Providing for the adoption of the resolution (H. Res. 895) establishing within the House of Representatives an Office of Congressional Ethics, and for other purposes.

I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I was very excited to be part of this ethics task force. And led by the able leadership of Chairman Mike Capuano and Ranking Member Lamar Smith, I was very hopeful that we could work in a bipartisan fashion to come up with a good, solid ethics bill.

We held over 30 hearings. We worked very hard. And I believed we were on track until about last August. And sometime during last August, the outside special interest groups got to the Democrat leadership, and this whole effort was derailed.

And what came out of this was terrible and I will just give you one specific example. This whole thing puts all of us in a vulnerable situation, but in this one specific instance there are six members appointed to the Office of Congressional Ethics, the OCE, and there are supposed to be joint appointments with the Speaker of the House and the Minority Leader. But there is a caveat. If you cannot get an agreement, and just hold off for 90 days and get your respective appointee in this position as one of the six members of the OCE.

Now, why should we be concerned that this was hijacked by the outside groups? These outside special interest groups exist to chastise and press charges against Members of Congress. That's how they raise their money. That's why they exist. And they're on both sides of the political spectrum; so all of us are vulnerable. These groups take sides in political battles, and use any scrap of evidence they can find to try to press charges against Members of Congress.

In fact, if you have ever amended your FEC report, there are examples of how they've used that as alleged unethical charges against Members of Congress. And nothing disqualifies these members of outside groups from sitting on the OCE as one of six members.

So we're all vulnerable by these politically motivated people being incorporated into this whole process to make sure that all of us have a chance to face charges, whether justified or not.

Now, just think of your worst critic. They're out there in the blogs. They're in the call-in for your newspapers. These are the types of folks that you will be confronted with if we allow these outside groups to inject themselves in this process.

And how will you respond? Well, the first thing you will have to do is go out and hire a lawyer, and those lawyers are about $1,000 an hour; and a minimum investigation, even when you're innocent, is going to a quarter of a million dollars. Now, some people don't mind that. Some have plenty of money to burn. But I think a majority of Members here in this Congress realize that even a false charge can bankrupt them and force them into a position where they have no financial substance. That will happen in this ethics bill.

This is just the tip of the iceberg of how this process got hijacked and how this ethics bill is not fair to Members of Congress. It's unconstitutional. And I think this rule ought to be defeated. And if you have a single ounce of self-preservation, you will vote ``no'' for this rule and vote ``no'' against this unconstitutional bill.

Mr. Speaker, rise today with reluctance and regret that I am unable to support the House rule change before us today.

Exactly 12 months ago I was both honored and excited to receive the appointment from my leader to serve on the Speaker's Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement. At the time, like my Republican colleagues, I was excited about the possibility of forging together a bipartisan piece of legislation that would address the fundamental issues that are currently plaguing our ethics system in Congress. Under the capable and civil leadership of Chairman Mike Capuano and Ranking Member Lamar Smith, I was hopeful of what we could achieve.

For the past 13 years I have observed the House ethics process and came to the conclusion early on that our system was not transparent enough, not efficient enough, and simply not effective. In a word, our system was broken. Sadly, today, I am forced to accept that the Speaker's Task Force has failed its mission and has produced a partisan, undemocratic, and unconstitutional bill that I am convinced will only compound our current problems--and further frustrate the wishes of the American people for this House to clean up its act.

While the Democrat proposal is flawed in several substantial ways, its biggest and most glaring failure is that it turns a democratic ethics process into an undemocratic and partisan one where justice can be easily denied. Under the proposal before us today, an investigation can he initiated by the action of only two of the six members of the new independent Office of Congressional Ethics, OCE.

The legislation also mandates that names of the two members remain secret and kept from the American public and the accused Member of Congress. An earlier version of this legislation required a majority vote of the new committee before proceeding to a second-phase review of the pending matter. However, under the version we are debating today, a full-fledged review and investigation may occur without a majority vote of the OCE. This proposal jettisons the basic and fundamental right of democracy and fair play.

Mr. Speaker, in addition to being undemocratic, this proposal also contains several provisions which are most likely unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable. The most egregious provision is the creation of the OCE.

In its 200+ years of existence, Congress has never seriously contemplated handing over one of its most important responsibilities-- that of regulating and disciplining its own Members--to an outside entity that is unaccountable to the American people unlike elected Members of Congress.

The legislation before us today would do just that. However, instead of abdicating our constitutional responsibility as specified in article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution, I propose that our task force goes back to work--and finds a solution which bridges our partisan differences while adhering to our constitutional obligations.

Our Ethics Committee is broken--so why not focus on and fix the problem instead of creating a whole new set of problems that will only serve to further undermine our ethics process? If Members of Congress are truly interested in repairing our ethics process--if Members of Congress are truly committed to restoring honor and integrity to this House--it's essential that we come together in a bipartisan spirit and develop a package that both sides can agree upon and support. Unfortunately, today's legislation falls way short of hitting that mark.

Mr. Speaker, in addition to abolishing basic rights of democracy and fair play--this proposal promises to undermine ongoing Ethic's Committee investigations and will likely impede Department of Justice investigations. In just one example, this legislation imposes an unreasonable period of time to investigate unethical conduct.

Quick and incomplete investigations can lead to unjust results-- including charging the innocent and letting the guilty off free. It's imperative that our processes of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior supports and complements the House Ethic's Committee-- regrettably, this bill will only undermine its ability to do its job.

On September 26, 2007, David H. Laufman, a former Investigative Counsel for the House Ethics Committee from 1996-2000 and a former federal prosecutor opined the following in Roll Call:

``[T]he creation of an outside ethics panel will not solve

the core problems that currently afflict the House. Real

ethics reform

in the House begins with willingness on the part of both

party leaderships to refrain from political intervention in

the ethics process and give the ethics committee the

independent, professional resources it needs to do its work.

. . . Creating an outside panel, moreover, would simply

create another layer of ethics bureaucracy that further slows

down a process already characterized by sluggishness.''

At this time I would like to submit Mr. Laufman's entire Op-Ed into the Record.

Mr. Speaker, instead of maintaining and fostering the cause of justice and ethical behavior in Congress, this piece of legislation may actually thwart the efforts of the Ethics Committee and Justice Department to investigate unethical behavior and punish Members appropriately. Again, if the Ethics Committee is broken lets fix or replace it--but why in the world would we want to ignore the problem by creating an additional layer of legislative redtape--which will only serve to work against the purposes of the Ethics Committee--instead of enhancing its ability to get its job done fairly and expeditiously.

Mr. Speaker, it was an honor to serve on this Task Force and work with my 7 distinguished colleagues. Over the past 12 months I participated in over 30 hearings, listening to testimony from a wide variety of interests on this important matter before us today.

While various organizations expressed their support for the concept of creating an independent body--and their endorsements have been promoted today in this debate--it would be unfair to not recognize that several witnesses expressed their misgivings and concerns with the direction this legislation would take the House ethics process. Witnesses I suggest were more qualified then others to testify to the pros and cons of creating a new independent body.

Last March the task force met in private with former Congressmen Bob Livingston, R-LA, and Louis Stokes, D-OH, regarding their experiences from serving as cochairs of the last House Ethics Task Force in 1997. Both men had served on the House Ethics Committee and were highly esteemed by their colleagues. Congressman Stokes was a former chairman of the House Ethics Committee and shared the following statement with our task force members:

I strongly believe the current Ethics Committee structure

should be preserved. I think Congress has a constitutional

obligation to police its members. The mechanism exists to

hire outside counsel whenever necessary, as the Committee did

in the Abscam cases and also in the sex and drug

investigations. In both cases the House received accolades

for its work. A dangerous aspect of investigations by either

a House Committee or an outside panel is interference with

Justice Department investigations.

At this time I would like to submit Mr. Stokes entire written statement into the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to raise one additional point that warrants discussion. Regardless of the outcome of today's vote, I believe it is important that this House give serious consideration to providing attorney's fees for Members of Congress that may become the subject of an OCE or Ethics Committee review in the future--but are subsequently cleared of any baseless charges. Under the OCE structure set up in this rule, it will be very easy for any two members to initiate an investigation--for any reason--without any real evidence--which in turn will force any discerning Member to hire a DC attorney to make sure their rights are protected and their name is not damaged in the process.

Colleagues do not be fooled--this will become inevitable if this rule is enacted today.

I want to thank Chairman Capuano for highlighting the issue of attorney's fees in his Report and also commend him again for his leadership and hard work with the task force. While I am unable to support its outcome today, I know that every member of the task force is sincere in their desire and efforts to help fix what's wrong with our current ethics process. Unfortunately, today's rule change falls way short of our goal.

Mr. Speaker, let me acknowledge that we started out on a great glide path of bipartisanship--but eventually the Democrat leadership was influenced by various outside organizations that refused to accept any compromise that involved maintaining the current democratic rules of justice and fair play. For example, the task force members--both Democrat and Republican--had agreed in principal to allow outside entities the right to submit ethics complaints to the OCE.

In fact, this provision was requested by these various organizations and highly promoted as a vehicle to bring much needed credibility to the current ethics process. And, while I had some reservations about it I was willing to support this provision.

Unfortunately, these same organizations were not willing to be subjected to the same level of scrutiny and transparency they wished to impose upon Members of Congress--namely the disclosure of their largest donors who may or may not have an ax to grind with a Member of Congress. One official quoted in an article on the issue stated: ``you can. imagine how upsetting this [provision] is to the donor community.''

Indeed.

And that was the end of that.

In closing Mr. Speaker, let me also thank Ranking Member Lamar Smith for his leadership, experience, expertise, and tireless efforts that he brought to this important effort.

Let me also thank the capable staff that assisted us throughout this process, including: Paul Taylor, Chief Republican Counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution; Ed Cassidy, Senior Advisor and Floor Assistant to the Republican Leader, and my Chief of Staff, Jeff Kahrs.

Before I end I can't help but note the irony in spending well over 100 hours of my time hearing testimony and discussing the significant ramifications of each provision within this legislation--the most sweeping ethics legislation in over 10 years--and the Democrat leadership decision to bring this bill to the floor--under the cover of darkness--and under a closed partisan rule which only allows 30 minutes of debate on each side--that's less than 30 seconds for each Member of this House to be heard on this topic.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that Members will not be fooled by the lack of an open and full debate on this important issue. I strongly oppose this rule change and respectfully urge all Members--Democrats and Republicans--to reject this proposal. It's time for the Ethics Task Force to get back to work and find a bipartisan solution to our failed ethics process that is supported by a majority of both Republican and Democrat Members. Anything less then a bipartisan solution will result in partisan failure.

[From Roll Call, Sept. 26, 2007]

Outside Panel Won't Resolve Core Ethics Problems

(By David H. Laufman)

Now that President Bush has signed into law S. 1, the

Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, it is fair

to ask what sort of enforcement regime for the new rules

Members of Congress can expect from the Senate Ethics

Committee and the House Committee on Standards of Official

Conduct, also known as the House ethics committee. As in so

much of life, the answer is: It depends.

The Senate Ethics Committee has long functioned quietly and

methodically to evaluate ethics complaints and allegations of

misconduct in a professional, nonpartisan manner. That track

record reflects the relative collegiality of the Senate and

the inclination of the respective party leaderships to leave

ethics matters ``to the professionals'' for sorting out.

There is every reason to expect that the Senate committee

will bring the same balanced enforcement to the new rules

that has characterized its operations in the past.

The House ethics committee, however, is a different matter.

Although the committee has undertaken some tough

investigations in recent years--most notably, its inquiries

regarding former Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) and

former Rep. Bud Shuster (R-Pa.)--it has been cleaved by

partisan turmoil and deadlock for much of the period since

the conclusion of the cases against former Speaker Newt

Gingrich (R-Ga.) in 1997. The nadir of this devolution

occurred in 2005, when two seasoned attorneys on the

committee's nonpartisan staff were fired in apparent

retribution for their work on the DeLay investigation, and

two committee members believed to be ``politically

unreliable'' by their party leadership were summarily

jettisoned.

Now, there is potential for even further disequilibrium in

the House ethics process. At issue is the pending

determination by the Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement

as to whether an outside panel should be established to

conduct preliminary review of ethics complaints and make

recommendations to the House ethics committee on whether

investigative action should be undertaken.

As a former investigative counsel to the House ethics

committee who investigated both Democrats and Republicans--

and as a former federal prosecutor--I fully appreciate the

importance of conducting thorough, independent

investigations. I also appreciate that the establishment of

an outside ethics panel might enhance public confidence in

the integrity of the House ethics process. But the creation

of an outside ethics panel will not solve the core problems

that currently affect the House.

Real ethics reform in the House begins with a willingness

on the part of both party leaderships to refrain from

political intervention in the ethics process and give the

ethics committee the independent, professional resources it

needs to do its work. All the new ethics laws and rules in

the world will amount to nothing unless the party leadership

on both sides refrain from politicizing the ethics process,

the committee members ultimately charged with implementing

them are committed to consistent, nonpartisan enforcement,

and committee members do not have to worry about retaliation

from their party leadership or fellow members.

Establishing an outside ethics panel also would constitute

a historic abdication of the House's constitutional

responsibility for self-regulation. Article I, Section 5,

Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that ``Each House

[of Congress] may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,

punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and with the

Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.'' Although the

drafters of the Constitution chose the permissive ``may''

rather than ``shall,'' it is clear that they intended to

create a system of peer review where Members of Congress

shoulder the responsibility for weighing allegations of other

Members' misconduct. The establishment of an outside panel to

evaluate ethics complaints would be an unprecedented

deviation from more than 200 years of self-regulation.

Moreover, it would be tantamount to an admission that the

House is now unable to fully govern itself and needs

protection against its own improper impulses.

Nor, if established, would an outside panel likely improve

the House ethics process. First, none of the publicly

reported proposals under consideration to establish an

outside panel divests the House ethics committee of ultimate

decision-making discretion as to whether ethics violations

occurred or what sanctions to impose if a violation is found.

Creating an outside panel, moreover, would simply create

another layer of ethics bureaucracy that further slows down a

process already characterized by sluggishness. Second, making

informed assessments of allegations of misconduct requires

more than the mere application of law or rules to facts: It

also requires a nuanced understanding of the institutional

context in which the alleged misconduct occurred. Arguably,

the need for such a nuanced understanding is particularly

great in the case of a political institution that has its own

unique cultural attributes. It is possible that retired

Members of Congress could bring the necessary perspective to

bear if appointed to an outside ethics panel. It is less

likely that retired jurists, academicians or individuals from

other professions would be equally capable of making the

necessary contextual judgments.

That the committee would retain autonomy to reject the

recommendations of an outside panel ignores political

realities surrounding ethics scandals. If, for example, the

outside panel recommended that the committee initiate an

investigation--a recommendation that almost certainly would

become publicly known--the pressure on the committee from

interest groups and the news media to accept the panel's

recommendation would be formidable.

Clause 1 of House Rule 23, which comprises the Code of

Official Conduct, states that ``A Member, officer, or

employee of the House of Representatives shall conduct

himself at all times in a manner which shall reflect

creditably on the House of Representatives.'' The special

task force would bring credit on the House by rejecting the

idea of an outside ethics panel and recommitting the House to

ethics enforcement marked by bipartisanship and consensus.

Mr. Speaker, I actually find very little in Mr. Dreier's comments I disagree with. I agree with almost everything he has said, and I commend him for that very thoughtful speech.

Mr. Speaker, before I comment on the specifics, I'd also like to thank the members of the task force, especially Mr. Smith, who was the ranking member for Republicans. It was a great opportunity to become a friend of another Member. We did disagree in the end, but I found it to be a very thoughtful, fruitful, and enjoyable experience.

I also want to thank other members of the committee: Mr. Price, Mr. Scott, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Meehan before he left, Mr. Hobson, Mr. Camp, and Mr. Tiahrt. I thought we had some great meetings, and it was a pleasure to me to engage in this endeavor.

I also want to thank the Members of the freshman class of 2006. They're the ones who really kept the pressure on us to try to fix our ethics rules. They came here on the backs of public discontent with our actions, and they have kept our feet to the fire. I thank them for that.

I also want to thank the many people that helped us walk through this. There are many people whom I will list in my extension of remarks at a later time because there are too many of them. I do want to point out one staff member, in particular my own, Christina Tsafoulias, who worked countless hours trying to get through this. I want to thank her publicly for that.

On the specifics, again I think I agree with most everything Mr. Dreier said. This is really all about public trust, but the point that seems to be missed is the public does not trust us on ethics issues at this point. Maybe that's fair. Maybe that's unfair. Maybe it's based on reality. Maybe it's based on perception. But it is a fact. They do not trust us. They don't trust us for many different reasons. As I see it, I can point to two different issues in particular: the perception of the good-ol'-boy network. Now, maybe that's not fair, but it's certainly what our constituents think. They think we are all here protecting each other. They think that we operate beyond closed doors and smoke-filled rooms to make sure that

no bad things get said about our colleagues. I don't think that is true, but that's certainly the perception. When people don't have trust in the system, they don't have trust in us, and I think that's an important thing to address.

The other part of it, as was already pointed out, is transparency, or the lack thereof. That encourages people to think that the good-ol'-boy network is all that we rely on. As far as partisanship, I totally agree. Any system that results in partisanship on ethics matters is unsuccessful. But partisanship has two points: yes, there is partisanship to initiate witch hunts, and that is a concern, I believe, this proposal addresses that by requiring joint appointments and by requiring one Democratic appointment and one Republican appointment to initiate a review. It totally undermines any legitimate concerns about partisanship witch hunts.

But the other side of the coin that nobody here wants to talk about is the potential for partisan stonewalling, which we have suffered in this House in the past where one party simply says, You cannot look at our Member. Period. End of discussion. And if you do, we will remove Members from the Ethics Committee who look at that Member, which has happened in this House, and everybody knows it.

And to think that partisanship is only a one-sided witch hunt is a mistake. Partisanship is also stonewalling. It's also protecting our fellow colleagues who may or may not have done something wrong simply because they come from the same party as we do. That's just as wrong as partisan witch hunts, and I believe this proposal addresses that as well.

I also want to comment on the two proposals that were dropped on us lately. One of them had been in one form or another for a while; but both of them, in their final form, were dropped on us lately. I will simply tell you that, yes, we did look at them; and I have an opinion here which I will submit to the Record from the Congressional Research Service and one from the House counsel that states by bringing non- Members into a Member-oriented item to have official votes on matters in this House is likely to be unconstitutional.

Now, I know that some people don't want to hear it, and certainly it won't be definitive until the Supreme Court were ever to act on it, but there is all of these constitutional questions on everything we do. I, for one, am a lawyer. I try to figure out how unconstitutional an issue might be; and if the answer is it's more likely to be unconstitutional than not, I won't do it. If the answer is I think it's constitutional, you try it. If it gets knocked down in court later on, so be it.

So these two proposals, according to two independent agencies we could get direct answers on quickly, believe that it's unconstitutional.

As far as the rule goes, I have had a year's worth of debate, and I would have welcomed anybody to come to any of our meetings and participated at any time they wanted to have the hours-on-hours of discussion. At the same time, this is a pretty simple proposal. I know some people don't like the concept of an independent entity having something to do with our ethics process. I respect that opinion. I disagree with it, but I respect it. It is a fair concern. At the same time, that's what this is.

An up-or-down vote on that, I think, is a fair thing for the American people to let them know how we feel about this concept.

The material I referred to previously I will insert into the Record at this point.

Congressional Research Service,

Washington, DC, March 4, 2008.

Memorandum

Subject: Permissibility of Non-Members Being Appointed to a

Committee of the House of Representatives.

From: Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law

Division.

This memorandum responds to requests from congressional

offices for a brief overview of the permissibility and

constitutionality of allowing the House to appoint non-

Members, that is, persons who are not current Members,

Delegates, or Resident Commissioner, to a committee of the

House of Representatives, with full voting privileges in

committee. Although the House of Representatives has

extensive authority and discretion concerning its own

internal proceedings and rules, the Constitution requires

that Members of the House be elected every two years by the

people of the several states, and thus a rule which would

allow persons who are not elected to the House to carry out

the constitutional functions of the House of Representatives

through full voting membership on one of its committees would

raise constitutional questions.

Each House of Congress generally has broad authority to

determine its own internal, procedural rules, and to

establish those procedures and internal structures within the

body to assist in implementing the institution's

constitutional duties. Under Article I, Section 5, cl. 2 of

the Constitution, which grants to each House the express

authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings * *

*,'' the institution of the House, within the framework of

express constitutional requirements, has broad discretion

concerning its own internal operations and functionings as

befits a legislative assembly which is an independent, co-

equal branch of government under our tripartite governmental

system of separated powers. Under this authority, the courts

have traditionally given deference to the explication,

application, and definition of internal procedural matters in

both Houses of Congress. As noted by the Supreme Court in

United States v. Ballin: ``The question, therefore, is as to

the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker

may of his own motion resort to * * * Neither do the

advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a

rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the

courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution

empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It

may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or

violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable

relation between the mode or method of proceeding established

by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.

But within these limitations all matters of method are open

to the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment

of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more

accurate or even more just. It is no objection to the

validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed

and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is

not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous

power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and

within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the

challenge of any other body or tribunal.

When there are interpretative and definitional ``gaps'' in

language of constitutional provisions, for example, the

courts have allowed each House to fill in the details of such

constitutional provisions regarding its internal procedures.

As noted by the Supreme Court in the case regarding the

procedure that the Senate adopted to carry out its

constitutional duties to ``try'' impeachment cases: ``As a

rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving

Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the

public interests and changing conditions may require * * *.''

The Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States, thus deferred to

the institution of the Senate in its determination under its

own rules of proceeding as to the method that the Senate uses

to ``try,'' as required by the Constitution, an impeachment

of a federal judge. Specifically, the Court deferred to the

judgment of the Senate to use only a small portion of the

entire membership of the Senate body, in the form of a

committee, to actually hear and take the evidentiary

testimony (and then to report to the full Senate which votes

to convict or not on the impeachment), since there was a

``textual commitment to a coordinate political department''

of the matter in the Constitution.

The courts have thus recognized the authority of

committees, and have allowed the committees broad

investigative and oversight authority, for example, because

committees of the House act as the House for those purposes

that are expressly delegated to those committees by the Rules

of the House (and have only those authorities and powers that

are in fact delegated from the full institution). The Supreme

Court has recognized the House's ``utilization of its

committees'' to carry out a ``legislative function belonging

to it under the Constitution.'' Since the committees act as

and on behalf of the House pursuant to its Rules, are

creatures of the House, and are in legal and actual essence a

division or sub-entity of the entire institution (carrying

out and exercising the constitutional functions of that

institution delegated to them), there is a very strong

indication that such committees exercising such functions may

generally be composed only of Members of the House.

Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that

Members of the House must be elected every two years by the

people of the several States. Membership in the House, and by

extension on committees acting for the House, would thus

appear to require that a Member be elected by the people of

the several states. In a brief review of legal sources, we

have not discovered any precedent where non-Members of the

House have been members of a House committee with full

privileges and votes similar to any Member of the House, and

thus we have found no judicial decisions and rulings on its

permissibility, other than in the case of the elected

delegates or resident commissioners in the House. In Michel

v. Anderson, the United States Court of Appeals, District of

Columbia Circuit, found that there exists what one might

describe as an ``historical exception'' to the general

constitutional proposition that the House must only be made

up of Members elected from the several states, and that

exception, recognized in law from the

very first Congress (1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789)), was that people

in territories and districts under the jurisdiction of the

United States could have a non-voting delegate or

commissioner in the House (that is, that such delegate may

not vote on legislation on the floor) to ``represent'' them:

``The territorial delegates, representing those persons in

geographic areas not admitted as states, then, always have

been perceived as would-be congressmen who could be

authorized to take part in the internal affairs of the House

without being thought to encroach on the privileges of

membership.''

Such non-voting representatives, in the form of elected

delegates from the territories and districts not admitted as

states, have in practice sat on House committees, and could,

according to the court, if authorized by the House, vote in

the ``Committee of the Whole'' (but only if their vote was

not the determinative vote), but could not vote on

legislation on the floor.

However, the court in Michel v. Anderson expressly noted

that this historical exception for territorial delegates was

limited, and noted, in dicta, that such exception and

permission for territorial delegates to participate in

certain internal matters in the House could not be extended

or applied to allow the House to adopt a rule putting other

non-Members on House committees: ``The appellees, for their

part, forthrightly concede that the House could not permit

persons other than the traditional delegates to perform the

role currently played by the delegates. It would, thus, not

be open to the House to authorize by rule, say, the mayors of

the 100 largest cities to serve and vote on House

committees.''

In the case of allowing persons not elected as Members of

the House to be full voting members of a committee of the

House, such as in certain proposals concerning the House

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, the precedent of

allowing territorial delegates to participate in certain

internal processes of the House, including voting in

committee, may be distinguished on three basic grounds.

First, there is historical precedent recognized from the

first Congress for the people of territories and districts,

not recognized as states, to have some limited, non-voting

representation in the House. In the proposals seeking to add

non-Members to the standing House Committee on Standards of

Official Conduct, no such purpose of representation of

persons in geographic regions under the jurisdiction of the

United States is provided, intended, or accomplished.

Secondly, as discussed above, the court noted in its opinion

that this historical permission for territorial delegates,

provided by law, to participate in certain House proceedings,

was a limited exception, and would not open the House to

``authorize by rule'' the addition of other persons (such as

mayors of cities) ``to serve and vote on House committees.''

Finally, the court noted that the voting of a territorial

delegate, even in a House committee or in the ``Committee of

the Whole'' (with the revote provision), is ``largely

symbolic'' because the vote could not immediately affect

legislation, such as a vote on legislation on the House floor

would. The duties and authority of the House Committee on

Standards of Official Conduct to both recommend the

discipline of a Member directly to the House, and to issue a

``letter of reproval'' on its own accord, upon the requisite

number of the votes of its members, may be seen as part of

the express constitutional authority of the House under

Article I, Section 5, cl. 2, to ``punish its Members for

disorderly Behaviour.'' As such, these activities might be

considered part of the direct and express constitutional

function of the House, delegated to and exercised in some

part by one of its committees made up of its own Members,

and thus something more than merely the ``symbolic act''

which was the subject of the Michel v. Anderson case.

A committee of the House, such as the House Committee on

Standards of Official Conduct, could clearly employ staff to

assist the committee in carrying out its functions, and could

use an ``outside counsel,'' an advisory committee, or ``task

force'' made up of non-Members (and even including on its

membership some sitting House Members) to assist the

committee in its investigative work, fact-finding, and even

recommending to the Committee that it take certain action on

matters. However, it may be argued that under existing

decisions and precedent, allowing persons who are not elected

as Members (or as delegates representing persons under the

jurisdiction of the United States in geographic regions that

are not states) to be full voting members of a House

committee exercising the constitutional functions of the

House delegated to it could, in the words of the U.S. Court

of Appeals, ``encroach on the privileges of membership.''

Jack Maskell

Legislative Attorney.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I stood right here a few years ago against my party in favor of reform. I got scars on my back from standing for reform. But I heard John Tanner say when I got to Congress that neither party has an exclusive on integrity and ideas, and I believe that is true.

I want to tell you tonight, on the same platform I stood a few years ago when I joined then minority in this reform, there is good reform and there is bad reform. This is bad reform. I don't care what you say about it, how kind you are about it, this is bad reform. It is not good for the institution. It is not workable.

Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record a four-page document by Ken Kellner, the senior counsel for your majority Ethics Committee, explaining all the problems.

Review of Task Force Proposal

Bill: I looked over the draft resolution forwarded by Rep.

Smith. I suggest you review it closely as well. Review of the

draft was not to critique the need for or merits of the

proposal, but to identify areas in which the proposal would

interfere with the operations of the Committee. We cannot

anticipate all plausible areas of concern prior to actual

implementation, but I did the best I could.

1. The new ``Office'' or ``Board'' is expressly authorized

to take up matters on its own initiative and to conduct

interviews and obtain testimony in its ``review'' of such

matters. See Section 1(c)(1)(A). This raises several

concerns, listed below:

As the Committee noted in its earlier feedback to the task

force, the interview of witnesses by both the new entity and

the Committee might result in conflicting statements that

would undermine the value of testimony from that witness.

Statements from witnesses would also likely be obtained

prematurely due to the time deadlines imposed on the new

entity. Sometimes there are valid investigative reasons not

to reveal the existence of an investigation to a witness

until other witnesses are interviewed or other evidence

obtained. In the course of its proceedings, the new entity

might reveal critical evidence or information to key

witnesses. The failure of those witnesses to keep this

information confidential may be very harmful to the integrity

of any future Committee inquiry.

The ``self-initiation'' discretion could undermine current

rules that limit complaints to those filed by Members. An

agent could provide information to the new entity that would

trigger review under its rules. There is no accountability as

to the source of information, unlike with respect to

``complainants,'' who must certify that the ``information is

submitted in good faith and warrants the review and

consideration of the Committee,'' and who must provide a copy

of the complaint and all attachments to the respondent. See

Committee Rules (d) and (e).

2. The new entity must ``transmit to the individual who is

the subject of the second-phase review the written report and

findings of the board[.]'' See Section 1(c)(2)(C)(ii). In

addition, the report will include ``findings of fact,'' ``a

description of any relevant information that it was unable to

obtain or witnesses whom it was unable to interview [] and

the reasons therefore,'' and a recommendation for the

issuance of subpoenas where appropriate.''

It is a bad idea for the Committee's purposes that the

``written report and findings of the board'' be transmitted

both to the Committee and to the individual under review.

This will provide information to a potential respondent at an

inappropriate stage, including alerting the respondent as to

witnesses who have been identified as potential recipients of

subpoenas. At a minimum, this would provide opportunities for

the coordination (or appearance of coordination) of

testimony. Potential respondents would also be alerted as to

difficulties encountered in obtaining information from

certain witnesses. This could discourage negotiated outcomes

if a respondent knows that certain individuals are not

cooperating witnesses.

This process is not sensitive to the need for

confidentiality of witness information at the early stages of

an investigation. Members, staff, and private individuals

should be able to provide information in confidence, at least

at the initial stages. The new rules may have an anti-

whistleblower effect and possibly employment ramifications

for individuals as well. For example, what if it is revealed

that a current employee is providing or refusing to provide

information about his or her employing Member? A previous

ethics task force was ``mindful'' of the need to ``protect

the confidentiality of a witness prior to publicly

disclosing'' a statement of alleged violation. Report of the

Ethics Reform Task Force on H. Res. 168, 105th Cong., 1st

Sess. at 25 (June 17, 1997).

The proposal is also inconsistent with Committee rules and

practices that keep investigative information confidential.

Under Committee Rule 26(f), evidence gathered by an

Investigative Subcommittee that would potentially be used to

prove a violation ``shall be made available to the respondent

and his or her counsel only after each agrees, in writing,

that no document, information, or other materials . . . shall

be made public until'' a Statement of Alleged Violation is

made public by the Committee or an adjudicatory hearing is

commenced.

There is no rule or precedent in effect for the new entity

for dealing with concerns of the Department of Justice in

cases of concurrent jurisdiction. As noted, under the

proposed process, there is considerable potential for the

making of inconsistent statements by witnesses and for the

release of confidential information. It this occurs, it

could easily undermine active criminal investigations.

The Board may make ``findings of fact'' as part of their

submission. This is generally a

function for a trier of fact after an opportunity for a

defendant/respondent to cross-examine witnesses or challenge

the evidence. What if the findings differ from those reached

by the Committee?

3. There appears to be a requirement that the Committee

publicly disclose Board submissions to the Committee. See

Section 3(2). This would occur if the Committee declines to

empanel an Investigative Subcommittee or if one year has

passed from the date of the referral from the new entity.

This means that the Committee must release the Board's

findings, even if the Committee has already determined to

handle the matter non-publicly. This is inconsistent with the

discretion now with the Committee (and investigative bodies

generally) to exercise judgment as to what matters to address

in a non-public fashion. With the possibility of review by

the new entity and public disclosure of conduct, there will

be greatly reduced incentive for witnesses and investigated

parties to cooperate with the Committee or to do so with

complete cooperation and candor.

This procedure also may place artificial pressure on an

Investigative Subcommittee to complete its work in well less

than a year, regardless of the impact on the investigation.

While such a time period may be sufficient, neither the

Department of Justice nor other law enforcement entities and

regulatory bodies, are subject to such limitations as they

would generally impact adversely on the completeness of an

inquiry.

4. A provision in the proposal provides that the Office

will cease its review of a matter on the request of the

Committee ``because of the ongoing investigation of such

matter by the Committee.'' See Section 1(d).

This rule should be clarified to make clear that it

includes informal fact-finding efforts by the Chair and

Ranking Member of the Committee. Otherwise, this important

rule may only have effect in the unusual case of empanelled

subcommittees. New language could be ``because of the ongoing

review of this matter by the Committee in accordance with the

Committee's rules.'' Section 1(d) and Section 3(3) should be

revised.

5. If the new entity ceases such review at the request of

the Committee it will ``so notify any individual who is the

subject of the review.'' See Section 1(d).

There are valid circumstances under which the Committee

would not want to notify an individual that it is undertaking

review of a matter until it is ready to do so for valid

investigative and privacy reasons. In general, it is not the

routine practice of law enforcement entities to notify

individuals. Such disclosures could trigger protective

behaviors that might undermine an investigation, as well as

lead individuals to hire of attorneys (perhaps unnecessarily

and at considerable expense). [By analogy, would it be

appropriate in all cases to notify a respondent that the

Committee has referred evidence of criminal conduct to the

Department of Justice? In many cases, it is in the interests

of criminal law enforcement that such referrals be made in

confidence.]

6. The new entity must adopt a ``rule requiring that there

be no ex parte communications between any member of the board

and any individual who is the subject of

any review by the board.'' See Section 1(c)(2)(E)(iv).

This provision should be revised to prohibit communications

from any interested persons and any member of the board, as

well as make explicit that ex parte contacts include those

made by counsel. A useful provision to examine in considering

ex parte prohibitions is the provision contained in Federal

Election Commission regulations pertaining to contacts with

any Commissioner. See 11 C.F.R. Sec. 201.2.

Kenneth E. Kellner,

Senior Counsel, Committee on

Standards of Official Conduct.

They kept a lid on it till today, and the bill is up tonight, and here it is. It is bad reform.

If you think that the steroid and baseball hearings are a distraction over the business of the people of this country, wait until tomorrow when this goes into effect, when outsiders are firing political shots at each other, listening to people back home want us to quit bickering and sniping and firing shots at each other and get these important things done for them.

The gentlelady said she yields the customary time. This is not a customary process. The rule was shut down. There are no substitutes, there is no recommit, there are no alternatives, and there is no consideration of a bipartisan alternative by two people with integrity who have been working together for weeks to have a day to say, no, this is a better approach.

Have former Members, first time ever that outsiders are part of this process, but they are former Members. They have no ax to grind. They will call it like it is. Let's take a logical step.

But let me tell you, if this is based on trying to hold the House, that's a false strategy. When we put our reelection as a majority above the people's business and honor and integrity we lost, and we should have, and you are doing the same thing.

Don't do this, House. It's not good for this country, and it's not good for us.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlelady from Ohio, Congresswoman Sutton, for yielding and for managing this very challenging bill this evening with such dignity.

This is an important time for us, my colleagues, because we are sending a message to the American people as to who we are. We know each other to be honorable individuals who come here with the best motivation. Our title ``Representative'' is our job description, to represent the people of our districts. We gain respect for each other as we work on issues across the aisle, across the region, across generations in every way, representing the beautiful diversity of our country.

Unfortunately, the American people do not share our view of ourselves here in the Congress and our reputation has received tarnish. Part of that tarnish came from a culture of corruption that preceded the Democratic takeover of this Congress. When I became Speaker of the House, I said it was necessary to drain the swamp that is Washington, D.C. so that the people will understand that we are here for the people's interest and not the special interests.

And so this legislation that is before us today represents what I believe is necessary for us to convey to the American people what we owe them: our best effort to have this Congress live up to the highest ethical standard.

And I know of what I speak because I had the responsibility to serve on the Ethics Committee for 6 years when we took up some terrible issues. The bank scandal, remember that? Many of you weren't here yet, but it was a horrible time. The Newt Gingrich case, it was a horrible time. During that time, as divided as we were, Democrat and Republican, I would pray at night that something exculpatory would come along, something that would say we don't need to continue this case because there is evidence that these charges are not true. It is hard, it is hard to pass judgment on your colleagues. It is very difficult.

And I say that in the most bipartisan way, and we worked together on that committee in a very bipartisan way during some very difficult times.

After 6 years, I thought my service was over; and I had to spend another year on what Mr. Hoyer referenced as the Livingston-Cardin Committee to rewrite the rules. We thought we did a really good job; but, obviously, a review of them some years later said we have to do more.

But that has been the story of ethics in the Congress. Since the Ethics Committee was first created in 1967, the House has set increasingly higher standards of conduct to guide Members because public service is a public trust. As I said, in recent years that trust has been eroded, and we have come here to drain the swamp.

Just last year on the first day of the Congress, the New Direction Congress, the House implemented new and sweeping changes to the gift and travel restrictions. Last September we passed the historic Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, historic lobbying and ethics reform that is now the law of the land.

Today, the New Direction Congress will, for the first time, open the ethics process up to the participation of our fellow citizens, which will make this institution more accountable to the people who sent us here, the American people. I welcome their assistance.

I want to say a word about Mr. Capuano. I want to thank him for his service to our country. In recognizing him, I want to recognize the participation of all of the members, Democrats and Republicans, on the task force, for their service to this House; and I believe there was a good-faith effort made to keep this process as bipartisan as possible. And that is the best you can do. If at the end of the day there is not a willingness to make the reforms necessary to restore the confidence of the American people in the Congress of the United States, then you cannot be held back because some do not want to act.

Mr. Capuano, I believe, led this effort in a way that was bipartisan and sensitive to the institution's history and traditions. And I must say that I received, early on, compliments from his co-Chair, the Republican co-Chair of the committee, about working with Mr. Capuano. He said something like, I am sorry you appointed him because he is very good to work with. That was supposed to be a joke.

In any event, I would like to extend special thanks to him for undertaking this very difficult task, not only in trying to make something that is important work, but also to convince our colleagues that this is the route to take.

Now as I said, I served on the committee under the old rules and I helped write the new rules, and there is always a time to revisit all of it. And there will be a time to revisit these rules as well.

A special thanks to my friend, Mr. David Hobson, for his work on the task force and for his many years of distinguished service in the Congress. We will miss his thoughtful deliberations and his contributions to our country. Thank you, David Hobson.

As I mentioned, I served on the Ethics Committee during some very, very difficult times; and I want to extend my deep respect and appreciation to those who serve on this committee now and who have served past and present. Until you have undergone that, until you have undergone that, you cannot really understand how difficult it is. And how happy you are when your term of office ends. But I want to salute them, all of them, past and present, for their important work.

I have deep respect for what Mr. Capuano, striving to work in a bipartisan way, has tried to achieve. Adopting the Capuano Task Force recommendations will provide the public and the House with the assurance that credible, credible allegations of wrongdoing will be addressed by the Ethics Committee in a timely fashion. I emphasize the word ``credible'' because I have no doubt that the main target of this, and who do you think the main target of any outside groups to this group will be? You're looking at her. You are looking at her.

But I am willing to take that risk because I also trust, yes, I also trust, my polite colleagues, I also trust that this group will rid itself of frivolous, baseless complaints and send a message to those who would file repeated frivolous complaints that is their price to pay to do this. I consider this a protection.

It will bring an additional measure of transparency to the ethics enforcement process. It creates this transparency, I think it is important to note, without compromising the House's constitutional prerogatives to discipline its Members without interfering with the work of the Ethics Committee and without altering the substantive rules governing the conduct of the committee's deliberations.

I fully realize that bringing non-Members to this enforcement mechanism is not only a step forward; it is a departure. It is a departure from the traditions of the House.

To those who have those concerns, I pledge that I will work closely with my friend, the Republican leader, Mr. Boehner, to jointly appoint the members of this new Office of Congressional Ethics, fair men and women who understand the importance of nonpartisan behavior and the compelling need to act fairly to protect the interests of the public, the House, and especially the Members.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I pledge that the House leadership, and I know I heard, listened with great interest to what Mr. Hoyer had to say about this, and thank you, Mr. Hoyer, for your extraordinary leadership on making Congress more accountable and live up to a high ethical standard. Our leadership will closely monitor the work of the new Office of Congressional Ethics and continually review all reasonable proposals intended to guarantee the highest ethical conduct and a more transparent and effective ethics process. Whether they relate to the new panel or the Ethics Committee itself, if additional changes are required, we will propose them.

And since I mentioned Mr. Hoyer's name, I want to associate myself with one of the remarks he made. I thought it was 30 days. Mr. Hoyer said 45 days. But in a very short period of time, according to the proposal that the Republicans are putting forth, in a very short period of time if the Ethics Committee had not disposed of those charges, they would go to the Justice Department. They would go to the Justice Department.

Well, the Ethics Committee is about the rules of the House, about conducting ourselves in a way that brings honor to the House. Many of those issues are not matters for the Justice Department. The Justice Department knows when its jurisdiction should weigh in.

This is about the facts, the rules of the House, and sometimes the law of the land. It's not about hearsay, rumor, suspicion, I thought so, somebody told me. It's about the facts, the rules and the law of the land. That is all that matters. That is all that matters.

I think that this evening this Congress has an opportunity to send a message to the American people, and as we do, each and every one of us does as well. Our votes will speak for themselves. We are willing to take a chance to make a vote on something we might have written differently. And I don't know one bill I've ever voted for that I wouldn't have, something you might have written differently, but something that can strive to remove the doubt that is in the minds of the American people about the integrity of this body.

I hope that you will all join in voting for this. It is worthy of your support. I know that, with my vote, I will be able to say I did everything I could, respecting the work of those who undertook this for practically 1 year to come up with a proposal that was fair, that was effective, and that helped us drain the swamp and say to our bosses, the people who sent us here, we honor you with our service, and we pledge to you that we will always serve in a Congress that upholds the highest ethical standard.

This is an important vote. I urge our colleagues to vote ``aye.'' And I thank Mr. Capuano once again for his extraordinary leadership.

My colleagues, rebuilding the bonds of trust between those of us who serve in this institution and the American people should be our highest priority. And I think the American people have every right to expect the highest ethical standards of every Member of this institution, and I think it is our obligation to deliver on that commitment to the American people.

Clearly, the Speaker believes that we need to establish this Office of Congressional Ethics because the Ethics Committee process is broken. Let me say, I agree with her. It is broken. It didn't work under Republican control here for at least the last 5 or 6 years that we had the majority in this House, and the lack of evidence that I've seen over the last 15 months, it's not worked well under the Democratic majority either.

In December of 2006, as the Speaker was waiting to take her position, she and I sat down and we talked about this. I expressed to her at the time my serious reservations about some outside, independent group that was responsible to no one. And I mentioned to the Speaker at the time that I thought that our obligations, as the leaders of this institution, were to stand up to make sure that this process really did work.

I think every Member of this institution wants the Ethics Committee process to work fairly, to work honestly, and to work in a bipartisan fashion, because it is our obligation to the American people and the obligation of each and every one of us, for the future of this institution, to make sure that this process works fairly, honestly, and in a bipartisan way.

I was here in 1991. Some of you were. Most of you weren't. I was standing right on the back wall when I and some of my colleagues had information that we read in USA Today about Members of Congress bouncing 8,300-some-odd checks the year before at the House bank. Some of us wanted to know why or how, what was going on at the House bank. And before we could get to the microphones with our privileged resolution, the Speaker of the House was down here in the well of the House. The majority leader was down here in the well of the House. Even the Republican leader was here in the well of the House, and all three of them basically said the same thing: We didn't do anything wrong, and we won't do it again.

So, for those of you that have concerns about the habits of this institution to sweep these issues under the rug, I saw it, and I've seen it since on both sides of the aisle.

When we will not rise up to meet our responsibility as Members, to judge each other and to hold ourselves to a higher ethical standard, I know that tendency. And for those new Members that are here who want to bring this process and make it more transparent and make it more open, trust me, there's no one who will work more closely with you to make it happen. The Ethics Committee process, again, I'm going to say it again, needs to work fairly, it needs to work honestly, and it needs to work in a bipartisan fashion.

In 2005 and 2006, the then minority leader, Ms. Pelosi, the minority whip, Mr. Hoyer, castigated the majority to no end over the issue of, it might have been in 2004 and 2005, over the issue of making changes to the ethics process and the ethics rules in a partisan manner. And I agreed with them. And those changes were later rescinded by a vote in this House.

But over the last 15 months, three times we've had bipartisan, I mean partisan changes to the rules brought to the floor of this House and forced down Members' throats. Three times. Tonight is the fourth time, the fourth time that we've gone down the same path that people decried and decried. And I think all of us on both sides of the aisle know that if this process is going to work fairly and honestly and in a bipartisan manner, it needs to be written in a bipartisan manner. No other way around it.

The members of the task force, Mike Capuano, the gentleman from Massachusetts, the other three Democrat members, Lamar Smith and the other three Republican members really did hard work and really tried to come to some agreement. But when you start to create this outside entity, as an excuse, as a way of saying we're doing something, instead of actually fixing the problem, that's where we could never come to an agreement.

I look around this House and I know that there are a majority of the Members of this House who are opposed to the creation of this Office of Congressional Ethics. I see you. I know who you are. You all know it.

We've been through this process. The 18 years that I've been here, we've been through this process of self-flagellating ourselves and introducing new ethics packages, passing them on the floor of the House, all of it, all of it under some rules of public pressure.

But what we really have never done is to create an ethics process that does work fairly and honestly in a bipartisan manner. I don't know what goes on down there, and I understand there's a reason for some secrecy, but to have some idea that something is moving in the ethics process would be helpful, to know that they are investigating case number whatever it is and that it will move.

But I do think that the proposal that we have tonight before us is partisan. I don't think it'll work. And I don't think it's in the best interest of the American people or this institution.

The current Ethics Committee is made up of five members appointed by the Speaker and five members appointed by the minority leader. It's bipartisan. The problem we have is that the process itself has not worked. And it's been frankly 10 years since it's worked very well. Now, there's a lot of ways to make it work. I think more transparency and more accountability. And I think Members could come to an agreement on making that process work, although I do believe the most important thing that will make it work is a commitment by the leaders on both sides of the aisle to say, we expect the Ethics Committee to work; we expect them to do our job. And the two leaders need to stand there and uphold those Members and the work that they do on behalf of this entire House. It can happen.

But the new proposal is three Members appointed by the Speaker and three Members appointed by myself and we have to come to an agreement. We have six Members that we could, six Members on this outside organization that we could agree on.

Now, the Speaker and I have come to some agreements here over the last couple of weeks, and it's been a very nice and wonderful experience. But to think that we can come to an agreement on six people to serve on this outside panel strikes me as a stretch. I can't imagine who in their right mind would want to serve on this outside panel because of the fighting that's going to occur, not by Members, but by partisan groups on both sides who are going to want to be filing frivolous complaints. And the problem with this outside process is that it does not have the secrecy and accountability that's necessary to ensure that Members' reputations aren't drug through the mud by some partisan charge that may have no basis in fact at all. None.

Now, if the bipartisan process that we have called the Ethics Committee doesn't work, why would we think that this bipartisan outside Ethics Committee is going to work any better?

I just want to say that this institution means a lot to me. It means a lot to, I think, all of us who serve. And before I came to the floor, I was watching the proceedings from my office, and I saw the new Member, the gentleman from Illinois, sitting here, probably was scratching his head wondering on his first day in Congress he's in the middle of this big partisan fight. It's not usually this way. But I've got to tell you that it really isn't usually this way.

What we're about to undertake here is something that will never be undone, if we do it. And if we do it wrong, which I believe it is being done wrong, it will be something that this institution and its Members will live with for a long, long time to come.

And I think there's only one real answer, and I want all of my colleagues to really seriously consider doing the right thing tonight. I think that we ought to defeat the previous question. I think that we ought to send this back to a committee that can, in a bipartisan way, find a way to make the Ethics Committee process work in the fair,

honest and bipartisan manner in which we all want it to work. Let's not paper over the problem. Let us go fix the problem, and the problem is the Ethics Committee process itself.

And so I would ask my colleagues to thank the great work of the bipartisan group of Members who tried to put this together, thank them for their job and the job they did for this institution. But let's also reject this proposal, agree that we will work together in a bipartisan way to do the right thing for our Members, our colleagues, this institution and for the American people.

Defeat the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. Speaker, did I understand that to challenge the vote on the previous question that it would rise to a question of the privileges of the House? Is that correct?

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the privileges of the House have been dishonored, that the rules have been violated.

Mr. Speaker, when could I introduce a privileged motion?

If I can't offer a privileged resolution until this business has been completed, there will have been a vote taken on final passage of this rule, which basically takes my remedy away from me. I believe that under the rule as written by the majority that a vote cannot be held open solely for the purpose of trying to change the outcome. It was violated.

Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn.