Mr. Speaker, the House Judiciary Committee has reported an identical House companion to S. 888. That bill is H.R. 2489, and the Judiciary Committee's report for the House bill, Report No. 110-468,…
Mr. Speaker, the House Judiciary Committee has reported an identical House companion to S. 888. That bill is H.R. 2489, and the Judiciary Committee's report for the House bill, Report No. 110-468, should be considered as part of the legislative history on S. 888, as reflecting the intent of the House.
Mr. Speaker, the first legal application of the term genocide came during the Nuremberg trials in 1945. Before then, there wasn't a word in our language to adequately express the brutality and evil that this crime embodies. The purpose of the Genocide Accountability Act is to ensure that no perpetrator of genocide is able to use the United States as a safe haven for prosecution. After the Holocaust, the Genocide Convention was the embodiment of the world's pledge, the promise of ``never again.'' And yet this promise has proven to be one of the world's most unfulfilled.
Not very long ago, genocide was the scourge of Bosnia, and before that, Rwanda. Two years ago, this body passed a resolution acknowledging that the devastation and murderous violence occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan was a genocide. Unfortunately, the genocide in Darfur remains an ongoing crime today. The struggle to prevent and punish genocide has been, and unfortunately will be, winding and long.
The bill we are considering today acknowledges that in some cases the perpetrators of this evil have ended up not just on the doorstep of the United States, but living inside our house. Current law allows us to deport them, but procedural limitations in our laws can keep us from delivering justice for their crimes.
Because current U.S. law lacks an extraterritorial jurisdiction clause for genocide, procedurally the Department of Justice is limited in its ability to charge an individual who is not a U.S. national for involvement in a genocide committed outside the United States, even if the victims include American citizens.
In 1948, the United States was the first nation to sign the Genocide Convention. Twenty years ago, with the Proxmire Act, we added to our criminal code provisions to fulfill the dual obligations of that Convention, to prevent and to punish genocide. S. 888 will strengthen the reach of U.S. laws to prosecute any individuals found in our country who have taken part in acts of genocide, in Darfur or anywhere else.
As the atrocities in Darfur continue, it is imperative that we enact measures in this bill to stand against genocide wherever it occurs and hold fully accountable the perpetrators of genocide who are able to escape justice.
Mr. Speaker, the term ``genocide'' was first proposed by Ralph Lemkin, a man of Polish-Jewish descent. In 1941 he came to the United States, and on the day of his arrival he gave a speech explaining to an American audience the international responsibility to respond to genocide. I'll paraphrase what he said: If you learned that a mass of women, children and old people was being murdered 100 miles from here, wouldn't you feel compelled to run to their aid? Why then, if the distance were 3,000 miles instead of 100, would you restrain this decision of your heart?
By passing this bill today, we are taking Lemkin's words to heart. We will work to punish and prevent the crime of genocide not just in our own country, but wherever it occurs around the world.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
I thank the gentleman for his question and yielding to me and appreciate his comments and partnership on this bill.
In response, I would say that the genocide in Darfur is an ongoing crime. The House recognized it as such over 2 years ago, and there is no question that this crime continues today. We believe that ex post facto clearly would not apply in this situation.
The gentleman raises an important issue, and I do not agree with that hypothesis. I think the witness from the Department of Justice was offering a spontaneous and personal opinion, which he was careful to label as such, and not an official interpretation by the Department.
When we crafted this bill, we were careful to write it as narrowly and precisely as possible. We were and remain interested only in changing the circumstances under which certain parties may be charged under the genocide statute. Our intent is to make a procedural alteration to the current law and leave everything else in the statute untouched.
In determining whether or not a law presents a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the Constitution, courts have generally considered whether the new law: one, places the defendant at a substantial disadvantage compared to the law as it stood when he committed the crime of which he has been convicted; secondly, changes the definition of the crime; or three, increases the maximum penalty for it. The Genocide Accountability Act doesn't alter in any way either the elements or the punishment for the crime of genocide.
The underlying notion here is that the defendant should be on notice that his actions constituted a crime. I think it would be very difficult for anyone to argue that the world is not on notice that we consider and have considered for many years genocide a crime. The United States has recognized genocide as a crime for nearly 60 years as a signatory of the Genocide Convention.
Neither do we make any change that would deprive one charged with the crime of any defense that is now available under the law. It is important to add that the Supreme Court has found a key exception to the ex post facto rule where changes to a law are procedural in nature.
In numerous decisions, the court has held that where a law involves changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated as opposed to changes in the substantive laws of crimes, and I quote that phrase directly, that does not deprive a defendant of substantial legal protections, then it is constitutional.
It is our conclusion that this bill falls within that exception and makes only procedural changes to the law. So it was our intent that this law be used to prosecute perpetrators of genocide who are on notice that their acts constitute a crime wherever it was committed.