Mr. President, we are proceeding at the moment to the nomination of White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States of America. He had served as a judge on the…
Mr. President, we are proceeding at the moment to the nomination of White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States of America. He had served as a judge on the Supreme Court of Texas and has been commonly referred to as Judge Gonzales, which I shall do during the course of my presentation.
Judge Gonzales, 49, comes to this nomination to be the chief law enforcement officer of the United States with an extraordinary record.
He was one of eight children, sharing a two-room living quarters with their parents. They had no hot water, no telephone. He pursued an academic career, first at the military academy; then at Rice University, where he graduated; and then at the Harvard Law School.
He went into the private practice of law and then was asked by then- Governor George Bush to work with him in the Governor's office.
Judge Gonzales then, as noted, was a justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. With the election of Governor Bush to the White House, Judge Gonzales has been White House Counsel for the last 4 years.
It is not irrelevant to note that Judge Gonzales would be the first Hispanic to be Attorney General of the United States. That is quite a dramatic rise in the legal community.
When I was elected district attorney of Philadelphia some time ago, in 1965, there was not a single Hispanic lawyer in Philadelphia. At that time, I made an effort of outreach to bring minority representation into the district attorney's office as assistants and could not find a single Hispanic. So there has been a great deal of progress. Now there are Hispanic Federal judges in Philadelphia, State court judges, city solicitors, prominent attorneys, but Judge Gonzales would be the first Hispanic to be Attorney General of the United States, if confirmed.
He will bring, I think, a unique perspective because of his minority status. I think he would have a broader view, a different view on civil rights. We have an issue which is subject to some congressional oversight where some 762 alien detainees were rounded up after
9/11, and according to a report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, there was never any showing of connection to terrorism or to al-Qaida or to any reason for their detention.
While we know we live in a very dangerous world, there has to be some reason--it may not be as strong as probable cause for an arrest, or probable cause for search and seizure, or even sufficiency for stop and frisk--but there has to be a reason for detention. That is something of which I think Judge Gonzales might have some greater perspective.
Judge Gonzales, I think, also would be expected to have a broader view on the immigration laws, being Hispanic, being from Texas, seeing the kinds of problems which are present both from the point of view of stopping illegal immigrants and also from the point of view of immigrants who come to this country who seek a better way of life.
Similarly, I think he might have some greater insights into voting rights. He took a position broadly viewed as divergent from the administration on affirmative action in the controversial cases involving the University of Michigan. Affirmative action, always a complicated, controversial subject, but one where differing views and a broader perspective is a quality that would be well served in the Attorney General of the United States.
He also took a broader view on the issue of what was required on parental notification under the Texas statute, drawing opposition from some on the so-called right of the party. There again, a little different view and a little broader view reflective of his background and his own attitudes.
A great deal of the hearing process on Judge Gonzales has been involved on the issue of compliance with the Geneva Convention, on compliance with the statutes of the United States which prohibit torture. A great deal has been made of a statement made by Judge Gonzales with respect to the Geneva Conventions. He has been broadly quoted on a statement that some of the Geneva Convention's limitations are obsolete or quaint. In an opinion which he circulated, he said this:
In my judgment, this new paradigm--
referring to what has happened after 9/11--
renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning
of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.
That part of the statement is the one always quoted, and the comment on ``quaint'' and the comment on ``obsolete'' have drawn a lot of criticism. But almost nowhere has there been a followup on what he was referring to. But what he said, continuing:
. . . renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that
captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary
privileges, scrip--i.e., advances of monthly pay--athletic
uniforms and scientific instruments.
Well, when you see the reference here to ``items like commissary privileges,'' I don't know that that would be exactly something to be concerned about on a prisoner, or scrip or advances of monthly pay or athletic uniforms or scientific instruments. So in that context, to say it is ``quaint'' or ``obsolete'' is not to challenge the underlying provisions of the Geneva Convention on its important substantive provisions.
In Judge Gonzales's statements and testimony before the Judiciary Committee, he has been very emphatic about his personal opposition to torture and about the opposition of the administration to torture. He has been emphatic on his opposition to transporting detainees to other countries which permit torture to enable detainees to be tortured in other countries where they could not be under the auspices of the United States. He has been explicit in articulating the view that the CIA is bound by the same rules prohibiting torture as anyone else.
He has come under considerable criticism for the so-called Bybee memorandum which was issued in August of 2002, signed by Jay Bybee, then Assistant Attorney General of the United States, where the memorandum was requested so that there would be a full
statement and an understanding of what the law required to comply with the statutes prohibiting torture in the United States.
That memorandum was erroneous in its legal conclusions, as has been generally agreed to, and has been withdrawn by the Department of Justice. The interpretation of what constituted torture was very extreme, referring to the kind of excruciating pain and loss of bodily function, certainly not a realistic or an adequate or a definition of torture which would withstand legal analysis or legal scrutiny.
The memorandum was extreme and excessive in a statement, an articulation of executive power. One example was the statement that the President of the United States had as much authority on questioning of detainees as the President had on battlefield decisions, which obviously makes no sense. When you talk about a battlefield decision, that is a prerogative of the Commander in Chief, as it is delegated down through field commanders. But that kind of authority does not reside in the President on an issue such as the questioning of detainees.
The memo went quite far in suggesting that the President had authority to ignore statutes if he felt they were unconstitutional. There has been some question raised, although it is not explicit in the Bybee memo, about the authority of the President to immunize those who violate the law. That certainly is not lawful. When you talk about immunizing, you talk about judicial action in the context where there is a statute by the Congress of the United States authorizing immunity in a given context, immunity from criminal prosecution to disclose some information, but there is no suggestion anywhere that the President has the authority to immunize executive branch officials from noncompliance with the law.
We find Judge Gonzales essentially working as White House counsel, working for the President in a role which he was very emphatic in distinguishing from the role of the Attorney General of the United States. As Attorney General he has a responsibility to represent all of the people. As counsel to the President, as White House counsel, his responsibility is limited only to the President.
The memorandum by the Department of Justice was requested in order to have the legal interpretation as to what the appropriate line of questioning could be in order to be in compliance with the law. That was the role of the Department of Justice. It was not the role of Judge Gonzales. Then the decision as to what the questions would be, what the interrogation would be is the role of the Department of Defense, again, not the role of Judge Gonzales.
Judge Gonzales has been very forthcoming, being available and meeting with some 27 Senators, which is said to be a record in being available to everyone on the Judiciary Committee and beyond, submitting to up to four rounds of questioning, 10 rounds each, and then in some cases the third round of 15, and in one case the fourth round of 22 minutes, and then responding to very broad questions, with the New York Times commenting that the responses of more than 200 pages of answers to questions was the most expansive view by the administration of its techniques and procedures on the questioning of detainees. So there is no doubt that Judge Gonzales has responded very broadly to the inquiries made of him.
There has been a challenge that he has not answered all the questions because he could not recall specific conversations which were held years before, but that is entirely understandable.
There were questions about discussions where representatives of the executive branch got together to discuss the specifics of the Department of Justice memorandum and the interrogation techniques to be employed by the Department of Defense. One of his answers to one of the written questions propounded gives a fair summary in a fairly abbreviated form as to Judge Gonzales's role. These are his words:
Shortly after September 11, 2001, until the present, the
administration has been involved in conducting the war on
terror by gathering as much information from terrorists as we
possibly can within the bounds of law. During that time, I
have participated in several meetings at which possible uses
of methods of questioning were discussed. These meetings may
have included from time to time representatives from the
National Security Council, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and others. In the meetings I attended,
agencies' representatives raised concerns that certain
terrorists had information that might save American lives.
The participants shared a desire to explore whether there
existed methods of questioning these terrorists that might
elicit that information. It was always very clear that we
would implement such methods only within the bounds of the
law.
That would bear repeating, ``always very clear that we would implement such methods only within the bounds of the law.'' Judge Gonzales continues:
As counsel to the President, my constant emphasis and
interest was on the last factor, ensuring compliance with the
law. It would not have been appropriate for me to comment on
issues such as whether a particular individual may have
information that would be helpful to the effort to save
American lives or to defeat terrorists or whether a certain
procedure for questioning that individual would be effective
in eliciting that information. Others with more relevant
experience, expertise, and information were responsible for
making those judgments. Instead it was my responsibility to
ensure that any method they deemed appropriate and effective
from an operational point of view was considered lawful by
the Department of Justice. To the extent I was involved in
recommendations, results, and assignments arising out of such
meetings, my activities were directed toward ensuring that
those with operational responsibilities would act only after
receiving the judgment of the Department of Defense that a
proposed course of action was lawful.
That is the end of Judge Gonzales's statement on that. His role was reasonably, clearly delineated. He represented the President. He was responsible for saying what were the outlines of the law, or what was lawful. Those practices were defined by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, which has the responsibility to do that. And then anything beyond the legal techniques of the questions would lie with those who have the expertise, as he described it, and the experience, and the responsibility from the Department of Justice or from the Central Intelligence Agency.
There was one other statement by Judge Gonzales in response to a question by Senator Kennedy, which I think is a summary, which delineates his own role. When asked about a specific newspaper article and about events that occurred several years before, Judge Gonzales replied:
Sir, I don't have any specific recollection. I read the same article. I don't know whether or not it was the CIA [that was in reference as to whether it was a CIA request]. What I can say is that after this war began against this new kind of threat, this new kind of enemy, we realized that there was a premium on receiving information. In many ways, this war on terror is a war about information. If we have information, we can defeat the enemy. We had captured some really bad people who we were concerned had information that might prevent the loss of American lives in the future. It was important to receive that information, and people at the agencies wanted to be sure that they would not do anything that would violate our legal obligations, so they did the right thing; they asked questions--what is lawful conduct, because we don't do anything that violates the law.
So here again is a capsule statement of Judge Gonzales's role. He is representing the President. He is not looking to determine what the appropriate scope of conduct is. That is a matter to be determined by those who are involved in questioning the detainees.
That is the essence of what I believe--to be succinct and to the point of the issue. There are a great many other responses that could be read, a great many other arguments that could be advanced. I will reserve further responses on this matter as the course of the argument develops.
I thank my colleague, Senator Hatch, for coming early in the proceedings to make a cogent argument.
Mr. President, I have sought recognition today to state my support for the nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States.
First, I would like to describe Judge Gonzales's personal background. He has had an extraordinary life and career. His personal story is one of dedication and courage--the sort of story
that is possible only in America, where the dreams of even the most humble citizens can be achieved through hard work and discipline.
Judge Gonzales was born in San Antonio, Texas, and raised in the small town of Humble, just outside of Houston. Although he and his seven siblings shared a two-room house that lacked either a telephone or hot running water, Judge Gonzales refused to be deterred by his difficult circumstances. He journeyed through Texas public schools, graduating from a Texas high school. Judge Gonzales then chose to serve his country by joining the Air Force and serving for approximately 2 years before entering the United States Air Force Academy for a 2-year stint. Shortly thereafter, he accomplished his childhood dream of graduating from Rice University. Following his graduation from Rice, Judge Gonzales went on to graduate from the Harvard Law School.
In June of 1982, he joined the law firm of Vinson & Elkins in Houston, TX, where he later became a partner. Not content merely to practice law without giving back to the profession, Judge Gonzales also taught law as an adjunct professor at the University of Houston Law Center.
The opportunity for service arose again when then-Governor Bush asked Judge Gonzales to leave his law firm to become the Governor's General Counsel. Thereafter, Judge Gonzales embarked upon a distinguished career in public service, including service as Texas's 100th Secretary of State from December 2, 1997 to January 10, 1999.
In what would be a capstone for many lawyers' careers, in 1999 Judge Gonzales was appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas--a job he loved, and the reason he is still today known as Judge. Although he enjoyed his job on the Texas Supreme Court, the President called upon him to serve his country as the White House Counsel, a position he filled throughout the administration's first term.
Mr. President, no one in the Senate could take issue with Judge Gonzales's remarkable rise to prominence, and the obvious talent and ability that fueled it. Indeed, I think we are all in agreement about that. Nevertheless, Judge Gonzales finds himself confronting substantial opposition from my colleagues across the aisle. The purported reasons do not justify the opposition.
First, the opponents of Judge Gonzales have succeeded in confusing the public about his views on torture. To listen to Judge Gonzales's critics, one would think that the policy of the United States was to promote or sanction torture, and that Judge Gonzales somehow established such a policy. Last week, for example, the senior Senator from Massachusetts stood on the Senate floor and accused Judge Gonzales of being a participant ``in the shameful decision by the administration to authorize the torture of detainees at Guantanamo and in Iraq.'' That charge is simply false. In fact, the White House has made very clear that the United States policy and law prohibit torture, and the President himself has insisted upon humane treatment for detainees. Judge Gonzales has been emphatic in his agreement with this position. When asked, point blank, by the senior Senator from Illinois whether U.S. personnel can legally engage in torture under any circumstances, Judge Gonzales answered: ``Absolutely no. Our policy is we do not engage in torture.'' To which my colleague replied: ``Good. I am glad that you have stated that for the record.''
Despite that exchange, and others like it, some critics, including the editors of the Washington Post and New York Times, have mischaracterized Judge Gonzales's answers to the committee's questions. In its editorial of January 26th, the Post claimed that Judge Gonzales had asserted the administration's right to, among other things, ``transport [foreigners] to countries where torture is practiced.'' In response to a question on this topic posed by my colleague from Massachusetts, however, Judge Gonzales wrote: ``The policy of the United States is not to transfer individuals to countries where we believe they likely will be tortured, whether those individuals are being transferred from inside or outside the United States.'' He added, ``I am not aware of anyone in the Executive Branch authorizing any transfer of a detainee in violation of that policy.''
In case this was not clear enough, Judge Gonzales reiterated to the Senator from Massachusetts: ``United States policy is clear--the President has directed that the United States is not to engage in torture anywhere in the world and is not to transfer detainees from anywhere in the world to other countries where they likely will be tortured.''
In the New York Times editorial, also dated January 26th, it is argued that the ``biggest strike against Mr. Gonzales'' is the fact that a ``now repudiated'' Justice Department memorandum giving a ``narrow definition of torture'' was addressed to him. This ignores several facts: First, Congress--not the Administration--enacted the definition of ``torture.'' In 1994, Congress defined torture as ``an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.''
The now repudiated Justice Department memorandum suggested that ``severe physical pain,'' as used in the torture statute, should be construed narrowly to mean the type of pain ordinarily ``associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions--in order to constitute torture.'' But, Judge Gonzales was not the author of this offending language, and--as I will discuss at greater length later--he has rejected this narrow view of what constitutes torture.
Moreover, while the memo has now been repudiated and replaced by one widely acknowledged to be more appropriate, neither memo altered the President's policy that detainees are to be treated humanely.
The Times editorial also cites a leaked draft memorandum from Judge Gonzales to the President. Some on the Judiciary Committee, including the Ranking Minority Leader from Vermont and the senior Senator from Massachusetts, have mischaracterized this draft memo as a disavowal of the Conventions. Again, this ignores what Judge Gonzales has written and said. The language from the leaked memorandum is often taken out of context. The relevant passage reads as follows:
The nature of the new war [against terrorism] places a high
premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly
obtain information from captured terrorists and their
sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against
American civilians, and the need to try terrorists for war
crimes such as wantonly killing civilians. In my judgment,
this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict
limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders
quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy
be afforded such things as commissary privileges, scrip
(i.e., advances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and
scientific instruments.
At his hearing, Judge Gonzales reasserted his commitment to the Geneva Conventions as a whole. He told the Judiciary Committee in no uncertain terms: ``I consider the Geneva Conventions neither quaint nor obsolete.'' And he stressed that, ``[t]he President has repeatedly condemned torture and made clear that the United States will not condone torture.'' When asked about potential changes to the Conventions, he noted: ``I'm not suggesting that the principles of Geneva regarding basic treatment, basic decent treatment of human beings, should be revisited. That should always be our polestar.'' Further, in response to another Democratic Judiciary Committee Member, Judge Gonzales reiterated, ``Yes, I do denounce torture, and if confirmed as Attorney General, I will prosecute those who engage in torture.''
Finally, none of those standing in opposition to Judge Gonzales has come close to articulating a viable case for linking the actions of Judge Gonzales to the so-called ``migration'' of a flawed interrogation policy to the atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib, and perhaps elsewhere. Despite multiple investigations, including several discussed at our hearing, no one has established a link--even an attenuated one-- between Judge Gonzales and improper interrogation techniques in the field; I have yet to see anything other than supposition and conjecture.
So, Mr. President, I think that Judge Gonzales has been clear about the United States' policy and his own views against torture, leaving no
meaningful basis to oppose his nomination on such grounds.
As I have already indicated, another issue that has been misrepresented by Judge Gonzales' opponents is his stance with respect to the Office of Legal Counsel's memorandum on the anti-torture statute, the so-called Bybee memo.
At the Judiciary Committee's last Executive Meeting, the senior Senator from Massachusetts suggested that Judge Gonzales had failed to reject the memorandum. The record established the contrary. For example, Judge Gonzales has rejected the Bybee Memorandum's overbroad statement of Executive authority. In response to the Committee's questions about the memorandum, Judge Gonzales said:
It has been rejected, including that section regarding the
Commander-in-Chief's authority to ignore the criminal
statutes. So it has been rejected by the Executive Branch. I,
categorically, reject it. And, in addition to that, as I have
said repeatedly today, this administration does not engage in
torture and will not condone torture.
During his hearing, I asked Judge Gonzales: ``Do you agree with the statement in the memo, `Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield'?'' Judge Gonzales answered: ``I reject that statement, Senator.'' This is a clear and unequivocal answer.
Moreover, Judge Gonzales has explicitly recognized that Presidential authority in this area is indeed limited. Among other things, he has noted:
We in the executive branch, of course, understand that
there are limits on Presidential power. We are very, very
mindful of Justice O'Connor's statement in the Hamdi decision
that a state of war is not a blank check for the President of
the United States with respect to the rights of American
citizens. I understand that and I agree with that.
In addition, at his confirmation hearing, Judge Gonzales testified that he did not agree with the portion of the Bybee Memorandum stating that severe physical pain, as used in the torture statute, was limited to pain equivalent to organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. In response to a question from the Committee's Ranking Member, for example, Judge Gonzales agreed that horrific conduct, such as cutting off someone's finger, would be considered torture. Nevertheless, at the Executive Meeting, the Senator from Massachusetts continued to suggest that Judge Gonzales might somehow condone conduct such as, ``[b]eating you, suffocating you, ripping out your fingernails, burning you with hot irons, suspending you from hooks, putting lighted cigarettes in your ear.''
Such hyperbole, Mr. President, serves to highlight the fact that arguments against Judge Gonzales have ignored significant statements by this nominee. Judge Gonzales has taken important steps towards accommodating the legislative branch of government through his rejection of the Bybee dicta and his concessions on the limits of presidential power. Ignoring such efforts is the wrong way to approach such an important nomination and the wrong way to assess such a fine and worthy nominee.
On a related note, my colleague from Massachusetts and other critics, including the New York Times, have seized upon the fact that the President's February 2002 directive regarding the humane treatment of prisoners is addressed to the Nation's Armed Forces to suggest that somehow the CIA has been operating without legal constraints. The senior Senator from Massachusetts, for example, has alleged that Judge Gonzales ``evaded answers to questions about whether the CIA can abuse prisoners, even if the military is prohibited from doing so.'' This is directly contradicted by Judge Gonzales's responses to the Judiciary Committee's written questions. For example, Judge Gonzales has written:
The CIA and other intelligence agencies are fully bound by
the prohibition on torture contained in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2340
and Sec. 2340A and, depending on the circumstances, by other
criminal statutes such as those defining crimes in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. Those statutes prohibit, for example, assault (18
U.S.C. Sec. 113) and maiming (18 U.S.C. Sec. 114). These
criminal prohibitions prevent abuse of detainees by
intelligence officers. In fact, the Department of Justice is
currently prosecuting a CIA contract employee for various
charges of assault under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 113.
Despite such answers, my colleague from Massachusetts continues to accuse the administration of sending ``the message that anything goes to our troops and intelligence officers in the field.'' To the contrary, Judge Gonzales has stressed that the ``CIA and other intelligence agencies are fully bound'' by the laws against torture. And, as further noted by Judge Gonzales, the CIA and other agencies have sought Department of Justice guidance concerning the boundaries emanating from U.S. obligations under, for example, Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture.
In fact, let me take a moment to address Article 16 directly. Some have suggested that the administration's interpretation of Article 16 has been used to justify or facilitate the cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of aliens overseas. Just last week, for example, the senior Senator from Massachusetts accused Judge Gonzales of saying ``that the CIA is not bound by the prohibition on cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture.'' Again, this ignores the testimony of Judge Gonzales. At our hearing, Judge Gonzales noted that, when the Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture, it took a reservation equating the requirements under Article 16 with the requirements under the Fifth, Eighth, and 14th Amendments. Judge Gonzales further acknowledged that, when interpreting these requirements, the Administration has looked to Supreme Court precedents holding that aliens interrogated by U.S. personnel outside the United States enjoy no substantive rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and 14th Amendment. Nevertheless, regardless of the debate about the strict legal requirements of Article 16, Judge Gonzales testified that the administration has sought ``to be in compliance as a substantive matter under the Fifth, Eighth, and 14th Amendment.'' He also testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the United States has met its substantive obligations under the Fifth, Eighth, and 14th Amendments. This commitment has often been overlooked by the Judge's opponents.
Contrary to the claims of his critics, Judge Gonzales also acknowledged that, based on his review of the relevant investigations, the responsibility for what happened at places like Abu Ghraib extends further up the chain than the culpable guards. The Senator from Massachusetts accuses Judge Gonzales and others in the administration of a ``continuing effort to pin the blame for the torture scandal on a few bad apples among our solders.'' In reality, however, Judge Gonzales testified:
The reports [by Schlesinger, Faye, Kearns and others] seem
to indicate that there was a failure, there was a failure of
discipline amongst the supervisors of the guards there at Abu
Ghraib, and also they found that there was a failure in
training and oversight at multiple layers of Command Joint
Task Force 7. And so I think there was clearly a failure well
above the actions of the individuals who actually were in the
prison. At least that's what the reports seem to indicate, as
I review them.
At the same time, he rejected the notion that inhumane treatment was tolerated or encouraged as a matter of course. He pointed out, for example, that, even within Abu Ghraib, the gross misconduct of the night shift was aberrant:
The findings in these eight reports universally were that a
great majority, an overwhelming majority of our detention
operations have been conducted consistent with American
values and consistent with our legal obligations. What we saw
happen on that cell block in the night shift was limited to
the night shift on that cell block with respect to that first
category, the more offensive, the intentional severe physical
and the sexual abuse, the subject of those pictures. And this
isn't just Al Gonzales speaking. This is what, if you look at
it, the Schlesinger report concludes. And so what you see is
that you have got this kind of conduct occurring at the night
shift, but the day shift, they don't engage in that kind of
conduct because they understand what the rules were. And so I
respectfully disagree with the characterization there was
some sort of permissive environment.
Once again, on this point as with others, the Judge's own words refute the accusations of his critics.
Some of my colleagues have also seized upon Judge Gonzales's inability to recall certain details of meetings that occurred more than 2\1/2\ years ago
to suggest that we lack sufficient information to make an informed decision about his nomination or that Judge Gonzales is being less than forthcoming when he asserts he cannot recall a matter. Last week, for example, the senior Senator from Massachusetts told the Judiciary Committee that Judge Gonzales ``refuses to tell us anything about those meetings.''
In fact, the Senator from Massachusetts had several exchanges with Judge Gonzales on this topic at our confirmation hearing. The Senator queried, for example: ``I just want to point out, if it is true, as the Post reported, that you held several meetings at which the legality of interrogation techniques, such as threat of live burial and water- boarding were discussed; do you remember that?'' Judge Gonzales responded:
Senator, I have a recollection that we had some discussions
in my office, but let me be very clear with the Committee. It
is not my job to decide which type of methods of obtaining
information from terrorists would be most effective. That job
responsibility falls to folks within the agencies. It is also
not my job to make the ultimate decision about whether or not
those methods would, in fact, meet the requirements of the
anti-torture statute. That would be a job for the Department
of Justice. And I never influenced or pressured the
Department to bless any of these techniques. I viewed it as
their responsibility to make the decision as to whether or
not a procedure or method of questioning of these terrorists
that an agency wanted, would it, in fact, be lawful.
Given the passage of time, his inability to recall precise details is understandable. Moreover, it must be viewed in the context of what he has recalled and provided to the committee. Among other things, he has: acknowledged his participation in meetings where the questioning of detainees was discussed; explained the genesis and purpose of such meetings; described the limited nature of his role; and explained the result of these meetings. In one lengthy written answer to a question posed by my colleague from Massachusetts, for instance, he explained:
Since shortly after September 11, 2001 until the present,
the Administration has been involved in conducting the War on
Terror by gathering as much information from terrorists as we
possibly can within the bounds of law. During that time, I
have participated in several meetings at which the possible
use of methods of questioning were discussed. These meetings
may have included, from time to time, representatives from
the National Security Council, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and others. In the meetings I attended,
agencies' representatives raised concerns that certain
terrorists had information that might save American lives;
the participants shared a desire to explore whether there
existed methods of questioning these terrorists that might
elicit that information; and it was always very clear that we
would implement such methods only within the bounds of the
law. As Counsel to the President, my constant emphasis and
interest was on the last factor--ensuring compliance with the
law. It would not have been appropriate for me to comment on
issues such as whether a particular individual may have
information that would be helpful to the effort to save
American lives or defeat terrorists, or whether a certain
procedure for questioning that individual would be effective
in eliciting that information. Others with more relevant
experience, expertise, and information were responsible for
making those judgments. Instead, it was my responsibility to
ensure that any method they deemed appropriate and effective
from an operational point of view was considered lawful by
the Department of Justice. To the extent I was involved in
recommendations, results, and assignments arising out of such
meetings, my activities were directed toward ensuring that
those with operational responsibility would act only after
receiving the judgment of the Department of Justice that a
proposed course of action was lawful.
That answer provides a good deal of information. The fact that he cannot recall details of those meetings is understandable. It is commonplace to forget details of meetings, particularly when years have passed. It is certainly not, given the responses that have been made, a reason to oppose someone who is universally praised for his ability and integrity.
Since his nomination, the White House has offered every Committee member a personal, private meeting with Judge Gonzales. To date, the Judge has met personally with 14 members of the Judiciary Committee, and more than a dozen other Senators.
At his hearing, Judge Gonzales testified for nearly 6 hours, answering multiple rounds of questions. There were three rounds of questions, and I encouraged Senators to participate in each round. After a complete and lengthy first round, 9 Senators participated in a second round of questions. After that, 4 Senators including myself took advantage of the third round. I made sure every Senator had ample opportunity to question Judge Gonzales. Indeed, one Senator was ultimately granted a fourth round of questions.
Contrary to the assertion by the Senator from Massachusetts that Judge Gonzales was unresponsive and he made ``a mockery of the notion of congressional oversight and accountability,'' Judge Gonzales's answers to the committee's written questions, contained in 221 single- spaced pages, provided nearly 450, often detailed, responses on issues ranging from the war on terrorism to intellectual property. So thorough was Judge Gonzales's response that the New York Times (January 19, 2005) stated that Judge Gonzales's answers to the committee's written questions comprised ``one of the administration's most expansive statements of its positions on a variety of issues, particularly regarding laws and policies governing C.I.A. interrogation of terror suspects.''
The questions kept pouring in even after the committee's hearing record closed on Thursday, January 13th, with 4 Senators submitting more than 40 additional questions for the nominee. Judge Gonzales has now responded to all of those supplemental questions. In 27 additional pages of questions and answers, Judge Gonzales has further clarified his position on several issues. He also furnished a remarkable 93-page memorandum on the Geneva Conventions prepared by the State Department as well as a letter reiterating his role in a court appearance for then-Governor Bush.
These facts refute the claims that Judge Gonzales has failed to provide us with sufficient information to evaluate his nomination.
Nevertheless, the Judge's opponents continue to clamor for more. At the executive meeting, for example, the senior Senator from Massachusetts complained that Judge Gonzales had ``not conducted a search for . . . requested documents.'' In fact, my colleague said it would be ``hard to imagine a more arrogant insult to this Committee's oversight responsibility.''
I requested that a search be conducted for any draft or final memoranda or other documents written by Judge Gonzales and relevant to the subject of interrogation techniques or torture. The White House responded by conducting a search.
On January 19, 2005, at the direction of the White House Chief of Staff, David Leitch, Deputy Counsel to the President, supervised a search of certain electronic records available in the Office of Counsel to the President. Specifically, he searched for word processing documents containing the words ``torture'' or ``interrogation'' that were located on (1) the shared Counsel's Office directory, (2) the personal and network directories used by Judge Gonzales and his assistants, or (3) the hard drive of Judge Gonzales's computer.
According to the White House, based on the practices concerning documents created by Judge Gonzales, there is a very high probability that any document of the sort described would have been identified as a result of this search. I have been advised, however, that no such documents were identified by the administration.
Moreover, the White House has represented, and Judge Gonzales confirmed, that he has no notes reflecting discussions at any meetings concerning these topics, nor does the White House believe there are any notes taken by Judge Gonzales in the files of the office.
Finally, I have been advised that, during Judge Gonzales's tenure as counsel to the President, there have never been any audio recordings or transcriptions of any meetings in the White House Counsel offices concerning these topics, or any others, so far as the White House is aware.
Judge Gonzales and the White House have undertaken appropriate efforts to accommodate the Senate by providing relevant information. Between his written answers and his testimony, Judge Gonzales has addressed his role in the solicitation and provision of legal advice, as well as his personal views on the contested issues--such as
the treatment of detainees. There is an ample record to evaluate his nomination. I urge Senators to review the voluminous materials that have been produced before coming to any conclusion.
Mr. President, another argument used by the Gonzales critics is that he refused to answer certain hypothetical questions during his hearing. Using the rejected language of the Bybee memo about a postulated Commander-in-Chief override of the torture statute, certain Judiciary Committee members repeatedly asked Judge Gonzales whether he believed the President could authorize torture in extreme and hypothetical circumstances. Judge Gonzales refused to engage in scenarios about when, if ever, torture might be sanctioned, because the President has rejected torture under any circumstances.
So, when the ranking minority member asked, ``Now, as Attorney General, would you believe the President has authority to exercise a Commander in Chief override and immunize acts of torture?'' Judge Gonzales answered:
[T]he President has said we are not going to engage in
torture under any circumstances. And so you're asking me to
answer a hypothetical that is never going to occur. This
President has said we're not going to engage in torture under
any circumstances, and therefore, that portion of the opinion
was unnecessary and was the reason that we asked that that
portion be withdrawn.
Given the administration's clear policy, this response is appropriate. Judge Gonzales has explained that the Bush administration will not engage in torture under any circumstance, so his reluctance to contradict the President's policy is perfectly understandable.
In fact, even the distinguished witnesses on the second panel of our confirmation hearing, including two law school deans and an advocate for victims of torture, were unwilling to engage in hypothetical debates about what set of circumstances--if any--might justify a presidential decision to approve torture. One witness even characterized the hypothetical about a ticking time bomb as ``fantasy'' and part of the ``mythology'' of torture. Such reticence is understandable, especially for someone, like Judge Gonzales, who serves a President who has rejected the use of torture under any circumstances.
Another of the anti-Gonzales shibboleths is that he is too close to the President to be independent. This argument ignores what Judge Gonzales, an honorable and credible man, told the Judiciary Committee. During his opening statement, and several times thereafter, Judge Gonzales acknowledged the difference between his role as White House Counsel and the job of Attorney General. At the outset of our hearing, he noted:
With the consent of the Senate, I will no longer represent
only the White House; I will represent the United States of
America and its people. I understand the differences between
the two roles. In the former I have been privileged to advise
the President and his staff. In the latter I would have a far
broader responsibility: to pursue justice for all the people
of our great Nation, to see that the laws are enforced in a
fair and impartial manner for all Americans.
That is a clear statement that he recognizes the difference between his current job and the job of Attorney General. Judge Gonzales has been the lawyer for one person--the President--and is now going to serve as a lawyer for all Americans. Judge Gonzales knows the difference and will serve honorably as the next Attorney General.
Before I conclude, Mr. President, I want to emphasize a few of the positive comments my Democratic colleagues on the Judiciary Committee have made about this nominee. At his confirmation hearing, the senior Senator from Wisconsin told Judge Gonzales: ``As you know, we have had an opportunity to work together on several different issues over the years, and I have come to respect you also. And I believe if you are confirmed that you will do a good job as Attorney General of the United States.'' At our Executive Meeting, the senior senator from Delaware noted: ``My vote, to state the obvious, is not about his character or his compelling personal story, which is compelling. He has overcome great adversity in his life, and I believe he is an intelligent, decent and honorable man.'' The senior senator from New York said, ``I like Judge Gonzales. I respect him. I think he is a gentleman and I think he is a genuinely good man.'' Such comments do not surprise anyone who has gotten to know Judge Gonzales.
As I have noted, Judge Gonzales has taken a strong stand against torture, rejected suggestions that the President is above the law, and recognized the important distinctions between the position of White House Counsel and Attorney General. So, what is behind the votes against him? Not his personal story. Not his character. Not his willingness to work with Congress. There may well be a large overhang of politics clouding this nomination. Politics, however, is a poor reason for denying the President his choice to be Attorney General. I urge my colleagues to consider this nomination based on the facts. Regardless of what administration is in power, that is a standard we should all honor.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that Judge Gonzales is a remarkable American, well-suited for the position of Attorney General, who has been forthcoming with the Senate and the American people about his role in some very difficult decisions during a very important time. He is a good man. Even his opponents acknowledge that. I urge my colleagues to support Judge Gonzales to be Attorney General.
I yield the floor.
That will be agreeable.
Mr. President, we have consent following the lunch. I think the Senator from----
The Senator is entitled to finish.
There had been a request for Senator Mikulski for 10 minutes right after lunch.
Mr. President, will the Senator from Utah be willing to await the completion of the remarks of Senator Mikulski for 10 minutes at 2:15 and Senator Schumer at 2:15 and then he will resume his remarks?
My unanimous consent request is that at 2:15, when we resume, Senator Mikulski be recognized for 10 minutes and Senator Schumer be recognized for 10 minutes and then Senator Hatch be recognized to conclude his remarks, then Senator Cornyn be recognized, and then Senator Kennedy be recognized.
It would be Senators Mikulski, Schumer, Hatch, Cornyn, and Kennedy.
I thank the Chair.