Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6493) to amend title 49, United States Code, to enhance aviation safety, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill, H.R. 6493, and include therein extraneous material.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in very obvious support of H.R. 6493, the Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.

I consider this a first or, say, initial legislative step in reversing the complacency over safety regulations that has set in at the highest levels of the Federal Aviation Administration.

At the outset, I want to express my appreciation to Mr. Mica, the gentleman from Florida, the ranking member on our full Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Ranking Member Petri from the Subcommittee on Aviation, and Chairman Jerry Costello from Illinois, chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee. All of us have worked diligently on the hearing that we held on aviation safety and on the legislation that we bring to the floor today.

For years, the FAA has earned and held the distinction of the ``gold standard for aviation safety'' in the world. Other countries come to the United States to emulate the practices of the FAA in overseeing safety and setting standards for safety and maintenance of aircraft, engine and airframe. And it is, indeed, the charter of the FAA, in the very opening paragraph of the Organization Act of 1958, that created the Federal Aviation Administration from the old Civil Aeronautics Agency, quote, ``Safety in aviation shall be maintained at the highest possible level.'' Not the level airlines choose, not the level they can afford, but the highest possible level.

Safety in aviation must start in the corporate boardroom and permeate all through the organization. It is the responsibility of the FAA to set minimum standards and expect that not only airlines will meet them, but exceed them.

And there has been, over the years, a partnership in safety between the manufacturers of aircraft--whether it's Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Cessna, Cirrus, Piper, or these days Airbus in France--with the FAA in establishing standards, seeing that the standards are met, and then ensuring that in the course of operation of aircraft and the maintenance of aircraft safety is maintained at that highest possible level.

Over the last few years, we've seen a slippage with the FAA from that high standard. And following information we received from whistleblowers in the committee staff, and it came to my attention immediately, we found that there was a change in attitude at the FAA, a shift away from insisting on those highest standards, a move from a partnership to a customer service initiative in which the FAA directed its principal maintenance inspectors to treat airlines as though they were customers. I've never heard that term used in aviation in my 25 years of involvement in oversight of and setting standards for aviation safety. If there is a customer, it's the traveling public, not the airline. And if the airline is your customer and the customer is unhappy with the service he is getting,

then that customer can complain. And that's what one of the airlines did, complained to the FAA about the principal maintenance inspector being too rigorous, overseeing too vigorously. And that PMI was removed from that position. Until the FAA found out that our committee was investigating a range of practices that strayed from the standard of vigorous oversight of and enforcement of aviation safety, then they brought the person back. Well, we found that one carrier with FAA complicity allowed at least 177 of its aircraft to fly with passengers in revenue service in violation of FAA regulations, the most serious lapse in safety I've observed in 23 years.

The investigation the committee launched led to the discovery of other instances in which inspections were not properly conducted and repairs were not properly made. The result, after we brought this to the attention of the FAA, and to the public in a statement that we released about the situation in preparation for our hearings, numbers of aircraft, hundreds, 972 aircraft were grounded by not only the airline in question, but other air carriers as well. Thousands of flights were cancelled. Serious questions were raised about whether high-ranking officials in the FAA were carrying out their safety responsibilities toward the industry and toward the traveling public.

Since the hearing we conducted on April 3, the investigative staff has been approached by individuals from other maintenance providers of other carriers alleging serious breakdowns in FAA's regulatory oversight. As a result of the rigorous investigation and the intensive hearing conducted in committee, there has been a shift in the FAA. The pendulum swung too far to the cooperation side and is now moving back to the middle with a more balanced relationship with airlines instead of the carrier-favorable relationship previously.

On June 30, 2008, the Inspector General of DOT issued a report entitled ``Review of FAA's Safety Oversight of Airlines and Use of Regulatory Partnership Programs,'' observing that the IG made several recommendations to the FAA to strengthen its oversight of air carrier safety. Specifically, the IG recommended the FAA periodically rotate its flight standards safety inspectors and establish an independent investigative organization to examine safety issues found by FAA employees.

The FAA said it did not agree with the recommendation to rotate inspectors. It said it only partially agreed to implement the recommendation to establish an independent organization to investigate employee complaints, FAA employee complaints. The FAA's response has been to implement a Safety Issues Report System that duplicates existing hotlines, does not provide for independent review outside of FAA's Aviation Safety Organization, which in the past had a long and successful and effective record of responding to complaints filed by whistleblowers. Well, I think FAA's response has been wholly inadequate.

This legislation will move us in the direction of correcting the problem and putting aviation safety back on the highest level, the gold standard, that has been characteristic of the FAA in years past.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The issues at stake in the hearing that we held relate principally to two major issues of aviation safety: One was hull inspection, and the other was inspection of the power control unit on 737 aircraft that regulate the movement of the rudder onboard those aircraft.

Both of these air worthiness directives and Federal air regulations that govern oversight of maintenance performed on high-time aircraft and on aircraft that have this unique power control unit resulted from accidents that involved loss of life.

The 737 of Aloha Airlines en route to Honolulu lost 18 feet of its hull in the air. The flight attendant was pulled to her death. Passengers strapped in suffered rapid, severe decompression injury but no other loss of life. The investigation that followed showed that there was extensive corrosion and metal fatigue and perhaps also improper technology used in putting the plates together in the hull of the aircraft.

There followed a worldwide conference on aging aircraft, which I was the lead speaker. We gathered aviation manufacturers, airline operators, and aircraft inspection agencies from every nation in the world that had commercial aviation operation.

And out of that conference resulted a number of recommendations which we crafted together in a bill that my then partner on the Aviation Subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clinger, and I moved through subcommittee, full committee, to the House floor and through to enactment.

The language reads: The administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall prescribe regulations that ensure the continuing airworthiness of aging aircraft. The regulations prescribed shall at least require that the administrator make inspections and review the maintenance and other records of each aircraft and air carrier used to provide air transportation that the administrator decides may be necessary to enable the administrator to decide whether the aircraft is in safe condition and maintained properly for operation and air transportation.

The air carrier shall at least demonstrate that as part of the inspection, maintenance of the aircraft's age, sensitive parts and components has been adequate and timely enough to ensure the highest degree of safety. And work performed under this section shall be carried out after the 14th year in which the aircraft has been in service.

That was not just a happenstance. It was a very specific directive dealing with high time aircraft, a very specific directive to the FAA and to airlines to undertake this rigorous inspection. The FAA failed to maintain that level of vigilance. The air carrier failed to maintain its level of vigilance. And on some of those aircraft, there were found to be small cracks. But it's those small cracks that led to failures, the small cracks that led to life lost.

In another instance, the power control unit on 737 aircraft, something happened to an aircraft to cause the flight deck crew to lose control of that aircraft when the rudder made an uncommanded movement. And 137 people died in Pennsylvania. In the investigation conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board pursuant to the accident, it was found that this very small unit, this big, had failed. Up to that time, there had been 93 million hours of operation of 737s, and Boeing Company said, we haven't had any failures. But when the NTSB looked back in the record of other unexplained accidents, they were traced to this power control unit which was subsequently redesigned and retested under the extreme conditions that aircraft fly at high altitudes and rebuilt and reinstalled and a vigorous airworthiness directive put in place to require periodic inspections of the power control unit. Those inspections were missed. And the airlines involved, having missed the deadline, had to go back, take those aircraft out of service and inspect those parts. That is what we're talking about, vigilance at the highest possible level.

And I have seen a situation where in safety, a very comfortable relationship can exist between the overseer and the practitioner of safety. To say, as we do in the Congress, to say as we do about other members of the executive branch, that you must move around from one position to another in the executive branch, and we say to those who leave service, leave the Federal public service, ``you cannot come back and lobby the Congress for a period of time'' is an already established practice. To say that in a period of 2 years, a person who leaves the FAA to go work elsewhere outside of government, is not to say to that person that your service is not valued. We just want to make sure you're not using it to a contrary purpose to that which the person had served for all those years.

We only in this language prevent that person from working for the carrier they once oversaw. I think that is a reasonable step. It is one recommended by the Inspector General. I think it is in the best interest of safety to do this. It is in the best interest of safety to continue the Air Transportation Oversight System, ATOS, where airlines and manufacturers are engaged in developing trend lines, by watching these trend lines where we know and see certain things happening and take action before there is a failure and before there is a catastrophe, to prevent a tragedy. ATOS is a very good system. But it should not be transformed into one in which the airline is in the command position. There is a proper balance. And I think this legislation will

bring the FAA back into proper balance.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield myself the balance of our time. And I will not take all of whatever time remains.

An observation, and I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman from Florida, committing himself and the committee as a whole to vigorous oversight of safety. It is a good record, as the gentleman said, in air carrier safety over the last few years. What I have learned in my experience with safety in aviation, highways, railways, waterways and airways, is that that safety is just around the corner from the next accident. And while it may have been an inconvenience for passengers for the airlines to pull aircraft out of service, it's a horrible inconvenience to be dead or injured because of an airline accident. Had the airlines been conducting their inspections appropriately, vigorously and in keeping with the airworthiness directives in the time frames envisioned, it would not have had to pull these aircrafts out of service to do major inspections in blocks, as was done this spring. And as the gentleman from Florida said, this legislation, enacted, carried out by the FAA, will make sure that aviation stays on a steady path of constancy in oversight of aviation safety. That is what we want. That is the objective of this legislation. It is the continuity of inspection and of oversight of the air carriers who have the prime responsibility to maintain their aircraft in safe, airworthy condition.

And that is what we will achieve when we get this legislation enacted into law. I'm very hopeful that the other body will act promptly on this legislation, that it will be signed and carried out vigorously by the FAA and reestablish its standing in the world community, which looks to the United States to set and maintain the gold standard for aviation safety.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, first of all, I want to pay tribute to Chairman Oberstar, the chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, whom I have had the honor of working with and leading the Republican side of the committee with him. And I might say that when Mr. Oberstar and I get to agree on moving forward a transportation initiative that's in the benefit of the Congress and the American people that things do happen, and this is a fine example of trying to take FAA and its safety measures and make them even better for the safety of the American public. So I commend Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Costello as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, and Mr. Petri as our Republican ranking member all for working together.

I come to the floor today as the former Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee during six very difficult times of trying to take an industry that had a number of problems. I became the chairman in 2001, the beginning of 2001. When I came to Congress, Mr. Oberstar was the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee and did an outstanding job in his service. He was faced with challenges; I was faced with challenges.

Both of us, though, wanted to construct an FAA inspection system and safety system that assured the flying public that we had taken the very best measures and put them in place so that we would have a safe aviation national system. And I remember instituting early on and supporting the institution of a change in the way we did aviation inspection. What we did is we switched from sort of a we gotcha, we're- going-to-catch-you-if-we-can system or sort of a routine inspection system where it's Monday, we're going to inspect in Seattle at this aviation facility, or it's Tuesday, we're going to be in St. Louis, or it's Wednesday, we're going to be in New York and we are going to do these inspections whether we need to on a rotating basis or not. We switched to a somewhat controversial system of inspection of these aircraft called ``self-reporting.'' And some people don't understand that, but what we did is we said there are no penalties. Everyone would report incidents where there is some problem or they see some defect, something that should command attention and should be noted, and we had a reporting system. And that's the way we have operated with the self- reporting system. Some say it got a little too cozy, and probably when you repeat things and do things in a certain fashion, that does happen. It's part of human nature.

The reporting system is very important, though, because then we took and we adopted a risk-based inspection in going after problems. And since we have done that, ladies and gentlemen of the House, my colleagues, we have had the safest history for aviation ever in the United States and probably in the world. We instituted that. We put in some protections but probably not enough.

Now, as you know, in April of this year, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held a hearing on the oversight of airline maintenance and brought to our attention, and through the investigative resources of the committee, we found lapses of proper attention, some conflict of possible interest, and some people who maybe got into too cozy a relationship. We held hearings on that, and as a result of that across the country, we asked that an audit be conducted. We wanted to see if what we saw in a limited incident or incidents was being repeated around the system.

The audit found that the United States carriers complied with more than 99 percent of the airworthiness directives sampled, and it's the remaining 1 percent that we want to make certain are addressed. So we instituted a new way of inspections. We instituted a new way of reporting. We found that we had some problems, and in this bipartisan effort, we are instituting corrective measures.

One of the things to deal with the cozy relationship is that we do establish a post-employment restriction for some of these FAA inspectors going back into industry for 2 years. I have some questions about the 2 years, but the other side of the aisle and the administration support the 2 years. I thought it might be a little bit too long. We will have to see how that works. It also requires that FAA principal supervisory inspectors rotate the office every 5 years, and we found also the cozy relationships, staying at one place, getting these relationships that sometimes might have a conflict of interest. We instituted that particular provision in this legislation. I have some questions about that too because it is difficult for these professionals and we want the very best to rotate and move their families around every 5 years, but we will see how that measure works. So those are the two questions that I probably have remaining. And what we have reached is a bipartisan accord.

But our intent here is to take a safe system where we found some problems and to correct it, institute some changes that will make certain that the system is even safer and that the problems that we have identified are corrected.

So I think this is an excellent measure. It shows what Congress can do working together to take a safe aviation system, make it even safer, correct some problems that we've identified, and make certain that the American public has the greatest confidence and that there are, in fact, measures being taken and having been instituted that will ensure that safety.

So with those comments, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette).

I yield myself such time as I might consume.

Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, as we conclude the debate on H.R. 6493, which makes changes to the way we conduct FAA airline inspections and how we make certain that we have the safest aviation system possible, I believe that it is important to point out just a couple of things. First of all, since November of 2001, there has not been a single large passenger aircraft fatality in the United States. We have had several commuter airlines, smaller aircraft, I know at least one in Charlotte, another in Lexington, and any loss of life in any size aircraft is not acceptable. Some of those did not relate to the inspection. The reasons for the air crash or fatalities was not as a result of inspections or the procedures we have before us today.

What we do have historically is again instituted a self-reporting system, probably a half a dozen years ago we shifted to this system. We do collect that data. That data is supposed to be acted upon by inspectors on a risk base. So we look at the data where there is a problem. And that is where we put our resources to make certain that the aircraft is operating, inspected and mechanically sound. And that has worked fairly well.

We have, again, to reiterate what I said before, the committee did investigate when whistle-blowers came to us. We found an instance or instances of this cozy relationship, and we felt that we should take some steps to first eliminate sort of the revolving door, stop the revolving door, put some time between those that worked for the FAA and then going out to the airlines, and also instituting some other protective measures.

Now I must say that even when the inspector general of the Department of Transportation investigated what was going on and what we found, they did not find the problem systemic. What they did say was that the data that was being collected on which we based our inspections and assessed risk was not adequately being adhered to. That data and the information was not being adhered to by all levels of FAA, for example, management, and eventually the Congress. So we also changed in this bill the recommendation that the inspector general made when they found that, again, the problem wasn't just the revolving door, but paying attention to the red flags and the signals that were being sent by the data.

So this is a good bill. This is a bipartisan effort to take a safe system, make it even safer, make certain that those warning signs are paid attention to both by FAA at all levels, inspectors, managers in this self-reporting system, and also by Congress who has the ultimate responsibility.

Also, I might say that how did this affect folks? Well, when Congress started to say we weren't properly inspecting or there were conflicts, FAA said, we're going to give you inspections. And they did give us inspections. And we closed down thousands of flights. And hundreds of thousands of people paid the price. And the airlines paid the price to make sure that zero tolerance was applied and that we did inspect those planes. But that is not exactly what we want to happen in the future.

H.R. 6493 will help us to avoid any future mass airlines groundings like the ones we saw this spring and the horrible inconveniences suffered by hundreds of thousands of people in the traveling public. This is an important bill that will ensure our national aviation system remains the safest in the world and that FAA provides the proper oversight of airlines and their maintenance programs that are so important to that safety.

I commend Chairman Oberstar, Mr. Costello, Mr. Petri, who is not with us, our ranking member, the staffs that worked on both sides. This is a good bill. I support it. It will make a good system even better.

And I think with that, Mr. Speaker, to assist the House in moving forward with the business of the day, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6493--The Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.

Mr. Speaker, as many of us know, FAA's stated mission is ``to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.''

Regrettably, recent aircraft groundings and flight cancellations by our Nation's air carriers to ensure compliance with safety directives calls into question whether or not the principal Agency charged with protecting the flying public is living up to its mission.

I think it goes without saying that over the years, the standing of our Nation's aviation system as one of the safest in the world can be directly attributed to the diligent efforts of dedicated inspection and maintenance personnel.

However, these respective personnel are only as good as their managerial and operational framework, and according to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel and our own Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Oversight and Investigations staff, serious flaws exist within the management of FAA's safety inspection framework.

In a letter dated December 20, 2007, to Department of Transportation Secretary Mary Peters outlining allegations of two FAA inspectors, now known as the whistleblowers, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel states, ``The whistleblowers allege that safety and adherence to regulatory compliance have taken a back seat to personal friendships and favors at the Southwest Certificate Management Office.

They have disclosed serious allegations of a compromise of the public safety mission at FAA. ``Even in the face of investigations substantiating wrongdoing and safety breaches [with respect to the ADs] FAA does not appear to have held management and safety inspectors appropriately accountable for their actions and inaction. The information disclosed by [the whistleblowers] reveals a substantial likelihood that serious safety concerns persist in the management and operation of the inspection and maintenance programs at FAA.''

Mr. Speaker, this type of behavior is simply unacceptable and warrants a complete overhaul of how the FAA goes about its business of safety inspections and over-reliance on Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Programs. H.R. 6493 is a step in this direction.

The bill establishes an Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office with an independent Director; modifies the Agency's customer service initiative; imposes post-employment on FAA inspectors; restricts the time a principal maintenance inspector may oversee a single carrier; and increases scrutiny of the Agency's air transport oversight system database.

When it comes to the proper adherence to safety protocols, FAA should be in the business of zero tolerance. If a plane is out of compliance for whatever reason, it should be grounded until it comes into compliance--period.

Yes, the American economy is dependent on the movement of people and goods, but this movement should not and cannot come at the expense of safety. Given the current, delicate nature of the airline industry, I cannot

imagine that there exists a single airline executive in this country that would sanction the operation of a noncompliant or unsafe plane.

As I close I want to thank the leadership of the Aviation Subcommittee, in addition to the leadership of the Full Committee for advancing this vital piece of legislation to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6493, the Aviation Safety Enhancement Act.

Over the last few years we have heard a number of disturbing reports that the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, is failing in its mandate to ensure the safety of airline passengers. Last year we discovered that the FAA had allowed Southwest Airlines to fly 117 planes that had not received their mandatory inspections. We learned of two near midair collisions at Newark Airport in my home state of New Jersey. In meetings with Air Traffic Controllers I have been told that these near misses were caused by pilot confusion over last minute and unpublished route changes by the FAA. Rather than address serious concerns about the safety of our nation's air travelers, the FAA has attempted to hide these complaints and issues. In some of these cases, the FAA has retaliated against whistleblowers who disclosed these issues and the number of whistleblower protection claims filed by FAA employees has tripled over the last year.

It is difficult to overstate how important whistleblowers are in the policy process. They are often the human face that confirms the existence of a tangible, even life-threatening problem in a federal agency. Bush Administration officials threatened Jack Spadaro, the former head of the National Mine Health and Safety Academy, MSHA, with the loss of his job when he tried to investigate a mining accident that occurred in 2000. In 2005, the Forest Service fired Douglas Parker, a 40 year employee of the service, after he filed a whistleblower complaint about the improper use of pesticides across several forests in New Mexico and Arizona. Fredrick Whitehurst, a long-time FBI bomb residue expert, filed whistleblower complaints after he pointed out major problems in the FBI's crime lab. I could go on at length about these kinds of cases, but I think you get my point. Outside of the national security community, protecting whistleblowers is perhaps more important in the transportation sector than anywhere else. If the FAA is

being too cozy with industry and pressuring maintenance personnel to reduce the number of violations they cite among the carriers, we need to know that so we can stop it. If the FAA is trying to implement a dangerous and inadequately tested national air traffic pattern change and air traffic controllers believe people will die as a result, we need to know that so we can stop it. This legislation would help us to do that.

Among its provisions, H.R. 6493 would create an independent office of Aviation Safety Whistleblower Protection within the FAA. This office would be responsible for receiving complaints and information from FAA and airline employees about possible violations of safety regulations, federal laws, and standards. This office would allow FAA and airline employees to disclose anonymously their safety concerns without fear of retaliation.

Madam Speaker, I rise to explain my reason for missing votes on July 22 and July 23, 2008. My voting percentage is over 96% for the 110th and I rarely miss votes, but there are certain family events that cannot be missed, and for that reason, I was in Houston for the birth of our newest grandson. I am proud to report the newest grandson, as well as mother, father, and the rest of the family are doing fine.

Had I been present for votes, I would have voted as follows:

On rollcall vote No. 523, H. Res. 1344, On Agreeing to the Resolution, Rule providing for consideration of H.R. 3999--The National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 522, H. Res. 1344, On Ordering the Previous Question on the Rule for H.R. 3999--The National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act (H.Res.1344) I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 521, H.R. 6535, Table Motion to Reconsider, National Energy Security Intelligence Act of 2008, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 520, H.R. 6535, On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, National Energy Security Intelligence Act of 2008, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 519, H.R. 3221, Concur in Senate Amendment with House Amendment, Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 518, H.R. 6532, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore the Highway Trust Fund balance, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 517, H. Res. 1363, On Agreeing to the Resolution, Providing for consideration of the Senate amendment to the House amendments to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3221, to provide needed housing reform and for other purposes, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 516, H. Res. 1363, On Ordering the Previous Question, Providing for consideration of the Senate amendment to the House amendments to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3221, to provide needed housing reform and for other purposes, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 515, On Motion to Adjourn, I would have voted ``nay;''

On rollcall vote No. 514, H. Res. 1202, On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree, Supporting the goals and ideals of a National Guard Youth Challenge Day, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 513, H. Res. 1311, On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree, Expressing support for the designation of National GEAR UP Day, I would have voted ``aye;''

On rollcall vote No. 512, H.R. 6493, On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended, Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008, I would have voted ``aye.''