Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1175, I call up the bill (H.R. 3221) moving the United States toward greater energy independence and security, developing innovative new technologies,…
Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1175, I call up the bill (H.R. 3221) moving the United States toward greater energy independence and security, developing innovative new technologies, reducing carbon emissions, creating green jobs, protecting consumers, increasing clean renewable energy production, and modernizing our energy infrastructure, with the Senate amendments thereto, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
Mr. Speaker, I have a motion at the desk.
Mr. Speaker, I will claim the remaining time on behalf of the Financial Services Committee.
Mr. Speaker, this is a composite package. The President some time ago, a couple of weeks ago, urgently asked the Congress to send him several pieces of legislation, three in particular. One is embodied in the part of the bill that came out of the Ways and Means Committee.
Two, in fact, had previously passed the House from our committee, the bill reforming the government sponsored enterprises--and that came out of our committee and on the floor in a form that the administration mostly liked--and the bill to modernize the FHA.
In fact, the Senate then acted on the bill to modernize the FHA. We went into conference, we ran into some difficulty. Not a formal conference, but a conversation. What we have done because, as we know, the Senate is in a situation where procedurally it's often harder for them to act, so we are acting on the basis of a Senate bill.
We are readopting today two of the pieces we already adopted, reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the FHA modernization. I think it ought to be noted that in both cases they are a recognition by the President that the private sector needs to be able to cooperate with public or quasi-public entities to get the job done. Those who take the philosophy that the market alone is sufficient unto itself, and that public sector intervention will do more harm than good clearly have been repudiated.
The FHA is a government agency. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government creations with both public and private aspects. It is clear that we need both of them if we are to get out of this current crisis in mortgage lending and be able to go forward in a healthy way.
There is one new element today. That is a bill that our committee voted on last week and the week before. We had a markup. It was suggested to us in many ways by some of the regulators. In its essential form it was endorsed last Monday by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and we worked closely with his staff. The administration had an objection to one major piece of an auction mechanism. That's the longer part of the bill. What it says is that holders of loans, not the lenders, because the lenders have unfortunately long since been able to sell off their loans in many cases--and that's part of the problem--if the holders of loans will write down the amount due them in the principal, and if they get to a point below the current value of the home, in many cases these homes have lost value from when they were first mortgaged, and the borrower can be reasonably expected to repay it, we will broaden the right of the FHA to make a case-by-case determination, provide a guarantee so that can then be financed and resold to the secondary market.
It's entirely voluntary on the part of the lender. The lender will retain the right to foreclose. In many cases we believe that it will pay the lender not to foreclose.
In fact, we have legislation in this package sponsored by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kanjorski) that will ensure servicers who are willing to write down the amounts, that they will not be sued if they write down those amounts to a reasonable level. We think that is very helpful. Again, it's voluntary.
We do believe that knowing if you write this down to a reasonable level, accepting your loss, you will be able then to at least get some guarantee of that to help stabilize the situation. But people should understand, there is not $1 of taxpayer money going to writing down that loan. The holders of the loans have to write it down.
Secondly, the borrower can then go to the FHA if the borrower can pay the new loan, but there is no taxpayer money that will go to help pay off that loan. The taxpayer exposure comes in the fact that there are FHA guarantees. If someone gets an FHA guarantee and subsequently fails to make the payments, his or her house is forfeited to the FHA.
We will lose some money on this, we believe. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that half a million foreclosures will be averted by this program, that would otherwise have taken place, at a cost to the taxpayers of $2.4 billion. That means $4,800 for every foreclosure averted.
We are told, well, this is a bailout, and I want to follow on what my colleague from Massachusetts said. We have seen one bailout this year over investors and speculators. It came when the Federal Reserve, actively urged on by the Treasury, bailed out for $30 billion potentially--we don't know what the losses will be--but $30 billion is at risk of what will ultimately be public money, to lenders, to speculators and investors, people who were partners at Bear Stearns.
Now there may have been some confusion yesterday. I tried to avoid it. I am not critical that we are doing that. I am critical of the lack of sensible regulation that led them to be in that position. I think we do have to examine it, and I want to examine it from the standpoint of what we can do that will make it less likely that we will be confronted with that kind of choice, either provide those funds or see serious further economic debilitation.
But for the administration that engineered $30 billion of bailout for the investors and others who did business with Bear Stearns to say that this $2.4 billion cost according to CBO that will avert 500,000 foreclosures is unacceptable as a bailout is as intellectually and morally and economically inconsistent a policy as we have ever seen. It is true, and some of the Republicans have said in a letter to me in the House, that they wanted to question this.
I would note, by the way, we talked about this, I have looked at the letter that was sent to me. I looked again at the letter, and in no case does it say they were opposed to it. People raised questions. Maybe that's an easy way to kind of cover your bases, but my point is not so much those who wrote the letter, it's the administration.
The administration says they're going to veto this bill, that it's a bailout. It is $2.4 billion versus $30 billion at Bear Stearns.
Now, I believe that Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke have been doing the best they can in this situation. I am not critical of what they have done. Chairman Bernanke has been consistent and thinks this is also a reasonable thing to do.
The President, of course, appointed Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke, and for the administration that supported and facilitated the $30 billion for Bear Stearns which went to lenders, went to investors and some of them were speculators--to then object when it's homeowners seems to me to be entirely the reverse of the reality of the situation.
Again, I want to stress, I was asked by 17 Republicans if the committee would have a hearing. My answer was yes, the committee will have a hearing after we have dealt with the current subprime crisis-- and that will be soon, that was our priority--and a hearing not simply to say what did you do, because we cannot compel them to undo it--to look at what they did in the Bear Stearns thing in the context of figuring out how we are best able to diminish the likelihood that it will recur.
But we are in a recession, and a major cause of that recession is the subprime crisis. We do not see any alternatives to this bill to trying to work on that.
Yes, we had Hope Now, and then we had FHA Secure. The administration had several policies. They have been closer, in many ways, to us. The differences are not as great as they once were.
But the fundamental here is this, foreclosures are causing, have caused and are causing serious economic problems. Diminishing the number of foreclosures is in the interest--not simply of those who will avert foreclosure--but of people in the neighborhood of the cities in which they are located and the whole economy. That's why we are going forward with this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, before I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida for 3 minutes, I would like to note the use of the figure $300 billion is not a hopeful sign about a rational debate. Three hundred billion is the total value of the mortgages that could be insured. It would cost $300 billion only if nobody made any payments ever, and when the property was taken by the Federal Government, none of it had any value. CBO gave us a score of $2.4 billion. So we can debate this, but I would hope we can debate it with real numbers. The CBO score for the mortgage part is $2.4 billion. Everybody knows that $300 billion is not remotely what is at risk.
I yield now 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite).
I yield myself first 45 seconds to say that on the scoring, $2.4 billion was the CBO score for the mortgage part. They did say a total of $2.7 billion. The other $300 million is attributable to an amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Illinois on mortgage. So the gentlewoman from Illinois is correct. It is $2.7 billion. That includes the $300 million she added to the bill with her amendment, and the $2.4 million in mortgages.
Yes, the gentlewoman is correct.
Now I would yield to the gentleman from Ohio for a unanimous consent request.
Request for Permission to Modify Amendment No. 3
Mr. Speaker, I don't know what the parliamentary status is. Has the gentleman objected or not?
Mr. Speaker, I regret that, but sometimes people would rather see things not improved so they can then complain that they weren't improved. Fortunately in this case, we are not constrained.
The gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Ohio said it had not come to our attention fully until after the committee markup. What happened was that they came forward with this amendment, and we heard some concerns from the Comptroller of the Currency, as the gentleman from Ohio has said, and from bankers.
We then talked to the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Miller), talked to the American Bankers Association, the Community Bankers Association, the Mortgage Bankers, the OCC, various of the advocacy groups, the State Attorneys General, the National Council of State Legislators, and they came to an agreement that adding these words would make this something that would work.
Now, the obvious thing in a constructive way would have been with the agreement of all of the stakeholders and the conversations among Members on both sides to be incorporated into the bill. But constructive isn't always the order of the day.
So let me make this announcement which I have also, in anticipation that there might be such an objection, although I had spoken to the ranking member and he told me he thought we should go forward. It was my understanding the gentleman from Ohio had talked to the leadership on the Republican side. They thought it should go forward. So here is where we are. We will vote on the Miller-LaTourette amendment. I will guarantee to the Members that when this goes forward in any discussions we have with the Senate, we will accept this language, the Miller- LaTourette language, or if someone comes up with a better idea, any other language that would be mutually agreed upon by the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from North Carolina, the two bipartisan sponsors.
So while we don't get the unanimous consent agreement, because some people would rather there not be a resolution over an objection, let me announce what may be a first, and I'm not always the most technologically updated person; I don't have a lot of the devices, but I do want to maybe be the pioneer of the virtual unanimous consent agreement. In good faith the gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Ohio want to amend this, they were denied unanimous consent, but I am prepared to act as if the body, and I have no question that it would have been adopted had we had a chance to vote on it, that it be incorporated. And as we go forward, we can guarantee Members that this language, if this bill is included, this will be included; and I can report that all of the stakeholders, the community advocacy groups, the banks, and the public officials at the State and local level believe that with the language that was worked out by the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from North Carolina with the Comptroller of the Currency, it will be fine.
So I wish we had got unanimous consent, but I want to assure Members that in this process going forward, our failure to get real unanimous consent, as opposed to virtual unanimous consent, will make no difference whatsoever.
On this point, let me yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina to complete this conversation.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to Mr. Kagen of Wisconsin.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, first I wondered how I'd fill 2 hours, but I could do that just responding to the inaccuracies we've just heard. Let me pick a couple.
The gentleman from New Jersey said that the administration wanted FHA reform and GSE reform and this Congress wouldn't get it. Well, he misread the newspaper. Bryan Montgomery, the head of the FHA, was quoted yesterday as saying, if Congress had done what I wanted in 2006, this wouldn't have happened. It was the Republicans who were in power in 2006. It was under the Republicans that GSE reform and FHA reform were frustrated.
When we took power as the Democratic majority, last year this Financial Services Committee and this House passed both of those in forms very close to what the administration wanted. In fact, the holdup on the GSE, and I know the gentleman thinks the notion of building affordable rental housing with public help is, as he calls it, a slush fund, and I think it's that lack of sympathy for affordable housing that was one of the contributing factors to getting people into homes they couldn't have owned.
But the fact is that we sent the GSE bill over to the Senate last year with a very large majority in favor, and the Senate hasn't acted, partly because the ranking Republican on the Senate committee hasn't wanted to act. I know the administration has been trying to persuade him to act.
So the notion that the affordable housing trust fund, that's slush fund for the gentleman from New Jersey, housing for lower income people, for elderly people, for disabled people, that's slush fund, well, it was not that that held it up. It was the refusal apparently of the ranking member to act on it.
So this is an example of the inaccurate descriptions you're getting.
I yield.
No, but the gentleman very inaccurately blamed the Democrats. He forgot, Bryan Montgomery said in 2006, the Republicans did it.
I think one ought to be more accurate and less partisan in a description of reality. The fact is that those were defeated under the Republicans when he was on the committee. Then, the Democrats did pass them.
And as to the GSE bill, he said it was the slush fund. I really like that phrase, ``slush fund.'' That's affordable housing for people, for lower income people. He said that's what's holding up the GSE bill. That is not remotely true. The GSE bill was sent by us to the Senate. They haven't taken it up. By the way, the affordable housing trust fund was in the Senate committee version when the Republicans were in power under the current ranking member when he was chairman. So that is just inaccurate.
It is true they have been held up in the Senate as they were held up under the Republican leadership as well. We are closer to passing them. I am confident that they are going to get passed fairly soon. We did finally get to some conversation on the FHA.
My objection was that the gentleman acted as if the world was created in January of 2007 and the Democrats refused to pass the bill, neglecting to note that the head of the FHA himself put the blame much earlier when the Republicans were in power.
I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Miller).
I yield 3 minutes to a very hardworking member of the committee, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Scott).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Gary G. Miller).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), member of our full committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to a very hardworking member of the committee who contributed to this bill, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mahoney).
I yield 1 minute to the majority leader, the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the gentleman from Texas.
He says, why isn't the $2.7 written into the bill? It is, in effect, because it is subject to appropriation, and no money will be spent until that is provided. The $300 billion is the number of mortgages that could be insured, up to that. We needed to put that number there before CBO could tell us how much it would cost. And written into this bill before it becomes law and becomes operational will be that $2.7 billion figure. That is the way the process works. You get a CBO score, and then you pay for it.
I now yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois, a very diligent member of our committee.
If the gentlewoman will yield, I know sometimes conspiracy theories rattle around this place. The reason we put in the legislation to protect disabled veterans who had bankruptcy from being excluded from this program is to protect veterans, disabled veterans who have been in bankruptcy from being in this program. There were people who suggested that the sensitivity people would have in bankruptcy could be a problem. Now I will point out, by the way, that thanks to some very good amendments by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Marshall) who has dealt with this problem in a more general way, and he is a bankruptcy expert--from the law side not the subject side. But we thought with disabled veterans, we know this engenders prejudice when people see in some cases people are disabled. So it was there for that reason, to protect people, to make sure that we, the Federal Government, would not, in any way, be discriminating against them and maybe therefore set a good example for everybody else.
If the gentlewoman will yield, absolutely I can guaranty that. I should be clear. I am cosponsor of the bill that would have provided a bankruptcy avenue for primary residences. That is a separate issue as far as I am concerned. No, this particular provision will not be a vehicle for that.
I yield the gentlewoman 30 additional seconds.
I guarantee this provision will only be what it is. If anybody wants to move elsewhere, I might support that. But entirely separate from this, this will not be a vehicle.
In fact, I think it would be dishonorable for anyone. We have had too many examples of people trying to use veterans, and particularly disabled veterans, as a political stick to achieve other objectives. I would find that to be an absolutely outrageous procedure, and I can guarantee you it will not happen.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady from Illinois an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Marshall).
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green), a very active member of our committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman who helped put this bill together, the gentleman from California (Mr. McNerney).