Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3195) to restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

I thank the gentleman.

Madam Speaker, I want to commend the distinguished majority leader and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) as well as the chairman of the Judiciary Committee and the chairman of the Education and Labor Committee for their leadership on this important legislation.

This bill would help to restore the Americans with Disabilities Act to its rightful place among this Nation's great civil rights laws.

This legislation is long overdue. Countless Americans with disabilities have already been deprived of the opportunity to prove that they have been victims of discrimination, that they are qualified for a job, or that a reasonable accommodation would afford them an opportunity to participate fully at work and in community life.

This bill fixes the absurd Catch-22 created by the Supreme Court in which an individual can face discrimination on the basis of an actual past or perceived disability and yet not be considered sufficiently disabled to be protected against that discrimination by the ADA. That was never Congress' intent, and this bill cures this problem.

Some of my colleagues from across the aisle have raised concerns that this bill might cover minor or trivial conditions. They worry about covering stomachaches, the common cold, mild seasonal allergies, or even a hangnail. I have yet to see a case where the ADA covered an individual with a hangnail. But I have seen scores of cases where the ADA was construed not to cover individuals with cancer, epilepsy, diabetes, severe intellectual impairment, HIV, muscular dystrophy, and multiple sclerosis.

These people have too often been excluded because their impairment, however serious or debilitating, was mischaracterized by the courts as temporary or its impact considered too short-lived and not permanent enough.

That's what happened to Mary Ann Pimental, a nurse with breast cancer who challenged her employer's failure to rehire her into her position when she returned from treatment. Ms. Pimental was told by the court that her cancer was not a disability and that she was not covered by the ADA. The court recognized that ``there is no question that her cancer has dramatically affected her life, and that the associated impairment has been real and extraordinarily difficult for her and her family.'' Yet the court still denied her coverage because it characterized the impact of her cancer ``short-lived''--meaning that it ``did not have a substantial lasting effect'' on her.

Mary Ann Pimental died as a result of her breast cancer 4 months after the court issued its decision. I am sure that her husband and two children disagreed with the court that her cancer was short-lived and not sufficiently permanent.

This bill ensures that individuals like Mary Ann Pimental are covered by the law when they need it. The bill requires the courts--and the Federal agencies providing expert guidance--to lower the burden for obtaining coverage under this landmark civil rights law. This new standard is not onerous and is meant to reduce needless litigation over the threshold question of coverage.

It is our sincere hope that, with the passage of this bill, we will finally be able to focus on the important questions: Is an individual qualified? Might a reasonable accommodation afford that person the same opportunities that his or her neighbors enjoy?

I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in voting for passage of H.R. 3195 as reported unanimously by the Judiciary Committee. I thank everyone associated with its passage.

Madam Speaker, I want to commend the distinguished majority leader and gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for their leadership on this important legislation.

H.R. 3195 would help to restore the Americans with Disabilities Act to its rightful place among this Nation's great civil rights laws.

This legislation is necessary to correct Supreme Court decisions that have created an absurd Catch-22 in which an individual can face discrimination on the basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability and yet not be considered sufficiently disabled to be protected against that discrimination by the ADA. That was never Congress's intent, and H.R. 3195 cures this problem.

H.R. 3195 lowers the burden of proving that one is disabled enough to qualify for coverage. It does this by directing courts to read the definition broadly, as is appropriate for remedial civil rights legislation. It also redefines the term ``substantially limits,'' which was restrictively interpreted by the courts to set a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. An individual now must show that his or her impairment ``materially restricts'' performance of major life activities. While the impact of the impairment must still be important, it need not severely or significantly restrict one's ability to engage in those activities central to most people's daily lives, including working.

Under this new standard, for example, it should be considered a material restriction if an individual is disqualified from his or her job of choice because of an impairment. An individual should not need to prove that he or she is unable to perform a broad class or range of jobs. We fully expect that the courts, and the Federal agencies providing expert guidance, will revisit prior rulings and guidance and adjust the burden of proving the requisite ``material'' limitation to qualify for coverage.

This legislation is long overdue. Countless Americans with disabilities have already been deprived of the opportunity to prove that they have been victims of discrimination, that they are qualified for a job, or that a reasonable accommodation would afford them an opportunity to participate fully at work and in community life.

Some of my colleagues from across the aisle have raised concerns that this bill would cover ``minor'' or ``trivial'' conditions. They worry about covering ``stomach aches, the common cold, mild seasonal allergies, or even a hangnail.''

I have yet to see a case where the ADA covered an individual with a hangnail. But I have seen scores of cases where the ADA was construed not to cover individuals with cancer, epilepsy, diabetes, severe intellectual impairment, HIV, muscular dystrophy, and multiple sclerosis.

These people have too often been excluded because their impairment, however serious or debilitating, was mis-characterized by the courts as temporary, or its impact considered too short-lived and not permanent enough--although it was serious enough to cost them the job.

That's what happened to Mary Ann Pimental, a nurse who was diagnosed with breast cancer after being promoted at her job. Mrs. Pimental had a mastectomy and underwent chemotherapy and radiation therapy. She suffered radiation burns and premature menopause. She had difficulty concentrating, and experienced extreme fatigue and shortness of breath. And when she felt well enough to return to work, she discovered that her job was gone and the only position available for her was part-time, with reduced benefits.

When Ms. Pimental challenged her employer's failure to rehire her into a better position, the court told her that her breast cancer was not a disability and that she was not covered by the ADA. The court recognized the ``terrible effect the cancer had upon'' her and even said that ``there is no question that her cancer has dramatically affected her life, and that the associated impairment has been real and extraordinarily difficult for her and her family.''

Yet the court still denied her coverage under the ADA because it characterized the impact of her cancer as ``short-lived''--meaning that it ``did not have a substantial and lasting effect'' on her.

Mary Ann Pimental died as a result of her breast cancer 4 months after the court issued its decision. I am sure that her husband and two children disagree with the court's characterization of her cancer as ``short-lived,'' and not sufficiently permanent.

This House should also disagree--and does--as is shown by the broad bipartisan support for H.R. 3195.

H.R. 3195 ensures that individuals like Mary Ann Pimental are covered by the law when they need it. It directs the courts to interpret the definition of disability broadly, as is appropriate for remedial civil rights legislation. H.R. 3195 requires the courts--and the Federal agencies providing expert guidance--to lower the burden for obtaining coverage under this landmark civil rights law. This new standard is not onerous, and is meant to reduce needless litigation over the threshold question of coverage.

It is our sincere hope that, with less battling over who is or is not disabled, we will finally be able to focus on the important questions-- is an individual qualified? And might a reasonable accommodation afford that person the same opportunities that his or her neighbors enjoy.

I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for passage of H.R. 3195, as reported unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee.

Madam Speaker, I want to commend the distinguished majority leader and gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for their leadership on this important legislation.

H.R. 3195 would help to restore the Americans with Disabilities Act to its rightful place among this Nation's great civil rights laws.

This legislation is necessary to correct Supreme Court decisions that have created an absurd catch-22 in which an individual can face discrimination on the basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability and yet not be considered sufficiently disabled to be protected against that discrimination by the ADA. That was never Congress's intent, and H.R. 3195 cures this problem.

H.R. 3195 lowers the burden of proving that one is disabled enough to qualify for coverage. It does this by directing courts to read the definition broadly, as is appropriate for remedial civil rights legislation. It also redefines the term ``substantially limits,'' which was restrictively interpreted by the courts to set a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. An individual now must show that his or her impairment ``materially restricts'' performance of major life activities. While the impact of the impairment must still be important, it need not severely or significantly restrict one's ability to engage in those activities central to most people's daily lives, including working.

Under this new standard, for example, it should be considered a material restriction if an individual is disqualified from his or her job of choice because of an impairment. An individual should not need to prove that he or she is unable to perform a broad class or range of jobs. We fully expect that the courts, and the federal agencies providing expert guidance, will revisit prior rulings and guidance and adjust the burden of proving the requisite ``material'' limitation to qualify for coverage.

This legislation is long overdue. Countless Americans with disabilities have already been deprived of the opportunity to prove that they have been victims of discrimination, that they are qualified for a job, or that a reasonable accommodation would afford them an opportunity to participate fully at work and in community life.

Some of my colleagues from across the aisle have raised concerns that this bill would cover ``minor'' or ``trivial'' conditions. They worry about covering ``stomach aches, the common cold, mild seasonal allergies, or even a hangnail.''

I have yet to see a case where the ADA covered an individual with a hangnail. But I have seen scores of cases where the ADA was construed not to cover individuals with cancer, epilepsy, diabetes, severe intellectual impairment, HIV, muscular dystrophy, and multiple sclerosis.

These people have too often been excluded because their impairment, however serious or debilitating, was mis-characterized by the courts as temporary, or its impact considered too short-lived and not permanent enough--although it was serious enough to cost them the job.

That's what happened to Mary Ann Pimental, a nurse who was diagnosed with breast cancer after being promoted at her job. Mrs. Pimental had a mastectomy and underwent chemotherapy and radiation therapy. She suffered radiation burns and premature menopause. She had difficulty concentrating, and experienced extreme fatigue and shortness of breath. And when she felt well enough to return to work, she discovered that her job was gone and the only position available for her was part-time, with reduced benefits.

When Ms. Pimental challenged her employer's failure to rehire her into a better position, the court told her that her breast cancer was not a disability and that she was not covered by the ADA. The court recognized the ``terrible effect the cancer had upon'' her and even said that ``there is no question that her cancer has dramatically affected her life, and that the associated impairment has been real and extraordinarily difficult for her and her family.''

Yet the court still denied her coverage under the ADA because it characterized the impact of her cancer as ``short-lived''--meaning that it ``did not have a substantial and lasting effect'' on her.

Mary Ann Pimental died as a result of her breast cancer 4 months after the court issued its decision. I am sure that her husband and two children disagree with the court's characterization of her cancer as ``short-lived,'' and not sufficiently permanent.

This House should also disagree--and does--as is shown by the broad bipartisan support for H.R. 3195.

H.R. 3195 ensures that individuals like Mary Ann Pimental are covered by the law when they need it. It directs the courts to interpret the definition of disability broadly, as is appropriate for remedial civil rights to legislation. H.R. 3195 requires the courts--and the federal agencies providing expert guidance--to lower the burden for obtaining coverage under this landmark civil rights law. This new standard is not onerous, and is meant to reduce needless litigation over the threshold question of coverage.

It is our sincere hope that, with less battling over who is or is not disabled, we will finally be able to focus on the important questions-- is an individual qualified? And might a reasonable accommodation afford that person the same opportunities that his or her neighbors enjoy.

I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for passage of H.R. 3195, as reported unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee.

I thank the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee for yielding, and I thank him for his efforts.

I want to thank his staff, as well, who have been extraordinary. Heather, in particular, has had her virtues regaled by Dr. Abouchar of my staff, and I thank her.

I want to thank Jim Sensenbrenner. I want to thank Cheryl, as well, who has been an extraordinary help on the Americans with Disabilities Act and with this Restoration Act. She has been a giant in her leadership. And I

want to thank Jim Sensenbrenner, with whom I've worked now for many years on this issue, and he has been, of course, a giant, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee in years past and one of the senior Members of this House, extraordinarily helpful and a partner in this effort.

I also want to thank Buck McKeon, the ranking member. At the time we testified, he said, you know, we want to see this pass but we want to work together and make sure we can all be for it. And I assured him that we would do that, and I was pleased today that he said, in fact, we had done that. And I think the result that we will see in the vote will show that clearly. And I thank him for his work and effort and good faith in working towards a bill that we could all support.

I want to thank George Miller, the chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, whose committee had primary jurisdiction over this bill, for his efforts in assuring that this bill moves forward.

Madam Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record a list of people, particularly in the disabilities community and also in the business community, who spent countless hours, days, weeks and, yes, even months trying to come to an agreement on a bill that both the business community and the disability community would feel comfortable with. We have accomplished that, but it was the work of these people as well who did that, and I would submit this at this time in the Record to thank them for their efforts and their success which they are so responsible for today.

People to Recognize

Chai Feldblum, Georgetown University; Former U.S. Rep. Tony

Coelho; Former U.S. Rep. Steve Bartlett; Sandy Finucane,

Epilepsy Foundation; Andy Imparato, American Association of

People with Disabilities; Randy Johnson, Mike Eastman, U.S.

Chamber of Commerce; John Lancaster, National Council on

Independent Living; Mike Peterson, HR Policy Association;

Curt Decker, National Disability Rights Network;

Jeri Gillespie, Ryan Modlin, National Association of

Manufacturers; Nancy Zirkin, Lisa Borenstein, Leadership

Conference on Civil Rights; Mike Aitken, Mike Layman, Society

for Human Resource Management; Abby Bownas, American Diabetes

Association; Jennifer Mathis, Bazelon Center for Mental

Health Law; Kevin Barry, Georgetown University; Jim Flug,

Georgetown University; Claudia Center, Employment Law Center;

Shereen Arent, American Diabetes Association; Brian East,

Advocacy Inc.

Madam Speaker, 18 years ago next month, the first President Bush signed into law one of the most consequential pieces of civil rights legislation in recent memory, in over a quarter of a century in fact. In the ceremony on the south lawn of the White House President Bush said this:

``With today's signing of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom.''

In large measure, President Bush was right. Those doors have, in fact, come open. Tens of millions of Americans with disabilities now enjoy rights the rest of us have long taken for granted: The right to use the same streets, theaters, restrooms, or offices; the right to prove themselves in the workplace, to succeed on their talent and drive alone.

We all understand why there are cuts in the sidewalk at every street corner, kneeling buses on our city streets, elevators on the Metro, ramps at movie theaters, and accessible restrooms and handicapped parking almost everywhere. By now, they have become part of our lives' fabric. And we wouldn't have it, I think, any other way, because each one is the sign of a pledge, the promise of an America that excludes none of its people from our shared life and opportunities.

That was the promise of the ADA. That was the promise of the ADA that President George Bush signed on July 26, 1990. But looking back 18 years, the hard truth is that we were, in some ways, perhaps too optimistic.

The door President Bush spoke of is still not entirely open, and every year, millions of us are caught on the wrong side. In interpreting the law over these 18 years, the courts have consistently chipped away at Congress' very clear intent, and I know what the intent was because I was there as so many of you were.

I know that many of my colleagues were as well, and I know that they share my disappointment in a series of narrow rulings that have had the effect of excluding millions of Americans from the law's protection for no good reason. We said we wanted broad coverage for people with disabilities and people regarded as disabled, but the courts narrowed that coverage with a ``strict and demanding standard,'' a severely restrictive measure that virtually excluded entire classes of people, even though we had specifically mentioned their impairments as objects of the law's protections.

Civil rights acts have historically been urged to be interpreted liberally to accomplish their objective of protecting the rights of individuals. Unfortunately, in this instance, the courts did not follow that premise.

We never expected that people with disabilities who worked to mitigate their conditions would have their efforts held against them. Imagine, somebody with epilepsy who takes medication to preclude seizures would be told that we're not going to hire you because you have epilepsy, but then be told by the court that that was not discrimination because prescription drugs mitigated the ability or the disability that you had. No one on this floor would have thought in their wildest assertions that that would be an interpretation.

The courts did exactly that, however, throwing their cases out on the grounds that they were no longer disabled enough to suffer discrimination. The discrimination, of course, was determining that somebody had epilepsy, and notwithstanding their ability to perform the job in question, that they would not be hired. That is the essence of discrimination.

That is what we sought to preclude, and I want to again congratulate the business community and the disabilities community for coming together on legislation that will right that misinterpretation because none of what has been held was our intent.

We are here today because a truly wide coalition--members of the disability community ready to claim their equal share, Members of both parties who were tired of seeing constituents shut out, and business groups eager to unlock new pools of talent--an alliance as broad as the one that joined forces to pass the original ADA, has come together to help the courts get this right. I know some of them are watching, and I want to thank them, through my colleagues and through the Speaker, for their efforts.

With the ADA Amendments Act, we make it clear today that a cramped reading of disability rights will be replaced with a definition that is broad and fair--fair to the disability community and fair to the business community--that those who manage to mitigate their disabilities are still subject to discrimination and still entitled to redress, and that those regarded as having disability are equally at risk and deserve to be equally protected.

I am proud, Madam Speaker, to have worked for so long with my colleague Jim Sensenbrenner, as I said earlier. He has been a leader in advancing this legislation, and we've joined together to submit for the Record a legal analysis of the bill that we've worked so hard to bring to fruition.

And I want to thank my good friend, former Congressman Tony Coelho for originally enlisting me in this effort. Very frankly, Tony is one of my very close friends, and when he left the Congress, the ADA had not yet been accomplished. But it was his leadership that got it to the point where, in fact, we could proceed, and he gave me the responsibility of ensuring its passage. Working with George Miller and John Conyers and Jim Oberstar and so many others, we were able to accomplish that objective. But Tony Coelho was our leader on this effort, and very frankly, Madam Speaker, our former whip remains our leader today.

Finally, it is my honor to dedicate this bill to the late Justin Dart, the pioneering disability advocate and inspiration behind the ADA, as well as to his wife, Yoshiko Dart.

Madam Speaker, few kinds of discrimination, in all of our history, have been more widespread than the exclusion of those with disabilities. But it was America, America that passed a pioneering law to help end that exclusion. We were the first in the world to do so.

We were the world's model on this central challenge to human rights. Eighteen years later, we cannot afford to fall behind.

Let us pass this bill and bring us one step closer to the days when the fruits of life in America are at last available to all.

I will yield to my friend.

I thank the chairman on behalf of Mr. Sensenbrenner and myself, and for all those who have been involved in this effort.

Joint Statement of Representatives Hoyer and Sensenbrenner on the

Origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 2008, H.R. 3195

On September 29, 2006, we introduced H.R. 6258, entitled

the Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2006.

This bill was a response to decisions of the Supreme Court

and lower courts narrowing the group of people whom Congress

had intended to protect under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA). The Supreme Court had interpreted the ADA to

impose a ``demanding'' standard for coverage. It had also

held that the ameliorative effects of ``mitigating measures''

that people use to control the effects of their disabilities

must be considered in determining whether a person has an

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity

and is protected by the ADA. This holding was contrary to

Congress's stated intent in several committee reports.

We introduced H.R. 6258, which was designed to reverse

these holdings, at the end of the 2006 legislative session.

We intended this bill to serve as a marker of our intent to

introduce future legislation to address this issue. On July

26, 2007, we introduced similar legislation, H.R. 3195, the

ADA Restoration Act of 2007, which ultimately garnered over

240 cosponsors. A nearly identical bill, S. 1881, was

introduced in the Senate on the same day by Senators Harkin

and Specter.

H.R. 3195 as introduced would have amended the ADA to

provide protection for any individual who had a physical or

mental impairment or a record of such an impairment, or who

was treated as having such an impairment. The purpose of this

legislation was to restore the intent of Congress to cover a

broad group of individuals with disabilities under the ADA

and to eliminate the problem of courts focusing too heavily

on whether individuals were covered by the law rather than on

whether discrimination occurred. The bill as introduced,

however, was seen by many as extending the protections of the

ADA beyond those that Congress originally intended to

provide.

In order to craft a more balanced bill with broad support,

we urged that representatives of the disability and business

communities enter into negotiations to try to reach an

acceptable compromise. We maintained contact with these

communities over the course of their negotiations and

supported them in their efforts to understand the needs and

concerns of each community. After several months of intensive

discussions, negotiators for the two communities reached

consensus on a set of protections for people with

disabilities that garnered broad support from both

communities. These protections would significantly expand the

group of individuals protected by the ADA beyond what the

courts have held, while at the same time ensuring that the

expansion does not extend beyond the original intent of the

Madam Speaker, pursuant to H. Res. 1299, I call up the bill (H.R. 3195) to restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for all Members to have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3195.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3195, the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.

Since 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act has made it possible for millions of productive, hardworking Americans to participate in our Nation's economy. Among other rights, the law guaranteed that workers with disabilities would be judged on their merits, not on their employer's prejudices.

But since the ADA's enactment, several Supreme Court rulings have dramatically reduced the number of workers with disabilities who are protected from discrimination under the law. Workers with diabetes, cancer, epilepsy, the very workers for whom the Americans with Disabilities Act was intended to protect, can be legally fired or passed over for promotion just because of their disability.

In January, the Education and Labor Committee heard testimony from Carey McClure. Although he was diagnosed with muscular dystrophy at age 15, Carey had been working as an electrician for more than 20 years. Like so many other Americans with disabilities, Carey was able to find his way to successfully perform his job and all of life's daily tasks despite his disability.

Carey received an initial job offer from General Motors pending a physical. During the physical, the doctor asked Carey to hold his arms above his head. Carey could not. The doctor asked how he would perform his job if it required reaching over his head. Carey gave a commonsense answer: he would use a ladder. When General Motors learned that Carey had a disability, it rescinded the job offer. Carey challenged General Motors' decision because he thought the Americans with Disabilities Act would protect him. He was wrong. The court ruled that, since Carey had adapted to his condition by modifying the way he performed everyday tasks, like washing his hair, he was not disabled; and, therefore, was not protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Because of Supreme Court rulings, Carey and many others are now caught in a legal Catch-22. The court has determined that, for individuals whose disabilities do not ``prevent or severely restrict'' major life activities and for those who mitigate their impairments through means such as hearings aids or with medications, they should not be considered disabled.

In other words, an employer could fire or refuse to hire a fully qualified worker simply on the basis of his or her disability, while maintaining in court that the worker was not ``disabled enough'' to qualify for protection under the law.

H.R. 3195, the legislation before us today, a bipartisan legislation, was introduced by Majority Leader Hoyer and Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, and it remedies this problem. The bill reverses the flawed court decision and restores the original congressional intent of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

H.R. 3195 clarifies the definition of a ``disability,'' ensuring that anyone with a physical or with a mental impairment that materially restricts a major life activity is covered under ADA.

In 2004, workers with disabilities lost 97 percent of the employment cases that went to trial. There has been no balance in the courts, putting workers at a distinct disadvantage. Too often, these cases have turned solely on the question of whether someone is an individual with a disability; too rarely have courts considered the merits of the discrimination claim itself.

H.R. 3195 stops the erosion of civil rights protections for people with disabilities while maintaining a reasonable solution supported by the business community.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce states that H.R. 3195 ``represents a balanced approach to ensure appropriate coverage under ADA.''

The Human Resource Policy Association, whose members employ 12 percent of the U.S. private-sector workforce, also supports the bill. The organization says that the ADA amendment ``would maintain the functionality of the workplace while providing important protections to individuals with disabilities.''

H.R. 3195 makes it clear that the Americans with Disabilities Act protects anyone who faces discrimination on the basis of disability and that Congress intended the law to be constructed broadly.

Many of our Nation's injured veterans returning from the battlefield will also need the protections guaranteed by the ADA. When injured soldiers return to civilian life, whether they go back to a job or to school, they should not be subject to discrimination. This legislation will ensure that they will not have to fight another battle, this time for their economic livelihood.

The Supreme Court rulings have also reduced protections for students with disabilities. The ADA Amendments Act ensures that students with physical and mental impairments will be free from discrimination and that they will have access to the accommodations and to the modifications they need to successfully pursue an education.

This legislation has broad support: Democrats and Republicans, businesses and advocates for individuals with disabilities. I am pleased we were able to work together to get to this point.

It is time to restore the original intent of the ADA and to ensure that the tens of millions of Americans with disabilities who want to work and to attend school and to participate in our communities will have the chance to do so. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Again, I would like to give a special thanks to Majority Leader Hoyer of Maryland and to Representative Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin for their outstanding efforts on behalf of the Members of this House during these negotiations, to bring those negotiations between the civil rights community, the disabilities community, and the employer community to a successful conclusion, which is embodied in this legislation today.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the committee.

(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Chairman, does the gentleman from California have any further speakers?

If we can reserve our time and let Judiciary go ahead and start using their time.

Will the gentleman yield?

I thank the gentleman for yielding, and certainly thank him for all his leadership on this bill. But I want to thank him on behalf of the Chairs and the ranking members of the two committees, you and Mr. Sensenbrenner, for the leadership that you both provided throughout these difficult and visionary negotiations to restore this act to the place that it should be. I just want to publicly, on behalf, I think, of everybody in the Congress, thank you and Mr. Sensenbrenner for your leadership on this.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I want to certainly thank the staffs of our committees on both sides of the aisle for all of their work. They put in a tremendous amount of time and intellectual power behind the amendments to the ADA and to put it back in the place that it should have after the court decisions damaged the intent and the purposes of this act. I certainly want to thank Sharon Lewis of the Committee on Education and Labor and Brian Kennedy and Thomas Webb, who is with us as an intern, for all of their work.

I am very proud to be a Member of Congress today and certainly of the House of Representatives as we pass this legislation. I was brought to the issues around the disability community when I first came to Congress, or perhaps a little before that when I was working in the State legislature in California by a hardy crew from California who were deeply involved in pursuing the civil rights of those with disabilities and the constitutional rights of those with disabilities and their place in the legislative process, and I want to thank them. And that is Judy Heuman from California and known to many; and Ed Roberts, a great champion of disability rights, a magnificent person; and Hale Zukor, who still resides in Berkeley and continues the battle; and Jim Donald, who is a wonderful attorney on behalf of many in the disability community; and so many others.

In my time in Congress, I have watched the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the battle over the 504 regulations; IDEA, at that time Education for All Handicapped Children, now IDEA; and the ADA; and today the restoration of the ADA to its proper position and power within the law. And I think it's a tribute to this Congress. While in many instances we have had very controversial fights and there have been eruptions over the implementation of these laws, we have continued to march forward and ensure the rights of the disabled, for their participation in American society. I think so many Members now and so many people in

our society recognize all that the members of the disability community have accomplished, all that they are accomplishing, and all that they will accomplish.

So today when we look at a young child seeking to be enrolled in school and to have an opportunity at the content and the curriculum that others have and to have the chance to participate in that school in a meaningful way and not be put off and sidestepped or in segregated classes; when we look at individuals who want to pursue a career, an activity, in our society and not be discriminated against; and when we now see employers recognizing the talents and the abilities and the contributions to be made by individuals with disabilities, we as a Nation are far better off, far richer, and far more understanding than we were prior to the struggles over these laws. And I hope that all Members will share the pride that I do when later on we will be able to vote to restore the ADA after the damage done by the court decisions.

And with that I thank all of my colleagues for their participation in this debate.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3195, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007.'' I wholeheartedly support this bill and urge my colleagues to support it also. The changes embodied by this Act, that restore the with Disabilities Act of 1990, ``ADA'', to its original purpose, are long overdue. This is a civil rights bill and the rights of the disabled must be restored.

H.R. 3195, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007,'' amends the definition of ``disability'' in

the ADA in response to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the definition, which has made it extremely difficult for individuals with serious health conditions--epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis and severe intellectual impairments--to prove that they qualify for protection under the ADA. The Supreme Court has narrowed the definition in two ways: (1) by ruling that mitigating measures that help control an impairment like medicine, hearing aids, or any other treatment must be considered in determining whether an impairment is disabling enough to qualify as a disability; and (2) by ruling that the elements of the definition must be interpreted ``strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.'' The Court's treatment of the ADA is at odds with judicial treatment of other civil rights statutes, which usually are interpreted broadly to achieve their remedial purposes. It is also inconsistent with Congress's intent.

The committee will consider a substitute that represents the consensus view of disability rights groups and the business community. That substitute restores congressional intent by, among other things: disallowing consideration of mitigating measures other than corrective lenses, ordinary eyeglasses or contacts, when determining whether an impairment is sufficiently limiting to qualify as a disability; maintaining the requirement that an individual qualifying as disabled under the first of the three-prong definition of ``disability'' show that an impairment ``substantially limits'' a major life activity but defining ``substantially limits'' as a less burdensome ``materially restricts; clarifying that anyone who is discriminated against because of an impairment, whether or not the impairment limits the performance of any major life activities, has been ``regarded as'' disabled and is entitled to the ADA's protection.

Background on Legislation

Eighteen years ago, President George H.W. Bush, with overwhelming bipartisan support from the Congress, signed into law the ADA. The act was intended to provide a ``clear and comprehensive mandate,'' with ``strong, consistent, enforceable standards,'' for eliminating disability-based discrimination. Through this broad mandate, Congress sought to protect anyone who is treated less favorably because of a current, past, or perceived disability. Congress did not intend for the courts to seize on the definition of disability as a means of excluding individuals with serious health conditions from protection; yet this is exactly what has happened. A legislative action is now needed to restore congressional intent, and ensure broad protection against disability-based discrimination.

Court Rulings Have Narrowed ADA Protection, Resulting in the Exclusion

of Individuals that Congress Clearly Intended to Protect

Through a series of decisions interpreting the ADA's definition of ``disability,'' however, the Supreme Court has narrowed the ADA in ways never intended by Congress. First, in three cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court ruled that the determination of ``disability'' under the first prong of the definition--i.e., whether an individual has a substantially limiting impairment--should be made after considering whether mitigating measures had reduced the impact of the impairment. In all three cases, the undisputed reason for the adverse action was the employee's medical condition, yet all three employers argued--and the Supreme Court agreed--that the plaintiffs were not protected by the ADA because their impairments, when considered in a mitigated state, were not limiting enough to qualify as disabilities under the ADA.

Three years later, the Supreme Court revisited the definition of ``disability'' in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her employer discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disabilities, which included carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendonitis, and thoracic outlet compression. While her employer previously had adjusted her job duties, making it possible for her to perform well despite these conditions, Williams was not able to resume certain job duties when requested by Toyota and ultimately lost her job. She challenged the termination, also alleging that Toyota's refusal to continue accommodating her violated the ADA. Looking to the definition of ``disability,'' the Court noted that an individual ``must initially prove that he or she has a physical or mental impairment,'' and then demonstrate that the impairment ``substantially limits'' a ``major life activity.'' Identifying the critical questions to be whether a limitation is ``substantial'' and whether a life activity is ``major,'' the court stated that ``these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.'' The Court then concluded that ``substantial'' requires a showing that an individual has an impairment ``that prevents or, `` severely restricts the individual; and ``major'' life activities, requires a showing that the individual is restricted from performing tasks that are ``of central importance to most people's daily lives.''

In the wake of these rulings, disabilities that had been covered under the Rehabilitation Act and that Congress intended to include under the ADA--serious health conditions like epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, cerebral palsy, multiple sclerosis--have been excluded. Either, the courts say, the person is not impaired enough to substantially limit a major life activity, or the impairment substantially limits something--like liver function--that the courts do not consider a major life activity. Courts even deny protection when the employer admits that it took adverse action based on the individual's impairment, allowing employers to take the position that an employee is too disabled to do a job but not disabled enough to be protected by the law.

On October 4, 2007, the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties held a legislative hearing on H.R. 3195, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007.'' Witnesses at the hearing included Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer; Cheryl Sensenbrenner, chair, American Association of People with Disabilities; Stephen C. Orr, pharmacist and plaintiff in Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Michael C. Collins, executive director, National Council on Disability; Lawrence Z. Lorber, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Chai R. Feldblum, professor, Georgetown University Law Center.

The hearing provided an opportunity for the Constitution Subcommittee to examine how the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the definition of ``disability'' have affected ADA protection for individuals with disabilities and to consider the need for legislative action. Representative Hoyer, one of the lead sponsors of the original act and, along with Representative Sensenbrenner, lead House co-sponsor of the ADA Restoration Act, explained the need to respond to court decisions ``that have sharply restricted the class of people who can invoke protection under the law and [reinstate] the original congressional intent when the ADA passed.'' Explaining Congress's choice to adopt the definition of ``disability'' from the Rehabilitation Act because it had been interpreted generously by the courts, Representative Hoyer testified that Congress had never anticipated or intended that the courts would interpret that definition so narrowly:

[W]e could not have fathomed that people with diabetes,

epilepsy, heart conditions, cancer, mental illnesses and

other disabilities would have their ADA claims denied because

they would be considered too functional to meet the

definition of disabled. Nor could we have fathomed a

situation where the individual may be considered too disabled

by an employer to get a job, but not disabled enough by the

courts to be protected by the ADA from discrimination. What a

contradictory position that would have been for Congress to

take.

Representative Hoyer, joined by all of the witnesses except Mr. Lorber, urged Congress to respond by passing H.R. 3195 to amend the definition of ``disability.'' Mr. Lorber, appearing on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce, opposed H.R. 3195 as an overly broad response to court decisions that accurately reflected statutory language and congressional intent.

Since the subcommittee's hearing, several changes have been made to the bill, which are reflected in the substitute that will likely be considered by the committee. The substitute, described section-by- section below, represents the consensus of the disability rights and business groups and is supported by, among others, the Chamber of Commerce.

Importantly, section 4 of the bill, amends the definition of ``disability'' and provides standards for applying the amended definition. While retaining the requirement that a disability ``substantially limits'' a ``major'' life activity under prongs 1 and 2 of the definition of disability, section 4 redefines ``substantially limits'' as ``materially restricts'' to indicate a less stringent standard. Thus, while the limitation imposed by an impairment must be important, it need not rise to the level of preventing or severely restricting the performance of major life activities in order to qualify as a disability. Section 4 provides an illustrative list of life activities that should be considered ``major,'' and clarifies that an individual has been ``regarded as'' disabled, and is entitled to protection under the ADA, if discriminated against because of an impairment, whether or not the impairment limits the performance of any major life activities. Section 4 requires broad construction of the definition and prohibits consideration of mitigating measures, with the exception of ordinary glasses or contact lenses, in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

I support this bill and I urge my colleagues to support it also.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman, my friend from Ohio, for yielding me the time to discuss this proposed rule for consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Restoration Act of 2007. And a hearty congratulations to the new Democrat majority for their openness as we celebrate the 58th closed rule, a new record for the United States Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the underlying legislation, which would amend and improve the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA as it is called, that was enacted into law in 1990 by President George Herbert Walker Bush with the strong bipartisan support of Congress.

The ADA--which was passed to, and I quote, provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities--protects individuals from discrimination in hiring, firing, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment on the basis of a person's disability.

Often referred to as the world's first comprehensive disability anti- discrimination law, the ADA specifies what employers, government agencies, and the managers of public facilities must do to ensure that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to fully participate in our society.

The ADA consists of three major titles protecting Americans with disabilities:

Title I prohibits discrimination in public or private employment;

Title II prohibits discrimination at public entities, like public universities or hospitals;

And title III prohibits discrimination at places of public accommodations like hotels and restaurants.

Mr. Speaker, this law has made a world of difference for millions of Americans with disabilities. But, for all of the great results that have come from this law, I believe it can still be improved. For far too long, our Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have wrestled with some of the contents of Congress' intent in defining the ADA key concepts.

For example, the ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to facilitate employees with disabilities but not if this causes undue hardship, leaving the courts to decide what is reasonable and what is undue. Most of all, Federal courts have spent years being puzzled over exactly who is considered disabled under the law. But, today, we have the opportunity to pass this legislation and to clarify Congress' intent, finally settling these outstanding questions of law once and for all, or so we hope.

I want to be clear that these shortcomings do not in any way minimize the great things that this legislation has achieved for disabled people in America. Today, many public accommodations like hotels, restaurants, and recreation facilities have opted for voluntary compliance. We have cut curbs, the areas where sidewalks slope down, to be at a level of the street to allow easy passage for wheelchairs and for other mechanisms that aid the disabled, which were virtually unheard of before ADA was passed and that now are in compliance in most major cities.

Unfortunately, since 1999, several U.S. Supreme Court decisions have narrowly provided the definition of disabilities so much so that persons with serious conditions, such as epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, cancer, diabetes, and cerebral palsy have been determined to not have impairments that meet the definition of ``disability'' under the ADA.

H.R. 3195 builds upon the ADA's original intent by clarifying what disabilities qualify an individual for coverage, and they address a number of the statute's further limitations that have been raised by disability advocates.

Because of this ambiguity, today, I join with more than 250 of my colleagues in supporting this legislation, which passed out of the Judiciary Committee by unanimous consent and out of the Education and Labor Committee by a vote of 43-1. Like my colleagues, I support expanding the definition of ``disabled,'' which was the main goal of this legislation, as well supporting to ensure that people with disabilities do not lose their coverage under the ADA because their condition is manageable and treatable with medication.

These policies have been endorsed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Society for Human Resource Management, the Human Resources Policy Association, and many other pro-business organizations.

From the disability community, this legislation was also supported by the National Epilepsy Foundation, the American Diabetes Association, the American Association of People with Disabilities, and other leading advocacy groups.

Mr. Speaker, the ADA has transformed the American society since its enactment, helping millions of Americans with disabilities to succeed in the workplace and making transportation, housing, buildings, services, and other elements of daily life more accessible to individuals with disabilities.

I applaud my colleagues for bringing this legislation, an important action, to the floor today, and I look forward to its passage.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Since taking control of Congress in 2007, this Democrat Congress has totally neglected its responsibilities to do anything constructive to address the domestic supply issues that have created skyrocketing gas, diesel, and energy costs that American families are facing today, including costs that are unacceptable for many disabled Americans who are struggling to be able to get to work or to live their life.

So, today, I urge my colleagues to vote with me to defeat the previous question so this House can finally consider real solutions to the energy crisis. If the previous question is defeated, I will move to amend the rule to allow for consideration of H.R. 5656, yet another time this Republican party is on the floor to say we support consumers and that we support American independence and security. This bill, H.R. 5656, would repeal the ban on acquiring advanced alternative fuels, and this bill was introduced by my dear friend Jeb Hensarling of Texas way back in March, 3 months ago.

This legislation would reduce the price of gasoline by allowing the Federal Government to procure advanced alternative fuels derived from diverse sources like oil shale, tar sands, and coal-to-liquid technology, commonsense marketplace answers to make sure that the American consumer and America is competitive with the world, rather than sending billions of dollars overseas, funding American enemies and providing the world with jobs and opportunities outside of what the consumer intended in this country.

Section 526 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which this Democrat Congress passed, places artificial and unnecessary restraints on the Department of Defense. Perhaps it is no surprise that this Democrat Congress places artificial and unnecessary restraints on the Department of Defense in getting its own fuel from friendly sources, like the coal-to-liquid, oil shale, and tar sands resources that are abundant in the United States and in Canada, our friend to the north. Needlessly raising grave national and economic security concerns is what this Democrat Congress has done to our military.

Mr. Speaker, Canada is currently the largest U.S. oil supplier. It sent 1.8 million barrels every day of crude oil and 500,000 barrels per day of refined products to the United States in 2006. That is according to the Canadian government. About half of the Canadian crude is derived from oil sands, with the sands production forecast to reach almost 3 million barrels per day in 2015.

Section 526 is choking this flow of fuel from one of our Nation's most reliable allies and economic partners, and is increasing the military's reliance on fuels from unfriendly and unstable countries. On top of that, it is causing the American consumer to pay more at the pump. We saw a 10-cent rise in the price of each gallon of gasoline just in the last week.

Mr. Speaker, now is the time for action. Now is not the time to be suing OPEC and to be saying ``no'' to a balanced energy proposal.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the amendment and extraneous material inserted into the Record prior to the vote on the previous question.

I urge my colleagues to vote for our military and for our economy, including many disabled people who are having a tough time paying for the high energy costs as a result of this Democrat Congress' insensitive position to not allow Americans to have their own energy independence. It is time that we produce more from America and from friendly places, like reliable sources like Canada.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.