A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Mr. President, Senator Nelson of Nebraska and Senator Collins and I have worked for some time to put forward a resolution embracing the very serious, heartfelt sentiments of Senators with regard to the President's plan that he enunciated on January 10.

That plan--and I credit the President for the in-depth study and preparation that went into it, the consultations; I was privileged to be a part of three consultations with the President in that period--it is that plan about which a number of us here in the Senate have some thoughts.

The President, in his statement on January 10, laid down the invitation for Members of Congress to come forward and provide their thoughts. And that is the vein in which the three of us, together with a series of cosponsors, have adopted this first draft, which is identical to the draft we put into the Record some nights ago. We purposely have not changed a comma or a period or any other word in it because a number of colleagues, in a very thoughtful and proper way, have come to us with suggestions and ideas. But at this time, we believe we should lay this down, such that other Senators who might wish to be cosponsors may do so. The Senate works its will each day, and we are always here to consider ideas from other colleagues, but at the present time this is the format. We purposely waited until after the Foreign Relations Committee worked on its resolution, which I understand will soon be working its way to the calendar.

So for that purpose, we put in ours. We find some differences--very significant, in my judgment--between ours and the resolution offered by the distinguished Senator, Mr. Biden, and others--Senator Levin, indeed, Senator Hagel.

We believe we have put a greater emphasis on urging the President to consider other options, given that we have a general disagreement with the very

significant level of troops that are specifically set forth in the President's plan.

We also feel very strongly about the issue of sectarian violence and how that must be the primary mission of the Iraqi forces. The American GI simply should not be, in my judgment--whenever possible, the rules of engagement should provide that the Iraqi forces should deal with the sectarian violence issue. They understand the language. They understand the cultural differences, which precipitate the animosity between the Sunni and the Shia and, indeed, the most distressing aspects of it: the Shia upon Shia and Sunni upon Sunni. We recognize that sectarian violence is undermining, in many ways--the level of it--the efforts of this Government under Prime Minister Maliki to go forward and exercise the full reins of sovereignty and that it is in those interests that sectarian violence has to be dealt with. It is an important mission, but I believe strongly it is a mission that should be given primarily to the Iraqi forces.

We concur with the President, who said many times, including in his statement on January 10, that to allow this Government to fail and to allow the accomplishments toward sovereignty through free elections by the Iraqi people to be lost and this country to simply be plunged into chaotic situations is not in the interests of peace in that region and, indeed, peace in the world.

Our resolution does not provide for a reduction in any way or suggest the level of U.S. forces there now. It does not provide a timetable. It simply urges the President to consider all options and sets forth in there the primary missions as we interpret them to be in the interests of our country. Those primary missions track in large measure the Baker-Hamilton report.

We also stress the need for benchmarks to be spelled out with clarity. And should the operations in Baghdad go forward under the Commander in Chief--and we recognize fully and in no way try to contravene the authority of the President to act under the Constitution as Commander in Chief--should that go forward, it will be done in an incremental fashion, as we have been told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others.

So when the first operation takes place, we should carefully set forth the benchmarks and see if the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi armed forces fulfill those benchmarks; namely, do they all come in the numbers that they were supposed to under that plan? They failed to do that when a similar augmentation for the Baghdad operation was initiated this summer. Will the political structure in Iraq resist, refrain, and in every other way allow the military commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, to carry out the missions as they see fit and employ such tactics as they deem necessary to achieve those missions without being called by the Government and told: Stop this, withdraw here, or do not take that prisoner, but if you have him, then release him. We cannot go in under that guise.

Thirdly and most importantly, we have to see how the Iraqis perform. Will they take the point? Will they take the lead? And in such tactics, will they then be the primary--the primary--if not the essential force that deals with sectarian violence, such that the rules of engagement spell out: Whenever necessary, the coalition forces and namely the United States shall not be utilized.

At this time, I would invite my colleagues to express their views, and I will ask each to name those cosponsors whom we have gotten from each side of the aisle.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I certainly will not object. I wonder if I might have 2 minutes following Senator Collins to summarize before we receive the distinguished Senator from Colorado for his remarks. I ask unanimous consent that the unanimous consent agreement be modified so I can have about 2 minutes.

Would the Senator yield?

Did not the CENTCOM commander, who is still the CENTCOM commander, General Abizaid, testify before our committee and, in the precise words, said he felt that at this time added troops were not necessary, more troops would lessen the incentive of the Iraqis to pick up the burdens which we are trying to have them assume under sovereignty?

I thank my colleagues, the Senator from Nebraska and Senator Collins. It is important that we have taken this initiative because a number of colleagues--10 now--wish to be recognized. But believe me, there are 10 more and 10 more who will soon come forward, hopefully, and support this resolution. I also want to stress, as both of my colleagues did, I hope as this debate progresses, it will not be a question of who is the most patriotic, who is the strongest supporter of the American troops. I pride myself with having had a relationship with the Armed Forces of the United States, modest though it may be, since late 1944-1945. I had the privilege of working and learning. I often feel the Armed Forces did far more for me than I have done for them. In my years, now 29 years, here in the Senate on the Armed Services Committee, I have done everything I could to repay the Armed Forces for what they did for this humble person, to provide for them in a way that meets the sincerity of their commitments and that of their families.

So it is not a question of who is the most patriotic or a question of who is trying to be confrontational with the President. These are heartfelt, closely held views we have about one of the most serious episodes in contemporary American history. I think the President has shown a measure of courage in this matter. But as has been acknowledged, we have made mistakes. And what we have tried to do is conscientiously say how we feel about the immediate future.

I asked for a change in strategy, I guess it was October, when I came back and said the situation, as I saw it, in Iraq was going sideways. That has been done. This is a change in strategy. I acknowledge that. We were invited by the President to make suggestions. We have done that in a courteous, respectful manner. I thank my colleagues.

I stress also the need for bipartisanship. I am not certain anyone can predict how this debate will go and what the outcome will be or how many resolutions come forward. I think it should be a healthy, strong debate and one in which the American public, which is

very much attuned to this situation and has strong views of its own-- and we should respect those views--I hope that what debate and actions follow, whatever they may be by this Chamber on such final resolutions that may be voted on, earn the respect and the trust and the confidence not only of the Armed Forces but of the American public. Because we can only be successful in this operation to save the Government of Iraq, whether it is this one or a successor one, to save the people of Iraq so they can exercise sovereignty if there is strong public support and a strong and accurate bipartisan level of participation by the Congress of the United States. To have a vote all on one side and a vote all on the other side will not help this very situation at this time.

So one of the main goals--and we have achieved it--is bipartisanship, truly.

I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor. And I wish to, in so yielding, thank the distinguished Senator from Colorado for joining us in this matter.

Mr. President, I wish to thank our colleague from Colorado and pick up on the theme that he closed and talked on earlier--unity.

Yes, there is great unity among the American people and a depth of concern about the loss of our forces and the wounding and suffering of the families. We have not lost our resolve. Our President has been firm. But this institution, the great Congress of the United States, a coequal branch of the Government, now must rise and show our commitment to fulfill the wishes and hopes and prayers of the American people, and do so in a bipartisan manner. That is the very heart of the effort of our 10 colleagues who thus far have come forward and put their names into the public domain as supporting the provisions of this resolution.

They do resemble, in many respects, the provisions in the Biden- Levin-Hagel resolution. When that first came out, so much of the rhetoric surrounding that resolution was disturbing to many people. That gave rise to the efforts that we have put forth, culminating in placing this document into the Record tonight.

I hope others will consider joining us because it is important to show unity and bipartisanship in the Congress in saying that we, in fact, understand the hopes, wishes, and prayers of the American people and the Armed Forces of the United States.

I thank my colleague and yield the floor.

Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to express my support for the nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, for appointment to the grade of General and assignment as Commander, Multinational Force--Iraq.

General Petraeus is presently serving as Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army's leader development, professional military education, doctrine development, and lessons learned center. This is the place where the Army focuses its attention and its greatest professional capabilities on developing leaders, on military education, on developing doctrine, and on learning the lessons from previous conflicts and challenges. As a matter of fact, the Army and Marine Corps' newly issued counterinsurgency manual was written under the command and guidance of General Petraeus at Leavenworth.

General Petraeus had two previous tours of duty in Iraq. The first was in 2003 when he was Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, which was headquartered in Mosul, Iraq. General Petraeus' second tour in Iraq was from May 2004 to September 2005, when he was Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command--Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission--Iraq. In that capacity, he was responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of Iraqi security forces.

General Petraeus' nomination to become the Commander of Multinational Forces--Iraq may be the single most important command in the Nation's defense establishment. The Nation will entrust him with the operational command and the welfare of over 130,000 American service members who are presently in Iraq, and of those who may be deployed to Baghdad as part of the President's planned increase in the middle of a protracted and bloody sectarian battle over the future of Iraq.

General Petraeus is professionally qualified for this command. He is widely recognized for the depth and breadth of his education, training, and operational experience. Noteworthy is his recent leadership of the new Army/Marine Corps manual. He testified that he believes the new military strategy for Iraq will work, and that the U.S. military forces under his command will be able to successfully accomplish their mission. We would not want a commander who did not believe in his mission and in the troops under his command. I pray he is correct.

I am obviously very concerned over a strategy that relies on the Iraqis meeting their commitments when they have repeatedly failed to do so in the past. I am obviously concerned about a strategy which is based on an increased military presence, when expert after expert, including military commander after military commander, has told us there is no military solution in Iraq; that the only way to end the violence in Iraq is for the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.

I am deeply concerned that this new strategy, I believe, is based on the wrong assumption--that there is a military solution to a sectarian war--when in fact the only solution to a sectarian conflict is for those groups to finally share power, share resources, including resolving the differences over autonomy that can end the violence. That is not just me saying that; that is also what the Iraqi President has said repeatedly--that it is the Iraqi political leaders' failure to reach a political settlement that is the cause of the continuing violence.

That being the case, I don't believe--and I don't think a majority of this body believes--that an increase in troops going into the middle of the neighborhoods of Baghdad and staying there--``holding,'' as we say--is going to contribute to a successful conclusion of our presence in Iraq. It is not going to help the Iraqis succeed, to put our troops in their neighborhoods in the middle of the sectarian strife. We are going to add targets without adding to the essential need of the Iraqis to face a reality--to stare at their options, to look into an abyss-- civil war or one nation? That has to be their choice. We cannot make it for them. We can make it easier or harder for them to do it.

The question is whether adding troops into that sectarian cauldron is going to contribute to their reaching a political solution or indeed will delay the day, as some of our commanders have said, when they will reach a political settlement. As a matter of fact, General Casey, the current commander, emphasized this point on January 2:

The longer we in the U.S. continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to make the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias.

General Abizaid said the following:

It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do the work.

Then he said this:

I believe that more American forces prevents the Iraqis

from doing more, from taking responsibility for their own

future.

That is what General Abizaid said in November.

So those are the expressions of our top military commanders who are there now. I believe they are right. But we need a commander in Iraq. General Casey is retiring. The question is not whether we agree with a particular strategy--and we will have an opportunity, hopefully next week, to vote on whether we agree with the increase of the American military presence as a way of pressuring the Iraqis or taking the heat off of their political leaders to reach a political solution. We will debate that issue.

But we need a commander. We have a qualified commander who has been nominated. There are other issues General Petraeus is going to have to face. General Keane, yesterday, pointed this out. We had a hearing in front of the Armed Services Committee yesterday. General Keane was there, along with former Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Ross. General Keane pointed out yesterday that we have a significant problem which is going to face General Petraeus in Baghdad other than the violence, other than inserting American forces into neighborhoods and trying to hold them with American forces, with an American face, with an American uniform. That is a big enough problem. But the command arrangements are such that U.S. and Iraqi forces are going to be operating side by side in those neighborhoods under two separate chains of

command, violating the unity of command principle that is so ingrained in U.S. military doctrine and, indeed, is one of the key principles in that counterinsurgency manual which General Petraeus helped to create. He must have unity at the command. They must agree down there on those streets: Yes or no, are we going into that house or not?

Now, who goes into that house is a critically important issue. Many of us don't believe it ought to be an American tip of the spear; that the Iraqi forces have been trained, 150,000 or more, to protect their country, and they should be the tip of the spear. That is one issue. There is a great dispute over that issue.

That goes to the heart of the matter as to whether more American troops are going to help solve this problem. But it complicates the problem, it exacerbates the problem when you have two commanders on the ground side by side who have two different chains of command who may have two different opinions as to who ought to go into that house or whether that house ought to be entered. That has not been resolved. That is what General Petraeus is also going to have to face.

General Keane, who is former Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, just yesterday expressed his strong concern about the command arrangements but said he was confident that General Petraeus had the ability to revise the arrangements so that there could be a unity of command. I hope he is right.

It may be a superhuman task. It may be an impossible task. It is not a task which ought to face a commander. These issues ought to be worked out in advance of forces entering into combat situations. But they are not worked out. So General Petraeus has to figure that out as well as the major issues that he is going to face.

Mr. President, did I yield myself a particular amount of time?

I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. President, during his testimony at his confirmation hearing, General Petraeus volunteered to provide honest, straightforward reports to the Congress on a regular basis in recognition of Congress's oversight responsibilities. We are counting on him doing so. He may even report to us over a TV network, but he made a commitment. He volunteered a commitment. This was not something we had to press him to do.

He said: I am going to regularly report to Congress on whether this new strategy is working and whether these so-called benchmarks which the Iraqis have allegedly agreed to, representing their commitments-- when will they produce troops; will those troops, in fact, be subject to political pressure; will the Iraqis come through with the commitments relative to the financing of reconstruction? He is going to report to us on all the commitments which the Iraqis have made, all the benchmarks which are supposed to be met. I take him at his word. He is an honorable man, and that is an important representation, again, made at his initiative.

I believe General Petraeus is highly qualified for his promotion to the grade of general and his assignment as our senior officer in Iraq at a very critical and dangerous time. That position needs to be filled. General Casey is retiring. I will vote for his nomination, and I urge our colleagues to do the same.

I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Alabama will yield for one moment.

Mr. President, I want to correct the record when I said General Casey was retiring. General Casey is being transferred to a different position and not retiring. I correct the record on that point. We still need General Petraeus to fill that position because of the shift in and the transfer of General Casey, but it is not a retirement.

I thank my friend from Alabama for yielding so I could correct the record.

Mr. President, unless there is someone else who wants to speak, I have already spoken. I would ask, is the vote scheduled?

I note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, let me first say I am pleased and honored to be here with Senator Warner and Senator Collins and Senator Nelson. It was about a year or so ago that Senator Levin and Senator Warner led a CODEL of Senators into Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the great fortune of traveling with both Senator Warner and Senator Levin on that CODEL. I learned a tremendous amount from them in terms of what it is they had seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the observations they made about where we were on the levels of violence in Iraq. I came away from that CODEL with them feeling as if they truly had the best interests of America at heart. As they have sponsored these resolutions today, what they are acting out here is in the best fashion of what a Senator should do, and that is trying to do the best for our country.

Let me say, first of all, with respect to the resolution that was heard earlier today in the Foreign Relations Committee, sponsored by Senator Levin and Senator Biden and Senator Hagel, I very much appreciate their leadership and thinking and the passion they brought to the debate and to this issue.

When I sat down and compared the resolution considered in the Foreign Relations Committee to the resolution that is now being introduced by Senator Warner and other colleagues, I thought there were a great number of similarities between the two resolutions.

Let me just comment about my own involvement and give part of my rationale for becoming an original sponsor of this resolution. First and foremost, I think what this country needs today more than anything else is a sense of unity. I think we have had a great deal of divisiveness in this country over the last 6 years. I think in the long run, when one looks 10, 20, 30, 40 years down the road at these very difficult times that are very challenging to our country--very challenging to our men and women in uniform and the other men and women of America--we will be judged as to whether we in this Congress were able to unify a direction in Iraq that ultimately was a successful direction in Iraq.

I have called for a new direction in Iraq because I believe we need that to get us to success there. I don't believe we can get to success in Iraq if we have a divided country in terms of how we move forward.

With respect to the resolution that is before us, in my own conversations with the President and with members of his administration in the past, I have told them that, in my view, with all due respect to our Commander in Chief, we need to move forward in a new direction.

When I returned from Iraq and Afghanistan with the Levin-Warner codel, one of the things I told the President we needed to do was to enhance our diplomatic efforts in the region; that the countries in the area have as much, if not more, at stake than the United States. I saw them doing very little.

Today, I see Saudi Arabia, with all its wealth, doing very little to help in the reconstruction of Iraq. The same thing could be said about Kuwait and many of the neighboring countries. That effort has to be enhanced because they simply, in my judgment, are not doing their part to contribute to a successful outcome in that region.

I have also spoken to the President and members of his administration about the importance of the effort of reconstruction and making sure that there are other countries besides the United States putting their shoulder to the wheel on the reconstruction efforts that are underway in Iraq.

The way I see this debate unfolding is that we essentially have the plan of the President, which I call plan A. His plan is that we do a lot of what we have been doing but, in addition, that we move forward and add an additional 21,500 troops to the war effort in Iraq. That would be what I call plan A. There is another plan out there, plan B, from some Members of Congress and others that say we ought to bring our troops home and bring our troops home right away; that we ought to engage in an immediate withdrawal from Iraq and from that region. My own view of that plan, plan B, is that is not a good plan either. At the end of the day, no matter what criticisms we make about the original decision to invade Iraq, about the way the war has been mishandled, the fact is we are in Iraq today; there is a mess in Iraq and in the Middle East. So the question for me becomes: How do we as the United States of America, working in the Senate, working in the House of Representatives, working with the President, how do we put Humpty-Dumpty together again? It seems to me that Humpty-Dumpty has fallen off the wall, and it is up to us to try to figure out, in some united way, under difficult circumstances, how to move forward together to create the unity that will allow us to succeed in Iraq.

When I look at the possibility of plan B, which is a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, it seems to me that will create tremendous dangers not only to the Middle East but to the long-term interests of the United States. I, for one, want us very much to succeed in Iraq and, because I want to succeed, I want to see whether we can create a kind of unity on how we move forward.

I think this resolution introduced by the senior Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Nebraska, and the Senator from Maine is a good direction for us to go in. I want to point out what I consider to be four central points of this resolution which, in my view, are also reflected in the Biden-Levin-Hagel resolution. The first of those points is that there is a disagreement with the President's decision to move forward with a surge of 21,500 more troops. I think both resolutions say that equally and clearly. Why, in this resolution, is that conclusion reached? Why was it reached in the other resolution heard in the Foreign Relations Committee?

In my view, it is because of what our military commanders have said. General Abizaid said it a few weeks ago, in November. He said an increase in troops was not the way to go because it sends the wrong signal about the ultimate responsibility to quell the sectarian violence in Iraq. It is not the right way to go because when you look at what happened with the surges we have had over the last 6, 7 months in Iraq, they themselves did not work. When operations going forward started in June, there was a sense that it might quell some of the sectarian violence going on. It didn't work. We came back in August and did another operation going forward. It did not work.

The Iraq bipartisan study commission, chaired by former Secretary Baker and Lee Hamilton, found, in fact, that those surges created an escalation of violence by 43 percent during that time period. In a matter of 6 months we saw a 43-percent escalation of violence there. Regarding putting more troops in, it seems we have the laboratory of experience where it hasn't worked in the past, and there is nothing I have seen that indicates that moving forward in that direction will work at this time. I agree with the resolution and making a statement that we disagree with the President's decision moving forward in that regard.

As to the second part of this resolution, also reflected in the alternative resolution in the Foreign Relations Committee, I think there is unanimity of opinion. I bet you that we can get 100 Senators to vote for the position that the Iraqi Government needs to assume responsibility for a functioning government that will provide security

to the Iraqi nation and to the people of Iraq.

When Senator Warner and I visited Iraq with Senator Levin, I still remember meeting with the Iraqi Ministers and with our own forces responsible for helping with the training of the Iraqi police. Mr. President, 2006 was supposed to be the year of the police in Iraq. This is the year where the Iraqi security was supposed to be taken to the point where they could move forward and assume the responsibility for their own security. Yet that handoff hasn't occurred and the sectarian violence has continued to increase.

I very much agree with the spirit of both resolutions that says if we are going to move forward and be successful on this issue, it is the Iraqi Government and people who need to move forward and assume responsibility for their security.

The third thing in this resolution that I think is important is that we contemplate that there is going to be some continuing involvement of the United States in Iraq, without limitation. Nobody knows for how long. But our efforts to engage in counterterrorism in that area will be a continuing and important role of the United States of America. Our efforts to attempt to restore the territorial integrity of Iraq and to stop the weapons flowing into Iraq from Iran and Syria are important measures that I believe the U.S. military can address. I agree with those aspects of the resolution as well.

Finally, as I said earlier in my comments, at the end of the day, this is not a United States of America problem alone. When one looks at the Gulf States and other countries in that area, such as Egypt, there is a huge problem that belongs to them as well. We have our hands on the tar baby as the United States of America. They, too, as countries have a huge stake in the success of Iraq and also have to get their hands on the tar baby. I believe the resolution put forward by Senator Levin and my other colleagues is a step in the right direction in that it creates a framework for how we ought to be moving forward in Iraq.

In conclusion, again, I say how much I respect the senior Senator from Virginia. I remember well the work that we did just a year or so ago in the so-called Gang of 14. I see that Senator Nelson and Senator Collins and Senator Warner are back again trying to pull the Members of this body together on what is a very contentious issue. I wish them well, and I am delighted to be part of the effort.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I do not in any way want to interrupt the proceeding, but I wonder if I might be recognized, following the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, to address the nomination.

Mr. President, I compliment my distinguished colleague for his remarks. I am proud to follow and likewise indicate my unqualified support for General Petraeus, to wish him well, and I hope he succeeds. We had a thorough hearing in the Armed Services Committee. I wish to compliment our new chairman, Senator Levin, and the ranking member, Senator McCain, for the speed and efficiency with which they managed to get this nomination before the Senate for confirmation.

We have also pending resolutions to address the situation in Iraq, most specifically our new strategy. I simply say to our leadership, I hope we can address those resolutions at the earliest possible date because our forces are engaged in combat as we speak here this morning, and we certainly do not wish to have debate any way construed as less than full support for what they are endeavoring to achieve. We wish them well, and their beloved families here at home, in these perilous days.

I have concurred steadily, steadfastly in the President's decision-- and it is an absolutely correct position. We cannot let Iraq fail, fail in the sense to lose the sovereignty they have gained through hard- earned elections and the opportunity for this Nation to emerge as a constructive partner toward world peace. Therefore, we must press on. But I think it is incumbent upon the Congress to provide its views. The President specifically asked, if there were suggestions, forward them, speak them, and I and others, in a matter of clear conscience, have done just that. We shall see what evolves from the resolutions now pending and possibly other suggestions that could be brought forth by colleagues in the days to come in the Senate. I do once again urge that we address it as expeditiously as the joint leadership can determine.

Yesterday, the Armed Services Committee had a hearing. We had the distinguished former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry; Ambassador Ross, who is a renowned expert on that region of the world, the Middle East; and the former Vice Chief of the U.S. Army, now retired, General Keane. It was excellent testimony. I wish to pick up on one thing General Keane addressed.

I go back to the President's remarks when he spoke to the Nation on January 10. He said:

Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The

Iraq government will appoint a military commander and two

deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government

will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across

Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully

deployed,

there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades

committed to the effort, along with local police. These Iraqi

forces will operate from local police stations--conducting

patrols and setting up checkpoints and going door-to-door to

gain the trust of the Baghdad residents.

This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our

commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will

change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their

campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to

the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American

force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional

American troops to Iraq. The vast majority--five

brigades--will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will

work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their

formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission:

to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help

them protect the local population, and to help ensure that

the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the

security that Baghdad needs.

I say most respectfully, this poses a command structure, a dual one, of Iraqi commanders and U.S. commanders, which is unique. Traditionally, American forces operating in military campaigns have a unified command. There is the commander, and it goes right on down to the lieutenant, the head of the patrols, and the platoons. I think this will require further definition, further study.

I bring to the attention of our distinguished nominee, General Petraeus, the testimony of General Keane yesterday where, in the course of a colloquy with me and I think Senator Levin and Senator McCain-- and, indeed, I remember the Senator from Rhode Island--we were quite concerned about how this unique command and control would work. General Keane concluded his testimony, in response to a question I posed, by urging General Petraeus early on to devote some attention to this question of how this sort of joint command and control is going to operate.

On the battlefield, decisions must be made in a matter of seconds, from the platoon level often right up the chain of command. We cannot have finger-pointing. We cannot have a mission where the Iraqi lieutenant says we should go left, the American embedded officer or whatever command America has in that situation says go right, and the mission not achieve its goal and then the finger-pointing as to which officer was correct and who was right and who was wrong. We cannot have that in this situation. It is going to be an extremely complex mission.

Yes, I have put forward, along with other colleagues, recommendations of how possibly this operation could be conducted with few American forces, and specifically our resolution says the rules of engagement of the forces--that is standard military technology--should have some specificity, hopefully saying: Wherever possible, the Iraqis will bear the brunt of the sectarian violence. I am very concerned about the American GI being thrust in the middle of the violence that really has root causes that go back 1,000 years to the divisions of thought between Iraqis as to whether they are Sunnis or Shias. It seems to me that Iraqi forces who have the language capability, who understand the cultural differences, are far better qualified than the American GI to do this.

Also, we have another document which was put out which explains the operations. It lists the President's priorities. It clearly says Iraqis will be in the lead and on the point. This is a White House document issued here in the last few days:

The President's New Strategy is Rooted in Six Fundamental

Elements: Let the Iraqis take the lead.

That has to be well defined and well understood. I commend the President for putting the emphasis on having the Iraqis do that.

So I hope we can go about our debate in an orderly way at the earliest possible time. I urge Members to be cautious as we proceed. The feelings on this are quite intense, as they should be, because this is one of the most pivotal, one of the most important decisions I have seen come before this body in my now 29th year in the Senate. I hope we conduct it with sincerity and dignity and huge respect among colleagues with regard to our differences. I speak for myself and I think those other nine individuals who worked with me--Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Susan Collins--this is a truly bipartisan effort.

Whatever we conclude here in the Senate, it is my fervent hope that it reflects a feeling of bipartisanship because therein is how best we can help the American public understand this complex situation, to give their public support. They are strongly behind the troops now. We want to get them to have a better understanding and a greater confidence in this new revised strategy going forward. This can best be achieved at the highest level of bipartisanship we can obtain here on these serious issues.

I see the distinguished chairman here. I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my two colleagues on the Senate floor this evening in submitting a very important resolution on what is perhaps the greatest challenge facing our country.

Let me first say it has been an honor and a privilege to work with the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as my friend and colleague from Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson. We have worked very hard on this resolution, spending many hours wordsmithing the language of it, trying to get exactly the kind of serious policy statement we could bring before our colleagues in the Senate.

I am very pleased that on the Republican side, we are joined by two leaders on this issue, Senator Coleman and Senator Smith. They, too, have had input to the resolution. That brings the number of us who are joining tonight as original sponsors of our resolution to 10 Members of the Senate. I would also note that based on conversations I have had with our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, there are several more Senators who are very interested in our resolution and may well join in cosponsoring it at a later date or certainly in voting for it.

Yesterday the Senate Armed Services Committee held a very useful hearing on the nomination of an outstanding military officer, General Petraeus, whom the President has tapped to lead our forces in Iraq. Earlier today the Senate Armed Services Committee, I believe by unanimous vote, voted to report this vital nomination to the full Senate. General Petraeus is the ideal person to be taking over as commander of our troops in Iraq. If anyone can make what I believe to be a flawed strategy a success, it is he. But I had a very interesting exchange with General Petraeus. I talked to him about my concern that inserting more American troops into Iraq may well lessen the pressure on Iraqi leaders to take the long overdue steps that are needed to quell the sectarian violence.

I know the President believes the answer is more American troops, that that will provide the Prime Minister and other leaders with the space they need to take the reforms forward. I fear it is just the opposite. I believe it lessens the pressure on the Iraqi leaders.

I am happy to yield.

The distinguished Senator from Virginia is exactly correct. That is indeed the testimony that was brought before our committee a month ago. This was not ancient history. It was very reasoned testimony and it could not have been clearer testimony. Indeed, similar testimony was given by General Casey.

I asked General Petraeus if he felt we would be facing the widespread and deteriorating sectarian violence that threatens the entire country, but particularly the Baghdad region, if Iraqi leaders had amended their Constitution, had passed an oil revenue law that more equitably distributed oil proceeds among the groups in Iraq, if they had held provincial elections, if they had more fully integrated the Sunni minority into the Government power structures; would we be in the same place today? And he told me he did not believe we would be. I think that is significant, because I believe if Iraqi leaders had taken those steps, we would not be facing the widespread sectarian violence that has engulfed the Baghdad region.

I also talked to General Petraeus about a fascinating article he wrote a year ago in which he outlined 14 observations that he had, based on his previous tours in Iraq. The first and most important observation in this article in ``Military Review'' that General Petraeus had was to quote Lawrence of Arabia back in 1917, to say that it was a mistake for us to do too much, whoever the foreign force is, and that you had to let the Iraqis take the lead on these issues. Well, those words, true in 1917, are just as true today, as General Petraeus himself observed in this article.

The second observation in the same article, General Petraeus said an army like ours in a land like Iraq has a half life as liberators, that they are quickly seen as an army of occupiers. I believe that is what has happened in Iraq and that confirms what my own observations were during a trip a month ago to that land. Our delegation met with a British commander in Basra who described to us a declining consent line. He said at first when the British arrived in Basra, they were greeted as liberators. But as time has gone by, their presence is more and more resented and less and less tolerated.

The observations General Petraeus had in this article offer us good guidance and, indeed, reflect in many ways the concepts we have worked hard to include in this resolution.

There is one final point I want to make this evening. Some have said if we pass this resolution, we show that America is somehow divided and not supportive of our troops. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is every Member of this body is united in support of our troops. Every Member of this body wishes General Petraeus all the best and hopes he will succeed in this very difficult mission. But the fact is, Americans are deeply divided over the strategy we should pursue in Iraq. It is part of the health of our American democracy that we debate these issues, and we do so because we care about the brave men and women in uniform who are representing us in Iraq, who are on the front lines, who are sacrificing so much. That is exactly the motivation for the resolution that the 10 of us are introducing tonight.

Let me close my remarks by again saying it has been a wonderful experience to work so closely with the senior Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Ben Nelson. Both of them have worked so hard. They care so much about this issue. It has been a great pleasure to join with them.

I thank the Chair.