Comprehensive Strategy for Iraq Act of 2007

Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor here today, disappointed. Over the next few months, the United States will make some very important decisions, probably the most important national security decisions that we will make in this decade. These decisions are going to affect the size and the composition and the equipment of our military. It will impact our relationships with our allies, the perception of our enemies, and the stability of the Persian Gulf region. These are serious and difficult issues that demand thoughtful leadership and the careful exercise of our considerable responsibilities under the Constitution.

The resolution that we have before us today is not binding in a legal sense. We are not exercising any real power here. But I think it is worse than that. The words in these two brief sentences are vague enough to allow people with very different views on what we should do to feel satisfied whichever way they vote. The language in this resolution is clever, but this isn't a time for clever. Whether I support this resolution or oppose it, this body should say something, say something that matters about what our vital national interests are, about how we should pursue those interests, about what the risks are, what the trade-offs are and the potential consequences. We should say whether we intend to buy the bullets and the body armor for those who are about to deploy and take on the challenges that we face as a Nation.

With power comes responsibility. And rather than do the hard work of building a consensus here in the House and leading the way, it is easier to punt, to be vague and clever, to frame political issues rather than confront forthrightly the difficult problems that we face as a Nation. For that reason I believe this resolution represents a lost opportunity that we cannot afford to lose.

I believe that too often in the last 3\1/2\ years our goals in Iraq have been described in the lofty and idealistic terms that go far beyond America's vital national interests. There has been a tendency to move beyond the hard-nosed and clear-eyed view of what America's national interests are in Iraq and we have come to emphasize the loftier dreams for the American people.

To be sure, I am glad that Saddam Hussein is dead and gone. And I hope that the Iraqi people seize this opportunity to create a unified state that respects minorities and has robust democratic institutions. But there is a difference between what we would wish for the Iraqi people and what is vital for America's national security.

In thinking about America's vital interests in Iraq, I think it really boils down to two things: First, Iraq must not become a safe haven for al Qaeda; and, second, Iraq must not be a source of instability in the region. These vital interests are actually quite narrow. Some might argue that they are too narrow. But they are most notable for what they do not include. Perhaps most significantly, I don't believe it is vital to America's national interests to stop all sectarian violence in Iraq.

We admire our military because they are forward leading and ``can do'' people. But in this instance we cannot do for the Iraqis what they will not do for themselves.

The President is sending an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq. The problem isn't the numbers. The problem is the mission and setting the conditions to be able to accomplish that mission. Some of these troops are going to Anbar, and I think that we do need to enforce our troops in the Sunni heartland to fight al Qaeda and to make it less likely that they will be welcomed there for the long term. But I am skeptical about the Baghdad mission. Operation Together Forward, the effort to secure Baghdad last year, failed. The idea was to clear, hold, and build; but the Iraqi units did not show up in enough numbers to be able to hold what America had cleared. In the early days of this surge in Baghdad, there are too many indications that this will be happening again.

The resolution we are considering this week contains only two thoughts. It is only two sentences long. First, that we oppose increasing troop levels in Iraq by 20,000. As I have said, I support increasing troops in Anbar, even though I am skeptical about the likelihood of success in Baghdad.

But the second thought is notable for what it omits. The resolution says that this House will fund our soldiers and our veterans if they are there now or if they have been there before.

This begs the most important question about our real power here in the Congress. What about the five brigades of young Americans who are now preparing their families and packing their gear to deploy? What about them? What are you saying to them? Will we buy body armor for them? Will we have armored Humvees for them? Will they have trucks to take them to their assigned place of action? Will they get the bullets and the night scopes and the sleeping bags and the chow? What about them? Will they get their combat pay? Will they get their family separation allowance?

I believe that the majority in this House and the sponsors of this resolution would support a clear statement that we will fund the troops and the mission they are being ordered to undertake. But, of course, perhaps half of the Democrats in the Congress, from the far left of America's political spectrum, want to stop the funding.

In this war on terrorism, the greatest burdens have fallen on the shoulders of the relatively small number of Americans who have volunteered to take great risks on our behalf. As leaders of this Nation, this House abdicates its responsibility if we fail to make clear to them that they will have the equipment they need to do the job and come

home again. The short two sentence resolution we will vote on here this week doesn't address any of these important issues.

If you are asking the wrong question, perhaps any answer will do. But we will vote anyway, and it will make headlines, and it will accomplish nothing of the hard work we have in front of us. What are our vital national interests in Iraq, and what is not vital? What strategies can we use to protect and promote those vital interests? What are the resources that are required to pursue those strategies? What are the risks and the costs and the choices we must make? Are there ways to mitigate those risks?

These are the important questions, and in the short two-sentence resolution, they remain unresolved, leaving the House with nothing very important to say about what matters to America and what we should do.

I have made my position clear in ways that this resolution fails to do. I will seek to provide leadership in this House to address these important questions, to influence this administration and to focus on what is vital to America. It is for these reasons that I must oppose the resolution in front of us today.

The Resolution and the Congress

I come to the House floor today disappointed.

Over the next few months, the United States will make some of the most important national security decisions of this decade. Those decisions will play out principally in Iraq, but will affect our broader national security and foreign policy.

The decisions we make will affect the size, composition, and equipment of the American military for many years.

These decisions will impact our relationships with our allies, the perceptions of our enemies, and the stability of the Persian Gulf region.

These are serious and difficult issues that demand thoughtful leadership and the careful exercise of our considerable powers under the Constitution.

We have to do more than debate. We have to take a stand; we have to make tough decisions; we have to clearly articulate what America's vital interests are. We have to do things that matter and build a broad consensus moving forward.

The resolution we have before us today is not binding in a legal sense--we are not exercising any real power here. But it is worse than that. The words in these two brief sentences are vague enough to allow people with quite different views on what we should do to feel satisfied with whatever way they vote.

The language in this resolution is clever. But this isn't a time for clever. We are better than this. Whether I support a resolution or oppose it, this body should say something about what our vital interests are, about why this matters, about what we do recommend and what we do not recommend, about whether or not we will buy the bullets and the body armor for the troops for the next rotation of troops, about the risks and the challenges we face to best protect our Nation.

With power comes responsibility. And perhaps the real truth is that the Congress is as uncertain and divided as the country is on what is best to do in the Middle East. Rather than do the hard work of building consensus and leading the way, it is easier to punt, to be vague and clever, to frame political issues rather than confront forthrightly difficult problems important to the security and future of this country.

For that reason, this resolution represents a lost opportunity that we can ill afford to lose.

Reviewing Iraq Policy

Over the last 3 months, I've spent a lot of time thinking about Iraq, reading widely from both classified and unclassified sources, meeting with experts inside and outside of government, spending time with our intelligence agencies and our men and women in the military listening to what they think and drawing on their experience.

At the New Year, I returned to Iraq. I went to Falluja, al Kut, Baghdad and Balad.

At each stop along the way, I was reminded of how fortunate we are to have such dedicated, capable and decent men and women serving us in uniform. They are all committed to their missions and they are performing admirably.

Our forces have the ``can do'' attitude that we have come to take for granted but never should. They are doing difficult work a long way from home and have been at it for a long time.

There are good reasons to be restrained in public comments about military strategy and operations when we have young Americans in combat. Honest debate about policy can be confused with lack of support for the troops.

There have been times that I have questioned the administration's conduct of the war over the last 3\1/2\ years--the inadequacy of force levels immediately after the fall of Saddam, the decision to disband the Iraqi army and the slow reconstitution of the Iraqi Army, the need to expand the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps, and the failure to understand the strategic significance of treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. All of these decisions were made at senior policy levels, not by people in the military doing the job.

I'm from the old school that believes partisan politics should stop at the water's edge. The security of this country is too important to make it subservient to domestic political maneuvenng.

It was clear to me in late October that it was time for a complete review of American strategy in Iraq. That means we must: Fully understand the situation we face in Iraq and be honest with ourselves and the American people about the challenges we face; clearly define and build a broad consensus on exactly what the vital national interests of the United States in Iraq are and, conversely, what is not vital; and develop strategies, plans, and resources to pursue those vital national interests fully vetting the alternatives and the risks of those alternatives.

The Situation in Iraq

Iraq is a country of 26 million people in a land area about twice the size of the state of Idaho. About 6.5 million people live in the capitol, Baghdad.

Ethnically, Iraq is 75-80 percent Arab and 15-20 percent Kurdish with the remainder Turkoman, Assyrians and others.

Iraq is 97 percent Muslim by religious faith. It is one of four countries in the world where there are more Shi'a (60-65 [percent) than Sunni (32-37 percent) Muslims. Shiite populations constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Worldwide, about 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite branch of Islam. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets. Their differences have sometimes been the basis for sectarian violence and political infighting.

governance

The Iraqi people have made substantial progress in governing themselves over the past two years. They have written a Constitution, conducted elections under that new Constitution and formed a government. The Iraqi people as a whole voted in the face of death threats and Iraqi elected officials serve in spite of risks to themselves and their families. If you are wondering whether there are Iraqi's who are willing to take great risks to build their future, you should visit the military hospital at Balad. Two thirds of the casualties brought to our great surgeons and trauma teams are Iraqi, not American.

Our admiration for their progress and their courage cannot blind us to some other realities.

The central government in Iraq is weak. In part, that weakness is inherent in the Constitution under which the Prime Minister does not form his own government. Ministers of Health, Interior and Defense for example are chosen separately and do not serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.

Ministers are loyal to different parties and factions. Corruption, a long established practice in that region of the world, is endemic. Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense are heavily penetrated by militias loyal to factions rather than loyal to the national government. As one officer involved in training local Iraqi police told me, ``The head of training for the police in this province has no experience and is not qualified for the job. He has the job because he is a member of the Badr Organization.''

Another officer involved with training the Iraqi border patrol said, ``The commander in my sector was given a list by the Ministry of the Interior of 42 people he was supposed to hire. They were all militia.''

The Iraqi central government and its ministries do not have the capacity and, in some cases, perhaps the will to support operations in the 18 provinces. Even though the central government has money, it can't seem to spend it. There is no national banking system so soldiers and police are paid sporadically and in cash. They must travel home to give their pay to their families.

The combination of factionalism within the ministries and weak logistics systems are used to undermine units in the field. As another officer told me, ``If I train a really good Iraqi police SWAT team that's going after the `wrong' people, they can be strangled by logistics. No bullets. No gasoline. No SWAT team.''

The national police are heavily infiltrated by the militias, particularly Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, which is loyal to Shia firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr.

A principal characteristic of a sovereign government is that it has a monopoly of the use of force within its borders. The central government of Iraq has not yet consolidated this monopoly for itself.

The Iraqi Army is more reliable and has made significant progress over the last 18 months. But the quality and capability of its

units varies. Even units that are fully manned usually have half of their soldiers on leave at any time. During Operation Together Forward, the joint Iraqi-American operation to secure Baghdad this summer, some Iraqi Army units refused to be deployed to Baghdad, a clear indication of the weakness of the central government and the questionable effectiveness of these units.

levels of violence

There is not a single insurgency or source of violence in Iraq. There are a number of interrelated and overlapping conflicts.

In the south, while there has been less violence, different Shi' a factions, principally those associated with Muqtada al-Sadr (JAM) and the Supreme Council for Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) (the Badr organization) periodically fight each other for local advantage and attack coalition forces as well.

In the northern Kurdish region the Kurdish Peshmerga has made the area mostly secure and stable. We can expect violence to increase in Kirkuk in the run-up to the referendum on whether this oil rich city will be associated with the Kurdish region.

Anbar province, the large province in western Iraq that borders Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, is predominantly Sunni. While there is a Sunni insurgency and rejectionists in this region, it has also been fertile territory for al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters. In recent months, some key Sunni tribal leaders have started working together to resist al Qaeda in this region, opening opportunities for United States forces to work more cooperatively with local leaders to fight al Qaeda.

Overlaying these regional fights is a rise in sectarian violence that has increased substantially since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Anger and distrust between Sunni and Shiite is very high and plays out in death squad killings, torture, intimidation and what amounts to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad.

This summer, the Iraqi government with the multinational force in Iraq launched Operation Together Forward to reduce widespread sectarian violence in Baghdad. U.S. Forces, including the American striker Brigade, were sent to Baghdad as part of an effort to ``clear and hold'' those neighborhoods. The operation failed, as did Operation Together Forward II this fall. Levels of sectarian violence are high and are not improving.

The concept was for U.S. forces to ``clear'' violent neighborhoods and the Iraqi Army would ``hold'' the neighborhoods providing security after they had been cleared out. The Iraqi Army forces didn't show up in the size required and were not able to provide security. As one Army officer told me, ``It wasn't clear and hold. It was clear and fold.''

Confidence in the ability of the central government, the Army and the national police force to provide security has declined causing people to rely on local militias and neighborhood security to protect their families. In some cases, JAM, Muktada al-Sadr's militia, has built confidence and support by blocking emergency response by the central authorities while JAM members help victims, thereby increasing local trust of the militias and further undermining the credibility of the government.

Finally, while the Sunni insurgency may have been spurred by al Qaeda in Iraq and various Shi'a groups get support from Iran, at this point, the violence in Iraq is largely internal and self-sustaining.

In summary: The overall security situation in Iraq is grave and is not improving. Strategies to quell violence have not been effective; while some violence is anti-coalition, the most dangerous trend has been the rise of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite militias and death squads in a cycle of violence and retaliation; while the unity government of Nouri al-Maliki says all the right things, there are strong doubts about the ability of the unity government to reduce widespread sectarian violence; further political evolution in Iraq is likely as factions maneuver for power relative to one another and decisions are made on critical issues including federalism, distribution of oil revenues, and the militias. Iraq will make more and more of its own political choices, less and less influenced by America.

America's Vital Interests

Too often in the last three and a half years, our goals in Iraq have been described in lofty and idealistic terms that go far beyond America's vital national interests.

Most of us in the Congress voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein because the intelligence said he had or was seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and that he intended to use them against the United States.

In my case, it was the intelligence on biological weapons that was the deciding factor, reaching the high threshold required for pre- emptive military action.

As we all now know, the intelligence was wrong in several important respects. Perhaps in part because it was wrong, there has been a tendency to move beyond a hard-nosed, clear-eyed view of our national interests in Iraq to emphasize loftier dreams for the Iraqi people.

To be sure, I'm glad that Saddam is dead and gone, and I hope the Iraqi people build a unified state with a society that respects minorities with robust democratic institutions. But there is a difference between what we would wish for the Iraqi people and what we need for American security.

The American military should only be used to protect America's vital national interests, under American command, with the resources necessary to win and come home again.

When it comes to clearly defining our vital national interests in Iraq, we have lost our way in mushy rhetoric. These words matter because they set the goals we ask our military to achieve and drive the strategies and resources to achieve them. There has been far too little debate and discussion on what our vital interests are and what they are not in Iraq.

Every discussion of what path forward we should choose in Iraq should start with clearly defining our vital national interests. As the saying on the classroom wall goes, ``If you don't know where you are going, you're likely to end up somewhere else.''

In thinking about America's vital interests in Iraq, it seems to me there are only two: Iraq must not become a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates; Iraq must not be a source of instability in the region.

These vital interests are really quite narrow--some might argue too narrow--and probably most notable for what they do not include.

It's not vital to America that Iraq be able to defend itself from outside powers. Iraq is unlikely to have an Army that can defend against external threats for a long time and we should not define success this broadly or even raise the possibility of arming them with indirect fire weapons, tactical air forces and so forth.

It is not vital to American interests that Iraq remain unified except to the extent dissolution of Iraq as a strong nation contributes to regional instability or creates ungoverned areas where al Qaeda could thrive. Iraq was created after World War I from three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. The country has a history of instability as a result of ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. It is not vital to American national interests that we resolve these tensions and probably not reasonable to expect to do so.

There are a variety of governing models from a loose confederation to de facto local arrangements that are consistent with the vital national interests of the United States.

The Iraqi constitution allows for regional arrangements and we need not spend too much capital resisting new arrangements that might emerge.

Perhaps most significantly, it is not vital to American interests to stop all sectarian violence in Iraq. Certainly if sectarian violence escalates to a conflagration that affects stability in the region, it could affect our vital interest in regional stability. But the Iraqi's must decide to quell sectarian violence. While we might assist and support Iraqi efforts, we cannot and should not do this for them. They must take the lead.

We admire our military because they are forward leaning and ``can do''. But in this instance, we cannot do for the Iraqi's what they will not do for themselves.

There are other things that do not appear in a clear statement of America's vital interests like making Iraqi into a model of democracy in the region and ensuring its economic prosperity. Both of these things are desirable. Iraq certainly has the oil, natural gas, and two fertile river valleys to sustain itself and prosper economically. But these desirable things are not vital to America's national interests and what is vital should drive American strategy.

If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. What is vital, it seems to me, boils down to two things: No al Qaeda safe haven and an Iraq that is not a source of instability in the region.

American Strategy

The shear breadth of the policy options for Iraq put forward in recent months by thoughtful people is striking.

Quit and withdraw. Reposition in neighboring countries. Increase U.S. forces temporarily. Increase forces substantially and with no deadline.

Side with the Shia because they are likely to win. Befriend the Sunnis. Destroy the Sunnis.

Withdraw U.S. forces from the cities. Start with Baghdad and the cities first.

Divide the country into three pieces. Insist on unity.

These debates are healthy when they get beyond the brainstorming stage--which they rarely do--but the breadth of the options out there is partially due to a lack of clarity and consensus about America's vital interests.

We should also be clear that no strategy is without risk. There are no easy or obvious paths here.

denying al qaeda safe haven

Al Qaeda in Iraq principally thrives in the Sunni regions of the country. Defeating al

Qaeda and denying them sanctuary must be a central objective for U.S. Forces in Iraq. This must be an area of focus and, to some extent, we have lost that focus over the last six months as we have emphasized the fight for Baghdad.

Using U.S. special forces, conventional U.S. military forces and American intelligence capabilities, the United States should target, kill or capture and detain al Qaeda leadership in Iraq.

U.S. forces have had some significant success in recent months capturing middle and high ranking al Qaeda operatives in Iraq in spite of the reduction of emphasis and fewer troops in the Sunni dominated areas of the country.

But there is an infuriating fact seldom discussed: fully half of the high value al Qaeda targets in Iraq have been captured and released before. As one senior officer put it, ``I have great photographs of half the people we are hunting. They are wearing orange jumpsuits in the mug shots we took of them when we captured them the first time.''

Weare operating a catch and release program for al Qaeda in Iraq. This is inexcusable and frustrating as all get out for our men and women in the fight.

American soldiers are capturing terrorists trying to kill Americans and Iraqis and they are turned over to an Iraqi run detention system that is likely to release them.

Indeed, some officers whose opinions I trust describe detention as training camp for al Qaeda where they share information and contacts improving their skills and enhancing their position within al Qaeda when they are released.

We cannot afford to spend half our resources hunting al Qaeda members we have already caught before. We need to change our detention policy so that there are no high value targets with orange jumps suit mug shots in ``wanted'' posters hanging on the walls in the operation centers of our special forces units in Iraq.

Using classic counter-insurgency strategies and tactics, the United States military and intelligence services should build relationships with tribal and local leaders in the Sunni-dominated regions who will deny al Qaeda safe haven for the long term.

We are having some recent and fragile success with this approach to security in al Anbar. Sunni tribal leaders, with the support and encouragement of U.S. forces, are recruiting men from their tribe into security units.

These counter-insurgency efforts building on established local tribal relationships and indigenous leadership must be supported financially directly by the U.S. military. Large U.S. aid programs run at the national level have been slow and ineffective at engaging the Iraqi people and getting things done.

The American military has the capability to use funds to support counter-insurgency operations at the community level rapidly and where needed without a lot of hassle. This mechanism has been used successfully in Iraq before, although it is not universally supported. It's a turf and power thing. To a certain degree, we have a choice. We can micro-manage contracts from Washington and Baghdad or we can get things done rapidly and effectively giving authority within broad guidelines for Lieutenant Colonels to use their judgment.

While al Anbar is a very large area, it is sparsely populated with about 1.2 million people, the vast majority of whom live in the Euphrates river valley. An intense counterinsurgency strategy in the Sunni areas can help to root out al Qaeda today and make their brand of extremism unwelcome for the long term.

Strengthen both technical intelligence collection and human intelligence collection in the Sunni regions of Iraq.

Intelligence is the first line of defense in the war on terror and we are doing a lot of things right. But there continues to be a need to strengthen technical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection so that more requirements can be met.

More importantly, we continue to lag behind in human intelligence collection capability.

We are five years after 9/11 and we still are desperately short of linguists in strategic languages. We need more soldiers trained in basic 30 and 60-day language programs in order to effectively conduct a counter-insurgency effort.

At a higher level, we need more military members and intelligence specialists who are fluent in languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun and Dari. Heretofore, this has just not been a national priority and it must change.

Train and expand the Iraqi Army

The training of the Iraqi Army has gone slower than any of us want. They are still heavily dependent on the U.S. for logistics and their capability and effectiveness is limited by the practice of allowing military members to go home for about two weeks of each month.

Still, the Iraqi Army offers the best possibility for the Iraqi government to consolidate its authority and quell violence.

The United States should continue to accelerate training and equipping the Iraqi Army so that they can take responsibility for internal security.

I am not convinced that embedding large numbers of U.S. soldiers in Iraqi units is the most effective way to train Iraqis. I'm not convinced that it is not effective either. There are differing views by thoughtful people and I don't have the experience to know. But it is an important question for the military and its training elements to assess. We should pursue training strategies that are most likely to make Iraqi units effective and independent in the shortest time.

There are two disadvantages of embedding Americans in Iraqi units. First, it is harder to protect and support the Americans to the standards we expect for our soldiers when they are detached. Second, some American trainers who have been embedded express concern that it is difficult to get the Iraqis to stand on their own and take responsibility because they think the Americans will do things for them. An embedded American trainer told me, ``I have to decide that I'm not going to do the maintenance for them even though I can. That's hard to do.''

Assist the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense in establishing logistics and service support for the Army.

While we have focused on training military units--and Iraq may need more of them than they initially planned--the systems for payroll and logistics support just do not exist. We need to put effort into helping them develop those systems so that the Iraqi army is fed, paid, has gasoline and trucks and uniforms.

The Iraqi police and border patrol are infiltrated by militia and ineffective. We should not expect that the police will be effective as other than a mechanism to employ and occupy young men anytime soon.

Support the Iraqi Government as they address Sectarian Violence

I do not believe that the United States should take the lead in resolving sectarian violence between Shi'a and Sunni or between different militias vying for power in Shi'a areas. The Iraqi government and Iraqi leaders must take the lead. We cannot and should not do this for them.

I told the President this before he announced his new plan for Iraq and I have been clear about this publicly both in New Mexico and here, in Washington.

American soldiers should not be in a situation as reportedly happened on October 24th when they raided an area looking for a leader of a Shi'a militia group and were told by the Iraqi government to stand down.

We cannot do for the Iraqis what they will not do for themselves. If they do not choose to disarm the militias and stop the death squads, Baghdad will continue to be a violent place.

I believe it is unlikely that this violence will rise to a level where Iraq becomes a source of regional instability even if it does threaten the internal stability and political direction of the country. As cold as it sounds, the sectarian violence is not something we can stop by getting in the middle of it and it is not vital to American national interests that we do so.

This is where we are at most risk, again, of losing our way by reaching beyond our grasp.

The Surge

The President is sending an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq. The problem isn't the numbers. The problem is the mission and setting the conditions to be able to accomplish that mission.

Some of those troops are going to Anbar, and I think we do need to reinforce our troops in the Sunni heartland to fight al Qaeda in Iraq and strengthen relationships that will make it less likely that they will be welcome there over the long term.

But I am skeptical about the Baghdad mission.

Operation Together Forward, the effort to secure Baghdad, failed because there was no ``holding'' after a neighborhood was ``cleared''. The Iraqis did not show up. And the ``building'' never really happened at all. It was a failed approach without adequate resources from the Iraqis to follow through. We probably made plenty of enemies without making people feel safer or more confident in the ability of their government to protect them.

Rather than ``clearing'' neighborhoods where there is sectarian violence, we should focus on strengthening indigenous security in cooperation with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army in neighborhoods and villages where there is stability or leadership to work with. This is an inside-out approach that builds indigenous capacity rather than an outside-in approach.

In the Kurdish region, the Peshmerga protect the Americans, not the other way around. That is a relationship we built over a decade. Al Qaim on the Syrian border used to be a hotbed of foreign fighter activity. Now it is largely peaceful and led by strong local tribal leaders who cooperate with the Americans and own their community.

In 2003 and 2004, immediately after the fall of Saddam when there was no Iraqi government, I believe a large U.S. presence that took charge and visibly controlled the streets killing or disarming any Iraqi with a weapon would have made a difference. When it comes to occupation, quantity has a quality all of its own.

But we are beyond that now. Iraq has its own government with an Army that is getting better. They must own their own neighborhoods. We can help them, but we cannot do it for them.

In the early days of this ``surge'' there are too many indications that we will be doing this for them. Two units of Iraqis have showed up to help secure Baghdad, and they are at about half strength.

Like Operation Together Forward, the units committed by the Iraqi government have shown up far below strength, which means the effort is unlikely to have enough reliable soldiers and police to conduct an effective counter-insurgency in a city of 6 million people.

Perhaps more importantly, as projected by the intelligence community in Congressional testimony, the Jaish al-Mahdi militia loyal to Muqtada al Sadr seems to have decided to lay low, put away their arms and wait out the surge calculating that they can afford to bide their time.

In contrast, the Sunni insurgents have escalated their attacks in recent weeks. As a result, it is possible that U.S. forces will concentrate on putting down Sunni insurgents and possibly rogue elements of Sadr's Shiite militia who don't keep their heads down. The irony here is that we risk strengthening radical anti-American cleric Muqtada al Sadr in the medium and long term by taking out his enemies now while his militia lays low waiting for America to leave.

While this scenario is not inevitable, we need to understand that US forces in the midst of sectarian violence may be helping consolidate the power of a radical anti-American Shiite.

Funding the Troops

The resolution we are considering this week contains only two thoughts. First, that we oppose increasing troop levels in Iraq by 20,000.

The second thought is notable for what it omits. The resolution says that this House will fund our soldiers and veterans if they are there now or if they have been in Iraq before. This begs the most important question about our real power as the Congress.

What about the five brigades of young Americans who are now preparing their families and packing their gear to deploy? Will we buy body armor for them? Will they have armored Humvees and trucks and bullets and night scopes and sleeping bags and chow? Will they get their combat pay and their family separation allowances?

Most of you know that I served in the United States military. I'm the only woman in the House or Senate who has. Some of you know that I am married to a man who continues to serve as a drilling reservist in the Air Force Reserve. A lot of our closest friends in the world still wear the uniform. These are not idle questions if you are the parent or the spouse or the child of a soldier who is being called up to do their duty.

I believe the majority of this House would support a clear statement that we will fund the troops and the mission they are being ordered to carry out. But, of course, perhaps close to half of the Democrats, from the far left of the American political spectrum, want to stop funding.

In this war on terrorism, the greatest burdens have fallen on the shoulders of a relatively small number of Americans who have volunteered to take great risks on our behalf. As leaders of this nation, this House abdicates its responsibility if we fail to make clear to them that they will have the equipment they need to do the job we are asking them to do.

In Closing

The short two sentence resolution we will vote on this week does not address any of these important issues. If you are asking the wrong question, perhaps any answer will do.

But we will vote on it anyway, and it will make headlines and accomplish nothing of the hard work we have in front of us. It is a disappointing abdication of our responsibility to grapple seriously with defining and protecting vital US national interests in the Persian Gulf.

What are our vital national interests and what is not vital? What strategies can we use to protect and promote those interests? What resources are required to pursue these strategies? What are the risks and the costs of the choices we might make? Are there ways to mitigate those risks? These are the important questions and, in this short two sentence resolution, they remain unresolved leaving this House with nothing very important to say about what matters to America and what we should do.

I support increased troops in al Anbar--the Sunni region where al Qaeda thrives. These forces are part of the 20,000 referred to in the resolution. It is vital to U.S. interests that we destroy al Qaeda in Iraq and deny them a safe haven from which to operate. The resolution makes no distinction or even reference to these forces.

I am skeptical that increasing U.S. forces in Baghdad in the quantity and with the mission and tactics described by the President and his military commanders will quell the sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni, nor do I think it is vital to America's national interests to do so. The Iraqis must resolve these sectarian rivalries. The President believes the Baghdad security plan is the most realistic path forward. I disagree with the President on this point and I have told him so directly. It's not about the troop numbers, it's about their mission.

The resolution intentionally leaves unanswered the question of whether we will fund the bullets and body armor for troops who are not there yet but are going. I believe a majority of this House would vote to equip and support the men and women being sent there, even if they question the President's strategy. The resolution's silence on this important reassurance to our troops and their families brings discredit on this House.

I have made my position clear in ways that this resolution fails to do. I will seek to provide leadership in this House to address these important issues and to influence the administration to focus on what is vital to America. We must adopt strategies, tactics and apply resources to secure those vital interests and garner the support of the American people for doing so. It is for these reasons that I will oppose the resolution before us.

Mr. Speaker, I wonder if my colleague from Massachusetts, given his comments about the resolution and the support for the troops we are deploying, would join me in a unanimous concept request to amend the resolution to express our intent and the intent of this House to support those in the U.S. Armed Forces who are serving and who will serve in Iraq.

Reclaiming my time, this is exactly my point, is the gentleman will not support those who are deploying, and the resolution does not do so. I thank my colleague from Arizona for the time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, he was conscientious, committed to peace and momentarily praised. His laurels burned in the bombings. His valorous and vain efforts had but hastened upon his people.

Yet, in eulogizing this ``English worthy,'' Sir Winston Churchill, an ardent opponent of the deceased's policy of appeasement, unexpectedly struck a conciliatory chord toward the late Neville Chamberlain:

``It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase, men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later when the perspective of time is lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History, with its flickering lamp, stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honor.''

Mr. Speaker, while not serving in this Chamber during the debates on the resolution authorizing the President of the United States to use martial force to remove Iraq's Baathist regime for numerous just causes, including its refusal to honor its Gulf War cease-fire and United Nations' resolutions, during my time as a temporary custodian of my constituents' office, I have striven to ensure our Nation's victory in the battles for Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the overarching war on terror. In doing so for 3 years, I have four times traveled to Iraq and once to Afghanistan to meet with our troops; visited wounded citizen soldiers, eulogized our fallen, and consoled their grieving families. As a witness to their courage, sacrifice and suffering, I have been morally compelled to support every appropriation for our military and civilian personnel in harm's way, oppose every policy injurious to our country's common cause of victory; advance my own ideas on how to secure our victory, including the introduction of bipartisan, though ultimately unaccepted, legislation to establish concerted congressional oversight over the course of this conflict; and refused to condone a resolution by my Republican peers which failed to meet its duty; and, immediately afterwards, introduced a resolution of my own in order to fulfill my duty to our soldiers, my constituents, and our country.

As a staunch supporter of our Nation's mission in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world, I did so in the belief that it is morally imperative for every sovereign American citizen and their congressional servants to ensure our valiant troops victoriously come home to their loved ones' arms. Were I to do otherwise and lapse in my moral duty, I would not only be violating our troops and my constituents' trust, I would be violating the dictates of my conscience.

It is equally true, of course, how within this House other Members' dictates of conscience have led them to a decidedly different, though equally constant course of action. To these Members and their fellow citizens who have done so to date, I share the sentiments Sir Winston held for Neville Chamberlain: You are ``An American Worthy,'' who ``however the fates may play, will ``march always in the ranks of honor.'' Yet, because the resolution thrust before us is a craven exposition of political expediency in a time of national crisis, today many may stray from the ranks of honor.

This resolution is ``nonbinding,'' which means the resolution has no force of law to compel future legislative acts in compliance with its dictates. In sum, then, this resolution legally changes nothing. Americans' money will still unabatedly facilitate our troops' continued deployment into harm's way, despite the United States Congress collectively condemning the President's announced troop reinforcement plan. This impotent resolution is injurious in the eyes of its opponents because it will undermine the morale

of our troops, their families, and our fellow citizens even as it heartens and emboldens our enemies; and this impotent resolution is injurious because it will not stop what many of its supporters purport will be a loss of life in a lost cause. By neither stopping the war nor speeding our victory and by calculatedly doing nothing in this time of national crisis, this resolution is immoral.

This immorality is manifest in how the resolution guilefully attempts to insinuate the United States Congress can simultaneously support our troops and oppose their mission. During a time of war, if an act is not i our national interest, such as the President's plan is deemed to be in this resolution, the act is injurious to the national interest. At best, the act will expend resources, most tragically claim lives without furthering the cause of victory. Better than anyone, our troops understand this. Therefore, this Congress does not support our troops when it proclaims they are risking their lives in a doomed mission injurious to America.

Yet, if Congress persists in this insanity, the Members must meet their responsibility to enumerate the reasons they disapprove of the President's plan and, in point of fact, the mission upon which our troops have already embarked. But this resolution does not provide any rationale for its conclusion. Thus, rather than deserving our collective concurrence, this resolution deserves our universal condemnation.

To this, some supporters will object and allege two defenses for this resolution's fatal omission. Do not these supporters' floor remarks provide the rationales sufficient to sustain this resolution? No. If floor remarks alone are sufficient to sustain the resolution's conclusions, then floor remarks alone would be sufficient to derogate the President's plan and, ergo, vitiate any necessity for a written resolution. Conversely, if it is imperative for the plan's detractors to express their opposition in a written resolution, it is also imperative to express their reasons in writing. Alas, such logic pales before some Members' impulsive muse of the moment.

Let us, then, move to some of the resolution's supporters' second, far more distressing defense: ``A vote of disapproval on the President's plan will set the stage for additional Iraq legislation which will be coming to the House floor.'' As no one who participated in the crafting of this covert legislative agenda has deigned to inform the American people as to its aims, one wonders if it will cut off funding for our troops in harm's way or cut off critical reconstruction funding in the supplemental appropriations bill, thus toppling an unheralded but essential pillar of the President's new victory strategy and proving the perspicacity of the present resolution. While we wonder and worry, according to newspaper reports there is a strategy to make this rumored legislative plan palatable to the public. This strategy's tactics, which its instigators are more than happy to relate to the media, are reputed to include a coordinated multimillion-dollar TV campaign by leftist special-interest pressure groups. No doubt somewhere beyond this ephemeral stream of time there lurks a jealous Clement Vallandigham. But, in fairness, let us disdain a priori speculation, and instead examine a previous resolution to glean the potentialities of the present resolution's supporters' secret legislative plan. The following passages are excerpted from a previous resolution which, albeit more forthrightly, also opposes the Commander in Chief's decisions:

``Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after 4 years of failure . . . by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity of war-power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for cessation of hostilities . . . to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace be restored.''

This previous resolution too expresses its support for our troops in harm's way:

``Resolved, That the sympathy of the Democratic Party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery of our Army and sailors of our Navy who are and have been in the field and on the sea under the flag of our country, and in the events of its attaining power, they will receive all the care, protection, and regard that brave soldiers and sailors of the Republic have so nobly earned.''

This previous resolution is the Democratic Party platform of 1864.

If the past is prologue, let us be firm in a fair request: If the resolution's supporters possess a victory strategy, or otherwise, for Iraq, these public servants must immediately reveal it to the sovereign citizens of the United States. If these stealth strategists refuse, they will incur the American people's inference this legislative plan assumes and will hasten our Nation's defeat in Iraq. How else could one explain these individuals' already having a legislative plan and an accompanying media plan premised upon our troop reinforcement failure, and doing so regardless of potential American victories on the ground or the advice of our military commanders? Perhaps while they demur from revealing it, these anonymous commander in chiefs will dubiously coin their legislative plan an ``exit strategy.''

It is an irrelevant distinction. Right now the enemy is actively seeking to murder more American and Iraqi soldiers and civilians. So right now and for the immediate future, an exit from Iraq is a defeat in Iraq. Whatever one pretends to the contrary, one will never convince our enemies otherwise.

Yes, it is all too human to wish the world were different; all too human to rationalize away one's misguided actions. Being composed of frail, fallible human beings, even great assemblies such as this have succumbed to the temptation. We must not.

Writing well before Churchill's magnanimous eulogy of Chamberlain and, to the contrary, warning the British people's representatives how history was pitiless, George Dangerfield coldly assessed his national leaders' mismanagement of state affairs during the pre-Great War years of 1910 to 1914: ``Along that row of distinguished and original faces there would pass from time to time, as lightly as a shadow upon the waters, an alarming, an alien spirit, a spirit dangerous and indefinite, the Spirit of Whimsy . . . In the hush of crisis, in the tumult of abuse, or when the stuffy air of the Commons seemed almost to glitter with the shining, salt ripples of sarcasm, there it played, airy, remote, and irresponsible.''

Is an inchoate angst over history's final verdict the reason some supporters of this resolution have taken to this floor, though not in this resolution itself, and verbally professed three key defenses of their decision? One defense is they were misled into supporting an Iraqi regime change because of the false claim it did or might possess weapons of mass destruction. Mercifully, let us stipulate these elected officials performed their due diligence on the matter and, especially for our Democratic colleagues so situated, they did not overly trust the some many of them had accused of stealing a Presidential election.

Again, there were numerous justifiable reasons for authorizing the President of the United States to militarily execute a regime change in Iraq. As those reasons are written in that resolution, I will not dwell upon them, for they do not constitute the crux of the matter, which is this: the war aim of regime change was a success. It is the post-war failure of Iraqi reconstruction breeding our present perils.

Thus even if a Member of Congress can be excused for authorizing force on the basis of being ``misled,'' the Member of Congress cannot be excused for failing to demand adequate post-war reconstruction planning, nor for a 3-year failure to demand constructive changes to an inadequate post-war reconstruction plan.

Dovetailing with this defense, some of the resolution's supporters now claim their initial ardor for the regime change was a mistake because this administration has botched Iraqi reconstruction beyond salvaging and the fledgling democracy is now in a state of civil war. This argument has the

merit of being partially correct, for despite the hard-learned lessons of our Nation's former successes in doing so, this administration utterly failed to comprehend and implement the fundamental principles of reconstructing a defeated, belligerent nation. Importantly, this does not preclude reconstructing Iraq now.

While rife with sectarian violence, much of it instigated and perpetuated from external elements, Iraq is not in a civil war. Relative calm exists in most of the beleaguered nation's provinces, and if one dares to look, there are the agonizingly slow but significant signs of incremental progress in the establishment of order. This progression will be expedited by the administration's new plan, which finally incorporates the two fundamental principles of Iraqi or any reconstruction plan, one, a liberal democratic society evolves upward from its traditional roots of order, not from a centralized bureaucratic government downward; and, two, a nation's transformational evolution into a liberal democracy must contemporaneously provide transactional benefits to its citizens. These fundamental principles will be implemented through critical initiatives, such as provincial reconstruction teams, an accord on oil revenue allocations, and a national reconciliation process, amongst others.

But to earn the support of terrorized Iraqis, security must first be established so they may commence securing the blessings of liberty. This is why the troop reinforcement is required and why the twin pillars of troop reinforcement and grass-roots reconstruction can achieve a joint American and Iraqi victory over the enemies of liberty.

The ineluctable fact of our victory is it must be won with the help of Iraqis, which is disconcerting to many of this resolution's supporters who believe the Iraqis are unwilling to fight for their freedom and are incapable of perpetuating once it is secured. This argument often intersects with the charge our mission in Iraq has been untenably shifted from effectuating a regime change to erecting a model democracy; and for the above reasons, they think this is impossible. This deplorable argument is antithetical to the self-evident truths written into our own Declaration of Independence, though, sadly, it is not without precedent. Once more, let us reference another resolution, this one opposing a military mission creeping toward a decidedly different goal:

``Resolved: that the emancipation proclamation of the President of the United States is as unwarranted in military as in civil law; a gigantic usurpation, at once converting the war, professedly commenced by the administration for the vindication of the authority of the Constitution, into a crusade for the sudden, unconditional and violent liberation of 3 million Negro slaves; a result which would not only be a total subversion of the Federal Union, but a revolution in the social organization of the Southern States, the immediate and remote, the present and far-reaching consequences of which to both races cannot be contemplated without the most dismal foreboding of horror and dismay. The proclamation invites servile insurrection as an element in this emancipation crusade, a means of warfare, th inhumanity and diabolism of which are without example in civilized warfare, and which we denounce, and which the civilized world will denounce as an uneffaceable disgrace to the American people.''

So much for the prognostications of the ``Peace Democrat'' controlled Illinois legislature's 1863 resolution. Thankfully, by the grace of God and the sanguine sacrifice of the American people, it was this Illinois legislature, not our African American brothers and sisters and our Nation's great emancipator, who are to be denounced by the civilized world for all eternity.

What of our legislative body? Now resurrects the specter of our own judgment, which hovers above and shadows us as we seek to ensure we are not forever weighed in the balance and found wonting. It is as it should be, as it must be, for notwithstanding its nonbinding nature, even after this resolution's disposition, our duty demands we make moral decisions affecting our Nation's victory or defeat, and our fellow citizens' lives or deaths. Is this not why, even while bearing malice towards none of them, in defending his own war plan, our own maligned President warned his opponents history is a harsh mistress:

``Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, would shorten the war and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood? Is it doubted that it would restore the national authority and national prosperity and perpetuate both indefinitely? Is it doubted that we here, Congress and Executive, can secure its adoption? Will not the good people respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we, can they, by any other means, so certainly or so speedily, assure these vital objects? We can succeed only by concert. It is not `Can any of us imagine better?' but `Can we all do better?' Objection whatsoever is possible. Still the question recurs `Can we do better?' The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country.

``Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We, even we here, hold the power and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free, honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of Earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just, a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.''

My friends, history harkens your honorable hearts to reconsider supporting this immoral resolution. If one believes all human beings are equally God's children, whether they be free or yearning to breathe free, one cannot, after a cruel sip of hope, condemn 20 million of God's equally beloved children to a saturnalia of slaughter. If one supports our troops, one cannot deride their cause as injurious to our country. If one seeks our victory in the war on terror, one cannot advocate a retreat and defeat in the face of our enemy.

My friends, through the fog of war, our fiery trial illumes and creeps ever nearer along the trail. Rather than curse the darkness and dread the echoes of history's verdict, let us acquit ourselves with lasting honor by leading our searching Nation through these trying, transformational times and into a transcendent, triumphal tomorrow. Let us earn the esteem of the latest and later generations of all free people by reaffirming our revolutionary Republic cherishes the self- evident truth that all human beings yearn to breathe free. Let us, in our Nation's finest traditions and truest character, remove the Iraqi people's bonds of oppression and replace them with bonds of brotherhood amongst our free, sovereign, and secure peoples.

Let us, in the face of terror, march always in the ranks of honor and courageously and selflessly secure the Iraqi people's blessings of liberty and, in so doing, secure our own blessings of liberty for unnamed generations of American children.

Mr. Speaker, fully cognizant of my moral duty to our troops, my constituents, my country, and my Creator, I cannot in good conscience support this resolution, which is injurious to the cause of our Nation's victory and in consequence is patiently immoral. Therefore, I urge this resolution's rejection and pray God graces, guards, and guides the steps of all who bear the burden of our decisions made on behalf of the majestic American people.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Cole).

I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I, too, rise in support of victory in Iraq and in support of our troops. But I also rise to oppose this Democratic defeatist resolution and I hope to provide some historical perspective to help the American people understand what the Democrats plan to do this year.

Make no mistake about it, this resolution is about polls. National polling before November's elections showed a majority of Americans were opposed to cutting off funds for the war but were generally unhappy with events on the ground. Now, this polling data led the Democratic message machine to create a ``we support the troops, don't support the war but won't cut off funding'' position. Much like Majority Leader Hoyer's empty promises to allow a Republican alternative to this defeatist resolution, the Democrats are now following polls and slowly, piece by piece, bit by bit, revising their stance on defunding the war.

Due to their majority status, this resolution will pass, and soon after the

passage, I suspect that Congressman Murtha and others will move to defund the war the same way the Democratic-controlled Congress defunded the Vietnam War over a several-year period. They will do so in a piecemeal fashion with various amendments to appropriation bills, always avoiding the term ``defunding'' at all costs.

Before we have even concluded this debate, our Speaker has already said a vote of disapproval will set the stage for additional Iraq legislation, which will be coming to the House floor. I ask our Speaker, what is your additional Iraq legislation?

The only difference between what the Democrats will soon attempt to do and what they did in the late 1960s and early 1970s is that they will continue to say publicly that they support the troops, instead of speaking, as Senator Kerry did, in front of a congressional committee of the atrocities of the so-called baby killers. The poisonous atmosphere of those times resulted in the military prohibiting all military personnel in the metropolitan Washington area from wearing their uniforms in public out of safety concerns.

Now, two of the most crippling amendments of the Vietnam War were passed in 1969 and 1973. In 1969, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky cosponsored an amendment prohibiting the use of ground troops in Laos and Thailand. In August of 1973, the Congress passed the Fulbright-Aiken amendment, which cut off all funding for U.S. military forces in or over or from the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

President Nixon's approval ratings in 1973 were dismally low, and he was close to resigning as a result of the Watergate scandal, and his weakened position emboldened the Democrats to take extreme actions. I would say that some of their actions may have bordered on treasonous, but they have never been judicially challenged.

Our current President has an approval rating nearly as low now as they did then. Democrats are feeling emboldened to challenge our Commander in Chief during a time of war specifically for political gain.

It has also been said that this nonbinding resolution will not affect troop morale. If so, why not amend this nonbinding resolution to send a copy to every man and woman fighting in Iraq, along with a record of each vote. That is right, we don't get a chance to have any amendments.

What is important here are the President's words and his actions. He has ordered more combat forces to Iraq. He has extended the tours of some forces already in country. Let us be perfectly clear, 14 of the 18 provinces in Iraq are secure. These additional forces will help restore overall order and provide a stable environment for the political process from within which to work. Now, I cannot assure all of my constituents that the recent developments in Iraq will result in a quick or certain victory in Iraq. But I can assure my constituents and my colleagues that Democrats cannot say with absolute certainty that there is no military solution to the war in Iraq.

I must also point out several other recent Democratic statements that I take issue with, like the one from over this weekend, where a Senator with Presidential ambitions said that more than 3,000 lives were wasted. Of course, he clarified his remarks, because he forgot about the secret Democratic memo that this isn't the 1970s any more, and trashing the military is no longer acceptable.

It reminds me of a former Presidential candidate who said that those who joined our Army were only stupid people. Of course, after the polls came in, he clarified his remarks because he saw they were not being taken very well.

Back to the polls, only 15 percent of the public expressed initial support for the first President Bush to invade Iraq in 1991. Many in my own Republican Party vehemently opposed FDR in World War II. During the Civil War, there was a congressional committee that met officially and unofficially on a regular basis to critique President Lincoln's performance in nearly every battle the Union waged. Does history now reflect these?

Mr. Speaker, I ask that the rest of my comments be inserted in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of victory in Iraq and in support of our troops.

I rise to oppose this Democratic defeatist resolution and I hope to provide some historical perspective to help the American people understand what the Democrats plan to do this year.

Make no mistake about it--this resolution is about polls. National polling before November's elections showed a majority of Americans were opposed to cutting off funds for the war, but were generally unhappy with events on the ground.

This polling data led the Democratic message machine to create a ``we support the troops, don't support the war, but won't cut off funding'' position. Much like Majority Leader Hoyer's empty promises to allow a Republican alternative to this defeatist resolution, the Democrats are now following polls and slowly, piece by piece, bit by bit, revising their stance on defunding the war.

Due to their majority status, this resolution will pass and soon after the passage, I suspect Congressman Murtha and others will move to defund the war in the same way the Democratic controlled congress defunded the Vietnam war over a several year period. They will do so in a piecemeal fashion with various amendments to appropriations bills and avoid the term ``defunding'' at all costs. Before we have even concluded this debate, our Speaker has already said, ``A vote of disapproval will set the stage for additional Iraq legislation, which will be coming to the House floor.'' I say to Speaker Pelosi what is your additional Iraq legislation?

This immoral approach will slowly squeeze off funding and support and become a self fulfilling prophecy for the Democratic party--a party fixated on the 2008 election and ``intoxicated'' by their new majority status.

The only difference between what the Democrats will soon attempt to do and what they did in the late 60's and early 70's is they will continue to say publicly they support the troops, as Senator Kerry did in front of a congressional committee, of the atrocities of the so- called ``baby-killers.'' The poisonous atmosphere of those times resulted in the military prohibiting all military personnel in the Metropolitan Washington area from wearing their uniforms in public, out of safety concerns.

Two of the most crippling amendments of the Vietnam war were passed in 1969 and 1973. In 1969, Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) cosponsored an amendment prohibiting the use of ground troops in Laos and Thailand. In August 1973 the Congress passed the Fulbright-Aiken amendment which cut off all funding for U.S. military forces in, or over, or from the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

President Nixon's approval ratings in 1973 were dismally low and he was close to resigning as a result of the Watergate scandal. His weakened position emboldened Democrats to take extreme actions. Some of their actions may have bordered on treasonous, but have never been judicially challenged. Our current President has an approval rating nearly as low; and now, as they did then, Democrats are feeling emboldened to challenge our Commander-in-Chief during a time of war, for political gain.

Last week the Democratic-controlled United States Senate attempted to debate various non-binding resolutions about the Iraq war. I must admit I found it interesting to hear Majority Leader Reid say that voting on a non-binding resolution would show the American people where they stood on the war. Senator Reid and the Democratic leadership of both the House and Senate have made it very clear where they stand on the war--they are opposed to winning the war, claim they were tricked into supporting it and will do anything in their power to cut off all funding to the war.

I encourage Democrats to put forth a bill that eliminates all funding for the Iraq war along with an accompanying statement of non-support for the deployed troops. This would show their true colors and allow the Democrats to be intellectually honest.

It has been said this non-binding resolution will not affect troop morale. If so, why not amend this nonbinding resolution to send every man and woman fighting in Iraq a copy of it, along with the recorded vote.

Oh--that's right, no amendments.

This would also stand in stark contrast to their most recent act of hypocrisy--voting to confirm General David Patraeus, wishing him luck and then moving to undercut his efforts soon after he left the Capitol to begin his journey to Iraq.

More importantly, we need to achieve real progress in Iraq. We have come to a critical juncture and must make sure the price that has been paid--the blood of our young men and women--results in victory. To ensure a real and enduring victory, our Commander-in-Chief is moving forward with a new plan. Some in Congress and the media are debating whether it is a new strategy, a new set of

tactics or no change at all. This political posturing is unimportant to the Specialist or Corporal walking point in Baghdad or Al-Anbar province.

What is important are the President's words and his actions. He has ordered more combat forces to Iraq and has extended the tours of some forces already in the country. Their mission is to restore order to the 4 provinces in Iraq that remain volatile. Let us be perfectly clear, 14 of the 18 provinces are secure. These additional forces will help restore overall order and provide a stable environment for the political process within to work.

Today we have received reports from various sources that the radical cleric Al-Sadr may have fled to Iran as a result of the American and Iraqi forces cracking down on his militias and top aides. Iraqi forces are showing up to their appointed duty locations in excess of 70 percent of the time. The Iraqi government is taking the politically difficult step of forcing some Baghdad residents to vacate homes they unlawfully moved into during the war. There is also talk of stricter curfews and closing the borders with Syria and Iran for 30 days--all of this talk coming from the Iraqis.

I cannot assure my constituents these recent developments will result in a quick or certain victory in Iraq. I can assure my constituents and my colleagues that Democrats cannot say with absolute certainty that there is no military solution to Iraq. I also must point out several other recent Democratic statements that I take issue with.

One Senator with Presidential ambitions claimed that the more than 3,000 lives lost in the war had been wasted--he then immediately clarified his remarks because he had forgotten the secret Democrat memo stating that this isn't the 70's and trashing the military is no longer acceptable. This reminds me of a former presidential candidate's comments alleging that only stupid people end up in the Army and in Iraq. Of course, another ``clarification'' was issued soon after these comments since 2-3 days of polling indicated that the remarks were not well received.

Back to polls--only 15 percent of the public expressed initial support for the first President Bush to invade Iraq in 1991. Many in my own Republican party vehemently opposed FDR in World War II and during the Civil War there was a congressional committee that met officially, and unofficially, on a regular basis to critique President Lincoln's performance in nearly every battle the Union waged.

Does history now reflect that these three conflicts were wrong for America to engage in? I think not. Resolute leaders bucked short term public opinion for the good of the country in the long term. That is why we elect Presidents and that is what we should demand of them.

To date, mistakes have been made and the President has acknowledged them. We must, however, win this war. I believe immediate withdrawal will destabilize the region and cause us to return there in the future, as we have had to do in many regions throughout our history. We cannot fight a war based on polls and emotions. We must take actions that will preserve and enhance our national security now and beyond the next election, the next news cycle or the next opinion poll.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, it has been said here on the floor by more than one speaker, or suggested at least, that the war in Iraq is not part of the war on terror. I disagree. I could not disagree more with that statement. But if you agree with that statement, and if you are casting your vote because you think that is a rationale upon which you can justify your vote, I hope you are sure.

I would say I would hope you are sure because I am in my 23rd year, and I know how this place works. It is a wonderful system, because we almost always have a chance to come back and correct our mistakes. A vote on tax policy? I happen to favor lower taxes. But if we make a tax vote that is a bad vote, we can come back next year and fix it. Or if we spend too much money on transportation this year, we can come back next year and reduce it.

This resolution takes us down a different road. This starts us down a road where, at some point, we won't be able to come back next year and just fix it.

You don't have to believe me. But listen to what our enemies say. I have here the text of a letter that was written on July 9, 2005, from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the author, the second in command in al Qaeda, to al-Zarqawi, the person who at that time was the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. ``Our intended goal in this age is to establish a caliphate in the manner of the prophet.''

Now, I don't claim to be an expert in Islam, but I am told that at one time under this establishment of a caliphate, the caliphate stretched from Spain through the Middle East and Northern Africa to Central Asia and to India. That is a vast stretch. If that is the goal, then we ought to be aware of it, because it becomes a very serious matter.

The first stage of this process is to expel the Americans from Iraq, according to al-Zawahiri.

The second stage, establish an Islamic authority or an emirate, to develop it and support it until it achieves a level of a caliphate over as much territory as you can spread power in Iraq.

The third stage, he says, is to extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage, it may coincide with what came before, he says, the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

So clearly, the al Qaeda leadership believes that Iraq is part of the global situation that we refer to as the global war on terror, and if that is right, and I think at least for me I have to assume that that is their intention, Iraq is certainly part of the global war on terror from a Western perspective. And so what the President has suggested is to take advantage of the assets that we have developed, while training Iraqi soldiers to provide for their own security, and send three brigades into the Sunni Triangle, mostly in Baghdad, to be supported by the 21,500 Americans who he has proposed to send. I heard yesterday that the Iraqi brigades are, in fact, showing up in Baghdad at a 75 percent level, which is better than anyone expected, at least better than I expected. Maybe others expected better.

So I think if we are going to take on this effort to develop a caliphate, as one of the previous speakers said before it gets here, then maybe we ought to do what the commander of the national VFW suggests.

The commander of the national VFW put out a press release, and I have the text of it here. ``The national commander of the Nation's largest organization of combat veterans is very concerned that the ongoing debate in Congress about the planned troop buildup will be perceived by those in uniform as a sign that America's lawmakers have given up on them and their mission in Iraq.

``My generation,'' he said, ``learned the hard way that when military decisions are second-guessed by opinion polls or overruled by politicians, it's the common soldier and their families who pay the price.

``There is no question,'' he said, ``that mistakes have been made in the prosecution of the war in Iraq,'' but ``there is no playbook to fight an unconventional war against an unconventional enemy that wears no uniform and acts without conscience, yet our forces have adapted and are performing brilliantly,'' and I agree with him.

``We fully respect congressional oversight and the first amendment rights of all Americans to debate issues of national importance, but the VFW is very concerned with the tone and timing of it,'' he said. ``We need to send the message to our troops that America wants them to succeed in Iraq by giving the buildup a chance to succeed.''

Mr. Speaker, I think the commander of the national VFW is absolutely right, and I thank the gentleman for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

First, let me begin by saying that I have observed several speakers here during this debate who I am sure in good faith made the representations that they did, that the short-term redeployment or surge was not a recommendation of the Iraq Study Group.

This is a copy of the report of the Iraq Study Group. On page 73 there is a discussion of increasing troop levels in Iraq. And the Iraq Study Group did in fact suggest that a substantial increase of 100,000 or 200,000 troops would likely be not a good idea.

However, they say this, and I quote. ``We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.''

And so I would say to my friends that is in fact the case. And so I hope that that puts that matter to rest. Mr. Speaker, this resolution, I suspect, has been drawn up as a well-meaning resolution. There have been some suggestions here today that it is political in nature. I do not know if that is true. But I would hope that it is a good, well- meaning resolution.

I have been here now for well over 20 years, I am in my 23rd year. I have learned a lot about the House. This is a great system. We do great work here. And we usually do it right. Sometimes we make mistakes.

On many issues we make corrections to those mistakes. When we pass tax bills, months later or a year later we will make some technical corrections to the tax bill, because we did not do it quite right. In many other cases, if we spend too much money in an appropriations bill this year, we can come back and reduce it in a future year.

But I would suggest to my friends who support this resolution that it is a start down a road; it is a start down a road that at some point could have disastrous effects. So we want to make sure, I am sure you want to make sure, that you get this right. I would like to walk you through some reasons why I think that this takes us in the wrong direction.

In fact, there is a bunch of evidence to point to the fact that the enemy is watching what we are doing, that they have learned from our past mistakes, and that they are in fact hoping that this resolution passes, for some fairly obvious reasons. Let me go through four case studies that we have made about similar situations.

First, a situation in Lebanon. Lebanon was a wonderful country. It was a democracy. It had a Parliament. Had Christians and Muslims living together sharing power. In the middle 1970s, things began to change. The big change was that fundamentalist Islam came to town and Hezbollah came to town.

And in 1975, a war erupted, which has been called a civil war. There was the emergence of multi-sided militia groups, sectarian violence and civilian massacres. Sounds familiar.

In 1982, the U.N. sent in a multi-national force to try to quell the violence. And on October 23, 1983 the Marine barracks was bombed by Hezbollah with the support of Iran. The best description of it I have heard or read comes from a description by some Navy SEALs who were sleeping in their bunker on the beach, not in the barracks. And the magnitude of the explosion, to hear them describe it, was something to behold. And it shocked America. And in 1984 we withdrew our Marines. The remainder of the peacekeeping force was gone by April of 1984. There was no serious U.S. retaliation for the Beirut bombing. The civil war continued until 1990. Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of Shia groups and, with Iranian assistance, quickly grew into a strong fighting force in Lebanon. That is case number one.

Case Number two. We have got troops today in Afghanistan. If things had happened somewhat differently a couple of decades earlier, they might not be there at all. But in the mid-1980s the Afghan resistance builds momentum with Muslim fighters to recruit a jihad against the Soviets. And we all have read about that resistance movement. It was fierce, and we actually helped them. And in 1989 the Soviets had had enough, just like we had had enough in Lebanon, and the Soviets withdrew.

From 1989 to 1992, the Afghan civil war continued until the government of Afghanistan fell. In 1993 and 1994, the Taliban came along, and they gained power. In 1996, Osama bin Laden moves back to Afghanistan and forges an alliance between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Since then, we know the history very well of Afghanistan. A void was there to be filled, and the fundamentalist Islamists filled it.

Now, I would like to turn to the third case study, the case study involving Somalia. In 1980, the Somalia Government becomes increasingly totalitarian and resistance movements emerge across the country, which leads to a civil war in 1991. Being great big-hearted Americans, in 1992 and 1993, we decided to save the starving Somalis, and we initiated Operation Restore Hope. In May 1993, the U.N. assumed the mission from the U.S. as an international mission. In October of 1993 the battle for Mogadishu took place. Eighteen Americans were killed. The U.S. stops operations against Aidid, and in March, 1995, both U.S. and U.N. forces withdraw. It was later confirmed that al Qaeda supported Aidid's militia. There is evidence that the U.S. withdrawal inspired bin Laden's first bombing of the World Trade Center. The Islamist fundamentalists filled the void once again.

Let me move to my fourth case study, the Israeli withdrawal, again, from Lebanon. Preceding the Israeli invasion in 1982 the PLO was conducting attacks on Israel from south Lebanon. In 1982, Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in response to an assassination attempt by Abu Nidal against Israel's ambassador to the U.K. After attacking PLO, Syrian and Muslim Lebanese forces, Israel occupied southern Lebanon.

If you want to read a great account of this, read the book entitled ``Because They Hate.'' It is a book written by a Christian woman by the name of Brigitte Gabriel, who is now living in the U.S., and she tells the story of living in a bunker, living in a bunker until the war was over, not a nice thing to do.

In 1982 to 1984, the multi-national peacekeeping force came to Lebanon. The PLO withdrawal in 1982 is replaced by a strengthening of Hezbollah. In 1985, Israel moves to the security zone in southern Lebanon. And in 2000, Israel withdraws.

I only need to point to the events of last summer in Lebanon to say, once again, the fundamentalist Islamists, Hezbollah, filled the void.

We are embarked today on a discussion of another potential road to withdrawal. And I don't represent that this resolution does that, but it puts us in that direction. Evidence of our failure to respond to terrorism has emboldened al Qaeda for years. This withdrawal would be another one, if it goes that far.

In 1993, the World Trade Center bombing took place. We didn't respond. In 1996, the Khobar Tower bombings took place and we didn't respond. In 1998, the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania occurred and we didn't respond. In 2000, the attack on the USS Cole occurred and we didn't respond. The result, New York City, 9/11.

People ask me why I am so concerned about this. People ask me why, Saxton, you have been on the floor too much.

Let me show you the next chart. This is why I am concerned. This is my family.

When I first ran for Congress in 1984 the steering committee asked me why I wanted to be a Member of Congress. I said, because I have had a good life. I said, because this is a great country, and because I want my family to have the same opportunities I have had.

This is my son Marty and his wife and their little gal, my granddaughter Allie. This is my daughter, Jen, this is Kate, and this is Jacqueline.

I will admit the artist got a little carried away because they made a montage out of this picture and they put my grandchildren on here two or three times each. But I will tell you what, if we go down this road to the point where we can't correct a mistake, I wonder what the future is going to be for my family and for your family.

And so this resolution today is an important one. It may be only 97 words or whatever it is, and it may have only two statements in it, but we are headed down a road, and it is a dangerous one, in my opinion.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I want to also acknowledge Mr. Marshall and the powerful sentiments he just shared with all of us. Mr. Speaker, this debate is long overdue. It is our first extended and substantive debate on the war in Iraq since Congress gave the President the authority to invade more than 4 years ago.

But if we do nothing more than debate the President's escalation plan, we will not keep faith with the American people who rightly expect this new Congress to bring our costly involvement in Iraq to a close. And while the resolution before us is largely symbolic and nonbinding, it can be, I think it should be, the opening part of a longer, thoughtful debate about our long-term national interests not only Iraq but the entire Middle East.

So this resolution is a start. And I will vote for it because I agree with the message it sends. The resolution expresses disapproval of the President's sending more troops to Iraq, an action that is contrary to the wise advice of the Iraq Study Group, critical members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and experienced military commanders like former Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The President's escalation is most likely too small to be effective, and adopting new counterinsurgency tactics comes 2 years too late. The resolution, in my opinion, represents the correct response to these facts. It expresses support for our brave men and women in uniform, but disagreement with the policy of military escalation.

Mr. Speaker, as we speak here today, the death toll in Iraq rises, and the war continues to drain our national Treasury, stretch our Armed Forces, and weaken our capacity to effectively counter Islamic terrorism. Congress needs to send the message that things must change.

I opposed the Bush administration's decision to go to war in Iraq, and I have never once regretted that vote. But today we must focus on the future. We cannot move the clock back, but we need to avoid making a bad situation worse. We should not be scaling up our military mission in Iraq, we should be scaling back. We need to make the U.S. military footprint lighter, not in order to hasten defeat or failure in Iraq, but to salvage a critical measure of security and stability in a region of the world that we can ill afford to abandon.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I know about the pressure on our active duty and National Guard and Reserve soldiers. They lack enough equipment and training. They are experiencing multiple or extended deployments and limited time at home between deployments. But to be successful our men and women must be properly trained, equipped, and ready to deploy worldwide quickly.

Shortfalls in personnel, equipment, or training increases the risk to our troops and to their mission. In short, this administration's policies have brought us to the point where we not only cannot sustain an escalation in Iraq, but also we are not fully prepared for other contingencies.

But that is not the only reason I oppose the escalation. I do not think the President's rationale for it makes sense, no matter our readiness levels. The just-released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq agrees that the term ``civil war'' accurately describes what is happening in Iraq, and suggests that the conflict may in fact be worse than a civil war.

Putting more Americans at risk is not a recipe for victory. And as a new Foreign Relations Council report notes, we bear responsibility for developments within Iraq, but are increasingly without the ability to shape those developments in a positive direction.

So what should be the way forward? For one, I believe a reduction of military forces in Iraq and a phased redeployment of our Armed Forces to border regions like Anbar and the Kurdish areas of Iraq would be effective. That can give us flexibility to act militarily in Iraq if necessary, but will also increase the pressure on the Iraqi Government to move toward political reconciliation.

I do not think an immediate withdrawal of American forces or setting a date certain for withdrawal makes sense, but neither does an open- ended commitment for American blood and treasure. And as bad as the situation is in Iraq, we must work to avoid a collapse in the region. Not only because we have a moral obligation to the people of Iraq, but also because our national security has been badly compromised by the Bush administration's failures.

We should adopt the main policy recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, including stronger efforts of diplomacy in the region. It is not in the interests of any nation to have Iraq descend into further civil war and chaos. As challenging as diplomacy is in the Middle East, I believe the sacrifice of our soldiers demand that we engage in serious regional talks, including those with our adversaries Syria and Iran.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am convinced we must reach for bipartisanship in crafting our policy in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, the stakes in Iraq are very high.

The outcome in this region will have consequences for future generations that will long outlive those of us who are in Congress today.

Great leaders acknowledge mistakes, learn and chart a new course. For the sake of future generations and to keep faith with the generations that built America, let us be a Nation of great leaders.

Mr. Speaker, this is the first significant debate we have had on the war in Iraq since Congress passed the President's request for an authorization to invade Iraq more than four years ago. And even though our debate today is on a largely symbolic question--a non-binding resolution disapproving the President's announced plan for moving additional troops to Iraq--I believe it ought to serve as the beginning of a deeper and more thoughtful debate about our long-term national interests in the Middle East, and Iraq.

If all we do is debate the wisdom of a surge, we will not keep faith with the American people, who rightly expect this new Congress to bring our costly involvement in the Iraq war to a close.

Nevertheless, I will support this resolution disapproving the president's call for additional troops in Iraq because it runs contrary to the wise advice of the Iraq Study Group (the Baker-Hamilton Commission), critical members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and experienced military commanders like former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on the best strategic approach in Iraq. The President's plan calls for an infusion of additional soldiers--probably too few to have the desired outcome--and utilizing counterinsurgency tactics that are two years too late and that I believe will be ineffective in the context of the civil war that has emerged in Iraq.

We are also expecting General David Petraeus and our troops to operate under a complicated joint command structure with Iraqi forces and political leaders that is unprecedented in our military history and undermines the ``unity of command'' rule in warfare. And all this comes at a time when the death toll in Iraq is rising and the war continues to drain our national treasury, stretches our armed forces, and decreases--rather than enhances--our ability to wage an effective war against Islamic terrorism. Even as we debate a ``surge'' in Iraq, we should not forget Afghanistan. We will win there if we redouble our efforts now.

I opposed the Bush Administration's decision to go to war in Iraq and I have never once regretted that vote. Today, we cannot move the clock back, but we can surely avoid making a bad situation worse. We should not be scaling up our military mission in Iraq--we should be scaling back. We need to make the U.S. military footprint lighter--not in order to hasten defeat or failure in Iraq, but to salvage a critical measure of security and stability in a region of the world that we can ill afford to abandon.

I say this as a Member of the Armed Services Committee who understands the pressures on our active duty and National Guard and reserve soldiers, including a lack of equipment and training, multiple or extended deployments, and limited time at home between deployments. To be successful, U.S. forces must be trained, equipped, and ready to quickly deploy worldwide. Shortfalls in personnel, equipment, or training increase the risk to our troops and to their mission. By all measurements, we are not in a position to sustain an escalation of troops.

But I don't believe the President's rationale for the ``surge'' makes sense, no matter our readiness levels. The just-released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq agrees that the term ``civil war'' accurately describes aspects of the Iraq conflict and goes further in suggesting that the conflict may in fact, be more complicated and worse than a civil war. Putting more American troops at risk in this kind of setting is not a recipe for victory; it is only a prescription for quagmire. As a new Foreign Relations Council report notes, we bear responsibility for developments within Iraq, but are increasingly without the ability to shape those developments in a positive direction.

So what should be the way forward? How should Congress respond?

I believe a policy aimed at escalating diplomatic and political efforts is preferable to one that continues to rely on our soldiers to carry the heavy burden of nation-building--a mission that soldiers are ill-equipped for without strong international support, particularly in the midst of civil war and sectarian violence. That is why I favor a reduction of military forces in Iraq, and a phased redeployment of our armed forces to border regions in places like Anbar province and the Kurdish areas of Iraq, which should give us some flexibility to respond militarily should circumstances require it, but will also increase the pressure on the Iraqi government to move toward political reconciliation and stability.

I do not believe an immediate withdrawal of American forces or setting a date certain for withdrawal makes sense, but neither does an open-ended commitment of American blood and treasure.

As bad as the situation is in Iraq, however, we must work to avoid a collapse in the region--not only because we have a moral obligation to the people of Iraq, but also because our national security has been so badly compromised by the Bush Administration's failures there. The President's decision to take the Nation to war has made our country less safe. We need to change course and chart a path that enhances our national security and sets the right priorities for the war on terrorism and struggle against extremists.

To do this, I believe Congress should pass a resolution that embodies the main policy elements of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, including a call for stronger efforts at diplomacy in the region and internationally. It is not in the interests of any nation to have Iraq descend into further civil war and chaos. As challenging as diplomacy is in the Middle East, I believe the sacrifice of our soldiers demands that we engage in serious regional talks, including talks with our adversaries, Syria and Iran.

Finally, I believe we must reach for bipartisanship in crafting our policy in Iraq. The President misguidedly took us into war on the eve of a bitter national election. We must try hard not to compound this error by turning a debate on Iraq into a partisan game of one-upmanship where legitimate disagreement with the Administration's plan for escalation is called a betrayal of our troops or where resistance to immediate withdrawal is called war-mongering.

For my part, I intend to speak out loudly and often for a responsible withdrawal strategy in Iraq, but I will also offer proposals that are aimed at finding common ground. I will be introducing legislation that looks beyond the ``surge'' and toward the necessary and inevitable contingency planning that will be needed if we are to avoid deeper and more catastrophic scenarios in Iraq and the region.

Mr. Speaker, the stakes in Iraq are very high. The outcome in this region will have consequences for future generations that will long outlive those of us who are in Congress today. Great leaders acknowledge mistakes, learn, and chart a new course. For the sake of future generations and to keep faith with the generations that built America, let us be a Nation of great leaders.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 5 minutes to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from the great State of Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), a member of the Armed Services Committee.