Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007

Mr. President, before I describe some of the most important provisions in this legislation, I want to thank the 9/11 families who have played a critical role throughout this process. They first pushed for the establishment of the 9/11 Commission and then continued their fight, now through three major pieces of legislation, to see that its recommendations became law.

I want to thank the majority leader of the Senate for his leadership in helping to get this legislation through the Congress, and through a long but ultimately very productive conference.

I want to thank Senator Collins, Chairman Thompson, Senator Collins, Congressman King, and all of my colleagues on the conference committee--and their staffs--on both sides of the aisle, from all of the relevant committees, and in both the House and the Senate for their willingness to work

through some difficult but critical issues to make our country safer.

All of us have not been able to agree on everything in this legislation, but most of us have agreed on most of it and that is why we are able to get this comprehensive legislation to the Congress, and hopefully, very soon, to the President's desk.

While this Nation was born in conflict, it was founded and grew in compromise--the melding of different threads of policy and personality into a national fabric that covers and protects us all.

This legislation was also born of conflict--the attacks by Islamist extremist terrorists against us on 9/11, and our response to these terrorists grows stronger as we come together in legislation like this.

This comprehensive, bipartisan legislation will make our Nation stronger, our cities and towns more secure and our families safer. Let me cite a few of its most important points:

Security enhancement in the legislation:

First, this legislation will help close one of the most obvious, and dangerous vulnerabilities in our Nation's defenses--that is the millions of cargo containers that flow into our country every year without being scanned and which could be the vehicle for bringing dangerous nuclear material into our country.

It requires that within 5 years, 100 percent of maritime cargo be scanned before it is loaded on ships in foreign ports bound for the United States. But it wisely gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to extend this deadline in 2-year increments if certain conditions important to our economy are not met. This has been a contentious issue--but I believe this legislation strikes the right balance between aggressively pushing for better security while ensuring that we maintain a sensible approach.

This legislation also enhances security in nonaviation sectors that have received far too little protection in our own country, even while terrorists have demonstrated a willingness to attack them abroad--most notably in London and in Madrid. It requires that rail and transit systems work with DHS to develop comprehensive risk assessments and security plans, and authorizes more than $4 billion over 4 years for rail, transit, and bus security grants.

Keeping in mind that the 9/11 hijackers and Richard Reed, the shoe bomber, boarded commercial aircraft and traveled here legally, this legislation will make it harder for terrorists to enter our country, by adding much needed security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program. These include a new electronic travel authorization system so that travelers from visa waiver countries can be checked against terrorist watch lists and improved reporting of lost and stolen passports.

This legislation also increases resources and staffing for the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and requires DHS to create a terrorist travel program to develop strategies and ensure coordination among relevant agencies involved with combating terrorist travel.

This legislation will also better secure our aviation system overall. It authorizes important funding increases for critical aviation security programs, like checkpoint screening, baggage screening and cargo screening on passenger aircraft. And it requires screening of all cargo carried onto passenger airlines within three years--again, closing another glaring vulnerability in our defenses that terrorists could exploit.

One of the critical failures of 9/11 was, of course, the failure to share vital information--and improving information sharing was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

While we have previously taken important steps to improve the unity of effort across intelligence agencies by creating the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counter Terrorism Center, this legislation moves the ball even further by strengthening the Information Sharing Environment, ISE, which was also established in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It does so by extending the term of the ISE program manager and authorizing him or her to issue government-wide standards for information sharing, as appropriate, and rewarding government employees for sharing information.

And it will improve the sharing of information between the Federal Government and its State and local counterparts by codifying the new Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, creating standards for State and local fusion centers, and ensuring that they receive Federal support and personnel. These measures will help ensure that intelligence to fight terrorism and keep Americans safe is shared more effectively among all levels of government.

In addition to strengthening Federal, State and local governments, as part of the compromise that brought this bill to the floor, this legislation will also provide legal protections to individuals who report suspicious activities. People acting in good faith to avert what they believe may be terrorist activity should not be punished for their vigilance.

Every citizen must observe his or her surroundings and be alert to suspicious activity without the fear of being sued for their life savings. That is why this bill grants immunity from lawsuits to those who in good faith report behaviour that they reasonably suspect is related to possible terrorist activity. We want to encourage--not discourage--citizens, like the video store employee in New Jersey, who stepped forward and alerted authorities to evidence which helped unravel a planned attack on Fort Dix.

This legislation will also improve the very controversial process for distributing homeland security grants, and just as importantly, it authorizes $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2008, increasing to $3.6 billion by 2012--$13.78 billion over the next 5 years--so that we can reverse the downward trend in funding for these programs that help State and local first preventers and responders do their jobs.

It authorizes for the first time the State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, to provide funds to States and high-risk urban areas to prevent, prepare, respond and recover from acts of terrorism. And it does so in a way that, while providing the vast majority of resources on the basis of risk, ensures that we build up the capabilities of all the states, knowing that terrorist plots can develop in any part of the country.

This legislation wisely authorizes emergency management performance grants and provides additional resources for this program--to assist States in preparing for all-hazards to ensure that every State has the basic capability to prepare for and respond to both man-made and natural disasters.

Following the communications disasters of both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, this legislation also creates a dedicated emergency communications interoperability grant program to improve emergency communications systems at the local, State, and Federal levels. This is clearly one of the highest priorities for our Nation's first responders--because it is necessary to save their lives so that they can save the lives of others--and by dedicating a program to interoperable communications we will enhance our Nation's ability to achieve it.

The 9/11 Commission rightly noted that while we must protect our homeland, we must do so in a way that also protects the freedom and civil liberties it was founded upon.

This legislation does so by strengthening the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by establishing it as an independent agency within the executive branch, ensuring partisan balance among members, requiring improved public disclosure, allowing the board to request that the Attorney General issue subpoenas to private parties and increasing its budget over the next 4 years by up to $10 million in 2011.

It also requires that agencies with intelligence and security roles designate their own internal privacy and civil liberties officers, and expands the authority of the DHS privacy officer.

Also, since 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure is under the control of the private sector, this legislation establishes a voluntary certification program so that those private sector entities that want to can receive certification that they have met consensus preparedness standards. This provision responds to another concern of the 9/11 Commission--which was also

reinforced during Katrina--that those companies that take preparedness seriously--that have plans and exercise them that provide life saving protection for their employees--will recover more quickly from a catastrophe and help get their local economy moving again.

This legislation responds directly to another 9/11 Commission recommendation--to improve Congress's ability to oversee the intelligence community--by requiring disclosure of the total amount spent by the intelligence community.

After the first 2 fiscal years the President may waive this requirement, but only after explaining to Congress why the disclosure would harm national security.

Like the 9/11 Commission, this bill also recognizes that we must do more to promote democracy abroad by requiring the Secretary of State expand strategies for democracy promotion in nondemocratic and democratic countries.

One of the great threats of our time is that nuclear material may be smuggled out of former Soviet states and fall into the hands of terrorists. This bill clears legislative obstacles that had constrained the cooperative threat reduction, CTR, program by repealing or modifying various conditions on CTR actions in former Soviet states and repealing a legislative prohibition on Department of Energy nonproliferation program assistance outside the former Soviet Union.

I want to thank my colleagues from both parties, from both houses, and their staffs who worked so hard and so late into so many nights to bring this to the floor. There is a lot in this legislation to make our country safer, and this result was only possible because of this hard work and dedication.

Mr. President, we began as a nation born in conflict as we fought for our freedom. Now we are a nation borne with confidence as we fight for our ideals against an adversary who promotes hate over hope and fear over a future that recognizes our shared humanity.

I urge my colleagues to adopt this conference report and the President to act swiftly to sign it to show the world that the spirit of this nation founded in freedom heeds the words of Abraham Lincoln that this ``government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the Earth.''

Lincoln was right. Let us protect our Nation. Let us thwart our enemies.

Mr. President, again, I thank my colleagues for the very strong vote in favor of accepting the conference report. It means a lot to those of us who worked on it. I obviously also think it was the right thing to do. This is comprehensive, bipartisan legislation that will make America stronger, our cities and towns more secure, and our families safer.

I want to take a moment to thank some of the people without whom this successful result could not have occurred. I want to begin by thanking the 9/11 families--the families of those who were lost on 9/11, the victims of this brutal Islamist terrorist attack. They took their loss and grief and came to Congress to do everything it could to make sure that our Government acted in a way so as to protect every other American family from having to suffer the loss they suffered. They lobbied for the 9/11 Commission. It was created. When the commission reported out and the legislation it recommended was brought before the Congress in 2004, the 9/11 families hung in there. Without their support, it would not have been adopted and then signed by the President.

Now we return for the second phase of the 9/11 Commission report to adopt, as we just have, those previously unimplemented sections, inadequately implemented sections or, frankly, our own ideas about how to better protect the American people from the ongoing threat from al- Qaida and other Islamist extremist organizations and, at the same time, from natural disasters, some catastrophic like Hurricane Katrina. The 9/11 families deserve our gratitude.

I also thank Senator Reid because he made this legislation a priority item for this session of Congress. I thank Senator Collins, my ranking member who, as always, was thoughtful, constructive, wonderful to work with, and set a tone where all the members of our committee worked very closely together to produce this legislation.

On the House side, in conference, we met with the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Congressman Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, and his ranking member Congressman Peter King of New York--good public servants. We had some differences, but we reasoned together and resolved a lot of them.

I would like to pay tribute to my staff, who have worked long nights and many weekends to produce excellent legislation.

I particularly want to thank my Homeland Security Committee Staff Director, Mike Alexander, for his superb leadership. I also want to thank the committee's Chief Counsel, Kevin Landy, for helping to shepherd the legislation through the process. Thanks also to Eric Anderson, Christian Beckner, Caroline Bolton, Janet Burrell, Scott Campbell, Troy Cribb, Aaron Firoved, Elyse Greenwald, Beth Grossman, Seamus Hughes, Holly Idelson, Kristine Lam, Jim McGee, Sheila Menz, Larry Novey, Deborah Parkinson, Leslie Phillips, Alistair Reader, Patricia Rojas, Mary Beth Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, Jason Yanussi, and Wes Young--all on my committee staff. And thanks to Purva Rawal and Vance Serchuk on my personal office staff.

I must also thank Senator Collins' staff director, Brandon Milhorn, as well as Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, and the Senator's entire staff for working with us to move this very important legislation.

And of course, thank you to our colleagues and thanks to the 9/11 Commission.

There were an enormous number of committees involved in this legislation, in some ways even more than in the first 9/11 legislation. So it took a lot of cooperation, which is the essence of getting anything done and, obviously, bipartisan cooperation to bring us to this point.

Again, I thank Chairman Collins, Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, and all our colleagues on the conference committee and their staff on both sides of the aisle from all the relevant committees in both the House and Senate for their willingness to work through some difficult, but critical, issues to make our country safe.

I have a particular debt of gratitude to my own Homeland Security staff: staff director Michael Alexander; chief counsel Kevin Landy; and Senator Collins' staff, beginning with staff director Brandon Milhorn.

Mr. President, I thank my friend from Oklahoma. The truth is the Senate is a better place because he is here, he is persistent, he is demanding, he spends a lot of time actually reading bills, and he brings his opinions to the table and to the floor. Although we may be in disagreement on some of the particulars, he cares enough about all this to not only work through the details but to stay here after midnight, after a busy week, to make these points. So I thank him for all that.

I thank him for the contributions he made along the way to the bill as a member of our committee. I am going to put some statements in the record to respond to some of the points in more detail that Senator Coburn made, but I do wish to say that Senator Collins and I worked very hard, both in the committee and then particularly in the conference committee, to take the State homeland security grants and make sure that they were allocated, a much greater percentage of them was allocated based on risk.

We heard the concerns. So the conference report allocates the overwhelming share of State funding based on the risk the State faces from terrorism. All States initially will be guaranteed a minimum of 0.375 percent. The number was up to .75 percent earlier on. This will be reduced to .35 percent over the course of the 5 years.

The reason for having any minimum is twofold: One is that, unfortunately, the enemy we face--Islamist extremist terrorism--has a higher probability of

attacking, at least by our experience in this country, very visible targets, such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But the truth is the whole country is, unfortunately, vulnerable to their attacks. As we have seen in other countries, they attack trains, they are prepared to blow up themselves with bombs in the middle of shopping areas, in crowds, et cetera. So there is some reason to have a minimum amount for every State in the country.

Secondly, homeland security generally--and we particularly get into this in one of the other grant programs that I will talk about in a minute--deals not only with protecting the States from terrorism but from all hazards, including natural disasters. The Department of Homeland Security is an all-hazard agency now, including within it, most particularly, FEMA, the Coast Guard, and other agencies that are involved when you think more in terms of protection from natural disasters. So I think we have made some progress there, and that is the reason why we have done what we have done.

There is a separate program, which perhaps is the one Senator Coburn was referring to, the urban area security initiative. That is allocated entirely based on risk. We also create, for the first time, two programs that are intended to be all-hazard programs and to support law enforcement and emergency response around the country. The first is an Emergency Management Grant Program and the second, which we talked about earlier, is the interoperability of communications.

So I think, on balance, when it comes to terrorism, we have allocated much more now than before based on risk. Yet we also, I think quite appropriately, provide something for areas all around the country to deal with all the other hazards, natural disasters, that can and have struck every section of the country.

There is also a substantial increase in funding that is authorized by this bill. Of course, ultimately, it has to be appropriated, but this is a new challenge, this terrible challenge of terrorism, against an unconventional brutal enemy, which, as someone other than myself has said, hates us more than they love their own lives. They hate us more than they love their own lives, so that they are prepared to kill themselves to express their hatred of us. Of course, these are not conventional armies fighting our conventional Army on a field of battle or at sea or in the air.

These are enemies who strike from the shadows and intend to strike at unprotected civilians--at innocents. So this requires a substantial commitment by our country to raise our defenses. I think it is part of the reason, along with the reform of our intelligence apparatus, that we have not, thank God, suffered another terrorist attack since 9/11. Part of it, of course, is good fortune, or, if you are so inclined, by the grace of God. But I do believe what we have invested is an important part of it.

I myself have said more than once that I thought after 9/11, entering this new era of both homeland security needs and the need to involve our military in seeking out for the purpose of capturing or killing these terrorists, then being engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that we would have done better if we had considered a special tax and one in which we asked everybody to pay to meet the additional expenses brought on by this war that Islamist terrorists started against us, so we would not be facing the increasing long-term debt that Senator Coburn is quite right that our children are going to have to pay.

What I am saying is the money we have authorized to be spent here is important. We have the best defense--the best military in the world. Part of the reason we do is because we are spending money on it, an enormous amount of money. We will continue to have the best homeland security and homeland defense if we do the same.

One of the great contributions Senator Coburn makes is to be very persistent at making sure we don't waste taxpayer money, and he has made a contribution to this bill. There are many provisions in the bill that improve the oversight of the spending of homeland security funds, and in my statement I make clear our gratitude to Senator Coburn and his staff for all that they did to strengthen the auditing provisions of this bill.

I will say, finally, on the question of congressional oversight of intelligence and the declassification of the top line of the national intelligence budget, this is a direct recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. It doesn't make it sacrosanct, but it does give it some force. They argued that the specifics of the intelligence appropriations should remain classified, as they do in this proposal, but that the top line ought to be publicized to combat the secrecy and complexity the Commission had commented on earlier. That is what we intend to do.

But we are mindful of the concerns that Senator Coburn and others have had. We have spent some time discussing this with members of the administration, and this is compromise language. The bill contains this provision, which is that the President would be required to disclose the total appropriated amount for the national intelligence budget for this year and the coming year, after which the President may waive this requirement by sending to Congress a notification explaining the reasons for this waiver.

Listen, I think most people, including most people in the media, know what the top line budget for intelligence is. But we are now bringing it out and giving the President the opportunity to stop the disclosure if he determines it is in the national security interest in future years, for various reasons, to do that.

The conference report addresses the oftentimes contentious issue of homeland security grants. It may not make everyone happy, but it represents a good and fair compromise and will do much to improve the process by which these grants are distributed and used.

The conference report allocates a greater share--indeed the overwhelming share--of state funding based on the risk a state faces from terrorism, yet still ensures that each state will get money to meet its basic needs in preparing for acts of terrorism. All States will initially be guaranteed a minimum of 0.375 percent of funds; this will be reduced to 0.35 percent over the course of 5 years.

Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, grants will be allocated entirely based on risk of terrorism. There will be a two-step process for selecting UASI cities. In the first stage, DHS will do a risk assessment of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the country, and each of these areas will be permitted to submit information to the Department concerning the risks faced by that area--thus opening up a dialogue with cities and bringing light to a process that has largely taken place behind the scenes. After doing this initial assessment, the FEMA Administrator will then have the discretion--as he does now--to select those high-risk urban areas eligible to apply for UASI grants.

The conference report also reverses the recent disturbing downward trend in funding for these essential grant programs. It would authorize $1.8 billion for the State Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, and UASI program in fiscal year 2008--our principal antiterrorism grants to first responders--and increase this over the next 5 years to $2.25 billion. Also, as a complement to this, the conference report would ensure that states have increased funds available for key all-hazards grant programs, including the emergency management performance grants and dedicated grants for communications interoperability. These programs help ensure that all States have basic preparedness capabilities for all disasters, whether natural or man-made.

The conference report would also for the first time specifically authorize State and urban area grants, and provide legislative guidelines for the programs, including permissible uses.

Finally, the conference report would provide a whole series of oversight measures to ensure that funds were being spent effectively and appropriately to achieve preparedness, and not wasted.

The 9/11 Commission report said:

To combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the

overall amounts of money being appropriated for national

intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer

be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate

appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad

allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been

assigned among the varieties of intelligence work.

The Commission went on to say that:

The specifics of the intelligence appropriation would

remain classified, as they are today. Opponents of

declassification argue that America's enemies could learn

about intelligence capabilities by tracking the top-line

appropriations figure. Yet the top-line figure by itself

provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and

methods.

A provision was passed to declassify the top-line of the National Intelligence Budget was passed by the Senate as part of the Intelligence Reform Act in 2004 but removed in conference.

In December 2005, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an independent organization led by the 9/11 Commission members, issued a grade of ``F'' on the implementation of this recommendation, writing that ``Congress cannot do robust intelligence oversight when funding for intelligence programs is buried within the defense budget. Declassifying the overall intelligence budget would allow for a separate annual intelligence appropriations bill, so that the Congress can judge better how intelligence funds are being spent.''

The final bill contains a compromise that we have worked closely with the White House to craft, one which finally addresses this important 9/ 11 Commission recommendation to disclose the top line of the National Intelligence Budget.

The compromise agreement will require the President to disclose the total appropriated for the National Intelligence Budget for 2 years-- 2007 and 2008--after which the President may waive this requirement by sending to Congress a notification explaining the reasons for this waiver.

The inclusion of this provision means that this important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission will now finally be implemented.

In this bill, we authorize significant additional funds for homeland security grants for State and local governments: for State Homeland Security Grants, for Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, grants, for Emergency Management Performance Grants, EMPG, for interoperable emergency communications, for rail and transit security, in order to ensure that our first responders across the Nation are prepared for disasters, natural and man-made.

In authorizing these additional funds, we are cognizant that we need to spend these funds wisely, in a way that will make our first responders most prepared and our nation most secure. For this reason, the conference report includes extensive oversight and accountability provisions designed to ensure that all grant funds are used as effectively as possible and for their intended purposes.

At least every 2 years, DHS is required to conduct a programmatic and financial review of each State and urban area receiving grants administered by the Department to examine whether grant funds are being used properly.

The DHS inspector general is tasked with following up these agency reviews by conducting full, in-depth audits of a sample of States and urban areas each year, and then report to Congress on his findings, and to post the results of the audits on the Internet.

For the Public Safety Interoperable Communications grants that go through the Commerce Department and are administered jointly by the Commerce Department and DHS, there are separate provisions requiring that the Commerce Department inspector general conduct audits of those grants.

The conference report also builds on provisions in the Post--Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act that we passed last fall by requiring that DHS develop and use performance metrics to assess the progress of States and urban areas in becoming prepared, and that States and urban areas test their performance against these metrics through exercises.

All states are required to report quarterly on their expenditures and annually on their level of preparedness.

Finally, The FEMA Administrator is also required to provide to Congress annually an evaluation of the efficacy of the Department's homeland security grants have contributed to State and local governments in meeting their target levels of preparedness and have led to the overall reduction of risk.

From the beginning, we have been aware of Senator Coburn's strongly held view that there be adequate oversight and auditing of homeland security grants, and his support for the provisions to this effect in the Senate bill--provisions that were not part of the House bill. Senator Collins' and I, and our staffs, have fought for the Senate auditing provisions in conference, in the face of a number of objections and concerns raised by House staff from various committees. And we have been successful in retaining in the conference report what we believe are very strong provisions to ensure accountability for homeland security grant funds.

Working with Senator Coburn, we were able to retain what I believe are very significant provisions to ensure the appropriate and effective use of homeland security dollars.

Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back all remaining time, and Senator Coburn, in the spirit of not only the good spirit I identify with him but in the spirit of the hour, I gather, is prepared to yield back his remaining time as well.

Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Collins and Senator Coburn. It is a measure of their devotion that they are both still here at this hour.

Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, on the pending legislation, S. 4, the Senate has now used up all the time postcloture so that what stands--if I could put it in a more negative light than I should--before the Senate and the vote on final passage of this important legislation is disposition of the remaining germane amendments and any other matters that can be passed by consent.

We are working on a managers' amendment which would contain the matters about which there is unanimous consent. We are whittling down the number of germane amendments that will need to be voted on. I say to my colleagues we hope to be able soon to announce when the last few votes on amendments and final passage will occur. But they will definitely occur this afternoon.

I thank the Chair, and pending further developments, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, we are making progress in disposing of the final amendments pending as we head toward final passage of S. 4. So at this time, I would like to propound a unanimous consent request that there are a number of pending amendments which I understand can be considered and agreed to without the necessity of a rollcall vote, and two of these amendments will have second-degree amendments.

I now ask unanimous consent that it be in order for the Senate to proceed en bloc to the consideration of the following amendments, that they be agreed to en bloc, and that the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table:

First, the Kyl amendment, No. 357, with a Feingold second-degree amendment, No. 441.

Second, a Schumer amendment, No. 337, with a modification that is at the desk, and with an Ensign second-degree amendment, No. 448.

Third, a Bond amendment, No. 389, with a modification at the desk.

Fourth, and finally, a Stevens amendment, No. 299.

Madam President, I thank the Chair and my friend from Maine, and I notify our colleagues that we are working very hard to eliminate the remaining objections on components of the managers' amendment. We anticipate at least one more rollcall vote on one of the pending amendments and then final passage, and hopefully that will happen soon.

Pending that, Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, we are coming to the moment when we adopt the managers' amendment and proceed to final passage. I want to respond to some of the things said by my friend from New Hampshire.

In response to my friend from New Hampshire, two things: One is, S. 4 is a direct response not just to the original 9/11 Commission in 2004, which was the basis of the Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act of that year, but it is a response directly to the appeal the 9/11 Commission issued in December of 2005 that there was unfinished business.

That appeal was not only seconded but echoed and amplified by the various organizations representing families who lost loved ones on 9/11 in the terrorist attack of that day.

So this legislation before the Senate now, about to go to final amendment consideration and adoption, includes improvements in information sharing--the critical question of connecting the dots before the terrorists can strike us so we can stop them from doing so. It creates a new dedicated grant fund to support interoperable communications equipment--complicated words which simply mean whether in a crisis, a potential terrorist attack, or a natural disaster such as Katrina, our firefighters, our police officers, our emergency responders can talk to each other as they were not able to do on 9/11.

This is a balanced, progressive recommendation to solve once and for all by legislation the ongoing dispute about how to distribute homeland security grant funding. We have improved the security requirements of the so-called visa waiver program. We have strengthened the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board and done much else. There is a lot constructive here. One of the parts of this legislation that I believe still should be the least controversial and, frankly, not the most important but an act of fairness consistent with our effort to improve homeland security, was simply to give the transportation security officers at the Transportation Security Agency, who now can join a union but cannot collectively bargain, the same right to collectively bargain in very limited areas without the right to strike, the same rights that most other employees at the Department of Homeland Security, including law enforcement personnel, have and continue to have, without impeding their carrying out of their law enforcement public safety functions. That includes the Border Patrol, obviously at the Capitol that includes our Capitol Police, and throughout America it includes firefighters and police officers.

It is unfortunate that is so much the focus of discussion about this bill because this bill is a direct response to the appeals of the 9/11 Commissioners and the 9/11 families to take constructive action to respond to the statements that the Commission itself made in 2004 and again in 2005: America is safer than it was on 9/11/01 but not yet safe enough.

This bill, which is not controversial and ought to receive nonpartisan support, will make the people of America, in an age of terrorism, safer yet than they have been before. It is why I strongly urge my colleagues across party lines to support final passage of the legislation.

I hope soon to be able to propound a series of unanimous consent agreements. I am waiting for final clearance from my ranking member. As soon as that happens I will rise to do so.

Amendment No. 448

I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding its adoption, the Ensign amendment No. 448 be considered a first-degree amendment, agreed to, and that it be inserted at the appropriate place in the bill.

Madam President, I am very happy to indicate to our colleagues we have reached agreement on a series of unanimous consent requests that will allow us to move to final passage.

I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and the Senate proceed to the consideration of a series of amendments, which have been cleared on our side and by Senator Collins on her side. The amendments are as follows:

Sununu amendment No. 291; Grassley amendment No. 293, with a modification; Coleman amendment No. 341; Feinstein amendment No. 323; Salazar amendment No. 290, with a further modification; Carper amendment No. 368; Akaka amendment No. 392; Lieberman amendment No. 332, with a modification; Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 391; Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 431; Wyden-Bond amendment No. 348; Byrd amendment No. 404; Pryor amendment No. 388, with a modification; Lieberman-McCain amendment No. 411, with a modification; Landrieu amendment No. 456;

Coleman amendment No. 414, with a modification; Inouye-Stevens- Lieberman amendment No. 412, with a modification; Menendez amendment No. 354, with a modification.

I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be agreed to en bloc; that the motions to reconsider be laid on the table, en bloc; that any statements thereon be printed in the Record as if read; and that consideration of these items appear separately in the Record.

Madam President, on behalf of the Commerce Committee, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and the Senate proceed en bloc to the consideration of a series of amendments which have been cleared by the chair and ranking member of the Commerce Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens.

Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that amendments Nos. 321 and 336 be withdrawn and that amendment No. 367 be further modified with the changes at the desk and that the amendment be considered and agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that following adoption of the substitute amendment and the bill has been read a third time, there then be 20 minutes for debate prior to the vote on passage of the bill, and that each of the following be afforded 5 minutes: Senators Collins, Lieberman, McConnell, and Reid.

Yes, Madam President. I thank my friend from Maine. I am sorry she didn't get this page. What I will do after this unanimous- consent request, hopefully, is agreed to, setting 20 minutes of debate and final passage, is to ask what the pending business is, which is the Biden amendment, and then I will urge action on the amendment.

Madam President, what is the pending amendment?

I ask for the yeas and nays.

Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Madam President, first, let me thank my ranking member, the Senator from Maine. I was thinking, as she was speaking, that when the transition occurred at the beginning of this 110th session of Congress I said to her, all that would change in our working relationship was our title, the title that each of us had. As I look back on our work together on this bill, S. 4, I am pleased to say that we worked with the same spirit of cooperation that we did under her chairmanship in 2004 when we had our first legislative response to the 9/11 Commission and we adopted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. So I thank Senator Collins.

I thank her staff for their work, and I thank my staff as well.

Madam President, I note the presence on the floor of the majority leader. I thank him for making adoption of this legislation a priority for this Congress. Here is why. This bill will strengthen our ability not just to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our Federal, State, and local governments to respond to natural disasters. In that sense, S. 4 is not only a response to finish the mission given us by the 9/11 Commission that learns from the lessons of the first months of implementation of that Commission report, but it also applies to lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. We are trying to create an all-hazards approach in our Government that increases our homeland security against the threat of a terrorist attack and also prepares our Government to respond better to natural disasters. I do not want to repeat some of the points in this legislation that Senator Collins focused on. I will just pick a few additionally.

One is that S. 4 recognizes that 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in our country that is potentially a target for terrorist attack in our great open society is privately owned. For the first time, we establish a voluntary program where the private sector can come in and have their facilities certified as, I would use the term ``terrorist resistant.''

In another section we declassify the bottom line of the intelligence budget. That was a specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission in the interests of transparency and accountability.

We also greatly improve the provisions that in our law and policy are aimed at disrupting terrorist infiltration of our borders. This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State to strengthen the security provisions of the so-called visa waiver program. It also authorizes an electronic travel system that would require travelers to apply in advance for authorization to visit the United States, thus allowing their names to be checked against terrorist watch lists.

I am very proud of the bill we present after almost 2 weeks of debate to our colleagues in the Senate for final consideration. I know it will strengthen the homeland security of the American people. It enjoyed strong nonpartisan support in our committee, coming out with a vote of 16 to 0 with one abstention.

I gather there will be a significant number of ``no'' votes on the final passage because of one section, and I regret that. I wish our colleagues would vote favorably because I know they support almost all of this bill because it is good for the security of the American people at home.

The one section, obviously, is the one that deals with the collective bargaining rights of transportation security officers. I sure hope we can continue to discuss this section: why we think it is fair, why we are totally convinced its implementation will have no adverse effect on public safety--no more than the collective bargaining rights of Capitol Police officers or local firefighters or police officers or members of the Border Patrol or other law enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security in any way adversely affects the carrying out of the duties to protect the American people.

Madam President, I also want to thank the chairman and ranking member of the Commerce Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens, for producing the rail and aviation security portions of this bill, and the chairman and ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senators Dodd and Shelby, who contributed important mass transit security provisions.

I would be remiss if I didn't also thank the majority leader, Senator Reid, for working with all of the committees involved to bring this comprehensive measure before tbe Senate. We have had 2 weeks of often spirited debate, and votes on some important amendments. Now, I believe we are ready to pass this bill, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to conference this measure with the House, and moving the legislation onto the President's desk for signature.

September 11, 2001, was a tragedy of unspeakable proportions, and it is for the men and women who died in the terrorist attacks that we work to enact this legislation. The attacks changed the course of history for our Nation and marked our nascent century as a new and dangerous era. Overnight, we became aware of our vulnerability to an enemy that doesn't wear uniforms nor follows any traditional laws of combat. Rather, they move silently among us, probing for weaknesses while plotting attacks on innocent civilians.

The families of those we lost on 9/11 have worked with us for years to get the 9/11 Commission recommendations implemented. I must thank them as well for their steadfast and courageous advocacy often in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. They worked with us to pass the bill that Senator McCain and I introduced to create the 9/11 Commission. They monitored the work of the 9/11 Commission, and testified before its members. And then they helped us win the fight to implement the Commission's recommendations in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.

In January, Senator Collins and I held a hearing on this legislation and heard from three family members who urged us to complete the job of enacting and implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. When we pass this bill today, they will be watching. And they will know that they had a hand in its success.

Senator Reid made adoption of this legislation a priority for this Congress. Here is why: This bill will strengthen our ability not just to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our

Federal, State, and local governments to better respond to natural disasters.

We are trying to create an ``all hazards'' approach that increases our homeland security against the threat of terrorist attack, but also prepares our government to respond better to natural disasters since it failed to prepare or respond adequately to Hurricane Katrina.

How do we do this? Let me briefly describe a few of the provisions in this bill.

First, we would improve information and intelligence sharing among Federal, State, and local officials. We know that before 9/11, different agencies had different pieces of information that, had they been put together, should have aroused suspicion about the attack that was to come. One of the most important innovations since 9/11 has been the establishment of fusion centers to share information within and between States. This legislation would create standards for the fusion centers, require the Department of Homeland Security to provide support and coordination, and authorize the assignment of homeland security intelligence analysts to the fusion centers to serve as conduits for sharing information. The legislation also encourages the elimination of the ``need to know'' standard, which allows the information holder in a given Federal agency to control dissemination, and instead, encourages a ``need to share'' standard--obviously with appropriate safeguards.

Second, this legislation provides support and resources to first responders through a balanced and better funded Homeland Security Grant Program. We would authorize over $3.1 billion for each of the next 3 years for key grants to reverse a precipitous decline in funding for homeland security over the past 4 years. We believe we have achieved a balanced proposal that gives the vast majority of the money out based on risk but still recognizes that risk is an art, not a science, and terrorists could strike anywhere. In an all-hazards approach, first responders everywhere need assistance to protect not just against a potential terrorist attack but also against natural disasters.

Third, we will help first responders attain the interoperable communications we know they need to save lives. We have known of this problem for decades, and on 9/11, when fire fighters and police officers could not communicate with one another inside the World Trade Center, hundreds of first responders lost their lives. So, we have created a grant program--authorized at $3.3 billion over 5 years--that will require States to spend their grant money consistent with their statewide communications interoperability plans and the National Emergency Communications Plan. In other words, their spending must be part of a statewide plan connected to the national plan.

Fourth, this legislation contains provisions to improve our ability to disrupt terrorist infiltration of our borders. It requires the Departments of Homeland Security and State to strengthen the security of the visa waiver program, by requiring better reporting by foreign countries in the visa waiver program of lost or stolen passports, requiring countries to share information about prospective visitors who may pose a threat to the U.S., and authorizing an electronic travel system that would require travelers to apply in advance for authorization to visit the U.S., thus allowing their names to be checked against terrorist watch lists.

Fifth, this bill moves to ensure that as we fight terrorism, we do not trample on the rights of Americans we are pledged to defend. Included here are provisions to strengthen the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by requiring its members to be confirmed by the Senate and by giving the Board subpoena power through the Attorney General.

This legislation also includes a provision similar to one I was pleased to cosponsor in committee with Senator McCaskill that will ensure Transportation Security Administration screeners--known as Transportation Security Officers--have the same employment rights as others in TSA and throughout the Department of Homeland Security. There is no good reason to deny TSOs these rights. Other law enforcement officers at Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection have these rights, with no negative effect on their performance of their security mission. In fact, Capitol Police also enjoy these rights and protections. This is simply a question of equality.

So this is a comprehensive bill. There are many other worthy aspects that I have not described. But I am convinced that, as a package, if this legislation passes and becomes law, the American people will be safer from the consequences of natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, than they are today. And we will have done everything possible to make sure no other Americans suffer the loss that so many experienced after the brutal terrorist attacks of 9/11.

In the preface to the 9/11 Report, Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton wrote, quoting here, ``We hope our report will encourage our fellow citizens to study, reflect--and act.''

We have studied. We have reflected. Now is the time to act to build a safer and more secure America for the generations to come.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my dedicated and exceptional staff, who have sacrificed nights, weekends, family time in the name of a safer America.

I particularly want to thank my Homeland Security Committee staff director Mike Alexander for his leadership in expertly guiding this legislation through drafting, markup, floor amendments, and onto final passage. I also want to thank the committee's deputy chief counsel Kevin Landy, whose drive and attention to detail resulted in superior legislation. Thanks also to Eric Anderson, Christian Beckner, Janet Burrell, Scott Campbell, Troy Cribb, Aaron Firoved, Elyse Greenwald, Beth Grossman, Seamus Hughes, Holly Idelson, Kristine Lam, Nate Lesser, Jim Mcgee, Sheila Menz, Larry Novey, Deborah Parkinson, Leslie Phillips, Alistair Reader, Patricia Rojas, Laurie Rubenstein, Mary Beth Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, Donny Williams, Jason Yanussi, and Wes Young--all on my committee staff. And thanks to Purva Rawal, Vance Serchuk, and Cherrie Daniels on my personal office staff.

I must also thank Senator Collins' staff director Brandon Milhorn and the Senator's entire staff for working with us to move this very important legislation.

But bottom line, thank you to our colleagues, thanks to the 9/11 Commission, thanks to the 9/11 families who have stuck with this mission to protect the American people from ever having to suffer the grievous loss they did at the hands of terrorists on 9/11.

I hope our colleagues will join together across party lines to support this very nonpartisan homeland security measure.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I have spoken to the manager of the bill, and I am--with his permission and their permission--going to speak. But as soon as they are ready to reclaim the floor, to close this down, I am prepared to stop at that point, or before.

Mr. President, I know there is not a lot of time, but the amendment that is at the desk, No. 383, that I have--I ask it be called up and be considered.

This is all about rail safety. The Federal Government currently has no say on where 90-ton rail tankers, filled with chlorine or other hazardous chemicals, are shipped around the Nation. The Naval Research Laboratory, at my request, some months ago, issued a report. The context of my inquiry with them was: What would happen if one of these 90-ton chlorine gas tanker cars exploded--for example, where a terrorist put C-2 underneath there in a populated area and blew it up?

What made me think of it was, you may remember almost 2 years ago now, out in North Dakota, one of these tankers leaked, and the end result was a number of adjoining towns, small towns, had to be evacuated because it was so deadly.

So I asked the question of the Naval Research Center. As you know, some of our best scientists in the world are there. I asked: What would happen? What would happen if a 90-ton tanker containing chlorine were to be blown up in a major metropolitan area?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the report submitted to me be printed in the Record.

Let me summarize the report.

The answer was ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in the first half an hour.'' Let me say that again. One of these tankers filled with chlorine gas--and there are hundreds, up and down the road, going through major metropolitan areas, from Los Angeles to New York and everywhere in between--what would happen if a terrorist were to explode one of those in a major metropolitan area? The answer was: ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in the first half an hour.''

Said another way: What happens if one of these is blown up in a freight yard in Philadelphia, PA, right along the Schuylkill River, 10 blocks, 15 blocks from City Hall, the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel University--a very populated area? Within one-half hour, 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed.

How long would it take to evacuate that area? Imagine evacuating downtown New York City, Baltimore, Miami, Seattle--you name the city.

So what is the problem? Well, the problem is--and we have seen in recent reports--insurgents in Iraq are using chlorine in their attacks on civilians. There is little doubt terrorists who are targeting us here at home are paying attention. In these roadside bombs, they are-- thank God they have not gotten it down very well yet--but they are injecting chlorine into that carnage they cause because they know the consequence of the dissemination of the highly toxic substance in a populated area.

Nevertheless, we continue to allow these 90-ton--that is a standard: 90-ton--rail tanks containing chlorine and other hazardous chemicals to roll unprotected through the hearts of our largest cities in high- threat areas. We know the rail industry has adamantly opposed any attempt to allow local officials, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security and security people, to reroute these tankers.

Now, again, look where this tanker is sitting, as shown in this picture. Do these buildings look familiar to you? This is an actual photograph of a 90-ton chlorine gas tanker car sitting in the direct view--if you look over the top of it, you can see the Hart Building, you can see the Dirksen Building, and you can see the U.S. Capitol.

By the way, I know my friend, the Presiding Officer, a former board member of Amtrak, a guy who has fought very hard to protect Amtrak--we take the train almost every day together back and forth to and from Delaware--I say to my colleagues, go on down to the station this afternoon and follow us down whenever we finish and get on the train. If it is not an Acela, stand in the back car of an Amfleet train. You can look out the back window. Watch as we pull out of the station. Tell me how many cops you see. Tell me how many cameras you see. Tell me how much protection exists there.

Look at this tanker car, shown in this picture, sitting right out there--in the middle of nowhere, in the middle of everywhere.

So, folks, the idea we do not even have as an option the ability of our security people and the mayors and local

officials to suggest these tankers bypass their cities so, God forbid, if something happens, they are not as high a prize of a target--by the way, the less sensational damage able to be done, the less likelihood it will be picked as a target.

Because someone could legitimately argue: Biden, you are taking this out of the route--and we have other maps showing the routes of the various alternative routes that could be used to avoid the major cities. Now, they could say: You are going to be going through more rural areas. Yes, serious damage could be done in rural areas, but the prize for the terrorist is much lower. The likelihood of them concluding that instead of coming down from, for example, Newark, NJ, all the way down into Augusta--you can, in fact, reroute these on Norfolk Southern, which goes through much less populated areas.

People legitimately say: Aren't you putting those folks at risk? No matter where these cars are, we are at risk. But again, where is the likely target? Where are terrorists going to risk their lives to be able to go in and do damage? They will do it where the most people are.

So I know the rail industry, as I said, is adamantly opposed to amendment No. 306, and is likely opposed to the updated version we will vote on today. But in the face of such risks, I do not know how we can let their opposition determine whether we go forward.

This amendment is very limited. It simply states the Secretary of Homeland Security, not the rail industry--the rail industry is not the bad guy--should determine the most secure routes for the shipments of the most dangerous chemicals, and that ownership of the track is not to be considered in making this risk-based determination; meaning, if you have something going down on a CSX track that is owned by CSX, they should be able to use and be diverted to a Norfolk Southern track. I could give you examples all across the country, as the Presiding Officer knows.

Again, all I am saying is, let the Department of Homeland Security determine whether the most dangerous chemicals are able to be diverted around the most populated areas in our country. And do not--do not--in fact, use as an impediment the idea the track upon which it is being carried is not owned by the company whose car is on that track.

That is all we are doing, Mr. President. The amendment would apply to only .36 percent--less than a third of a percent--of all the shipments that occur on our rail system. It only applies to through-shipments; it does not apply to the destination city. Some of this stuff goes into large populations, where that is the end point. It doesn't say it cannot go there, but it does say we should reduce the probability of catastrophic damage by allowing them to be rerouted, if that is the judgment of the Department of Homeland Security.

A similar amendment was passed by voice vote in the House Homeland Security Committee today. Not one Republican or Democrat spoke in opposition to this measure. This amendment will ensure that the Senate is on the right side of the issue as well.

Mr. President, I was asked by my colleague from Connecticut, one of the two managers, that he be added as a cosponsor. I ask unanimous consent his name be added.

Mr. President, I understand that a man with whom I hardly disagree, Senator Inouye, has reservations. I hope he will reconsider those reservations. Again, all we are doing is letting the Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with local officials, make the judgment whether the risk is so high that it warrants it being rerouted. Of all the cargo on all of the tracks in America, we are talking about .36 of 1 percent, all that is transported on rail. So we are not asking much. The downside of us being mistaken is significant.

I close by quoting from the rail industry's letter opposing this amendment. They say:

Rerouting would not eliminate the risk, but instead shift

it from one population to another.

That is true, but this amendment says the Department of Homeland Security, not the rail industry, should determine how to weigh and respond to this known potentially catastrophic risk. What did we just debate last week on the floor? The allocation of resources for Homeland Security should be going toward the danger lines. There is nothing that is risk free--nothing. It is a little like my friend from Delaware and I have heard so much every time we come up with rail security legislation. We are told we cannot secure every mile of track. That is true, we can't, but there is a big difference with a terrorist taking a single train off a track somewhere in rural America and a terrorist taking a train at 140 miles an hour into the most visited area in Washington, DC, Union Station, at a high speed.

There is a difference between blowing up a tunnel underneath the Chesapeake Bay or the Hudson River and blowing up a tunnel in the middle of some rural area. Terrorists pick targets for the greatest effect. So the idea that we would not reroute--if the Department of Homeland Security determined it made sense--a series of chlorine gas tankers from a major metropolitan area to a more rural area seems to me to be such a silly argument to make.

The idea is, how do we reduce the risk for the most people of the United States of America? Again, I will end where I began. When this was called to my attention some years ago, I went to the Naval Research Laboratory and I asked them--and I have included this in my statement-- to tell me what would happen--and, again, it doesn't take much for terrorists to figure out a way to puncture a hole in the bottom or the side of one of these tanks by use of explosives or other devices. The answer was that if that were to occur in a highly populated area, ``over 100,000 could be seriously harmed or even killed in the first half hour.''

Imagine how many people we get to evacuate reasonably so that there is essentially no one left in a half hour. If the gun goes off right now, how long does it take downtown Manhattan or downtown Washington, DC, or Capitol Hill to evacuate people so they are not around? If you don't evacuate--to say it another way--within a half hour, a whole lot more than 100,000 people will be seriously injured or will die.

I know the Senator from Connecticut supports this amendment. I don't know what the view of our colleague from Maine is. I hope they understand how limited this amendment is, how consequential it is. I hope my colleagues, when it comes time to vote, will vote in favor of this amendment.

I thank the Chair and I thank the managers. I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Maine. She may have misunderstood two aspects of the amendment. One, it doesn't mandatorily require rerouting at all. It says the Department of Homeland Security can reroute, if they determine it should be rerouted.

No. 2, the freight industry, where they made the judgment on how much further in distance it would travel if, in fact, you were to reroute, factored in only that it had to be rerouted on their own tracks. So the idea being that they would not be able to--this happens all the time, where other tracks are used; for example, the Chesapeake using Norfolk Southern track.

No. 3, the Chamber of Commerce is opposed because it costs more money. A lot of these things cost more money. Will it cost more money to be able to reroute up to one-third of 1 percent of the freight on rail? Yes. But I ask the rhetorical question: What will it cost if one of these tankers goes off in a populated area? What will the cost then be to the very businesses that are most concerned about it?

Fourth, this doesn't affect destination. If the chlorine gas tanker car is going to a water treatment facility, it still goes to that facility. Nothing changes. What we could have changed is what we did in Delaware, not use chlorine. There are other means by which water can be purified. We have done it in our home State. That is what you should do. But that doesn't stop this car, or any other car, from going to such a facility.

Let me emphasize again that there is no prohibition on end point distribution. If the car is designed to go to a facility in the center of a city, it goes to the center of the city. There is nothing you can do about that. That is very different than--I am making up these numbers for illustration--you may have one of these tankers going in once a month versus 50 going through the same city in a month or 100 in a month. This is all about percentages. You play the percentages. Again, it is true, rerouting may render cities in North Dakota--well, they would not be rerouted in North Dakota, but I referenced the small towns. There was a chlorine gas tanker car going across the top of the Nation and, thank God, what happened was it went off in a rural part of the world. You were able to evacuate the three cities and nobody died. Had that same thing occurred in the middle of Chicago, you would not be able to evacuate the city. We would not have had time.

So, yes, it is true. Are you going to put a different population at risk? Yes, about one-tenth, one-twentieth, one one-hundredth or one one-thousandth of the population, depending on where it is rerouted. So it is a little bit like saying: Why do we spend so much money worrying about the Sears Tower? It is there, it is big, and it is a target. Is it possible that a terrorist would go into a building that is two stories and blow it up? Yes. Can they fly an aircraft into a rural town grain elevator? Yes. But that is not what we are worried about. They are not likely to do that. They are likely to fly a plane, plant a bomb, do something devastating where the most people are.

So I find it to be a totally disingenuous argument. This is about the bottom line. I measure the bottom line--as I suspect all of us would if we thought about it--in human life.

The bottom line, in terms of the dollars, the impact that would occur in a catastrophic circumstance is if there is a town of 1,000 people and a town of 6 million people, there is a phenomenal difference whether that chlorine gas tanker car gets exploded.

Let me summarize. It is indicated by the Department of Homeland Security again that an explosion of a rail tanker carrying chlorine would kill 17,500 individuals, require the hospitalization of another 100,000--and only then if we evacuate within a half an hour. We can evacuate a city of 1,000 people in half an hour. We cannot evacuate a city of 4 million people in half an hour. So it matters.

If this rail tanker goes off in New York City, my friend from New York is going to be on the floor again pointing out the catastrophic impact. If it goes off in rural Delaware, it will be a tragedy for me and my constituency, but there will be a significant magnitude of difference.

So everything we do in terms of allocation of resources goes in this place to deal with protecting the most people who can be protected: The shipment originates or the point of destination is in the high-threat corridor; no practical alternative routes exist. If they don't exist, it doesn't get rerouted. Rerouting would not increase the likelihood of an attack. It would decrease the likelihood of an attack because people attack targets that have the maximum impact. This would not increase the total number of cars on the track. It would allow the potential for homeland security to reroute them away from the places that would do the most damage.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, she is correct, but it only requires the Secretary to do it if he or she concludes that there is a safer way to reroute the shipment. If the conclusion made by the Secretary is that in a high-risk corridor the rerouting would not result in an increased safety margin for the shipment, then he or she need not reroute it. But it is correct, the presumption is, in a high- risk corridor we reroute if it is not a point of destination or origin but only if the determination by the Secretary is that the shipment, in fact, would be safer to be rerouted. It is on page 4 of the amendment. It is section 2, subparagraph E, ``Transportation and Storage of High Hazard Materials through High Threat Corridor'' areas. It says:

In General.--The standards for the Secretary to grant

exceptions under section

(d)(4) shall require a finding by the Secretary that--

(A) the shipment originates or the point of destination is

in the high threat corridor;

(B) there is no practical alternative route;

(C) there is an unanticipated, temporary emergency that

threatens the lives of persons or property in the high threat

corridor;

(D) there would be no harm to persons or property beyond

the owners or operator of the railroad in the event of a

successful terrorist attack on shipment; or

(E) rerouting would increase the likelihood of a terrorist

attack on the shipment.

The bottom line is that it should be left to the discretion of the Secretary to decide not to reroute rather than the privately owned railroad. I thank the Senator for her clarification.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I support the Improving America's Security Act of 2007 because it takes a giant step in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Keeping America safe requires more than expensive weapons and war funding; it also requires a commitment to homeland security. This legislation shows that commitment.

We learned on September 11 and during Hurricane Katrina how important it is for our first responders to be able to communicate with each other. For years, I have been urging the Department of Homeland Security to establish a dedicated funding source for interoperable communications equipment. I am pleased that this legislation creates a grant program dedicated to improving operability and interoperability at local, regional, State and Federal levels.

I am also pleased that this legislation moves us closer to the equitable distribution of homeland security grant funding. For 5 years, the largest homeland security grant programs have distributed funds using a formula that arbitrarily sets aside a large portion of funds to be divided equally among the States, regardless of size or need. The current ``small State formula'' has severely disadvantaged States such as Michigan with high populations. In addition, it reduces the amount of funding that can be allocated to States with highest risks. Although I am disappointed that the Senate failed to pass two amendments that I supported that would have lowered the minimum funding level even further, the .45 percent minimum in the underlying bill is an improvement from the current .75 percent base funding amount.

The legislation also includes language that I authored that directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish international border community interoperable communications demonstration projects on the northern and southern borders to improve collaboration and help identify common frequencies for cross border communications. These interoperable communications demonstration projects will address the interoperable communications needs of police officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, National Guard, and other emergency response providers at our borders by identifying common international cross-border frequencies for communications equipment; fostering the standardization of interoperable communications equipment; identifying solutions that will expeditiously facilitate communications interoperability across national borders; ensuring that emergency response providers can communicate with one another and the public at disaster sites or in the event of a terrorist attack or other catastrophic event; and providing training and equipment for relevant personnel to enable those units to deal with threats and contingencies in a variety of environments.

Also included in the legislation is language that I authored that will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a cost- benefit analysis of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI, before publishing the final rule. The WHTI will require individuals from the United States, Canada, and Mexico to present a passport or other document proving citizenship before entering the United States. Although we all share the goals of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative to make our borders as secure as they can be, we need to make sure that we are achieving that goal in a way that will not cause economic harm to our States. I am also pleased that language was included in the bill that I worked with Senator Coleman on to require the Department of Homeland Security to sign a memorandum of understanding with one or more States to conduct a pilot project to see whether secure driver's licenses could be used as a form of documentation for travel between the U.S. and Canada under the WHTI. The amendment also provides that DHS must evaluate the pilot project and map out next steps, including an expansion if appropriate.

This legislation also takes important steps to shore up rail, transit and cargo security in the United States. The legislation establishes a grant fund for system wide Amtrak security improvements and much needed infrastructure upgrades as well as authorizes an existing grant program for improving intercity bus and bus terminal security. It establishes a grant program for freight and passenger rail security upgrades and requires railroads shipping high-hazard materials to create threat mitigation plans. It authorizes studies to find ways to improve passenger and baggage security screening on passenger rail service between the U.S. and Canada. The bill will hopefully move us closer to addressing something I have been trying to get implemented at our northern car and truck border crossings for years: establishing a preclearance system. The study is required to identify what exactly is needed to perform prescreening of rail passengers on the northern border.

I am pleased that the Senate retained language that will require that TSA screeners finally come under an unambiguous personnel system. A further amendment that I supported will finally give Transportation Security Administration screeners the whistleblower protections afforded to most other Federal workers, including law enforcement officers. It also gives them the right to appeal suspensions and to collectively bargain, just like their counterparts in the Border Control, FEMA and the Capitol Police.

The bill also requires studies on how to improve the safety of transporting radioactive and hazardous materials and shipments of explosives and radioactive materials on our highways. I am pleased that this legislation requires the screening of all cargo carried on passenger airplanes within 3 years.

The intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a significant degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to support administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one direction, making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent, thereby promoting the decision to remove Saddam from power. Nuances, qualifications and caveats were dropped. ``Slam dunk'' was the assessment.

Among the most important things we can do to keep this from happening again is to strengthen congressional oversight to ensure that intelligence community assessments are objective and uninfluenced by the policy judgments of whatever administration is in power. The 9/11 Commission agreed, stating in its report that ``Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important.'' Section 1102 of S. 4 bill is directed at that goal.

Too often Congress is stonewalled or slow-walked by the executive branch in accessing intelligence information necessary to make policy and conduct oversight of the intelligence community. Section 1102 of this bill adds a new section 508 to the National Security Act that will ensure Congress has access to intelligence information critical to do its job.

Section 508 requires elements of the intelligence community to provide, upon request from congressional committees of jurisdiction, timely access to intelligence information. The requirement would apply unless the President certified that the requested documents were not being provided because the President was asserting a constitutional privilege. Requiring the

intelligence community to respond to requests for information from the vice chairman and ranking member of the Senate and House intelligence committees, respectively, will encourage rigorous oversight regardless of which party controls the Congress.

In addition to providing information in a timely manner, we expect the intelligence community to provide Congress its assessment of intelligence matters uninfluenced by the policy goals of the administration. However, an Office of Management and Budget--OMB-- memorandum directs executive branch agencies to clear, through OMB, legislative proposals, agency reports, and testimony on pending legislation. The memo also states that ``If agencies are asked by Congressional Committees to report or testify on pending legislation or wish to volunteer a report, similar clearance procedures are followed.''

Our intelligence agencies should not have to get permission from the OMB, or any other executive branch official to share their views with the Congress. Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 508 (d) to the National Security Act that says no executive branch official can require the intelligence community to get permission to testify or to submit testimony, legislative recommendations or comments to the Congress. Section 508 (d) is based on authority that exists for numerous other executive branch agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing Finance Board, and the National Credit Union Administration.

A CRS legal review of direct reporting requirements like the one created by section 508 (d) states that ``direct reporting provisions are well within the Congress's constitutional authority to inform itself in order to perform its legislative function which has been consistently acknowledged by Supreme Court decisions, and dates back to the early enactments of the First Congress in 1789.'' The CRS review calls Department of Justice objections to direct reporting requirements ``without substantial merit.''

Finally, it is important for whistleblowers to know that they can come directly to Congress if they have evidence that someone has made a false statement to the Congress. And the Congress has a right to that information--even if it is classified.

Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 509 to the National Security Act making it clear that intelligence community employees and contractors can report classified information directly to appropriate Members of Congress and cleared staff if the employee reasonably believes that the information provides direct and specific evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in an intelligence assessment, report or estimate.

Section 509 is substantively the same as section 225 of the Senate- passed version of the intelligence reform legislation. Section 225 was stripped from the intelligence reform bill in conference. Section 509 is also similar to a provision that passed the Senate twice previously. Once as part of the fiscal year 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act and once as a stand alone measure S. 1668, in the 105th Congress. S. 1668 passed the Senate 93-1.

Section 509 is also consistent with congressional findings passed in the 105th Congress as part of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 and incorporated by reference into the intelligence reform bill. Those findings state among other things that:

Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered

by the Constitution to serve as a check on the executive

branch; in that capacity, it has a ``need to know'' of

allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch,

including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence

Community; . . .

(N)o basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization

of disclosures to the intelligence committees of Congress by

employees of the executive branch of classified information

about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community . . .

I am pleased that the Senate will soon pass this legislation, for the families and friends of those we lost on September 11, 2001, and for the safety and security of our Nation.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the legislation reported by the conference, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/ 11 Commission Act of 2007. I was proud to serve on this very important conference, and while I may not agree with every part of the act, I believe that on balance it is a very important piece of legislation that will serve to make our Nation more secure and help protect Americans of all walks of life. Over 5 years after the tragic events of 9/11 and almost 2 years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we continue to hear from Governors, county executives, mayors, first responders, health professionals, and emergency preparedness officials that our country as a whole remains unprepared for another manmade or natural disaster. We have heard the argument, which I support, that Congress needs to do more to support regional and local efforts to protect Americans. Overall, I believe this conference report takes a critical step forward in making America more secure.

I am going to focus on the titles of this legislation dealing with transportation security, with which I was deeply involved throughout this process as chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, which has jurisdiction over public transportation.

Title XIV of this bill creates a new grant program to improve the security of public transportation and its 14 million daily passengers. Safe and secure transit systems are essential to the well-being of our citizens and the health of our economy. The Banking Committee examined the state of transit security in our very first hearing of the 110th Congress, which was my first hearing as chairman. At that hearing, the committee heard from some very compelling witnesses, including the directors of the London and Madrid transit systems. It is not all that common that we invite witnesses who are not U.S. citizens to come and participate in congressional hearings. But given the tragedies in Madrid and London, we thought it would be worthwhile to have those who manage the transit operations in those two cities come and share with us information about their experiences. I think their testimony was very helpful in demonstrating the importance of this issue and galvanizing the attention of the Congress to address this issue in the legislation before us.

We learned in those hearings that transit attacks have unfortunately been a major component of terrorist activities over the last several decades. It is no secret that worldwide, terrorists have favored public transit as a target. In the decade leading up to 2000, 42 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide targeted rail systems or buses, according to a study done by the Brookings Institution. In 2005 they attacked, as I mentioned, London's rail and bus system, killing 52 riders and injuring almost 700 more in what has been called London's bloodiest peacetime attack. In 2004, they attacked Madrid's metro system, killing 192 people and leaving 1,500 people injured.

Transit is frequently targeted because it is tremendously important to any nation's economy. Securing our transit systems and our transportation networks generally is a difficult challenge under any circumstances. We must do all that we can to meet that challenge. Beyond the obvious implications of physically protecting our citizens, safe transit systems can help to maintain public confidence, encouraging transit use, reducing pollution, and preventing our cities from being mired in gridlock.

The first piece of legislation that the Banking Committee marked up after I became chairman addressed with transit security. That legislation, reported out of the committee as S. 763, was included in the Senate version of the 9/11 bill. I am extremely pleased that it is included in the conference report which the Senate is considering. Similar to the bill that was reported by the Banking Committee, the conference report provides $3.5 billion in grants directly to transit agencies for security equipment, evacuation drills, and worker training--on which several witnesses, particularly from Madrid and London, testified would be the most important investment we could make. Indeed, the conference report requires worker training for all transit systems that receive security grants. The importance of worker training can scarcely be overstated. Transit workers are the first line of defense against an attack and the first to respond in the event of an attack. Mr. O'Toole, the director of London's transit system, said it well: ``You have to invest in your staff and rely on them. You have to invest in technology, but don't rely on it.''

The conference report also authorizes funds for the research and development of security technologies and authorizes

funding for the Information Sharing Analysis Center, ISAC, a valuable tool that provides transit agencies timely information on active threats against their systems. At the Banking Committee hearing we heard testimony from the American Public Transportation Association in strong support of the ISAC, and I am very pleased that the conference report authorizes this important center.

The conference report follows the Banking Committee's bill in allocating grants directly to transit systems on the basis of risk. The legislation makes clear that the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for making these critical decisions and allocating the grants among the Nation's 6,000 public transit agencies. The report does leave open the important decision of which agency, the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Transportation, should actually distribute these grants and audit recipients' compliance with important provisions of transit law, including labor protections. The legislation requires the Secretaries of these 2 Departments to make this decision on the basis of which Department can distribute grants in the most effective and efficient manner. It is my opinion that at this moment, and at least for the next few years, the Department of Transportation is the agency that can best meet these criteria. DOT already has an efficient and effective grant distribution system in place that directly reaches our Nation's transit systems. The Federal Transit Administration is well aware of the various provisions of transit law that the recipients of security grants will be required to comply with and will therefore be able to monitor for compliance effectively. These transit security grants must go out to agencies quickly, as we face an urgent threat. It is my hope that the Secretaries will make a decision based on sound policy to best protect the American public and not with an eye toward jurisdiction or turf.

Over the years we have invested heavily in aviation security. In fact, we have invested about $7.50 per aviation passenger per trip. About 1.8 million people travel using the aviation system daily in this country. Fourteen million people use mass transit systems every workday. We have invested about $380 million in the security of mass transit systems. That is about one penny per passenger per trip.

I am not suggesting, nor do we require, that there be an equilibrium between the security investment in aviation and mass transit systems. I am simply suggesting that the Federal government can and should do more to secure our transit systems. To that end, the conference report provides an authorization of $3.5 billion for transit security. We believe with this additional authorization, and we hope an appropriate appropriation from the responsible committees, that we will be able to provide some additional security for this critically important component of our economy.

Again, I am grateful to the members of the conference committee for their support of this effort. I also want to thank my colleague and ranking member on the Banking Committee, Senator Shelby, who has been a true champion for transit security for many years. This National Transit Systems Security Act of 2007 would never have reached this stage without Senator Shelby's work. This was truly a bipartisan product, and I want to thank Senator Shelby and our colleagues on the Banking Committee, including the former chairmen of the Housing and Transportation Subcommittee, Senators Reed and Allard, who have also made very valuable contributions to this bill over the many years that we have been working to improve transit security.

I also want to make a few comments about other items that are included in this conference report. First, as chairman of the Banking Committee, I recognize the preparedness requirements that the Federal financial regulators have imposed on institutions under their jurisdiction and which those institutions have observed. I am pleased to have worked with my colleagues Senators Lieberman and Collins on title IX to clarify that the private sector preparedness certification is voluntary and should not be construed as a requirement to replace any preparedness, emergency response, or business continuity standards, requirements, or best practices established under any other provision of Federal law, or by any sector-specific agency.

The Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs also exercises jurisdiction over the preparedness of American industry to supply our Government in times of defense and homeland security emergencies. Key to this effort is ensuring that our Nation's critical infrastructure operates uninterrupted and unhindered by natural or manmade disasters. Title X of this bill will enable the Department of Homeland Security to assess our vulnerabilities and hopefully work with other agencies to build up defenses for our critical infrastructure. In one specific provision, we built off of the Banking Committee's work 4 years ago when we reauthorized the Defense Production Act, DPA. In 2003, we emphasized the importance of the DPA's authorities in protecting our critical infrastructure. Today, under the conference agreement, we will require the Homeland Security Department, in coordination with the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Defense, and Energy, to explain how it is implementing these 2003 DPA requirements. With the DPA's authorities expiring in September 2008, this report may prove helpful for our Committee's eventual markup of the reauthorization and modernization of the DPA.

Finally, I want to express my disappointment that the conference report includes an immunity provision that was added to the report despite not being contained in either the Senate bill or the House bill that was sent to conference. I note that this provision was not supported by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over this matter, and I believe it should have been dealt with in a very different manner. While I share the belief that our citizens are the first line of defense against terrorism and that they need to be encouraged to report legitimate suspicious behavior, we need to be very careful whenever we grant blanket immunity and even more careful when we pass legislation granting this immunity retroactively.

To conclude, Mr. President, I am pleased to recommend this conference report to my colleagues, as I believe that it will serve us well in our efforts to make Americans more secure.