Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007

Mr. President, I rise today with Senator Collins, Senator Durbin, Senator Feingold, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Casey to introduce legislation to authorize a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy and posture.

Before we ramp up funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program as the administration has requested, we should have a clear, bipartisan consensus on the role nuclear weapons will play in our national security strategy and the impact they will have on our nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007 does three things.

First, it authorizes the President to conduct a nuclear policy review to consider a range of possible roles of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy. The administration may reach out to outside experts and conduct public hearings to get a wide range of views. The policy review will provide options and recommendations for a nuclear posture review.

This report is due on September 1, 2009.

Second, following the completion of the nuclear policy review, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. to clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. This report is due March 1, 2010.

Finally, it zeros out funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program until the policy review and posture review reports have been submitted to Congress.

In his testimony on March 29, 2007, before the House Energy & Water Appropriations Subcommittee, former Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of Nuclear Threat Initiative, noted that:

On the [Reliable Replacement Warhead] itself, if Congress

gives a green light to this program in our current world

environment, I believe that this will be: misunderstood by

our allies; exploited by our adversaries; complicate our work

to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and . . .

make resolution of the Iran and North Korea challenges all

the more difficult.

I could not agree more.

Indeed, I remain deeply concerned about this administration's nuclear weapons policy.

As a U.S. Senator, I have worked with colleagues in the House and Senate to stop the re-opening of the nuclear door and the development of new nuclear weapons.

Together, we have eliminated funding for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and the Modern Pit Facility.

These were consequential victories but the fight is far from over.

For fiscal year 2008, the administration requested $118 million for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program; $88 million in the National Nuclear Security administration's budget and $30 million in the Department of Defense's budget.

These funds would be used for Phase 2A activities: design definition and cost study.

This would represent approximately a four-fold increase over fiscal year 2007 funding of $24.7 million.

The House, however, rejected the administration's request and zeroed out funding for RRW in its fiscal year 2008 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill. In its report accompanying the legislation, the House cited the lack of a definitive nuclear weapons policy review as a key reason for withholding funding for what will be a costly new nuclear warhead program. It stated:

The lack of any definitive analysis or strategic assessment

defining the objectives of a future nuclear stockpile makes

it impossible to weigh the relative merits of investing

billions of taxpayer dollars in new nuclear weapon production

activities when the United States is facing the problem of

having too large a stockpile as a Cold War legacy. Currently,

there exists no convincing rationale for maintaining the

large number of existing Cold War nuclear weapons, much less

producing additional warheads, or for the DoD requirements

that drive the management of the DOE nuclear weapons complex.

While the Senate bill did not follow suit, it did cut $22 million from the administration's request, for a total of $66 million, and restricted activities to Phase 2A.

I believe we can match the House's action and this bill would do just that.

The administration is clearly getting nervous about the prospects for funding for RRW.

On Wednesday, the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and State released a 4-page white paper on nuclear weapons strategy: ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century''. It affirmed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and sought to justify funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Among other things, it stated that the Reliable Replacement Warhead program is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in the nuclear stockpile and will help reduce the stockpile and move us away from nuclear testing; and any delay to the program will force the U.S. to maintain a larger stockpile, invest in costly and risky Life Extension Programs, and increase the likelihood that we will have to resume nuclear testing.

These arguments simply do not stand up to scrutiny.

Indeed the evidence clearly shows that there is no need to rush forward with increased funding for RRW. Let us take a close look at the status of our nuclear weapons arsenal.

Are there currently problems with the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal?

No, for each of the past 11 years the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense have certified that the nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable.

Has the Pentagon asked for a new warhead for new missions?

No, there is no new military requirement to replace existing, well- tested warheads.

What about the plutonium pit, the ``trigger'' of a nuclear weapon? In past years, the administration requested funding for a Modern Pit Facility that could build up to 450 pits a year arguing that the pits in our current stockpile were reaching the end of their life-span.

Is our stockpile at risk due to aging pits?

No, a December 2006 report by the National Laboratories showed that plutonium pits have a life-span of at least 85 years, and possibly up to 100 years.

That report validated Congressional action to eliminate funding for the Modern Pit Facility. I am pleased that the administration listened and did not request funding for the facility in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008.

Are we at risk for resuming nuclear testing?

No, as I have argued our stockpile is safe and secure and will clearly remain so for the foreseeable future.

If the likelihood of resuming nuclear testing is increasing it is due to the fact that the administration has, in past years, requested funding to lower the time to test readiness at the Nevada test site from 24-36 months to 18 months and, above all, refused to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT.

What about costs? I find it interesting that the administration would cite the costs of successful Life Extension Programs as a reason to ramp up funding for the RRW.

Has the administration shared with us what it will cost to replace the warhead on our deployed nuclear arsenal with a new Reliable Replacement Warhead?

The answer is no. The administration has remained silent about when the supposed cost savings from RRW will ultimately kick in.

In fact, the development of a new nuclear warhead will likely add billions of dollars to the American taxpayer's bill at a time when, as noted above, the stockpile is safe and reliable. As the House Energy and Water Appropriations report argued:

Under any realistic future U.S. nuclear defense scenario,

the existing legacy stockpile will continue to provide the

nation's nuclear deterrent for well over the next two to

three decades. The effort by the NNSA to apply urgency to

developing a significant production capacity for the RRW

while lacking any urgency to rationalize an oversized complex

appears to mean simply more costs to the American taxpayer.

Before we move any further with this program which would add a new warhead to the stockpile, we should have a better understanding of the role nuclear weapons will play in our security policy in a post-Cold War and post 9/11 world.

If we as a country are going to move away from massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons and explore more conventional alternatives, does it make sense to add a new warhead to the stockpile?

If we are committed to strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, what impact would a Reliable Replacement Warhead have on those efforts?

If the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program can certify the safety and the reliability of our existing nuclear stockpile, should we shift resources from RRW to more pressing concerns?

It is common sense to ask these questions and engage in comprehensive review and debate about these options before we make the decision on manufacturing new warheads.

As it stands now, we are addressing this issue backwards and behind closed doors.

That is, we are rushing to develop a new warhead without an understanding of the role it will play in our nuclear weapons policy and national security strategy and without public input that will lead to a bipartisan policy.

Let us be clear: a rushed, four page white paper is simply not sufficient to answer these questions and make decisions about developing new nuclear warheads.

The administration has promised a more detailed report but its haste to put out this paper suggests that it is more intent on rushing the development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program than in taking a sober,

unbiased look at our nuclear weapons policy and posture.

A lack of a substantive debate and review means we are not paying sufficient attention to the potential negative consequences of RRW.

Speeding up the development of a new nuclear warhead may send the wrong message to Iran; North Korea; and other would-be nuclear weapon states and encourage the very proliferation we are trying to prevent.

What to us may appear to be a safer, more reliable weapon could appear to others to be a new weapon with new missions and a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a report last month acknowledging that a Reliable Replacement Warhead ``could lead to a final selected design that is certifiable without a nuclear test.''

Yet, the report also concluded that absent a comprehensive review of nuclear policy and stockpile needs, the purpose and intention of RRW could be widely misinterpreted abroad.

Pointing out that there has been no high level statement about nuclear weapons policy since the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, it called on the administration to develop a bipartisan policy on the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy before moving ahead with RRW. It stated:

In the absence of a clear nuclear posture, many

interpretations are possible [about U.S. nuclear weapons

policy] and the lack of a national understanding and

consensus on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons puts any new

approach at considerable risk at home and abroad. For

example, an RRW plan that emphasizes the goal of sustaining

the deterrent without nuclear testing could be perceived

quite differently from one that focuses on future flexibility

to develop and deploy nuclear weapons for new military

mission.

It goes on to state:

. . . nuclear weapons are ultimately an instrument of

policy and strategy rather than of war fighting, and only

with the leadership of the president can there be major

changes in that instrument.

Unfortunately we have not seen such leadership from this administration.

Because it pursued the development of low-yield nuclear weapons and a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, because it sought to lower the time- to-test readiness at the Nevada test site from 24-26 months to 18 months, because it sought to build a Modern Pit Facility that could produce up to 450 pits a year, this administration has lost the credibility to take a fresh and open look at nuclear weapons policy and posture.

Only a new administration, free from the constraints of the heated debates of the past, will have the authority to conduct a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy and posture.

A bipartisan consensus on this policy is essential. It will let the world know exactly where we stand on these important issues and help clear up any confusion about our intentions.

Friend and foe alike will know that regardless of who holds power in Congress or the White House, the role of nuclear weapons in our security strategy will not change.

It will strengthen our efforts to convince other states to forego the development of nuclear weapons and make the world safer from the threat of nuclear war.

I believe that bipartisan policy is beginning to emerge.

In a January 4, 2007 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons'', George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn laid out a compelling vision for a world free of the threat of nuclear war.

They laid a set of common sense steps the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states can take to make this happen including: taking nuclear weapons off high-alert status; substantially reducing the size of nuclear stockpiles; eliminating short-ranged nuclear weapons; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; securing all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium around the world; getting control of the uranium enrichment process; stopping production of fissile material for nuclear weapons globally; resolving regional confrontations that encourage the development of nuclear weapons.

They conclude:

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear

weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal

would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative

consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could

have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future

generations. Without that bold vision, the actions will not

be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the

vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We should pay close attention to these words.

In conclusion, let me say that there is a big difference between an RRW program that increases the reliability of the existing stockpile and one that leads to a resumption of nuclear testing.

Congress should ask the tough questions to ensure that this is not a back door to new nuclear weapons with new missions and new rounds of testing.

I firmly believe we should zero out for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program until the next administration takes a serious look at our nuclear weapons programs and issues a bipartisan policy on the size of the future stockpile, testing, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

I look forward to working with my colleagues and the administration to craft that sensible, bipartisan nuclear weapons policy that will make Americans safe and allow us to reclaim a leadership role in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce bipartisan legislation with my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Hagel. The bill addresses an issue of paramount importance to our country and its quality of life: the deteriorating condition of our infrastructure systems.

I do not believe there is one person present in this chamber, funding myself, who has not taken our Nation's infrastructure systems for granted at some point. Indeed, our roads, bridges, mass transit systems, drinking water systems, wastewater systems, and public housing properties, collectively comprise the overlooked but critically important adhesive that holds our society together. These systems allow for the continuous passage of people and goods across the country; they allow people to communicate with each other here and around the world; they allow business and Government to function; and they allow goods to be consumed and services to be rendered. All in all, our infrastructure systems are directly responsible for providing the high quality of life that we Americans have come to enjoy in a free society.

Yet, it is precisely because we have taken our infrastructure systems for granted that we find ourselves in a precarious position today concerning their future viability. One does not have to look far to comprehend the extensive problems plaguing many of our infrastructure systems and facilities.

According to the American Society of Civil Engineers in their seminal 2005 Infrastructure Report Card, the current condition of our Nation's major infrastructure systems earns a grade point average of D and jeopardizes the prosperity and quality of life of all Americans.

According to the Federal Highway Administration, 33 percent of all urban and rural roads are in poor, mediocre or fair condition. 27.1 percent of all bridges are structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. Data from the Federal Transit Administration shows our mass transit systems are becoming increasingly unable to handle the growing demands passengers in a safe and efficient manner. According to the Texas Transportation Institute, the average traveler is delayed 51.5 hours annually due to traffic and infrastructure-related congestion in the Nation's

20 largest metropolitan areas. The delays range from 93 hours in Los Angeles to 14 hours in Pittsburgh. Combined, these delays waste 1.78 billion gallons of fuel each year and waste almost $50.3 billion in congestion costs. Furthermore, the average delay in these metropolitan areas has increased by almost 35.3 hours since 1982.

A significant percentage of our Nation's drinking water and wastewater systems are obsolete; the average age of these systems range in age from 50 years in smaller cities to 100 years in larger cities. Finally, the Department of Housing and Urban Development reports there are 1.2 million units of public housing with critical capital needs totaling $18 billion. Clearly, these statistics are alarming and they are not getting any better.

In their Infrastructure Report Card, the American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that $1.6 trillion is needed over a 5-year period to bring our Nation's infrastructure systems to a good condition.

Regrettably, our current infrastructure financing mechanisms, such as formula grants and earmarks, are not equipped by themselves to absorb this cost or meet fully these growing needs. They largely do not address capacity-building infrastructure projects of regional or national significance; they largely do not encourage an appropriate pooling of Federal, State, local and private resources; and they largely do not provide transparency to ensure the optimal return on public resources.

This is why I rise with my colleague from Nebraska today. We are introducing the National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, a bipartisan measure that addresses the critical needs of our Nation's major infrastructure systems. Our legislation establishes a new method through which the Federal Government can finance infrastructure projects of substantial regional or national significance more effectively with public and private capital.

Our legislation establishes the National Infrastructure Bank, which, as an independent entity of the Government, is tasked with evaluating and financing capacity-building infrastructure projects of substantial regional and national significance. Infrastructure projects that come under the bank's consideration are publicly-owned mass transit systems, housing properties, roads, bridges, drinking water systems, and wastewater systems.

Modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the bank is led by a 5 member Board of Directors, each whom are appointed by the Prsident and confirmed by the Senate. The bank's board has flexibility to develop an organization of professional civil service staff to carry out the bank's authorized activities. An Inspector General oversees the bank's daily operations and reports on those operations to Congress.

Infrastructure projects with a potential Federal investment of at least $75 million are brought to the bank's attention by a project sponsor, State, locality, tribe, infrastructure agency, e.g. transit agency, a consortium of these entities. To determine a level of Federal investment, the bank uses a sliding-scale method that incorporates conditions such as the type of infrastructure system or systems, project location, project cost, current and projected usage, non- Federal revenue, regional or national significance, promotion of economic growth and community development, reduction in traffic congestion, environmental benefits, land use policies that promote smart growth, and mobility improvements.

Once a level of investment is determined for a project, the bank develops a financing package with full faith and credit from the government. The financing package could include direct subsidies, direct loan guarantees, long-term tax-credit general purpose bonds, and long-term tax-credit infrastructure project specific bonds. The initial ceiling to issue bonds is $60 billion.

The bank is tasked to report annually to Congress on the projects it reviews and finances. A public database is created to catalog what projects were funded and what financing packages were provided. The bank is also tasked to report every 3 years on the economic efficacy and transparency of all current Federal infrastructure financing methods, and how those methods could be improved. After 5 years, the Government Accountability Office would be tasked with evaluating the bank's operations and efficacy.

It is important to note that our legislation does not displace or supplant any existing infrastructure finance mechanisms, such as formula grants and earmarks. Instead, the bank targets large-scale projects that are currently underserved by these existing financing mechanisms.

I would like to take a moment to thank the Centers for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, and the work undertaken by Dr. John Hamre in infrastucture finance. CSIS, Ambassador Felix Rohatyn, and former Senator Warren Rudman have provided valuable assistance and support in the development of our legislation.

I would also like to thank the American Society of Civil Engineers and the National Construction Alliance for their support of our bill.

It is my intent to take up this legislation in the Banking Committee after the August recess. This is an issue that cannot be neglected or deferred any further. Restoring our Nation's infrastructure demands our immediate attention and commitment in the Senate. The quality of life in our country hangs in the balance.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and letters of support be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, today Senator Snowe and I are introducing the TSA Acquisition Reform Act of 2007 to repeal exemptions from Federal contracting laws that were granted to the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, after 9/11 in the rush to secure airports. Representative Carney has introduced identical legislation in the House and I look forward to working with him to improve contracting at TSA.

TSA is one of the few Federal agencies and the only agency within the Department of Homeland Security that is not subject to the same procurement rules that every other Federal agency, including the Department of Defense, must abide.

Specifically, it is exempt from the Federal Acquisition Regulation, FAR, which covers every major procurement law and requires Federal agencies to provide for an open and competitive bidding process and submit contract information to the Federal Procurement Data System. TSA's exemption from the FAR was never meant to be permanent, and this amendment would bring the agency in line with normal Federal contracting rules.

TSA has a record of mismanaging contracts and wasting taxpayer dollars, and has been the subject of several DOT and DHS Inspector General reports. For instance, in 2002, TSA, despite using FAR guidelines, issued a federally prohibited cost-plus-a-percentage contract to Boeing to install explosive detection systems in airports. In September 2004, the IG found that the initial $508 million contract ballooned to $1.2 billion, that Boeing was paid $49 million in excess profit, received $82 million to cover $39 million in costs, and ultimately received a 210 percent return on its investment.

In 2005, the Washington Post reported on an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency which showed that a contract issued to the Pearson government solutions firm to recruit Federal passenger screeners increased in cost from $104 million to $741 million in 9 months in part because TSA changed the scope of the contract to require Pearson to use posh hotels, including the Waldorf Astoria, as recruitment centers. TSA disputes this account, but cannot provide any paperwork to back it up. The article quoted Deputy DHS Secretary Michael Jackson as saying, ``Honestly, I have no memory of it.''

In 2004, the when the GAO wanted to review 21 TSA contracts, it literally had to send staff to rummage through boxes of files to retrieve information that would otherwise have been in the Federal Procurement Data System.

As Chairman of the Small Business Committee, I am particular concerned about TSA's inability to meet its small business contracting goals. I am pleased that the 2007 DHS Appropriations bill applied the Small Business Act to TSA, but small business owners won't truly benefit because TSA is still exempt from basic contracting rules under the FAR that helps them compete for Federal contracts. Although TSA's small business contracting goal is 23 percent annually, only 10.7 percent of its contracts went to small businesses in 2005. Analysis conducted by my staff suggest that the true figure is closer to 6 percent because many of the large corporations that contract with TSA set up subsidiaries that technically qualify as small businesses but are in fact part of a larger corporation. I am concerned about this and I know that my colleague, Senator Snowe, the ranking member of the Small Business Committee, is concerned as well.

There is another important reason to require TSA to follow the FAR. DHS, which encompasses 22 different agencies, is trying to create a unified procurement system and a common culture within the department. The Comptroller General noted last year before the House Homeland Security Committee that ``the various acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a disparate manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up to each individual component.'' How can DHS create a common contracting system when the agency that spends the most money on contracts within the department is exempt from the department's own rules?

It would be wrong to suggest that exemption from FAR is the main reason that TSA has mismanaged contracts. Its acquisition office was understaffed after 9/11, and there was a rush to meet Congressional deadlines that led to sloppy oversight. I understand that TSA has spent millions to improve its contracting office and I commend it for doing so. However, it is far from clear that TSA has a functional procurement system. A 2006 GAO review of the ongoing Boeing contract suggests that poor contracting oversight continues to plague TSA. The report states that ``TSA officials provided no evidence that they are reviewing required contractor submitted performance data,'' and that they ``do not document their activities because there are no TSA policies and procedures requiring them to do so. I know all Members would agree that this is a problem.

Unfortunately, lack of transparency and accountability are common themes in TSA's procurement history. Former DHS IG Kent Ervin has said that ``TSA is rapidly becoming the poster child for contracting dysfunction.'' Citizens Against Government Waste, which has endorsed this amendment, said in a letter to my office that ``TSA has a record of wasteful spending and mismanagement in its acquisition process and a continued exemption will only lead to more abuse.'' I think we would be remiss in our oversight responsibilities if we did not repeal these exemptions. TSA should not be policing itself.

I am not alone with these concerns. Just ask the Professional Services Council, the Nation's largest trade association representing Government contractors. In a letter to sent to my office yesterday, the PSC stated that my amendment will ``increase competition, expand opportunities for small businesses, provide greater accountability and transparency in their procurement process.'' This judgment comes from the association representing the contractors that do business with TSA.

Last year, TSA sent a letter to my office saying that it follows the FAR as a general rule but that its exemption ``benefits taxpayers.'' Amazingly, TSA criticized the FAR's requirement that Federal agencies consider all interested companies in the bidding process, saying that ``negatively impacts the limited resources of the government.'' It is hard to see how taxpayers benefit when an agency has the ability to opt out of the competitive bidding process at its choosing. The Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force, none of these agencies can simply decide to opt out of the FAR unless they meet the criteria for an exemption which is already provided for under the law.

This legislation is simple: apply the same rules to TSA that every other agency has to follow. There is no legitimate reason to maintain these exemptions--not for efficiency, not for national security. If it is good enough for the Department of Defense, it is good enough for

Mr. President, about a year ago, a group of hardwood plywood

manufacturers came to me with a problem, Chinese hardwood plywood imports were threatening their businesses. They raised a whole host of issues, from tariff misclassification to subsidies to fraudulent labeling to illegal logging. These unfair and illegal practices were lowering the costs of the Chinese hardwood plywood imports, giving them an unfair advantage over U.S. hardwood plywood and putting American companies in jeopardy of going out of business and the folks that they employ out of work.

Since that time, I have been working to level the playing field for Oregon hardwood plywood manufacturers and protect the jobs of the workers that they employ. I have met with the Department of Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Customs and Border Patrol, and the International Trade Commission and urged them to investigate these issues and, where appropriate, act to address them. They have, raising these troubling practices in diplomatic negotiations, opening investigations, and even filing a case before the World Trade Organization targeting Chinese subsidies that benefit the hardwood plywood industry, among others.

Today, with the support of industry, labor, and the environmental community, I am proud to introduce the Combat Illegal Logging Act of 2007 to halt the trade in illegal timber and timber products. This act will help to level the playing field, not just for Oregon hardwood plywood manufacturers affected by Chinese imports, but for all American manufacturers across the country struggling to compete against imported, low-priced wood and wood products harvested from illegal sources.

Equally important, the act helps address an illegal logging crisis. From the Amazon to the Congo Basin, from Sulawesi to Siberia, illegal logging is destroying ecosystems. It is gutting local economies. It is annihilating ways of life. Because of the speed and violence with which illegal logging is occurring, failing to curb its effects now may result in irreversible damage.

The bill that I am introducing today can help curb illegal logging and thwart its devastating consequences.

The Lacey Act currently regulates trade in fish, wildlife, and a limited subset of plants by making it unlawful to ``import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase'' any that are taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any State law or, with respect to fish and wildlife only, any foreign law. The Combat Illegal Logging Act of 2007 would expand the Lacey Act so that violations of foreign law that apply to plants and plant products fall within its protections. It would also specify the types of foreign law violations that trigger Lacey Act liability, laws intended to prevent theft or ensure the legal right to harvest the plants. Finally, the act would create a declaration requirement to facilitate the Lacey Act's enforcement for timber without placing an undue burden upon law-abiding businesses.

The declaration requirements provide basic transparency for wood shipments. The declaration will have critical value for combating illegal logging by 1. encouraging importers to ask basic questions regarding the origin of their timber and timber products; 2. providing information at the point of import that will allow authorities with limited resources to do efficient, targeted inspections and enforcement; and 3. helping enforcement agents to immediately identify ``low-hanging fruit,'' such as timber expressly prohibited to be exported.

The act will definitely change the way that folks who are importing illegally harvested timber and wood products do business, this is its intended purpose. But for the many companies who already play by the rules, the act's requirements should result in minimal changes to the way they operate. Moreover, when the act's impact from a competitiveness standpoint is factored in, the effect is a net positive for these companies. This act changes the incentives to reward due diligence, a sound long-term business strategy from any perspective.

This bill is the culmination of hundreds of hours of work by stakeholders that many might view as strange bedfellows. The principal negotiators of the compromise, the American Forest & Paper Association, the Hardwood Federation, and the Environmental Investigation Agency, deserve a tremendous amount of credit for sticking with this and finding a solution that everyone could support. I applaud them for their hard work, the maturity with which they approached the issue, and the respect that they showed each other throughout the process. Their conduct is a model for how things should work in Washington.

I would also like to applaud the work of several of my colleagues in the House, Congressman Blumenauer, Congressman Wexler, and Congressman Weller, who introduced their own illegal logging bill, the Legal Timber Protection Act, earlier this year. I understand that their bill may be taken up by the House Natural Resources Committee this fall and I am hopeful that they will substitute the broadly supported text of the Combat Illegal Logging Act for their bill, paving the way for the enactment of this important piece of legislation.

I would like to thank Senator Alexander, Senator Kerry, Senator Snowe, and Senator Feingold for agreeing to be original cosponsors of the bill. I would also like to thank the following organizations, in addition to the American Forest & Paper Association, the Hardwood Federation, and the Environmental Investigation Agency for endorsing the bill: Center for International Environmental Law, Conservation International, Defenders of Wildlife, Dogwood Alliance, ForestEthics, Friends of the Earth, Global Witness, Greenpeace, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, National Hardwood Lumber Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, Rainforest Action Network, Rainforest Alliance, Sierra Club, Society of American Foresters, Sustainable Furniture Council, The Nature Conservancy, Tropical Forest Trust, United Steelworkers, Wildlife Conservation Society, World Wildlife Fund.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be inserted in the Record.

Mr. President, I am proud to join with Senator Hatch to introduce the Trade Enforcement Act of 2007. This bill will provide the administration additional tools, resources, and accountability to enforce international trade agreements abroad and domestic trade remedy laws here at home.

Over 400 years ago, William Shakespeare wrote ``The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.'' The same could be said of our trade enforcement laws today.

The administration has many tools at its disposal to enforce international trade agreements. It can file dispute settlement cases in the World Trade Organization, WTO. It has Section 301 to fight market access barriers. It has Special 301 to address intellectual property violations abroad. It has Section 421 to remedy Chinese import surges that cause injury here at home.

But having these rules on the books is not enough. We need to enforce them.

There is a very real sense among Americans that our trading partners do not play by the rules. And there is a very real sense that the U.S. Government is allowing them to get away with it.

That is why I am introducing the Trade Enforcement Act of 2007--to ensure that the administration has the resources to enforce our existing trade laws, to provide political accountability when it does not, and to create new tools that address the enforcement priorities of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and service suppliers.

This legislation bolsters enforcement of U.S. trade agreements in three important ways.

First, it requires the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, to dedicate more time to enforcement. The bill requires USTR to provide an annual report to Congress identifying the most significant barriers to U.S. companies abroad and to take enforcement action to resolve them. It also makes trade enforcement more accountable to Congress. The bill allows the Senate Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee to require USTR to identify a specific barrier in its annual report. And, significantly, the bill creates a Senate-confirmed Chief Enforcement Officer at USTR to investigate and prosecute trade enforcement cases.

Second, the bill addresses serious concerns that have been raised about the quality of recent World Trade Organization dispute settlement decisions. It does so by establishing a commission of retired judges and international trade law experts to review the decisions and determine whether they impose obligations on the U.S. that are not found in the text of the WTO agreements. The bill also prevents the administration from changing a regulation to comply with an adverse WTO decision until Congress receives the commission's report.

Third, the bill ensures that other U.S. government agencies do not use foreign policy and other noneconomic rationales to block USTR from taking tough enforcement actions. It clarifies that while USTR must carefully consider any advice provided by the interagency trade organization established under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, it need not, and shall not, seek approval of its actions from the organization.

The bill also bolsters enforcement of U.S. trade remedy laws in four important ways.

First, the bill limits the President's discretion to deny relief in Section 421 cases to address Chinese import surges. This administration has utterly failed to use this trade remedy as Congress intended. It has denied relief in every case where the International Trade Commission, ITC, determined that relief was warranted. Our bill remedies this deficiency by requiring the President to proclaim any import relief that the ITC recommends unless the President finds, in extraordinary cases, that the relief would seriously harm our national security or would have an adverse impact on our economy that clearly and significantly outweighs the benefits. Congress may override the economic determination and reinstate the ITC's decision if it enacts a joint resolution of disapproval.

Second, the bill makes it easier for U.S. companies to obtain relief from subsidized imports from certain countries. It clarifies that the Commerce Department may apply countervailing duties to nonmarket economies like China. The Commerce Department has long taken the position that our countervailing duty laws do not apply to nonmarket economies, and it has refused to do so until very recently. The bill closes this loophole and eliminates any remaining uncertainty.

Third, the bill makes it easier for U.S. companies to obtain relief from subsidized and dumped imports from all countries by overriding the Federal Circuit's recent Bratsk decision. The bill provides that the ITC must make its injury determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases without regard to whether imports from other countries are likely to replace imports from the country under investigation.

Fourth, the bill increases intellectual property expertise at the ITC. It authorizes the ITC to appoint hearing officers, rather than administrative law judges, ALJs, to take evidence and make initial decisions in intellectual property investigations under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Unlike the current ALJs, the hearing officers would be required to have technical expertise and experience in intellectual property law.

The overarching goal of this bill is, as Shakespeare might say, to ``wake up'' our trade laws from their current slumber and ensure that the administration enforces them to the fullest extent. Our farmers, ranchers, and companies deserve nothing less.

I therefore hope that my colleagues will support the Trade Enforcement Act of 2007.