Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 928) to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to enhance the independence of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other purposes.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I again want to thank Mr. Cooper for introducing this legislation and working with us as it moved its way through the subcommittee and committee process; Mr. Towns for his leadership; and the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for his leadership as well.

Today, we take up H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act of 2007. This legislation is intended to enhance the independence of Inspectors General throughout the government to improve their ability to monitor and oversee executive branch operations.

Since the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, Inspectors General throughout the government have played an integral role in identifying waste and mismanagement in government. IGs have also been instrumental in aiding Congress and the executive branch to make government more efficient and effective.

We all agree IGs should operate independently, free from political interference. After all, both agency heads and Congress often rely on IG reports to provide frank assessments of the effectiveness of Federal programs.

However, Inspectors General should also be part of an agency's management structure, part of a team, albeit with some independence, rather than a ``fourth branch'' of the Federal Government. If we separate the IGs from the day-to-day operations of the agencies they oversee, IGs will cease to perform a constructive, integrated role and instead will become Monday morning quarterbacks with their function solely second-guessing decisions made by agencies.

Many of the provisions in H.R. 928 will help to enhance the effectiveness of the IGs in overseeing Federal agencies and programs. I am concerned that certain provisions of the legislation go further than I would like in isolating IGs, removing them from the agency decision- making process.

For example, during committee consideration of the legislation, I offered an amendment to exempt smaller agency IGs from the ``for cause'' removal provision in the bill, thereby reserving the ``for cause'' removal threshold only for Cabinet-level agency IGs. The purpose of this amendment, which was adopted, I might add, with the help of my friends on the other side, was to strike an appropriate balance between the need to ensure independence of our Inspectors General while at the same time preserving the President's authority over employers and officers of the executive branch.

I also have concerns with a provision that's in the current bill authorizing IGs to independently submit their budget requests to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process. My concerns with this new authority pertain more to the logistical nightmare this creates rather than any particular objection to increased IG independence. After all, having 60 separate budgets for individual offices accompanying the President's annual budget submission to Congress will only add unnecessary confusion to the already confusing Federal budget process. So when Members get the President's budget, under the way the law is currently written, they get the Federal budget submitted by the President and then 60 separate requests from IGs.

Now, I intend to offer an amendment, which I am hopeful the other side will accept, which goes at least part of the way toward addressing the legitimate concerns raised by the administration but getting to the points that the author of this bill wanted to get as well.

In closing, I believe the underlying legislation improves the laws governing our IGs. I think some additional changes need to be made as it moves forward, but I very much appreciate Mr. Cooper's efforts on this bill and his initiative in trying to identify these problems as we move through.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me talk, first of all, about what the legislation does. It establishes a 7-year term of office for the over 60 Inspectors General in the Federal Government. This gives them continuity from administration to administration, so they're not political lackeys, they are professionals. It limits the President's authority to remove a Senate-confirmed IG, and that's about half of them, except on certain grounds; for example, permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. That gives the IGs independence from pressure from the appointing administration.

At the smaller agencies, a different standard applies. There, an IG can be removed, but it will require 30-day advance notification to Congress before an agency head removes the agency's IG.

The legislation also authorizes IGs to submit their budget requests to Congress independent of the President's budget submission. This is something that I'm going to have an amendment on later that I think will clarify it.

This also codifies an executive order establishing the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. This is a coordinating council of Federal IGs, as well as an integrity committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by IGs. And unfortunately, we see that; these people are human beings as well.

It increases the salary of IGs and prohibits IGs from receiving bonuses. It enhances IG power by granting limited personnel authority, expanded subpoena authority, and increased ability to deputize IG agents.

It strengthens the GAO's authority to conduct investigations, for sworn testimony it requires congressional notification of agency noncooperation, and it expands IG ability to pursue false claims and recoup losses resulting from fraud.

Now, the administration has issued a negative statement of policy on this for two reasons. One, they don't like the limitation on the President's authority to remove executive branch officials. On that, I think we have gone overboard, working together, both parties, to try to put reasonable limitations, but at the same time maintaining a higher level of independence for IGs than you will find at other levels. And I think institutionally, as Members of this House, the changes in this bill I think are worth supporting, I would oppose the administration in that. The second concern is the independent submission of the IG's budget to Congress, and we are offering an amendment to try to clarify that, which I will speak on later.

Once again, this legislation was introduced by Representative Jim Cooper from Tennessee in February. It was approved by our committee by a voice vote in August. In addition to a substitute offered by Representative Cooper, which made a number of technical changes, the committee did adopt an amendment offered by me to limit the application of removal for cause in a way that I think we are all comfortable with.

So, again, I want to thank the players who have brought this to this stage.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), a cosponsor of this bill.

Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?

If the gentleman has no further speakers, I will take a minute and sum up and yield back.

Let me just say again, I want to thank the author of this legislation. I want to thank Mr. Towns for moving this through subcommittee and Chairman Waxman. I just want to note, for IGs to work successfully, they need to work with their agencies. I think however we write the law, the President that appoints and the Senate that confirms, we need to look for more accountants.

Frankly, we have seen a surge of people coming out of the U.S. Attorney's offices, and they make this more adversarial than it needs to be. A good IG is going to work with their agency to identify waste, fraud and abuse, not enter into a gotcha mentality. For government to work, you need them all working together. You need an independent IG, there is no question about that. But the person in that office ought to be right there with the agency head making sure that things work. That doesn't always happen. I don't think we can write any law that makes that happen. That is going to depend on the goodwill of the people, the agency heads and the IGs working together. But I think this legislation goes a long way toward establishing that independence, giving the IG the authority that they need. But the rest is going to be up to the appointing President and the confirming Senate to get the right people in these jobs, professionals who want to be a part of government and making it work efficiently for the taxpayer.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, as currently drafted, the Improving Government Accountability Act would authorize Inspectors General throughout the government, and more than 60 of these offices exist, to directly submit their budget requests to Congress. By doing so, this legislation would circumvent the long-standing process under which Presidents submit to the Congress a budget proposal on behalf of the executive branch.

While I understand the sponsor's intent in authorizing independent budget submissions by IGs, I have concerns with the way the authority is currently constructed. Our concerns pertain more to the logistical nightmare than any particular objection to increased IG independence.

First of all, according to the Congressional Research Service, no other offices or agencies within the executive

branch currently are authorized by statute to independently submit their budgets to Congress. H.R. 928 would not simply make an exception for one uniquely situated office, it would make an exception for all of the more than 60 IG offices currently in government. In other words, the President's annual budget would be accompanied by 60 separate IG budgets. This is inefficient; it is disorganized and unproductive.

Second, I am concerned that by authorizing IGs to submit their budgets independently to Congress, we are encouraging them to submit their wish lists to Congress rather than submitting budgets that take into account the limited resources that are available to agencies.

It doesn't take an active imagination to envision the increased government spending that this would cause. After all, if an IG submits its wish list to Congress, will Members of Congress have the stomach to appropriate an amount less than an IG requests? If we do, we could be painted as antioversight, a label none of us are interested in.

Because of these concerns, I have filed an amendment proposing an alternative approach to the budget issue. This amendment would authorize Inspectors General to notify Congress if the budget request submitted by the agency head would substantially inhibit the IG's ability to perform his or her duties. The President would be required to include in his budget submission the original amount requested by each IG.

This approach would give additional information to Congress, which is the intent, I think, of the legislation. It also encourages IGs to speak out if their agencies try to stifle the IG's independence by reducing the IG's budget request. But it would stop short of authorizing all 60 IGs to separately submit their own budget request to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process.

I think this amendment is a reasonable compromise which carefully balances the need for IG independence with the need for streamlined budget authority. We have enough problems enacting the Federal budget every year; we don't need to create 60 new ones. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, that is correct. Let me just add, I think that was the intent of the legislation, to make sure that the IGs weren't stifled and that Congress gets their eyes on that original request, and it would allow that.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to talk anybody out of it, so I yield back as well.

Mr. Chairman, although I am not opposed, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require agencies to include links on their Web pages to their IG's Web page. In addition, this amendment would require IGs to make public reports and audits conducted by the Inspector General immediately available on their Web sites, and it would require links for individuals interested in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.

To the extent any of this is not currently being done by agencies and IGs, I am fully supportive of Congress requiring such information to be made available in order to increase the transparency of Federal Government operations. We are prepared to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Towns).

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

I am in its present form.

Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit would require all agency Inspectors General to report annually to Congress and to the President whether the IG believes an abolishment, reorganization, consolidation or transfer of existing Federal programs and agencies is necessary to reduce Federal expenditures, increase efficiency of government operations, eliminate overlap and duplication in Federal programs and offices, abolish agencies or programs which no longer serve an important governmental purpose, or identify reductions in amounts of discretionary budget authority or direct spending which can be dedicated to Federal deficit reduction.

The IGs would be required to accompany those reports with proposed legislation in order to encourage Congress to act on those recommendations.

This legislation is borne out of frustration. How many more times are we going to hear about redundancy in Federal programs without doing anything about it? We have the IGs. We have made them more independent as a result of this. Let's utilize that expertise for suggestions in how we can reduce waste, fraud and abuse in government.

How many more times are we going to have to hear about the 70 programs located throughout 13 Federal agencies providing substance abuse prevention services for our youth? The over 90 early childhood programs scattered among 11 Federal agencies and 20 offices? The 40 different programs in the Federal Government having job training as their main purpose? The 86 teacher training programs in nine Federal agencies? The 50 different Federal homeless assistance programs administered by eight different agencies? The more than 17 Federal agencies monitoring and enforcing over 400 U.S. trade agreements? The 17 Federal Departments and agencies operating a total of 515 Federal research and development laboratories? Or the eight different Federal agencies administering 17 different programs just in the area of rural water and wastewater systems, each with its own set of regulations?

After all, the primary reason all these Federal programs exist in the first place is because Congress has this bad habit of haphazardly establishing new programs to achieve short-term solutions whenever a problem arises.

In fact, Paul Volcker, Donna Shalala and Frank Carlucci all testified before our committee in 2003 about a National Commission on Public Service report that they had recently released. The report concluded that, over the years, the ad hoc layering of agencies, Departments, and programs greatly complicated management, expanded the influence of powerful interests and diminished coherent policy direction. The Federal Government today is a layered jumble of organizations with muddled public missions.

Congress is as much to blame for this problem as anyone else. Admitting we have a problem is the first step in recovery. I am here to help our colleagues understand we have a problem. The extent of overlap and duplication in government is an issue the Committee on Government Reform has spent years investigating. Our hearings have focused on a range of Federal program areas, from child welfare programs to intelligence operations to Federal food safety oversight.

This motion to report forthwith, so it doesn't kill the bill, it reports right back, would provide a tool which could assist the Congress and the President in identifying ways to streamline government operations and make them as efficient and effective as possible. The motion to recommit should appeal to all Members who believe there are inefficiencies in the Federal Government requiring attention. All after, Congress never has and never will be a management body. We need the assistance, and this legislation does it, of independent, outside observers to tell us what programs we created years ago are not an efficient or effective use of taxpayer funds.

We have given the Inspectors General here authority and independence to call the balls and strikes and to make government more efficient. Let's utilize that. Let's help us make government more efficient. Let's support the motion to recommit.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this modified closed rule that waives important portions of the Congressional Budget Act.

Last night in the Rules Committee, we learned that this special rule finds yet another way for the majority to break regular order. By waiving section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act, this rule undermines the integrity of the budgeting process by allowing legislation within the Budget Committee's jurisdiction to be considered by the House without the Budget Committee's review.

My friend from Pasco, Washington, Doc Hastings, asked the acting chairman of the committee, Mr. McGovern, if the rule being considered does indeed waive this budget rule that protects taxpayers and Members of this House of Representatives. The answer came back simple and clear: Yes, the rule waives this commonsense provision.

I wish that I could say that I am surprised by the Democrat leadership's decision to find yet another way to toss House rules and procedures out the window. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has come to be known as, and to expect from, the new broken promise Democrat majority.

Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us has the noble goal of strengthening and clarifying the authority, tenure, resources, oversight and independence of the Inspectors General in the various Federal Departments and agencies.

Many of the issues addressed by the legislation today enjoy bipartisan support and are of great importance to me and a huge number of my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle. The bill establishes a council to identify, review and plan to promote efficiency and address waste, fraud and abuse. It provides for greater integrity by establishing a new committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and to report on their efforts to the executive branch and to Congress.

It requires reports to Congress on the cooperation of all Federal agencies with the General Accountability Office and requires that semiannual inspection and evaluation reports, in addition to audit reports, be submitted to Congress.

Despite all of the noble goals of this legislation, I do regret that this bill was not crafted in closer coordination with the administration to resolve some of the outstanding issues that prevent it from being signed into law.

Like me, the administration has publicly stated its strong support for the work of Inspectors General and their overall mission to improve agency performance and to eliminate waste, fraud and abuse. However, the administration strongly objects to some of the provisions included in this legislation that are likely unconstitutional.

The end-run contained in this legislation around article II of the Constitution, which our Founding Fathers provided to the executive branch to ensure that all of our Nation laws are faithfully executed, guarantees that this

bill will not only be vetoed by the President but would also be overturned by the Supreme Court if this bill were ever passed by the House and the Senate.

Also, by requiring Inspectors General to circumvent the long-standing and constitutionally based budgeting process that currently exists, without even including the House Budget Committee in the decisionmaking process, is a thinly veiled political stunt intended to draw a veto threat from the President and to create a false disagreement over this bill when it is clear that both Republicans and Democrats support reducing waste, fraud and abuse at each of our Federal agencies.

Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record a copy of the administration's statement of policy regarding their position on this legislation.

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management

and Budget,

Washington, DC, October 1, 2007.

Statement of Administration Policy

H.R. 928--To amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to enhance the

independence of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other purposes

The Administration appreciates the work of inspectors

general (IGs) and their mission to improve agency performance

and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. IGs play an important

role in Executive Branch efforts to measure and achieve

success in program performance. Each agency's Office of

Inspector General (OIG) fills a vital role in these efforts

by reviewing operations and making recommendations for

improvements and corrective actions. By providing objective

information to promote strong management, decision-making,

and accountability, OIGs contribute to the success of each

agency and the Federal government as a whole. The

Administration strongly supports efforts to ensure that IGs

have: the skills and training they need to perform their

duties; fair pay; findings and recommendations that are

transparent to the public; and access to necessary legal

advice.

H.R. 928, the ``Improving Government Accountability Act,''

would further some of these objectives. However, the

Administration strongly objects to provisions that are

inconsistent with these goals, and with broader policy

considerations and constitutional requirements. If H.R. 928

were presented to the President in its current form, the

President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the

bill.

H.R. 928 would permit the President to remove IGs only for

cause. The Administration strongly objects to this intrusion

on the President's removal authority and his ability to hold

IGs accountable for their performance. The responsibility to

``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''--which

Article II vests solely in the President--includes the

responsibility to supervise and guide how IGs and other

executive branch officers investigate and respond to

allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch. IGs

already have the independence necessary to perform their

investigative functions with respect to individual agencies,

because agency heads generally may not supervise IGs' conduct

of investigations. H.R. 928's attempt to extend this current

independence to include independence from supervision by the

President does not enhance the function of IGs and raises

grave constitutional concerns.

The Administration also strongly opposes provisions that

would authorize IGs to circumvent the President's

longstanding, and constitutionally based, control over

executive branch budget requests by allowing IGs to submit

their budget requests directly to Congress and by requiring

the President to include each IG's request as a separate line

item in the President's annual budget request. Since its

inception, the current executive branch coordination process

has worked well for both the President and the Congress. The

process is deliberative and results in an agency and

government-wide coordinated submission that accounts for

long-range planning and priorities.

IGs have been a part of this process since their creation

in 1978, and there is no evidence that the current process

results in budgets that fail to enable appropriate IG

performance.

The Administration also objects to provisions that would

establish within the Executive Branch a freestanding,

independent Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity

and Efficiency. A similar council already exists under

Executive Orders. Statutory codification of such a council

would impede the President's ability to react swiftly and

effectively to problems with IGs or with the Council itself.

Furthermore, the council provisions in H.R. 928 raise

constitutional questions because they restrict the

President's authority to nominate individuals to serve on the

Council and contain ambiguous definitions of offices and

their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, it is

critical that disclosure protections regarding the Witness

Security Program apply to the Department of Justice's

Inspector General's internal investigative procedures and

release of information, since the release of specific

information related to the program could endanger the

program's means and methods, personnel, and the continued

safety of the program's protected witnesses.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose the majority's unwillingness to work with the administration in a bipartisan way to create a bill that all Members of this body can support and that would also pass constitutional muster. I also oppose the Democrat leadership's willingness to once again subvert regular order for political purposes and to prevent my colleague from The Woodlands in Texas, Congressman Kevin Brady, from having an opportunity to offer his amendment to provide additional review of the work product of our Federal agencies.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I appreciate the gentlewoman engaging me at this time. Mr. Speaker, I would inform my colleague that I do not have any additional speakers.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio and enjoy working with her.

Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the previous question so that I may amend the rule to allow for consideration of H. Res. 479, a resolution that I like to call the Earmark Accountability Rule.

During last year's campaign and again at the beginning of this Congress, promises were made to the American people and to the new minority about the Democrats' supposedly new and improved earmark rules. As the year has worn on, however, I have noticed that while the Democrats' rules changes may sound good as a cynical sound bite for the evening news, they haven't actually accomplished much since the majority has repeatedly turned the other way when it comes to their own actual enforcement.

We continue to see nondisclosed earmarks appearing in all sorts of bills, and even the House Parliamentarian has determined that the hastily drafted and passed Democrat earmark rule ``does not comprehensively apply to all legislative propositions at all stages of the legislative process.''

I will insert this letter from the House Parliamentarian, John Sullivan, to the Rules Committee chairman, Louise Slaughter, into the Record at this point.

House of Representatives,

Office of the Parliamentarian,

Washington, DC, October 2, 2007.

Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter,

Committee on Rules, House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

Dear Chairwoman Slaughter: Thank you for your letter of

October 2, 2007, asking for an elucidation of our advice on

how best to word a special rule. As you also know, we have

advised the committee that language waiving all points of

order ``except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI''

should not be adopted as boilerplate for all special rules,

notwithstanding that the committee may be resolved not to

recommend that the House waive the earmark-disclosure

requirements of clause 9.

In rule XXI, clause 9(a) establishes a point of order

against undisclosed earmarks in certain measures and clause

9(b) establishes a point of order against a special rule that

waives the application of clause 9(a). As illuminated in the

rulings of September 25 and 27, 2007, clause 9(a) of rule XXI

does not comprehensively apply to all legislative

propositions at all stages of the legislative process.

Clause 9(a) addresses the disclosure of earmarks in a bill

or joint resolution, in a conference report on a bill or

joint resolution, or in a so-called ``manager's amendment''

to a bill or joint resolution. Other forms of amendment--

whether they be floor amendments during initial House

consideration or later amendments between the Houses--are not

covered. (One might surmise that those who developed the rule

felt that proposals to amend are naturally subject to

immediate peer review, though they harbored reservations

about the so-called ``manager's amendment,'' i.e., one

offered at the outset of consideration for amendment by a

member of a committee of initial referral under the terms of

a special rule.)

The question of order on September 25 involved a special

rule providing for a motion to dispose of an amendment

between the Houses. As such, clause 9(a) was inapposite. It

had no application to the motion in the first instance.

Accordingly, Speaker pro

tempore Holden held that the special rule had no tendency to

waive any application of clause 9(a). The question of order

on September 27 involved a special rule providing (in

pertinent part) that an amendment be considered as adopted.

Speaker pro tempore Blumenauer employed the same rationale to

hold that, because clause 9(a) had no application to the

amendment in the first instance, the special rule had no

tendency to waive any application of clause 9(a).

The same would be true in the more common case of a

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute made in

order as original text for the purpose of further amendment.

Clause 9(a) of rule XXI is inapposite to such an amendment.

In none of these scenarios would a ruling by a presiding

officer hold that earmarks are or are not included in a

particular measure or proposition. Under clause 9(b) of rule

XXI, the threshold question for the Chair--the cognizability

of a point of order--turns on whether the earmark-disclosure

requirements of clause 9(a) of rule XXI apply to the object

of the special rule in the first place. Embedded in the

question whether a special rule waives the application of

clause 9(a) is the question whether clause 9(a) has any

application.

In these cases to which clause 9 of rule XXI has no

application in the first instance, stating a waiver of all

points of order except those arising under that rule--when

none can so arise--would be, at best, gratuitous. Its

negative implication would be that such a point of order

might lie. That would be as confusing as a waiver of all

points of order against provisions of an authorization bill

except those that can only arise in the case of a general

appropriation bill (e.g., clause 2 of role XXI). Both in this

area and as a general principle, we try hard not to use

language that yields a misleading implication.

I appreciate your consideration and trust that this

response is to be shared among all members of the committee.

Our office will share it with all inquiring parties.

Sincerely,

John V. Sullivan,

Parliamentarian.

Mr. Speaker, even the nonpartisan House Parliamentarian acknowledges what Republicans have been saying since January: that the so-called Democrat earmark rule has more holes than a bowl of Cheerios and that earmark abuse by the broken promise Democrat majority continues to run rampant.

This rules change would simply allow the House to debate openly and honestly about the validity and accuracy of earmarks contained in all bills, not just appropriations bills.

If we defeat the previous question, we then can address that problem today and restore this Congress' nonexistent credibility when it comes to the enforcement of its own rules.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the amendment and extraneous material appear in the Congressional Record just prior to the vote on the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 701 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.

I yield myself such time as I may consume. I also ask unanimous consent that all Members be given 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on House Resolution 701.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 701 provides for consideration of H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act. The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate controlled by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill except clauses 9 and 10 of rule XXI. The rule makes in

order the Oversight and Government Reform Committee reported substitute. The rule makes in order all five germane amendments that were submitted to the Rules Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in favor of the rule and in favor of H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act. I am very proud to be a Member of this new Congress because over the last 9 months we have made huge strides to better our great country.

We have empowered our workers. We have fought to lift up our citizens. And today, I am proud to join my colleagues once again as we press for greater government accountability and work to restore the trust of the American people in this great institution.

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today will amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to ensure necessary government oversight and strengthen the role of the Inspectors General.

Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Inspector General Act. Offices of Inspector General now exist in more than 60 Federal Departments and agencies where they work to combat waste, fraud and abuse.

The Inspectors General have many vital tasks. They act as government watchdogs, conducting audits and examining complaints from agency employees. They actively promote efficiency in government programs, and encourage employee disclosure of waste and fraud.

Our bill today acts to strengthen and clarify their tenure, resources, authority, oversight and autonomy. It is an important action that we are taking today. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, in recent years, politics has crept into the inner workings of the Inspectors General leaving the door open for political pressure and influence to prejudice the job that they are supposed to perform.

Under President Bush, only 18 percent of the Inspectors General have audit experience while 64 percent have political experience. This is in comparison to President Clinton who appointed far more, 66 percent, of Inspectors General with audit experience versus only 22 percent with political experience.

And what's more, over one-half of the IGs appointed by President Bush had made contributions to his campaign or to other Republican candidates and over one-third had worked in a Republican White House prior to their appointment; whereas none of the IGs appointed by President Clinton had worked in a Democratic White House.

These statistics are concerning because the hallmark of Inspectors General must be their independence from the departments and agencies within which they are housed. This independence is crucial because the inspectors are charged with submitting reports to the agency heads and to Congress regarding any failures on the part of their agencies.

When this independence is compromised, the missions and goals of the Inspectors General lose credibility. Their work is critical to ensuring that taxpayer dollars are being used wisely and that our government is working efficiently and effectively.

The Improving Government Accountability Act will strengthen the independence of these important watchdogs. First, it clarifies when the inspectors can be removed from their posts. Under current law, they have limited protection from removal from office. In fact, inspectors that are appointed by the President can be removed by the President without cause. The only requirement is that the President must report the removal to Congress after the removal has already been accomplished. It is much more difficult to be independent when you know that the head of the Department that you are critically evaluating can remove you and that there are no checks on that power.

Our bill specifies that they may only be removed before the end of their term for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. This takes the politics out of a position and a decision- making process where it never should have been in the first place.

Under this new law, removal of an Inspector General must be communicated to both Houses of Congress at least 30 days before that inspector's removal.

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today encourages inspectors to remain in office for at least 7 years by setting a fixed term of office and allowing the inspectors to be renewed at the completion of their term. This allows for greater continuity and increased independence on the part of the inspectors.

Under this legislation, an Inspector General will be allowed to submit budget requests directly to the Office of Management and Budget. This is a vital change. Inspectors General must not be at the mercy of administration officials who have the unbridled power to cut their budget because of disagreement over their findings or improper political influence. Budget autonomy is crucial to the independence of these inspectors.

Further, H.R. 928 establishes the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. This council's task will be to increase the professionalism and effectiveness of the Inspectors General staff. The council will seek out fraud, waste and abuse in Federal programs.

Today, through the Improving Government Accountability Act, we will give the Inspectors General more power to do their job and, more importantly, to do so with heightened independence and integrity.

The trust of the American people is a precious thing. The bill today guarantees that our departments and agencies are worthy of that trust.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas if he has any remaining speakers.

Okay. I'm the last speaker for my side, so I will reserve my time until the gentleman has closed for his side and yielded back his time.

Mr. Speaker, in 1978, the House committee that was then known as Government Operations envisioned Inspectors General as watchdogs to bring accountability and oversight to our agencies. Now, almost 30 years later, we act to update and improve this valuable program.

This important bill will not only bring enhanced continuity and accountability to the Inspectors General; it will strengthen their most important quality: their independence from the Departments and agencies that they inspect.

The American people should have the utmost faith that their precious taxpayer dollars are being used in the most efficient manner. This bill ensures the accountability that our citizens demand and which they deserve.

I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule.

The material referred to previously by Mr. Sessions is as follows:

(The information contained herein was provided by

Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the

109th Congress.)

The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

This vote; the vote on whether to order the previous

question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.

A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote

against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow

the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an

alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be

debating.

Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of

Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the

previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or

control the consideration of the subject before the House

being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous

question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the

subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling

of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the

House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes

the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to

offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the

majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated

the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to

a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to

recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:

``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman

from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to

yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first

recognition.''

Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic

majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is

simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on

adopting the resolution . . . . [and] has no substantive

legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is

not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of

the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual

published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page

56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using

information form Congressional Quarterly's ``American

Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is

defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition

member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages

an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the

pending business.''

Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives,

the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a

refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a

special rule reported from the committee on Rules] opens the

resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21,

section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the

motion for the previous question on a resolution reported

from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member

leading the opposition to the previous question, who may

offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time

for debate thereon.''

Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does

have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only

available tools for those who oppose the Democratic

majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the

opportunity to offer an alternative plan.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act, focuses on the important role of the Inspector General in providing independent oversight within Federal agencies. By investigating and reporting waste, fraud and abuse to both agency leaders and to the Congress, Inspectors General play a critical role in maintaining checks and balances in the Federal Government.

When Congress created the Inspectors General nearly 30 years ago, the idea was that having independent officials inside the Federal agency would help detect and prevent wasteful spending and mismanagement. This concept has been a tremendous success. Investigations by IGs have resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars from companies and individuals who defrauded the Federal Government.

These investigations have led to thousands of criminal prosecutions, contractor debarments, employee suspensions, and in some instances, dismissals.

In sum, the work of IGs to expose criminal and abusive action in government has gone a long way to create the cleaner and more efficient government the taxpaying public expects and deserves.

Of course, even the best systems need some improvement from time to time, and that is the reason for this bill today, to effectively carry out that mission. Inspectors General must be independent and objective, which requires that they be insulated from improper management and political pressure.

To preserve the credibility of the office, Inspectors General must also perform their duties with integrity and apply the same standards of conduct and accountability to themselves as they apply to the agencies that they audit and investigate.

In recent years, there have been several episodes which raised questions about the independence and accountability of IGs. These episodes have been well documented in hearings of the Oversight Committee as well as other standing committees of the House. In some instances, IGs who are seen as too aggressive in pursuing waste at their agencies had their budget cut or were threatened with dismissal. In other cases, IGs who abused their authority remained in office in part because there were no statutory standards or procedures for removal. This bill is designed to address both of those problems. H.R. 928 creates fixed terms of office for Inspectors General and specific reasons for their removal. It allows IGs to submit their budget requests directly to the Congress. The bill establishes an Inspector General council and sets procedures for investigation of potential IG misconduct. And the bill increases the rank and pay of IGs as well.

This is a strong bill and a necessary bill. Passing this bill will send a message that Congress values the work of the Inspectors General and the oversight that they provide.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee, who has been very instrumental in bringing forth this legislation, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to Mr. Yarmuth, the gentleman from Kentucky.

I have no further speakers.

Mr. Chairman, I think this legislation is a giant step in the right direction. I would like to thank the chairman of the full committee, Congressman Waxman. I would like to thank Congressman Davis, the ranking member. I would like to thank subcommittee ranking member, Congressman Bilbray from California. Of course, I would like to thank Mr. Cooper for all of his work on this legislation. And I would like to thank the staff for all of their work in terms of making certain that we were able to come today. I want to thank the sponsors for this bill. Mr. Cooper and I and our colleagues across the aisle have been very open to getting input and making changes to this bill. This is what the legislative process is all about, exchanging ideas, sharing information, and trying to improve the legislation. I think the end result in this bill will increase the Office of Inspector Generals and give them the kind of independence that they need to be able to do the efficient work that is so required. I am excited about the possibilities, of course, and I encourage all my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very good amendment. It is especially important that the Department of Justice IG have the authority to examine a broad range of issues in that Department. Considering all the problems that congressional investigations have recently uncovered, I think that this is a very timely amendment. I really feel that we should aggressively get behind it and support it and encourage our colleagues also to support it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment, I think. I am not sure. Let me ask some questions and then I can make up my mind.

As I understand it, under your amendment, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), each Inspector General's appropriations request as originally made to his or her agency head would be noted in the President's budget submission to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, is that correct?

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, with that in mind, I do support the amendment, and, of course, I am prepared to accept the amendment. It achieves the goal of the budget provision in this bill, which is to expose whether IGs are having their budgets slashed in retaliation of their investigations.

I look forward to working with you as this bill moves through the legislative process to clarify the language of the amendment to ensure that its intent is fulfilled.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a well thought-out amendment. I want to

commend the gentleman from North Carolina for this. It makes it clear that the bill is not intended to protect poorly performing IGs from removal.

There was some question about an IG who managed his office so poorly that it caused most of the senior career staff to quit, and then the IG would still be there. At least this amendment addresses that issue as well by adding gross mismanagement and gross waste of funds and abuse of authority as grounds for removal. This amendment clarifies that an IG who is not an effective leader can be removed for that reason.

We also support the technical and procedural changes that Mr. Miller has included in this amendment. This is a very, very good amendment, and I hope that it has support coming from both sides of the aisle, because this is an amendment that is long overdue.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the committee also supports this amendment by Mr. Miller. One of the problems that we have seen is that recent IG appointments have had far more experience in politics than they have had in investigating and auditing.

The council created by this amendment is advisory, but it will provide an independent evaluation of whether a candidate for appointment has the professional background and experience to succeed in the IG role. This information should be valuable to the President and to the Senate as they fill IG vacancies.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is a fine amendment and I am hoping that both sides of the aisle will support it. This is what strengthening legislation is all about, dialogue on both sides and then supporting. So I am hoping this amendment gets a strong, strong vote. It is a good amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment. I think it is a very good amendment because it deals with waste, fraud and abuse. I think anything that strengthens this bill, I am for. There is no question about it, my colleague from New York definitely improves the legislation. Therefore, I am in total support of the amendment, and would encourage my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House in the motion to recommit, I report H.R. 928 back to the House with an amendment.

I would first like to thank the subcommittee chairman, my friend, Mr. Towns, for doing an outstanding job on this and other legislation. I want to thank the ranking member, Mr. Davis, who has been particularly accommodating in working on this bill to do a better job for the Federal taxpayer. That's what this is all about, making government work better. If there has ever been a good government measure, this is it.

I also want to thank the full committee chairman, Mr. Waxman, who was so helpful in so many ways, and the outstanding staff of this committee, the Government Reform Committee. There is none better on the Hill, perhaps in the history of the Hill, so we are very proud of their work.

Finally, let me thank my personal staff, my legislative director, Cicely Simpson. She has been a tireless champion of this bill, and even her predecessor, Anne Kim.

Sadly, this good government measure has taken years to come to the floor and to be passed by the House of Representatives, but now we're making progress, and the Federal taxpayer will benefit as a result.

Now, why do I say this is such a good government measure? There are some 58 IGs scattered throughout the Federal Government. They are the fiscal watchdogs for the taxpayer. They are the first line of defense against fraud, waste and mismanagement in Federal Government. These IGs and their staff save many, many times more money than their salary cost or their benefit cost. These are the folks who see the fraud first and catch it before it gets too big.

Let me give you an example. In today's Washington Post, there is a new GAO study that comes out and it says, Federal officials too often flying first and business class, GAO finds, their leg room and your tax dollars.

The GAO has found that $146 million was spent just in the last year for improper Federal first class and business travel. They could go through agency after agency naming executives who have abused the Federal credit card. This is an outrage. Now, by Federal standards, this is a relatively small outrage, but this is the sort of stuff that needs to be caught and caught early.

This is also why we need Inspector General independence, because they're not going to be popular when they point out to their agency head or other senior officials in Federal Government that they shouldn't have been flying first class. That endangers the IG's position because that is not a popular thing to do.

One of the folks here was caught flying his entire family of eight from Washington, D.C. to Eastern Europe first class. That's wrong. And I'm sure the Federal executive wanted to take his whole family first class, but these are Federal tax dollars at stake.

So this is a very important bill. It is very important to update the original IG legislation. It has been on the books since 1978. Problems have occurred since then, and now we will fix those problems.

Now, it has been noted here today by the ranking member, and I appreciate his courage in opposing the administration veto on this, the veto threat. A SAP has been issued, a Statement of Administration Policy, and in my opinion, at least, the grounds for this threatened veto are remarkably flimsy. So I hope that the Members listening

back in their offices and their staff, particularly across the aisle, will pay close attention to the reasons that the administration says it objects to this reform legislation and to figure out whether those reasons are really valid.

There are two fundamental grounds. First of all, they object to ``for cause'' dismissal. I think perhaps the Bush administration feels this is somehow aimed at them. It's not. Everyone knows that by the time this legislation is fully administered, the next administration will be in place. This legislation is really designed to help all administrations, whatever their political stripe. So it's very important to realize that the ``for cause'' language that the administration objects to has already been removed at the urging of the ranking member, due to his excellent amendment in committee, for half of the IG agencies. It only remains for the Cabinet-level agencies. Why? Because those folks should have a 7-year term and have full political independence so that they can make the tough calls, even if it means denying a Cabinet Secretary first-class airfare to Europe. They need independence.

The second grounds that the administration has posed for objecting to this legislation is they shouldn't have separate budget submissions. Now, I was down eating lunch with one of my colleagues a few minutes ago, and he had the mistaken notion that somehow this would be an entire separate budget for the entire agency. That's not true. This is just the IG's own budget for the IG and his or her staff. So that's a very modest request, that the IG cannot be pressured by the agency head. So that, to me, also is a pretty flimsy ground for objecting to this legislation.

So, I would urge all Members to take a close look. This is good government legislation. This will save the taxpayer billions of dollars, according to the committee report. Just last year, IG recommendations saved $9.9 billion in audit recommendations and $6.8 billion in investigative recoveries. That's $15 billion-plus for the Federal taxpayer. We need to be saving much more money like this, and IGs and this bill can do it.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to take the time in opposition to the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate my friend, the gentleman from North Carolina, because he has been an excellent Member of this body for some time and has worked on the Science Committee and has contributed greatly to the work of this body. I am particularly grateful for his work on the IG issue.

I want to make it crystal clear to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that the gentleman's amendment essentially makes it easier to fire IGs. I support that. I think the gentleman's reasoning is sound.

I also think it is very important that Members on the other side the aisle realize that this largely should eliminate the President's veto threat, because the primary grounds in this Statement of Administration Policy for opposing this bill is that IGs may be too hard to fire. Well, the gentleman's helpful amendment adds additional grounds that makes it easier to get rid of errant IGs if they knowingly violate the law, rule or regulation, if they are guilty of gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds or abuse of authority. So that should obviate the administration's objections to this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I hope by accepting the gentleman from North Carolina's amendment we cannot only promote the cause of good government, we can also get the folks at OMB and in the administration to relax and realize what a good bill this is. So I would urge a huge and bipartisan majority vote for this legislation thanks to the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I speak as a Blue Dog Democrat, and I'm proud to see progressives and Blue Dogs, Democrats and Republicans coming together on this important good government cause. We've been working on it for 4 years now, and now it's about to pass. We're about to send it to the Senate, hopefully, with a huge vote, because Members on both sides of the aisle can agree that we need to cut out waste, fraud and abuse in government, and there's no better group to do it than our Inspectors General. That's what this bill does, empower Inspectors General. So I want to thank the chairman, Mr. Waxman, for his outstanding work with our ranking member. We've done a great job of moving this and other important legislation before Congress.