I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his leadership in bringing this important legislation to the body tonight. I rise in strong support of the bridge loan of $15 billion to three of the…
I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his leadership in bringing this important legislation to the body tonight.
I rise in strong support of the bridge loan of $15 billion to three of the largest manufacturers in America.
In response to my good friend on the other side of the aisle, if you're concerned about saving small businesses, there are literally thousands of small businesses that are associated with the auto industry in our country.
I would like to put in the Record a report that my office and I worked on that shows the ripple effect of the loss of these jobs in America. Over 3 million jobs are either directly or indirectly associated with the auto industry--one in seven manufacturing jobs, many small businesses, the auto dealers, the suppliers. This is a major employer in America.
Last month, we lost over 533,000 jobs. Unemployment is at 6.7 percent. If this industry fails, the unemployment rate will jump to, roughly, 8.3 percent. Our fragile economy is in a crisis. We can not afford to lose these jobs. Other countries support their auto industries. We should, too.
The Ripple Effect: Why Failure of the Big 3 Is Not an Option
The Auto Industry Employs One in Ten Manufacturing Jobs
The domestic vehicle manufacturing industry, including the
numerous companies that manufacture parts and technologies to
supply American automakers, represents over 10 percent of the
nation's manufacturing employment. A major contraction or
collapse of the domestic auto industry could have multiple
adverse affects on the economy, especially by driving up
unemployment. Serious jobs losses in the industry would also
have negative spillover effects for the manufacturers that
supply everything from tires to cutting edge advanced
technology such as advanced batteries for hybrid vehicles.
These spillover effects would harm future innovation in the
United States broadly, not just in the auto sector. Finally,
over 10 percent of U.S. exports are motor vehicles or parts,
and an additional 39 percent of exports are from capital
goods sectors such as industrial machinery that depend in
part on supplying domestic automakers. For this reason, a
major failure of U.S. automakers will have an immediate and
severe negative effect on our trade deficit, and will make
any future progress on improving our trade balance far more
difficult.
Approximately 2 million workers build or sell vehicles made by the
detroit three
Chart I shows a breakdown of the estimated employment that
depends directly on the Detroit Three, based on data from the
Department of Commerce. The production supply chain alone
relies on almost 1.5 million workers, far more than the
quarter million workers who are directly employed by the
automakers. This is because most of the workers who produce a
car work for outside suppliers who manufacture vehicle parts
and components. In addition, vehicle parts suppliers must
themselves draw on producers of other supplies and services,
ranging from steel to machine tools. The Commerce
Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that each
job in auto assembly and parts production directly supports
2.4 additional jobs in the economy through its supply chain
purchases.
Once the car is produced, it is sold and serviced through
auto dealerships that employ over a million workers,
approximately half of which sell Detroit Three cars. In
total, almost two million workers are directly employed in
the production and sale of Detroit vehicles. Only 12 percent
of these jobs are in the Detroit automakers themselves, but
all of them could potentially be threatened by an automaker
shutdown.
Multiple Studies Estimate Job Losses of 2.5 Million or More from a
Major Automaker Contraction
The two million workers connected to the Detroit Three
indirectly support many other jobs. Job loss among auto
workers would reduce spending in their communities, leading
to further job losses in retail and other sectors. At a time
of general recession, the job and consumer expenditure losses
created by a major auto industry contraction will not be made
up from other sources.
The exact number of jobs supported by this spending is
difficult to estimate. However, it is clear that numerous
additional jobs would be at risk. Three separate studies--
from Mark Zandi of the economic analysis firm Moody's
Economy.com, the Center for Automotive Research, and the
Economic Policy Institute--have estimated that a major
disruption to the auto industry would lead to job losses of
at least 2.5 million and possibly as much as 3 million jobs.
This implies that a major contraction or collapse of the
domestic auto industry could singlehandedly drive the
unemployment rate from its current level of 6.7 percent to
8.3 percent, even as job losses in other sectors continue.
The Current Financial Automaker Crisis Is Exacerbated By the Credit
Crisis
The magnitude of these losses were driven by the
combination of a massive spike in crude oil and gasoline
prices during 2006-07, followed by the credit crisis and
recession that has begun over the past year. The credit
crisis has led to a sharp cutoff in financing for auto loans,
and the general impact of the recession has led to record
drops in consumer spending. Chart 2 shows the combination of
these two factors has devastated North American vehicle sales
for all manufacturers. Total vehicle sales in November 2008
were down 37 percent from one year ago. Once recovery has
begun from the credit crisis and the recession, it is likely
that automaker earnings and sales will begin to show a
recovery as well.
American Automakers Have Already Made Major Progress on Needed
Restructuring
In 1990, MIT researchers estimated that Toyota and other
Japanese ``lean manufacturers'' were twice as efficient as
the U.S. ``Big Three'', and could manufacture a car in one-
half the time required by American firms. Today, the most
recent data finds that U.S. manufacturers have ``nearly
erased the productivity deficit against their Japanese-based
competitors.'' General Motors has increased its productivity
15 consecutive years, and now requires 32.3 hours to
manufacture a car, as opposed to 30.7 hours for industry
leader Toyota--a productivity gap of only about 5 percent.
Chrysler has now tied Toyota in productivity.
GM and other Detroit manufacturers have also made major
recent investments in improving fuel efficiency, to avoid a
repeat of sales declines associated with rising gas prices.
General Motor's 2008 model line has more vehicles with 30 or
more miles per gallon than any other manufacturer, and the
company plans the introduction of 16 new hybrid vehicles by
2010.
Auto Worker Pay and Benefits Have Already Been Slashed To Competitive
Levels
A major reason for cost difference between Detroit and
Japanese automakers is that U.S. firms must assume additional
pension and retiree health costs not faced by foreign
manufacturers. However, in 2005 and 2007 the United Auto
Workers (UAW) made major concessions in pay and benefits. The
new contract slashed starting salaries at auto plants by 50
percent, to about $14 per hour. Current UAW workers also
sacrificed all wage increases from 2006 through the end of
the contract in 2011. Most important of all, the new contract
established a health care trust fund that cut retiree pension
and health benefits significantly. For example, the new
contract will cut GM's total legacy pension and health
benefits from $7 billion to approximately $1 billion
beginning in 2010, and cuts Ford's legacy-related costs from
$16 to $3 per current labor hour.
The frequently cited figure that UAW autoworkers make over
$70 per hour is inaccurate, and is based on representing the
full fixed costs of retiree health and benefits as part of
labor costs for the current, much smaller auto-maker
workforce. In fact, the most highly paid UAW worker at a
Detroit Three automaker, a skilled trades worker with
seniority, earns about $33 per hour. The new labor agreement
cuts full labor costs, including all current and legacy
benefit costs, to $53 per hour for U.S. automakers, as
compared to $49 per hour at non-unionized Honda and Toyota
assembly plants.
Standard Bankruptcy Is Not a Viable Solution for Troubled Automakers
Companies in bankruptcy restructuring are dependent on
external financing to continue operation. In the current
credit crisis, it is highly unlikely that private sector
external financing will be forthcoming for GM or other auto-
makers that enter bankruptcy. Without private sector
financing, a standard Chapter 11 process could quickly result
in a movement to Chapter 7 liquidation, potentially resulting
in the large-scale job losses outlined above.
It is also important to note that the bankruptcy process is
designed to pay off creditors, not to protect the public
interest. During the bankruptcy process, firm management
would be unable to undertake major new initiatives to improve
technology, fuel efficiency, or productivity, since their
attention would be engaged by legal conflicts over finances.
Finally, consumers are unlikely to purchase automobiles from
a bankrupt manufacturer, due to concerns over warranties and
service.
A Conditional Bridge Loan from the Federal Government Is the Right Step
The American auto industry is under tremendous financial
pressure from a unique set of economic circumstances. If one
or more auto manufacturers go out of business at this time,
then the total costs to society will be far greater than the
loan that has been requested from government. The study by
the Center for Automotive Research found that a 50 percent
contraction in Detroit automaker employment would cause
government to lose $50 billion in the first year and $108
billion over three years due to combined declines in tax
receipts and increases in transfer payments.
Bridge financing would be crucial in helping these
companies past the current credit and economic crisis, until
recent improvements in productivity and fuel efficiency pay
off. Any bridge financing should be accompanied by strict
oversight and conditions for investment in continued progress
in improving efficiency, as well as further stakeholder
concessions.