Bridge Life Extension Act of 2008

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6578) to provide for the sale of light grade petroleum from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and its replacement with heavy grade petroleum, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, gas prices are outrageous and we need to act. Families are hurting and are looking to us to do anything and everything that can help.

There's no silver bullet, but there sure are things we can be doing better. One way is to make better use of our energy feedstocks, use what we ought to use today and save what we need to save for tomorrow.

The goal of this bill, H.R. 6578, the Consumer Energy Supply Act, is simple: to increase the supply of oil in the United States that can be refined into gas. The bill will direct the Department of Energy to release 70 million barrels of light sweet crude oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The bill requires the sale or exchange of light sweet crude to begin 15 days after enactment and to be completed within 6 months. Under the bill the revenue from the release will go into the SPR petroleum account to purchase more oil so the SPR will end up with more oil than it started out with. The bill will make sure that the SPR level will not fall below 90 percent of the current level during the exchange.

Now, the type of oil that will be released from the SPR is light sweet crude, which is the easiest and the cheapest to turn into gas.

And the oil that will replace the light oil will be heavy sour crude which happens to be the oil that is best suited to be refined into diesel.

What we need more of in this country is the highest and best use of all of our energy feedstocks. And this bill takes the oil that we pump back into the ground to save for later and puts that oil to its highest and best use right now and replaces that oil with oil whose highest and best use is to be held in reserve for a true national emergency.

This bill makes it easier and cheaper to get this fuel to the market right now while making sure we aren't putting our future needs at risk. We need to use today what is good for today and save for tomorrow what is good for tomorrow. Because our refineries need more oil they can refine quickly to get gas and diesel on the market, this bill gives it to them. Adding heavy sour crude to the SPR in its place will make sure that the SPR will be more effective if a real emergency arises. That is because the heavy oil we will be swapping for light oil can be refined to the diesel fuel needed to power our trucks, our trains and our military needs in times of a true emergency.

In April this year, the acting director for natural resources of the Government Accountability Office, Frank Rusco, gave Congress a detailed report to modernize the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and improve its flexibility and effectiveness. The Department of Energy has completed a study in 2005 which produced similar conclusions. This legislation will ensure that the SPR is more reflective of our Nation's modern refining capacity and that its strategic capabilities are better used while providing more oil available for refining right here in the U.S.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit these two documents for the Record.

Mr. Speaker, this bill will ease market tensions. It will help unlock some of the value in the SPR without negatively affecting the overall capacity or our strategic reserve policy. A release from the SPR will also help reduce the effects of market speculation on oil prices by sending the message that Congress is prepared to defend American families and businesses from these corrosive prices. That is what this bill will do. That is why it is a good idea for us to pass it. And that is why I urge my colleagues to vote for the bill.

[From the United States Government Accountability Office]

Testimony Before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global

Warming, House of Representatives

Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Improving the Cost Effectiveness of

Filling the Reserve

(Statement of Frank Rusco, Acting Director Natural Resources and

Environment)

Why GAO Did This Study

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created in 1975

to help protect the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions

and currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Department of

Energy (DOE) to increase the SPR storage capacity from 727

million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which it plans to

accomplish by 2018. Since 1999, oil for the SPR has generally

been obtained through the royalty-in-kind program, whereby

the government receives oil instead of cash for payment of

royalties on leases of federal property. The Department of

Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) collects the

royalty oil and transfers it to DOE, which then trades it for

oil suitable for the SPR.

As DOE begins to expand the SPR, past experiences can help

inform future efforts to fill the reserve in the most cost-

effective manner. In that context, GAO's testimony today will

focus on: (1) Factors GAO recommends DOE consider when

filling the SPR, and (2) the cost-effectiveness of using oil

received through the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR.

To address these issues, GAO relied on its 2006 report on

the SPR, as well as its ongoing review of the royalty-in-kind

program, where GAO interviewed officials at both DOE and MMS,

and reviewed DOE's SPR policies and procedures. DOE provided

comments on a draft of this testimony, which we incorporated

where appropriate.

What GAO Found

To decrease the cost of filling the reserve and improve its

efficiency, GAO recommended in previous work that DOE should

include at least 10 percent heavy crude oil in the SPR. If

DOE bought 100 million barrels of heavy crude oil during its

expansion of the SPR it could save over $1 billion in nominal

terms, assuming a price differential of $12 between the price

of light crude oil and the lower price of heavy crude oil,

the average differential over the last five years. Having

heavy crude oil in the SPR would also make the SPR more

compatible with many U.S. refineries, helping these

refineries run more efficiently in the event that a supply

disruption triggers use of the SPR. DOE indicated that, due

to the planned SPR expansion, determinations of the amount of

heavy oil to include in the SPR should wait until it prepares

a new study of U.S. Gulf Coast refining requirements. In

addition, we recommended

that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value--rather

than a steady volume--of oil over time when filling the SPR.

This ``dollar-cost-averaging'' approach would allow DOE to

acquire more oil when prices are low and less when prices are

high. GAO found that if DOE had used this purchasing approach

between October 2001 through August 2005, it could have saved

approximately $590 million, or over 10 percent, in fill

costs. GAO's simulations indicate that DOE could save money

using this approach for future SPR fills, regardless of

whether oil prices are trending up or down as long as there

is price volatility. GAO also recommends that DOE consider

giving companies participating in the royalty-in-kind program

additional flexibility to defer oil deliveries in exchange

for providing additional barrels of oil. DOE has granted

limited deferrals in the past, and expanding their use could

further decrease SPR fill costs. While DOE indicated that its

November 2006 rule on SPR acquisition procedures addressed

our recommendations, this rule does not specifically address

how to implement a dollar-cost-averaging strategy.

Purchasing oil to fill the SPR--as DOE did until 1994--is

likely to be more cost-effective than exchanging oil from the

royalty-in-kind program for other oil to fill the SPR. The

latter method adds administrative complexity to the task of

filling the SPR, increasing the potential for waste and

inefficiency. A January 2008 DOE Inspector General report

found that DOE is unable to ensure that it receives all of

the royalty oil that MMS provides. In addition, we found that

DOE's method for evaluating bids has been more robust for

cash purchases than royalty-in-kind exchanges, increasing the

likelihood that cash purchases are more cost-effective. For

example, in April 2007, DOE solicited two different types of

bids--one to purchase oil for the SPR in cash and one to

exchange royalty oil for other oil to fill the SPR. DOE

rejected offers to purchase oil when the spot price was about

$69 per barrel, yet in the same month, DOE exchanged royalty-

in-kind oil for other oil to put in the SPR at about the same

price. Because the government would have otherwise sold this

royalty-in-kind oil, DOE committed the government to pay,

through forgone revenues to the U.S. Treasury, roughly the

same price per barrel that DOE concluded was too high to

purchase directly.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to participate in the

Committee's hearing on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

Congress authorized the SPR in 1975 to protect the nation

from oil supply disruptions following the Arab oil embargo of

1973 and 1974 that led to sharp increases in oil prices. The

federal government owns the SPR, and the Department of Energy

(DOE) operates it. The SPR currently has the capacity to

store up to 727 million barrels of crude oil in salt caverns

in Texas and Louisiana. As of April 21, 2008, current

inventory of the SPR stood at 701.3 million barrels of oil,

which is roughly equivalent to 58 days of net oil imports.

DOE made direct purchases of crude oil until 1994, when

purchases were suspended due to the federal budget deficit,

and in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 approximately 28 million

barrels of oil were sold to reduce the deficit. Since DOE

resumed filling the SPR in 1999, it has obtained oil from the

Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service

(MMS) ``royalty-in-kind'' program. Through this program, the

MMS receives oil instead of cash for payments of royalties

from companies that lease federal property for oil and gas

development. MMS contracts for some of this royalty oil to be

delivered to designated oil terminal locations or ``market

centers'' where DOE takes possession. Because the royalty oil

often does not meet SPR quality specifications, and because

the market centers can be distant from SPR storage sites, DOE

generally awards contracts to exchange royalty oil at the

market center for SPR-quality oil delivered to SPR

facilities. Obtaining oil for the SPR through the royalty-in-

kind program avoids the need for Congress to make outlays to

finance oil purchases, but the foregone revenues associated

with using royalty-in-kind oil to trade for SPR oil imply an

equivalent loss of revenue because MMS would otherwise sell

the oil and deposit the revenues with the U.S. Treasury.

Interior estimates that the forgone revenue attributable to

using the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR were $4.6

billion from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2007.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed DOE to increase the

SPR storage capacity to 1 billion barrels and to fill it ``as

expeditiously as practicable without incurring excessive cost

or appreciably affecting the price of petroleum products to

consumers.'' It required DOE to select sites to expand the

SPR's storage capacity within 1 year of enactment, by August

2006. On February 14, 2007, Secretary of Energy William

Bodman designated three sites for the expansion, including a

160 million barrel facility in Richton, Mississippi, an 80

million barrel expansion of a facility in Big Hill, Texas,

and a 33 million barrel expansion of a facility in Bayou

Choctaw, Louisiana. In its June 2007 SPR plan, DOE

anticipated these expansions would begin in fiscal year 2008

and be complete in 2018. DOE also indicated that it would

prefer to continue using the royalty-in-kind program to fill

the additional storage capacity. DOE estimates the capital

cost for the SPR expansion at approximately $3.67 billion,

and estimates the cost of operating and maintaining the

expanded portion of the SPR at $35 to $40 million per year.

As DOE begins to expand the SPR, past experiences may help

inform future efforts to fill the SPR in the most cost-

effective manner. In that context, our testimony today will

focus on: (1) Factors we recommend DOE consider when filling

the SPR, and (2) the cost-effectiveness of using oil received

through the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR.

To address these issues, we are summarizing work from our

August 2006 report on the SPR and our ongoing review of the

royalty-in-kind program. For our August 2006 report, we

contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a

group of 13 industry, academic, governmental, and

nongovernmental experts to collect opinions on the impacts of

past SPR fill and use and on recommendations for the future.

We also reviewed records and reports from DOE and the

International Energy Agency. In addition, for our ongoing

review of the royalty-in-kind program for this committee and

others, we identified and reviewed applicable laws and

documentation on DOE policies and procedures for evaluating

SPR purchase and exchange bids, and interviewed officials at

both Interior and DOE. We have also drawn upon previous GAO

reports on the royalty-in- kind program. We conducted our

work on this testimony from January to April 2008 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. Those standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for

our findings and conclusions based on our audit

objectives.

In summary

To fill the SPR in a more cost-effective manner, we

recommended in previous work that DOE include in the SPR at

least 10 percent heavy crude oils, which are more compatible

with many U.S. refiners and generally cheaper to acquire than

the lighter oils that comprise the SPR's volume. DOE

indicated that, due to the planned SPR expansion, such

determinations should wait until it prepares a new study of

U.S. Gulf Coast heavy sour crude refining requirements. In

addition, we recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady

dollar value of oil over time and allowing oil companies more

flexibility to defer delivery of royalty-in-kind exchanges to

the SPR when prices are likely to decline in return for

additional deliveries in the future. In updating us on the

status of this recommendation, DOE indicated that its

November 8, 2006, rule on SPR acquisition procedures

addressed our recommendations; however, this rule does not

specifically address both how to implement a dollar-cost-

averaging strategy and how to provide industry with more

deferral flexibility. In subsequent comment, DOE noted that

the November 8, 2006, acquisition procedures do not address

dollar-cost-averaging, but they do address flexibility of

purchasing and scheduling in volatile markets.

Filling the SPR with oil purchased in cash is likely to be

more cost-effective than filling the SPR through the royalty-

in-kind program for several reasons. For example, the

royalty-in-kind program adds a layer of administrative

complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing the

potential for waste or inefficiency. Moreover, DOE has

evaluated the cost of cash purchases more thoroughly than

exchanges, increasing the * * *

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I would like for us instead to proceed with the speakers that we have identified, and we will address this later on as circumstances warrant at the end of the debate time that is allotted.

So I do object at this time with the understanding that I will be glad to consider such a request at the appropriate time at the end of the time allotted for debate.

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson).

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. Speaker, regrettably, I do need to object, and I would be happy to consider such a request at the end of the time allotted for debate.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Van Hollen).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the distinguished Speaker of the House, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).

Just a quick question, was it 15 minutes that Mr. Barton was asking about?

We will consent to 15 minutes, but equally divided at the present time, 7\1/2\ minutes for each side.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).

(Mr. EMANUEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gene Green).

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to yield an additional 2 minutes to the author of this legislation, the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson).

I object.

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield an additional 2 minutes to the distinguished coauthor of this legislation, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. Speaker, before proposing accommodation to my friend from Texas, I would like to confirm the amount of time that we have left. It's my understanding we have 5 minutes remaining; is that correct?

Mr. Speaker, what I propose to do is reserve the balance of our time and at the same time ask unanimous consent that my friend from Texas may be allowed to control 3 minutes of our remaining time.

We have no further speakers on our side. I would reserve the balance of our time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

In the course of this debate, from time to time it has seemed as though folks were talking about this as if this was draw-down authority, as if this was just a pure draw-down from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I think it's important to emphasize this is not a draw-down proposal.

This legislation proposes a swap. It proposes a swap for that which is best saved for tomorrow in exchange for that which is best used today. We propose to put in the ground what we should save for tomorrow, and put back into the system what we're getting out of the ground now which is best used today. We should use today what's best for today and save for tomorrow what's best for tomorrow.

Also, much has been made, or rather, little has been made of the fact that this is just 3\1/2\ days of national consumption being added into the supply system. Only 1 percent of national consumption is being talked about here.

When Mark Twain was born, he was the 100th person born in the town of Hannibal, Missouri. He said, you know, when I was born, I increased the population of my town by 1 percent. That's more than most folks can say in this world.

Well, by this legislation, we can increase the supply of oil and what we've refined into gas in this country by 1 percent, and that's more than we can say about most of the pieces of legislation that we get to vote on from time to time.

Also, it's important to recognize that this 3\1/2\ days, this extra 1 percent, is a far greater percent of the thing on which the world price rests. The world price rests on the very thin margin between daily worldwide production and daily worldwide consumption. What is that margin? That margin is a mere 1 million barrels a day. So we're talking about putting into the system 70 times the world's daily float, the difference between daily production and daily consumption.

That is a very significant factor. It is not only a decent percentage of what we consume; it's a very significant factor of that very thin margin that contributes the most to the runaway cost of gas and oil in the world today.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend my colleague from Texas for his conduct and debate.

I yield back the balance of my time.

I thank the gentleman from Georgia.

I will just make a couple of points in response to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Barton). One, I look forward to working with the gentleman in modernizing and working to overhaul the SPR. It is certainly in need of improved management. And I might also mention that a version of this bill was introduced back in May. And we also have been working on it to make it as bipartisan a bill as we could possibly make it since November. So there has been a great deal of effort to try to make sure that we've heard everyone's concerns and to try to address them.

And one of the points that the gentleman made about imports and where our heavy oil would come from to replace this, we purchase 14 percent, or 70,000 barrels, from Canada per month. Also the Gulf of Mexico has a significant amount of heavy crude that we also would be purchasing to put into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

And I might make the point that the refineries have made significant and actually great advances in technology. And they refine heavy crude just as easily as they refine light crude today.

So, Mr. Speaker, today we consider this legislation that I believe is an important step for our Nation's future energy security. It will make the Strategic Petroleum Reserve more compatible with modern U.S. refineries and thus more effective. Improving the SPR's flexibility will maximize its utility. Shoring up our Nation's energy reserves is just one piece of this energy supply puzzle which also includes increased domestic drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf as well as research and development for alternatives.

I would like to address national security concerns that have been mentioned. The day that we went to war with Iraq, the SPR contained only 624 million barrels of oil. Today we have more oil in the SPR than we have ever had. And this bill ensures levels will not fall below 90 percent of the current level. In 2006, President Bush declared the SPR is sufficiently large to guard against any major supply disruption with only 688 million barrels. Today it's more than 700 million barrels. Most

importantly, this change will strengthen the SPR and enable refiners to operate at full capacity during any potential supply disruption.

When Congress created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1975 following the Arab oil embargo to protect the Nation from any future oil supply disruptions, refiners largely processed only light and medium crude. Advances in technology over the years have led to the ability to efficiently process heavy oil as it has become a larger part of the market. In fact, 40 percent of the oil accepted last year by refiners was heavier than the oil contained in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. With refiners planning to expand by 800,000 barrels worth of mostly heavy oil capacity in just the next few years, I believe it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the Nation's oil reserves match refining capacity.

The GAO stated if forced to rely on SPR oil, about half of the refiners subject to potential supply disruptions would experience an additional 5 percent or 735,000 barrels a day reduction in production, further exacerbating any supply issues. This exchange will ensure that the SPR will provide maximum protection for the Nation's energy supplies.

This will further strengthen our energy supply against potential disruptions because the exchange will raise funds that will be deposited in the SPR account that will allow the SPR to increase the total inventory level without the need for additional appropriations, further strengthening our energy supply against potential disruptions.

Thank you, Mr. Barrow, for yielding me the time.

You know, advances in technology over the years have led to the ability to efficiently process heavy oil as it has become a larger part of the market. In fact, 40 percent of oil accepted last year by refineries was heavier than the oil contained in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. That's a critical point in my opinion.

Earlier we put into the Record the GAO report, and I would like to submit for the Record the report that was mentioned within the GAO report that came from the Department of Energy and read just one paragraph from it:

``To address the compatibility issues of the 11 heavy crude refiners and provide full protection for the Nation for all disruption scenarios, the SPR would need for approximately 10 percent of its inventory to be heavy oil. With consideration being given to a larger Reserve and additional storage sites, it may be desirable, and physically viable to store lower gravity crude than what is currently stored in the 700 million barrel Reserve.''

The GAO stated that the Department of Energy may have underestimated this amount in recent testimony. All the more reason why we should be looking at how we can find a solution to this problem, use an opportunity that is available to us.

That's exactly what I started out to do in November. When I approached many of my colleagues at this House, this is something that we should not be down here using partisan rhetoric over, pointing the finger at one side not doing something the other side should be doing. We understand this is a small part of the problem that we're going to be facing. It is only one thing that needs to be addressed. But it is one part, and it can make a difference.

And who cares if it's 1 percent or 3 percent or 5 percent or 10 percent? If the American people see the people from this House trying to do something that will make a difference in their lives, help with the pain at the pump, isn't it worth the effort? That's what we set out to do. That's all we set out to do. And there is no reason in the world why this legislation should not be made law of the land.

Executive Summary

Over the past two decades, many refiners in the United

States (U.S.) have expanded and ramped their refineries to

process higher sulfur, lower gravity crudes to increase their

refining economics and profitability. As a result, overall

U.S. crude oil imports have been consistently moving from the

higher quality crudes toward the lower quality crudes.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) inventory consists of

high quality oils that have been previously determined to be

the best crudes to address oil supply disruptions. However,

the industry's trend toward the use of lower quality crudes

has raised the question about how well the current SPR crude

inventory can meet refiner needs.

This study provides a comprehensive assessment of the

compatibility of the crudes stored in the SPR with respect to

U.S. refining capabilities and likely disruption demands.

Specifically, the study addresses SPR crude compatibility

from two aspects (1) the compatibility and physical

limitations of U.S. refiners to substitute and refine SPR

crude in place of their usual foreign crude supplies, and (2)

the capability of the SPR to meet the Nation's refinery needs

in the event of potential supply disruptions.

a. spr inventory

As of December 31, 2004, the SPR had a total inventory of

681 million barrels (MMBbls) in storage at its four

underground storage sites along the Texas and Louisiana Gulf

Coast.

The SPR storage sites maintain only two crude type

segregations. One is a sweet crude having a sulfur content of

less than 0.5 percent and an API gravity ranging between

35 deg. and 37 deg., and the other is a sour crude having a

sulfur content of approximately 1.4 percent and an API

gravity ranging between 30 deg. and 34 deg.. The SPR's mix of

sweet and sour crudes is roughly 45 percent sweet and 55

percent sour.

compatibility with u.s. refiner processing capabilities

In 2004, the U.S. had 149 operating refineries which

processed an average of 15.3 million barrels of crude oil per

day (MMBbl/D). Of this total, 7.0 MMBbl/D came from U.S.

domestic oilfields or Canada, and are considered secure crude

supplies. The remainder, 8.3 MMBbl/D, was foreign imports

(exclusive of Canadian), for which SPR crude would be

considered a replacement in the event of an import

disruption.

A two step approach was used to evaluate the compatibility

of each of the 149 refineries with respect to SPR crudes. A

screening analysis was then used to classify refiners as (a)

not SPR connected, (b) domestic/Canadian only, (c) fully SPR

compatible, (d) high SPR compatibility, or (e) low SPR

compatibility. An engineering analysis was then used to

determine the maximum volume of SPR crude the refinery can

process and the extent the refinery will be forced to reduce

refinery runs.

In 2005, of the Nation's 149 refineries, 44 refineries were

identified as having compatibility issues with using SPR

crudes. Thirty three of these refineries were classed as

``high compatibility'', where the use of SPR crude would not

substantially impact their refining operations. Eleven of

the refineries were classed as ``low compatibility,''

where the capability to substitute SPR crude for heavy oil

imports was limited. These 11 refineries are all located

in PADD III on the Gulf Coast and predominantly import

crude from Mexico and Venezuela. If all of this oil were

disrupted, these 11 refineries would need to reduce U.S.

refining runs by approxImately 508 MBbl/D (3.3 percent of

U.S. refining). Gasoline production would not be affected,

but the production of distillate fuels (jet and diesel)

would be reduced.

c. compatibility with u.s. needs in a disruption

From a world oil market perspective, the study evaluates

the compatibility of SPR crudes with respect to U.S. crude

shortages resulting from five major supply disruptions which

have the potential of occurring within the next 10 years. The

disruption scenarios were: a Persian Gulf oil disruption, a

Saudi Arabia oil disruption, a Nigerian oil disruption, a

Venezuela oil disruption, and a hurricane disruption of the

domestic Gulf of Mexico oil production.

The results show that the SPR crudes are fully capable of

satisfying U.S. refiner demands under four of the five

disruption scenarios. The only disruption case where the SPR

was not fully capable of mitigating the crude loss due to

incompatibility issues was the Venezuela oil disruption. Even

in this case, the SPR sour crude is effective as a blending

stock and will reduce the potential shortfall of U.S. heavy

oil runs from 2,200 MBbl/D to 450 MBbl/D.

The reduced refiner run of 450 MBbl/D will not impact the

production of motor gasoline in the United States, but it

will reduce the production of jet fuel, diesel fuel,

kerosene, residual fuels, and other heavier refined products.

d. conclusions

In general, the crudes currently stored in the SPR are

compatible and desirable for the majority of the U.S.

refineries and are well suited to mitigate most supply

disruptions. There are, however, eleven PADD III refineries

which have been specifically configured for processing heavy

crude largely from Latin America that would be impacted in

the event of a disruption of foreign crude supplies. However,

they would still be able to process a limited quantity of SPR

crude and maintain their full production of gasoline.

To address the compatibility issues of the eleven heavy

crude refiners and provide full protection for the Nation for

all disruption scenarios, the SPR would need for

approximately 10 percent of its inventory to be heavy oil.

With consideration being given to a larger Reserve and

additional storage sites, it may be desirable, and physically

viable to store lower gravity crude than what is currently

stored in the 700 million barrel Reserve.

GAO stated DOE may have underestimated this amount in

recent testimony.

I. Introduction

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the largest

government owned stockpile of crude oil in the world. Since

the SPR was authorized in 1975, the reserve has grown to 681

million barrels (MMBbls) by the end of 2004.

The crude is stored in salt caverns at four storage sites

along the Louisiana and Texas Gulf Coast. The sites are known

as West Hackberry, Bryan Mound, Big Hill, and Bayou Choctaw.

The SPR is connected to U.S. refineries by pipeline and by

waterway. Refineries along the Gulf of Mexico are connected

to the SPR by local pipelines. Refineries in Chicago and

other mid-continent areas are connected to the SPR by

interstate pipelines. Refineries along the Atlantic Coast and

West Coast can be supplied with SPR oil using tankers that

load oil through Gulf of Mexico marine terminals. The SPR

distribution system has been carefully developed to serve the

needs of the Nation in the event of a foreign crude oil

supply disruption.

Crude has been acquired from 25 countries over the past 30

years. The quality of the stored oil is classified as light.

This crude quality has been and it remains adequate to

support most foreseeable supply disruptions. In recent years,

however, refineries in the

U.S. have imported increasing quantities of heavy crude

largely from Venezuela and Mexico. The trend toward heavier

oil imports raises a question about how well the current

light oil in storage will mitigate future heavy oil supply

disruptions.

This study was undertaken to assess the compatibility of

SPR crude with respect to the current and future crude

requirements of U.S. refineries. The objective of the study

is two-fold:

Assess the capabilities and physical limitations of U.S.

refineries to substitute and refine SPR crude in place of

foreign crude supplies, and

Assess the capability of the SPR to meet U.S. refinery

needs in the event of a supply disruption.

To accomplish these objectives, a methodology was developed

to identify U.S. refineries with crude compatibility issues.

Refinery data were systematically evaluated to determine the

refineries that could not fully use SPR crude because of

crude quality differences. These refineries would need to

reduce crude input into the refinery and this would reduce

the amount of jet fuel and diesel fuel that would be

available during the disruption.

The compatibility assessment results were incorporated

mathematically into models that simulate the world petroleum

market. Five disruption scenarios were identified as having a

high probability of occurring at least once over the next

decade. The scenarios were selected to evaluate the

SPR response capabilities in both volume and in the

capability to provide compatible crude.

Chapter II summarizes key information about the volume and

quality of oil currently stored by the SPR and how that oil

compares with the oil currently imported by U.S. refiners.

Limits on the capability to substitute SPR crude in an

emergency are addressed.

Chapter III is a comprehensive assessment of the

compatibility of SPR crude with U.S. refineries. The

assessment addresses the physical limitations of the

refineries, the maximum volume of SPR crude that could be

utilized, and the extent the refineries would need to reduce

runs due to compatibility issues.

Chapter IV summarizes the results of five disruption

scenarios. The capability of the SPR to meet refinery demands

under emergency conditions is presented and discussed.

Chapter V addresses the issue of future storage of heavy

oil and the need and rationale to provide a heavy oil

component to meet a future heavy oil disruption.

Chapter VI presents the overall conclusions and

recommendations from the study.

Appendix A contains the analysis results for each of the

149 refineries in the U.S. that processed oil in 2004. The

compatibility of each refinery is presented and the

individual results summarized by region.

Appendix B discusses the two models used in the disruption

analysis. One model establishes the optimal drawdown from the

SPR in response to a supply disruption. The second simulates

the world petroleum market and estimates the impact of the

disruption on the flow of petroleum around the world.

Appendix C is a world map that displays the impact of each

supply disruption on the worldwide flow of petroleum. Data

that support the analysis are also presented.

Mr. Speaker, before I begin, I would ask unanimous consent for an additional 30 minutes of debate on this bill for debate purposes only, equally divided between the majority and the minority. So, the minority would get 15 extra minutes, and the majority would get 15 extra minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I would yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this piece of legislation. I want to start by the simple statement that the House of Representatives, which is the body closest to the people of the United States, is considering a bill that wasn't written apparently until this morning. There hasn't been a committee hearing on the issue. There hasn't been a committee markup or a subcommittee markup. We could not even get the text from the committee of jurisdiction's majority counsel last

evening at approximately 7:30 because they didn't have it. Apparently, the text that was prepared in the middle of the night was changed some time early this morning at the request of unidentified parties.

In an economy where we're paying some of the highest gasoline prices in the world, and certainly the highest gasoline prices the United States has ever paid in terms of absolute dollars, where our truckers are paying $5 for diesel and our airlines are hemorrhaging cash because of their fuel costs, we are now bringing to the floor a piece of legislation that nobody has really seen or vetted.

I think that is absolutely unacceptable, terrible public policy and a travesty on the process of the House of Representatives. I can't object more strongly to the process that even the majority counsel on the committee of jurisdiction didn't have the text last evening. So on process grounds alone, we ought to reject this legislation.

Now let's talk about the policy. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve was established in 1975 as a consequence of the Arab oil embargo by OPEC against the United States of America where there was a conscience effort to prevent oil supplies from coming to this country. President Ford signed the SPR Act into law in December of 1975. It authorized 1 billion barrels of oil to be put into a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. And that oil was only to be used in the event of a severe supply interruption that would result in severe economic harm to this country as a result of a Presidential declaration of emergency. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, as established, was not intended to be used in a manipulative way to control or affect prices.

Now we haven't had any hearings, we haven't had a law that has changed the use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. What we have before us is a piece of legislation that was put together by unknown parties. I could give some pretty good guesses about who some of those parties are. But officially I don't know who they are. It's on the floor. It allows 70 million barrels of oil to be released from the reserve. But not just any 70 million barrels. It allows the sweet light crude, which is the best oil in the reserve, to be released with apparently the intent to lower prices.

Now, the problem on policy grounds with this particular SPR release is that it also requires that that oil has to be replaced beginning no later than 6 months and within 5 years with heavy crude, which is some of the worst oil in the world. Do you know who has the heavy crude available today? Saudi Arabia. So we're going to sell oil, the light sweet crude, out of the reserve--right now, up to 70 million barrels-- and we're going to replace it theoretically over time with heavy crude that is not nearly as easy to refine and not nearly as amenable to the various product differentials as the sweet light crude is, and the only place to get it is Saudi Arabia, which is, as we know, in the Middle East, one of the most unstable regions of the world.

So what we are really doing, apparently, is helping out our Saudi friends to make sure that the crude oil that they can't sell on the world market right now because it's too heavy and there's not a market, we will buy it and put it in the reserve, and we will use up the best oil in our reserve for some short-term price fix here in the U.S. market.

Well, what kind of a price impact will we get, Mr. Speaker? We have got a supply-demand problem in the world oil markets. We are using about 85 million barrels a day. And there is only about 85 to 86 million barrels a day of production available on the world market. If you put up to 2 to 3 million barrels a day of this oil on the market and sustain it, you probably will have a temporary price decrease. If you can get the supply-demand equation up to a 2 or 3 percent differential, I would say that oil prices will come down temporarily. But since we're only selling 70 million barrels, if we sold 3 million barrels, you can pump about 4 million barrels a day out of the reserve. So let's say we pumped it out at maximum. That would give us about 17 days of oil. So for 17 days, you might see a price decline. But on the 18th day, when there is no more oil to come out of the reserve, what is going to happen? You have not created new supply in the world. The price is going to shoot back up. Speculators are going to step back in, and the reserve is going to be 70 million barrels less.

I mean if this isn't a cynical political ploy to hopefully lower oil prices for the next 2 months before the election, then I have never seen one. We ought to vote against this. If you want to have a real debate on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if you really want to change the purpose for which it was intended, let's go through the committee system. Let's hold hearings. Let's have a give and take. Maybe we can come up with a way to use the SPR somewhat differently than what it was intended to be used. But unless you're willing to change the current Federal law on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, bringing up this piece of legislation is just a political sham to, A, maybe show the country that something is being done; B, help the Saudi oil ministry who can't sell their heavy crude on the market today; and, C, maybe get the price down for the next couple of months to help our majority friends in the upcoming election.

I can't more strongly emphasize that we ought to vote against it on not only procedural grounds but also on policy grounds. The SPR was intended to be a buffer if we have a severe supply interruption that would harm the U.S. economy in a significant way. We don't have that today. We have high energy prices in America and high gasoline prices in America because we are not producing energy in America that we could produce.

Let's bring an OCS drilling bill, an ANWR bill, a shale bill and a coal-to-liquids bill. Bring those bills to the floor, Mr. Speaker, and actually show the world that America will develop its own energy resources. If we do that, you're going to see the speculators get out of the market. And you're going to see that as the supply goes up and we hold demand constant, then you're going to see the price go down. And that will be permanent and productive for the American economy.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished minority leader from the great State of Ohio (Mr. Boehner).

Mr. Speaker, before I yield to our distinguished whip, I would again like to ask unanimous consent for an additional 30 minutes evenly divided between the majority and the minority for debate purposes only on this pending legislation.

May I inquire how much time remains on each side.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished whip from the Show-Me State of Missouri (Mr. Blunt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to a distinguished member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).

Mr. Speaker, at this time I want to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Westmoreland).

Mr. Speaker, once again I am going to ask unanimous consent for an additional 30 minutes for debate purposes only, equally divided between the majority and minority. I still have at least six speakers.

Thirty minutes total, 15 minutes each side.

I guess that's a start. So we have an additional 15 minutes.

Well, we are increasing the supply of time. I will take 15 minutes right now.

I thank my colleague from Georgia for his courtesy.

I would like to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished member of the Ways and Means Committee, from the great State of Texas, the MVP Republican of last week's thrilling 11-10 baseball victory, Mr. Brady.

I yield the gentleman 30 additional seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I am going to recognize myself for 2 minutes.

I want to respond to what my good friend from Illinois just said. He is absolutely right that in July of 2005 we put an Energy Policy Act on the floor of this body. I would like to point out that that was a conference report that every relevant committee in the House of Representatives had had hearings and open markups on; we had a full conference with the Senate that was open, that the ranking member on the Democratic side at the time which was in the minority, Mr. Dingell, signed the conference report. The ranking member in the Senate, Mr. Bingaman of New Mexico voted for the conference report.

And I said on the House floor when that conference report passed that it was an excellent bill for stationary energy, but it was not an excellent bill on mobility energy because we did not have in that report to drill in ANWR. We did not have in that bill to drill and explore in the Outer Continental Shelf, for the simple reason we didn't have the votes, primarily in the other body, to put those things in the bill.

But the conference report that was voted on was bipartisan, it went through the regular process, it was not done the night before or the morning of and put on the floor under a suspension rule. And where it was, what was in the bill was good and is working today.

But I said on the floor at the time, you can go back and look at it in the Congressional Record, on mobility energy, it was not as good as I think it should have been because simply we didn't have the votes.

Today, the American people support drilling in ANWR. Today, the American people want to drill in the OCS, or at least explore what is in there, and we can't get those bills to the floor, Mr. Speaker.

So I would ask that, at some point in time, after these political shams are concluded, we put some of those bills on the floor and see where the votes are. I think there is a bipartisan majority for those bills right now on the floor of this House.

I would like to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished ranking member of the Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Mr. Upton of Michigan.

Mr. Speaker, I want to yield 2 minutes to a distinguished member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Mr. Terry of Nebraska.

Mr. Speaker, can I inquire as to the time remaining on each side.

Mr. Speaker, could I ask unanimous consent for 10 additional minutes equally divided between the majority and minority? That would give me enough time to take the three remaining speakers that I have. It would be 5 minutes for the majority and 5 additional minutes for the minority.

I would yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren).

Mr. Speaker, I'm going to yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn), a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee.

Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman from Georgia prepared to close?

I have one unanimous consent request, and then I'm prepared to close.

I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) for a unanimous consent request.

(Mr. SHAYS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I have how much time?

I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.

First, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my friend from Georgia for yielding 3 minutes of his time. I sincerely appreciate it.

I want to point out some of the fallacies in the debate as quickly as I can.

The first fallacy is that nothing that we do in terms of developing domestic energy supplies in the United States is going to take effect for 10 years. That's poppycock. We can convert coal to liquids within the next 2 years. We can be drilling in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, if it's allowed, within the next year. We can be doing major pilot projects on our shale oil resources within the next year. We can be drilling in parts of Federal lands that are currently snafued because of Federal permitting within the next year. Those are all things that can be done very quickly.

Even up in ANWR, it's not going to take 10 years if we give the green light to drill and develop ANWR. It will definitely take more than 2 to 3 years, but you could have production in ANWR, I'm told, within 5 years.

The thing that we have got to do in this country if we're going to bring energy prices down and keep them down is change the fundamental difference between supply and demand in the world oil market. You have got 85 million barrels of oil we're using worldwide, and we've got approximately 86 million barrels of oil that's available. That less than 1 percent supply margin is what brings these high prices.

A gimmick like we have today where we take some oil out of the SPR for 60 days and then hopefully put it in within the next 6 years is not going to change that fundamental. If it has a temporary supply price decrease, that's a positive. I'll admit that.

But if it has, it's only temporary because you are not changing the fundamental supply-demand equation on the world oil market.

So what Republicans are saying is, let's have a strategic plan. Perhaps releasing some oil from the SPR is part of that plan, perhaps. That's what hearings are about. That's what a regular order process in the committee system would be about. So we're not saying that we never want to release any oil from the SPR, but we are saying it ought to be a part of a strategic plan, and part of that strategic plan has got to be to develop domestic American energy resources.

And Speaker Pelosi, for some reason, is adamantly afraid of that kind of a bill coming to the floor. I don't care if it's a Gene Green bill, a John Dingell bill, a Rick Boucher bill, a Steny Hoyer bill; but let a bill come up that's got some real domestic energy supply in it and have an honest debate, and let's see where the votes are. Let's don't have an energy gimmick of the week.

That's what this is. It's the latest energy gimmick of the week, and if it has a positive effect--and I say that as an if--it will be temporary because if you take 70 million barrels--and oh, by the way, I want to give a hint to my friends on the majority side who drafted the bill. You've got a drafting error in the bill. It won't do what you think it will do, but I will let you find it. If it were to become law, which it won't, but if it were, it won't put 70 million barrels of oil on the market. So you find the mistake. You developed it in the midnight. You find the mistake.

With that, vote ``no'' on the bill, and let's bring a rational, long- term, strategic plan to the floor in the next 2 weeks.

Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him for his excellent management of this legislation on the floor today. I want to commend him, as well as commending Mr. Lampson for this legislation, which he has worked on for a very long time and which makes very good sense for the American people. I also thank Mr. Markey for his extraordinary leadership on this issue as well.

The choice that we have before us today, my colleagues, is a simple one. The price at the pump is one that is a problem and challenge to the paycheck-to-paycheck economic security of America's families. It must be brought down.

There are two goals that we have in what we are doing here. One is to protect the consumer. That is a responsibility that we have. And in order to do that, to increase the supply of oil that will help bring down the price at the pump.

This week we have the SPR bill to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Next week we will have the speculation bill which will address the issue of undue, excessive speculation in the oil markets and what impact that may have on the price of oil.

In the course of this debate, I think it's important to remember some fundamentals, and one of them is the following. The United States Government is sitting on a stockpile of oil, 700 million barrels of oil. This fact is well known to you in the course of the debate, I know, 700 million barrels of oil. This is oil that the taxpayers have paid for and in some cases have paid a very expensive price for, and it is there.

The President is sitting on that oil. It's called the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and it is reserved for an emergency. The difference of an opinion that we have here is, is it an emergency that the American people are facing the prices at the pump that they have and home heating oil and the rest.

We say it's an emergency, but an emergency that would justify our taking not more than, well, we would take it down to, I think it's 90 percent of what is in the SPR. The SPR, as I said, has 700 million barrels, and 97.5 percent of this stockpile, this government stockpile, is filled. It's fuller than it's ever been in history. It's an historic supply.

So what we are saying to the President is just take a small amount of that. Free our oil. This oil has been paid for by taxpayers' dollars. Free our oil, increase the supply on the market, and within 10 days the price at the pump can come down.

A while back, we asked the President to stop filling the reserve. Imagine, we were buying oil at top dollar this spring to keep filling this stockpile. The President refused. This Congress voted overwhelmingly in both Houses to stop filling the SPR, recognizing that as we pulled oil out of the supply and into the stockpile, we were affecting the price at the pump.

This time we are saying it hasn't come down enough, certainly not for America's consumers. We need you now to do the reverse, to follow up on that, not only not fill the stockpile, but to increase the supply in the marketplace.

Every time this has been done, and it has been done three times in the last 20 years. Every time this has been done, and you have seen the charts here, Mr. Markey has those charts. Every time it has been done, the price of oil has come down.

So it's a proven way to bring the price at the pump down. When the price of oil comes down in a very sound, market-oriented way, we will buy oil cheaper to replace this oil that we took out and sold at a higher price and make a profit on it.

It makes all the sense in the world to do it this way. Those who oppose this are using this argument that instead of releasing the oil from the stockpile, government-owned stockpile, paid for by the consumer and the taxpayer, instead of releasing this oil to increase the supply in the market, we should be drilling more. We should be drilling in protected areas.

Even the President has said that that is not any short-term fix. Everybody recognizes that if you drill, that it takes 10 years to affect the price at the pump, and only about 2 cents at that.

So instead of saying only drill, only drill and get a 2 percent benefit 10 years from now, we are saying release the oil from this stockpile so that we can have a price at the pump result in 10 days, not 10 years. This is part of what we brought forth last week, too--use it or lose it.

Democrats support drilling. It's important in this debate to recognize that there are 68 million acres in our country which have permits and are ready to go for drilling. So we are saying to the oil companies, use it or lose it. Use your permits, drill for oil, but don't say I don't want to drill there where I have an environmental permit to drill, I want to go drill in some protected area, which is going to take longer for me to do, by the way. And the reason I'm not drilling so much where I'm allowed to is I don't have the equipment to do it.

See this for the hoax on the American people that it is. Yes, we are saying drill, use it or lose it as a way to increase domestic supply. We are also saying you increase domestic supply by investing in renewable energy resources, wind, solar, biofuels and the rest. No less a stalwart Republican than T. Boone Pickens is saying, ``I'm for everything.'' He's for drilling, he's for wind, he's for solar, he's for natural gas, he's for alternatives to foreign oil. We must reduce our dependence on foreign oil. It is a national security issue, it is an economic issue, not only for our economy but for the economics of America's families and for our consumers.

It is an environmental health issue to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and especially foreign oil. And it is a moral issue, because it has an impact on how we preserve our planet. That's why we have so many evangelicals supporting our efforts for renewables rather than fossil fuels.

So it is an important debate that we are having, because this argument that we shouldn't have oil today on the market, which will reduce the price in 10 days, but, instead, should be drilling where we are not allowed to and have a 2-cent saving in 10 years, think of it. This isn't a reason, this is an excuse, and it's an excuse for a failed energy policy.

It is the energy policy of the Bush administration and some of the Republicans in Congress, but not all, because many have voted in an enlightened way on this subject. This is an excuse for their failed energy policy. These are the same people, George Bush and Dick Cheney, who brought us over $4 a gallon gasoline at the pump. And now they are saying more of the same.

We are saying a new direction. And now we can drill, we can increase the supply, we can invest in renewables, we can end speculation, we can protect the consumer. As we do all of that, including the drilling, we can do it now, and we can do it right. The fastest way to help the consumer is to release the oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but let's think of that as a government stockpile paid for by taxpayers' dollars that a small amount can have a big impact.

I urge my colleagues to go down the same path you did before when overwhelmingly over 300 Members of the House and Senate, Democrats and Republicans alike, voted to stop filling the SPR. Now let's just say there is so much in there, you can spare some to help the consumer. Do it right. Do it right now.

I urge a ``yes'' vote on this very important legislation.

Again, I would commend Mr. Markey, Mr. Barrow and Mr. Lampson, the author of this legislation. I thank you, Mr. Lampson, for your leadership.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Lampson and I and Mr. Van Hollen introduced this legislation under the leadership of Speaker Pelosi in order to ensure that the American people get the relief at the gas pump they need before Labor Day in 2008. But the Republicans are holding consumers hostage. No immediate relief, they are saying to American consumers, unless the ultimate agenda of Big Oil is met. Unless they are allowed to drill off the beaches 10 years from now, they will not allow the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to be used now in order to preserve it. Ten to 20 days of relief is all it will take for us to get help to the American consumer. The Republican plan is 10 to 20 years, according to their own Department of Energy.

The President says he does not have a magic wand. Well, he does have a magic wand, he has a big stick and that big stick is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that he can use right now to beat down the prices of oil which are driving American consumers crazy in terms of their home budgets.

Deploying the Strategic Petroleum Reserve works. It worked in 1991 when President Bush's father used it. It worked in the year 2000 when President Clinton used it, and it worked after Hurricane Katrina when President Bush the Second used it. The President is willing to use the Army Reserve to go to Iraq to protect the oil over there, but he is not willing to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in order to protect American consumers here from the emergency which we are facing at home--high gas prices, home heating oil prices, natural gas prices, the airline industry going under, the trucking industry in desperate shape. But they will not use it right now.

The Democrats have a short-term plan, and that is to give relief in 10 to 20 days. Use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, use it as a weapon against speculators, against Big Oil and against OPEC; but the Republican Party is still the GOP; GOP, Gas and Oil Party. That's what this is all about.

How did we get here? It's very simple. President Bush and Dick Cheney were elected 8 years ago. They put together a secret energy plan. Two oilmen now in the White House. And here is the simple mathematics. Two oilmen plus two terms in office equals $4 a gallon for gasoline for every American consumer across the country. Very simple mathematics.

The Democratic energy plan, on the other hand, is very simple. Right now deploy the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Put the fear of the Lord into speculators, into OPEC, into the oil industry. The price will plummet. It did in 1991 when President Bush's father used it; it did in 2000 when President Clinton used it; it did when President Bush himself used it after Hurricane Katrina. This is a huge emergency for families as they look at their pocketbooks. They're being tipped upside down. The President should use it.

And for the Democrats, after the Republicans controlled Congress for 12 years, in 2007 the Democrats took over. We increased the fuel economy standard for the vehicles which we have to drive, the appliance-efficiency standards, the lighting standards, new biofuels policy. We backed out with that bill that passed in December of 2007, the Democratic bill, 4.1 million barrels of oil per day over the next 10 to 20 years.

Right now we spend $387 million a day to send American troops over into the Middle East, and we have to purchase 2.1 million barrels a day from the Persian Gulf. Our bill in December that President Bush signed backs out that oil.

But the Republicans had 12 years of control of this Congress to do something about it. They did not. Now they say we need a renewable electricity center so electricity is generated from renewables. The Republicans are saying no.

Vote ``yes'' on this bill. This is the solution the consumers need before Labor Day.