated the death penalty in

1978, they made killing an on-duty peace officer one of the

``special circumstances'' that could subject the killer to

execution. The idea behind that was simple enough. If you

made killing a cop a death-penalty offense, maybe it would

make criminals think twice before doing it. . . . But it's

doubtful that the special circumstance concerning peace

officers strikes any fear into the heart of a would-be cop-

killer. Because in the 24 years since the new death-penalty

law was passed, not one cop-killer has been executed in

California. During that time, more than 200 California peace

officers have been murdered in the line of duty, including

eight in Orange County, and dozens of cop-killers have been

sent to death row. But not one has died for his crime. True,

California hasn't been in any hurry to execute other

murderers, either. Since 1978, more than 700 killers have

been sent to death row, but only 10 have been executed. But

the justice system seems particularly reluctant to actually

enforce the death penalty against cop-killers. ``That sends a

terrible message,'' says Marianne Wrede of Anaheim Hills,

whose son, West Covina Police Officer Kenneth Wrede, was

murdered in 1983. ``It says the justice system doesn't

respect the sacrifices of police officers and their

families.'' (Gordon Dillow, State Balks at Executing Cop-

Killers, The Orange County Reg., Dec. 5, 2002)

These unconscionable delays have greatly increased the suffering experienced by the surviving families of murdered police officers. Again, a few examples from recent news stories illustrate the nature of the problems created by the current system of decades-long post- conviction review:

On August 31, 1983, West Covina Police Officer Kenneth Wrede, 26 years old, responded to a call about a man behaving strangely in a residential neighborhood. Wrede confronted the man, who became abusive and tried to hit Wrede with an 8-foot tree spike. Wrede could have shot the man, but instead attempted to defuse the situation. The man then reached into Wrede's car and ripped the shotgun and rack from the dashboard. Wrede drew his gun and persuaded the man to lay down the shotgun, but the man picked it up again when Wrede lowered his revolver and shot Wrede in the head, killing him instantly.

Years later, Wrede's parents described the terrible impact of this crime on their family. Marianne Wrede told of how ``a half hour before local television newscasts would broadcast the story, her doorbell rang. On the steps stood her son's commander and a police lieutenant. Between them stood Kenneth Wrede's distraught wife. `I knew it was bad news,' Marianne Wrede said. `I shut the door in their faces and I said, `It can't be my boy.' '' (Laura-Lynne Powell, Grief Unites Kin of Fallen Officers, The Orange County Reg., June 20,1991, at EO1) Many years after the crime, she reflected that ``every day I miss my son and it never goes away.'' (Anne C. Mulkern & Tiffany Montgomery, Caring Counts in Line of Duty, The Orange County Reg., Sept. 25, 1996, at BO1) Ken Wrede's father also described the impact of the loss of his son. ``My life will never be the same. I deal with it every day; when I hear a police siren and immediately think of my son, when I pull up next to a police car and think that that could have been him. I still stop as often as I can and tell the officers to have a good day and be careful.'' (David Haldane & Michael Wagner, For Some, a Reminder of Past Tragedy, L.A. Times, July 15, 1996, at A3)

Officer Wrede's killer was sentenced to death in 1984, and that conviction was affirmed by the California Supreme Court in 1989. Then in 2000--17 years after Ken Wrede's murder--a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the killer's death sentence. The

Ninth Circuit found that the killer's lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase because he did not present additional evidence of the killer's abusive childhood and drug use.

At the time, Marianne Wrede noted, ``We thought we finally were close to getting this behind us. And now this.'' (Gordon Dillow, Long Wait for Justice Gets Worse, The Orange County Reg., May 11, 2000, at BO1) A California Deputy Attorney General denounced the decision, stating that ``it can always be suggested a jury should have heard something else in the penalty phase of a death penalty case.'' (Richard Winston, Reversal of Death Penalty in Officer's Killing Decried Courts, L.A. Times, May 10, 2000, at B3) West Covina Corporal Robert Tibbets, the original investigator at the scene of Wrede's murder, described the Ninth Circuit's decision as a ``miscarriage of justice.'' (Id.) He had promised Wrede's parents that he would accompany them to every court hearing for their son's killer. He made good on his promise, even 19 years later, when the killer was retried and again sentenced to death in 2002. But the Wredes now face another round of state and then federal appeals. At the retrial, Ken's father noted that ``my family and 1 had endured 19 years of trial, appeals, delays, causing us to relive the trauma of Kenny's death over and over again.'' The trial judge agreed. He stated, ``It is an obscenity to put anyone through this needlessly for 19 years. It is inexcusable for us in the system that we need to look at this case for 19 years to get it resolved. The system at some point in the line has become clogged and broken.'' (Larry Welborn, 19 Years and no Resolution for Parents, The Orange County Reg., Sept. 21, 2002)

Riverside Police Officers Dennis Doty and Philip Trust were killed by a man whom they attempted to arrest at his home on May 13, 1982. The man was in bed when the officers arrived and they permitted him to dress. The man then pulled out a gun that he had been sitting on and shot and killed both officers. He apparently sought revenge for injuries that he sustained when he was shot while committing a bank robbery. Officer Doty had served a tour of duty in Vietnam, where he had received a purple heart and bronze star. The State supreme court affirmed the killer's conviction and death sentence in 1991.

In 2002, 20 years after the murders, Federal district court reversed the killer's death sentence, finding that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not trust his lawyers. Local Superior Court judge Edward Webster denounced the decision, declaring that he was ``outraged by the entire federal process.'' He declared that ``this [ decision] is just a product of judges'' personal opinions and philosophies opposing the death penalty.'' (Marlowe Churchill, Riverside Judge Takes Federal Court to Task, The Press-Enterprise, July 22, 1995, at BO1) The Riverside assistant police chief noted that the decision was particularly unfortunate for the officers' families: ``They lived this 20 years ago, and not to have closure on the trial process is particularly difficult'' (Mike Kataoka, Court Annuls Death Decree, The Press Enterprise, May 31, 2002, at BO1)

Los Angeles Police Detective Tom Williams was shot and killed by a man against whom he had testified several hours earlier in a robbery trial on October 31, 1985. Detective Williams was killed while picking up his son at a day-care center. A local newspaper gave the following account of the crime: ``With [his son] Ryan sitting beside him in the front seat of his truck, Williams, 42, saw the man in the ski mask, saw the automatic weapon pointing out of the driver's side window of the passing car. But he was helpless to do anything to protect himself. All he had time to do was scream for Ryan to get down, then cover the boy with his own body.'' (Dennis McCarthy, Youth Feels Need to Serve, L.A. Daily News, Aug. 24, 1993, at Nl) The Los Angeles Times gave the following account of testimony from the killer's trial:

A seventh-grade pupil at a Canoga Park church school

testified Wednesday that he saw 6-year-old Ryan Williams

sitting on the ground crying moments after the boy's father,

a Los Angeles police detective, had been gunned down in the

street on Oct. 31,1985. Thomas C. Williams, 42, was picking

up Ryan from school at 5:40 p.m. when he was struck by eight

bullets from an automatic weapon. The detective died, slumped

against the driver's side of his orange pickup truck. . . .

[The pupil] said he looked toward Williams' truck, parked in

front of the Faith Baptist Church school, and saw the

windshield shatter. ``It split into pieces,'' [he] said.

``Then I ducked. I couldn't see anything. I got up because I

heard some little boy cry. I walked over. He was sitting on

the ground and he was crying and he had a bloody lip.'' (Lynn

Steinberg, Boy Tells of Fatal Attack on Detective, L.A.

Times, Feb. 11, 1998, at 12)

Detective Williams's killer remains on death row today, 20 years after committing this crime.

Garden Grove police officer Donald Reed was shot and killed while arresting a man at a bar on June 7, 1980. The killer appeared at first to cooperate with police, but then pulled a pistol from his jacket and began firing. One officer who comforted Reed as he lay on the ground describe the scene: ``I could see a sense of panic in Don's eyes. He said, `I am not gonna make it' '' (Daniel Yi, Slain Officer's Family Testifies, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1)

When Reed died, he had two toddler sons, ages 3 and 1\1/2\. Reed's killer was sentenced to death, but the sentence was reversed on appeal, and he was retried and sentenced to death again in 2000. Reed's sons were 22 and 21 by the time of the retrial. Still coping with the loss of their father, they chose not to attend the second trial. ``I was a mother, a father, I had to teach them everything,'' Reed's widow stated. (Id.) Of her husband, she simply noted, ``He was taken unnecessarily.'' (John McDonald, Officer's Widow Details Trauma, The Orange County Reg., Feb. 9, 2000, at B01) She also described the impact on her family of holding a second trial 20 years after the crime. ``We had all moved on, and then this came back and smacked us in the face. It really just tears you apart.'' (Daniel Yi, Slain Officer's Family Testifies, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1)

Los Angeles Police Officer Paul Verna was gunned down during a traffic stop on June 2, 1983, by two men who earlier had committed a series of violent robberies. The first man shot Verna from inside the car, and the second then exited the vehicle and shot Verna five more times as he lay on the ground. Verna was survived by his wife and two young sons. Years later, the state supreme court reversed the death sentence of one of the killers. A new trial was held in 2000. At the first trial, Verna's widow described the devastating impact of the crime on her family. She spoke of how ``no one who has not done it can know how difficult it is to tell two young boys that the daddy they loved so much is gone.'' (Janet Rae-Dupree, 2 Sentenced to Die for Killing Policeman, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1985, at 6) A local newspaper gave the following accounts of the sentencing retrial:

Vema's sons were young boys, 4 and 9, when he was murdered.

This past week, they testified as young men. They told the

jury that they did not have a lot of first-hand recollection

of their dad. They did have the memories of stories from

their mom and many others as to what their dad was like. Ryan

[the younger son] spoke of sometimes feeling uneasy at being

told how much he looked like and even acted like his dad,

whom he does not remember. Sandy, Verna's widow, spoke of the

challenge of properly raising two very young boys alone. (Jim

Tatreau, Who Was Paul Verna? Murdered Officer Deeply Missed

Hero, L.A. Daily News, Oct. 22, 2000, at V3)

``At age 33, to be a widow--my roles in life completely

changed. The very hardest part was when they were very young

kids--when Ryan, who was 4 years old when his father died,

would get hurt and would cry to his mother at bedtime,

`Mommy, I just want my daddy.' I couldn't give that to him,

no matter how hard I tried. I could do everything else, but I

couldn't give him his daddy.'' (Jason Kandel, Retrial Brings

Victim's Family to Tears, L.A. Daily News, Sept. 27, 2000, at

Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague, Senator Cornyn of Texas, to introduce the ``DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005.'' This act will allow State and Federal law enforcement to catch rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals whom it otherwise would be impossible to identify and arrest.

The principal provisions of the DNA Fingerprint Act make it easier to include and keep the DNA profiles of criminal arrestees in the National DNA Index System, where that profile can be compared to crime-scene evidence. By removing current barriers to maintaining data from criminal arrestees, the act will allow the creation of a comprehensive, robust database that will make it possible to catch serial rapists and murderers before they commit more crimes.

The impact this act will have on preventing rape and other violent crimes is not merely speculative. We know from real life examples that an all-arrestee database can prevent many future offenses. In March of this year, the city of Chicago produced a case study of eight serial killers in that city who would have been caught after their first offense--rather than after their fourth or tenth--if an all-arrestee database had been in place. This study is included in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The first example that the Chicago study cites involves serial rapist and murderer Andre Crawford. In March 1993, Crawford was arrested for felony theft. Under the DNA Fingerprint Act, the state of Illinois would have been able to take a DNA sample from Crawford at that time and upload and keep that sample in NDIS, the national DNA database. But at that time--and still today--Federal law makes it difficult to upload an arrestee's profiles to NDIS, and bars States from keeping that profile in NDIS if the arrestee is not later convicted of a criminal offense. As a result, Crawford's DNA profile was not collected and it was not added to NDIS. And as a result, when Crawford murdered a 37- year-old woman on September 21, 1993, although DNA evidence was recovered from the crime scene, Crawford could not be identified as the perpetrator. And as a result, Crawford went on to commit many more rapes and murders.

On December 21, 1994, a 24-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned building on the 800 block of West 50th place in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the September 1993 murder, and this December 1994 murder could have been prevented.

On April 3, 1995, a 36-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned house on the 5000 block of South Carpenter Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the two earlier murders that he had committed, and this April 1995 muurder could have been prevented.

On July 23, 1997, a 27-year-old woman was found murdered in a closet of an abandoned house on the 900 block of West 51st Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the three earlier murders that he had committed, and this July 1997 murder could have been prevented.

On December 27, 1997, a 42-year-old woman was raped in Chicago. As she walked down the street, a man approached her from behind, put a knife to her head, dragged her into an abandoned building on the 5100 block of South Peoria Street, and beat and raped her. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the four earlier murders that he had committed, and this December 1997 rape could have been prevented.

In June 1998, a 31-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned building on the 5000 block of South May Street in Chicago. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the four earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this June 1998 murder could have been prevented.

On August 13, 1998, a 44-year-old woman was found murdered in an abandoned house on the 900 block of West 52nd Street. Her clothes were found in the alley. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the five earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this August 1998 murder could have been prevented.

Also on August 13, 1998, a 32-year-old woman was found murdered in the attic of a house on the 5200 block of South Marshfield. Her body was decomposed, but DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the six earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this additional murder could have been prevented.

On December 8, 1998, a 35-year-old woman was found murdered in a building on the 1200 block of West 52nd Street. She had rope marks around her neck and injuries to her face. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the seven earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this December 1998 murder could have been prevented.

On February 2, 1999, a 35-year-old woman was found murdered on the 1300 block of West 51st Street. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the eight earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this February 1999 murder could have been prevented.

On April 21, 1999, a 44-year-old woman was found murdered in the upstairs of an abandoned house on the 5000 block of South Justine Street. DNA evidence was recovered. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the nine earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this April 1999 murder could have been prevented.

And on June 20, 1999, a 41-year-old woman was found murdered in the attic of an abandoned building on the 1500 block of West 51st Street. DNA evidence was recovered from blood on a nearby wall, indicating a struggle. That DNA evidence identifies Crawford as the perpetrator. If the DNA Fingerprint Act had been law, and Crawford's profile had been collected after his March 1993 arrest, he would have been identified as the perpetrator of the ten earlier murders and one rape that he had committed, and this additional murder could have been prevented.

As the city of Chicago case study concludes:

In January 2000, Andre Crawford was charged with 11 murders

and 1 Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. If his DNA sample

had been taken on March 6, 1993, the subsequent 10 murders

and 1 rape would not have happened.

The city of Chicago study goes on to discuss the cases of 7 other serial rapists and murders from that city. Collectively, together with Andre Crawford, these 8 serial rapists and

killers represent 22 murders and 30 rapes that could have been prevented had an all-arrestee database been in place.

The DNA Fingerprint Act eliminates current federal statutory restrictions that prevent states from adding and keeping arresttee profiles in NDIS. In effect, the Act would make it possible to build a comprehensive, robust national all-arrestee DNA database.

Here is how the DNA Fingerprint Act works: First, under current Federal law, a DNA profile from an arrestee cannot be uploaded to NDIS until the arrestee is charged in an indictment or information. Thus today, even an arrestee charged in a pleading cannot have his DNA uploaded to the national index. The act eliminates this restriction, allowing arrestees to be included as soon as they are arrested. It also eliminates a statutory restriction that bars inclusion of profiles from suspects who provide so-called ``exoneration'' samples. The act recognizes that criminal suspects have no legitimate interest in evading identification for crimes that they have committed.

Second, the act requires an arrestee to take the initiative to opt out of NDIS if charges against him have been dismissed or he has been acquitted, and he does not want his DNA profile compared to future crime scene evidence. Current law places the burden of determining who may be removed from the index on the administrator of the DNA database, thus requiring the administrator to track the progress of individual criminal cases. This bureaucratic burden discourages states from creating and maintaining comprehensive, all-arrestee DNA databases. It also effectively precludes the creation of a genuine national all- arrestee database. In effect, only convicts' DNA profiles can be kept in the database over the long term. The act would allow arrestee profiles to be kept in the database as well.

Third, the DNA Fingerprint Act would allow expanded use of CODIS grants. Congress currently appropriates funds for use by states to expand their DNA databases. Current law restricts the use of these grants, however, to only building databases of convicted felons. This bill expands this authorization to allow use of these funds to build a database of all DNA samples collected under lawful authority--including samples taken from arrestees.

Fourth, the DNA Fingerprint Act allows the Federal Government to take and keep DNA samples from arrestees. The act gives the Attorney-General the authority to develop regulations allowing collection of DNA profiles from federal arrestees or detainees. The authority to issue such regulations would give the Attorney General the flexibility needed to respond to new legal developments and changes in technology.

And finally, the act tolls the statute of limitations for Federal sex offenses. Current law generally tolls the statute of limitations for felony cases in which the perpetrator is implicated in the offense through DNA testing. The one exception to this tolling is the sexual- abuse offenses in chapter 109A of title 18. When Congress adopted general tolling, it left out chapter 109A, apparently because those crimes already are subject to the use of ``John Doe'' indictments to charge unidentified perpetrators. The Justice Department has made clear, however, that John Doe indictments are ``not an adequate substitute for the applicability of [tolling].'' The Department has criticized the exception in current law as ``work[ing] against the effective prosecution of rapes and other serious sexual assaults under chapter 109A,'' noting that it makes ``the statute of limitation rules for such offenses more restrictive than those for all other Federal offenses in cases involving DNA identification.'' The DNA Fingerprint Act corrects this anomaly by allowing tolling for chapter 109A offenses.

Further evidence of the potential effectiveness of a comprehensive, robust DNA database is available from the recent experience of Great Britain. The British have taken the lead in using DNA to solve crimes, creating a database that now includes 2,000,000 profiles. Their database has now reached the critical mass where it is big enough to serve as a highly effective tool for solving crimes. In the U.K., DNA from crime scenes produces a match to the DNA database in 40 percent of all cases. This amounted to 58,176 cold hits in the United Kingdom 2001. (See generally ``The Application of DNA Technology in England and Wales,'' a study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice.) A broad DNA database works. The same tool should be made available in the United States.

Some critics of DNA databasing argue that a comprehensive database would violate criminal suspects' privacy rights. This is simply untrue. The sample of DNA that is kept in NDIS is what is called ``junk DNA''-- it is impossible to determine anything medically sensitive from this DNA. For example, this DNA does not allow the tester to determine if the donor is susceptible to particular diseases. The Justice Department addressed this issue in its statement of views on S. 1700, a DNA bill that was introduced in the 108th Congress:

[T]here [are no] legitimate privacy concerns that require

the retention or expansion of these [burdensome expungement

provisions]. The DNA identification system is already subject

to strict privacy rules, which generally limit the use of DNA

samples and DNA profiles in the system to law enforcement

identification purposes. See 42 U.S.C. 14132(b)-(c).

Moreover, the DNA profiles that are maintained in the

national index relate to 13 DNA sites that do not control any

traits or characteristics of individuals. Hence, the

databased information cannot be used to discern, for example,

anything about an individual's genetic illnesses, disorders,

or dispositions. Rather, by design, the information the

system retains in the databased DNA profiles is the

equivalent of a ``genetic fingerprint'' that uniquely

identifies an individual, but does not disclose other facts

about him.

Elsewhere in its Views Letter, the Justice Department also explained why the restrictive expungement provisions in current law are unnecessary and contrary to sound public policy. The letter noted that the FBI maintains a database of fingerprints of arrestees--without regard to whether the arrestee later was acquitted or convicted. The letter states, ``With respect to the . . . exclusion of DNA profiles of unindicted arrestees, it should be noted by way of comparison that there is no Federal policy that bars States from including fingerprints of arrestees in State and Federal law enforcement databases prior to indictment.'' The Justice Department also pointed out that ``[t]here is no reason to have a . . . Federal policy mandating expungement for DNA information. If the person whose DNA it is does not commit other crimes, then the information simply remains in a secure database and there is no adverse effect on his life. But if he commits a murder, rape, or other serious crime, and DNA matching can identify him as the perpetrator, then it is good that the information was retained.''

From the Chicago study--which examines the experience of just one American city over recent years--we know that an all-arrestee database can and inevitably will make the critical difference in solving and preventing violent sex offenses. From the British experience, we know that a comprehensive database can be a highly effective tool in solving crimes. And we know that DNA databasing does not violate the right to privacy. I urge the Congress to enact the DNA Fingerprint Act--before another preventable sex crime occurs.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Chicago study be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, tax shelter and tax haven abuses are undermining the integrity of our tax system, robbing the Treasury of tens of billions of dollars each year, and shifting the tax burden from high income individuals and businesses onto the backs of middle income families. These abuses account for a significant portion of the more than $300 billion in taxes owed by individuals, businesses, and organizations that goes unpaid each year. As a matter of fairness, these abuses must be stopped. Today, I am introducing, with Senator Norm Coleman, a comprehensive tax reform bill called the Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005 that can help put an end to these abuses. Senator Barack Obama is also an original cosponsor.

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, on which I serve with Senator Coleman, has worked for years to expose and combat abusive tax shelters and tax havens. In the previous Congress, we introduced legislation confronting these twin threats to U.S. tax compliance; today's bill reflects not only the Subcommittee's additional investigative work but also innovative ideas to stop unethical tax advisers and tax havens from aiding and abetting U.S. tax evasion.

Abusive tax shelters are very different from legitimate tax shelters, such as deducting the interest paid on your home mortgage or Congressionally approved tax deductions for building affordable housing. Abusive tax shelters are complicated transactions promoted to provide large tax benefits unintended by the tax code. Abusive tax shelters are marked by one characteristic: there is no real economic or business rationale other than tax avoidance. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in Gregory v. Helvering, they are ``entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation.''

Likewise, a tax haven is simply a country or jurisdiction that imposes little or no tax on income and offers non-residents the ability to escape taxes in their home country. The abuse of tax havens occurs when income is attributed to that country, even though little or no business activity actually occurs there. Tax havens are also characterized by corporate, bank, and tax secrecy laws that make it difficult for other countries to find out whether their citizens are using the tax haven to cheat on their taxes.

Today's tax dodges are often tough to prosecute. Crimes such as terrorism, murder, and fraud produce instant recognition of the immorality involved. Abusive tax shelters and tax havens, by contrast, are often ``MEGOs,'' meaning ``My Eyes Glaze Over.'' Those who cook up these concoctions count on their complexity to escape scrutiny and public ire. But regardless of how complicated or eye-glazing, the hawking of abusive tax shelters by tax professionals like accountants, bankers, investment advisers, and lawyers to thousands of people like late-night, cut-rate T.V. bargains is scandalous and has got to stop. Hiding tax schemes through offshore companies and bank accounts in tax havens with secrecy laws also needs to be attacked with the full force of the law.

Today, I would like to take a few minutes to try to cut through the haze of these schemes to see them for what they really are and explain what our bill would do to stop them. First, I will look at our investigation into abusive tax shelters and discuss the provisions we have included in this bill to combat them. Then, I will turn to tax haven abuses and our proposed remedies.

For three years, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has been conducting an investigation into the design, sale, and implementation of abusive tax shelters. While I initiated this investigation when I was Chairman of our Subcommittee in 2002, it has since had the support of our new Chairman, Senator Coleman.

In November 2003, our Subcommittee held two days of hearings and released a report prepared by my staff that pulled back the curtain on how even some respected accounting firms, banks, investment advisors, and law firms had become the engines pushing the design and sale of abusive tax shelters to corporations and individuals across this country. In February 2005, the Subcommittee issued a report that provided further details on the role these professional firms played in the proliferation of these abusive shelters. Our Subcommittee report was endorsed by the full Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in April.

The Subcommittee investigation found that many abusive tax shelters were not dreamed up by the taxpayers who used them. Instead, most were devised by tax professionals, such as accountants, bankers, investment advisors, and lawyers, who then sold the tax shelter to clients for a fee. In fact, as our investigation widened, we found hordes of tax advisors cooking up one complex scheme after another, packaging them up as generic ``tax products'' with boiler-plate legal and tax opinion letters, and then undertaking elaborate marketing schemes to peddle these products to literally thousands of persons across the country. In return, these tax shelter promoters were getting hundreds of millions of dollars in fees, while diverting billions of dollars in tax revenues from the U.S. Treasury each year.

For example, one shelter investigated by the Subcommittee and featured in the November 2003 Subcommittee hearings has since become part of an IRS effort to settle cases involving a set of abusive tax shelters known as ``Son of Boss.'' To date, more than 1,200 taxpayers have admitted wrongdoing and agreed to pay back taxes, interest and penalties totaling more than $3.7 billion. That's billions of dollars the IRS has collected on just one type of tax shelter, demonstrating both the depth of the problem and the potential for progress.

The Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005 that we are introducing today contains a number of measures to curb abusive tax shelters. The bill strengthens the penalties on promoters of abusive tax shelters. It codifies and strengthens the economic substance doctrine, which eliminates tax benefits for transactions that have no real business purpose apart from avoiding taxes. The bill deters banks' participation in abusive tax shelter activities by requiring regulators to develop new examination procedures to detect and stop such activities. It ends outdated communication barriers between key enforcement agencies to allow the exchange of information relating to tax evasion cases.

The bill also requires the Treasury Department to issue tougher standards for tax shelter opinion letters. It increases incentives for whistleblowers to report tax evasion to the IRS. The bill also provides for increased disclosure of tax shelter information to Congress. It simplifies and clarifies an existing prohibition on accountants being paid contingent fees which increase as phony tax losses increase. And it expresses the sense of the Senate that the IRS needs more funding to combat tax shelter abuses.

Let me be more specific about these key provisions to curb abusive tax shelters.

Title I of the bill strengthens two very important penalties that the IRS can use in its fight against the professionals who make these complex abusive shelters possible. A year ago, the penalty for promoting an abusive tax shelter, as set forth in Section 6700 of the tax code, was the lesser of $1,000 or 100 percent of the promoter's gross income derived from the prohibited activity. That meant in most cases the maximum fine was just $1,000.

Many abusive tax shelters sell for $100,000 or $250,000 apiece. Our investigation uncovered some tax shelters that were sold for as much as $2 million or even $5 million apiece, as well as instances in which the same cookie-cutter tax opinion letter was sold to 100 or even 200 clients. There are big bucks to be made in this business, and a $1,000 fine is laughable.

The Senate acknowledged that last year when it adopted the Levin- Coleman amendment to the JOBS Act, S. 1637, raising the Section 6700 penalty on abusive tax shelter promoters to 100 pefcent of the fees earned by the promoter from the abusive shelter. A 100 percent penalty would have ensured that the abusive tax shelter hucksters would not get to keep a single penny of their ill-gotten gains. That figure, however, was cut in half in the conference report, setting the penalty at 50 percent of the fees earned and allowing the promoters of abusive shelters get to keep half of their illicit profits.

While 50 percent is an obvious improvement over $1000, this penalty still

is inadequate and makes no sense. Why should anyone who pushes an illegal tax shelter that robs our Treasury of much needed revenues get to keep half of his ill-gotten gains? What deterrent effect is created by a penalty that allows promoters to keep half of their fees if caught, and of course, all of their fees if they are not caught? Tax shelter promoters ought to face a penalty that is at least as harsh as the penalty imposed on the person who purchased their tax product, not only because the promoter is usually as culpable as the taxpayer, but also so promoters think twice about pushing abusive tax schemes.

Effective penalties should make sure that the peddler of an abusive tax shelter is deprived of every penny of profit earned from selling or implementing the shelter and then is fined on top of that. Specifically, Section 101 of this bill would increase the penalty on tax shelter promoters to an amount up to the greater of either 150 percent of the promoters' gross income from the prohibited activity, or the amount assessed against the taxpayer--including back-taxes, interest and penalties.

A second penalty provision in the bill addresses what our investigation found to be one of the biggest problems: the knowing assistance of accounting firms, law firms, banks, and others to help taxpayers understate their taxes. In addition to those who meet the definition of ``promoters'' of abusive shelters, there are professional firms that aid and abet the use of abusive tax shelters and enable taxpayers to carry out the abusive tax schemes. For example, law firms are often asked to write ``opinion letters'' to help taxpayers head off IRS questioning and fines that they might otherwise confront for using an abusive shelter. Currently, under Section 6701 of the tax code, these aiders and abettors face a maximum penalty of only $1,000, or $10,000 if the offender is a corporation. This penalty, too, is a joke. When law firms are getting $50,000 for each of these cookie-cutter opinion letters, it provides no deterrent whatsoever. A $1,000 fine is like a jaywalking ticket for robbing a bank.

Section 102 of the bill would strengthen Section 6701 significantly, subjecting aiders and abettors to a maximum fine up to the greater of either 150 percent of the aider and abettor's gross income from the prohibited activity, or the amount assessed against the taxpayer for using the abusive shelter. This penalty would apply to all aiders and abettors not just tax return preparers.

Again, the Senate has recognized the need to toughen this critical penalty. In last year's JOBS Act, Senator Coleman and I successfully increased this fine to 100 percent of the gross income derived from the prohibited activity. Unfortunately, the conference report completely omitted this change, allowing aiders and abettors to continue to profit without penalty from their wrongdoing.

If further justification for toughening these penalties is needed, one document uncovered by our investigation shows the cold calculation engaged in by a tax advisor facing low fines. A senior tax professional at accounting giant KPMG compared possible tax shelter fees with possible tax shelter penalties if the firm were caught promoting an illegal tax shelter. This senior tax professional wrote the following: ``[O]ur average deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000.'' He then recommended the obvious: going forward with sales of the abusive tax shelter on a cost- benefit basis.

Title III of the bill would strengthen legal prohibitions against abusive tax shelters by codifying in Federal tax statutes for the first time what is known as the economic substance doctrine. This anti-tax abuse doctrine was fashioned by federal courts evaluating transactions that appeared to have little or no business purpose or economic substance apart from tax avoidance. It has become a powerful analytical tool used by courts to invalidate abusive tax shelters. At the same time, because there is no statute underlying this doctrine and the courts have developed and applied it differently in different judicial districts, the existing case law has many ambiguities and conflicting interpretations.

Under the leadership of Senators Grassley and Baucus, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Finance Committee, the Senate has voted on multiple occasions to enact this economic substance provision, but the House conferees have rejected it each time. Since no tax shelter legislation would be complete without addressing this issue, Title III of this comprehensive bill proposes once more to include the economic substance doctrine in the tax code. I hope that with continued pressure, it will become law in this Congress.

The bill will also help fight abusive tax shelters that are disguised as complex investment opportunities and use financing or securities transactions provided by financial institutions. In reality, tax shelter schemes lack the economic risks and rewards associated with a true investment. These phony transactions instead often rely on the temporary use of significant amounts of money in low risk schemes mischaracterized as real investments. The financing or securities transactions called for by these schemes are often supplied by a bank, securities firm, or other financial institution.

Currently the tax code prohibits financial institutions from providing products or services that aid or abet tax evasion or that promote or implement abusive tax shelters. The agencies that oversee these financial institutions on a daily basis, however, are experts in banking and securities law and generally lack the expertise to spot tax issues. Section 202 would crack down on financial institutions' illegal tax shelter activities by requiring federal bank regulators and the SEC to work with the IRS to develop examination techniques to detect such abusive activities and put an end to them.

These examination techniques would be used at least every 2 years, preferably in combination with routine regulatory examinations, and the regulators would report potential violations to the IRS. The agencies would also be required to prepare joint reports to Congress in 2007 and 2010 on preventing the participation of financial institutions in tax evasion or tax shelter activities.

During hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on tax shelters in November 2003, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson testified that his agency was barred by Section 6103 of the tax code from communicating information to other federal agencies that would assist those agencies in their law enforcement duties. He pointed out that the IRS was barred from providing tax return information to the SEC, federal bank regulators, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)--even, for example, when that information might assist the SEC in evaluating whether an abusive tax shelter resulted in deceptive accounting in a public company's financial statements, might help the Federal Reserve determine whether a bank selling tax products to its clients had violated the law against promoting abusive tax shelters, or help the PCAOB judge whether an accounting firm had impaired its independence by selling tax shelters to its audit clients.

A recent example demonstrates how ill-conceived these information barriers are. A few months ago the IRS offered a settlement initiative to companies and corporate executives who participated in an abusive tax shelter involving the transfer of stock options to family- controlled entities. Over a hundred corporations and executives responded with admissions of wrongdoing. In addition to tax violations, their misconduct may be linked to securities law violations and improprieties by corporate auditors or banks, but the IRS has informed the Subcommittee that it is currently barred by law from sharing the names of the wrongdoers with the SEC, banking regulators, or PCAOB.

These communication barriers are outdated, inefficient, and ill- suited to stopping the torrent of tax shelter abuses now affecting or being promoted by so many public companies, banks, and accounting firms. To address this problem, Section 203 of this bill would authorize the Treasury Secretary, with appropriate privacy safeguards, to disclose to the SEC, Federal banking agencies, and the PCAOB, upon request, tax return information related to abusive tax shelters, inappropriate tax avoidance, or tax evasion. The

agencies could then use this information only for law enforcement purposes, such as preventing accounting firms or banks from promoting abusive tax shelters, or detecting accounting fraud in the financial statements of public companies.

Another finding of the Subcommittee investigation is that some tax practitioners are circumventing current State and Federal constraints on charging tax service fees that are dependent on the amount of promised tax benefits. Traditionally, accounting firms charged flat fees or hourly fees for their tax services. In the 1990s, however, they began charging ``value added'' fees based on, in the words of one accounting firm's manual, ``the value of the services provided, as opposed to the time required to perform the services.'' In addition, some firms began charging ``contingent fees'' that were calculated according to the size of the paper ``loss'' that could be produced for a client and used to offset the client's other taxable income--the greater the so-called loss, the greater the fee.

In response, many States prohibited accounting firms from charging contingent fees for tax work to avoid creating incentives for these firms to devise ways to shelter substantial sums. The SEC and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants also issued rules restricting contingent fees, allowing them in only limited circumstances. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board sent the SEC for approval a similar rule prohibiting public accounting firms from charging contingent fees for tax services provided to the public companies they audit. Each of these Federal, State, and professional ethics rules seeks to limit the use of contingent fees under certain, limited circumstances.

The Subcommittee investigation found that tax shelter fees, which are typically substantial and sometimes exceed $1 million, are often linked to the amount of a taxpayer's projected paper losses which can be used to shelter income from taxation. For example, in three tax shelters examined by the Subcommittee, documents show that the fees were equal to a percentage of the paper loss to be generated by the transaction. In one case, the fees were typically set at 7 percent of the transaction's generated ``tax loss'' that clients could use to reduce other taxable income. In other words, the greater the loss that could be concocted for the taxpayer or ``investor,'' the greater the profit for the tax promoter. Think about that--greater the loss, the greater the profit. How's that for turning capitalism on its head!

In addition, evidence indicated that, in at least one instance, a tax advisor was willing to deliberately manipulate the way it handled certain tax products to circumvent contingent fee prohibitions. An internal document at an accounting firm related to a specific tax shelter, for example, identified the States that prohibited contingent fees. Then, rather than prohibit the tax shelter transactions in those States or require an alternative fee structure, the memorandum directed the firm's tax professionals to make sure the engagement letter was signed, the engagement was managed, and the bulk of services was performed ``in a jurisdiction that does not prohibit contingency fees.''

Right now, the prohibitions on contingent fees are complex and must be evaluated in the context of a patchwork of Federal, State, and professional ethics rules. Section 201 of the bill would establish a single enforceable rule, applicable nationwide, that would prohibit tax practitioners from charging fees calculated according to a projected or actual amount of tax savings or paper losses.

Past laws, such as the Whistleblower Protection Act and qui tam lawsuits under the False Claims Act, demonstrate that individuals with inside information can help expose serious misconduct that the U.S. government might otherwise miss. The tax arena is no different. Persons with inside information can help expose millions of dollars in tax fraud if they are willing to step forward and tell the IRS what they know about specific instances of misconduct.

Under current law, potential whistleblowers with inside information about tax misconduct do not have an established IRS office that is sensitive to their concerns, provides consistent treatment, and oversees the calculation and payment of monetary rewards for important information. Section 206 of this bill, which is very similar to a provision developed by the Senate Finance Committee, would, among other measures, establish a Whistleblowers Office within the IRS, codify standards for the payment of monetary rewards, and exempt whistleblower monetary payments from the alternative minimum tax.

Each of these measures is intended to increase incentives for persons to blow the whistle on tax misconduct. The one key difference between our bill and the Finance Committee provision is that we would continue to give the IRS the discretion to determine the amount of money paid to an individual whistleblower; our bill would not enable whistleblowers to appeal to a court to obtain additional sums. The fact-specific analysis that goes into evaluating a whistleblower's assistance and calculating a reward makes court review inadvisable. The existence of an appeal also invites litigation and necessitates the expenditure of taxpayer dollars--not for tax enforcement but for a court dispute. The new Whistleblowers Office is intended to promote the consistent, equitable treatment of persons who report tax misconduct, without also inviting expensive and time-consuming litigation.

Section 205 of the bill would direct the Treasury Department to issue new standards for tax practitioners issuing opinion letters on the tax implications of potential tax shelters as part of Circular 230. The public has traditionally relied on tax opinion letters to obtain informed and trustworthy advice about whether a tax-motivated transaction meets the requirements of the law. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found that, in too many cases, tax opinion letters no longer contain disinterested and reliable tax advice, even when issued by supposedly reputable accounting or law firms.

Instead, some tax opinion letters have become marketing tools used by tax shelter promoters and their allies to sell clients on their latest tax products. In many of these cases, financial interests and biases were concealed, unreasonable factual assumptions were used to justify dubious legal conclusions, and taxpayers were misled about the risk that the proposed transaction would later be designated an illegal tax shelter. Reforms are essential to address these abuses and restore the integrity of tax opinion letters.

The Treasury Department recently adopted standards that address a number of the abuses affecting tax shelter opinion letters; however, the standards do not take all the steps needed. Our bill would require Treasury to issue standards addressing a wider spectrum of tax shelter opinion letter problems, including: preventing concealed collaboration among supposedly independent letter writers; avoiding conflicts of interest that would impair auditor independence; ensuring appropriate fee charges; preventing practitioners and firms from aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability by clients; and banning the promotion of potentially abusive tax shelters. By addressing each of these areas, a beefed-up Circular 230 could help reduce the ongoing abusive practices related to tax shelter opinion letters.

The bill would also provide for increased disclosure of tax shelter information to Congress. Section 204 would make it clear that companies providing tax return preparation services to taxpayers cannot refuse to comply with a Congressional document subpoena by citing Section 7216, a consumer protection provision that prohibits tax return preparers from disclosing taxpayer information to third parties. Several accounting and law firms raised this claim in response to document subpoenas issued by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, contending they were barred by the nondisclosure provision in Section 7216 from producing documents related to the sale of abusive tax shelters to clients for a fee.

The accounting and law firms maintained this position despite an analysis provided by the Senate legal counsel showing that the nondisclosure provision was never intended to create a privilege or to override a Senate subpoena, as demonstrated in federal regulations interpreting the provision. This

bill would codify the existing regulations interpreting Section 7216 and make it clear that Congressional document subpoenas must be honored.

Section 204 would also ensure Congress has access to information about decisions by Treasury related to an organization's tax exempt status. A 2003 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Tax Analysts v. IRS, struck down certain IRS regulations and held that the IRS must disclose letters denying or revoking an organization's tax exempt status. The IRS has been reluctant to disclose such information, not only to the public, but also to Congress, including in response to requests by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

For example, earlier this year the IRS revoked the tax exempt status of four credit counseling firms, and, despite the Tax Analysts case, claimed that it could not disclose to the Subcommittee the names of the four firms or the reasons for revoking their tax exemption. Our bill would make it clear that, upon receipt of a request from a Congressional committee or subcommittee, the IRS must disclose documents, other than a tax return, related to the agency's determination to grant, deny, revoke or restore an organization's exemption from taxation.

Section 208 of the bill would establish that it is the sense of the Senate that additional funds should be appropriated for IRS enforcement, and that the IRS should devote proportionately more of its enforcement funds to combat rampant tax shelter and tax haven abuses. Specifically, the bill would direct increased funding toward enforcement efforts combating the promotion of abusive tax shelters and the aiding and abetting of tax evasion; the involvement of accounting, law and financial firms in such promotion and aiding and abetting; and the use of offshore financial accounts to conceal taxable income.

Tax enforcement is an area where a relatively small increase in spending pays for itself many times over. If we would hire adequate enforcement personnel, close the tax loopholes, and put an end to tax dodges, tens of billions in revenues that should support this country would actually reach the Treasury.

In addition to abusive tax shelters, the bill addresses the abusive tax havens that help taxpayers dodge their U.S. tax obligations through using corporate, bank, and tax secrecy laws that impede U.S. tax enforcement. The London-based Tax Justice Network recently estimated that wealthy individuals worldwide have stashed $11.5 trillion of their assets in tax havens. At one Subcommittee hearing in 2001, a former owner of an offshore bank in the Cayman Islands testified that he believed 100 percent of his former clients were engaged in tax evasion. He said that almost all were from the United States and would take elaborate measures to avoid IRS detection of their money transfers. He also expressed confidence that the government that licensed his bank would vigorously defend client secrecy in order to continue attracting business to the islands.

Corporations are also using tax havens to reduce their U.S. tax liability. A GAO report I released with Senator Dorgan last year found that nearly two-thirds of the top 100 companies doing business with the United States government now have one or more subsidiaries in a tax haven. One company, Tyco International, had 115.

Data released by the Commerce Department further demonstrates the extent of U.S. corporate use of tax havens, indicating that, as of 2001, almost half of all foreign profits of U.S. corporations were in tax havens. A study released by the journal Tax Notes in September 2004 found that American companies were able to shift $149 billion of profits to 18 tax haven countries in 2002, up 68 percent from $88 billion in 1999. Estimates show that funneling these profits from the U.S. to tax havens deprives the U.S. Treasury of anywhere from $10 billion to $20 billion in lost tax revenue each year.

Here's just one simplified example of the gimmicks being used by corporations to transfer taxable income from the United States to tax havens to escape taxation. Suppose a profitable U.S. corporation establishes a shell corporation in a tax haven. The shell corporation has no office or employees, just a mailbox address. The U.S. parent transfers a valuable patent to the shell corporation. Then, the U.S. parent and all of its subsidiaries begin to pay a hefty fee to the shell corporation for use of the patent, shifting taxable income out of the United States to the shell corporation. The shell corporation declares a portion of the fees as profit, but pays no tax since it is a tax haven resident. The icing on the cake is that the shell corporation can then ``lend'' the income it has accumulated from the fees back to the U.S. companies for their use. The companies, in turn, pay ``interest'' on the ``loans'' to the shell corporation, shifting still more taxable income out of the United States to the tax haven. This example highlights just a few of the tax haven ploys being used by some U.S. corporations to escape paying their fair share of taxes here at home.

Sections 401 and 402 of our bill tackle the issue of tax havens by removing U.S. tax benefits associated with jurisdictions that fail to cooperate with U.S. tax enforcement efforts. Dozens of jurisdictions around the world have enacted corporate, bank, and tax secrecy laws that, in too many cases, have been used to justify failing to provide timely information to U.S. officials investigating tax misconduct. Some tax havens have refused to provide timely information about persons suspected of either hiding funds in the jurisdiction's offshore bank accounts or using offshore corporations and deceptive transactions to disguise their income or create phony losses to shelter their U.S. income from taxation.

Section 401 of the bill would give the Treasury Secretary the discretion to designate such an offshore tax haven as ``uncooperative'' and to publish an annual list of these uncooperative tax havens. We intend that the Treasury Secretary will develop this list by evaluating the actual record of cooperation experienced by the United States in its dealings with specific jurisdictions around the world. While many offshore tax havens have signed treaties with the United States promising to cooperate with U.S. civil and criminal tax enforcement, the level of resulting cooperation varies. For example, after one country signed a tax treaty with the United States, the government that led the effort was voted out of office by treaty opponents. Treasury needs a way to ensure that tax treaty obligations are met and to send a message to jurisdictions that impede U.S. tax enforcement. This bill gives Treasury the tools it needs to get the cooperation it needs.

Under Sections 401 and 402 of the bill, persons doing business in tax havens designated by Treasury as uncooperative would be denied U.S. tax benefits and incur increased disclosure requirements. First, the bill would disallow the tax benefits of deferral and foreign tax credits for income attributed to an uncooperative tax haven. Second, taxpayers would be required to provide greater disclosure of their activities, including disclosing on their returns any payment above $10,000 to a person or account located in a designated haven. These restrictions would not only deter U.S. taxpayers from doing business with uncooperative tax havens, they would also provide the United States with powerful weapons to convince tax havens to cooperate fully with U.S. tax enforcement efforts and help end offshore tax evasion abuses.

Sections 403 and 404 further address offshore tax evasion. Section 403 would toughen penalties on eligible taxpayers who did not participate in Treasury programs designed to encourage voluntary disclosure of previously unreported income placed by the taxpayer in offshore accounts and accessed by credit card or other financial arrangements. Section 404 would authorize Treasury to promulgate regulations to stop ongoing foreign tax credit abuses in which, among other schemes, taxpayers claim credit on their U.S. tax returns for paying foreign taxes, but then fail to report the income related to those foreign taxes. Under the leadership of Senators Grassley and Baucus, both Sections 403 and 404 passed the Senate earlier this year as part of the Highway Bill, H.R. 3, but were dropped in conference.

The eyes of some people may glaze over when tax shelters and tax havens are discussed, but unscrupulous taxpayers and tax professionals see illicit

dollar signs. Our commitment to crack down on their tax abuses must be as strong as their determination to get away with ripping off America and American taxpayers.

Our bill provides our government the tools to end the use of abusive tax shelters and uncooperative tax havens and to punish the powerful professionals who push them.

It's long past time for Congress to act to end the shifting of a disproportionate tax burden onto the shoulders of honest Americans.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill's provisions and the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Medicaid Emergency Psychiatric Care Act of 2005, which will serve to improve access to mental health treatment and remove an unfunded mandate on our private mental health treatment centers. I am particularly pleased to introduce this bill with several of my colleagues, Senators Conrad, Lincoln, and Collins, who share my belief that we must improve access to treatment for many of the 18.5 million Americans who are afflicted with a mental health disorder.

Our bill will move a step closer to achieving this goal by requiring the Medicaid program to provide reimbursement to private mental health facilities that receive patients under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, known as EMTALA. EMTALA requires hospitals to provide emergency care to patients, regardless of their ability to pay. However, this stands in conflict with Medicaid law, which in most cases prohibits payment for psychiatric treatment for people between the ages of 21 to 65 years. Our legislation will remedy that situation by providing Medicaid coverage for emergency treatment for mental illness, thus expanding access for acute psychiatric care and ensuring that patients with mental disorders receive the assistance they vitally need in a timely fashion.

Under current law, Medicaid payment for psychiatric treatment for patients between the ages of 21 and 65 years is restricted to hospitals that have an in house psychiatric ward. If a patient seeks care from a private psychiatric hospital or is transferred to a private facility from a community hospital, Medicaid does not provide reimbursement due to the so-called Institutions for Mental Disease, IMD, exclusion. In comparison, if the same patient seeks care under EMTALA from a hospital because of a physical ailment, Medicaid provides coverage regardless of the type of facility that provides the treatment. I have therefore joined together with Senator Conrad, Senator Lincoln, and Senator Collins to introduce legislation that will require Medicaid to pay for the cost of care associated with emergency psychiatric treatment necessary to comply with EMTALA. No longer will private entities be required to shoulder the burden of this Federal mandate, and no longer will Medicaid-eligible beneficiaries go without access to necessary and appropriate emergency care.

This bipartisan legislation has been carefully crafted with input from both the provider and beneficiary communities to ensure that assistance is directed to those who are most in need and to ensure that the coverage only extends to people who require emergency treatment. The definition in the EMTALA statute of an emergency is straightforward for psychiatric patients. Patients must present as a danger to themselves or others--for example, as being suicidal or threatening physical harm to others.

Our bill also offers a targeted and low-cost solution to ease the crisis in emergency departments. Emergency department overcrowding is a growing and severe problem in the United States, and dedicated physicians and nurses who work in emergency rooms are reaching a breaking point where they may not have the resources or surge capacity to respond effectively. Patients often face a long wait in the emergency room, sometimes for days, because there is no bed or other appropriate setting available. Tens of thousands of dollars every day are being spent inefficiently on extended treatment in emergency rooms that is not the most appropriate or clinically effective care.

This crisis in emergency departments impacts everyone's access to lifesaving care. According to a May 2005 report by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the number of annual emergency department visits increased 26 percent over a 10-year period, from 90.3 million in 1993 to 113.9 million visits in 2003--an average increase of more than 2 million visits per year. During the same time, the number of hospital emergency departments decreased by more than 12 percent, resulting in a greater number of visits to emergency departments that remain open.

How do these problems affect emergency care for all of us? Overcrowded emergency rooms result in reduced availability of physicians, nurses, and healthcare staff; fewer available examination areas and beds; longer waits for patients and their families; and hospitals more frequently having to divert patients by ambulance to other hospitals.

The existing situation is not only jeopardizing access to emergency rooms and treatment but ultimately, in many cases, it is overwhelming the criminal justice system. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that, on average, 16 percent of inmates in local jails suffer from a mental illness, and in Maine, the National Alliance for the Mentally III, NAMI, an advocacy group for persons with mental illness, estimates that figure is as high as 50 percent. In my home state of Maine, 65,000 people have a severe mental illness but with the severe shortage of psychiatric beds in the State, many people go without treatment. We must take action to provide the mentally ill with better access to care, and we must start by ensuring that Medicaid reimburses the facilities that provide treatment.

Passing the Medicaid Emergency Psychiatric Care Act and providing Medicaid coverage for emergency psychiatric treatment in both general and psychiatric hospitals will accomplish several goals. First, and most importantly, it will result in better psychiatric emergency care for patients. Second, it will result in more efficient and effective use of both Federal and State Medicaid dollars. Third, by resolving the current conflict in Federal law between EMTALA requirements and the Medicaid IMD exclusion from reimbursement, the bill will enable

freestanding psychiatric hospitals to receive reimbursement for Medicaid psychiatric patients on the same basis as general hospitals and help preserve the viability of these hospitals.

We have received strong support from a number of leading national mental health and medical associations who confirm the critical need for this legislation, including NAMI, the National Association of County Behavioral Health Directors, the American Psychiatric Association, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the American Hospital Association, and the National Association of Psychiatric Health Systems. I am especially pleased to have also received endorsements from a number of Maine organizations, including the Maine Hospital Association, Spring Harbor Hospital, and NAMI Maine.

This legislative change is vitally important to ensure that Medicaid patients with mental illness receive the right care at the right time in the right setting, instead of prolonged stays in emergency rooms and in hospital settings without psychiatric specialty care. The cost of achieving a more efficient, effective, and clinically appropriate care system for psychiatric emergencies is small and well worth it. I urge my colleagues to join us in cosponsoring the bill.

I ask unanimous consent that these letters of support be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Medicare Payment Adjustment To Community Health Centers, PATCH, Act of 2005. I am particularly pleased to introduce this bill with my good friend and colleague, Senator Bingaman. Two years ago we introduced a more comprehensive version of this legislation, S. 654. I am happy to report that many of the provisions in S. 654 were included in the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The bill I am introducing today reflects two key provisions which remain the priorities of our community health centers.

This legislation will improve Medicare beneficiaries' access to primary care services and preventive treatments by increasing access to Community Health Centers. Local, non-profit, commnnity-owned health centers, also known as Federally Qualified Health Center, FCHQs, furnish essential primary and preventive care services to low income and medically underserved communities. In many cases, community health centers are the only source of primary and preventive services to which Medicare beneficiaries have access. This is especially true for people living in America's medically underserved rural areas.

For nearly 40 years, the national network of health centers has provided high-quality, affordable primary care and preventive services. Community health centers are located in areas where care is needed but scarce, and they improve access to care for millions of Americans regardless of their insurance status or ability to pay. Their costs of care rank among the lowest, and they reduce the need for more expensive emergency, in-patient, and specialty care, saving billions for dollars for taxpayers.

Community health centers are increasingly becoming important providers of primary care and prevent1ve services to seniors--as well as providers of on-site dental, pharmaceu ical, and mental health services. In short, community health centers provide the ease of ``one- stop health care shopping,'' meaning that seniors, instead of moving from location to location to receive comprehensive primary hearh services, can usually receive all of their essential primary care in one place.

The PATCH Act will ensure that community health centers can fully participate in the Medicare program and provide seniors with these vital services. Ensuring that Medicare pays its fair share is important to the stability of community health centers. While 17 percent of health center patients in Maine are Medicare beneficiaries, the Medicare program pays only 78 cents on the dollar for the health center costs incurred in delivering comprehensive primary care services to them. For health centers to remain a viable part of the health care delivery system, we must make changes.

Over the last 15 years, Congress has made many improvements to the Medicare program through the addition of new primary and preventive benefits, including screening mammograms, pap smears, colorectal and prostate cancer screenings, flu and pneumococcal vaccinations, bone mass measurement, and glucose monitoring and nutrition therapy for diabetics. However, Congress has not updated the Medicare law to add these crucial services to the health center reimbursement package, so health centers are denied payment for these services when provided to Medicare beneficiaries. This lack of reimbursement has caused significant losses for health centers every time they deliver these services to Medicare patients. Our bill will add these essential services to the health center package of benefits so that they can receive payment for these services.

The Medicare law has also neglected to include health care for the homeless grantees as Federal qualified health centers. The bill would also restore these centers for recognition within the Medicare statute. Our legislation is strongly supported by the National Association of Community Health Centers, and I ask unanimous consent that their letter of support be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PATCH Act makes these two technical and straightforward changes to the Medicare program to ensure that Community Health Centers can fully participate in Medicare and provide seniors with these vital primary and preventive services. These changes are vitally important in my state of Maine and also to health centers throughout our nation. By making these two straightforward changes, we will be able to enhance the care that all Medicare beneficiaries receive, especially those living in rural and medically underserved communities. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor the bill.

Mr. President, I have the support of many of my colleagues on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation to introduce legislation to help rural America transition to an age of digital television. Television is an important media outlet for local news, weather and information. Years ago, it was decided that the United States should transition to a higher standard of television service. Digital television is much more than simply a sharper picture; it allows for an increase in the number of channels, more efficient use of spectrum and many new features for consumers. As the Senate considers broader digital television transition legislation, it is important not to leave rural America behind.

The bill I introduce today is aimed to assist translator stations and low power analog stations. Translator stations are small stations that repeat a signal from full power stations so that the signal may be reached in remote areas. Low power analog TV stations are television stations that typically serve smaller, rural communities. While translators and low power analog TV stations are located in many parts of the country, most are concentrated in rural areas, including many parts of Maine.

There has been a long time understanding that low power stations would not be a part of the full power digital television transition. This understanding, however, does not mean that Congress can simply look away. We must ensure that low power stations have the necessary time and adequate funds to move into the digital age. The Digital Low Power Television Transition Act aims to address these needs.

First, the bill I am introducing today puts a deadline for the low power digital televison transition four years out from whatever the hard date is that Congress ultimately decides for the full power digital television transition. Full power stations have had years to transition to digital. Low power stations have yet to even receive their digital allocations, and therefore need additional time to upgrade equipment. This delay will also allow consumers in rural areas to continue to use analog television sets to receive over-the-air signals until digital television equipment becomes more prevalent in small town consumer electronics stores.

Second, the Digital Translator and Low Power Television Transition bill establishes a grant program within the National Telecommunications and Information Agency, NTIA, to help defray the cost of upgrading translators and low power television stations from analog to digital. This money for the grant program would come from a trust fund set up with proceeds of the spectrum auctions that will take place because of the full power digital television transition. The Federal Communications Commission, FCC, estimates that approximately $100 million will be needed for the 4474 translators and 2071 low power analog and to upgrade. The trust fund's size reflects the FCC's estimate.

The goal of this Act is to assist the rural, low power stations without interrupting the greater digital televison transition. Because of the secondary status of translators and low power stations, the auction of full power analog spectrum will remain unaffected. These stations do play an important role in rural communities, therefore this bill calls upon the FCC to report to Congress on the status of translators and low power analog.

This bill is not meant to be a comprehensive approach to the digital television transition. It is merely a solution to one of the many questions Congress will face this Congress. Rural America deserves the same benefits that digital televison will bring that will be available in urban areas. This Act gives translators, low power analog and Class A stations the assistance they need to smoothly transition to digital.

Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a bill, the Small Business Lending Improvement Act of 2005, which I have introduced today to provide small businesses with easier access to loans and to increase efficiency in the Small Business Administration's largest loan program, the 7(a) program, which provided $12.7 billion in small business loans in 2004.

As Chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, I am committed to supporting our Nation's Main Street small business community by increasing its access to capital. This legislation will reform a cumbersome SBA lender licensing process that does not provide our small businesses with the most efficient means of accessing the capital they must have to start and sustain their firms. The bill would allow the SBA's 7(a) loan program to better capitalize on the demonstrated potential small business have to create jobs and economic growth.

As our Nation continues to prosper from economic growth, low inflation, and low unemployment, we should not forget the critical role played by our small businesses. Without strong and successful small businesses, our prosperity would not be what it is today.

Under current law, the most prolific lenders in the SBA's 7(a) loan program can participate in the ``Preferred Lender Program'' (PLP Program), which allows them to use their own processing facilities and therefore both increases lenders' efficiency and reduces costs for the SBA. However, PLP lenders are required to apply for PLP status in each of the 71 SBA districts nationwide to obtain PLP status in that district, and they must re-apply each year in each district. This is extremely inefficient and wasteful, and creates enormous unnecessary administrative costs.

Section 2 of this bill would allow qualifying lenders to participate in the PLP Program on a nationwide basis after just one licensing process. This provision was in S. 1375, the Small Business Administration 50th Anniversary Reauthorization Act of 2003, which I introduced in 2003 and which the Senate approved unanimously in September 2003.

This provision would drastically reduce administrative costs and would standardize the operation of the PLP program. A National Preferred Lenders Program would eliminate the inefficiencies and cost of applying for PLP status in each district, and would increase the ease with which loans are made to small businesses, thereby improving small businesses' access to capital. Competition among lenders for small business customers would increase, increasing financing alternatives and lowering costs for small businesses.

In addition to simplifying licensing processes for both lenders and the SBA, the bill would allow the SBA's lender oversight to be done more efficiently and effectively, on a national basis. The current process of having to renew licenses in each district is extremely time- consuming and administratively burdensome for the lenders and the SBA. A National Preferred Lenders Program could remedy the inefficiencies and cost of applying for PLP status in each district and save a tremendous amount of taxpayer dollars.

Section 3 of the act increases the maximum size of a 7(a) loan to $3 million, from the current $2 million, and increase the maximum size of a 7(a)

guarantee to $2.25 million, from the current $1.5 million. This would maintain the maximum 75 percent guarantee. Small businesses' financing needs are increasing and, especially with the high cost of real estate and new equipment, it is appropriate to respond to those needs by offering larger loans.

In the SBA's 504 Loan Program, loans may now be as large as $10 million, with $4 million guaranteed, for manufacturing projects, $5 million (with $2 million guaranteed) for loans that serve an enumerated public policy goal (such as rural development), and $3.75 million (with $1.5 million guaranteed) for all other ``regular'' 504 Program loans. Thus, this increase in 7(a) Program loans to $3 million would bring 7(a) loans closer in size to 504 Program loans, while still leaving 7(a) loans smaller than 504 Program loans.

Section 4 of the bill increases the program's authorization level to $18 billion for fiscal year 2006, instead of the $17 billion authorized for fiscal year 2006 in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, enacted in December 2004. The program is on pace to achieve loan volume of between $14 and $15 billion in fiscal year 2005, and this provision would allow the program adequate ability to grow unimpeded in fiscal year 2006, especially if the maximum loan size is increased.

Section 5 of the bill requires the SBA to implement an alternative size standard, in addition to the program's current standard, for the 7(a) program. The SBA would create an alternative size standard for the 7(a) program, as it has already done for the 504 program, that considers a business's net worth and income. This provision would bring the 7(a) program into conformity with the 504 Program. This provision was also in S. 1375 in the 108th Congress, passed unanimously by the Senate in 2003.

Currently, in the 7(a) program a small business's eligibility to receive a loan is determined by reference to a multipage chart that has different size standards for every industry that can be very confusing, especially for small lenders that do not make many 7(a) loans. In the 504 Program, however, lenders can use either the industry-specific standards or an ``alternative size standard'' that the SBA created, which simply says a small business is eligible for a loan if it has gross income of less than $7 million or net worth of less than $2 million.

This would simplify the 7(a) lending process and provide small businesses with a streamlined procedure for determining if they are eligible for 7(a) loans, and it would conform the standards used by the 7(a) and 504 programs. It would make the program far more accessible to small businesses and small lenders.

All of these improvements to the SBA's largest loan program will support our national goal of building a vibrant and growing economy. Small businesses are the heart of our economy, and this bill will help to improve small businesses' economic prospects.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague, Senator Carper, to introduce the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2005, a bill designed to help the 225-year-old Postal Service meet the challenges of the 21st Century. This legislation represents the culmination of a process that began in the summer of 2002 when I introduced a bill to establish a Presidential Commission charged with examining the problems the Postal Service faces, and developing specific recommendations and legislative proposals that Congress and the Postal Service could implement.

I originally introduced the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act last

May. In June of 2004, the bill was unanimously reported out of the the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. That bill, S. 2468, had the strong endorsements of the National Rural Letter Carriers Association, the National Association of Letter Carriers, the National Association of Postmasters of the United States, and the Coalition for a 21st Century Postal Service--which represents thousands of the major mailers, employee groups, small businesses, and other users of the mail. It also had the strong bi-partisan support of twenty-two members of the United States Senate. Unfortunately, due to a variety of factors, my efforts to have the bill considered before the full Senate were stalled.

Since last Fall, Administration representatives have become actively engaged in postal reform efforts, and have given me their commitment to working with Congress to ensure passage of a reform bill this year. I have every expectation that this will be the year comprehensive postal reform legislation is signed into law.

It has long been acknowledged that the financial and operational problems confronting the Postal Service are serious. At present, the Postal Service has more than $90 billion in unfunded liabilities and obligations, which include $1.8 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury, $7.6 billion for Workers' Compensation claims, $3.5 billion for retirement costs, and as much as $47 billion to cover retiree health care costs. The Government Accountability Office's Comptroller General, David Walker, has pointed to the urgent need for ``fundamental reforms to minimize the risk of a significant taxpayer bailout or dramatic postal rate increases.'' The Postal Service has been on GAO's ``High- Risk'' List since April of 2001. The Postal Service is at risk of a ``death spiral'' of decreasing volume and increasing rates that lead to further decreases in volume.

In December of 2003, President Bush announced the creation of a bipartisan commission charged with identifying the operational, structural, and financial challenges facing the U.S. Postal Service. The President charged this commission with examining all significant aspects of the Postal Service with the goal of recommending legislative and administrative reforms to ensure its long-term viability.

The President's Commission conducted seven public hearings across the country at which they heard from numerous witnesses. On July 31, 2003, the Commission released its final report, making 35 legislative and administrative recommendations for the reform of the Postal Service.

As I read through the Commission's report, I was struck by what I considered the Commission's wake up call to Congress: its statement that ``an incremental approach to Postal Service reform will yield too little, too late given the enterprise's bleak fiscal outlook, the depth of current debt and unfunded obligations, the downward trend in First- Class mail volumes and the limited potential of its legacy postal network that was built for a bygone era.'' That is a very strong statement, and one that challenged both the Postal Service and Congress to embrace far-reaching reforms.

To the relief of many, including myself, the Commission did not recommend privatization of the Postal Service. Instead, the Commission sought to find a way for the Postal Service to do, as Co-Chair Jim Johnson described to me, ``an overwhelmingly better job under the same general structure.''

The Postal Service plays a vital role in our economy. The Service itself employs more than 750,000 career employees. Less well known is the fact that it is also the linchpin of a $900-billion mailing industry that employs 9 million Americans in fields as diverse as direct mailing, printing, catalog production, paper manufacturing, and financial services. The health of the Postal Service is essential to the vitality of thousands of companies and the millions that they employ.

One of the greatest challenges for the Postal Service is the decrease in mail volume as business communications, bills and payments move more and more to the Internet. The Postal Service has experienced declining volumes of First-Class mail for three straight years. This is highly significant, given that First-Class mail accounts for 48 percent of total mail volume, and the revenue it generates pays for more than two- thirds of the Postal Service's institutional costs.

The Postal Service also faces the difficult task of trying to cut costs from its nationwide infrastructure and transportation network. These costs are difficult to cut. Even though volumes may be decreasing, carriers must still deliver six days a week to more than 139 million addresses.

As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, I held a series of eight hearings, including a joint hearing with the House, during which we reviewed the recommendations of the President's Commission. The bill Senator Carper and I introduce today reflects what the Committee learned from dozens of witnesses.

First and foremost, the Collins-Carper bill preserves the basic features of universal service--affordable rates, frequent delivery, and convenient community access to retail postal services. As a Senator representing a large, rural State, I want to ensure that my constituents living in the northern woods, or on the islands, or in our many rural small towns have the same access to postal services as the people of our cities. If the Postal Service were no longer to provide universal service and deliver mail to every customer, the affordable communication link upon which many Americans rely would be jeopardized. Most commercial enterprises would find it uneconomical, if not impossible, to deliver mail and packages to rural Americans at rates charged by the Postal Service.

The Collins-Carper bill allows the Postal Service to maintain its current mail monopoly, and retain its sole access to customer mailboxes. It grants the Postal Service Board of Governors the authority to set rates for competitive products like Express Mail and Parcel Post, as long as these prices do not result in cross subsidy from market-dominant products. As a safeguard, our bill establishes a 30 day prior review period during which the proposed rate changes shall be reviewed by the Postal Regulatory Commission.

It replaces the current lengthy and litigious rate-setting process with a rate cap-based structure for market-dominant products such as First-Class Mail, periodicals and library mail. This would allow the Postal Service to react more quickly to changes in the mailing industry. The rate caps would be linked to the Consumer Price Index. The goal would be to make rate increases more predictable and less frequent and to provide incentives for the Postal Service to operate efficiently. Price changes for market-dominant products would be subject to a 45 day prior review period by the Postal Regulatory Commission.

Our bill would introduce new safeguards against unfair competition by the Postal Service in competitive markets. Subsidization of competitive products by market-dominant products would be expressly forbidden, and an equitable allocation of institutional costs to competitive products would be required.

The President's Commission recommended that the regulator be granted the authority to make changes to the Postal Service's universal service obligation and monopoly. The vast majority of the postal community, however, shared my belief that these are important policy determinations that should be retained by Congress. The Collins-Carper bill keeps those public policy decisions in congressional hands.

The existing Postal Rate Commission would be transformed into the Postal Regulatory Commission with greatly enhanced authority. Under current law, the Rate Commission has very narrow authority. We wanted to ensure that the Postal Service management has both greater latitude and stronger oversight. Among other things, the Postal Regulatory Commission will have the authority to regulate rates for non- competitive products and services; ensure financial transparency; establish limits on the accumulation of retained earnings by the Postal Service; obtain information from the Postal Service, if need be, through the use of new subpoena power; and review and act on complaints filed by those who believe the Postal Service has exceeded its authority. Members of the Postal

Regulatory Board will be selected solely on the basis of their demonstrated experience and professional standing. Senate confirmation of all Board Members will be required.

To meet the Presidential Commission's call for increased financial transparency, the Collins-Carper bill will require the Postal Service to file with the Postal Regulatory Commission certain Securities and Exchange Commission financial disclosure forms, along with detailed annual reports on the status of the Postal Service's pension and postretirement health obligations.

The Governmental Affairs Committee dedicated two hearings to the examination of the Commission's workforce-related recommendations. The Postal Service is a highly labor intensive organization, using $3 out of every $4 to pay the wages and benefits of its employees. Their workforce is comprised of more than 700,000 dedicated letter carriers, clerks, mail handlers, postmasters, and others, many of whom place great value on their right to collectively bargain. Our bill reaffirms that right. This bill only makes changes to the bargaining process that have been agreed to by both the Postal Service and the four major unions. We replace the rarely used fact-finding process with mediation, and shorten statutory deadlines for certain phases of the bargaining process.

Additionally, the Collins-Carper bill corrects what I believe to be an anomaly in the federal workers' compensation law that results in high costs for the Postal Service. Under the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), federal employees with dependents are eligible for 75 percent of their take-home pay, tax free, plus cost of living allowances. In addition, there is no maximum dollar cap on FECA payments. As a result, employees often opt not to retire, staying on the more generous workers' compensation program permanently.

According to a March 2003 audit issued by the Postal Service's Office of Inspector General, the Postal Service's workers' compensation rolls include 81 cases that originated 40 to 50 years ago, with the oldest recipient being 102 years old. The IG's office found 778 cases that originated 30 to 40 years ago; and 1,189 cases that originated 20 to 29 years ago.

The Collins-Carper bill works to protect the financial resources of the Postal Service by converting workers' compensation benefits for total or partial disability to a retirement annuity when the affected employee reaches 65 years of age. This change would reflect the fact that disabled postal employees would likely retire at some point were they not receiving workers' compensation. I would like to note that the average postal employee retires far earlier than age 65, so this is still a generous program. It is important to point out that the Postal Service has reduced their workplace injury rate by twenty-eight percent over the past three years.

The Collins--Carper bill also puts into place a three-day waiting period before an employee is eligible to receive 45 days of continuation of pay. This is consistent with every state's workers' compensation program that requires a three- to seven-day waiting period before benefits are paid.

To address the President's Commission's recommendation for improved executive compensation, this bill will allow the Postal Service to raise their overall executive compensation level from Executive Level 1 to that of the Vice President. This would bring the Postal Service in line with authority granted to federal agencies. This new authority will be contingent upon the development of a meaningful performance appraisal system.

Our bill has reached an important compromise on the issue of workshare discounts. The workshare program was developed by the Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission to enable customers to pay lower rates when they perform mail preparation or transportation activities. The language in our bill supports the principle that workshare discounts should generally not exceed the costs that the Postal Service avoids as a result of the worksharing activity. However, the bill spells out certain circumstances under which workshare discounts in excess of avoided costs are warranted.

Finally, our bill would repeal a provision of Public Law 108-18 which requires that money owed to the Postal Service due to an overpayment into the Civil Service Retirement System Fund be held in an escrow account. Repealing this provision would essentially ``free up'' $78 billion over a period of 60 years. These savings would be used to not only pay off debt to the U.S. Treasury and to fund health care liabilities, but also to mitigate rate increases as well. In fact, failure to release these escrow funds could mean, for mailers, a double-digit rate increase in 2006--an expense most American businesses and many consumers are ill-equipped to afford.

The bill would also return to the Department of Treasury the responsibility for funding CSRS pension benefits relating to the military service of postal retirees. No other agency is required to make this payment. Ratepayers should not be held responsible for this $27 billion obligation.

The Postal Service has reached a critical juncture. If we are to save and strengthen this vital service upon which so many Americans rely for communication and their livelihoods, the time to act is now.

I look forward to working with all of my colleagues in the Senate, and House Government Reform and Oversight Committee Chairman Tom Davis, who, together with Congressman John McHugh, also recently introduced a postal reform bill, H.R. 22.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, today I introduce the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2005, a bill designed to help the 225-year-old Postal Service meet the challenges of the 21st century. I originally introduced this bill last May. In June of 2004, the bill was unanimously reported out of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. That bill, S. 2468,

had the strong endorsements of the National Rural Letter Carriers Association, the National Association of Letter Carriers, the National Association of Postmasters of the United States, and the Coalition for a 21st Century Postal Service--which represents thousands of the major mailers, employee groups, small business, and other users of the mail. It also had the strong bi-partisan support of twenty-two members of the United States Senate. Unfortunately, the 108th Congress expired before my bill passed the Senate.

It has long been acknowledged that the financial and operational problems confronting the Postal Service are serious. At present, the Postal Service has roughly $70 billion to $80 billion in unfunded liabilities and obligations, which include $1.8 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury, $7.6 billion for workers' compensation claims, $3.5 billion for retirement costs, and as much as $47 billion to cover retiree health care costs. The Government Accountability Office's Comptroller General, David Walker, has pointed to the urgent need for ``fundamental reforms to minimize the risk of a significant taxpayer bailout or dramatic postal rate increases.'' The Postal Service has been on GAO's ``High-Risk'' List since April of 2001. The Postal Service is at risk of a ``death spiral'' of decreasing volume and increasing rates that lead to further decreases in volume.

The Postal Service is the linchpin of a $900-billion mailing industry that employs 9 million Americans in fields as diverse as direct mailing, printing, catalog production, and paper manufacturing. The health of the Postal Service is essential to the vitality of thousands of companies and the millions that they employ.

First and foremost, my bill preserves the basic features of universal service--affordable rates, frequent delivery, and convenient community access to retail postal services. If the Postal Service were no longer to provide universal service and deliver mail to every customer, the affordable communication link upon which many Americans rely would be jeopardized.

This postal reform legislation grants the Postal Service Board of Governors the authority to set rates for competitive products like Express Mail and Parcel Post, as long as these prices do not result in cross subsidy from market-dominant products. It replaces the current lengthy and litigious rate-setting process with a rate cap-based structure for market-dominant products such as first-class mail, periodicals, and library mail. The bill also introduces new safeguards against unfair competition by the Postal Service in competitive markets.

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act will greatly improve the financial transparency of the Postal Service. The USPS would be required to file with the Postal Regulatory Commission certain Securities and Exchange Commission financial disclosure forms, along with detailed annual reports on the status of the Postal Service's pension and postretirement health obligations in order to ensure increased financial transparency.

The legislation repeals a provision of Public Law 108-18 which requires that money owed to the Postal Service due to an overpayment into the Civil Service Retirement System Fund be held in an escrow account, which would essentially ``free up'' $78 billion over a period of 60 years. These savings would be used to not only pay off debt to the U.S. Treasury and to fund health care liabilities, but also to mitigate rate increases. It also returns to the Department of the Treasury the responsibility for funding CSRS pension benefits relating to the military service of postal retirees--a responsibility that the Treasury Department bears for all executive branch departments and agencies.

The bill also converts workers' compensation benefits for total or partial disability to a retirement annuity when the affected employee reaches 65 years of age, and puts into place a 3-day waiting period before an employee is eligible to receive 45 days of continuation of pay. These changes will save the Postal Service approximately $50 million in workers' compensation costs over a 10-year period.

The Postal Service has reached a critical juncture. If we are to save and strengthen this vital service upon which so many Americans rely for communication and their livelihoods, the time to act is now.

I therefore ask the Senior Senator from New Hampshire and chairman of the Senate Budget Committee whether I can count on his assistance and support to help pass this legislation this Congress.

I thank my friend from New Hampshire and look forward to working with him on this important piece of legislation.

Mr. President, the entire world continues to wait for signs that the administration takes seriously its moral and legal responsibilities to eliminate torture and abuse. It is long past time for the administration to give the American people and the world an ironclad assurance that these shameful tactics are no longer being used in any prison or detention facility under American control and that we are not outsourcing our torture to regimes well known for using them.

I strongly support the legislation that Senator Leahy has introduced to deal with this urgent problem and to see that our Nation is not farming out abusive interrogations to other countries. The bill makes crystal clear that we can't torture by proxy.

Abhorrence to torture is a fundamental value. Our attitude toward torture speaks volumes about our national conscience, our dedication to the rule of law, and our essential ideals. 9/11 is no excuse for abandoning our ideals.

The line separating right from wrong must clearly exclude the reprehensible practice called extraordinary rendition, the ridiculous code word for torture by proxy. Article 3 of the Treaty Against Torture, which the United States has ratified, provides: ``No State Party shall expel, return, or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.'' The secretive U.S. practice of rendition is a violation of international law because it involves detaining prisoners without a shred of due process and delivering them for interrogation into the hands of countries known to commit torture. As one commentator noted: ``In terms of bad behavior, it stands side by side with contract killings.''

Ask Maher Arar. In the fall of 2002, Arar, a Canadian citizen, was returning to Montreal from a family visit in Tunisia and he made a stopover at Kennedy Airport in New York City. Acting in part on flawed intelligence from Canadian officials, U.S. Immigration officials seized Mr. Arar at the airport. He was not charged with a crime, or given a chance to talk with a lawyer. Instead, he was held in Brooklyn and interrogated for days by U.S. law enforcement authorities.

When the interrogation failed to produce incriminating information, Mr. Arar was flown to Jordan and handed over to Jordanian authorities. He was chained, blindfolded, and beaten in a van that transported him to the Syrian border. In Syria, he was placed in a small, dark cell-- three feet by six feet, like a grave--and was held there for almost a year. He was slapped, beaten, and whipped on his palms, wrists, and back with an electric cable. He begged them to stop. He heard other prisoners screaming as they were tortured. He signed any confessions he was told to sign.

Mr. Arar was released in October 2003. Syrian officials told reporters that their investigators found no link between Mr. Arar and al-Qaida. His confession turned out to be worthless and his suffering was pointless. Mr. Arar is now home in Canada.

How can any of us stand idly by knowing that this country condoned and facilitated such brutality?

Tragically, Mr. Arar is not the only victim. On March 6, 60 Minutes aired a report on rendition. On the program, Michael Scheuer, a recently retired CIA official who created its rendition program, admitted that he would ``have to assume'' that suspects the U.S. sends to Egypt are tortured. ``It's very convenient,'' he said. ``It's finding someone else to do your dirty work.''

The Defense Department has attempted to justify this tactic. On June 25, 2003, Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes wrote to Senator Leahy, stating that whenever the U.S. transfers an individual to another country, ``United States policy is to obtain specific assurances from the receiving country that it will not torture the individual being transferred to that country. We can assure you that the United States would take steps to investigate credible allegations of torture and take appropriate action if there were reason to believe that those assurances were not being honored.''

Mr. Haynes' ``assurances,'' are difficult to accept. The State Department's annual human rights report, released last month, criticized numerous countries for a range of interrogation practices it labeled as torture. The State Department identified Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, among others, as countries practicing torture. Press reports make clear that since 9/11, the U.S. has flown 100-150 suspects to countries such as these. The State Department condemns Syria for torturing its prisoners, but Mr. Haynes blindly relies on Syria's promise that the prisoners we send there will be treated humanely.

Recent press reports also suggest that the assurances of humane treatment sought by the CIA are worth very little. According to today's Washington Post, ``one government official who visited several foreign prisons where suspects were rendered by the CIA said . . . `It's widely understood that the interrogation practices that would be illegal in the U.S. are being used.' '' The official also said, ``they say they are not abusing them . . . but we all know they do.''

According to the Post, an Arab diplomat, whose country is actively engaged in counterterrorism alongside the CIA said it was unrealistic to believe the CIA really wants to follow up on assurances. He said: ``It would be stupid to keep track of them because then you would know what's going on.'' He said, ``it's like don't ask don't tell.''

So, it seems that we are not fooling anybody but the American public.

We are a Nation of laws, not hypocrites. Our country is strong and our constitutional system has endured because it permits us to do great things and still ensure that we treat people fairly and humanely. We are not supposed to ``disappear'' people here.

Yet, that is exactly what rendition and the related tactic of ``ghost detainees'' amounts to, making people vanish into a shadowy world of secret abuse. In his report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, MG. Antonio Taguba

wrote that prisoners had not been registered as required by Army regulations and they were being moved around to avoid detection by the Red Cross. General Taguba called the practice ``deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine, and in

violation of international law.'' Last September, Army investigators told the Senate Armed Services Committee that as many as 100 detainees at Abu Ghraib had been hidden from the Red Cross at the CIA's direction.

Last month, the Associated Press reported that one of the ``ghost detainees'' held at Abu Ghraib, Manadel al-Jamadi, died in November 2003 under CIA interrogation. He had been suspended by his wrists, with his hands cuffed behind his back. According to an Army guard who was asked by the interrogator to adjust al-Jamadi's position, blood gushed from his mouth ``as if a faucet had been turned on'' after he was released from his shackles.

Behavior like that forces us all to ask, ``what has America become?''

The issue shows no signs of abating. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that transfers of detainees from occupied territory to any other country ``are prohibited, regardless of their motive.'' Violations of the Article constitute ``grave breaches'' of the Treaty and qualify as ``war crimes'' under Federal law. Nevertheless, a Justice Department memorandum in March, 2004 re-interpreted the Treaty to allow the CIA to remove prisoners from Iraq for the purpose of ``facilitating interrogation.'' According to press reports, the CIA used this ``Goldsmith Memorandum'' as justification to transport ``as many as a dozen detainees'' out of Iraq. The legal analysis in the memorandum is an embarrassment. Yet it appears to have provided the legal justification for the CIA to commit war crimes.

The New York Times recently reported that the U.S. plans to transfer as many as half the 550 detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to prisons in other countries. This week, a Federal judge blocked the government from transferring 13 citizens of Yemen until a hearing can be held on the propriety of the move. Lawyers for the detainees expressed concern that the prisoners would be delivered into the hands of torture.

Even worse, last week Attorney General Gonzales defended the practice of rendition, despite admitting that he ``can't fully control'' what other nations do and that he doesn't know whether countries have always complied with their promises.

Congress can't allow these shameful tactics to continue. Senator Leahy's bill is designed to prevent them. It states that no person in the custody or control of the United States can be sent to another country on the State Department list of countries that commit torture. Nor, may any person be sent to a country, even if it is not on the State Department list, where there are grounds to believe the person would be in danger of being tortured. The bill states that mere diplomatic assurances that detainees will be treated humanely are not sufficient to permit a detainee's transfer. Instead, in certain circumstances, the act permits delivery of the detainee where there is an actual mechanism to verify that the person will not be tortured, such as by allowing unfettered access to the detainee by humanitarian organizations.

The Bush administration's has clearly condoned the use of torture and abuse by our own government, as well as handing prisoners over to other countries for the same purpose. Officials have approved and used interrogation techniques that include feigning suffocation, feigning drowning, ``stress positions,'' sleep deprivation, and the use of unmuzzled dogs. According to one report, ``The methods employed by the CIA are so severe that senior officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have directed its agents to stay out of many of the interviews of the high-level detainees . . . ``because the FBI fears that the techniques could subject their agents to criminal lawsuits.

The anti-rendition bill offered today is a way to start addressing the problem. It deserves to pass as soon as possible. Torture and other abuses of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo have done immense damage to America's standing in the world and has clearly made the war on terrorism harder to win. We need to repair that damage and re-claim our national commitment to fairness and decency.

As Edmund Burke said, ``The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.'' We in Congress have it in our power to prevent the triumph of an evil practice. Knowing what we now know, the Senate cannot simply look away and do nothing. I urge my colleagues to support us in ending these despicable abuses.

Mr. President, today, Senator DeWine and I are introducing legislation to give the Food and Drug Administration broad authority to regulate tobacco products for the protection of the public health. We cannot in good conscience allow the fuderal agency most responsible for protecting the public health to remain powerless to deal with the enormous risks of tobacco, the most deadly of all consumer products.

Last year, a large bipartisan majority of the Senate voted to grant the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products. It was a major step forward in the long-term effort to enact this legislation, which health experts believe is the most important action Congress could take to protect children from this deadly addiction. Unfortunately, the legislation was blocked by a small group of House conferees.

We are reintroducing our bill today and we are hopeful that 2005 will be the year when Congress takes the final steps to enact this extraordinarily important health legislation. This bill has majority support in the Senate and strong support amongst rank and file members in the House. Now is the time to make it the law of the land.

The stakes are vast. Five thousand children have their first cigarette every day, and two thousand of them become daily smokers. Nearly a thousand of them will die prematurely from tobacco-induced diseases. Smoking is the number one preventable cause of death in the nation today. Cigarettes kill well over four hundred thousand Americans each year. That is more lives lost than from automobile accidents, alcohol abuse, illegal drugs, AIDS, murder, suicide, and fires combined. Our response to a public health problem of this magnitude must consist of more than half-way measures.

We must deal firmly with tobacco company marketing practices that target children and mislead the public. The Food and Drug Administration needs broad authority to regulate the sale, distribution, and advertising of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.

The tobacco industry currently spends over eleven billion dollars a year to promote its products. Much of that money is spent in ways designed to tempt children to start smoking, before they are mature enough to appreciate the enormity of the health risk. The industry knows that more than 90 percent of smokers begin as children and are addicted by the time they reach adulthood.

Documents obtained from tobacco companies prove, in the companies'

own words, the magnitude of the industry's efforts to trap children into dependency on their deadly product. Recent studies by the Institute of Medicine and the Centers for Disease Control show the substantial role of industry advertising in decisions by young people to use tobacco products.

If we are serious about reducing youth smoking, FDA must have the power to prevent industry advertising designed to appeal to children wherever it will be seen by children. This legislation will give FDA the ability to stop tobacco advertising which glamorizes smoking from appearing where it will be seen by significant numbers of children. It grants FDA full authority to regulate tobacco advertising ``consistent with and to the full extent permitted by the First Amendment.''

FDA authority must also extend to the sale of tobacco products. Nearly every state makes it illegal to sell cigarettes to children under 18, but surveys show that those laws are rarely enforced and frequently violated. FDA must have the power to limit the sale of cigarettes to face-to-face transactions in which the age of the purchaser can be verified by identification. This means an end to self- service displays and vending machine sales. There must also be serious enforcement efforts with real penalties for those caught selling tobacco products to children. This is the only way to ensure that children under 18 are not able to buy cigarettes.

The FDA conducted the longest rule-making proceeding in its history, studying which regulations would most effectively reduce the number of children who smoke. Seven hundred thousand public comments were received in the course of that rulemaking. At the conclusion of its proceeding, the Agency promulgated rules on the manner in which cigarettes are advertised and sold. Due to litigation, most of those regulations were never implemented. If we are serious about curbing youth smoking as much as possible, as soon as possible; it makes no sense to require FDA to reinvent the wheel by conducting a new multi- year rulemaking process on the same issues. This legislation will give the youth access and advertising restrictions already developed by FDA the immediate force of law, as if they had been issued under the new statute.

The legislation also provides for stronger warnings on all cigarette and smokeless tobacco packages, and in all print advertisements. These warnings will be more explicit in their description of the medical problems which can result from tobacco use. The FDA is given the authority to change the text of these warning labels periodically, to keep their impact strong.

Nicotine in cigarettes is highly addictive. Medical experts say that it is as addictive as heroin or cocaine. Yet for decades, tobacco companies have vehemently denied the addictiveness of their products. No one can forget the parade of tobacco executives who testified under oath before Congress that smoking cigarettes is not addictive. Overwhelming evidence in industry documents obtained through the discovery process proves that the companies not only knew of this addictiveness for decades, but actually relied on it as the basis for their marketing strategy. As we now know, cigarette manufacturers chemically manipulated the nicotine in their products to make it even more addictive.

The tobacco industry has a long, dishonorable history of providing misleading information about the health consequences of smoking. These companies have repeatedly sought to characterize their products as far less hazardous than they are. They made minor innovations in product design seem far more significant for the health of the user than they actually were. It is essential that FDA have clear and unambiguous authority to prevent such misrepresentations in the future. The largest disinformation campaign in the history of the corporate world must end.

Given the addictiveness of tobacco products, it is essential that the FDA regulate them for the protection of the public health. Over forty million Americans are currently addicted to cigarettes. No responsible public health official believes that cigarettes should be banned. A ban would leave forty million people without a way to satisfy their drug dependency. FDA should be able to take the necessary steps to help addicted smokers overcome their addiction, and to make the product less toxic for smokers who are unable or unwilling to stop. To do so, FDA must have the authority to reduce or remove hazardous ingredients from cigarettes, to the extent that it becomes scientifically feasible. The inherent risk in smoking should not be unnecessarily compounded.

Recent statements by several tobacco companies make clear that they plan to develop what they characterize as ``reduced risk'' cigarettes. This legislation will require manufacturers to submit such ``reduced risk'' products to the FDA for analysis before they can be marketed. No health-related claims will be permitted until they have been verified to the FDA's satisfaction. These safeguards are essential to prevent deceptive industry marketing campaigns, which could lull the public into a false sense of health safety.

Smoking is the number one preventable cause of death in America. Congress must vest FDA not only with the responsibility for regulating tobacco products, but with full authority to do the job effectively.

This legislation will give the FDA the legal authority it needs--to reduce youth smoking by preventing tobacco advertising which targets children--to prevent the sale of tobacco products to minors--to help smokers overcome their addiction--to make tobacco products less toxic for those who continue to use them--and to prevent the tobacco industry from misleading the public about the dangers of smoking.

Enacting this bill this year is the right thing to do for America's children.